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BRAZIL AS A LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL UNIT

1. PHASES OF BRAZILIAN HISTORY

It is almost a truisim to say that interest in the history of a country is in proportion to the international importance of it as a nation. The dramatic circumstances that might have shaped that history are of no avail to make it worth knowing; the actual or past standing of the country and its people is thus the only practical motive. According to such an interpretation of historical interest, I may say that the international importance of Brazil seems to be growing fast.

Since the Great War, many books on South America have been published in the United States, and abundant references to Brazil may be found in all of them. Should I have to mention any of the recent books, I would certainly not forget Herman James’s *Brazil after a Century*,¹ Jones’s *South America*,² for the anthropogeographic point of view, Mary Williams’s *People and Politics of Latin America*,³ the books of Roy Nash, J. F. Normano, J. F. Rippy, Max Winkler, and others.

Considering Brazil as a South American political entity, it is especially the historical point of view that I purpose to interpret. Therefore it may be convenient to have a preliminary general view of the story of independent Brazil,

¹See reference, Lecture V, p. 296.
emphasizing the characteristic features of the different periods. Though usually precise dates are difficult to determine for the limitation of historical tendencies or trends, it happens that in Brazilian political evolution they seem to work satisfactorily enough.

1. The first ten years that followed independence, under Dom Pedro I, might be described as the period of political adjustment to constitutional life.

2. Then the first twenty years, 1831-1850, of the second emperor were the phase of internal strife in the provinces.

3. The next twenty years, 1850-1870, belong mostly to the history of external intervention in the River Plate affairs.

4. The last twenty years, 1870-1889, of the reign of Dom Pedro II, involved chiefly questions of social evolution—slave liberation and immigration—with a persistent republican propaganda.

5. With the republican institutions there is a quarter of a century, 1889-1914, of political adaptation and economic equipment of the country.

6. The war-crisis for ten years with presidency discussed and criticized.

7. The last ten years, 1930-1940, could be labeled: industrialization and social legislation—with a strong current of nationalism.

During these 120 years of independent life, Brazil, as a political unit in our continent, has had her international interest of different kinds interpreted by a diplomatic agency of remarkable continuity of views, on the whole, and of great wisdom and moderation. I do not know whether tolerance and mildness are political qualities for a nation; anyway, they belong to the Brazilian people, and history proves that, whatever the regime of the country, they were traditionally connected with Brazilian foreign policy.
Before stating the different problems that have called for the attention of republican diplomacy, it is necessary to say something about imperial and even colonial tradition.

II. TRADITIONS IN BRAZILIAN IMPERIAL DIPLOMACY

When the Brazilian nation became autonomous, there was no need to organize a new administrative system, to plan new international schemes, to train for a new political routine, for there had been no breaking up of the past, no swerving from established direction. On the contrary—and the fact seems unique among newly-formed nationalities—Brazil had already a well-organized foreign office with traditional views and ways. It was due to King John VI who, fleeing from Portugal in 1807 under the pressure of Napoleonic invasion, brought to Brazil, the new metropolis of his kingdom, papers, archives, officials, civil servants, and officers of one of the best-organized cabinets of Europe. Rio de Janeiro became thus the heir to Lisbon secrets from John I and his English wife, Philippa of Lancaster, Luis de Cunha, Alesandre de Gusmão, and the Marquis de Pombal. Four centuries of European political wisdom were piled in the royal trunks that landed in Brazil at that moment. And, as a Brazilian historian, Pedro Calmon, expresses it, King John rendered two great services to us: he endowed the country with a complete political apparatus of European make, and when he sailed away in 1821 he did not dismantle it. So we learned our lesson in European experience, and the Holy Alliance held no secrets for our rulers.

Although there was no discontinuity in Brazilian political activities on our continent, it does not imply that there was no evolution in the diplomatic system.

We inherited from the Portuguese system a certain attitude towards the Spanish American territories. Since 1679,
the Portuguese had repeatedly interfered in the River Plate. For the first time the Brazilian system had worked in 1750, and we had kept away from River Plate entanglements. But the European king, under cover of the Holy Alliance spirit, to uphold legitimacy and royalty against the revolution in Buenos Aires, interfered in Uruguay and finally annexed the Cisplatina Province. It was a personal triumph for King John, notwithstanding British diplomatic opposition. Soon after independence, the first emperor lost the heirloom of Cisplatina.

But against the Portuguese system of "imperial expansion," our policy turned little by little to the Brazilian system of "national consolidation," based on the principle of *uti possidetis*, expressed in the Treaty of Madrid, in 1750, by the Brazilian diplomacy of Alesandre de Gusmão.

The early relations of the United States with Brazil were not so friendly as they have become to-day. At the beginning of the nineteenth century privateering was unquestionably a profitable source of income to many American ship-owners. Baltimore's reputation as a rendezvous of privateers became so notorious that at the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 the Portuguese government submitted a memorial on the subject, and the powers agreed to take up the question in a friendly fashion with the United States. Undoubtedly Brazil was back of the Portuguese protest, because it was Brazil that had suffered particularly through this practice. The Banda Oriental, now the Republic of Uruguay, had been seized by the Portuguese in 1816 from Artigas and his Argentinian forces. Artigas, however, could not afford to lose Montevideo; hence he engaged a number of privateers to prey upon Portuguese commerce. The Abbé Correa, the Portuguese minister to the United States, asserted that the greater part of these privateers were fitted out and manned in the ports of the United States. Adams conceded not only that this abomination had spread over a large portion of the merchants and population of Baltimore, but that it had infected almost every officer of the United States in the place. . . . Fortunately, by 1820 the power of Artigas was completely broken.¹

This was a blessing for peace and security as evidenced in

the Treaty of 1828. In exchange we were able to compel River Plate governments to acknowledge the independence of Uruguay and our true southern boundaries.

Our reactionary attitude towards revolutionary explosions in Pernambuco in 1824 was duly appreciated by European monarchies of the Metternich system, but in America it was not approved in the same way. James Monroe is said to have expressed to the Argentinian Carlos Alvear his opinion that: the Brazilian government has close relations with European sovereigns but their relations with the new American nations are of mere courtesy, and undermined. On the other hand, Bolivar is supposed to have seriously planned a "destruction of the Empire" as stated in a letter from Dorrego to Lavalleja. As to our young emperor, while he had rather contradictory views on liberalism, his Americanism on the whole was of a constructive nature. The last scheme of Dom Pedro I was revealed, years later, to Manuel Moreno by the Foreign Office: Santo Amaro, his representative in London in 1830 had been instructed to discuss the possibility of enthroning European princes of royal blood in South American capitals. In 1831, however, he was compelled to abdicate himself. Curiously enough, his son, Pedro II, was not interested in the strange adventure of his cousin, Maximilian of Mexico, thirty years later.

The twenty years' period of the regency during Dom Pedro II's minority and the first years of his reign was one of internal strife and turbulence in the River Plate provinces.

Soon after the accession of the new emperor, local revolutions had broken out on political grounds in Minas, São Paulo, Recife, and Rio Grande do Sul. In this last province the "Farrapos" or "Tramps" war lasted ten years, 1835–1845. The gaucho rebels of the south never appealed for
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foreign support, but the revolution itself was intimately connected with the River Plate crises, because of the attitude of Argentine and Uruguayan leaders toward the empire. The most interesting episode of that whole period of history in Buenos Aires was what has been called the “Age of Rosas,” a twenty years’ dictatorship of a so-called federalist caudillo, J. Manuel Rosas, whose “lack of a sound, wholesome sense of humour,” says Mary Williams, “invited fanatical extremes.”

For ten solid years, Dom Pedro II hesitated to interfere with River Plate caudillos. The year 1843 seems to be the turning-point in Brazilian diplomacy; it started the preparation of a new system in foreign policy, the intervention period that lasted from 1850 to 1870. The knotty point of the question was the siege of Montevideo by the commander-in-chief of Rosas’ army, the “blanco” caudillo Oribe. The imperial government had no special sympathy towards the besieged “colorado” caudillo Rivera, who had friends among the “farrapos” rebels in Brazil. So the first move of imperial diplomacy was to accept an exchange of views with Tomas Guido, Rosas’ representative in Rio de Janeiro. Mutual support was then considered, but the Brazilian cabinet insisted on a definite boundary convention with Uruguay and a positive acknowledgment of Uruguayan sovereignty. A preliminary treaty was negotiated, but for unknown reasons Rosas rejected it. At that moment it was all the worse for Brazil that England and France had recognized the blockade of Montevideo, and the hostility of Rosas was all the more significant. An inversion of attitudes was the result of the new Brazilian move in Uruguay and the “South American Troy” was victualed by our ships. In consequence, peace was restored in the Rio Grande by the pacification policy of the Duke of Caxias; a Brazilian emissary was sent to President Carlos López of Paraguay; the Marquis of Abrantes was
sent to Europe to persuade Aberdeen and Guizot to help Rivera in Montevideo.

At that time our diplomatic relations with England were strained on account of difficulties that had arisen about the enforcement of the Aberdeen Bill on the slave trade. England was opposed to Brazilian intervention in the River Plate quarrel. At any rate, imperial diplomacy in 1850 succeeded in financing the resistance of Montevideo and came to an understanding with Urquiza, Rosas' caudillo in Entre Rios. A coalition was thus organized, with Argentinian, Uruguayan, and Brazilian elements, so that when the English cabinet started to discuss the case the London *Times* published the intervention news and, a few days later, Rosas was defeated at Monte Caseros and had to leave Buenos Aires on a British ship.

Thus were Argentina and Uruguay restored to normal representative government and Brazilian intervention appeared in its true light, pacifying, constructive, liberal, and American.

In Uruguayan political life the blanco party had always been anti-Brazilian and favored Argentina; the colorado party, on the other hand, was favorable to Brazil. Ten years later, in 1864, the complaints of Brazilian landowners in Uruguay, cattle breeders, and "rancheros" settled in northern departments, compelled the imperial government to send a special agent to Montevideo. This was the Saraiva Mission charged with demanding reparation for blanco aggression and attacks. In the meantime the new president of Paraguay, dictator Solano López, gave his underhand support to Uruguayan resistance, and the Saraiva Mission failed to obtain reparation. The empire was thus led to back the Uruguayan rebels of Venancio Flores and a new war started with the blockade of Salto and of Paysandú by the Brazilian fleet.
Montevideo surrendered at last and the colorados were restored to office.

This second war made unavoidable the third conflict: the Paraguayan War of five years, a long, cruel, and costly struggle. Over 100,000 Paraguayan soldiers lost their lives to uphold tyranny in South America. The Paraguayan dictator died in the last battle. The Brazilian monarch extended to the unhappy country his protection and generosity; there was neither retaliation, annexation, mortgage, nor irredentism. Brazil had found in Mitre, president of Argentina, and Flores, president of Uruguay, two helpful allies, who, acting in close cooperation, proved that the Brazilian attitude was the expression of continental political agreement.

The last phase of our imperial life was a period of twenty years of peace and prosperity. Dom Pedro II had promised that so long as he should live, no new war would ever drive him into conflict. The venerable old monarch upheld conciliation, accommodation, and arbitration as the best ways to settle international difficulties.

It was under his influence that our “imperial system” submitted to the President of the United States the boundary discussion we still had in 1889 with the Argentine Republic—the so-called Mission Territory question, that was settled later according to our claims.

III. PHASES OF REPUBLICAN DIPLOMACY

When republican government was established, in November, 1889, the recognition of the new order by foreign powers was by no means an easy task.

In America, I admit, the Spanish-speaking countries greeted the new regime with cordiality and sympathy. They were eager to see Brazil complete the list of American
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republics. The Argentine statesman Alberti had written in his *Essays*: “The existence of a monarchical power in Brazil does not suit American Republics.” Another Argentine, Juan Carlos Gómez, had written to General Mitre: “I love the Brazilian people, but I hate the Brazilian Monarchy.” Indeed, Argentina and Uruguay promptly recognized the new republic on November 20, 1889, five days after the proclamation; and in turn recognition was accorded by Chile on December 13; on January 3, 7, 13, and 29, respectively, by Bolivia, Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States; on February 6 by Guatemala and El Salvador, and on February 20 by Colombia, while in March Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras followed suit.

In Europe there was at the beginning a sort of lack of confidence in the provisional government that had overthrown the empire. There was also a significant expectant attitude of most monarchical governments in relation to what republican France would do. The negotiations in Paris were rather delayed and our agent, Baron de Itajubá, had some difficulties with Monsieur Ribot on account of a decree on naturalization issued by the Brazilian government on December 14, 1889, involving foreign residents in the country, and also on account of boundary disputes in Guiana. Only in June, 1890, was the French cabinet satisfied with our explanation and willing to recognize the new political form of government.

In Germany, Bismarck had a rather curious way of solving the question: his attitude in Berlin, not even receiving officially our envoy, differed totally from his attitude in Rio de Janeiro, where his envoy was instructed to carry on relations with the new Brazilian government.

In London, Salisbury admitted unofficially the Brazilian minister, but waited until the republican constitution had
been promulgated to invite him to the Queen’s “drawing room.”

On the other hand, Portugal, Italy, and Spain were unwilling to take definite action before hearing from France, whether, in the light of that country’s experience with revolutions, ours was of a trustworthy type.

In Belgium recognition was unexpectedly involved in claims of Gaz Company shareholders.

Russia, bound by tradition, only recognized the Brazilian Republic in May, 1892, after the death of Emperor Pedro II.

At last, in the United States, discussions in Congress on Brazilian affairs proceeded as a sequence to the debates on President Harrison’s message of December 2, 1889, in which immediate recognition was recommended.

Senator Morgan, Democrat, of Alabama, made a motion in support of the recommendation, referring in particular to the personality of the emperor, his visit to the United States, his liberalism, and rare qualities. He thought that any hesitation by the United States might have encouraged European monarchical interference in South America to restore the old regime, impair autonomy in our continent, and thus bring us under the operation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Republican senators were not so eager to act and wanted more information on recent Brazilian political events. Finally the motion was sent to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and recognition followed in February, 1890.

Early in our republican life, and after two unimportant diplomatic incidents, one with Portugal and the other with Great Britain, there appeared on the Brazilian political stage the remarkable personality of J. M. da Silva Paranhos, known as the Baron of Rio Branco, or simply “the Baron.”

He was the son of the Viscount of Rio Branco, a statesman of the imperial regime. Born in 1845, he studied law in São
Paulo and Recife, followed his father in a mission to the River Plate and Paraguay, and was elected deputy in 1869 by the Conservative Party. He soon entered journalism and stood for the freedom of the slaves.

His diplomatic career started in 1876 when appointed to Liverpool as consul-general. He spent long years in Europe, studying almost exclusively Brazilian affairs, history, politics, and geography, in European archives and libraries.

Therefore it was not by accident that the republican government chose Rio Branco, though not a republican himself, but evidently the best-equipped specialist to defend Brazilian interests in Washington, where our territorial dispute with Argentina, about the Mission Territory between the Uruguay River and the Iguassú River, had been submitted to the President of the United States for arbitration. In February, 1895, President Cleveland’s decision acknowledged Brazilian rights: it was a victory of justice and of learning as well. The “Brazilian Memoir” of Rio Branco was a masterpiece.

It was only natural that after such a success another similar mission should be entrusted to the Baron. It was the territorial question of the Guiana, a controversy with France that went as far back as the Treaty of Utrecht. The question was submitted to the arbitration of the Swiss Federal Council. Another “Brazilian Memoir” of 840 pages was produced in Berne by Rio Branco and, in 1900, another diplomatic victory of the same kind was achieved by Brazil.

When Councillor Rodrigues Alves was elected president of the republic for the term 1902–1906, he invited the Baron to be his Foreign Secretary. Rio Branco came back to his country, reorganized the Chancery, centralizing in his office a well-informed “Intelligence Service” in close contact with all American diplomatic moves. And for ten years, until his
untimely death in 1912, he was the Brazilian Chancellor, the most popular man in the country, with moral authority and political prestige.

These ten years might be described as the Golden Era of Brazilian diplomacy.

The extensive frontier that both colonial and imperial regimes had bequeathed to the republic was in great part unsettled and uncertain. It was one of Rio Branco’s chief purposes to have it settled by international agreements. One of Brazil’s most prominent personalities, the historian and diplomatist Joaquim Nabuco, helped to solve another Brazilian frontier dispute by arbitration of the King of Italy, who in June, 1904, awarded most of the area in dispute to British Guiana. Later on Joaquim Nabuco was sent to Washington as our first Ambassador.

Out of 16,300 kilometers of continental frontiers, 14,000 kilometers were settled by Rio Branco, while in office; and the territory awarded to Brazil by his negotiations amounts to almost 450,000 square kilometers.

By far the greatest diplomatic stroke was the Brazilian achievement in the well-known Acre Territory, where a Brazilian community of settlers in the Upper Amazonian jungle had set up a sort of independent state in open conflict with Bolivian authorities and the newly incorporated Bolivian Syndicate. Rio Branco’s intervention caused an expeditionary corps to be sent to prevent hostilities between Bolivian troops and the Acreans. Peace was successfully maintained, and a few months later the Treaty of Petropolis was signed between Brazil and Bolivia, November, 1903. We purchased the territory for two million pounds. A boundary adjustment was established, and we promised to build a 300-kilometer railway along the Madeira and Mamoré rivers to afford an outlet for India rubber exports of all
the Brazilian-Bolivian Amazonian tributaries. Almost 150,000 square kilometers were thus peacefully annexed to Brazilian territory. Besides being good business it was an effective application of our traditional policy of *uti possidetis*. In three years, production of India rubber paid for the purchase.

Many more adjustments were negotiated by the Baron to settle our frontier questions with Venezuela, Colombia, and Dutch Guiana, and a boundary treaty was signed also with Peru for the western part of the Acre Territory, in 1909. In conformity with the spirit of the first republican constitution, no fewer than thirty arbitration treaties were ratified with all the nations.

Many other events of diplomatic significance were brought about by Rio Branco: the first cardinal for South America was appointed by Rome; the first South American Embassy in Washington was accepted; the Third Pan American Congress was summoned in Rio de Janeiro, in 1906, with a visit of Secretary Elihu Root; Brazil was represented by Ruy Barbosa at the Second Hague Conference in 1907.

All these facts show a growing international interest in Brazil as the result of intelligent and efficient political action of which Rio Branco was the promoter.

Of course such activity would arouse opposition in some quarters. Brazilian diplomacy was denounced as imperialistic by an Argentine statesman and journalist, Zeballos. In 1908 the famous Dispatch No. 9 was distorted by the press as meaning evil intentions of the Brazilian government in the River Plate. The Baron did not hesitate to publish the cipher, and the true tenor of the dispatch was revealed as the most peaceful and conciliatory instructions that a government could send.

Rio Branco's sentiments toward Argentina are expressed
in a private letter to the Argentine minister, Gorostiaga, in 1905: "I spent my youth," he wrote, "during the effective alliance of Brazil and Argentina. I am the son of a man who always was a sincere friend of the Argentine nation as he often proved in his political career. I wish that it might be said some day that during my term of office I did everything to dissipate misunderstandings and tighten relations of harmony between the two nations. Every day I am more convinced that a cordial understanding between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile would be of the greatest advantage to all three of them and would benefit others, beyond their frontiers."

Toward the United States Rio Branco's feelings might be gauged by the last lines of an article under the pseudonym, J. Penn, written by him when foreign secretary. "All the maneuvers against us tried in Washington, since 1823 up to now, have always failed against the unconquerable barrier of traditional friendliness that happily links Brazil to the United States, and it is the duty of the present generation to foster it with the same spirit and eagerness as our forefathers." These words are truly the most telling advice on foreign policy that has been bequeathed to Brazil by the Great Chancellor.

Not long after Rio Branco's death the world crisis dragged civilized nations into the Great War. Brazil kept neutral as long as possible, but not without a marked sympathy toward the Allies, chiefly under the influence of a prominent statesman, Ruy Barbosa, who could not remain an "indifferent spectator," as he said, in the world tragedy. After the unrestricted submarine warfare began in 1917, the country changed its attitude and severed diplomatic relations with Germany as the United States entered the conflict. In October of the same year the sinking of Brazilian ships determined the congress to join the Allies. Brazil sided with
those whose position was, at the time, most critical and less promising. It was a severe drawback to her economic life, but it had, at least, one happy result: it drew our attention to the necessity of intensifying our relations with the United States and, consequently, to the leading of a decidedly American life. We realized at last in a practical way what Elihu Root had said in 1907: our national resources are complementary and so are our respective populations, their activities, and their mentalities. These facts had considerable bearing henceforth on our foreign policy.

After peace was restored Brazil joined the League of Nations and was able to secure one of the four non-permanent seats in the Council. She played her part in the pacific settlement of disputes, namely, in the Aaland Islands case between Sweden and Finland in 1921. For six years Brazil held her seat in a state of semi-permanence, but in 1926 when the entry of Germany was decided upon, and the Concert of Great Powers seemed willing to drop old friends for new, the Brazilian government thought it advisable to give notice of their resignation. The withdrawal of Brazil from the League did not involve her indifference to the non-political activities of the World Court and the Labor Bureau. The League of Nations episode, in the diplomatic life of the country, emphasized to us the fact that Pan Americanism is, for the time being, the only practical form of internationalism.

"It is necessary to recognize that the Council, as constituted," says Gathorne-Hardy, "was definitely a compromise between the democratic theory of the League and the practical survival of a Concert of Great Powers, without whose approval the new order could not be expected to work. . . . a class distinction in the international hierarchy was implicit in the arrangement."\(^1\)

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The failure of the League of Nations in America became apparent in 1933 when four non-American representatives, Spain, Great Britain, France, and Italy, besides Mexico, were appointed to adjust the Chaco quarrel in South America. Both belligerents, Paraguayans and Bolivians alike, announced that they preferred Americans. A mediatory group consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay succeeded in a few months in bringing about negotiations for peace—a protocol was signed in June, 1935. Once more Brazilian diplomacy was called to join in with her sister republics.

IV. BRAZIL AND PAN AMERICANISM

It appears that the Monroe Doctrine has two meanings: a general one on which everybody seems to agree, because everybody sees in it the same thing, let us say, an almost exclusive interest in American territories and activities; and an individual view, that has not yet commanded unanimous approval, in which every single person or group of persons finds a different thing, according to an optimistic or a pessimistic view of human affairs. Thus in addition to a permanent element, the Monroe Doctrine has expedient and pragmatic elements that vary according to opportunities.

The first point of view, the only one that interests us, as a lasting interpretation, shows a closer connection with what we call Pan Americanism. “We are Americans and nothing could ever find us indifferent.”

The Monroe Doctrine is an international principle, maybe, but it is far more an attitude of the American mind. It is my purpose to examine, as far as Brazil is concerned, what our reactions have been in connection with it.

First of all: Brazil had a Monroe Doctrine before President Monroe had delivered his well-known message of 1823. We
were still a Portuguese colony, a kingdom, when our regent, Prince Pedro of Bragança, sent to the United States of America and to Buenos Aires consular representatives that were, in fact, secret agents of his political plans for independence. To Correa da Camara, our agent in Buenos Aires, José Bonifacio gave confidential instructions which run as follows:¹ "You shall show that a recolonization of Brazil is an impossibility." This was written on May 30, 1822, ninety days before our independence was declared.² These confidential instructions say further:

Yet, if it were believable that Brazil would fall to pieces owing to internal divisions, the example would prove fatal to America and her other States would repent in vain not having helped us; but, as soon as Unity and Independence are consolidated, Europe shall at once lose all hope of restoring her domination in her former colonies. After having skillfully persuaded (the Buenos Aires government) that the interests of this Kingdom are the same as those of the other States of this Hemisphere, and demonstrated the destinies they share with us, your Lordship shall promise on behalf of his Royal Highness the solemn acknowledgement of their political independence, and shall explain the invaluable benefits that would result from a Confederation or an offensive and defensive Treaty with Brazil, in order to oppose, with all Spanish American Governments, the astute plots of European policy.

Brazil was ripe for hearing and understanding President Monroe’s advice. A few days later, on June 10, more instructions were sent to our secret agent by our Foreign Office: "I may inform your Lordship that His Royal Highness does not wish to adopt a system that would not prove to be American, for He is convinced that the interests of all American Governments, whatever they are, must all be considered as homogeneous, resulting from the same principle: a just and firm repulse of the arrogant claims of Europe."

²President Monroe recognized our Independence in 1824. "At the cabinet meeting when the question was brought up, Mr. Wirt opposed recognition on the ground that the government was monarchical and not republican; but both Calhoun and Adams favored recognition on the basis of independence alone, leaving aside all consideration of internal government"—Graham H. Stuart, op. cit., p. 421.
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Early in 1824, José Sylvestre Rebello was appointed first diplomatic representative to the United States. About two months after Monroe’s message enunciating the Monroe Doctrine, the imperial government had sent Rebello the following instructions: “The principles expressed in the President’s message of December to both Houses have a more general application to all the States of this Continent, as the message announces clearly the necessity of uniting ourselves to struggle for the defense of our rights and territories. Your Lordship shall feel the dispositions of the United States Government towards an offensive and defensive alliance with this Empire, as a part of the American Continent; provided such an alliance have no reciprocal concessions as a base, but only the principle of mutual convenience thereof resulting.” Rebello suggested a concert of American powers to sustain the general system of American independence and proposed a definite alliance.

“Monroe,” says Graham Stuart, “declined the proposal in private to Adams; but no official reply was made until Adams became President, when Clay declared that the prospect of a speedy peace between Portugal and Brazil seemed to make such an alliance unnecessary.”

In 1825, an incident brought about strained relations between Brazil and the United States. Condy Raguet, the American chargé, protested against the Brazilian blockade of Buenos Aires, and a crisis was reached when the American vessel, the Spark, was seized in 1827 by a Brazilian warship, as suspected of being a privateer. Unsatisfied with the Brazilian explanations, Raguet “the next day asked for his passports and the Emperor, although ‘surprised at this precipitate request couched in abrupt and vague language’ ordered them to be delivered, but with the notice that the

American representative would be answerable to his government for the consequences which might result. Before the break in diplomatic relations came, both Clay and Adams became convinced that Mr. Raguet’s language and conduct were not so reserved as they should have been, and in a note dated January 20, 1827, Clay wrote Raguet that the President would have been better satisfied if he had abstained from some of the language employed."

The interruption of diplomatic relations in Rio did not extend to Washington, for Clay, being assured by Rebello that reparations would be forthcoming, named as chargé at Rio, William Tudor, a merchant at Lima. The appointment proved excellent. Tudor was a man of tact and good judgment. He placed the relations between the two nations upon a firm basis of friendly understanding. He concluded a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, incorporating the most-favored nation clause and settlement of the blockade question.

It would take too long to quote all the episodes of a century of friendly relations, in which the words “American interests,” “friendship,” “understanding,” and even “alliance” have frequently been repeated as expressing attitudes and purposes held in common. It would be sufficient to quote the words of some of our most prominent statesmen like Rio Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and others.

In 1910, at the Fourth Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires, the Brazilian minister at Buenos Aires, Dr. Domicio da Gama, explained to members of the Chilean delegation the wish of the late Ambassador Nabuco to present to the Conference a motion which “would evidence the recognition by all the countries of America of the fact

that the Monroe Doctrine had been beneficial to them.” It was a formal declaration the Government of Brazil desired to present without any change, out of respect to the memory of the Ambassador, “recognizing it as a permanent factor making for international peace upon the American Continent.” Alexandre Alvarez proposed a rather different resolution, “a factor contributing towards guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Nations of this Continent.” It was submitted to the members of the Argentine delegation. Some delegates thought that the approval of the motion would be sanction of “many acts of hegemony committed by the United States by which more than one country had felt its sovereign dignity to have been wounded.” Therefore the delegation of the United States, though admitting the right of Latin America to make the Monroe Doctrine hers, feared the discussion would create dissensions in the assembly, and thought it preferable to make no presentation at all. Brazil realized that unanimous assent was difficult to obtain. Anyway the incident helped to make clear: (1) that the Monroe Doctrine was in accord with the New World diplomatic aims and was part of its public law; (2) that the Chilean government was willing to join in the resolution; (3) that the wording was difficult to find without exciting European susceptibilities, and some states wanted restrictions as to the United States hegemony; (4) that Brazil had not received a diplomatic rebuff; (5) that the Monroe Doctrine was not disavowed by the Conference, since the question was not one of public law proclaimed, but of simply a historical fact recognized as having dominated the political life of the New World.

In 1923 the Centennial of the Monroe Doctrine was celebrated on December 2 in our Foreign Office, and Chancellor Felix Pacheco in his speech mentioned the diverse interpre-
tations of that Doctrine, but added: "It is not my business to say anything about these interpretations. As Minister of Foreign Affairs of my country, my duty is to affirm, once more, our gratitude to, and besides that gratitude, our close solidarity with the United States of America in supporting that line of action in which the idea of mutual help and assistance the American nations owe to one another is a capital element."

Chancellor Pacheco’s conviction was that the Doctrine had worked long enough to prove that it was a permanent factor of peace on the American continent.

The Chilean internationalist, Alexandre Alvarez, has abundantly proved that the political and economic history of the New World has provided all the elements for an American international law.

As European international law, resulting from Christian civilization and occidental culture, seemed to be universal, it would be difficult for Europeans to admit the existence of an Asiatic or of an African international law, yet there are such laws and their existence in no way destroys the universal community of nations.

The American international law ignores such questions as "influence zone," "protectorate," "neutral states," "personal union," etc. On the other hand, "federation," "nationality," "international rivers and canals" have different meanings in America, and many more problems of international cooperation and support have among us a broader field. Our fifty years’ experience of Pan American Conferences has emphasized many new aspects of inter-American relations, many more than Secretary Blaine ever dreamed of when he invited us to Washington in 1889.

A long way has been travelled since: the third Conference was summoned in 1906 in Rio de Janeiro, and the last one,
the eighth, was summoned in Lima in 1938. Brazil has faithfully attended all these meetings, besides many others, and has sent her representatives to Europe, to the Hague Peace Conference in 1907, and to the Versailles Peace Settlement, after the first Great War, but always the same principles have guided her attitude, and those principles were typically Pan American.

To European diplomatists it was almost scandalous for the Brazilian delegate, Ruy Barbosa, to talk in 1907 of compulsory arbitration, to propose equality of all nations in the Permanent Court of Justice, and to suggest the non-recognition of acquisitions by war or by threat—an interpretation that later on was to be known as the “Stimson Doctrine,” in 1932. As one of our prominent internationalists, Dr. Raúl Fernandes, defined us in 1928, “Brazil, from an international point of view, is synonymous with Arbitration.”

These were truly American ideals that could only have grown in Pan American hot-beds, and it might be inferred that in extra-American meetings Brazil has always represented the tradition of America.

Lately our President, Dr. Getulio Vargas, said, “Extending to the field of economic cooperation our relations of good neighborliness with a marked character of continental solidarity, our Country shows how ideals of American fraternalization may be attained.”

V. THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS

Brazil has always maintained friendly feelings towards her sister republics of the continent. A traditional friendship has long existed between Brazil and Chile; with the Argentine also there are cordial memories of alliances in the past, for example, against Rosas and in the Paraguayan War; nor did Rio Branco’s victory in the Mission Territory arbitration
blur any of them substantially. In 1899, General Julio Roca visited Brazil, and the next year President Campos Salles returned the visit. An Argentine president, Roque Saenz Pena, had already declared to Brazil: “Everything unites us, nothing divides us.”

When, in the beginning of 1914, the Tampico incident and the Vera Cruz landing nearly resulted in a Mexican War, the so-called A.B.C. powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, did not hesitate to instruct their ambassadors in Washington to meet President Wilson in conference and offer their friendly intervention. It was accepted and the Niagara Falls meeting smoothed the whole situation.

After the World War had started, the A.B.C. powers thought that perhaps their cooperation in America would prove useful. A treaty was signed in Buenos Aires on May 25, 1915, the Argentine Independence Day, to “make easy the pacific solution of international controversies.” The A.B.C. initiative, however, was not always well interpreted: Peru and Bolivia, still sore over the Tacna and Arica question with Chile, tried a “Bolivarian league” to oppose the possible hegemony which the A.B.C. might try to establish in South America.

The A.B.C. Treaty, however, was never ratified by Argentina, yet in 1932 the A.B.C. made a worthy attempt to settle the Leticia controversy between Peru and Colombia. In short, the A.B.C. entente never worked as such, not because of any idea of domination, but because the remainder of the alphabet was missing, and the true Pan American spirit requires both totality and equality among American nations.

The A.B.C. group has proved itself useful in international relations, and might still be of some help in the future, but merely as an occasional American group that agrees on some special question, and not as an international entity with a
permanent committee, as was planned in 1915. Brazil and the Argentine are the best friends in the world, they are economically complementary, and are not competitors, but their leanings are diverse: Argentina is far more European in her sympathies, interests, and politics.

It would not be fair to say that Brazil has kept away from powerful European influences. Our civilization was born of European cultural complexes, and we do not intend to sever our ties with Europe.

But these ties are of different kinds. With practically all nations of the Old World we have important commercial relations: they are the basis of diplomatic connections with the European powers. Since the early years of our independence, commercial and navigation treaties have been signed with the different countries; they were denounced in the twentieth century and new understandings were drawn. For the time being, we have provisional commercial agreements, passed in 1936, with most European countries.

Another line of special interests concerns the nations that send us an annual flow of immigrants. We are therefore in more intimate diplomatic contact with Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Germany, as well as Japan, in Asia.

The pre-eminence of England in our foreign relations during more than a century was due in part to the financial dependence of Brazil. With Germany there has been scientific contact; from Italy a great deal of Latin culture has come through artistic channels. Portugal, in former times, revealed Asia, and chiefly India, to the Brazilians.

But the greatest cultural influence, through literature, art, political life, fashions, and social customs has been that of France. And of course such a powerful contact, though slightly in decline, owing to competition of other cultures, is bound to create political sympathies that even opposite economic interests are not able to abate or even to check.
A Brazilian diplomatist, Helio Lobo, has recently written about our position in America: "With the United States, we were in America a variant of language and customs, besides other factors that segregated us also." Was that the origin of our friendship? Did that friendship always exist? The fact deserves investigation, as the interest of the American reader in Brazil seems to have increased lately, for several books refer to the diplomatic relations of the two countries.

It is possible that when official correspondence, reports, and private archives of the two nations have been searched and studied, different phases of these relations will appear under a new light.

The first phase began when we became independent of Portugal and tried to interest the government in Washington in our affairs, for example, through the missions of G.da Cruz and Sylvestre Rebello. It was a period of mutual sympathy without cooperation.

The second phase, although it involves the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1828, was marked by the missions to Rio de Janeiro of Raguet, of Henry Wise, and General Watson Webb. Incidents were multiplied; perhaps some blunders were made: we recognized Maximilian, we insisted on being neutrals in the Civil War, we saw our attitude in the River Plate ill interpreted. I would call that the period of mutual distrust, which lasted until Watson Webb was recalled in 1869.

The third period is a period of calm and soothing effect. The Brazilian republican evolution makes us more alike; we are no more suspected—recovered sympathy is joined by interest in the Commercial Agreement of 1891—sympathy and interest might be its title.

The fourth period starts in 1902, when the Great Chancellor came into office. It is the phase of Rio Branco, Elihu
Root, Joaquim Nabuco, in Pan American Congresses. There is more than interest: it is the period of good will and cooperation.

The fifth phase starts with the joining in the Great War and the after-war developments. It spells even more than cooperation; it is mutual understanding and help. That is still the situation we are trying to improve, if possible.

"The fact," says Normano, "that Brazil's attitude toward the United States is more friendly than that of any Spanish American country, has been noted by many writers of the United States," and he quotes Bingham, Clarence Haring, Percy Martin, and others. If the spirit of a truly political alliance is already in the air, what shall the next phase be called, I wonder?

Carlos Delgado de Carvalho.