|dc.contributor.author||Boylan, Richard T.
Boylan, Richard T.. "The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining." Journal of Law and Economics, 55, no. 3 (2012) The University of Chicago Press: 565-591. https://hdl.handle.net/1911/71216.
This study examines whether criminal suspects facing more severe punishments
are more likely to go to trial. Sample selection makes it difficult to obtain valid
proxies for severity; for instance, I expect severity to be positively related to the
prosecutorﾒs decision to indict, to indict in federal court (versus state court),
and to try the suspect. Theoretical and empirical findings indicate that in samples
containing only indicted, convicted, or tried suspects, reasonable proxies for
severity may be negatively related to actual severity. The assignment of defendants
to judges randomizes the severity of punishment in a manner that is
unrelated to sample selection. Thus, by examining the effect of these assignments,
I find that a 10-month increase in prison sentences raises trial rates by
1 percentage point.
The University of Chicago Press
The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining
Journal of Law and Economics