Stone, Randall W.
Fang, Songying and Stone, Randall W.. "International Organizations as Policy Advisors." International Organization, 66, (2012) The IO Foundation: 537-569. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000276.
How can international organizations persuade governments to adopt policy
recommendations that are based on private information when their interests conflict?
We develop a game-theoretic model of persuasion that applies regardless of
regime type and does not rely on the existence of domestic constituency constraints+
In the model, an international organization ~IO! and a domestic expert have private
information about a crisis, but their preferences diverge from those of the government,
which must choose whether to delegate decision making to the expert+ Persuasion
can take place if the international institution is able to send a credible signal+ We
find that this can take place only if the preferences of the IO and the domestic expert
diverge and the institution holds the more moderate policy position+ This result contrasts
with conventional wisdom, which holds that the necessary condition for IOs to
exert influence is support from a domestic constituency with aligned preferences. Our
model suggests that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized
domestic politics may be a necessary condition for IOs to exert effective influence.
The IO Foundation
International Organizations as Policy Advisors