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dc.contributor.advisor Jones, Mark P.
dc.creatorMicozzi, Juan Pablo
dc.date.accessioned 2011-07-25T01:39:30Z
dc.date.available 2011-07-25T01:39:30Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/61922
dc.description.abstract Legislators who do not expect to be permanently reelected are not necessarily non-ambitious politicians. Whenever current legislators have different office goals in mind, it is likely that they try to use their available resources to further those aims. Thus, it can be expected that they bias the content of the bills they draft towards their prospective constituents. Through the analysis of 180,000 bills and an original database of candidacies in Argentina, I demonstrate that legislators who have subnational executive ambitions tend to submit more municipality-based legislation. This finding is substantive for the literature on electoral systems, political careers and representation in federal regimes; as well as the keystone towards the creation of a general theory of legislative performance in multilevel systems.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.subjectLatin American history
Political science
dc.title The electoral connection in multi-level systems with non-static ambition: Linking political careers and legislative performance in Argentina
dc.type.genre Thesis
dc.type.material Text
thesis.degree.department History
thesis.degree.discipline Humanities
thesis.degree.grantor Rice University
thesis.degree.level Doctoral
thesis.degree.name Doctor of Philosophy
dc.identifier.citation Micozzi, Juan Pablo. "The electoral connection in multi-level systems with non-static ambition: Linking political careers and legislative performance in Argentina." (2009) Diss., Rice University. https://hdl.handle.net/1911/61922.


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