A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games

Fox, Jeremy T.; Lazzati, Natalia

doi:https://doi.org/10.3982/QE489

dc.contributor.author	Fox, Jeremy T. Lazzati, Natalia
dc.date.accessioned	2017-12-19T15:24:08Z
dc.date.available	2017-12-19T15:24:08Z
dc.date.issued	2017
dc.identifier.citation	Fox, Jeremy T. and Lazzati, Natalia. "A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games." Quantitative Economics, 8, no. 3 (2017) Wiley: 1021-1036. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE489.
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1911/98892
dc.description.abstract	We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically equivalent when we restrict attention to the class of potential games and impose a specific equilibrium selection mechanism in the data generating process. We provide new identification results for the two related models.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Wiley
dc.rights	Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0.
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.title	A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games
dc.type	Journal article
dc.citation.journalTitle	Quantitative Economics
dc.subject.keyword	discrete choice demand binary games identification bundles complements substitutes entry games potential games
dc.citation.volumeNumber	8
dc.citation.issueNumber	3
dc.identifier.digital	Fox_et_al-2017-Quantitative_Economics
dc.type.dcmi	Text
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.3982/QE489
dc.type.publication	publisher version
dc.citation.firstpage	1021
dc.citation.lastpage	1036