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dc.contributor.advisor Brody, Baruch
dc.creatorParker, Joseph Clinton
dc.date.accessioned 2009-06-04T08:35:14Z
dc.date.available 2009-06-04T08:35:14Z
dc.date.issued 2003
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1911/18558
dc.description.abstract In this project, I argue that moral complicity is best conceptualized as conduct that expressively aligns one with another agent's wrongdoing. Expressive alignment occurs as a result of one agent expressing a positive desire, attitude, or belief toward another agent's (a primary agent's) wrongdoing. I use William Alston's account of illocutionary acts to elucidate the notion of complicit expression. I go on to argue that causal facilitation can also function as a form of positive expression toward a primary agent's wrongdoing. I then compare and contrast the expressivist account with accounts of complicity put forth by Sanford Kadish, Judith Kissell, and Christopher Kutz. I then argue that the wrongness of complicit conduct stems from the fact that it expresses antipathy and disregard for the moral law. Finally, I use the expressivist account to analyze three different cases of purported complicity: stem cell research, referrals for physician-assisted suicide, and the bombing of Dresden.
dc.format.extent 183 p.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.title Moral complicity: An expressivist account
dc.type.genre Thesis
dc.type.material Text
thesis.degree.department Philosophy
thesis.degree.discipline Humanities
thesis.degree.grantor Rice University
thesis.degree.level Doctoral
thesis.degree.name Doctor of Philosophy


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