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dc.contributor.authorStoll, Richard J.
McAndrew, William
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-23T20:38:51Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-23T20:38:51Z
dc.date.issued 1986-06
dc.identifier.citation Stoll, Richard J. and McAndrew, William. "Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-1979 : Modeling the Bargaining Process." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30, no. 2 (1986) Sage: 315-326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002786030002005.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/72234
dc.description.abstract Using data collected by Jensen (1984), we investigate whether cooperative and inverse reciprocity can successfully predict U.S. and Soviet actions during the 23 rounds of strategic arms negotiation during the 1969-1979 period. Each type of reciprocity gives rise to three models of bargaining behavior, which we implement as computer routines. In our analysis, we find that the cooperative reciprocity models fit more often than inverse reciprocity models
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Sage
dc.rights This is an author's peer-reviewed final manuscript, as accepted by the publisher. The published article is copyrighted by Sage.
dc.title Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-1979 : Modeling the Bargaining Process
dc.type Journal article
dc.citation.journalTitle Journal of Conflict Resolution
dc.citation.volumeNumber 30
dc.citation.issueNumber 2
dc.embargo.terms none
dc.type.dcmi Text
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002786030002005
dc.type.publication post-print
dc.citation.firstpage 315
dc.citation.lastpage 326


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