THE EGYPTIAN RED BOOK
ILLUSTRATED
PRICE SIXPENCE

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS,
EDINBURGH & LONDON.
THE EGYPTIAN PUZZLE.

"Fine Egyptian cookery."  Antony and Cleopatra.
THE
EGYPTIAN RED BOOK

"Blow these sands."
Titus Andronicus.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, EDINBURGH AND LONDON.
The entries in “The Egyptian Red Book” can be authenticated by reference to the Official Blue Books and Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates.
"By their Egyptian policy the Liberal Government will stand or fall."—LORD SALISBURY.

PREFACE.

“I CONSIDER that every moment’s delay in preparing an expedition diminishes Gordon’s chances of escape. I think that the Government will ultimately, but too late, send a relieving force, not because Mr Gladstone wishes it, but because public indignation will compel him, *volens volens*, to do so; and, little as the Prime Minister may value Gordon, the Prime Minister cares a great deal for Mr Gladstone. The danger to Gordon is owing to the dawdling policy of the Government, which never carries out to-day what it can put off till to-morrow. The more pressure is brought to bear upon Mr Gladstone to compel him at once to commence preparations for an expedition, the better chance for Gordon’s life. Every day wasted is one more nail in the coffin of himself and garrison.”

The late COLONEL FRED. BURNABY,

16th May 1884.

“The curses of 1878, 1879, and 1880 have come home to roost.”—JOSEPH COWEN, M.P.
THE EGYPTIAN RED BOOK.

"The judgment upon General Gordon's position does not rest upon a single despatch, but it rests upon a series of despatches." - W. E. G., 22nd April 1884.

Sept. 1882. - Mr. Gladstone's Government invade Egypt at a cost to British Tax-payers of £7,000,000, and 500 English lives and 4000 Egyptian. The Mahdi rampant in the Soudan. The G. O. M. all at sea on board the Grantully Castle. ["They have meddled in Egypt just enough to muddle, and not enough to cure."]

Aug. 1883. - General Hicks is ordered to fight the Mahdi with soldiers dragged to battle in chains, "without transport, money, clothing, food, or camels." [No aid is sent, as Mr. G. is preparing a new edition of "Lessons in Massacre."]

22nd Nov. - Hicks' whole army destroyed. 13,000 massacred. [The Do-Nothing Government slumber on, as their Chief has a cold in his head.]

THE GARRISONS ABANDONED.

26th Nov. - Sir E. Baring, the Government Representative in Egypt, to Lord Granville. - "Fears are entertained for the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat." [Nothing done, as the Premier had a letter to write to the Derby Working Men's Gladstone Presentation Committee.]

2nd Dec. - Another massacre at Tamanieb. 1000 Egyptians killed within 20 miles of British troops and war-vessels. [The Grand Old Mummies look on smiling and do nothing, as they are unveiling a statue of the G. O. M. in the City Liberal Club.]

8th Dec. - The commander at Tokar writes: - "The assistance that I begged for, you have not afforded me. I have received nothing but empty compliments. We have done our work like brave men, but there is no one to support us. There is no use your writing complimentary letters to us if at the end we are to fall into the hands of the enemy." [Nothing was done, as Mr. G. was presenting a chestnut tree to the Corporation of Brighton.]

5th Feb. 1884. - Massacre near Tokar. 96 officers, 2250 men slaughtered within a day's march of British troops.

9th Feb. - The commander at Sinkat telegraphs: - "We are dying of starvation, and our condition is desperate. The men are chewing the leaves of trees to allay their cravings." [Nothing was done, as Mr. Gladstone was presenting a bust of himself to the town of Kirkwall.]

12th Feb. - Massacre at Sinkat. The brave Tewik and 1000 men, women, and children are butchered within 26 miles of the British garrison. ["We have been involved in some amount, at least, of moral complicity with the basest and blackest outrages upon record." - W. E. G. on the Bulgarian Horrors.]

Granville to Baring, 22nd Feb.

"We have taken the responsibility of preserving tranquillity in Egypt; and this task is impossible without exposing our troops to whatever risks the climatic influences involve."

Moral. - The British army (under the Gladstone Government) cannot invade an enemy's country without a satisfactory report upon the drains.
"What noise is this? What traitors have we here?"
1 Henry VI.

THE SALVATION (?) ARMY.
29th Feb.—Battle of El Teb. British and Arab losses, 2550. [N.B.—Mr Gladstone's Mission in the Soudan was entirely “Pacific,” so that a general “scuttle” order was given, after this purposeless slaughter.]

THE SOUDAN ABANDONMENT.

4th Jan. 1884.—The G. O. M. decides to abandon the Soudan, and insists upon the resignation of all Egyptian Officials who differ from him. Cherif Pasha and his Government therefore retire—Cherif saying, “Time and posterity will judge between me and Mr Gladstone.” The Mahdi takes heart from the abandonment policy, and the insurrection naturally increases. [“All men worship the rising sun.”—General Gordon, 7th Jan. 1884.]

GENERAL GORDON TO THE RESCUE.

11th Jan.—General Gordon is refused permission by the G. O. M. to suppress the slave trade on the Congo unless he resigns his commission in the British Army. [N.B.—Mr Gladstone’s father was a slave-owner, but did not resign his commission (£68,454) on the slaves.]

16th Jan.—The Grand Old Weathercock is shamed into changing his mind and allowing Gordon to retain his commission.

17th Jan.—Wind again changes. The G. O. M. recalls Gordon and sends him, against his wish, and that of the Egyptian authorities, to Khartoum, to save the Gladstone Government.

22nd Jan.—Sir Charles Dilke says at Chelsea:—“We were informed that General Gordon, although he had no wish to go to Egypt, would go if he were ordered.” [And he was ordered.]

18th Jan.—General Gordon leaves Charing Cross at 8 P.M. “Lord Wolseley carried the General’s portmanteau, Lord Granville took his ticket for him, and the Duke of Cambridge held open the carriage door.”—Pall Mall Gazette, 19th Jan. [N.B.—Mr Chamberlain was unable to be present as he was privately engaged on “pacific negotiations” with Mr Larry Mack, of Birmingham.]

THE GOVERNMENT POLICY. (?)

1st Feb.—Gordon says:—“It is possible I may go to the Mahdi.” 6th Feb., Baring to Gordon:—“I hope you will on no account visit the Mahdi.” 6th Feb., Granville to Baring:—“Your message to Gen. Gordon is approved.” Commentary: 12th May 1884, the G. O. M. says:—“We did not negative General Gordon’s visit to the Mahdi.” [At the very outset, Gen. Gordon’s “pacific mission” is obstructed by the G. O. M. & Co. Refused permission to try peace; afterwards refused permission to try war.]

5th Feb.—In reply to a question with regard to assistance to General Gordon, the G. O. M. at once declares his Egyptian Policy and says:—“Her Majesty’s Government do not find themselves called upon to adopt any measures of any kind.” [And they didn’t.]

13th Feb.—W. E. G. says:—“It is no exaggeration, in speaking of General Gordon, to say that he is a hero. It is no exaggeration to say that he is a Christian.” [Moral: It is no exaggeration to say that the G. O. M. is the original of Pecksniff.]

8th Feb.—General Gordon crosses the desert to Khartoum, on the Gladstonian “pacific mission,” to convey, without “military operations,” 20,000 troops and 30,000 civilians through the heart of a savage insurrection. [“Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform”—especially Retrenchment.]
"The Oracles are dumb."

Milton.

THE SLEEPING BEAUTIES.
18th Feb.—Gordon asks for the assistance of Zebehr Pasha, and is answered—

22nd Feb.—Granville to Baring.

"The public opinion of this country (i.e., the Brummagem Caucus, Sir Wilfrid Lawson, and the Peace Society) will not tolerate the appointment."

28th Feb.—Baring to Granville.

"Any attempt to settle Egyptian Questions by the light of English public opinion is sure to be productive of harm, and it would be preferable to follow the advice of responsible authorities on the spot."

[The Cabinet, however, referred the appointment to a committee composed of Caucus Joe and Larry Mack, Esq., who negatived the appointment.]

NO HELP FOR GORDON.

27th Feb. [received by Granville on 11th March.]—General Gordon tells the tribes of the Soudan by Proclamation: "The troops of the British Government are now on their way, and in a few days will be at Khartoum." [3rd April, Lord Hartington says:—We have no knowledge that Gordon even desires that troops should be sent.]

1st March.—Gordon to Baring. "I feel conviction I shall be caught in Khartoum."

2nd March.—Gordon to Baring. [received by Granville on 4th March.]—"I am sure the revolt will collapse if I can say that I have British troops at my back." [22nd April. The G.O.M. says:—"As a matter of fact, no request from General Gordon for the sending of British troops to Khartoum has ever been received." ("The right hon. gentleman is indebted to his imagination for his facts."—SHERIDAN.)

3rd March.—Gordon to Baring. "My difficulty arises from haziness of the future (i.e., the indecision and vacillation of the Weathercock Government). Do not delay." [But the Do-Nothing Government must keep up their reputation, and do delay for seven months.]

8th March.—Gordon to Baring. "If you do not send Zebehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away. Zebehr is fifty times the Mahdi's match." [But the Gladstone Government had decided on 5th Feb. "not to adopt any measures of any kind"—so the garrisons are massacred.]

PEACE and WAR.

19th March. Zebehr Pasha says:—"The policy of working with an army at Suakim, while Gordon is diplomatically acting at Khartoum, is a mistake. Gordon is in the greatest jeopardy; yet, if you act quickly, I will be responsible with my own life for bringing him safely back to Cairo." [Zebehr was a Conservative—and had put the definition of the Government want of policy "in a nutshell"—so nothing was done.]

21st March. Khartoum totally invested. 21st-24th. The Mahdi's forces attack Khartoum. [22nd April. Granville says:—"It is well known that the Arabs shrink from any attempts at attacking a fortified town."

24th March. Baring to Granville. "The question now is how to get General Gordon away from Khartoum." [The answer to this telegram was unusually prompt. 25th March. Granville to Baring. "Her Majesty's Government desire to leave full discretion to General Gordon to remain in Khartoum."

24th March. Baring to Granville. "I think that an effort should be made to help Gordon from Suakim. Gen. Stephenson and Sir E. Wood are of opinion that the expedition is possible."

[N.B. "The military authorities here" were Lord Chamberlain, Larry Mack, the Peace Society, and Lord Welsley. The "impossible" becomes "possible" in 1885.]
"They shall have wars and pay for their presumption."

3 Henry VI.

THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.
25th March.—Baring to Granville.

"Gordon evidently expecting help from Suakin, and has ordered messengers to be sent along the road from Berber to ascertain whether any English force was advancing."

26th March.—Tamanieb burnt. English commander telegraphs, "The campaign is at an end." [Which end?]

27th March.—Gordon writes:—"If Her Majesty's Government do not act promptly, Graham's victory [at Tamanai] will go for naught." [No heed was paid to this warning, and Granville telegraphs to Gen. Graham, "The Government have no intention of sending British troops to Berber. Preparations should be made for immediate embarkation of force." So they scuttled from Suakin, leaving the garrisons entreaty assistance. Apparent victory for the British—real victory for the Mahdi.]

28th March.—Lord Granville announces the final abandonment of Gen. Gordon, and says:—"General Gordon's assurances fail to convince Her Majesty's Government." [Not even a Birmingham affidavit would have convinced them of General Gordon's danger—as at this time they were busy jerry-mandering with the Franchise Bill.]

28th March.—Granville to Baring.——"The condition of affairs does not appear to call for measures attended by so much risk, and entailing possibly a great loss of life, and certainly large expenditure." [Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform—especially Retrenchment. Gordon versus E. S. D.] 28th March.—Granville to Baring.——"Her Majesty's Government have sanctioned the despatch of two British Officers to Berber." [At 13s. 7d. per head per diem. Lord Granville at the same time forwards a second-hand English flag to be waved judiciously at intervals, and a band to play "Rule Britannia"—when there are no Arabs in the immediate vicinity.]

MORE APPEALS FOR HELP.

28th March.—Soudan Merchants to Baring.——"On the appearance alone of English troops depend our lives, our families, and our goods. May the Almighty grant that this appearance may not be delayed. We await the arrival of help in agony to see the British flag covering us with its power." [The British flag, damaged in New Guinea, is under repair.]

29th March.—Gordon to Baring.——"I dare not go out for fear of the town. Had you sent Zebcar how different would have been the state of affairs." [12th May, Sir M. Hicks-Beach says:—"The principal danger which besets General Gordon is not famine, nor even the attacks of the insurgents outside, but it is treachery within the town." Moral.—23rd Feb. 1885, W. E. G. says:—"Khartoum was betrayed. What connection has betrayed with the question of a relief expedition? It should have hurried it on.

1st April.—The question is asked in the House of Commons:— "Is it true then that General Gordon is to be left to share the fate of Tewfik Bey?" No answer was given, and nothing was done.

3rd April.—W. E. G. says:—"General Gordon is under no order and under no constraint to stay at Khartoum. [i.e., according to the Past-his-Prime Minister of England, a British General who is besieged is quite safe because he can save his own life by deserting his army.]

3rd March.—Gordon to Baring.——"If I was mean enough to escape, I have no power to do so. As a gentleman, could you advise that course?" ("Why, certainly, the life of the Government before the life of the Garrisons.")

4th April.—W. E. G. says:—"General Gordon faces the difficulties before him." [Which is more than can be said of Her Majesty's Ministers.]
"Doing nothing with a deal of skill."

Cowper.

THE EGYPTIAN "EXPEDITION"
7th April.—Consul Power telegraphs:—

"Khartoum is at present the centre of an enormous rebel camp. To retreat to Berber is impossible. The English Government have turned down their thumbs while General Gordon is struggling here."

(The reasons were sufficient.

Lord Kimberley, Sec. for India, House of Lords,
4th April 1884.

"Everybody must be aware that the position of General Gordon must be critical at Khartoum."

5th April.—The Marquis of Hartington says:—"It appears to the Government that General Gordon has somewhat overrated the danger from the Mahdi." [4th April, General Gordon writes:—"No human power can deliver us now. We are surrounded, and unless God causes the savage Arab tribes to disperse, no English troops will do so, until they have reached Khartoum, and massacred the inhabitants. What the people want is plunder."]

7th April.—Baring to Granville (received 7th April).—"The number of rebels surrounding Khartoum is increasing. There is great alarm at Berber." [But not in Downing Street.]

8th April.—The House rises, and the G. O. M. being "under no constraint to remain" in London, "finds himself able" to go and relieve his son at Hawarden Parish Church.

BERBER ABANDONED.

15th April.—Inhabitants of Berber to Baring. —"We implore that great, chivalrous, and humane power to come to our help, for it is full time. Can it raise us again after our death? We await help from England. We implore you then to quiet our minds by announcing to us the immediate despatch of a force to our assistance. If not, certain death awaits us." [And it did, for "that great, chivalrous, and humane power" had abandoned itself to "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform."]

17th April.—Baring to Granville. —"Zebeh has received a telegram from Gordon directing him to proceed to Berber. He will be watched, and his departure will be prevented." [12th Feb., W. E. G. had said:—"It was our duty to beware of interfering with General Gordon's plans."

23rd April.—Egerton (in place of Baring) to Granville. —"Governor of Berber telegraphs, 'We are in great danger. If Berber falls there will be no hope for the Soudan. Answer quickly.' [No answer is sent because the rescue of Berber is not a "political necessity," as, according to W. E. G. (24th April), 'There would be no essential change in the position of Khartoum in consequence of the fall of Berber."

The Egyptian Government having decided upon an immediate advance on Berber—

Granville to Egerton, 23rd April.

"We cannot sanction attempt to send English force to Berber, or to send Egyptian troops alone. TELL GOVERNOR OF BERBER THAT NO ASSISTANCE CAN BE GIVEN TO HIM." [As the G. O. M. & Co. were a "pacific" firm.]

House of Commons, 25th April.

It was asked whether the Egyptian Government had abandoned the expedition for the relief of Berber owing to directions from Her Majesty's Government.

Mr Gladstone said:—"No, sir, I have not been informed of the fact."
"Beauty, Wisdom, Modesty."

Merchant of Venice.

THE THREE GRACES.
24th April.—W. E. G. is asked whether the garrison of Berber may meet the fate of the garrison at Sinkat, and replies, "We have no reason to believe there is any risk at Berber of any such thing." [The Ministry have no "intelligence"—and never had.]

RESULT:

10th June.—Major Kitchener to Sir Evelyn Wood.—"Berber was surprised nine days ago, and every one massacred. The Governor, and all his family, and all soldiers, and many merchants killed. The Pasha's family are killed, and men, women, and children massacred in the streets." 3500 lives lost.

[12th May.—The G. O. M. said:—"We declined to send troops to Berber and other places. There was no one to conquer at Berber."—But plenty to slaughter.]

"Five millions of Bulgarians, hardly venturing to look upwards even to their Father in Heaven, have extended their hands to you; they have sent you their petition; they have prayed for your help and protection."
—W. E. G. on Bulgarian Atrocities, 7th May 1877.

KHARTOUM ABANDONED.

11th April.—Mr Power, brother of the English Consul at Khartoum, says in The Times:—"It should be clearly understood by all, that those in Khartoum have been abandoned by the present Government, and further, the Government, in so devoting these three brave men to death, have done so KNOWINGLY, WILLINGLY, and HEARTLESSLY."

16th April.—Gordon to Baring.—"I shall leave you [i.e. the G. O. M. & Co.] the INDELEBLY DISGRACE OF ABANDONING THE GARRISONS, WITH THE CERTAINTY THAT YOU WILL EVENTUALLY BE FORCED TO SMASH UP THE MAHDI UNDER GREAT DIFFICULTIES, IF YOU WOULD RETAIN PEACE IN EGYPT." [March 1885.—The Gladstone Government, having abandoned the garrisons, proceed to smash up the Mahdi at a cost of thousands of lives and millions of money.]

16th April.—Baring to Granville (received by Granville 16th).—"General Gordon has told Colonel Stewart and Power that, as British troops are not coming to the relief of Khartoum, they can take their choice of retreating with him to the Equator, or trying to retreat to Berber. They both prefer the former course as the less dangerous," Consul Power having said, "I do not see how it is possible for any but an Arab to get to Berber."

24th April.—The G. O. M. says:—"It is not a fact that General Gordon has requested Her Majesty's Consular Agent to leave Khartoum. It is not a fact that that measure was essential to their safety, and it is not a fact that General Gordon stated that the only means of leaving Khartoum would be by Equatorial Africa and the Congo."

[It is a fact that the G. O. M.'s facts were not facts.]

Lord Granville, 22nd April, in the House of Lords.

"It is quite true that Gordon was promised co-operation, but we had not the slightest hint—we had not the slightest idea—that he required it." [Or we wouldn't have promised it.]

Baring to Granville, 18th April.

"General Gordon appears to think he is to be abandoned, and is very indignant." [9th April.—Despairing of aid from England, Gordon had appealed to British and American capitalists to advance £300,000, that he might get Turkish troops to help him.]

23rd April.—Granville to Egerton.—"Gordon should be at once informed that we do not propose to supply him with TURKISH OR OTHER FORCE. That if, with this knowledge, he continues at Khartoum, he should state to us the cause." [The cause had already been stated, as on 18th April General Gordon had said—"We are hemmed in by determined men."]

25th April.—Egerton to Granville.—"The last messenger that was sent to Khartoum returned, being unable to proceed." [28th April. W. E. G. says:—"We have heard nothing to the effect that General Gordon was insecure."
Such painted puppets.

THE MUMMY GOVERNMENT.
22nd April, W. E. G. says:

"It may be the opinion that General Gordon is in imminent danger. In our view that is an entirely erroneous opinion."

22nd April, Lord Granville says:

"The Government has no fear now of the personal safety of General Gordon."

16th April, Power to Baring:

"We are quite blocked on the north, east, and west. [And they had previously been ordered by Lord Granville not to go south.]

7th April.—Through Admiral Hewett, England begs assistance from the King of Abyssinia.

22nd April.—Gordon to Baring. "There are rumours of Abyssinian advance, which I trust for the honour of England are not true. It is like a big boy getting a little boy to fight his battle."

28th April.—Hewett to King of Abyssinia.

(Translation) "Are you very well? Are you very well? I am, thank God, quite well."

[As also promised, through similar negotiations, by Rum Ti Foo, King of the Cannibal Islands, the Prince of Monaco, the Claimant, and Larry Mack, after his present engagement is terminated.]

26th April.—Merchants of Kassala write: "If English troops do not come, Gordon's mission will be much compromised." [No troops sent, as Mr Gladstone was translating his Midlothian speeches into Arabic.]

26th April.—Gordon to Baring. "We are making decorations for defence of Khartoum. You will not be asked to pay for them." [Special Meeting of Cabinet summoned. Mr Childers proposes the debased half-sovereigns as decorations. Price 9s. 6d. each.]

3rd May.—It is reported in Khartoum that help is coming, and that the English army is at Berber. [3rd March 1885, Lord Wolseley at Korti expressed the hope that they "would all be in Khartoum by the end of 1885."]

8th May.—Meeting at St James's Hall to protest against the abandonment of General Gordon. [Nothing is done, because the G. O. M. is getting well hissed at the Healtheries, although he tries to "explain" the hisses away.]

THE TOO-LATE EXPEDITION.

10th May.—The G. O. M. & Co. are hissed into ordering the military authorities in Cairo to prepare for the immediate despatch of a relief force to Khartoum, to start in five months (i.e. October).

13th May.—Lord R. Churchill says: "The Prime Minister thinks that the British people will wait till October. Does he think that the Mahdi will wait till then?" [The Mahdi does not wait till then.]

12th May.—"The G. O. M. says: "We are determined not to place this country in conflict with a people struggling for their freedom." [March 1885. The G. O. M. instructs Lord Wolseley to "smash up" these "people struggling for their freedom."
W. E. G., 12th Feb. 1884.

“These (i.e., the Sudanese rebels) are people struggling to be free, and they are struggling rightly to be free.” (Hansard, 288, col. 55.)

Commentary: 27th Feb. 1885. W. E. Forster says:— “My right hon. friend (i.e., the G. O. M.) convinces himself, and he convinces others, but he does not always convince facts.”

W. E. G., 1st May 1884.

“There is no military danger at the present moment besetting Khartoum.”

11th May.—Although there is “no military danger,” prayers are offered up in the churches throughout England for the safety of General Gordon.

12th May.—Granville to Egerton.—“General Gordon is enjoined to adopt measures for his own removal.”

15th May.—By a majority of 28 on a proposed vote of censure, the Automaton Radical majority vote for further abandonment, and a continuance of the Micawber policy of waiting for something to turn up.

19th May.—The Grand Old Mystifier says:—“Whatever measures the Government take will be in the direction of making effective arrangements with regard to bringing all the difficulties to an end.” [The Gladstonian equivalent for “doing nothing.”]

20th May.—The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, interrogated, “Knows nothing except that communication with General Gordon is cut off.” [Yet he was in no danger.] On another point the Gladstonian-trained Under-Secretary is questioned, and replies, “I daresay I shall be able to answer it to-morrow.” [Probably!]

20th May.—Messrs Gladstone & Co. negotiate with Messrs Cook, the tourists’ providers, for a cheap third-class return ticket for Lord Wolseley to Khartoum and back. (Hansard, 288, col. 1010.)

[“Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform”—especially Retrenchment.]

23rd May.—The G. O. M. says:—“The intelligence from Khartoum is re-assuring,” although, according to the Under-Secretary, there had been absolutely “no intelligence” since the 10th April. (Hansard, 288, cols. 1181-2.)

25th May.—While maintaining that General Gordon is not in danger, the G. O. M. & Co. offer £200 for an answer to their telegram to the General at Khartoum. (Egypt, No. 24, p. 75.) [The bribe didn’t take, as no Arab could be got to run the risk or trust Her Majesty’s Government to that extent.]

27th May.—Lord Granville displays his ignorance of his own business by declaring, “so far as I know, the Mahdi resides somewhere in the interior of Africa.” (Hansard, 288, col. 1454.) [Probably in the Cameroons or at Angra Pequena.]

GORDON FORGOTTEN.

May, June.—Gordon forgotten—“knowingly, willingly, and heartlessly,” because the Government is engaged on the Franchise Bill and in an attack upon the House of Lords. “How scandalously unjust were the suspicions entertained by some that the prolonged silence of General Gordon arose from offended pride. It was the enforced silence of an English officer so closely beleaguered that no messenger from without was able to bring tidings to the besieged. During these long summer months General Gordon was battling for his life against overwhelming odds, the bullets falling incessantly into his palace from every side.”

[9th September.—General Gordon writes:—“While you are eating, drinking, and resting in good beds, we soldiers and servants are watching by night and day, endeavouring to quell the movement of this false Mahdi.”]
"A deed without a name."

Macbeth.

ABANDONED.
23rd June.—A Conference on Egyptian Affairs is summoned, meets, and—[2nd Aug.—collapses. March 1885, England ultimately surrenders to France.]

23rd June.—W. E. G. says:—"We have agreed with France that our occupation of Egypt shall terminate on 1st June 1888." [If Lord Wolseley's pic-nic party has reached Khartoum by that date.]

24th June.—Marquis of Hartington states:—"No decision has been come to with respect to an expedition to Khartoum." [No decision was come to till March 1885, when the Govt. was morally defeated in the House of Commons.]

3rd July.—Lord Know-nothing Fitzmaurice states:—"Nothing has been heard from General Gordon since the 10th of April." [On account of the noise caused by the Franchise Demonstrations.]

20th July.—Message from Gordon:—"Tell the messengers where the reinforcements are, and what is their number." [Answer:—Number of soldiers, 137,632. Place, England—until something turns up.]

21st July.—Lord Hartington says:—"The climate was given as one of the principal reasons for not sending the troops asked for by General Gordon." [And yet the Government had persistently denied that Gordon had ever asked for troops.]

13th May.—Lord Hartington says:—"General Gordon does not appear to have made any request for British troops to be sent to Khartoum. General Gordon never suggested the employment of British troops for the relief of Khartoum."

22nd July.—Egerton to Granville.—"£10,000 might be offered for bringing General Gordon out of Khartoum." [But it wasn't.]

30th July.—Gordon to Baring.—"Retreat is impossible. I recommend, as a route for troops, Wady Halfa, but fear it is too late." [And it was.]

31st July.—Gordon to Baring.—"You ask me to state cause and intention of staying at Khartoum. I stay at Khartoum because Arabs have shut us up and will not let us out." [23rd Feb. 1885, W. E. G. says:—"We believe that it was in the power of General Gordon to have removed himself.]

31st July.—Counsel Power writes:—"For the last five months the siege has been very close." [11th July, Lord Hartington said:—"The intelligence does not point to the fact that General Gordon has been closely besieged. On the contrary, it rather points in the opposite direction."]

30th July.—Gordon to Baring.—"If we get out, it is in answer to prayer."

5th Aug.—The Ministry begins to make up its mind (if it has any), and asks for a Vote of Credit for "preparations." [The only credit they ever got.]

14th Aug.—The G. O. M. says in the Queen's Speech:—"I shall continue to fulfil with fidelity the duties which grow out of the presence of my troops in the valley of the Nile." [Quite so—pure Gladstonian.]

**HOW THE NILE ROUTE WAS SELECTED.**

8th Aug.—Hartington to General Stephenson at Cairo.—"I am advised [by Lord Wolseley] that the transport of a force in small boats, such as were employed by Lord Wolseley (!) in the Red River Expedition, would not present any insuperable difficulties.

11th Aug.—Stephenson to Hartington.—"Small boats proposed not suitable."

12th Aug.—Hartington to Stephenson.—"Experienced officers here (i.e., Lord Wolseley) confidential of practicability of boat plan."

Notwithstanding the adverse opinions of Captain Molyneux, Commander Hammill, and Admiral Sir John Hay, who had been deputed to examine the cataracts of the Nile, Lord Hartington adheres to his crotchet, because it was Lord Wolseley's, and the route afforded the best chance of being "too late."
"Spur to the rescue!"

1 Henry VI.

"RESCUE AND RETIRE"
21st Aug.—Stephenson to Hartington.—"Small boats impracticable. Naval opinion here is in this sense. I am still in favour of Suakim-Berber route." [In 1874 Gordon left Suakim on 23rd Feb. at 10 A.M., and reached Khartoum on 13th March at 6 A.M.]

22nd Aug.—Hartington to Stephenson.—"I am still of opinion that small boat expedition is practicable." [Opinion of Canadian boatmen on Lord Hartington's boats:—"The boats were too frail, while the keels were obstructive to navigation on the shallow part of river. The men actually tore the stems out of them, and ten of the voyageurs were drowned."]

RESULT:

26th Aug.—General Stephenson is shunted in favour of Lord Wolseley, although, as the G. O. M. said on 23rd Feb. 1885, "For some months the balance of evidence appeared to be in favour of Suakim-Berber route." But the Pendulum Government swing on, and the Wolseley "real water" theatrical scene is enacted.

MORE DELAY.

22nd Aug.—General Wood to Egerton.—"Men who swam out of Khartoum say that that place is in great straits, being long invested." [21st April, W. E. G. said that the enemy were near Khartoum, "forming more or less of a chain around it. I draw a distinction between that and the town being surrounded." [More Gladstonian.]

MORAL.—"My right hon. friend (i.e., W. E. G.), as we all know, is the greatest master that ever existed of distinctions and differences."—W. E. Ponsref, 27th Feb. 1885.

23rd Aug.—Gordon to Baring.—"English troops must be sent to the Soudan. If the rebels kill the people, you will be responsible for their lives." [Nothing was done, as W. E. G. was engaged in "editing" for publication the Egyptian despatches, and Lord Granville was making further concessions to Germany.]

24th Aug.—Gordon writes:—"We are very cross with you all. The rôle of our country has not been very noble in Egypt or Soudan." [Or in the Transvaal, New Guinea, Angra Pequena, or elsewhere.]

31st Aug.—Egerton to Granville.—"Question of time as to General Gordon's relief appears serious." [More delay, as the G. O. M. was in a fog on the top of Ben Macdhui.]

31st Aug.—Gordon to Baring.—"Is it right that I should have been sent to Khartoum, and no attention paid to me till communications were cut?"—(Egypt, No. 35, p. 96.)

THE NILE EXPEDITION.

30th Aug.—At last, the Wolseley pic-nic party leaves England to supersede General Stephenson (who supported the Suakim-Berber route), and is timed to reach Khartoum too late.

4th Sept.—Gordon writes:—"Had another fight, and again was defeated with heavy loss. One of our steamers has 970 bullet marks on her. Another 850." ["A position of security," according to W. E. G.—who was not on deck.]

9th Sept., Gordon writes:—

"How many times have we written asking for re-inforcements, calling your serious attention to the Soudan? No answer at all has come to us as to what has been decided in the matter, and the hearts of men have become weary of this delay. Of course you take no interest for suppressing this Rebellion, the serious consequences of which are reverse of victorious for you, and the neglect thereof will not do."
"Stand not upon the order of your going,  
But go at once."  
Macbeth.
17th Sept.—Lord Hartington, abusing Her Majesty’s English, writes:—‘‘In arriving at this decision, Her Majesty’s Government desire to remind you that no decision has been arrived at.”—(Egypt, No. 35, p. 97.) [Painful grammatical result of the Government’s first arrival at a decision.]

18th Sept.—Massacre of Colonel Stewart, Consul Power, and French Consul Herbin near Merawi. —The bodies were thrown into the river.” [9th Sept., Gordon to Baring:—‘‘I have sent Colonel Stewart because you have been silent all this while, and HAVE NEGLECTED US, and lost time WITHOUT DOING ANY GOOD.’’]

17th Sept.—Hartington to Wolseley.—‘‘You are fully aware of the views of Her Majesty’s Government.” (Which is more than they are themselves).

18th Sept.—Two telegrams from General Gordon complaining of slackness of Relief Expedition, and saying that the number of rebels was increasing. [23rd Feb. 1885. W. E. G. said:—‘‘We had no proof that General Gordon was in danger within the walls of Khartoum.”]

18th Sept.—Gordon to Baring.—‘‘I asked that I might be helped with reinforcements. Hitherto they have not come. Having so often promised the people that assistance would come, we are now as liars in their eyes. I am at Khartoum as a hostage, and it may cost me my life.” [27th Feb. 1885, W. E. Forster says:—‘‘The Prime Minister evidently believes that the delay in the sending of the expedition did not cause Gordon’s death. He almost went so far as to suppose that the delay prolonged his life.”]

20th Sept.—Baring to Granville.—‘‘Gordon has given Stewart orders to burn Berber. I have informed Stewart that he should not allow Berber to be burnt.” [Since it may become useless to the Mahdi, as it did.]

4th Oct.—Baring to Granville.—Enclosing despatch from General Gordon, who writes:—‘‘We must fight it out with our own means. If blessed by God we shall succeed. If not His will, so be it.” [1st Sept., W. E. G. says:—‘‘We have not known as much as we could have desired to know of all Egyptian affairs. The public out of doors naturally [very!] have known still less”—because the despatches had been carefully “doctored” before issue.]

MORE “EXPEDITION.”

4th Oct.—Lord Wolseley arrives at Wady Halfa—and delays for four days waiting for a fresh supply of Gladstone jam, marmalade, pickles, napkin rings, toothpicks, safety matches, Gladstone bags (from Galashiels), and angling tackle, “to capture flounders in the Nile, where the only fish is the crocodile.”

13th Oct.—Announcement that the Madhi, having heard that General Gordon was running short of provisions, was determined to starve out the Garrison.

19th Oct.—The Madhi advancing rapidly on Khartoum—Lord Wolseley not advancing rapidly on Khartoum.

24th Oct.—Wolseley to Hartington.—‘‘Burke remains at Wady Halfa for another fortnight to push on supplies, and, generally speaking, to keep the ball rolling.” [Like Sisyphus.]

5th Nov.—Troops embark on the boats. The “expedition” goes up the Nile—so does 2d. on the Income Tax.

13th Nov.—Lord Wolseley marches back to Wady Halfa—to hasten his advance on Khartoum.

“Our only general, he had ten thousand men,
He led them up the Nile, and led them down again.”

[13th Nov., Lord Hartington says:—‘‘I should be very sorry to hazard any conjecture as to when Lord Wolseley will be before Khartoum.”]

20th Nov.—‘‘The average rate of the whaleboats is scarcely five miles a day.”—The Daily (? Delay) News.

26th Nov.—General Gordon writes:—‘‘I will accept nothing whatever from Gladstone’s Government. I will not even let them pay my expenses. I will never put foot in England again.”
"I cannot get him out o' the House."

Coriolanus.

"NEITHER RESCUE NOR RETIRE."
16th Dec.—Lord Wolseley at Korti—where he stays, and offers a prize to the first regiment that reaches Debbah.

27th Dec.—Arrangements for an advance very nearly completed. The troops will shortly move forward to save Mr Gladstone and gain a hundred pounds.

HOW THE DESPATCHES WERE "EDITED."

31st Dec.—Wolseley telegraphs to Baring (received by Granville, 1st Jan.):—"The messenger to General Gordon has just returned here. He brings only a piece of paper the size of a postage-stamp, on which is written:—'Khartoum all right. C. G. Gordon. Dec. 14, 1884.'"

[This information, evidently intended by Gordon for the enemy in the event of the messenger's capture, was published, but the following, intended for Wolseley and the Public, was suppressed by Granville:—]

"General Gordon told the messenger to give me the following message:—'We are besieged on three sides. Fighting goes on night and day. Enemy are numerous. Our troops are suffering from lack of provisions. Food we still have is little. Some grain and biscuit. We want you to come quickly. Do this without letting rumours of your approach spread abroad.'"

[N.B.—General Gordon's Diaries are edited in an equally satisfactory manner by Messrs. Gladstone & Co.]

12th Jan. 1885.—Wolseley to Harnington.—"I reached Korti on 16th Dec. . . . A small column would probably be able to fight its way into Khartoum. Possibly it might fight its way out again, but it could not bring away General Gordon and his garrison." [But it might have prevented treachery, and saved General Gordon's life.]

17th Jan.—Battle of Abu Klea. 168 British killed and wounded, including Colonel Burnaby and Lord St Vincent.

19th Jan.—Battle of Metammeh. 124 British killed and wounded, including General Stewart, Mr Cameron, and Mr Herbert.

FALL OF KHARTOUM.

24th Jan.—At last. After 3 months' delay, Sir Charles Wilson advances on Khartoum, Lord Wolseley remaining at Korti.

Letter from General Gordon, dated 14th Dec. 1884.

"All is up. I expect a catastrophe in ten days' time. It would not have been so if our people had kept me better informed of their intentions. My adieu to all." C. G. GORDON.

26th January 1885.

After a year's gallant defence, waiting for succour which never came, Khartoum is betrayed, and General Gordon assassinated.

"O LOVED ONE, LYING FAR AWAY,
WHAT WORD OF LOVE CAN DEAD LIPS SEND?
O WASTED DUST AND SENSELESS CLAY,
IS THIS THE END? IS THIS THE END?"
"Here I and Sorrow sit."
George Eliot’s Letters.

"MELENCOLIA."
“I had thought I had had men of some understanding
And wisdom, of my Council; but I find none.”

Shakespeare.
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