

## Spenser's Inhumanity

“He wrote of knights and ladies, wild creatures imagined by the aristocratic poets of the twelfth century...but he fastened them with allegorical nails to a big barn-door of common-sense, of merely practical virtue.”<sup>1</sup>

W.B. Yeats

Nowhere is the human more distinct than in its inhumanity. So it seems for Edmund Spenser, a poet for whom inhumanity is a defining paradox. On the one hand, the invocation of Spenserian inhumanity most often appears with reference to uniquely human forms of brutality, especially those associated with the Tudor occupation of Ireland. Perhaps tellingly, just where an entry on “inhumanity” or the “inhuman” might appear alphabetically in the *Spenser Encyclopedia*, one encounters, instead, “Ireland, the cultural context.” Moreover, no entry for “the human” exists, though there is an entry on “Humanism,” which makes brief reference to Pico’s *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, which it describes, rather optimistically, as an endorsement of an idea of man as “the central glory of divine creation.”<sup>2</sup> Yet if inhumanity also refers to a world that is neither entirely nor even primarily human, then inhumanity might come in many and more salubrious forms. *The Shepheardes Calendar* bristles with the interdependent creatures of pastoral, from doleful shepherds to naked trees to needy sheep. *The Complaints* include three beast poems, *Virgil’s Gnat*, *Muipotmos*, and *Prosopopoeia: Or, Mother Hubbard’s Tale*, which feature insects, apes, and foxes. The *Amoretti* showcases vipers, cuckoos, angels, and fawns, amongst other creatures. *The Faerie Queene* may set itself the task of generating images of the ideal ethical form of life for the human, but it does so by trafficking quite extensively in and relying heavily upon nonhuman figures for definition. In addition to the array of often-recalcitrant life forms and unusually active (even vocal) objects and materials in

Spenser's corpus, literary devices especially associated with allegory, such as personification and *prosopopoeia*, render humanity through conspicuously inhuman systems of figuration even as such devices offer the appearance of rendering all that falls outside of the charmed circle of the human through conspicuously human systems of figuration.

When describing Spenser, and as quoted in the epigraph above, W.B. Yeats enumerates his core concerns as the lives of "knights and ladies" as well as of "wild creatures," all of which are, "fastened with allegorical nails to a big barn-door of common-sense, of merely practical virtue." Allegory, brutality, and creatures (including but not restricted to the human) come to the fore in a consideration of Spenser's corpus which is also a consideration of Spenser's inhumanity. Jean-Francois Lyotard describes two varieties of the inhuman, one that might "break up the more or less presumed unity of a (human) subject" and one which is the result of "the inhumanity of the system which currently being consolidated under the name of development," by which term Lyotard refers to a kind acceleration and increasing dominion over time resulting from the realignments of late capitalism and that "must not be confused" with the former sense of the inhuman.<sup>3</sup> One variety of inhumanity displaces the human; the other degrades or destroys it. Spenser's corpus offers up its own entangled varieties of inhumanity, each with its own governing paradox. The first concerns an interest in the wide range of creatures and things endowed with life, an interest compatible with recent approaches to animals and ecology in Renaissance studies (and beyond). Thus to consider Spenser's inhumanity might be to dislodge the centrality and supremacy of the human and in so doing consider a wider range of creatures, materials, and environments. Yet references to a variety of creatures, materialities, and objects may be deployed to compromise the humanity of particular humans and therefore justify their brutalization. Thus while displacement of "the human" might topple a series of privileges over

other life forms, the degradation of particular classes or groups of humans enables violent and systematic marginalization. This first paradox of inhumanity I refer to as the paradox of the animal while also noting the limitations of herding all forms of inhumanity into the confines of the term animal.<sup>4</sup> This paradox is very much with us in the era of the Anthropocene as the claims of marginalized and often dehumanized human populations can seem at odds with calls to action on behalf of the human “species” or to a “human collectivity” as Dipesh Chakrabarty puts it, with responsibilities to other creatures and to large scale environmental and planetary concerns.<sup>5</sup>

The second and related paradox concerns the relationship between systematicity and the human, which I refer to as the paradox of allegory. One vision of allegory as a system of meaning suggests a kind of dehumanizing violence of application. Yeats refers to the “allegorical nails” used to “fasten” humans and nonhumans alike to the “barn-door of common sense.” Angus Fletcher refers to the way allegory “treats real people in a formulaic way” while displaying a decided “lack of common humanity.”<sup>6</sup> Moreover, Fletcher’s conception of allegory as daemonic personification imagines a human possessed or seized by “some foreign force” that reduces the human to a singular function or quality.<sup>7</sup> Gordon Teskey understands allegory as the capture or seizure of matter by form. Such visions of allegory suggest the violent denaturing of the human even when in the service of the apparent representation of the human or of human morality. Yet allegory can also be understood a system by which a series of capacities—agency, speech, will, vitality, affect, and cognition—are distributed to a range of creatures, objects, and landscapes including but not limited to the human. Allegory would then be a system for the incitement and distribution of life, one in which the entanglement of literary form, life form, and form of life is especially apparent. To elucidate Spenser’s constitutive inhumanity, this essay turns first to the paradox of the animal, and the figure of Gryll, critical attention to which

elucidates the tension between the desire to witness the dehumanization (or bestialization) of the human and the desire to see in Spenser's great compendium of creaturely life a world not limited to human prerogatives. I then turn to the paradox of allegory and to animals and allegorical figurations in the Legend of Justice to consider the tension between allegory's violent disfiguring of the human and allegory's capacity to distribute life beyond the parameters of the human.

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What were animals to Edmund Spenser? Just ask Gryll.

At the conclusion of perhaps the most iconic episode of *The Faerie Queene*, Guyon's infamous destruction of the Bower of Bliss, not only are the allurements of the bower razed with "rigour pittilesse" (2.12.83) but also its inhabitants, formerly subject to unbidden Circean transformations, find themselves suddenly liberated.<sup>8</sup> No longer "figures hideous / According to their minds like monstrous," (2.12.85), these victims of their own intemperance and of Acrasia's lust, are, by the agency of the Palmer's "vertuous staffe" rendered human: "And streight of beastes they comely men became" (2.12.86). Comely but "vnmanly," qualities worth later consideration, these erstwhile animals respond with a combination of shame and rage. Of course not all are pleased. Thus as rendered in some of the most iconic lines from that episode, one of Acrasia's lovers regrets his transformation from hog back to human and becomes, thus, the object of the Palmer's disdain:

The donghill kinde

Delights in filth and foule incontinence:

Let Grill be Grill, and haue his hoggish mind

2.12.87

Spenser's Gryll enjoys quite a pedigree, drawn from a conversation Plutarch imagined between Odysseus and a former companion who, on the island of Circe, refuses to return from human form. Plutarch's dialogue "Beasts are Rational" informs both Giovanni Battista Gelli's dialogue *Circe*, which considers the relative merits and capacities of human and animal life as ventriloquized by a series of animals who were once human and who, given the chance to return to human form, refuse; and the closing moments of the Legend of Temperance.

In addition to long being an object of conversation in Spenser studies, Gryllus also made his mark in 2013, in two monographs cresting a wave of recent work on the nature of human-animal relations in the Renaissance: Laurie Shannon's already influential *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales*, which examines an inclusive and "fundamentally political idiom" used to "characterize the state of relationship thought to hold among the world's creatures,"<sup>9</sup> and Karen Raber's *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture*, which considers the relationship between humans and animals with respect to notions of shared embodiment.<sup>10</sup> Both discuss the figure of Gryllus with respect to a conversation about the comparative felicities of human and animal life. For both, Gelli's text contests a human exceptionalist point of view that locates the greatest share of that felicity with the privileges of the rational human. Shannon, more particularly, finds in Gelli's *Circe* an instance of "the happy beast tradition's arraignment of man as an insufficient animal."<sup>11</sup> In the process, Shannon makes glancing reference to what she considers Spenser's rather "limited" interest in Gryllus in the Legend of Temperance:

Edmund Spenser's engagement with Plutarch's swine is even more limited in the sense that *The Faerie Queene's* "Grill" serves within the confine of human moral allegory to symbolize self-indulgence and bestial preoccupations (the 'hoggish mind') in book 2's consideration of lust and temperance. The animal testimonies of Plutarch and Gelli, by contrast, offer thought experiments in dialogism that enable them not only to voice an estranging account of (animal) happiness but also to lodge a keen critique of man as the most calamitous of animals.<sup>12</sup>

In a footnote Shannon continues to note that "Plutarch's Gryllus, by ironic contrast [to Spenser's Grill], articulates the standard of temperance book two is concerned to establish as human."<sup>13</sup>

One might pause over such an optimistic account of the value of animal ventriloquism in Renaissance texts. But what emerges in her attention to Spenser's Grill offers one explanation for a particular phenomenon noticeable in the last decade or so of scholarship, which we might summarize in a single word to which we will return. That word is allegory.

But to begin with the phenomenon: in spite of a fairly robust bull market for considerations of the animal or, more broadly the non-human, in Renaissance studies, scholarship thus far seems only occasionally interested in Edmund Spenser, while, simultaneously, Spenser studies has taken relatively little time to linger over conversations about animality or nonhumanity, though the exceptions, to which I will refer later in this essay, are both notable and growing. Certainly, a familiar Shakespeare effect plays a role in this phenomenon. As I argue elsewhere, not only is Shakespeare that figure on whom most critical approaches are tested but the legacy of his exceptional status haunts the emergence of patterns of

thought in animal studies and ecocriticism alike.<sup>14</sup> But I would suggest that more than just the vagaries and vicissitudes of critical proclivity explain why one of the great compendia of life forms and forms of life in the Renaissance, *The Faerie Queene*, has been much less likely, than, say, *King Lear* to draw attention even though no animals appear in *King Lear*.<sup>15</sup> One might, indeed, ask similar questions about other authors and other works—John Donne’s *Metempsychosis* certainly comes to mind.<sup>16</sup>

Shannon’s diagnosis of Grill suggests one reason for this critical disconnect. Grill, it seems, is never more than a “human moral allegory” designed to “symbolize self-indulgence and bestial preoccupation.” We might extrapolate from this understandable reading of the episode and ask if there is not something in *the operations of allegory*—both in the writing and reading of allegory—that makes impossible something more like the “animal testimonies” of interest to Shannon, moments that testify to animal existence that exceeds metaphor. In *The Open* Giorgio Agamben influentially formulates the boundary between human and animal life with reference to an “anthropological machine,” which is “a machine or device for production the recognition of the human.”<sup>17</sup> Is allegory an anthropological machine into which life forms are fed but out of which only figurations of the human emerge? Are the mechanisms of personation and personification common to allegory ones that afford other-than-human points of view? This is not to suggest that the mechanisms of allegorical reading or writing are, necessarily, dehumanizing or that, if they were, that this would necessarily be akin to forms of violent dehumanization elsewhere represented in Spenser’s poetry. Indeed, such a view would need to be sustained by a fairly simple understanding of who dwells within the privileged provinces of the human, provinces which are themselves not immune to differentiation and variegation.

Rather, might a Spenserian focus on allegory open up ways of thinking about personation and about the non- or in- or un- humanity the figure of the human can obscure?

Dehumanization organizes another strand of responses to Spenser's Grill and thus reveals a second reason for the divergence of Spenser studies and animal studies. Andrew Hadfield's *Edmund Spenser's Irish Experience: Wilde Fruit and Salvage Soyl* considers both Guyon's destruction of the Bower of Bliss and the Palmer's subsequent disdain for the hoggish Grill as part of a larger "fear of uncontrollable chaos" that characterizes attitudes to the wild and savage Ireland of both English imagination and Tudor policy. Thus the Grill episode "recalls New English criticisms of Old English 'degeneration' into Irishness."<sup>18</sup> Such destructive retribution Stephen Greenblatt famously diagnosed some years earlier in *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, connecting the moralistic eradication of the Bower of Bliss to anxieties about the new world.<sup>19</sup> Although one might question the ease of this association between either Guyon's "rigour pitiless" or the Palmer's disdain and the ethical point of view of the poem, the spectacular nature of this destruction suggests a complex relationship between incivility, savagery, and the human addressed by Tiffany Jo Werth, Katarzyna Lecky, and Tullia Giersberg in this issue.

If the sometimes-obscure workings of allegory raise questions about non-human legibility, so too do *the regimes of dehumanization* that render the animal merely the negative mirror in which to view the human, either because the bestial symbolizes human depravity or, even in seemingly, though not actually, generous moments, the animal appears as that which, though animal, is not quite as depraved as abominably behaved humans. Dehumanization through animalization thus obliterates the nonhuman so as to make possible gestures of greater discrimination with respect who exists within the charmed circle of the human. As Cary Wolfe has argued recently of a phenomenon quite familiar to readers of Spenser, "dehumanization by



means of the discursive mechanization of ‘animalization’ will be readily available for deployment against *whatever* body happens to fall outside the ethnocentric ‘we.’”<sup>20</sup> Thus bestialized humans (sometimes figured as animals, sometimes as monsters, sometimes even as insects) appear frequently not only as figurations of the Irish but also as figurations of gender, racial, and religious difference. Is it possible to see, beneath this dense weave of compromised humans anything other than the human?

At least a decade of scholarship has introduced scholars of Renaissance literature and culture not merely to what some think of as the question of the animal but, also, to the limitations of the term animal for referring to a range of modalities of life (and, more recently, the unliving). And yet the rubric of the animal is certainly a place to begin, if for no other reason than to assess transformations in critical language. Before the animal, however, life and nature dominate the reception of Spenser’s works generally and, more particularly, *The Faerie Queene*. Perhaps it should be no surprise that these terms would emerge given quite early interest in Spenser’s visual acuity, which was frequently conflated, as I have argued elsewhere, with liveliness.<sup>21</sup> Robert Salter marvels that “a right learned and virtuous gentleman hath so lively deciphered in his legend of the Patron of True Holiness, the Knight of the Red Cross.”<sup>22</sup> Sir Kenelm Digby describes a “Spenser, who is seated above the reach of my weak eyes as, [such that] the more I look to discern and descry his perfections, the more faint and dazzled they grow through the distance and the splendor of the object.”<sup>23</sup> Joseph Warton was one particularly who, in *An Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope*, identified Spenser with the unfettered and sublime powers of creation, noting that “Here all is in life and motion; here we behold the true Poet or Maker; this is creation.”<sup>24</sup> C.S. Lewis’s posthumous volume *Spenser’s Images of Life* (1967) would later look to *The Faerie Queene* to find a “verbalization of Pageant” and an “iconographical art” that

“was not so much a comment on life so much as a continual statement of it,” life being also, for Lewis, a way of understanding “Spenser’s Nature” and thus the truth of the created universe.<sup>25</sup>

Donald Cheney’s classic study *Spenser’s Images of Nature* (1966), considered the intertwining operations of allegory and pastoral, aiming to describe a “concept of Nature as the world external to the poet and the poet’s art, as the sense of reality which the poem is trying to illuminate.”<sup>26</sup>

Studies of Spenser’s “nature” persist, and indeed it might be fair to say Spenser has more regularly appeared in works attentive to Renaissance ecology.

No book-length studies of Spenser’s animals seem to exist, but although Spenser studies seems to lack the late Victorian fascination with natural history that characterizes Shakespeare studies, sustained concentration on animals as repositories of metaphor emerged at least half a century ago. Madeleine Pelner Cosman noted decades ago in “Spenser’s Ark of Animals” that “Animals abound in Spenser’s *Faery Queen*. Virtually each character is linked with an animal—is chased by, battles with, is transformed into, or is compared to some member of the animal kingdom.”<sup>27</sup> Cosman distinguishes her approach to “animal imagery” from the study of allegorical figures like the Blatant Beast. “The numerical preponderance of animal analogy over any other type of imagery in the *Faery Queen*,” she argues, “is striking,” more particularly so since “animal analogies are Spenser’s repetitive and intensifying devices.” The sheer “numerical preponderance” Cosman indexes in a series of charts detailing the frequency, length of image, and animal family of images in each of the books of *The Faerie Queene*. Soon after Arthur Marotti published a response, which, though it credits Cosman with publishing “the first general discussion of its kind” argues that Spenser’s “animal symbolism” requires reference to “the proper materials. Science and pseudo-science, Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance literature, mythology, iconography, Scripture, and Scriptural commentary provide the diverse yet mutually

informing traditions by which *The Faerie Queene* expands its meanings through animal figures and images.”<sup>28</sup> Expanded archive nonetheless, Marotti, like Cosman, treats the animal as a symbol of the human, an “animal mirror,” to use Donna Haraway’s powerful formulation. “People like to look at animals,” she argues, “even to learn from them about human beings and human society . . . We polish an animal mirror to look at ourselves.”<sup>29</sup> Similarly, Judith Dundas’s *The Spider and the Bee: The Artistry of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene* considers bees and spiders, webs and hives not as creatures, per se, but as beings who provide creaturely metaphors for Spenser’s understanding of the poet’s practice.

The struggle to look at the animal and not find an animal mirror begins in a more concerted manner with a trio of essays by Joseph Loewenstein, Elizabeth Harvey, and Elizabeth Bellamy, first delivered as a panel on “Animal Being” at the International Spenser Society conference in Toronto (2005) and later published in a special issue of *Spenser Studies* (2007). These essays offer portraits of Spenser as an artist with varying degrees of access and interest to animality. Essays by Harvey and Loewenstein, treat Spenser’s Gryll, though they seem to receive no mention in the broader conversations about early modern animalities. Harvey argues that Spenser’s *Visions of the worlds vanitie* and *Mother Hubbard’s Tale* “trouble the border between human and animal” in a way that Donne and others (Montaigne, especially) would more profoundly accomplish. She deems Guyon’s “confrontation with Grill . . . the most dramatic encounter of the animal-human interface.”<sup>30</sup> Whereas Spenser “calls into question for the skeptical reader the philosophical nature of the distinction between species,” his use of prosopopeia does not upset how “the trope functions anthropomorphically, performing the same rhetorical subordination that social structures do in their relegation of animals to a philosophical category that does not permit a genuine looking or talking back.”<sup>31</sup>

Loewenstein's thoughtful "Gryll's Hoggish Mind" offers a powerful answer to the question of what Spenser's interest animals might be. Spenser, he argues, "seems to have virtually no affective engagement with fauna...they're no more than an imaginative convenience for him, like trees or pagans."<sup>32</sup> Affective interest or "engagement" marks the distance between Spenser and animals and his lack of a "faunal imagination," at least for creatures larger than insects.<sup>33</sup> "The explanation," Loewenstein suggests, might have something to do with a repression of the brutal conversion of pastoral to arable agriculture in Ireland, but satisfactory explanation lies beyond the aims of this essay." In spite of Spenser's disinterest, Loewenstein describes a Renaissance interest in both animal intelligence and "fellow feeling" between humans and animals in a series of writers embedded in "the history of philosophical skepticism" (Plutarch, Montaigne, and Gassendi) yet that eluded Spenser and, certainly, some of his exemplary knights.<sup>34</sup> Thus Gryll need not be evidence of the limitations of human-centered allegory but of early modernity's "skeptical animals," whose skepticism responds to the desperation to distinguish man from beast typical of Guyon or the Palmer.<sup>35</sup>

Elizabeth Bellamy's "Spenser's Open," places Spenser in "a genealogy of Western culture's ongoing discourse, from Aristotle to Descartes to Heidegger, on the question of the animal as a bearer of absolute alterity."<sup>36</sup> She considers how Spenser's gnats indicate that "our access to animality—more particularly to insect-being—is less mediated than we might think."<sup>37</sup> Although *Virgils Gnat* and *Muiopotmos* work within the tradition of the beast fable, for which the animal is not only an animal mirror but also an ventriloquist's dummy, the gnats that assail Redcrosse knight expose an utterly independent insect worlds that exist "in a parallel universe to human experience."<sup>38</sup> In *The Faerie Queene*, then, "Spenser brings his readers closer than [Thomas] Moffet to the gnats of the British isles...gnat-similes invite us to imagine these insects

as neither epic poetic nor antiquarian embellishments but as products of Spenser's own local, naturalist observations in England and in Ireland's fens of Allan."<sup>39</sup>

The question, then, of Spenser's "animals," raised here refreshingly from the point of view of insects, as opposed to the four-legged beasts of most work in animal studies, concerns how naturalistic we consider *The Faerie Queene* given that even early natural history does not necessarily, Bellamy argues, attend to the specificity of animal being. Indeed, Sean Henry's recent probing analysis of Spenserian crocodiles establishes that very often early modern natural history works hand in hand with political and moral allegory.<sup>40</sup> And yet the contention of Chris Barrett's striking recent study of the dragon's corpse in the Legend of Holiness is that "Even discourses that militate against allegorization are invited into the poem, along with their resistance to the 'dark conceit' or 'other speaking' narrative allegory demands." Opposed to the tendencies of allegory are "the protocols of natural philosophical investigations of the late sixteenth century, particularly as pertains to practices of observation, measurement, and collaborative interpretation of natural phenomena."<sup>41</sup> Bellamy, Henry, and Barrett seem to endorse Brian Ogilvie's *The Science of Describing*, which argues that, contrary to previous accounts that have "overemphasized the theoretical and philosophical elements in natural history, particularly taxonomy and classification," throughout the Renaissance "the task of natural history" became the "describing nature, cataloguing its marvels and mundane products."<sup>42</sup> More powerfully, the practice of description in Ogilvie's powerful account becomes a good in itself, as if some variety of more accurate naturalism provides the ideal antidote to animal symbolism and this still-emergent ideal of observational acuity provides privileged access to animal being.

And yet this also means that, motivated by the understandable desire to seek some greater sense of "animal being" or animal presence in early modern literary works, we abandon

understandable skepticism about narratives of the steady march of scientific progress, a march leading to ever more accurate approaches to life forms like animals. Indeed, Shannon has argued that early modernity witnesses a “larger-scale renegotiation of status in which animals are transformed from subjects of law to objects of science.”<sup>43</sup> Thus whereas once animals might be represented as participants (and even victors) in legal trials, gradually they become subject to vivisection and experimentation for the sake of the production of knowledge. Thus the desire to demystify, to see through the cloudy enwrappings of allegory that seem to deny the reality or being of animals, might carry with it varieties of structural violence.

Take the gloriously diminutive gnat, which Loewenstein identifies with respect to “Spenser’s especially warm participation in a fashionable taste for the intricately lapidary and minute,” yet which Bellamy suggests offers a glimpse of animal being.<sup>44</sup> Her view of the blissfully “local, naturalist observations in England and in Ireland’s fens of Allan” might be tempered when we consider how burdened with dehumanization are swarms of insects that are, especially in the Legend of Justice, signatures of non-compliant subjects: peasants, women, and the Irish, particularly. “The vulgar” are seen to “flocke” around the Egalitarian Giant “like foolish flies about an hony crocke,” (5.2.33). Later this “lawlesse multitude” is “like a swarme of flyes” (5.2.52, 53). Radigund’s Amazonian army is “like a sort of Bees in clusters swarmed,” (5.4.36). The peasants who harass Sir Bourbon are “as a swarme / Of flyes” (5.11.58) and are later described as a “baser crew” and “the raskall manie” (5.11.59). Bellamy’s point, drawn from Jacob von Uexhüll, that insects live “a parallel universe to human experience” even within the same space, is well taken, yet the way to bridge this distinct milieu might require the tools of the imagination as much as those of observation.<sup>45</sup> For, indeed, the effort to elude the privileges

afforded humanity may thus be in conflict with an attempt to redress the dehumanization of particular humans, just as exclusive focus on dehumanization makes animals recede from view.

There is no doubt we understand differently the relationship between Renaissance texts and the many forms of creaturely life because of recent interest in a range of early modern discourses, from humoralism to natural history and beyond. It was, as Loewenstein points out, “a period of burgeoning empirical correctness and augmentation of the natural historical record.”<sup>46</sup> Yet it is worth being cautious about participating in the fantasy of some direct or unimpeded contact with “animal being” through scientific observation, as Bellamy imagines. Scholars posit other ideals for literary representations of human-animal relations. Shannon describes a “zoographic” writing tradition that would reveal greater intimacy with animals in early modernity.<sup>47</sup> Harvey invokes the idea of a “genuine looking back” as antidote to the one-sided nature of prosopopeia.<sup>48</sup> Loewenstein, like Shannon, seeks authors who, unlike Spenser, articulate a greater sense of “fellow feeling” with other creatures.<sup>49</sup> It is no simple task to create some rapprochement between the equally ethical impulses to account for non-human life and to account for the injustice of Spenser’s Ireland. At moments, the task seems quite simple. Arthegall, for instance, is trained up in the ways of justice by Astraea who:

caused him to make experience

Vpon wyld beasts, which she in woods did find,

With wrongfull powre oppressing others of their kind.

5.1.7

Later the narrator returns to the specter of animal injustice at the opening of the ninth canto of the Legend of Justice:

What Tygre, or what other saluage wight  
Is so exceeding furious and fell,  
As wrong, when it hath arm'd it selfe with might?  
Not fit mongst men, that doe with reason mell,  
But mongst wyld beasts and saluage woods to dwell;  
Where still the stronger doth the weake deuoure,  
And they that most in boldnesse doe excell,  
Are dredded most, and feared for their powre:  
Fit for *Adicia*, there to build her wicked bowre.

#### 5.9.1

Wildness, savagery, and animality are all associated with unreason and with the figure *Adicia*, who is not a personification and yet whose name refers to injustice and who is yet another of the temptresses of *The Faerie Queene* equipped with a bower in need of annihilation. Twice, then, Spenser associates the savage, natural world as one characterized by oppression: the weak suffer at the hands of the bold and powerful. In that book of *The Faerie Queene* dedicated to the liberation of *Belgae* and *Irenas*, Belgium and Ireland, it takes very little effort to connect the vicissitudes of justice with *A Veue of the Present State of Ireland*, which opens with the remark that a country possessed of as “commodious a soyle” as Ireland has been treated with no better “course” for “the touning thereof to good uses, and reducing that salvage nation to better



government and civility.”<sup>50</sup> A great deal of scholarship has treated the ambition to “reduce” a “salvage nation” to “civility.”<sup>51</sup> Here I would simply add that the description of the animal world of the Legend of Justice creates a direct parallel with Ireland. Savage injustice, in each realm, must be quelled through virtuous (and violent) efforts. Dehumanization of the Irish depends directly on bestialization. Thus it would seem that to consider more complexly and ethically the Irish might alter the perception that the purported “savagery” of nature should elicit corrective response. And yet, the temptation of recent work on animals has been to locate a *more* ethical position either in the animal world itself, as when the readers of Plutarch and Gelli endorse the counter-arguments of the animals who resist Odysseus’s desire to turn them back into humans because animals it turns out are more perfect than humans, or in a greater proximity between humans and animals, whether in Shannon’s zootopian constitution, or Loewenstein’s ideal of “fellow feeling,” Bellamy’s idea of witnessing “animal being,” or Harvey’s ideal of reciprocity. To put it more simply, the creaturely world beyond the human seem likely to be equally indifferent to justice and other human institutions regardless of whether those creatures are held up as exemplars of justice or savagery. Moreover, we might notice that even more distant from the realms of justice than animals or the Irish would be women—at least, women of a certain variety. *Adicia* lives:

farre from resort of men,

Where righteous *Artegall* her late exyled;

There let her euer keepe her damned den,

Where none may be with her lewd parts defyled,

Nor none but beasts may be of her despoyled:

## 5.9.2

Here, the sexually inappropriate female personification of injustice keeps a “damned” den and “her lewd parts” make even the savage and unjust animals her victims. Our ethical touchstones leave us with as many questions as do our literary touchstones. The paradox of the animal raises questions about literary devices and representation and already intimates the paradox of allegory.

What, then, are animals to allegory? In the course of the overview of scholarship above, a number of literary and rhetorical devices have emerged: dialogue, animal testimony, beast fable, epic simile, personification, prosopopoeia, and, more generally, allegory. We have tended to understand allegory as some amalgam of extended metaphor, doublespeak, pun, and riddle. For Michael Murrin it is a form of “veiled communication” meant to exclude the masses and empower the elite.<sup>52</sup> Maureen Quilligan describes the “generation of narrative structure out of wordplay”<sup>53</sup> while Gordon Teskey focuses our attention on “a ritualized form of information processing” rife with “hermeneutic anxiety” and “interpretive play.”<sup>54</sup> Angus Fletcher’s classic definition of allegory as a “protean device,” a “radical linguistic procedure” characterized by “daemoniac personification” points us back to prosopopoeia and personification, or the creation of persons as the signature power of allegorical systems.<sup>55</sup> Since Paul DeMan, it has been hard to see prosopopoeia as anything other than a species of anthropomorphism, as characteristics, often human, are thrust upon an animal or object.<sup>56</sup> Harvey argues, with respect to Spenser’s *Prosopopoeia, or Mother Hubbard’s Tale* and *Virgil’s Gnat*, “the trope functions anthropomorphically performing the same rhetorical subordination that social structures do in their relegation of animals to a philosophical category that does not permit a genuine looking or talking back.”<sup>57</sup> Perhaps the problem is the notion that a literary text provides “a genuine looking

or talking back,” which is itself a gesture of personification extending to other creatures not only the capacity but also the desire to look or talk back in a manner humans would acknowledge.

The resources of allegory, including prosopopoeia and personification, might offer more useful ways of thinking beyond this literary and ethical dead end. T.V.F. Brogan, A.W. Halsall, and J.S. Sycherz define prosopopoeia as, “The speech of an imaginary person. A term still used for personification—the attribution of human qualities to animals or inanimate object—to which it is closely allied.”<sup>58</sup> Carolyn van Dyke argues that “in *prosopopoeia* as the theoreticians defined it, the speaker substitutes a fictitious person for an absent or nonhuman referent that could have been named more directly; the astute listener reverses the substitution and recovers the original meaning. In literature, on the other hand, personifications are not substitutions but compounds. The personification is equally a person and a thing or idea, and it evokes, simultaneously or successively, various kinds of reality outside the text: ordinary people, historical figures, human institutions, components of the psyche, transcendent ideas.”<sup>59</sup> Elizabeth Fowler defines personification as “a device that brings to life, in a human figure, something abstract, collective, inanimate, dead, nonreasoning, or epitomizing” and also claims that “personification should be seen as a device for distributing agency, emotion, cognition, gender, and the like.”<sup>60</sup>

A series of ideas drawn from these various definitions seems particularly useful for future thought on what is and is not human in and beyond Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene*. First, allegory reveals that prior to other attributions (speech, reason, affect, pain, etc.) creatures receive through representation is the fundamental attribution of life or vitality to what otherwise would be inanimate or unreasoning. That is to say, before distinctions between human and nonhuman, there is a more fundamental *distinction between life and non-life*. This has been a subject of some interest, of late, in a variety of fields.<sup>61</sup> One wonders not only what resources Spenser

provides but also what bearing literary devices that operate through animation might tell us about how various eras understood the complex intertwining of life (a basic principle of vitality with material, social, and political implications), life forms (various instances of creaturely life), forms of life (the ethical shapes life take, such as the idea of the virtuous knight or upright citizen), and literary form. Allegory is that form constituted by a complex network of devices that display quite dramatically the web of interdependency that connects life, life forms, forms of life, and aesthetic form.

Second, the notion of a compound, or what van Dyke later calls “compound agency,” might prove more useful language than either hybridity or indistinction to describe what it is to imagine human or other life forms. As van Dyke points out, “human referents in *The Faerie Queene* are compounded not just with historical figures and with concepts that might be construed as psychological, but also with animals and elements of physical nature.”<sup>62</sup> All figures in an allegorical landscape might be thought of as parts of larger compounds or, to borrow a term from Bruno Latour, assemblages.<sup>63</sup> Such compounds lead more or less naturally to a third point. Fowler describes personification as “a device for distributing agency, emotion, cognition, gender, and the like.” This notion of distribution or a network is central to reconceiving of the landscape of allegory. Neither personification nor allegory need be imagined as merely devices for distributing humanity. In fact, while a single instance of personification or prosopopoeia might seem especially anthropomorphic, extended networks suggest instead a world in which agency, cognition, and affect are not human qualities distributed to other creatures or objects but, rather, forces that exist external to individual instances of life in a shared universe in which humans participate and to whom shares of agency, cognition, and affect are distributed, often in compound structures.

To close, we might examine just one of the many moments where allegorical systems, especially through the device of personification, reveal the compounds and networks through which life, agency, cognition, and affect find themselves distributed. The figure of *Guile*, first called *Malengin*, presents an array of creaturely signatures. He is described thus:

For he so crafty was to forge and face,  
So light of hand, and nymble of his pace,  
So smooth of tongue, and subtile in his tale,  
That could deceiue one looking in his face;  
Therefore by name *Malengin* they him call,  
Well knowen by his feates, and famous ouer all.

#### 5.9.5

Although evil, his renown (“well knowen by his feates and famous ouer all”) sounds almost knightly. His deceptive nature endows him with the name *Malengin*, which may refer to ill intentions or to evil devices. A.C. Hamilton thus describes his “iron hook” as a distillation of such devices. In seizing the damsel who describes him he is like a bird catcher. Later, facing off against Arthegall and Talus, he shifts shape from goat to fox to hedgehog to snake. What is this creature? As *Malengin* his form of life is as villain: he is the duplicitous counterpart of the virtuous knight. As *Guile* he personifies that duplicity. He is an “evil engine” with an iron hook, suggesting some kind of tool being defines this figure. Similarly, he captures the damsel “Like as the fouler on his guilefull pype / Charmes to the birds.” The description invokes pipes and nets, which are his tools, but also a series of “slights and iugling feates” and “legierdemayne,” which

evoke deceptive performances that might be practiced by humans in politics or war or by animal surviving in the brutal savage world of *The Faerie Queene* (5.9.13). His metamorphoses, not unlike those of Proteus in the Legend of Chastity, suggest a world in which a series of capacities are distributed and might be occupied by human and animal alike. *Guile* presents a kind of contradiction. It is perhaps no wonder that although Arthegall chases him, Malengin is caught and obliterated by Talus in the end, who

Gan driue at him, with so huge might and maine  
That all his bones, as small as sandy grayle  
He broke, and did his bowels disentrayle

5.9.19

Talus leaves him “a carrion outcast; / For beasts and foules to feede vpon for their repast,” (5.9.19). Although *Guile* or *Malengin*’s fate leaves him to be the devoured victim of the savage natural world, it is fitting Talus destroys this assemblage of human, tool, personification, and animal whose compound nature offers up one vision of inhumanity. Talus, a tool-like figure himself, offers a figure of automated, instrumentalized violence as justice, which is another face of inhumanity.

Allegorical strategies reveal not that humans are animalistic, which we might celebrate or revile, but rather that life creates form through the exercise of capacities, the performance of operations, and the distribution of cognition, agency, and affect beyond the particularities of any one life form, even as those particular life forms develop and become associated with particular capacities. Perhaps I am in danger here, myself, of personifying Life as some super-agent behind

the forms of life and life forms, and yet perhaps a function of reading Spenser is the intimation of a world bristling with vitality. Take the exquisite catalog of sea creatures Guyon faces on the way to the Bower of Bliss. These figures will be dismissed by the Palmer as yet one more distracting enchantment to be read through. And yet his dismissal and Guyon's subsequent eradication of the Bower of Bliss cannot dispel the power of these lines:

The waues come rolling, and the billowes rore  
Outragiously, as they enraged were,  
Or wrathfull *Neptune* did them driue before  
His whirling charet, for exceeding feare:  
For not one puffe of wind there did appeare,  
That all the three thereat woxe much afraid,  
Vnweeting, what such horroure straunge did reare.  
Eftsoones they saw an hideous hoast arrayd,  
Of huge Sea monsters, such as liuing sence dismayd.  
  
Most vgly shapes, and horrible aspects,  
Such as Dame Nature selfe mote feare to see,  
Or shame, that euer should so fowle defects  
From her most cunning hand escaped bee;  
All dreadfull pourtraicts of deformitee:  
Spring-headed *Hydraes*, and sea-shouldring Whales,  
Great whirlpooles, which all fishes make to flee,

Bright Scolopendraes, arm'd with siluer scales,  
Mighty *Monoceroses*, with immeasured tayles.

The dreadfull Fish, that hath deseru'd the name  
Of Death, and like him lookes in dreadfull hew,  
The griesly Wasserman, that makes his game  
The flying ships with swiftnesse to pursew,  
The horrible Sea-satyre, that doth shew  
His fearefull face in time of greatest storme,  
Huge *Ziffius*, whom Mariners eschew  
No lesse, then rockes, (as trauellers informe,)  
And greedy *Rosmarines* with visages deforme.

All these, and thousand thousands many more,  
And more deformed Monsters thousand fold,  
With dreadfull noise, and hollow rombling rore,  
Came rushing in the fomy waues enrold,  
Which seem'd to fly for feare, them to behold:  
Ne wonder, if these did the knight appall;  
For all that here on earth we dreadfull hold,  
Be but as bugs to fearen babes withall,  
Compared to the creatures in the seas entrall.



Spenser offers up a gruesome and terrifying vision of teeming life reminiscent of images of the fecundity of the Nile in whose “fertile slime...breed / Ten thousand kindes of creatures,” (1.1.21). These creatures, too, appear as “monstrous shapes” and appear in proximity to the creature Error but also, later, in the Garden of Adonis and in association with the “miraculous” solar fecundity that impregnates Chrysoگونه and that also explains how “life conceiue and quickned are by kynd: / So after *Nilus* inuudation, / Infinite shapes of creatures men do fynd,” (3.6.8). These sea creatures are the consequence of an awesome fecundity that which dwarves humans and their fears, reducing both in scale to things that are “as bugs to fearen babes withal, / Compared to the creatures in the seas entrall.” The inhumanity Spenser here diagnoses may be deployed as that savagery projected upon uncivilized opponents of virtue. And yet it also serves to suggest a world far more potent and in which humans are but one very small player.

Inhumanity in *The Faerie Queene* cuts both ways.

How easy to assume *The Faerie Queene* is a machine designed to make the perfect human. The “Letter of the Authors” famously asserts the poem’s purpose, “to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline.” And so it is, in part. But *The Faerie Queene* finds purpose beyond the engineering of a particular form of life and beyond the marshalling of life forms into strict moral confines. The poem is a device to incite life. It is, then, the task of the reader to apprehend life in all its potent forms and inhuman splendors.

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<sup>1</sup> W.B. Yeats, *The Cutting of An Agate* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 231.

<sup>2</sup> O.B. Hardison, Jr., "Humanism," in *The Spenser Encyclopedia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 379. For a corrective to such accounts of Pico, see especially Gouwens, "Human Exceptionalism," in *The Renaissance World*, ed. John Jeffries Martin (London: Routledge, 2007), 415-34.

<sup>3</sup> Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 2.

<sup>4</sup> Many protest the inadequacy of the term "animal," which violently reduces what Jacques Derrida calls "a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living." (*The Animal That Therefore I Am* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 31.) For my own treatment of this problem with respect to insect life see Campana, "The Bee and the Sovereign? Political Entomology and the Problem of Scale" *Shakespeare Studies* 41(2013): 94-113.

<sup>5</sup> See especially Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Climate of History: Four Theses." *Critical Inquiry* 35 (Winter 2009): 221.

<sup>6</sup> Angus Fletcher, *Allegory: Theory of a Symbolic Mode*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 28, 29.

<sup>7</sup> "If we were to meet an allegorical character in real life, we would say of him that he was obsessed with only one idea, or that h had an absolutely one-track mind, or that his life was patterned according to absolutely rigid habits from which he never allowed himself to vary. It would seem that he was driven by some hidden, private force; or, viewing him from another angle, it would appear that he did not control his own destiny, but appeared to be controlled by some foreign force, something outside the sphere of his own ego," (Fletcher, 39).

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<sup>8</sup> All references (to book, canto, and stanza) are to, Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, ed. A.C. Hamilton, revised 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Harlow: Longman, 2001).

<sup>9</sup> Laurie Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 3.

<sup>10</sup> Karen Raber, *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

<sup>11</sup> Shannon, 137.

<sup>12</sup> Shannon, 153.

<sup>13</sup> Shannon, 153.

<sup>14</sup> See Joseph Campana, “Exceptional Humans, Human Exceptionalism, Shakespearean Exceptionalism” forthcoming in “Shakespeare and the Human,” a special issue of *Shakespeare International Yearbook* 16 (2016).

<sup>15</sup> See, for instance Laurie Shannon, “Poor, Bare, Forked: Animal Sovereignty, Human Negative Exceptionalism, and the Natural History of *King Lear*.” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 60.2 (2009): 168-196 and Andreas Höfele, *Stage, Stake, and Scaffold: Humans and Animals in Shakespeare’s Theater* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chapter five.

<sup>16</sup> For an exception to this tendency see Elizabeth Harvey whose essay I discuss below.

<sup>17</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Open* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 26.

<sup>18</sup> Andrew Hadfield, *Edmund Spenser’s Irish Experience: Wilde Fruit and Salvage Soyl* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), 164.

<sup>19</sup> Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), chapter 4.

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<sup>20</sup> Cary Wolfe, *Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 9.

<sup>21</sup> See Campana, "On Not Defending Poetry: Spenser, Suffering, and the Energy of Affect." *PMLA* 120:1 (January 2005): 33-48, and more broadly *The Pain of Reformation: Spenser, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Masculinity* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).

<sup>22</sup> Paul J. Alpers, *Edmund Spenser: A Critical Anthology* (New York: Penguin, 1969), 54.

<sup>23</sup> Alpers, 58. Thus it is no surprise when, moments later, Digby claims "that what perfections [poets of Greece, Rome, and Tuscany] have severally you may find in him alone, as though Nature had strived to show in him that when she pleaseth to make a masterpiece, she can give in one subject all those excellencies... And if at any time he plucketh a flower out of their gardens, he transplaneth it so happily into his own that it growth fairer and sweeter than it did when it first sprang up."

<sup>24</sup> Paul J. Alpers, *Edmund Spenser: A Critical Anthology* (New York: Penguin, 1969), 113

<sup>25</sup> C.S. Lewis, *Spenser's Images of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 11.

<sup>26</sup> Donald Cheney, *Spenser's Images of Nature: Wild Man and Shepherd in "The Faerie Queene."* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1.

<sup>27</sup> Madeleine Perner Cosman, "Spenser's Ark of Animals: Animal Imagery in the *Faerie Queen*." *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900* 3.1 (1963): 85.

<sup>28</sup> Arthur Marotti, "Animal Symbolism in The Faerie Queene: Tradition and Poetic Context." *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900* 5.1 (1965): 69.

29. Donna Haraway, "Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part II: The Past Is the Contested Zone: Human Nature and Theories of Production and Reproduction in Primate Behavior Studies." *Signs* 4.1 (1978), 37.

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<sup>30</sup> Donne and Montaigne “upset the humanist hierarchy, both because they insist on a real, “face-to-face” encounter between the animal and the human, and because they indict reason as the highest good,” (Harvey, 274).

<sup>31</sup> Harvey, 264, 266.

<sup>32</sup> Joseph Loewenstein, “Gryll’s Hoggish Mind.” *Spenser Studies* 22 (2007): 244.

<sup>33</sup> Loewenstein, 246. “This interest in insects,” Loewenstein argues, “is far easier to explain than Spenser’s general unresponsiveness to other animals—this in a period of burgeoning empirical correction and augmentation of the natural historical record.”

<sup>34</sup> Loewenstein, 251 and 248.

<sup>35</sup> Loewenstein, 253.

<sup>36</sup> Elizabeth Jane Bellamy, “Spenser’s Open,” *Spenser Studies* 22 (2007): 227.

<sup>37</sup> Bellamy, 229.

<sup>38</sup> Bellamy, 233.

<sup>39</sup> Bellamy, 237.

<sup>40</sup> Sean Gordon Henry, ““How doth the little Crocodile improve his shining Tale: Contextualizing the Crocodile of *Prosopopoia: Or Mother Hubberds Tale*.” *Spenser Studies* 23 (2008): 153-179. See also his contextualization of Spenserian lions in “Hot and Bothered: The Lions of *Amoretti* 20 and *The Faerie Queene* I.” *Spenser Studies* 27 (2012): 47-76.

<sup>41</sup> Chris Barrett, “Cetaceous Sin and Dragon Death: *The Faerie Queene*, Natural Philosophy, and the Limits of Allegory.” *Spenser Studies* 28 (2013): 147.

<sup>42</sup> Brian Ogilvie, *The Science of Describing: Natural History in Renaissance Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 8, 6.

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<sup>43</sup> Shannon, 227. See, more broadly, chapter five, “Hang-Dog Looks: From Subjects of Law to Objects of Science in Animal Trials.”

<sup>44</sup> Loewenstein, 246.

<sup>45</sup> Bellamy, 233. See the recently republished Jacob von Uexküll, *A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: with A Theory of Meaning* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) and Giorgio Agamben’s take on von Uexküll in his essay “The Tick” in *The Open* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). For a reading of swarms and multiplicity see Campana “The Bee and the Sovereign (II): Segments, Swarms, and the Shakespearean Multitude,” in *The Return of Theory in Early Modern English Studies, vol. II*, ed. Bryan Reynolds, Paul Cefalu, Gary Kuchar (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 59-80. For a reading of swarms of insects as signatures of memory and imagination in the Legend of Temperance, see Grant Williams, “Phantaste’s Flies: The Trauma of Amnesiac Enjoyment in Spenser’s Memory Palace.” *Spenser Studies* 18 (2003): 231-52.

<sup>46</sup> Loewenstein, 246.

<sup>47</sup> Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal*, 8.

<sup>48</sup> Harvey, 266.

<sup>49</sup> Loewenstein, 251.

<sup>50</sup> Edmund Spenser, *A Vewe of the Present State of Ireland*, 1.

<sup>51</sup> See particularly Hadfield and Wily Maley, *Salvaging Spenser: Colonialism, Culture, and Identity* (London: Palgrave, 1997).

<sup>52</sup> Michael Murrin, *The Veil of Allegory* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969), ix, 39.

<sup>53</sup> Maureen Quilligan, *The Language of Allegory: Defining the Genre* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 22.

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<sup>54</sup> Gordon Teskey, *Allegory and Violence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), xi; and “Allegory,” in *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., ed. Roland Greene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 37.

<sup>55</sup> Angus Fletcher, *Allegory: Theory of a Symbolic Mode*

<sup>56</sup> Paul DeMan, “Auto-biography as De-facement.” *MLN* 94.5 (1979): 919-930.

<sup>57</sup> Harvey, 266.

<sup>58</sup> “Prosopopoeia” *Princeton Encyclopedia*.

<sup>59</sup> Carolyn Van Dyke, “Personification.” *Spenser Encyclopedia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 538.

<sup>60</sup> Fowler, 1026. See also Andrew Escobedo for the tension between early modern and present-day notions of personification in “Allegorical Agency and the Sins of Angels.” *ELH* 75.4 (2008): 787-818 and “Daemon Lovers: Will, Personification, and Character.” *Spenser Studies* 22 (2007): 203-25.

<sup>61</sup> See, especially, Eugene Thacker, *After Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010) and *In the Dust of This Planet* (New York: Zero Books, 2011) for broader approaches to questions of life and non-life, from classical philosophy to the present. Two relatively recent accounts of life in the Romantic era seem worth mentioning: Denise Gigante, *Life: Organic Form and Romanticism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) and Robert Mitchell, *Experimental Life: Vitalism in Romantic Science and Literature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). Garret Sullivan’s *Sleep, Romance, and Human Embodiment: Vitality from Spenser to Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) addresses the Aristotelian tripartite soul without addressing in a broader way vitality.

<sup>62</sup> Van Dyke, 538.

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<sup>63</sup> See for instance Bruno Latour, *Re-Assembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007).