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dc.contributor.authorAlkabani, Yousra
Coleman, Todd
Kiyavash, Negar
Koushanfar, Farinaz
dc.date.accessioned 2017-08-02T22:03:08Z
dc.date.available 2017-08-02T22:03:08Z
dc.date.issued 2010-03-02
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/96385
dc.description.abstract This paper presents the design and implementation of spyware communication circuits built into the widely used Carrier Sense Multiple Access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. The spyware components are embedded within the sequential and combinational communication circuit structure during synthesis, rendering the distinction or dissociation of the spyware from the original circuit impossible. We take advantage of the timing channel resulting from transmission of packets to implement a new practical coding scheme that covertly transfers the spied data. Our codes are robust against the CSMA/CA’s random retransmission time for collision avoidance and in fact take advantage of it to disguise the covert communication. The data snooping may be sporadically triggered, either externally or internally. The occasional trigger and the real-time traffic’s variability make the spyware timing covert channel detection a challenge. The spyware is implemented and tested on a widely used open-source wireless CSMA/CA radio platform. We identify the following performance metrics and evaluate them on our architecture: 1) efficiency of implementation of the encoder; 2) robustness of the communication scheme to heterogeneous CSMA/CA effects; and 3) difficulty of covert channel detection. We evaluate criterion 1) completely theoretically. Criterion 2) is evaluated by simulating a wireless CSMA/CA architecture and testing the robustness of the decoder in different heterogeneous wireless conditions. Criterion 3) is confirmed experimentally using the state-of-the-art covert timing channel detection methods.
dc.format.extent 22 pp
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights You are granted permission for the noncommercial reproduction, distribution, display, and performance of this technical report in any format, but this permission is only for a period of forty-five (45) days from the most recent time that you verified that this technical report is still available from the Computer Science Department of Rice University under terms that include this permission. All other rights are reserved by the author(s).
dc.title A Timing Channel Spyware Robust to MAC Random Back-off
dc.type Technical report
dc.date.note March 2, 2010
dc.identifier.digital TR10-04
dc.type.dcmi Text
dc.identifier.citation Alkabani, Yousra, Coleman, Todd, Kiyavash, Negar, et al.. "A Timing Channel Spyware Robust to MAC Random Back-off." (2010) https://hdl.handle.net/1911/96385.


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