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dc.contributor.advisor Robinson, John Alan
dc.creatorAdams, Anne Donchin
dc.date.accessioned 2016-04-22T21:59:00Z
dc.date.available 2016-04-22T21:59:00Z
dc.date.issued 1965
dc.identifier.citation Adams, Anne Donchin. "Analyticity and logical truth." (1965) Master’s Thesis, Rice University. https://hdl.handle.net/1911/89913.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/89913
dc.description.abstract The concept of analyticity is not one concept but many. Consequently if a distinction is to be made between statements which are claimed to be analytic and statements which are synthetic, how the distinction is to be made becomes a question of crucial importance. In the essay I review critically several representative formulations of the distinction that has traditionally been made between two kinds of truth: the Aristotelian distinction between essence and accident; Leibniz' effort to separate truths of reason from truths of fact; Hume's classification of relations; and the explicit formulation of Kant who originated the terminology "analytic-synthetic." Each sought to distinguish truths of experience from truths which can be known on logical grounds. But each understood logic differently and each formulated the distinction within the context of his own epistemology. It was Frege who first completed and systematized modern logical theory and distinguished between analytic and synthetic propositions within a formal language system where the distinction could be made apart from epistemological considerations. Since Frege, there have been many efforts to express the distinction precisely, both within formal language, and in natural language as well. Tarski's formulation of the semantic concept of truth explicates the distinction for all first order uninterpreted languages but there has been no comparably successful explication for interpreted language. In lieu of such a characterization some philosophers have sought to extend the defined condept of truth for formal language to natural language. However, though the concept of logical truth explicates one aspect of the notion of analyticity, it does not clarify the concept for natural language where additional factors must be considered. If traditional formulations of analyticity do represent efforts to clarify an intuitive notion, then perhaps attempts to characterize statements of natural language apart from epistemological and psychological considerations are misdirected. The concluding Chapter focuses on two of the numerous contemporary attempts to explicate a concept of analyticity: the characterization of analytic statements as "definitional rules" developed by Rudolph Carnap and the effort to understand analyticity as "empirical generalization." Though these two approaches are not fully representative of current studies, they do presuppose very different assumptions about the behavior of natural language, and suggest divergent solutions to the problem. I argue that Carnap's formulation involves serious ambiguities and distorts common linguistic usage; the analytic statements of natural language are dependent upon context and cannot be distinguished apart from the interpreter of the language.
dc.format.extent 104 pp
dc.language.iso eng
dc.title Analyticity and logical truth
dc.identifier.digital RICE0948
dc.type.genre Thesis
dc.type.material Text
thesis.degree.department Philosophy
thesis.degree.discipline Humanities
thesis.degree.grantor Rice University
thesis.degree.level Masters
thesis.degree.name Master of Arts
dc.format.digitalOrigin reformatted digital
dc.identifier.callno Thesis Phil. 1965 Adams


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