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dc.contributor.authorBehrman, Jere R.
Parker, Susan W.
Todd, Petra E.
Wolpin, Kenneth I.
dc.date.accessioned 2017-06-05T19:27:05Z
dc.date.available 2017-06-05T19:27:05Z
dc.date.issued 2015
dc.identifier.citation Behrman, Jere R., Parker, Susan W., Todd, Petra E., et al.. "Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools." Journal of Political Economy, 123, no. 2 (2015) University of Chicago Press: 325-364. https://doi.org/10.1086/675910.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/94787
dc.description.abstract This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentive schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment 1 provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment 2 to teachers only, and treatment 3 gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers, and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment 3, smaller impacts for treatment 1, and no impact for treatment 2.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher University of Chicago Press
dc.rights Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
dc.title Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools
dc.type Journal article
dc.citation.journalTitle Journal of Political Economy
dc.citation.volumeNumber 123
dc.citation.issueNumber 2
dc.type.dcmi Text
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1086/675910
dc.type.publication publisher version
dc.citation.firstpage 325
dc.citation.lastpage 364


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