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dc.contributor.authorBoylan, Richard T.
dc.date.accessioned 2013-05-16T18:29:48Z
dc.date.available 2013-05-16T18:29:48Z
dc.date.issued 2012-08
dc.identifier.citation Boylan, Richard T.. "The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining." Journal of Law and Economics, 55, no. 3 (2012) The University of Chicago Press: 565-591. https://hdl.handle.net/1911/71216.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/71216
dc.description.abstract This study examines whether criminal suspects facing more severe punishments are more likely to go to trial. Sample selection makes it difficult to obtain valid proxies for severity; for instance, I expect severity to be positively related to the prosecutorメs decision to indict, to indict in federal court (versus state court), and to try the suspect. Theoretical and empirical findings indicate that in samples containing only indicted, convicted, or tried suspects, reasonable proxies for severity may be negatively related to actual severity. The assignment of defendants to judges randomizes the severity of punishment in a manner that is unrelated to sample selection. Thus, by examining the effect of these assignments, I find that a 10-month increase in prison sentences raises trial rates by 1 percentage point.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher The University of Chicago Press
dc.relation.urihttp://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/663588
dc.rights Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
dc.title The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining
dc.type Journal article
dc.citation.journalTitle Journal of Law and Economics
dc.citation.volumeNumber 55
dc.citation.issueNumber 3
dc.embargo.terms none
dc.type.dcmi Text
dc.type.publication publisher version
dc.citation.firstpage 565
dc.citation.lastpage 591


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