THE RICE INSTITUTE

ERNST JÜNGER

AND THE "FIGURE" OF THE WORKER

by

Robert P. Newton

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

Houston, Texas
October 1958
Raised in a comparatively stable society, in one of the most politically conservative states in the world, an American tends to be baffled by the personality that, with intelligence and sensitivity, deliberately advocates totalitarian schemes. Reading superficially the anti-liberal literature of Germany, one is struck by the fact that concepts such as Freedom, Democracy, Progress, and Individualism have come into ill repute. Their opposites have become the slogans of a fuller life. Even totalitarianism, one then finds, is in some sense pursuing the ideals of a more intense existence; of freedom—from indecision; and of stronger personal identity—by identification. Insofar as the totalitarian thinker is not cynical, hypocritical, or self-deceiving, what does he find desirable in a state to whose interests the totalitarian himself is fundamentally subordinated?

In Ernst Jünger we are fortunate, or disquieted, to find a man of intelligence, a man who has been called "the greatest German stylist of the twentieth century," scientifically educated, his courage proved in battle, acquainted with the world—a man who also wrote a book which is as close to being a bible of totalitarianism as one could well imagine. In this book, Der Arbeiter, there is not a single good word for "Inalienable Rights" or "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."

Ernst Jünger later demonstrated that he could say convincing and forceful things about the individual, his freedom and the foundation
of tolerable society in mutual respect. What were the formative moments, then, that produced *Der Arbeiter*? How does a man see himself who sees men as simple functionaries in a great collective work? What could such a work possibly be? These are the questions prompting this dissertation.

After an introduction to some social and intellectual factors directly affecting the times under consideration, Ernst Jünger's early career will be resumed and his personal motivations examined. On this basis his intellectual perspective, his vision of "figures," will be analyzed. There follows a presentation of the "Worker," totalitarian man, as seen by these eyes. In conclusion, Jünger's somewhat dismayed reassessment of values, after 1934, is outlined.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface .......................................................... 1
Reference Abbreviations ........................................... 4

Chapter

I  Introduction ................................................... 5
II  Ernst Jünger's Rebellion ..................................... 29
III What Makes Ernst Jünger Run? ............................... 44
IV  "Figures" and "Bearing" ..................................... 50
V  The Worker ................................................... 72
VI  Aftermath .................................................... 89

Notes ............................................................... 98
Bibliography ..................................................... 124
REFERENCE ABBREVIATIONS

I. The following abbreviations are used in the body of the text; for information on editions, see Bibliography.

A  Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter
AF Jünger, Ernst, Atlantische Fahrt
AH Jünger, Ernst, Das abenteuerliche Herz, "Zweite Fassung"
AS Jünger, Ernst, Afrikanische Spiele
BG Jünger, Ernst, Besuch auf Godenholm
BS Jünger, Ernst, Blätter und Steine
EBWB Brock, Erich, Das Weltbild Ernst Jünger
F  Jünger, Ernst, Der Friede
FB Jünger, Ernst, Feuer und Blut
GK Jünger, Ernst, Der Gordische Knoten
GNAG Nebel, Gerhard, Ernst Jünger, Abenteuer des Geistes
GS Jünger, Ernst, Färten und Straßen
H  Jünger, Ernst, Helionpolis
ISG Jünger, Ernst, In Stahlgewittern
RM Ortega y Gasset, José, The Revolt of the Masses
Schl Die Schleife, Dokumente zum Weg Ernst Jüngers
S  Jünger, Ernst, Strahlungen
TM Jünger, Ernst, "Die totale Mobilmachung," in Krieg und Krieger
W  Jünger, Ernst, Das Wäldchen 125
WG Jünger, Ernst, Der Waldgang

II. Throughout the notes, Nietzsche's Werke refers to the editions published by Alfred Kröner, Leipzig, 1903-1923.
"Aufgestanden ist er, welcher lange schlief,
Aufgestanden unten aus Gewölben tief.
In der Dämmerung steht er, groß und unbekannt,
Und den Mond zerdrückt er in der schwarzen Hand.

In den Abendlärm der Städte fällt es weit,
Frost und Schatten einer fremden Dunkelheit.
Und der Märkte runder Wirbel stockt zu Eis.
Es wird still. Sie sehen sich um. Und keiner weiß."¹

No one knew. Yet many felt, like Georg Heym, the same ambiguous
dread of a World War, years before 1914 saw the outbreak of active
hostility. Often a contradictory spirit of expectancy and mounting
enthusiasm touched the same hearts. The advent of a great conflagration
had been prophesied too long by poets and philosophers and had too long
been the unconscious fear and hope of the restless masses, the goal too
long of adventurers and politicians, not finally to emerge as conscious
dreams of excitement, solidarity, and glory:

"...if only war would come! If only it would come—it is
lurking everywhere on glittering towers of clouds.... People
against people, land against land—nothing but a raging field
of thundering and lightning, a twilight of men, a joyous
destruction,"²
cried Gustav Sack, author of Ein verbummelter Student (1917), who would,
he claimed, rather be coarse than cultivated. Inexplicable forebodings appeared early, as the century turned, when R. M. Rilke wrote in September of 1899:

"Ich lebe grad, da das Jahrhundert geht.
Man fühlt den Wind von einem großen Blatt,
das Gott und du und ich beschrieben hat
und das sich hoch in fremden Händen dreht.

Man fühlt den Glanz von einer neuen Seite
auf der noch alles werden kann.

Die stillen Kräfte prüfen ihre Breite
und sehen einander dunkel an."³

A sort of hysteria, with apocalyptic visions, seized many writers such as Heym, Johannes Becher, and Albert Ehrenstein. Shortly before the war began, Stefan George issued ten copies of a book printed on Japanese paper, Der Stern des Bundes, containing the following poem:

"Ihr baut verbrechende an maass und grenze:
>Was hoch ist kann auch höher!< doch kein fund
Kein stütz und flick mehr dient..es wankt der bau.
Und an der weisheit end ruft ihr zum himmel:
>Was tun eh wir im eignen schutt ersticken
Eh eignes spukgebild das hirn uns zehrt?<
Der lacht: zu spät für stillstand und arznei!
Zehntausend muss der heilige wahnsinn schlagen
Zehntausend muss die heilige seuche raffen
Zehntausende der heilige krieg."⁴
Thus, long prepared for, variously anticipated, the first months of battle struck waves of popular enthusiasm, released long pent-up energies, and came to many like a great sigh of relief. Carl Zuckmayer writes about his feelings toward the declaration of war:

"As we read in the newspapers in the hotel we noticed nothing whatsoever of enthusiasm or national excitement, instead only disgust and loathing for the incomprehensible, the senseless automatism of this sliding of the sensible world into absurdity—and at night I wrote wildly excited verse condemning war. ...Three days later I joined in the rejoicing with holy inflamed passion and with deepest sacrificial earnestness. I experienced the excitement as redemption and release from all the oppressing anxieties of our epoch, life, and youth, as the powerful content of every soul thirsting after greatness and fulfilment—and I rushed to enlist immediately."

Doom—and redemption—were the great experiences of many of the important German intellectual figures during the closing years of the nineteenth-century and in the war-generation of the twentieth. For Ernst Jünger, the First World War was both formative experience and form of redemption. To understand Jünger and his reactions to society as he found and fought in it, one must appreciate the social currents which carried, after 1914, the complacent century of "progress" and the pacific hopes of liberalism into armed catastrophe, anarchy, Fascism, and an almost unprecedented explosion of irrationalism.

The first factor to be considered is both simple and fundamental. Jose Ortega y Gasset in The Revolt of the Masses (1932) analyses the sheer physical problem of masses of people, herded together in Europe as a result of the "population explosion" of the nineteenth century.
This crisis of over-crowding became in turn a political crisis, indeed, a crisis in human nature. Between the sixth century of our era and the eighteenth, the total population of Europe never exceeded one hundred and eighty millions. Between 1800 and 1914, however, the number of inhabitants rose to four hundred and sixty millions. Ortega y Gasset attributes this startling expansion to the interaction of technology and liberalism, a liberalism which is threatened by the very irresponsibility of its coddled and self-satisfied children:

"Heap after heap of human beings have been dumped onto the historic scene at such an accelerated rate, that it has been difficult to saturate them with traditional culture. And in fact, the average type of European at present possesses a soul, healthier and stronger it is true than those of the last century, but much more simple. Hence at times he leaves the impression of a primitive man suddenly risen in the midst of a very old situation."

Nevertheless, the "historic level" has risen; freedom and material well-being have been widely extended; the privileges of the mass-man have increased. The mass-man "uses the instruments invented by the select groups, and hitherto exclusively at their service." Yet, he does not share their consciousness of responsibility for the creation and maintenance of these instruments. He wants rights without duties and freedom without obedience. His vital desires are increasing, but he has no sense of purposiveness because he refuses to accept the feeling of insecurity which is essential to full and responsible life. The technical world is for him a product of nature, and he cannot see the need of "certain difficult human virtues" which must insure its functioning. The other aspect of this rebellion of the masses is desertion of responsibility by the directing minorities. Yet, the European cannot
live without some great unifying enterprise. His modern life is therefore not based on the solid substratum of life. "It is not a genuine impulse or need" (RM 135). Such, essentially, is Ortega y Gasset's argument.

This mass-man, because of the rise of the "historic level," represents in many respects a continuation of the bourgeois middle-class ethos of the latter half of the nineteenth century, an ethos which, in itself, is a degenerated form of the solid liberalism of the middle third of the century. Thus, the attack on the bourgeois ethos by men in the school of Nietzsche and Spengler transformed itself, after an initial sympathy for the more primitive vitality of the common man, into an attack on the new, more powerful, half-educated masses.

This anti-liberal tradition, especially in Germany, is a second important factor for the understanding of the two world wars. Anti-liberal criticism centered around the "bourgeois" complex of ideas—"irresponsible" liberal democracy, endless "empty" progress, the exaggeration and exacerbation of pettyish "individualism." This criticism opposed the uncommitted, facile, and somewhat superficial atmosphere of enlightenment, optimism, unlimited intellectual and personal option, and scientific positivism. German criticism, especially, traces the "Problematik" of the bourgeoisie to its intellectual foundations in the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). According to Rousseau, the middle-class society finds its loyalties fundamentally divided between class and state interests, which frequently may not coincide. The burgher is a private individual and at the same time a citizen of the state. How does he reconcile the
legitimate demands of his personality with the very different-natured requirements of the society as a whole? How can he be both an "homme" and a "citoyen," since in attempting both he comes to a stalemate of forces when no regulative concept exists? What he does become in such a case is a typical bourgeois spirit, that is, nothing definite at all. It is to this very basic dilemma that modern political schemes, including the totalitarian ones, have sought an answer. A solution may best be found, according to Rousseau, in a "social contract," sanctified by a "civil religion," or in the political submersion of the "homme" with his individual interests into the body of the state. Rousseau considered the Greek city-states as models of the latter and himself recommended such a society for small nations, as Poland and Corsica were at at the time.

After the excesses of the French Revolution had disquieted both conservative and "liberal" (bourgeois) Europe, after Napoleon's Empire had aroused German nationalism and coalesced the conservative reaction, resistance against the philosophic roots of "republicanism" took systematic form. The liberalism of the bourgeois bore the blame for uncertain conditions. Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831), in his Rechtsphilosophie (1821), disputed Rousseau's notion that the community of wills of individual burghers may found a satisfactory state. He insisted rather on a real "common will" (Gemeinwille) based on "understanding common to all" (allgemeiner Verstand). The French Revolution confused the state with a single interest, that of bourgeois society, and thus pretended only to the protection of private property and personal security. The state has no general interest of its own, and
the burgher participates in it arbitrarily. For the burgher the state is merely another means to an end, his own particular interest. It is a state based on an agreement and has no substantial nature or unity. Hegel believes, on the contrary, that in reality a person enjoys substance, objectivity, and morality only insofar as he leads a "communal," a political life, insofar as he participates in the "substantiality" of the state. This is an attempt to synthesize individual with communal interests.

Karl Marx (1818-1883), one of Hegel's dialectical successors, advocated eliminating the contradiction of forces by fundamental elimination of "individual interests." After all, he argued, the "individual" referred to in this phrase is actually just the product of an historical phase; he is the burgher in more generalized dress. The much-vaunted individual rights of bourgeois liberalism, its law, morality, and religion, are actually only tools for the supression of community interests in favor of its own. Without the bourgeoisie only community interests would remain—those of the universal class, the proletariat—for the bourgeois age has at least simplified class stratification to exploiter and exploited. The international proletariat has no interests separate from the interests of the "proletariat in general." Communism is thus an attempt to establish communal solidarity without the dangers of competitive freedom.

The problem of freedom and equality in the liberal democracies of Europe has been especially well analyzed by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). Ernst Jünger has recognized de Tocqueville as one of his personal augurs of the "maelstrom-depths into which we have sunk" (39). According to this French sociologist, the wrong relationship
in modern societies between "freedom" and "equality" is possibly due
to their separate historical origins and their often quite disparate
goals. The Christian church, growing commerce, a money economy, the
introduction of printing and the invention of fire-arms, America and the
Enlightenment had long been doing the work of "leveling." The idea that
equality might be achieved through individual political freedom is more
recent, says de Tocqueville. After the French Revolution had done the
work of both, real freedom disappeared in the despotic Napoleonic
"democracies." These were founded on the rational basis of the equality
of individuals in isolation—individuals, that is, who were separated
from traditional action-groups, corporations, and churches. People
became indifferent to their collective destiny and lost a sense for
positive citizenship. Democracy, or equality, de Tocqueville believes,
loses its justification when there is no counterbalancing positive
freedom to prevent enforced uniformity, a freedom such as the Greek
city-states, the Renaissance cities, and the medieval European "estates"
provided. Instead, bourgeois democracy was concerned essentially with
security and comfortable living, without any possibility of human
"greatness."

"Actually it is the century for efficient heads, for
practical people who comprehend quickly, who, equipped with
a certain skill, feel their superiority to the crowd, even
if they themselves are not gifted with the highest potential-
ities."

So wrote Goethe in a letter of 1825. In 1930, Ortega y Gasset,
looking about him, can say:

"The characteristic of the hour is that the commonplace
mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to
proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to impose them wherever it will."

The satisfaction in abilities which are competent but not extraordinary, which implies a scorn for the challenge to greatness, has in the intervening century spread to huge masses of people living in a state of comparative physical well-being.

The intellectual reaction to middle-class lethargy and liberalistic fearfulness increased in vigor as the nineteenth century drew to a close. In Germany one man more effectively than any other both diagnosed the loneliness, "decadence," pointlessness and instability of modern life, and also gave a positive impetus to sincere intellectuals, culture morphologists, medicine-men, demi-gods, and practical politicians. It was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) who announced the death of God in a tone sufficiently lyrical, approaching hysteria, to bring home the immensity of His decease. The tradition leading from Kant through Hegel to Marx, and Feuerbach's materialism, were expressions of the Zeitgeist working against the philosophical foundations of Christianity. The religion of faith was increasingly vulnerable to a world whose mechanism, exploited and emphasized by technology, became rapidly more compelling. Nietzsche attacked vigorously not only the Christian faith but also the moral category of good and evil, of which Christian morals were but one expression. Every such moral precept, he said, is but a bit of tyranny against nature and reason; morality in a developed society is the "tyranny of such arbitrary laws."
The occasion of moral sentiment is the resentment and fear of the slave, the man of the herd, against the elite who represent positive vital forces. The herd has always existed, but in modern Europe, through the democratic movement, the herd and its slave-morality has triumphed over the Master-morality, threatening to stamp out all superior quality. The democratic movement represents not only a decadent form of political organization but a decadent form, a diminished form, of the human-being, "his mediocrification and the debasement of his worth." The conscientiousness of the modern European springs from an "imperative of herd fearfulness: we want a time to come when there will be nothing more to fear! Sometime, anytime—the will and the way there is called, everywhere in Europe today, 'progress'." This Nietzsche calls a false progress, but there is indeed a possible line of future development in man. It is to the cultivation of a master-morality, a type of exceptional individuals, that we must look for the restoration of value in the world. The current nihilism is a lack of any answers to the question "Why?" Only the will to power is a positive, insurable value that can "end the frightful domination of senselessness and coincidence called history until now." We must therefore find our social purpose in the cultivation of the super-man. To do so, the "strong and dangerous drives, such as enterprising spirit, rashness, vindictiveness, cunning, rapacity, tyranny," must be consciously and not just tacitly bred.

"One misunderstands the beast of prey and the predatory man (for example Cesare Borgia) fundamentally, one misunderstands 'nature' so long as one seeks a 'diseased state' in the basic nature of these healthiest of all tropical brutes and growths...."
The moralists appear to harbor a hate against the primeval forest and the tropics; the "tropical man" must be discredited as a degeneration or a disease, in favor of the "temperate zones."

From Morgenröthe (1881) through Also Sprach Zarathustra (1891), and in his later works, Nietzsche was developing his concept of the "will to power." Initially, he circumscribed this idea as "love of power" or "lust for power." The "will to power" is the predatory instinct, an instinct with which Nietzsche confronted the shallow morality of democracy and the equally disastrous, more dangerous, current of nihilism. Both are but the two extremes of the traditional value-interpretation of existence. Within this scheme man as a species could not progress. "Higher types" could be achieved—witness Caesar—but they had no tenacity as "types." The domestication of man did not go deep and, where it did, became degeneracy, as in the conception held by many Christians of Jesus. To escape mediocrity between these poles we must first return to the "wild" man who is "cured" of culture. Then "free spirits" can begin work on the "super-man," the future reigning type, to which they themselves do not pretend to belong. The present workers, the "higher spirits"—men of intellect and strength of will—must prepare themselves by gradually and cautiously releasing a number of instincts previously much maligned and usually held in check. This higher spirit is colder, harder, less scrupulous, without fear of ordinary opinion. He is the jungle-man of organic life, who always emerges "where the struggle for power has been longest fought." Replacing morality by
will, he is beyond pity or benevolence; there is nothing lovable about his soul. He represents the "new nobility" and is the antagonist of the vulgar mob and its ignorant force. Whoever cannot obey his truest and strongest self, and is therefore excluded from greatness, must obey the new type. For society is no contract but a continuous search for the "commander." As long as God existed we were perhaps equal in His sight. But God is dead, and the "higher man" tolerates no equality "before the mob."

Ideas such as those here recapitulated are obviously incompatible with the socialist sentiments of some anti-bourgeois movements. Lukacs calls Nietzsche's whole life's work "a continuous polemic against Marxism," although Nietzsche probably knew none of Marx' or Engel's writings. Nietzsche is equally scornful of the forms of bourgeois nationalism. He found the "rabble" at all social levels, among the rich as well as the humble. What Nietzsche actually sympathized with in politics, in Lukac's argumentation, was the "struggle for the creation of an imperial Germany," in which his ideal of a two-caste society might be realized—a society of slaves (Zwangsarbeiter) and of leisured creators (Freiarbeiter). Although normally anti-nationalistic, Nietzsche could tolerate the newly predominant "democratic" Bismarck Germany as a transition stage to an Empire under the sway of the Prussian spirit. "My starting point is the Prussian soldier: here are real conventions, here is compulsion, sternness and discipline, also with regards to form."

What is there about the Prussian spirit, or the Prussian style as Oswald Spengler calls it, which exerts an intellectual appeal on the
advocates of elemental life, the "Lebensphilosophen" such as Nietzsche and Spengler? Due to several historical factors, among them the inability of the weak burgherdom to support the king against the landed classes, the monarchy in Prussia had never succeeded in achieving an absoluteness such as it at one time enjoyed in France and other western countries. The feudal nobility of Prussia thus continued in existence as a military and land-owning caste and was not subjected to the "civilizing" pressures exerted on court nobility. It maintained "much more of its feudal forest-primitivity," isolated on great agricultural estates in a landscape with few large towns where the middle class might prosper. Industry and the professions developed slowly until the early nineteenth century; the aristocrats devoted themselves more to the army and government service. To these factors are to be attributed the military ethos and bureaucratic formalism of the Prussian government, long after its development of a more modern economy. Since the honesty and proprietary honor of these institutions, as well as their anachronism, was to a certain extent quite real, they presented a favorable "romantic" comparison to the cheap and invidious machinations of capitalism as well as to the dangerous insubstantiality of the socialists.

The most recent advocate of the Prussian spirit to affect Ernst Jünger, and a successor of Nietzsche in the anti-liberal tradition, is Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), whose historiographic activity spans the first third of the twentieth century. His contemporaneity gave him special weight in the studies of Jünger. "From Goethe I have the
method, from Nietzsche the questions to answer, summarizes Spengler in the Preface to his *Decline of the West* (1923). The method will be broached in Chapter IV. The questions are those inherent in a "German Philosophy," a "Philosophy of Destiny." Spengler peers through Nietzsche's "view" (Ausblick) to map a "survey" (Überblick) of history. Foremost among Nietzsche's ideas, he has adopted the dynamic moral relativism and the idea of the superiority of creative myths to abstract, legal organizations. His truths are not true in themselves (an sich) but only true for his cast of mind at a specific time in a particular culture. Even mathematics has no absolute validity; every culture has its own——"There is no number 'an sich' nor can there be." Number, language, concepts, laws, and even causality are social experiences of the Ego as it awakes in the reality of a culture. Causality, being the logic of space, cannot be applied to the interpretation of history. Instead, destiny, the logic of time, is the fitting tool. This is the "language of form," or the periodic structure of human history, an organic as opposed to a mechanical logic. Human cultures, like animal organisms, suffer growth and decay. The young and healthy society is a real "culture" which lives like a "soul." It is burgeoning life, development, and naïveté. Bound to the land, it consists of farmers, priests, and the country nobility. Contrariwise, continues Spengler, the old and petrifying society is what is called "civilization," which lives through "intellect." It is centered in great, cold cities, produces little art, is unmetaphysical, practical, cosmopolitan. It replaces the "state" with a "society" and has lost all fruitful contact with the soil. To the cosmopolis (Großstadt), which subordinates
the provincial "homeland" (Heimat) belong the "masses" rather than a "people" (Volk). Greece and Rome present the most brilliant example of this organic transition from youth to age. The same metamorphosis from a culture to a civilization occurred in Germanic Europe in the nineteenth century. This senility is inescapable.

The burgher is the product of the spreading cities. He scorns the land-classes---the plow, the stola, and the sword---which are the three healthy estates of a youthful culture. The bourgeoisie is in actuality an "un-estate" which denies the organically acquired (rather than arbitrarily proclaimed, "natural") rights of the priest and the nobleman. Yet, the priesthood and knighthood are the most fundamental expressions of life. The nobleman, as peer, is a symbol of time. He is man as history, destiny, race, generation, temporality. The priest is a symbol of space, man as nature, holy causality, language, and the senses. It is not mere custom, it is an idea which lies beneath these class divisions:

"It gives them the mighty feeling of a rank, bestowed by God and therefore exempt from all criticism, which makes self-respect and self-confidence a duty but also the strictest self-discipline, even death, under circumstances. It confers to both castes the historical supremacy, the magic of the soul, which does not require power, but creates it. Men who intrinsically belong to these estates, and not only by name, are something really different from the rest; their life is utterly sustained by a symbolic dignity, in contrast to the farmer and the burgher. It does not exist to be lived but to have meaning. It is the two sides of all unhampered vitality that are expressed in these 'estates,' of which one is total presence, the other total awareness."

The sympathy which Spengler would have with the traditional Prussian land nobility is evident. Equally evident is the personal antipathy towards the middle classes and their government. The bourgeoisie is
the only real "party." A "party" in the liberal sense is really a protest against the whole essence of the state. Even those anti-intellectual intellectuals who assail the liberal ideas of "individualism," insofar as they participate in "politics," belong to the "un-class" of burgherdom. Spengler believes that relief for disturbances of Western society, if to be found at all, would of necessity stem from a conscious return to the healthier forms of caste-society, probably on a Prussian model.

Of course, the vehemence of the anti-liberal intellectual reaction is merely a sign of the growing power of the bourgeoisie throughout Europe, even in the countries where it won no immediate political victories. The acceleration of technology and expansion of trade produced a commercial and professional class which everywhere increased percentagewise and in prestige. The number of workingmen in industry was also multiplying rapidly, and they were more apt, politically, to ally with the strictly "liberal," bourgeois parties than with the conservatives of the Old Regime or the ultramontanes. By 1830 the middle classes enjoyed sovereignty in France, Belgium, and Switzerland. Their achievements in these countries were a steady inspiration and goad for the active forces of liberalism in Poland, Germany, Italy, and Scandinavia. By 1848 the revolutionary impetus in France had passed to the Parisian socialists, and the new emperor emerging from the confusion of the February Revolution, Louis Napoleon, saw himself obliged, despite somewhat conservative inclinations, to consider the interests not only of the bourgeoisie but also of the urban workers.
The age of the mass-man began to make itself felt.

In Germany, however, which had to wait until Bismarck for concessions to the socialists, not even the bourgeoisie could claim clear successes against the monarchial absolutism perpetuated by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. A third factor affecting the political and social climate into which Ernst Jünger was born is, thus, this atmosphere of defeat and impracticality surrounding the efforts of the middle classes to unite the German principalities and liberalize the national government which would result. After the enthusiasm of the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon had encouraged nationalistic sentiment, and thus raised the prestige of its liberal representatives, there followed a short period of reorganization which seemed to promise some sort of constitutional, federal government and the legal assurance of individual rights. But the panic sweeping Austria and Prussia, as well as other German principalities, as a result of insignificant revolutionary manifestations, led to even stricter limitations of press, academic and personal freedom. The Bundesversammlung in Frankfort, which was not composed of popularly elected representatives, proved naturally to be ineffective in furthering liberal or nationalistic aims. Only in Saxe-Weimar, and in the countries of the south and west of Germany—-Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemburg, Hesse-Darmstadt—were constitutional monarchies established which guaranteed legal equality and personal security. Even in these cases the prince remained sovereign, with sole right of proposing laws. Indifference to political matters, and fear of any participation in them, were widespread due to the oppressive legislation, enforced by capable police systems.
In 1830, the July Revolution in France encouraged liberal elements who were becoming bolder in spite of unfavorable conditions. Organized demonstrations in Brunswick, Saxony, Hanover, and other small lands forced the reigning princes to grant constitutions. In the already constitutional southwest, press censorship was relaxed and democratic publications sprang up. But these "privileges" lasted only as long as the anxiety of the governments in question. By 1832, Metternich had secured the passage of decrees in the Frankfort Bundesversammlung which were directed against constitutional government, the press, and radical elements such as students and revolutionary immigrants. This effectively put an end to further liberal agitation until 1848.

In 1848, again inspired by the events in France, a more concerted attempt was made by the bourgeoisie and the liberal intellectuals to realize their ambitions for a united Germany organized as a constitutional monarchy. A constitutive convention met in Frankfort in the summer of 1848. It was composed of elected representatives from all the German lands and some of the non-German provinces of Prussia and Austria. Having formed a provisional federal government, it dismissed the old Bundesversammlung and preceded to the work of creating a constitution, determining the boundaries of the German empire to be, and selecting an Emperor. The constitution adopted by this enthusiastic but inexperienced assemblage of professors, writers, and tradesmen followed the Belgian model in establishing equality before the law, judicial independence, communal autonomy, and popular representation. Freedom of the press, of association, of religion, and of education was
insured. Having prepared the ground for a new federal government, the decision was made, after much behind-the-scenes manipulation, to limit the federation to German territories outside the Austrian empire. A natural consequence of this was the choice of the King of Prussia as emperor. The whole fabric of hopeful illusion woven by this active parliament collapsed when Frederick William refused to accept the crown from this "illegitimate" instance without first consulting his peers, a condition tantamount to refusal; for the Kings of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Saxony, and Hanover had no inclination to become subject to the king of Prussia. The parliament was rapidly reduced in size by the defection of various blocs, and finally the republican remainder, transferred to Stuttgart, was dispersed by force of arms. The unification of Germany, which at the time would undoubtedly have contributed to the power of the bourgeoisie, was forced to wait for Bismarck's surer methods. The German Empire, when finally established then in 1871, was of more autocratic constitution than would otherwise have been the case and its whole political atmosphere, though not closed to the influence of the middle classes and the socialists, was more permissive of reactionary institutions. Indeed, the liberal opposition often appeared feckless and petty in the light of Bismarck's glamorous successes, and the general prosperity and splendor of the German Empire from 1871 until 1914 perpetuated the respectability and reputation of the government's paternalistic methods.

This conspicuous prosperity, and the rising standard of living in Europe in general, resulted from the reproductive fecundity of the
applied sciences which, once established on a sufficiently broad economic basis, seemed logically subject to no limits. Technology, which according to Ortega y Gasset elevates and frees but spoils and barbarizes the masses, was one line of social development which could not be turned back or even halted. In the long run it was the exigencies of industrial society which carried the day against conservative forces in eastern Europe, although the burgherdom, as the commercial and managerial class, profited from the development. In a sense the sensational accomplishments of technology were an intellectual triumph for the liberal middle classes and their faith in progress and reason, an optimism amounting in the opinions of some (among them Ernst Jünger) to a dangerously exaggerated hybris. The exalted optimism felt in the sciences was justified to the extent that discovery and invention, in their rapidity, seemed to accelerate history or foreshorten time, at any rate to disclose endless vistas of change. The development and variability in technological society, always in the direction of increasing power, found a counterpart in the biological theory of evolution proposed by Charles Darwin in 1859. The concept of evolution extended itself to many fields of thought and provided a doctrine on which to found the positivistic spirit of the time.

A typical representative of the prophets of unlimited rational progress was Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919). In his *Anthropogenie* (1874), Haeckel demonstrated with countless, monstrously ugly woodcuts his basic insight, derived through systematization of Darwin's ideas,
"Ontogeny repeats phylogeny." The human embryo, that is, recapitulates in its development the "natural history of creation." Haeckel, a fearless speculator, did not hesitate to accept the philosophical implications of late nineteenth century science. In 1892 he delivered an address, later expanded into a small book, formulating a modern, positivistic monism. Here, the roots of pantheistic monism were traced to Giordano Bruno and Spinoza. According to Haeckel, the whole universe has been constituted in accordance with one law, which governs the relation of matter and energy—two manifestations of one substance. The world's development is not teleological; divinity is rather to be conceived of as a "moving spirit" within the cosmos, as the element of "soul" in each cell. "The human soul" itself, said Haeckel, can be analyzed into a sum of "soul" phenomena assigned to specific physiological functions. It is "but an insignificant part of the all-embracing 'world soul'." Through the revelations of biology, the ethical phenomenology of this "soul" can be purified, i.e., converted into "rational anthropology." The basic ethical doctrine of monism is the balancing of egoism against altruism, thus serving both the individual's desire for self-preservation and the need for the survival of the species.

In a later work, Die Welträtsel (1900), Haeckel undertook a review of the problems of contemporary science and its relations to society and religion. Here he claimed to be "wholly a child of the nineteenth century," and consciously admitted to reacting against "anthropism," a proud attitude which, in opposing the human organism to the whole of the rest of nature, arrogantly assumed divinity for itself. Actually,
man is:

"...but a tiny grain of protoplasm in the perishable framework of organic nature."

This magnificent cosmological perspective gives the proper standard for judging our human prestige and arranging our moral dealings.

Haeckel was primarily inveighing against the Christian church, the clergy, and the self-satisfied moralism of a prosperous and pedantic burgherdom, but he struck almost unconsciously at the root of his own liberalism—the dignity of the individual. Although he apotheosized the "good," the "beautiful," and the "true," it was difficult to glorify these qualities in terms of an organism which is all sensation and reaction.

Haeckel is not unconscious of the moral dilemma of the time but cannot, as a good positivist, do more than admonish:

"An entirely new character has been given to the whole of our modern civilization, not only by our astounding theoretical progress in sound knowledge of nature, but also by the remarkably fertile practical application of that knowledge in technical science, industry, commerce, and so forth. On the other hand, however, we have made little or no progress in moral and social life, in comparison with earlier centuries; at times there has been serious reaction. And from this obvious conflict there have arisen, not only an uneasy sense of dismemberment and falseness, but even the danger of grave catastrophes in the political and social world."

As this study of Ernst Jünger continues, it will become clear that Jünger, as he himself states, has been strongly influenced by such an outlook, by its emphasis on vitalism and its depreciation of free will and the individual. It will also be apparent that he reacted strongly against this view's "endless" perspectives, its analytical and unheroic character. However, it is through the biological sciences and positivists,
such as Haeckel, that Jünger had most intimate access to the scientific age; his experiences with "war as technology" in the great battles of World War I created strong but ambiguous impressions.

Other purely literary influences undoubtedly affected Jünger and his style of utterance. There came, at the turn of the century, the mystical search for deeper, less trite, irrational experiences in symbolism. There were messianic movements. The imperious voice of Stefan George announced itself, denounced God, the masses and the "swamp of hypocritical brotherhood"; proclaimed its own will to leadership of an aristocratic mystocracy, isolated from the cheap and impudent crowds; spoke in invented languages and worshipped a dead sixteen-year old boy. Julius Langbehn popularized, in Rembrandt as Educator (1890), the idea of an elementary genius in the Saxon races which qualified them to supersede the dying bourgeois culture. R. M. Rilke and Hugo von Hofmannsthal, poet's concerned with man's uncertain feeling of existence and solidarity with other souls, both enjoyed huge popularity. "The basis of the really new writing" of this period is, according to Paul Fechter, "not any longer just literature, but a complete intellectual attitude, a new world, at whose threshold stand philosophy and religion also and the will to leadership-responsibility."38

The ideas and personalities sketched in this introduction were obviously present, and in many cases reportedly so, to a man of Ernst Jünger's age and education as he fought in the First World War, and as he drifted into a literary career. The most pressing problems of his
time were: the governing of large masses of self-confident mediocrity; the assignment of moral sovereignty to the individual or to a class or state; the preservation of natural, organic values in an increasingly artificial, technical society. To these problems Jünger addressed himself in his "totalitarian" book, Der Arbeiter (1932). Why he felt himself concerned with these problems is the story of his life until that time.
Chapter II

ERNST JÜNGER'S REBELLION

Ernst Jünger was born in Heidelberg in 1895, the first of five children. His father came from a family of farmers in Lower Saxony, in the region of the Steinhuder Meer. His mother's people were likewise rooted in the soil, in Franconia, but she herself was raised in Munich. In 1898 the family moved to the environs of Hanover.¹

The best picture of the family in which Ernst Jünger received his early training is provided by his brother, Friedrich Georg,² also an author, whose literary association with Ernst has proved a frequent similarity in their impressions. Jünger's father was a chemist by temperament, education, and profession. He possessed to extreme degrees the spirit of independence and a complete reliance on scientific rationality. Faith occupied no place in his mentality, although, raised a Protestant, he considered religion a private prerogative, beyond his concern. His confidence rested wholly in the laboratory and the scientific method; his scepticism did not extend to the logical foundations of that method itself. Analysis was the natural mode of this thought. Ernst attributed to him a certain "chemical look" which directed itself at the traits and disposition of a personality, without ever locating the person himself. "An eye, from which such a look comes, becomes a lens."³ He attempted to free himself from all unexamined opinions and attachments of an irrational nature. He consciously cultivated self-sufficiency.
"His urge for independence exerted itself forcefully, bluntly, even insultingly, wherever the suspicion of danger appeared. Then he was cold and alert simultaneously."

Irony and satire were his weapons. Trenchancy was his only style:

"In his movements as in his sentences, there was not the least latitude, not the slightest indirection. His sentences were as short and exact as a strong will, paired with a practiced scientific mind, could elicit. His brevity had something willful, a tone of command. This was not military but pure, piercing reasonability. He also prized insociability and was of the opinion that a single insociable person could get more accomplished than a dozen good-natured ones. I would be willing to bet that he had never said the word "Gemüt," no more than the words "inwardness," "virtue," "edification," or whole groups of other words that were missing in his vocabulary."

He had, however, a respectful curiosity for his children and trained them to exactness of observation. "He was alert, liked alertness in others and also wanted to see it in his children—wanted them to think and move quickly and precisely." Although he justified his personal independence in phrases that sounded much like anarchy, isolated and isolating, he was nevertheless unprepared to assert himself in violent circumstances. Where rational thinking, law, and the rights of property ceased, he felt himself in quicksand. Through his father Ernst was introduced to astronomy, a sense for history, and a delight in precise and glistening scientific instruments. "From early youth," he later said, "my thinking was determined by the exact realism and positivism of my father."

Ernst's mother was a woman of equal independence but more forceful and of warmer temperament:

"There was a strain of impatient energy and certainty in her, which asserted itself early, a personal will and confidence that never left her."
In her, Bavarian contentedness and joy of life were evident. Although she was never heedless in emotions, she would follow inclination whenever it was strong enough, in spite of all mere reasonability. She was "guided surely by her future," for she had not only a "restlessness of heart" but sureness in this unrest, not only pride but the strength to submit. Traveling was a passion with her. She was an "eye-nature, who wanted to see, observe, enjoy."\(^9\)

The family was a well-ordered one, economically secure and intellectually active. For a period of almost thirty years, until the death of the father late in the second World War, it remained intact. The second oldest boy, Friedrich Georg, studied law but later devoted himself to literature, primarily poetry and essayistic writing. He remained a close companion of Ernst. Both were lieutenants in the first World War, and they occasionally met on the battlefield under adventurous circumstances. The third brother, Hans, became a physicist and the fourth, Wolfgang, a geographer.

As a scholar, young Ernst presented educational difficulties. His wandering distraction of mind became legendary among teachers. Effort was made to inoculate him with the school-knowledge necessary to pass the "Abitur." In pursuit of this goal he transferred from school to school in the vicinity of the paternal home near Hanover. Perhaps here originate the "examination dreams" Jünger later records (GS 64), dreams of life as a test. Ernst balked utterly at the invitation to
enter the "icy wastes" (Schl. 26) of differential calculus. He preferred, if at all, the plastic comprehensibility of solid geometry (Schl. 26). Especially noxious was the concept of infinity thus ingeniously explained: "At no point in the sequence of numbers are there sufficient grounds not to count one more." 10

"The whole perceptible and tangible world and therewith the intangible world also were subjected to a process like the lye-bath in which an anatomist boils the flesh from bones." 11

The world seemed dull and trite; imagination and extensive reading provided the first escapes from the security of middle-class order. In adolescence, however, Jünger's rebellious spirit required less vicarious adventures.

In 1912, after long periods of planning and hesitation, he undertook a serious flight from the oppressive reality and routine of a school-boy. 12 Utilizing the money entrusted to him for the expenses of returning to a new semester of studies, he purchased a six-shot revolver for twelve marks, a copy of The Mysteries of the Dark Continent, and a rucksack. Although his geographical orientation was poor, he knew that Trier was near the French border and that in Verdun one could join the French Foreign Legion. By train and on foot he arrived in the latter town and, dropping his remaining funds into a sewer as an ultimatum to action, succeeded in enlisting. A brief career as a Legionnaire brought him to various North African training-camps, where he plotted desertion into the wilds of the interior. He and his companion in this escapade were taken into custody the first morning of freedom, ignominiously caught.
sleeping hidden in a hay-stack where weary fugitives were picked up as a matter of routine. Much later Jünger conceded that such an attempt at romantic escape was bound to fail, as is every attempt "to elude the coldness of the looming technical age." Meanwhile Father Jünger, ever reasonable, was effecting a discharge for the disillusioned youth through higher French authorities. He then made a pact with his son. Ernst was to finish his studies and, upon completing the Abitur, might participate in an expedition to Mount Kilimandjaro.

But destiny, an important concept with Jünger, revises all. The war broke out in 1914, and Jünger volunteered enthusiastically for military service. He successfully passed a simplified examination to finish school, matriculated at the University of Heidelberg, and enlisted in the Hanoverian 73rd Fusilier-Regiment in October. By December the nineteen-year old was in the front-lines.

"We had left lecture halls, school benches, and workshops and were fused together in the short weeks of training to a great, enthusiastic body, bearers of the German idealism of the years after 1870. Grown up in the spirit of a materialistic age, there stirred in us all a longing for the unusual, for the great experience. Then the war seized us like a frenzy. We marched out in a rain of flowers, in drunken dedication to death. The war would certainly bring us grandeur, strength, solemnity. It seemed a manly deed to us, a joyful rifle match on blooming, blood-bedewed meadows."

The enthusiasm was soon extinguished by a stalemated war of attrition, and in its place remained only the gleeds of devotion, professional pride in one's courage, and the worthy comradeship of warriors. Of course, horror was also an attraction of this war:
"A long period of law and order, as our generation had behind it, produces a ravenous hunger for the extraordinary, which was further heightened by literature. So, among other questions, we were concerned with how a landscape would probably look in which the dead were left above the ground."15

Showing evidence of military ability, as well as a certain avidity for violence, Jünger was especially trained and promoted within a year to the rank of lieutenant. He found time even as an officer, during the "war of position," to keep a journal of precisely observed images and impressions; to form, as a confirmed devotee of the "subtle hunt" (amateur entomology), a collection of beetles; and to cultivate the acquaintance of men of all social classes. In order to combat a natural tendency toward reclusiveness he spent free evenings in the alcoholic company of young officers, "in which there soon formed the fresh, carefree tone that has always been the custom in the Prussian Officer Corps."16 During the course of the war Jünger took part in many of its major campaigns, such as Somme and Langemark. He became known for his courage and enterprise on patrol and reconnaissance duty, was wounded fourteen times, and in September 1918 was awarded the medal Pour le Mérite. He was the youngest officer ever to receive this highest decoration. The apparent lack of meaning which this "unprofitable," ideal distinction enjoyed in commercial times was resented deeply. "In a store-keepers' age naturally," remarks Jünger, "where only money matters, such things lose their value, which depends, of course, on the idea associated with them."17 However, in Strahlungen (1949) Jünger recalls that, at the time, even Hindenburg considered such early acclamation dangerous for an ambitious young man. Jünger adds that Hindenburg was probably right (S 329).
Participation as an officer in a seemingly endless war was a decisive experience. Gradually he came to distinguish between the masses of tamed and fearful time-servers and those valiant few who displayed, before the overpowering apparatus of destruction, an active and cheerful scorn. This admiration extends to similar individuals among the enemy. "A crime, to have to shoot down such fellows" (iSG 76), he says at one point about a stalwart English assailant taken captive in the trenches. Jünger speaks frequently of a "sportsman's" (iSG 46) attitude toward war, without hate—which, incidentally, the mass-man is incapable. On the other hand, he knows and relishes "the atavistic drive to destroy" (iSG 196). Assault-troops move "in the spell of mighty, primitive urges." In heroism the godly and the animalian are "inseparably mixed." With time, however, the battle of matériel, the growing mechanical and unheroic character of war, demanded unprecedented exertions of blood and pure will against iron and explosives. A new type of warrior is bred, who is cold, efficient, violent—the face, a hard immobile mask. Materialistic technology becomes the enemy of man's spirit, endowed as it is with terrifying but magical powers of attraction.

In addition to Jünger's feeling of kinship with a small coterie of natural soldiers, the "princes of the trench" (iSG 210), a foremost result of his years at the front is an unquestioning devotion to the fatherland.

"I had gone forth with the intention of celebrating a joyous war, a festival intoxicated by the effervescent blood of youth and, weapon in hand, had not thought much about the
idea for which I was supposed to stand. Now I looked back: four years of development in the midst of a generation doomed to death.... And out of all the sacrifices, almost without my noticing it, was refined ever purer and more splendid the idea of the fatherland."^20

Although "faith today no longer possesses living force" (iSG 282), this was an idea for which one still could die, like the Christian martyrs. Perhaps the possibility of even this "unshakeable loyalty" (iSG 217) would soon disappear. But though "force from outside and barbarism from within mass in darkening clouds,"^21 the German youth who are capable of thought and enthusiasm "stand for that which will be and for that which has been."^22

Full of nationalistic zeal and loyalty to the Prussian officer-caste, Jünger remained in the military service until 1923. Assigned to stations in Berlin and Hanover, his duties included security operations, undertaken by the army in the post-war political chaos, and work on a new series of combat-regulations. For these manuals he wrote sections on platoon and company tactics. He thus remained "for the time being in the compass of one of the last remaining orders, the army. From here he observes what is rising anew out of the destruction of the war."^23 The work itself, however, and his relations with superiors were both sources of dissatisfaction. In a sense he was just "marking time," lending his "wildness" (Schl 71) to the old order, which he might leave at any time.

Meanwhile, Jünger had begun his literary career. In 1920 his first book, In Stahlgewittern ("In Storms of Steel"), was published
and enjoyed considerable popularity. It was a sternly objective account of battle experiences, with a liberal salting of patriotic apostrophies. Of this book André Gide noted in his Journal, December 1, 1942: "...incontestably the most beautiful war book that I have read; of perfect good faith, truthfulness, and honesty." In 1922 the second book, Kampf als Inneres Erlebnis ("Battle as an Inner Experience"), sought to analyze, with expressionistic pathos, moments such as "Fear," "Courage," "Blood." What differentiates this style from conventional expressionism is the "catholicizing" effort to posit, in the "service" of elemental "fury," a connection with some real and more permanent order of things.

Poems and a novel were also produced in this period, but the manuscripts have not been preserved. In 1925 and in the following year Waldchen 125 ("Copse 125") and Feuer und Blut ("Fire and Blood") described within a smaller scope specific military operations. Stephen Spender summarizes Jünger's war-mystique as follows:

"Only in war can modern humanity measure itself against the machines which it has created."

Even these early works were not strictly literary or philosophical. In Die totale Mobilmachung ("Total Mobilization," 1930), a highly nationalistic essay, Jünger speaks of recent German war literature as an effort to compel the public to take a stand on important issues (TM 15).

In 1923 Jünger requested discharge from the army. He then studied philosophy and zoology in Leipzig and Naples until 1925. In
Naples he devoted his scientific studies largely to cuttle-fish, insects, and scarab-beetles, of which latter he formed a large collection. Jünger attributes his intellectual formation to training in the sciences and claims a need for the "testimony of understanding" (S 523) in his speculations. He took no degree. After 1925, the year in which he married, he lived as a free-lance writer. In the second half of the "twenties" Jünger's interests were predominantly political, and his writings were almost exclusively of a journalistic nature. In the details of political organization he avowed no interest. Rather, the ideological clarification of nationalism was his concern. His initial project was an attempt to win the reactionary, patriotic veterans' organization, the "Stahlhelm," to his ideas of revolutionary nationalism. After several years, discouraged by these "duds of the World War" and their bourgeois antics, he directed his efforts toward the smaller action-groups of a more dynamic character. Here the possibility existed of elaborating a nationalist metaphysic without concessions to practical politics and the masses. Throughout this brief but historic period Jünger was forced to take stands with respect to National Socialism. These range from enthusiasm (1925) through condescension to qualified disappointment (1929), the causes for which will be indicated after a resumé of Jünger's own position. This position was determined by one overriding reality—for Ernst Jünger, the war had never really stopped:

"After the Armistice, which only seemed to end the war, but which in reality mined and fenced all frontiers of Europe with whole systems of new conflicts, a situation was left in which catastrophe appears as the a priori of a transformed mentality."
The huge economic momentum of industry, the dislocation of men and society, the crucial probing of values all projected, like swords drawn but not resheathed, into the years of peace. They constituted what Jünger thought of as a world revolution. His aim was to channel these forces of a "transformed mentality" into the "total mobilization" of society, which would at least present a unified front to catastrophe. This mobilization was to be undertaken in the name of the fallen soldiers, whose sacrifice must not have been in vain. Just as war had been a "gigantic industrial process" (TM 14), with the state as producer and the battlefield as consumer, so peace is a state of organized alarm into whose patterns the image of war must be prefigured (TM 15). For—"war is the father of all things," as Thucydides said. And Jünger did not hesitate to agree.

Jünger later refers to a political advance from left to right, from socialism to conservatism. Actually, although Der Arbeiter is devoted to the "worker," left and right were secondary considerations (GS 182) in his political orientation at the time. The major categories were dynamism and death. Nationalism and socialism and even communism, in an undogmatic and militant form, all serve the same ends. They are the antagonists of the precious bourgeois status quo. Behind such a cavalier obliteration of ideological differences lies a metaphysic of vitalism, the actual content of Jünger's political writing. "Life" is the ens realissimum, and there are but two primal forms of life: love and battle. The love referred to is mainly erotic and, outside of a chapter on "Eros" in Kampf als Inneres Erlebnis, occurs only by implication in the war books. In Heliopolis (1949) love is
finally awarded metaphysical recognition. But until after 1933, conflict and self-assertion are Jünger's interest. Value and conceptualization are either ignored or explicitly depreciated. The mode of judgment is based on the degree to which phenomena are filled with "living force," "movement," and "tension." Nationalism, being in this case Germanic nationalism, both consists of, and is justified by, "fullness of life"; it needs no scientific foundation a la Marx. Nationalism is "pure and unconditional will toward commitment for the nation, felt and known as a central value." What is this value, if not moral? It is a positive, almost Nietzschean value. It consists in the nation's being that dynamic agent of destiny for which one can develop the greatest intensity of will and devotion. In "intensity," in the power of "blood," lies the source of all value. It is obvious that the actual issues of political debate become secondary, receding before the "total" will toward a "great and mighty empire of all Germans," where the emphasis rests not so much on "Germans" as on "great" and "mighty." "Blood" and "race" are for Ernst Jünger not easy, automatic dowries such as the National Socialists received, but titles conferred only on the heroically deserving.

Jünger's mission, explicitly set down in several articles, is the explication of four ideas: nationalism, socialism, war, and total dictatorship. Socialism is here a state of comradeship and justice necessary for the conduct of "total operations. War is just that state of "total" commitment, whether on the battlefield or in the industrial landscape. Dictatorship is the absolute discipline which makes "war's"
conduct possible. The search for "leaders," for "great personalities," is an urgent necessity:

"The great leader has not yet appeared. His coming will be like an act of nature; it cannot be predicted or influenced. To prepare his way, however, is the immediate mission of the front-soldiery."33

It should be noted here that Jünger is definitely not referring to any practicable Messiah, such as Adolf Hitler, who both prophesied and promoted his own Advent.

Superficially it seems curious that, with the passage of events, Ernst Jünger defected from the cause of Italian Fascism (1927–1930) and from National Socialism (1929–1933). Jünger came to see in these "total" movements merely brutalized forms of liberal, bourgeois-nationalistic states. Although he had at first admired Hitler's rhetorical magic, he ended by considering this spell of words a mask to hide the lack of "magical" leadership in his own sense. Another factor in his disillusionment was the painful realization of the feckless gestures of his own small nationalistic cliques. They proved to have neither the inclination nor the ability to deal with the organization of large groups of actual people. Jünger had at one time hoped to enlist his "revolutionary nationalists" as the ideological officers of the National Socialists. However, after being strongly disappointed by Adolf Hitler's tactical disavowal of the Farmers' Revolution (1929) in Schleswig-Holstein, he reëmphasized his variance from National Socialist ideas. Yet despite its "mass" character, he expressly hoped for a National Socialist victory.36
Whatever his theoretical considerations may have been, Jünger did not wish personally to associate with the National Socialists. In 1927 he had rejected Adolf Hitler's offer of a Reichstag mandate, remarking that he "considered the writing of a single good verse more meritorious than representing sixty thousand imbeciles." In 1933 he declined membership in the reorganized Dichter-Akademie and forbade the reprinting of one of his articles in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the official organ of National Socialism.

In 1932 Ernst Jünger was still being identified with the National Socialists by some political commentators. In that year also, his most controversial opus was published. In *Der Arbeiter* Jünger tried, systematically and abstractly, to elaborate, within a framework of political forces as he saw them, the vitalistic ideas he had acquired in the war. It is a book capable of many interpretations, as supple as the ambiguous "Burschikosität" of its language. One obvious interpretation was the Third Reich's "defense economy" (Wehrwirtschaft). It could also, naturally, be interpreted as socialism and was called bolder in some ways than the Communist Manifesto and a victory over France.

The theme of *Der Arbeiter* is the total harnessing of human energy and human aspirations to destiny's plans. This chain of command can only become effective if men reject their individual, one might almost say "empirical," selves and don the metaphysical uniform of the "figure"
(Gestalt) of the Worker. All the loyalty and feeling of existential exaltation which Ernst Jünger brought from the wars he bequeathed to this "world spirit." How Jünger sees, and what he thought he saw, is the doctrine of "figures," a doctrine of virtual self-alienation.
Chapter III
WHAT MAKES ERNST JÜNGER RUN?

Before the doctrine of "figures" (Gestalten) is discussed, Ernst Jünger should appear in his own chosen light, which may illuminate his methods.

Despite autobiographical information in the first version of Das abenteuerliche Herz ("The Adventurous Heart" 1929) and in Afrikanische Spiele ("African Games" 1936), as well as his various journals, it is difficult to feel acquainted with Jünger as a person. Ernst Jünger as a force of will, however, and of analytical consciousness, is present in any sentence of his prose—so much so that, with some justice, J. P. Stern considers all his "sensibilities frozen in the sheer effort of self-assertion."[^1] This quality of "coldness" is indeed one of his most characteristic. Stern also calls it "partial anaesthesia," and says that Jünger "lies in a cave of unfeeling." "His ordinary self is in abeyance."[^2] By ordinary self Stern means warm spontaneity of response, and this surely is in abeyance. In spite, or perhaps because, of his vitalism, one should not go to Jünger to bask in vicarious "life." On the other hand it is a bit extreme to assert, as Stern does, that his central inner-experience is "the vicarious experience of violent death."[^3] Jünger's characteristic "Befindlichkeit" is that of an observing mind who rejects a "total" involvement in physical surroundings and ordinary human concerns, including death. This mind occupies "in the storm of motion the splendid calm of loneliness."[^4] Jünger himself repeatedly points this out. In the introduction to the first version of Das abenteuerliche Herz he notes:
"I have this feeling—as if an attentively observant point controlled and registered the mysterious hustle and bustle from excentric distances, but seldom lost even in the most confused moments."\(^5\)

In *Afrikanische Spiele* he describes his feeling of observing life through a telescope whenever he is "uninvolved with its palpable intentions," i.e., its practical aspect. Sometimes a partial panic threatens, so great is the telescopic distance. The Bergrat in *Strahlungen* relates the reaction of explorers in the huge spaces of the Caucasian landscape, full of glistening emptiness: "The distance from life's daemon is so great that the heart is seized by longing for any remaining human, even an enemy.\(^6\) To this withdrawn point of consciousness Jünger early took refuge. His first grade-card, he says, criticized his lack of attention. Instead of entering the labyrinth of mathematical argumentation, to which he was hostile, he "hovered in closed circles of imagination" (Schl 25)—of the tropics, slave-traders, and imperious adventures. "The almost intolerable, the as yet unexperienced was what enticed" (Schl 23). His abstraction from the temporal present became a science: "I had invented a kind of non-participation which attached me to reality like a spider, by only an invisible thread."\(^7\)

The primary element in Jünger's character is spider-like detachment. The second element, forming the content of his phantasy, is an infatuation with freely-growing, brute-existent nature—in other words, what surrounds the point of consciousness with a life unhampered by consciously individual concerns. Africa was its symbol.

"Africa was for me the epitome of the wild and primitive."\(^8\)

"Africa, ---that was the splendid anarchy of life which beneath its
wild appearance fulfills a deep and tragic order of things." Some-

where, far back in the interior, there would still be great lakes,

melancholy steppes and wide forests, whose names were on no maps." Africa is a symbol of wilderness, of crawling organic life, and of

encompassing warmth. It combines one of Jünger's favorite phantasies

as a boy, that of life in an ant-hill (AS 182), with the heat which is

"the actual element of life, the bearer of a particular sensual abun-
dance that gives itself like grace, without effort." Ernst's

parents maintained a greenhouse, and he spent many noons there,
luxuriating in the temperature and the presence of unconscious life.

"Each one of us is always feeling the mighty pull with which the obscure depth of life's night seeks to swallow him. There is a huge striving, hidden in always changing forms, that hopes to re-win our life again to the laws that dominate the nest and the darkness of the womb. Here there is no happiness, no greatness, no justice beyond the deep, blind togetherness." Africa is also the last stronghold of freedom and adventure,

"where one has undivided control of oneself and all attributes of power." The third element in Jünger's temperament is the desire for freedom from any restraint. It originates in a growing awareness of the polarity of the conscious-point and nature.

"Perhaps it was possible after all, I thought to myself, to live as one sees the animals and plants do—without help, without money, without bread, without anything that human hands ever created or touched—to live from innermost force." Not to be dependent on society is the necessary, and self-
sufficient, condition of the pirate. "One should live like a ship, with everything required on board, and always in fighting trim" (AS 88). To a certain extent, this piratical activity is a reaction against the
contemplative ennui of the "telesopic observer," an attempt by force of arms to board the "real" world. In Afrikanische Spiele Jünger looks upon the effort of initiating his escape from the camp as a "victory over the state of deedless day-dreaming" (AS 48). On the other hand, there is a real rejection of the social milieu. Jünger detected in himself a "strong tendency toward aristocratic pride," a wish to arrange his life in accordance with private inclination.

"To realize this uttermost degree of freedom it seemed to me necessary to evade every possible encroachment, and in particular every contrivance which possessed even the most distant connection with the civilized order." What was this civilized order? It was the world of well-worn paths, of economic dependency, of practicality and opportunism, mechanical efficiency, repression of elemental urges, of common sense and of education, which is "an attempt to exterminate what is marvelous, or to explain it, which is the same" (Schl 31). Jünger proved by his youthful adventure in the Foreign Legion that his rebellion against civilization was no pose, but a conscious "bearing." In the Legion he met a type of German which incorporated this ideal:

"His foundation is formed by the study of Stoic philosophy—to that must be added its practice, in the plight of the ship-wrecked man. It is a question of inner health whose force first reveals itself in misfortune, only when things go wrong. This was, of course, without my really knowing it, the actual theme I sought to solve—the conduct of one's life by one's own force, on untrodden paths."

Jünger's excursion into the Dark Continent was of short duration, but it brought home to him the impossibility of life without deliberate regulations:
The adventure into lawlessness is instructive, like the first encounter with love or the first combat; common to these early engagements is the defeat which arouses newer and stronger forces. We are born a bit too wild and cure the yeasty fevers with drinks of a bitter taste.\(^{18}\)

The fourth element that characterizes Jünger is the awakening need for control of these chaotic and somewhat blind forces of adventurous self-assertion. When Jünger decided to cooperate with military custom in the Foreign Legion casernes, he discovered that "voluntary participation in discipline strengthens my state of mind also, like a good medicine."\(^{19}\) Henceforward, a major incentive will be to find a regimen of thought and action, within whose "order" (often even compared to religious orders) movement acquires direction and an end. This cleaving of a restless spirit, aware of its isolation from the fertile world, this "immediate urgency of the heart, which seeks attachment to a cause and longs for splendid words,"\(^{20}\) is Jünger's genius and his vulnerability. Gifted with the objectivity of the scientific mind, with the courage and composure of the adventurer, but compelled also by a "vegetative" consciousness to strike roots somewhere, to conquer mind's distance and annex life's energy, he is plagued always by a dualism of change and stasis. For while it is difficult to experience real adventure while "on duty," still, absolute adventure remains an ideal. Later, Jünger relegates it in its purity to love, dreams, and intoxication. The creeping compulsion to maintain a certain "bearing," which is the habit of an "order," has usurped piecemeal the privileges of the spontaneous self—personal taste, free expression, relaxed communication and adaptability. One regrets that the young renegade from Wilhelminian
burgherdom learned the lesson of abortive insurrection all too well:

"'Anyone can live capriciously' is a well-known adage; more true is—no one can live capriciously."
"Bearing" (Haltung) is the form and firmness of behavior characterizing a man who incorporates a "figure" (Gestalt) which is potent in history. It is the cloak of constraint awarded to shapeless human energy, the reward of identity made to those who serve the cause of destiny's missionary "orders." It is the only elemental relationship to pain, which must inevitably enter human life. In both the heroic and the religious orders life is kept in touch with the tragic reality of pain by discipline. Priestly discipline is aimed at deadening pain, soldierly towards steeling against it—but in the one as in the other, it is intended to keep life fully in one's power, so that at any moment it may be committed for the sake of a higher order of things (BS 175). Jünger's own pride in his status as a Prussian officer is obvious (isG 115), and as early as 1921 he was already reading Loyola's "Spiritual Exercises" (Schl 64). Temperament, circumstance, and education conspired to exclude him from a military or ecclesiastical career.

Regardless of Jünger's statement about the "conduct of one's life by one's own force," his literary career is a continuous exposition, revelation, or creation of substitute "figures" in whose service he might experience "historical ecstasy"¹ and by whose discipline he might cultivate a "bearing," a bridge across the abyss between the 'point of consciousness" and the "splendid anarchy of life." That this
is not equivalent to acting in the cause of some fixed faith, or crusading for an institution, is emphasized by Erich Brock. Jünger's starting point is not from a "contentual belief, but from a bearing"; he strives "not toward ideas, but toward a 'figure'." Nevertheless, they are considered absolute:

"The more we dedicate ourselves to motion, the more intensely must we be convinced that something changelessly existent is concealed beneath it, and that every acceleration of this motion is only the translation of an immortal, original language."3

What is a "figure"? To understand the transition between "figure" as a simple picture or image and as a more complex "figuration" or "representation" of historical forces we must consider both Jünger's peculiarity and sensitivity of perception and some literary sources, in which he found a related mode of thought already conceptualized.

Like his mother, Ernst Jünger is an "eye-nature" (Augenwesen). Some of his finest passages are precise, brilliant descriptions of natural objects and luxurious growths, full of color and tension, and at the same time conveying an intimation of hidden minds behind quiet phenomena. An excellent example is the opening entry in Das abenteuerliche Herz (1938), a description of the tiger-lily:

"Lilium tigrinum. Petals bent strongly backwards, of a painted, waxy red, that is delicate but of great luminescence, sprinkled with numerous oval, dark blue spots. One may deduce from the distribution of these patches that the living force which produces them grows gradually weaker. Thus, they are missing entirely at the tip, whereas in the vicinity of the flower-cup they are forced up so powerfully that they stand, stilt-like, on high, fleshy protuberances. Stamens the narcotic color of darkly russet velvet, pulverized."
"Looking at it, the impression of an Indian conjuror's tent arises, in whose interior a soft, beginning music sounds."4

Such interpretations of botanical and zoological subjects have been inspired by the conviction that every form in nature conceals something more than form: "...an age has left behind its seal, which glows again when struck by a more penetrating glance."5

His visual delight never ceases in "changing materials, rainbow-refracting glasses and liquids whose colors shimmer" (AH 134) in transparent crystals, stones, particolored fish and glittering scales, in the sight of a bowl of bouillebaisse, in shells and nesting birds, slithering emerald snakes and beetles in their hard and polished armor, in all growing, dying inhabitants of the earth. Jünger's descents into this silent world bring up his best stylistic booty.

In the realm of sound he is held transfixed by monotonous, somnolent scenery such as this in "The Song of the Machines":

"Yesterday night, on a walk through remote streets of the eastern quarter where I live, I saw a lonesome and gloomy picture. A barred cellar-window revealed an engine room to view in which, without any human attendance, a monstrous fly-wheel whirled upon its axis. While a warm and oily vapor drifted outside through the window, the ear was fascinated by the splendid movement of a sure, directed energy which, as softly as a panther on its padded feet, overpowered the senses...."6

This fascination by the senses is Jünger's basic state when he relaxes. In Afrikanische Spiele he describes the moment before sleep:

"We enter sleep as hesitantly as a cave, whose first turnings from the entrance are still lit by the pale reflection of the daylight. As we seek to discern the inner forms in this ever deeper dusk, a state of fascination overcomes us in which the object assumes a higher power than the eye observing it. Then, suddenly, glowing images emerge like transparencies whose hidden meanings are illuminated by a new and unknown light. That is the moment in which we often start up from first slumber, frightened as it were by a forbidden approach."7
Close observation of the elements around him, in penetrating curiosity yet without any emotional intimacy, is characteristic of Jünger even in his war-books, which constantly utilize the contrast of violent events and baroque details. In Feuer und Blut, an episode of hand to hand fighting is related, in the course of which Jünger is shot near the heart. He thinks, still standing:

"Now I am going to fall over forward as I've seen so many do. It's all over now. And, strangely, as I stare at the ground, I see the stones on the yellowish dirt of the path, blackish flint chips and polished white pebbles. In this terrible confusion I see each single one exactly, and their orientation to one another impresses itself upon me as if it were the most important thing in the world."³

Vision is not just a gift. It must be disciplined if it is to be more than mere seeing, if it is to be perceiving. Even the bloody horrors of war are not immediately obvious as such. Jünger writes about his first encounter with the oft imagined landscape full of mangled corpses:

"Since even seeing and apprehending objects depends on practice, anything completely unfamiliar can only with difficulty be deciphered by the eye. So we had to stare over and over again at these things we had never seen before, without being able to grasp their meaning."⁹

This demonstrates a peculiarity of his reactions. He is overcome by an awe more metaphysical than physical at the sight of death—a floating transcendence which he tries to connect with reality by visual, "botanologizing" exercises; for he goes on to say that he feels himself in a dream, "in a garden full of singular growths" (iSG 21).

In one of Jünger's novels the protagonist, looking down upon burning harbor cities at the base of his belvedere "on the marble cliffs," feels himself gripped by a "dreaming paralysis" (MK 149), in
which state one "perceives many things simultaneously" (MK 149).
Jünger's visionary perspective is thus further clarified by taking into account his relationship to dreams. He uses the word often, and his journals and novels are full of dream accounts and surrealistic episodes. In a "dream" one is both "inside" acting and "outside" watching, but in any case self-contained. In *Afrikanische Spiele* we make the acquaintance of several recurring dream-personalities, Dorothea being the foremost, who are the young adventurer's most reliable companions. Gerhard Nebel, an acquaintance of Ernst Jünger, points out that many characters in his novels were conceived in dreams, and in particular the Oberförster of *Auf den Marmorklippen*, who has falsely been considered by some as Adolf Hitler. Nebel also reports that Jünger "feels himself stronger and more existent sleeping than awake."

Another characteristic perspective is that of departure, of actual presence but immanent distance, joined in a state of readiness. In *Afrikanische Spiele*, as young Ernst is brought to the railroad station in Algeria, even a previously unpleasant companion assumes new meaning:

"Now I was sorry to leave even him, since generally in the moment of departure for ever every one we know seems significant and lovable to us—or, better said, appears as his 'figure'."  

A further alienated perspective is that of the "stranger." Jünger has always been an enthusiastic traveler and wanderer, and he frequently made his longer voyages alone. In the symposium conducted in *Heliopolis* (1949) Lucius characterizes his ideal of happiness as that of the secret agent landed on a foreign coast, who exults in the realization that no
one knows his name, and that he is free to spend a day "beyond the law" (H 129), beyond duty, habit, and routine. The special insight of the "stranger" is also described in Heliopolis:

"A stranger, who was not acquainted with love and pain, would see creatures magnetically ordered in marvelous chains, in the magic spell of powerful mysteries." 13

This lack of involvement improves the power of pure observation (AF 98) which, divorced from the habit of judging comparison, sees even "flaws" as "properties" (GS 255). A peculiar "stranger" pathos inheres in Jünger's remark, as he speaks of the city of Paris and of his wanderings in that "coral-reef of destiny," full of history and associations: "How gladly I take part in the life of men." 14

But perhaps the strongest experiences of this distance-perspective, a schism of isolation and hunger within the cocoon of self, came to Jünger during the first World War. There, constant proximity of the most primitive danger, the participation in huge, planned operations, the authority of his commission, and the fraternity of "fire-eaters" in his shock-troops all appealed to elements which early developed in his character. A close encounter with death, however, gave new significance to, or permitted a more positive interpretation of, his own abstraction. Jünger, despite his being frequently wounded, preserved throughout the war a sense of ultimate invulnerability. He mentions the tremendous luck "to which I accustomed myself as something self-evident" (FB 127). Lying then once, fatally wounded as he thought, on the bottom of a trench, his mind is occupied not with concern for his life but disgust
"It is curious that in such moments one's own body arouses the feeling of a foreign object. One steps out of oneself as it were with the inmost force of life and feels the desire to turn away as from a senseless image. Thus I explain to myself the expression of a certain disgust or weariness as is observed so often on death-masks."

Dying becomes an art—the art of stepping out of one's body and petty personal existence into a symbolical existence which, as symbol, need fear no extinction. This "outside" observer then sees life not as a movement but as a landscape, visible in all its sectors at once, and sees itself as a "figure" discharged from specific personality:

"A man comprehends his changing life in the perspective of necessity, for the first time without shadow or light."

The assurance of invulnerability is saved, the dying man is filled with an unearthly serenity. Just this sensation came to Jünger and confirmed his confidence in alienation from self, for it stood the test of utmost fear. What was still more, death appeared to him as a feeling of bliss, of release from necessity into the abundance of absolute powers. It is not impossible that this perfect unconcern with death is physiological—Jünger wrote to his brother in 1918 that, a pistol being pointed at him by a revolutionary, he only had a "sleepy feeling"—but it is also true that despite his early positivism he has always appeared to believe in personal immortality.

The "figure" one identifies in oneself is important because it is invulnerable, impersonal, and capable of observing itself. It is thus self-confirming. The "figure" is a vantage point from which to conduct fearless sorties into danger, a spiritual companion walking beside its likeness, the body (MK 145).
"It is essential that the feeling of closeness disappear, the feeling of a value not symbolical, but grounded in itself, and that instead the movement of living units be directed from a great distance."

The feeling of closeness is discarded by "turning away" from the body as an object:

"The important question of the rank of existing values can be determined exactly by the degree to which the body can be handled as an object."

It is this ability which rescues the dignity of man from the disgrace of his weakness and mortality. In *Das abenteuerliche Herz* Jünger speaks of the "contempt for man, which the sight of his weakness all too easily produces" (AH 37). To prevent this despair of our dignity every mere rational action of the mind must be seen as a revelation of the "substantial life" which belongs to a "figure."

The "figure" saves man from the fear of loss, but it is also what makes meaningful action possible. This idea is developed in the situation of a "lost post," the second of Jünger's influential battle experiences. As a leader of assault-groups and reconnaissance patrols, Jünger was often isolated behind enemy lines. One particular instance seems to have impressed him. The occasion was the retreat of the German army behind the Somme. Ernst Jünger, in charge of the rear-guard, reconnoitered the deserted positions and was the last man to make the river crossing (AH 129). He describes the unaccustomed clarity with which he saw the most ordinary thing. He became the Carlylian "hero," who is the "spectator of reality."
At a "lost post," where destruction seems inevitable, insight is keener and one can act not according to one's preservation, but according to one's meaning (AH 130). The courage of victory is dubious; the courage of a man in the face of death is a final truth. Not until then does "the power of one's alliances" (AH 131) become apparent. Then, as in the great burning hall of Etzel's castle:

"History achieves its utmost plasticity, or the center of time. Thus the sublime feeling of doing ultimate, conclusive things can possess a person, the feeling which must illuminate every good representation of the Last Supper."^23

This significance of one's self seen by the doomed or dying man corresponds, on a higher level, to what Jünger as a metaphysical zoologist calls "the secret meaning of an animal" (A 43). This meaning is to be found in the animal's motions, but they, and therefore the meaning, become the most obvious when the animal stops. We are amazed at this cessation, and our astonishment comes from the sensation of hearing, then, "the deeper springs" (A 43) that feed the temporal current of motion.

Jünger's passion for visual impressions of objects has been pointed out. Likewise, his various emotional perspectives have been shown to involve as a common factor a radical split of the self into poles of engagement and observation, neglecting emotion as a connecting link. The result of these traits is his "pictorial thinking."^24 Nebel calls Jünger a "sculptor of language" (GNAG 126) and says "in this ability to condense thoughts into similes and to contemplate opinions in metaphors
lies the whole of Ernst Jünger." Nebel further opines that a problem is solved for Jünger when a pertinent "plastic" comparison has been found (GNAG 266). Jünger himself asserts that he does not just "lift up luminous symbols," but that he discloses the "fabulous density of substance, which is peculiar to familiar scenes (Bilder)," that he sees the universalia in re (A 227).

"Pictorial thinking" applied to the political self as an object rather than to personality types, fish, or flowers results in the Jüngerian "figures." He defines "figure" in Der Arbeiter and provides an epistemology of "pictorial thinking" in the person of Nigromontanus, mentor of magic and prophet of the "Doctrine of Surfaces," who has hovered in the background since the first version of Das abenteuerliche Herz (1929).

In Der Arbeiter Jünger cautions that a "figure" "exists" and is therefore not logically definable. There will be talk of the "Worker," but the word is just an empty space, an open window "which can only be framed by language and which must be filled in by the reader through an activity other than reading" (A 82).

There are, however, some things a "figure" is not. It is not derivable from "concepts, ideas, or mere phenomena" (A 32). It has nothing to do with social organizations, parties, communities, or movements (A 32). No mere masses of people constitute it (A 32). Forces of reason, religion, or economics are not involved (A 32).
A "figure" has nothing to do with the "soul" which has never been convincingly contrasted to matter (A 33). After death it is not the soul that leaves the body but the "figure" that enters a new order in "radiant corporeality." The "figure" is not an element in the Hegelian dialectic although it provides the dialectic with "content" (A 77). It is not subject to development or evolution, cause or effect, because it is independent of time (A 79). Human history is just the tradition which the "figure" provides itself (A 79). The fate of a "figure" cannot therefore be used for optimistic or pessimistic prognoses, for it is above history (A 79). It is not old or new, neither means nor goal (A 131). The "figure" can be considered in the light neither of will nor of valuation (A 80). It has no quality (A 80). It cannot be assumed at will.

In all these negative specifications one sees a radical reduction of the discussion to a plane below, or above, intellectual activity. As a matter of fact, the abdication of intellect is a further specification: "What remains when the mind suspends itself—is not dynamism but the 'figure'." On the positive side, a "figure" is "in the most significant sense a being (Sein)" (A 77). One either is the "figure," or is not (A 77). The "figure" is a totality (Ganzes), more than its parts (therefore inaccessible to an "anatomical" age (A 31)), just as a body is more than its cells, a family more than its members, a people more than its political units (A 32). As a totality it puts its stamp (Prägung) on the age, space, and man (A 31). "Figures" are the powers that reveal themselves to an eye which understands that the world is embraced by a
more decisive law than cause and effect (A 31). These powers are more real, corporeal, and necessary than one can imagine (vorstellen, A 35), subjects of utmost admiration and hate. They are perhaps full of contradictions and tension (A 43), but in moments of undisturbed meditation we recognize them as "serene and preformed might." The best explanations Jünger gives are the following simple descriptions:

"As a 'figure' the individual comprises more than the sum of his energies and abilities; he is profounder than he can divine in his deepest thoughts and mightier than he can express in his mightiest deed." 30

"All great moments of life, the glowing dreams of youth, the intoxication of love, the fire of battle, coincide with a deeper consciousness of the 'figure,' and memory is the magical return of the 'figure' which touches the heart and convinces it of the imperishability of these moments." 31

Jünger is trying to conjure a personality that lies deeper than rationality, decision, and volition, and to establish this as an unquestionable basis for loyalty and respect. The weakness of the conscious self may be despicable, but, deep down, there is a glowing guiltless image where conscious responsibility may rest. As a "figure," says Jünger, man belongs to eternity (A 34):

"In his 'figure,' quite independent of any merely moral evaluation or any 'striving endeavour,' rests his inborn, unchanging, and imperishable merit, his highest existence, and his deepest confirmation." 32

Nothing could make more clear the quasi-religious motivation of Jünger's ideas and the questionability of their practical application to politics, although that is what he attempts.

For he does not content himself with the "figure" as an anaesthetic
and void-filling confirmation of one's own existence. It is much more. "With the 'figure' man discovers also his destiny and calling." He discovers his "astrological character" (A 221) which is immeasurably more important than his moral character. In the "figure" he finds simultaneously his freedom and his standard of values, which is thus contained within himself: "This constitutes the pride and the sorrow of his life." 

The "figure" provides a standard for the man who has seen it in himself, but there is a prior measure—whether he has been able to see the "figure" in the first place. The quality of intellect and vision is determined by the degree to which "figures" are visible (A 31); that is one's "legitimation or guilt" (A 39). One must choose the most real, powerful, and vital "figure"—to whom the future belongs—but one has no concepts to help himself:

"Rather it is a matter of a new language that is suddenly spoken, and a man answers, or he remains mute—and that determines his reality." 

For the fortunate ones:

"The scales fall from the eyes; it is as if the first greeting of a new, puzzling, and dangerous life speaks from them, that one affirms with joy and horror." 

This was Jünger's experience among the aviators of World War I, as he first noticed the uniform faces of this new caste of warriors who sought ever bolder forms of battle. From the moment one experiences a "figure" "the world appears as a theater of 'figures' and their relationships" (A 32). As an agent of these forces one is not superior
because one seizes power but because one has a new "style," one "represents" power (A 269). One is the "servant of the world-spirit," and contributes elemental energy ("Elut") to the cause of this spirit's rule. In return, the "figure" which currently represents the world-spirit gives meaning, order, and freedom—which is the "certainty of sharing in the innermost bud of time."^39

It is this "insight into the mythical foundations that shines through in the hours of destiny" (BG 95) which gives Nigromontanus his "ancient power of command" (BG 66) over the men of action who are "commandeered by recurring 'figures' and put into service" (BG 96). This is the gift of a "great view" (grosse Schau) as opposed to ant-like intellectual industry (AH 25).

Nigromontanus, the migratory mystic who has served as director of conscience and tutor of a new art of perception for most of the major characters in Jünger's books, develops an epistemology of "figures." His fundamental insight is the doctrine of the "bow" (AH 34), a "metalogical trope," which teaches a "higher way of withdrawing oneself from empirical relationships," of "tying a knot in absolute time," of reaching, somewhere, a stopping-point. The world is a room with many doors, some open for all, some visible only to a few (AH 36). These latter open only to the "great men" (hohe Menschen), who recognize one another by secret signs; they lead to the "splendid calm of solitude" (AH 36). In these hidden chambers one comprehends more swiftly and effortlessly; the differences of past, present, future
disappear; one finds the proper standards when one faces a decision. Nigromontanus' instruction provides the key to these treasure chambers. He teaches contemplative observation, whose abstractions are constantly corrected by the object (AH 134). He teaches confidence in the senses (AH 134) based on faith in the "hidden coherence" (AH 136) of "things." Through the surface of the senses contact with deeper currents is established. The "Doctrine of Surfaces" states that "surface" and "depth" are in a profound way identical to the keen and patient eye. The "surface," properly seen and recognized—like a mosaic, a cryptogram, a picture-puzzle, or a kaleidoscope—reveals a pattern that goes "deep" into meaning. The best examples of this identity are "transparent formations" (AH 10) such as glazes and crystals. Depth and surface are there simultaneously visible. The crystal is a "being" capable of forming a surface through which it turns itself "inside out" (AH 10); the "purpose" (Sinn, AH 9) of its depth is to create the surface, the "rainbow skin of the world" (AH 9). In significant moments we can suddenly peer into this crystalline landscape and are seized by vertigo and shuddering (AH 10). Such moments are love, beauty, and truth—but especially pain, death, and destruction, which cut into the ordinary texture of the world and expose the flesh of its reality. Indeed, the visible universe itself is but one of myriad "incisions" into possibility—a book of which we see but one page. By increasing the fineness of our mental "cuts" into the "fruit of matter" (H 14), we reach the point where surface and depth are identical, like a second and an eternity (H 15). A magical interpretation of
Nigromontanus' microtome-method is given by an officer of the Regent in Heliopolis. He considers the project to be "saturating the surface with depth, so that things are at the same time symbolic and real." Yet again the best explanation is not magical, but is an allegory for the penetration of the barrier of matter by the eye of mind:

"According to the standpoint adopted, first the brain and then the cosmos, first cognition and then existence change into mere conceit, and the one of these doctrines replaces the other in the history of thought. But you, Lucius, hold fast to the surface, keep your grip on the neck and root of the world. Being and knowledge—they intersect in the point of the eye; they intersect there where the rose-windows are pierced through the dome of the skull with a gleam of iris. The eye is feminine, for it drinks the abundance of the world. The eye is also masculine, for it dominates, fructifies the world with its beam, endows it with purpose. But don't you attempt to differentiate—rather aspire to their lofty marriage. The surface, that is the earth, is the scene of battle and the bed of love for the inner and external powers; they mingle in the eye as in their most beautiful blossom, as in their finest chalice. You perceive the alteration now as knowledge, now as revelation. That both are one and the same, only cleft by the word 'Let there be,' you will learn when you understand death as the greatest act of love, which balances the act of generation."

Jünger's personal communion-chalice, where matter, as it were, assumes spirit, derives in part from his "pictorial thinking." It is not, however, without immediate sources.

His "figures" have been related by Erich Brock to the idea of "types" in the Greek Weltanschauung (EBWB 113), and specifically to Plato who "likewise wanted something higher, but not abstract, and therefore was willing to accept the fact that this higher thing would assume the character of an individual being." As with Plato the "good," so with Jünger the "figure" is not contentually specified.
It is true that Jünger occasionally speaks of "archetypes" (Urbilder). He uses the word several times meaning genera (S 459, A 221) and once meaning merely a composite memory of women who become "woman" (S 459). His theory of "living" rather than "mechanistic" evolution postulates archetypes which do not evolve but project themselves more completely into the region of perception (A 221). In Die totale Mobilmachung he even speaks of the Unknown Soldier as a Platonic idea (TM 28), albeit ironically. Still the usage of "figure" with Jünger is meant to be more dynamic. The "figure" of the hero at a Lost Post is far too baroque in its gesticulation for Plato to have had a hand in it. Undoubtedly Jünger has absorbed Greek elements from his graecophile German education. He speaks approvingly of the lack of "individuality" in Greek landscaping and art:

"The faces of Greek statues elude physiognomy, just as the antique drama escapes psychological motivation; a comparison, say with Gothic statuary, illuminates the difference between soul and 'figure.' It is a different world in which actors appear with masks, gods with animal heads, and in which it is a sign of creativity to petrify symbols in an endless repetition reminiscent of natural processes."45

A significant negative influence on Jünger, effective through reaction rather than stimulus, is the concept of evolution formulated by Darwin and later widely applied. It is against this basic notion of the late nineteenth century, of limitless development, the "shoreless motion" (A 133) of reason, that Jünger asserts his elementary need "to come somewhere to a reliable conclusion."46 In the Darwinian view, as opposed to the mythical view, the animal loses "reality":
"Creation is moved out of eternity into the infinite; that means, out of unity into the statistics of large numbers. The wonder is nullified."47

Another negative influence is the Hegelian dialectic. Jünger somewhat disparages this mode of thought as typical of the endless progression into empty space of rootless bourgeois rationalism. In Jünger's theater of "figures," contrasts do not synthesize, because they are irreconcilable; they assert themselves alternately. History is the tension of battle, followed by the harmony of one victorious order. The antagonists themselves are eternal and their strife is "fruitful and indispensable" (GK 141).

An indeterminable influence on Jünger's perspective, which shows itself especially in the predilection of Nigromontanus for things which "strangely metamorphose with closer inspection" (AH 134) is the work of Alfred Kubin (b. 1877). In March 1929, Jünger published a review of Kubin's novel Die andere Seite (1909). Later, in 1933, came an essay on "Alfred Kubin's Work," which was reprinted in Blätter und Steine (1934).48 Jünger calls Kubin's expressionistic paintings and sketches "a challenge to seek." The observing eye is "set before a puzzle" (BS 104). In Kubin's style, as in Jünger's certainly, "Life and death, face and mask, dream and reality flow together curiously; what is mobile appears numbed and what is rigid seems somehow to be moving."49

"The life of the people is seen in dreamy moments; it is of demonic activity or of a dull, plantlike self-engrossment."50

With Jünger, the "figures" and people often seem like an activity seen in retrospect or in a reverie. Die andere Seite, according to
Fechter, is an expressionistic novel in which the relation of delusion and reality, vice and virtue is reversed. Only the hero, the mysterious Klaus Patera, commands the whole range of his empire of dreams in Central Asia. It is perhaps mere speculation to trace Nigromontanus to Klaus Patera, but it is possible in point of Junger's acquaintance with Kubin. Junger does tell us, in Besuch auf Godenholm (1952), that Schwarzenberg (Nigromontanus) had crossed "almost unknown areas of Asia" (BG 36) and "for a long time was considered lost" (BG 36).

The really major influences behind Junger's pictorial thinking are Friedrich Nietzsche and Oswald Spengler. Hohoff feels that the phenomenon of Ernst Junger could easily be explained in terms of Nietzsche's work:

"From Nietzsche comes the point-blank style, the thinking in symbols, the lightning quick combinations—the stylistic sub-cooling, the icy glance into the heart."  

The impetus to write Der Arbeiter might have been lacking, however, without the influence of Spengler's more specific morphology of history and the impression of immediate involvement created in Junger by Spengler's writings on the contemporary scene. In a letter to Friedrich Georg, August 1922, Junger asserts that Spengler had confirmed his conviction of the unity of human history, without which unity it would be mere zoology. He continues:

"The definitely pleasant feeling that came over me while reading [Spengler] I explain so: the intellectual advance of the nation takes place along a quite definite line. To everyone moving along it, there is imparted a certain consciousness of it or the responsibility for it. In this situation an imperative note is added to utterances which I did not fail to hear in Schopenhauer or in Nietzsche, and which I found again here."
From Nietzsche, Jünger had absorbed the apocalyptic mood, the glorification of force and power, the confidence in an emergence of "higher types," stock provisions of the education he enjoyed. The effect of Nietzsche's marvelously frightening visionary power was amplified by Jünger's own experience in the war. Specifically formative for the idea of "figures" was Nietzsche's idea of "myth" as an "epitomized picture of the world," \(^{54}\) operating directly and through the morphology of Spengler. Nietzsche considers a mythos the source of creative energy in every culture, as opposed to the analytically destructive tendencies of abstract thinking. Myth is the center around which phantasy, force, and apollonian dreams may cluster and take root. It provides a "homeland," a "womb":

"The images of the myth must be the unnoticed but ever present demonic guards under whose protection the young soul grows, by whose signs the man interprets his life and struggle." \(^{55}\)

Jünger has used the term "myth" expressly in a private publication Drei Kiesel (1952):

"The historical person is determined by one origin, one history, one end. The mythical figure on the other hand can have several fathers, several careers, can be simultaneously dead and alive, and every contradiction—insofar as it is genuine—will increase it in exactness." \(^{56}\)

A specific instance in Nietzsche of return to the mythical "womb" is his description of the "vanished individual," who, not wishing to be an individual, submerges himself in a "great type." As such types Nietzsche lists the great poets, the ideal Greek citizen, the Jesuit, the Prussian officer or official, and the disciple of a great Master. \(^{57}\)
The last three types appear frequently in Jünger's novels—the officers of the Proconsul in *Heliopolis* and Einar and Moltner in *Besuch auf Godenholm* to mention but a few.

Spengler's analysis of the bourgeoisie as a "protest in general against the symbolical form of life,"\(^{58}\) has already been mentioned. He advances instead the challenge that:

"...life should serve not a practical aim, but above all, with its whole bearing, should serve the expression of the symbolism of time and space, and only thus may claim a high rank."\(^{59}\)

A "thinker" is a man who displays his age symbolically, presents a picture of the world that has been born in him. Truth is for this thinker "his nature formed in words, the meaning of his personality formed as a doctrine, changeless throughout his life, because it is identical with his life."\(^{60}\) This is in fact, if not in theory, what Jünger practices. Spengler considers the historian the creative thinker who conceives in terms of change, facts, physiognomy, and "figure" (Gestalt) rather than—as in the abstract sciences—in terms of nature, truths, system, and law. The former are living and fecund, the latter lifeless and destructive.\(^{61}\) The true historian recognizes a *habitus* or a "style" in organisms,\(^{62}\) rather than abstracting from objects, which method kills as it dissects. This organic method can be traced to Goethe's "exact sensual imagination"\(^{63}\) and is describable as viewing a reality "in its 'remembered' form."\(^{64}\) What is more, this view is out of great isolation, according to Spengler, as of something "infinitely far and strange." The parallel with Jünger's viewpoint is close, when
we remember his penchant for occupying the moon as a cosmic grandstand
to study society in its transcendent unity (A 62; FB 74; BS: "Sizilian-
ischer Brief an den Mann im Mond").

It is clear that Jünger's conception is sufficiently ambiguous to
include not only the three officially designated "figures," the Unknown
Soldier, the Worker, and the Wayfarer in the Forest, but also sub-
ordinate representatives such as the Hero of the Lost Post, the Masters
of Dynamite, the Magician, the Padre, the Prussian Officer, as well as
almost all the characters who appear in Jünger's novels. For instance
the artists and scholars in Heliopolis represent the Magician while
even the minions of the Landvogt act like Masters of Dynamite. This,
of course, is as it should be. For a "figure" may spawn many symbols,
types, and representatives. It is certainly Jünger's conscious inten-
tion that his major characters should be visible as such, for in
Afrikanische Spiele (1936) he demonstrates ability to create "personal-
ities" where he so desires.

The "figure" of the Worker is the perfected evolution of most of
the others and will be the object of closest attention. The Wayfarer
in the Forest undertakes an advance down the path toward greater
personal freedom. He will be shown as a redeployment from the humanly
untenable post of "heroic realism."
Chapter V

THE WORKER

After realizing that the new breed of warriors he had eulogized tended to fade in significance with years of peace, Jünger turned to the task of identifying the "figure" which could, in greatest generality, represent the adventurous aggression against the "incredible indolence" of the bourgeoisie—\textit{as Adolf Hitler termed it in Mein Kampf} with, by contrast, an almost bourgeois sense of tact. This "figure" was the Worker. From \textit{In Stahlgewittern} (1920) until \textit{Blätter und Steine} (1934) Jünger is singleminded in his aim; the only possible exceptions are certain portions of \textit{Das abenteuerliche Herz} (1929). He is sustained by the certainty that his fundamental experience is the typical experience of his generation (Schl 9)—the discovery that:

"Somehow, hidden to common-sense thinking, the actual meaning of life seems to lie in movement through a region filled with a thousand-fold danger.... Duty makes the task tolerable, but the joy of danger makes it easy."^3

A frantic "sich-in-die-Luft-knallen" mood is therewith balanced by an equal emphasis on discipline. In the considerately sober pages of \textit{Strahlungen} (1949) Jünger still calls "the two great traits of our life and our world: strict, conscious, disciplined order and elemental release of restraint."^5 Other conceptual oppositions frame the same magical unity. In the realm of the intellect "blood and spirit" make words irresistible. In the domain of the will, "might and right—raise one's own nature to the rank of a law with respect to what is foreign."^6 Whatever the poles of tension, it is the same feeling of
feverish "restlessness, which is the sign of the new generation, and that no idea in this world and no image of the past can satisfy." Without understanding Jünger's conscious, indeed rapturous, submission to an unknown destiny as the guiding force of dynamism, it is difficult to credit the seriousness of his ideas. In Feuer und Blut he toasts:

"Therefore, let us drink, and see in that which destiny wills also our own personal will."6

This is no passive fatalism. It implies that any intense activity is bound to have a justification before destiny and is an excuse for engagement rather than relaxation.

"Anyone belongs necessarily to the living part of a great force. Here one can only let oneself drift and be formed by the manipulation of the world-spirit itself."7

Again, the world-spirit is to be understood perfectly literally as a "spirit" and not just as a phrase or concept. Otherwise, the idea of "figures" would be historical rather than mythical. The war-books establish the connection between the fearless, self-sacrificing Unknown Soldiers of the first World War and the world-spirit; Der Arbeiter discovers that spirit expressing itself in the Worker. Both Worker and Unknown Soldier are stages of the same "magic unity" of discipline and elementalism.

The Unknown Soldier is mentioned first in "Die totale Mobilmachung," but in a deprecatory manner, as a symbol of the West's religion of freedom and progress (TM 27). In Der Arbeiter he has been adopted as a positive symbol, as the representative of the Worker "under an heroic aspect" (A 11). Earlier, in In Stahlgewittern, Jünger had referred to the same "unknown, brazen" (iSG viii) types as "lithe tigers of the
trenches, masters of dynamite." It is in this "soldierly oligarchy, a generation of soldiers by free choice and personal passion" that he sees the world-spirit working against the bourgeois world of security, i.e., the West. Only occasionally does he drop into traditional nationalistic postures, seeing the World War as a struggle for the "possession of the world" (ISG 226) and apotheosizing the Fatherland qua fatherland. This belongs, however, to the earliest stages of his development. Soon Jünger identified the "real" Germany, the "figure of the Empire" (A 38), with the world revolution against liberal democracy; and then he saw in the "tigers of the trenches" the primitive force of the "Volk" which, without scruples or doubts, asserts its presence (W 63). This "new race" (FB 17) is capable of conducting its "revolution sans phrase" without any articulated ends:

"It is a matter of being able to will and believe quite independently of the content which this willing and believing assumes." This is, in part, the "spirit of the Prussian barracks square," mere practiced tactics, but the strategy is to establish contact with the long suppressed elementary powers and to assume responsibility for them, for the forces greater than oneself (W 32) which the burgher denies. One advances to meet the "radically problematic" (RM 74) nature of life, from which the nineteenth century fled. According to Friedrich Georg Jünger, the soldiers assume any and all responsibility for the war, which they find more authentic than the peace which preceded. They know, however, that they as men do not determine wars (TM 11). So they can only believe that the battles in which they risk their lives are directed by some greater order, that the strings on which they dangle
are knotted to a meaning (W 74). Still, it is the sacrifice which is important and not the sense. "The profoundest happiness of man consists in being sacrificed." This sacrifice is hallowed by the courage and willingness of the Unknown Soldier (A 147) who knows that death is no important event (ISG 131).

"What is good?... To be brave is good.... It is the good war which hallows any cause." 17

Frequently Jünger emphasizes that aspect of the Unknown Soldier which is sacrificial and which has an authentic relation to the pain, danger, and tragedy of life. 18 But another face is different. This is the "staring expression" under the steel helmet which the German soldier wore after the battle of the Somme. It is a look of "energy strained to the utmost" (ISG 99), the look of a charging soldier who has lost sight of all objectives in the spell of primitive drives (ISG 235). This aspect of the "figure" exults in the joy of danger, just as the first carried out its duty even in the absence of a cause. It is the glowing heart under the other's icy brain (W 85), with a hunger for "being there" (Dasein) with "blood, muscle, and heart" (Schl 16); it is the predatory spirit with all its beauty (FB 49) which Jünger sees as "Germanic innocence" (TM 26) but which Thomas Mann calls a belief in the "moral superiority of harsh and repellent ideas." 19

The Unknown Soldier is the first stage of the Worker, a "blind will" (A 147). As such he appears both in an active and in a passive situation, in the "work" of the assault and at a Lost Post (A 79).
It is a matter of no importance to him whether it be one or the other since he lives the fate of his "figure" and not his own life of beginning and end (A 79). A higher representative of the Worker has entered the scene since the war, however, one whose presence earlier would have given a decisive turning to the conflict but which at any rate is destined to harvest the future (A 147). This type represents the total work-character of the state (A 148). Through his agency the liberal industrial "society" will be supplanted by the total technological state; the chameleon-idol of progress will be countered with an absolute "figure" and shattered. It is true, says Jünger, that the victory of bourgeois progressive ideals in World War I was inevitable against a Germany which tried half-heartedly to share them, but, with the Worker, Germany once more is allied with a victorious world-spirit (TM 21). The appearance of the Worker is not confined to Germany, but the "rise of the Worker is synonymous with a new rise of Germany." 20

It would be quite false to relate this Worker to any Marxist notions, contends Jünger. The "figure" of the Worker transcends the Marxian concept in its generality and meaning. Marxism is successful, naturally, because it is one possible way of "representing" the Worker: in the modern struggle for political power, however, no serious movement can fail to be a "Worker's Movement" (A 63). On the other hand, such traditional nineteenth-century socialism is essentially a bourgeois phenomenon. It is the Worker babbling in the language of the burgher, which he was forced to learn in his helpless infancy (A 15). The Worker does not represent a new "class" at all. "Class" is certainly
a perfectly good word, but much misused by the burgher to serve his own interests (A 17). By propagating a "dialectic" of change in society, an organized replacement of "classes," the burgher hopes to perpetuate his endless conversation of reason and morality in the defense of his interests (A 17). The Worker, however, is not the pinnacle of any dialectic, Marxian or otherwise, since as we have seen a "figure" stands above all dialectics and provides their content. The Worker does not need to seize power; he represents it (A 269) in its only possible form.

The liberal age, maintains Jünger, is de facto condemned to death (A 21). Previous socialist theory contented itself with the same framework of conception and justification as bourgeois theory, i.e., society, the individual, freedom, economics, prosperity for all (A 27). It merely opposed materialism to idealism (A 28), making the identical error of treating destiny as an object of calculation (A 26). Any attack on the bourgeoisie in this sense can only lead to repeated triumphs of the principle of bourgeois security, the continuance of a policy of negotiation and conciliation (A 29). This is only a "playing" (A 16) of revolution. The Worker must realize that he is not just an economic outgrowth or a product of the factories (A 28), not just the bearer of a new "age" but of a new "degree" of life (A 17). He is a new "master" à la Nietzsche (A 41). The Worker is in contact with elementary forces, has a "wilder innocence" (A 39), of which the burgher never dreamed (A 17), or did so only in his nightmares. In a violent reaction to the personality of the bourgeois individual, not to his office as an exploiter, we find the message of Der Arbeiter.
When Jünger talks about the bourgeoisie it is usually in its character as an infection from the West. Thomas Mann, in _Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen_ (1918), differentiated the good German "Bürger" from the bourgeoisie and saw the former as the authentic bearer of German culture against Western civilization. Mann held that Germany was unpolitical ("politics" is a Western word) and that its natural government was an "authoritative state." Jünger is far more radical, disinherit ing even the "Bürger" because he represents no "figure" (A 37). Just why is it that Jünger would rather be a "criminal" (A 24) than an "individual" in the traditional Western European sense? Why are Democracy, Freedom, Individual, Reason, Virtue, and Morality pejorative terms in quite serious thinking?

Certainly the history of the "democratic process" in Germany between 1920 and 1933 makes no reassuring impression. The continual change, realignment, coalition, confusion of party programs must have disquieted anyone concerned with a stable order of society. Yet Ernst Jünger's objection to this scene is more personal than political. He does not like the actors. He does not like them, the middle-class politicians, because they could neither win nor lose the war completely (A 38). They were incapable of the "highest justification of war—the attack" (A 19); they were incapable of a flaming Götterdämmerung. But for Jünger "war is one of the most real things in my life." Both the men who capitulated and the men of the subsequent revolution were burghers who had no real sense of destiny (A 38) but shared the "feminine disposition" (A 22) of "society" to absorb every opposition.
This "society" is a disorganized "mass" (not a "community") of atomized "individuals" (not "personalities") who have only negative, economic freedom, but no positive freedom, which is directed power. They are people who love to exaggerate their uniqueness and their "personal" experiences. They defend their exacerbated and irresponsible sensibilities (A 19), to their disengaged and arrogant intellects (A 40), by constant appeals to common sense, personal freedom, abstract morality, and utilitarianism. They think in the "nihilistic" concepts of "progress," of temporal dynamics and probability, which although mathematically convincing, have no foundation in elemental, eternal realities (A 43). Looking for safety, they attempt to convert all bonds of responsibility into contracts, subject to notice (A 21), and all risks into insurance policies, equally distributed (A 49). Even the state becomes nothing but an "administrative union" (Zweckverband, A 251). Bourgeois society is the disintegration of the state (A 254) instead of its recognition as the highest means to power (A 17). The bourgeois must hide in his individuality, so fearfully, because he cannot by his very essence admit the elemental forces (A 20). He must, therefore, "deny" danger as unreasonable (A 18) and, by all means, insulate himself from it. He even tries to "calculate" the unconscious in psychology and so to draw it into the safe ring of conscious light (A 49). Consequently, he has no understanding for warriors, saints, artists, seamen, hunters, criminals, or for Workers.

Against a background of such men, Jünger saw a more hopeful type arrive—the "tigers of the trenches," now discharged, whose explosive
energies are eager for discipline in a "cheerful anarchy" (A 34). They enjoy a new relationship to their fellow-man, one of more ardent love and more terrible mercilessness (A 34). The motor is a good symbol for them—explosion and precision made compatible:

"It is the bold toy of a breed of men who can blow themselves up with pleasure and who see in this act a confirmation of order. From this bearing—which is not accessible to idealism or materialism, but must be referred to as "heroic realism"—results that utmost degree of aggressivity which we need."  

In *Der Arbeiter* the antagonism towards the middle class avails itself of the courage of the Unknown Soldier. Jünger's earlier ambiguous attitude toward technology becomes positive, almost against his will. Technology is no longer a cold machine pulverizing brave men in the war of matériel, but an instrument of these men's claim to dominance. The fall of the monarchy in 1918, although permitting the final blossoming of bourgeois democracy, was a fortunate "leveling of all barriers" (A 68) which made way for a total mobilization of society. In the essay "Die totale Mobilmachung" (Total Mobilization, 1930) Jünger first formulated a program for the "front-soldiers" who were active in various political splinter-groups. This program, which still speaks of the "mobilization of the German" (TM 30) against western "progress" and in the interest of "secret" (TM 28) and "eternal Germany" (TM 29), is an initial ideology for nationalism. It extends the "total war" of Ludendorf into a post-war Germany seething with Unknown Soldiers in paramilitary organizations. In *Der Arbeiter* this stridently nationalistic tone has ceded to a program of civil war, an attempt to unify nationalist leaders against internal forces of hostility (A 63).
In the changes brought about by technology in the everyday world of things and people Jünger analyzes an emerging pattern. He adds an additional group to the forces of the "figure." The Unknown Soldier is a "metaphysician of work" (A 146) who lives in lonely and endangered responsibility. He is only the high-level Worker. Jünger recruits now the lower-level Workers, the ant-like communities that move "in the spell of labor" (A 42) and form the "basis of the pyramid" (A 145). Throughout his work Jünger displays a fascination with social insects, such as bees and ants (GS 131). In his war-books he often likens life in the bunkers to that in ant-hills. It is not surprising then that the armies of the "figure" of the Worker are to be composed largely of the swarming laborers in the industrial landscape. The higher types merely are better conductors of the electricity of "work" (A 146). What is common to all is the victory of the Worker over individuality. Jünger points out the increasing use of work masks in industry, just as at the front (A 117); he points out the uniformity of worker's faces and work clothes (A 116); the worker's contrasting beardlessness and his clumsiness in civilian dress (A 121); the mass-produced look of his household objects (A 123); the increasing association of numbers with names (A 139) and the importance of alphabetical registers (A 139); he points to the cold objectivity of photographs (A 123), the distortion of individuality in modern painting (A 122), and the disappearance of theater and prima-donna in favor of infinitely reproducible motion-picture films (A 127). Jünger also finds significant the emphasis on
training of well-built bodies and the mobilization of sport as a social function. These phenomena indicate a triumph of absolute form over uniqueness, beloved by the bourgeoisie (A 127). The burgher did not "deal" in absolute types. For him a work of art was judged by the economic value of its uniqueness. He banished classical drama. He disposed of official uniforms and representative costumes. What distinguishes the Worker is not so much his use of "apparatus" (A 126), his technical activity, but his ability to cooperate enthusiastically, one might almost say ferociously, in a world of disciplined uniformity. For the Worker the "new style" (A 119) extends to sports, festivals, labor, and love:

"Work is the tempo of the fist, of the thoughts, the heart, life by day and night, science, love, art, faith, cult, war; work is the vibration of the atom and the force that moves stars and solar systems."

Work is an organic, closed, rhythmical, total concept (A 65), opposed to a generalized, mathematical infinite one (A 139).

The new style is a "renunciation of differentiation" (A 62) in the interest of restoring the unity of technology and nature such as exists in all elemental organisms (A 192). Organism can be contrasted to mechanism only as long as something remains unmechanized. The Worker, once all is mechanized, will ride his machine like a centaur; his human head will be organic to an iron-horse. This involves, of course, the sacrifice of many values which have been cherished (A 116), but this impoverishment will produce in the long run a society where the "naïve certainty" (A 227) of an animal using its own members replaces the
nervous nihilism of the burgher. This is the certainty of a soldier so trained in the use of his weapons and body that no material force, short of death, can destroy the morale of good discipline. Once this state is reached:

"Then the individual, who is basically only an employee, becomes a warrior; the masses become an army, and the establishment of a new chain of command replaces the alternation of the social contract. This removes the worker from the sphere of negotiations, pity, literature, and raises him into that of action; it transforms his legal ties into military ones—that means, he will have leaders instead of lawyers, and his existence will become a standard instead of necessitating interpretation."  

Technology is merely the weapon with which the Worker mobilizes the world (A 150). The Worker, so seen, is the only possible heir of Prussianism (A 66), although he differs from the Prussian ethos in channeling rather than subduing the elemental forces. The emphasis in both cases is strictly on form and performance (A 146), on power through service (A 71). The personal, human substance is of no relevance; man is a means and not an end, a means of propagating power and its freedom (A 71). The Worker's performance, an expression of the "figure's" will toward total transformation of life into energy, is indisputable since expressed in completely objective symbols. Other categories of judgment do not come into question.

The Worker has no choice but to represent the world of technology. He must accept credit where time extends it (A 81). The only alternative is senseless defeat (A 158). Engagement in the realization of the "figure" cannot be refused (A 144). It is as practical a matter as the necessity of subscribing to the public utilities (A 114). One no longer
has a contract with society but a task in society (A 39) and has not the distance from it to exercise criticism (A 141). One is not unique (einmalig) but singleminded (eindeutig) (A 128). This type will soon completely eliminate the individual, simply because no freedom other than the freedom of work will exist. Technology is not a neutral force that could have been "used" by the individual (A 159). It is an apparent anarchy which actually "serves" a mythical "figure" (A 161) and will eliminate all other powers, permitting only its own kind of freedom, the substantial freedom of belonging to a type (A 144), and of having a hand in the transformation of the world. It is the most unchristian power (A 154), a will to total dictatorship (A 42), and before its tribunal abstract justice, the freedom of investigation, and the artistic conscience must present their case (A 40).

This is the article of faith in Jünger's thoughts: that technology contains in itself a purposiveness, however invisible, the acceptance of whose authority restores meaning to a chaotically dynamic world. One must have this belief in order to continue confidently under the strain of continuous mobilization. This is a faith without dogma and knowledge without maxims (A 92). It is not meant to be faith in progress, which is, according to Jünger, the poison of endlessness. Jünger proposes something final behind the flux of improving techniques—the "figure" of the Worker, eternal, absolute. Its legitimation is the mastery of things (A 76). That justifies the sacrifice of workers and soldiers and of human values; it gives man the security of "substantial attachment" (wesensmäßige Zugehörigkeit, A 144), of being a
copy of the "figure" stamped out in a timeless rhythm, of "belonging to eternity," and thus not being lost "in a new world" (A 105). Like the sentiment at a Lost Post it is, presumably, "a new way to love one's life, without the drive for self-preservation."^26

The tradition of submerging the individual in the interests of a metaphysical entity is as well founded in German thought as the opposed, but psychologically related, tradition of radical egocentricity. The basic pattern of the former thinking is, as Jünger expresses it—"The individual subtracted from the individual leaves nothing,"^27 i.e., nihilism, whereas the individual subtracted from the Worker, or the community, or the state, or the "Divine Will" leaves everything, which has been worthwhile to the departing, just as it was. A. L. Rouse mentions in this connection Luther's De Servo Arbitrio (1525), which glorifies the attached will as opposed to the free one.^28 A good passage in this vein is found in Fichte:

"The new education must consist essentially in this, that it completely destroys freedom of the will in the soil which it undertakes to cultivate and produces on the contrary strict necessity in the decisions of the will, the opposite being impossible. Such a will can henceforth be relied upon with confidence and certainty."^29

All true education, Fichte continues, attempts to produce a determinate and lasting "being" that does not "become" but "is." Otherwise, it would be a purposeless game. A will is either a definite will to something, a necessity, or it is nothing. These ideas are associated with a concept of the state as a "whole" (totality) which, as an
embodiment of reason, commands the service of the individual but also
insures the development of his potentialities. Fichte feels that such
a "Kulturstaat" is most likely to develop in Germany, as a reaction to
the dangers of "capricious" individualism, arising out of political
developments after the French revolution.

The influence of idealistic nationalism, such as Fichte's, and of
sociological nationalism, such as Tönnies', is strong in nineteenth-
century Germany. In these, German "state" and "community" (Gemeinschaft)
encounter Western "society." The most immediate influences on Der
Arbeiter are not idealists or sociologists, however, but again Nietzsche
and Spengler. In Nietzsche, Jünger tasted the lyrical exaltation of a
power-elite, which establishes itself as ultimate instance in value
questions; through Spengler he was confirmed in associating this elite
with some heir of the cool Prussian ethos, inoculated with the tropical
fever of anarchy.

The Nietzschean idea of a "purified race" is an intimation of the
later "worker as social insect."30 In Nietzsche, the increasing
purification of a race is accomplished by gradual limitation of avail-
able force to special selected functions. "Such a limitation will at
the same time always look like an impoverishment..."31 but, finally, a
large and focused force will be at the command of the whole organism.

Likewise, the Nietzschean "great man" (großer Mensch) shares many
of the features of the Unknown Soldier at a Lost Post or as leader in
the assault, albeit still uncommitted to any absolute. The "great man"
is under his own jurisdiction, inaccessible to praise or blame; he is
colder, harder, more unscrupulous; he wants no "sympathetic heart" but
rather servants and tools; he is always trying to make something out of
people; he creates conditions under which stronger men, with unbending
"physico-mental" discipline, are necessary. The great man learns from
the warrior to take his cause seriously enough to sacrifice human life.
Nietzsche does not fail to mention work and the worker. He refers with
admiration to the "disinterested labor on their marble" of Caesar and
Napoleon and foresees that the future worker must, conversely, learn to
feel like a soldier. For society is not a legalistic contract (Vertrag)
but a probing essay (Versuch), a long search for the "commander."

Next to the ideas on "figure"—thinking in history, Spengler's
most important contribution to Jünger was the comparison of Prussianism
and socialism. Understanding the world means being equal to the tasks
imposed by the world. The Prussian officer or official and the
socialist activist are alike in their emphasis on "being in form" for the
challenges that may arise. The romantics and the bourgeoisie could not
tolerate the idea of the state as "being in form" for something, because
they, as individuals, were not in form. Spengler maintained that the
Prussian style was, despite ideological differences, also to be found
in workers' movements. This style is "the necessity of disciplined
devotion," "the inner-freedom of fulfilling duty," "self-command and
self-control in view of a great goal." Socialism is also a moral form
of life, of disciplined willing, and requires readiness for sacrifice.
Spengler traces this tradition of "being in form for a task" to the
medieval "Deutschritterorden," whose mission was defending the "Faustian culture" against Asia. Prussianism itself partakes of the primal powers of life. It is an instinct for power and aristocratic social structuration, for performance as a scale of valuation, for the primacy of state interests over economic ones. Internal politics is a matter of keeping the nation in form for its external task, i.e., mobilized. Parallels to Der Arbeiter need no specifying.

Der Arbeiter has been interpreted as the doctrinization of Jünger's personal military and political experiences, and as a development of a certain German political tradition. It attempts to specify for the modern world the state invoked by this tradition. In conclusion his subsequent position will be indicated as a dynamic stalemate between "figure"-thinking and a feeling for personal values.
Chapter VI
AFTERMATH

The bulk of Ernst Jünger's work since Der Arbeiter, at least since 1934, has been a reinterpretation of the ideas in his "Old Testament" (§ 166) with a rather profound change of perspective. The ideas of "love" and the "core of freedom" entirely alter the character of nevertheless unchanging demands for elemental immediacy, discipline, and elite leadership. To organize his more recent opinions on man's liberty versus his need for solidarity, his wondering contemplation versus the power of his will, would be a rewarding task. Jünger's real literary importance lies undoubtedly in such books as Das abenteuerliche Herz (1938), Gärten und Straßen (1942), Strahlungen (1949), Heliopolis (1949), and also scattered through other less ambitious volumes. The new, more gracious style is captivating in its precision and balance, even where not completely clarified of logical and emotional ambiguities. In general, the imaginative content of the "pictorial thinking" increases in spontaneity and aptness with the increasing tolerance and latitude of the author's personality. Jünger's final effort at conceiving a political "figure" is the Wayfarer in the Forest ("der Waldgänger" in Der Waldgang, 1951), but the scale is modest compared to Der Arbeiter—the apparatus still mystical and unwieldy but more convincing because less ambitious, more heartfelt. It becomes ever clearer that his talent is largely unpolitical, in any practical way. His best insights are into man's timeless dignity and not his embarrassment as a society.
The analysis of power relations in Europe as they concern the individual, traditions, and ideas is far more convincing on the mythical level of the "City of the Sun" (Heliopolis) than in the figure of an isolated spiritual partisan, as in Der Waldgang.

The personal crisis of Ernst Jünger can only be traced indirectly in the crises suffered by his novel-characters, but it seems obvious that he experienced sometime after 1933 what he himself might almost call a "moral collapse" (moralischer Zusammenbruch, H 163). In Heliopolis both the narrator of "Ortner's Erzählung" and Lucius de Geer, the chief character, are forced in various degrees to the same realization:

"We have invoked monstrous powers and were not equal to their answer." ¹

In both cases love offers redemption from a world of magical forces that have enslaved the magician. The feeling of invulnerability collapses; sensitivity increases; Lucius is struck "like a shell" with his need for another—individual—human being. In his relationship with Budur Peri, Lucius loses for the first time his:

"...consciousness of distance that separated him from people and of which he was proud."²

He retreats from his ascent into the "crystal world" (H 413) of magic, where the air cooled and thinned; the willful tension of his senses is released and allows itself the gift of happiness (H 420); he no longer "looks through" another person like a magic-glass, aiming at the Absolute (H 413); man has become incalculable, unpredictable (H 412). Lucius' friend, Ortner, says to him as Lucius leaves Heliopolis to join the Regent's forces:
"There are degrees of suicide for which one needs no weapon. If you had been born in the previous century, you would have already met your fate."

This reference confirms Jünger's "Old Testament" in the category of the Sturm-und-Drang.

The Regent is a supernal commander in whom might and love are combined as in a Father. Under him is gradually being organized an elite of men who have run all the courses of possibility, suffered pain and exhaustion, and have ended with "no way out" (H 429). They are then worthy to join the Regent's cadre. The Regent has no plan to enforce; he would only step into the confused world if invited, to change the social relationship into a relationship of love:

"We do not wish to interfere in developments. Nor can we say what the solution is, for the solution is only correct for him who has found it. That is why the Regent does not allow even intellectual means and superiority to appear. The reason is to be sought in the high opinion he has of man. There is greater hope in pain than in the gift of happiness."

This conversion to an "open" view of the world (H 251) does not invalidate completely the insights of Der Arbeiter nor its motivations, which avalanched into excess. As an epilogue to the "figure" of the Worker, Jünger's revisions and criticisms of his own work, and of the anarchic nationalism which bore it, will be summarized.

He admits to some considerable re-evaluations:

"It is true that many of my views changed, especially my evaluation of war and also christianity and its permanence. But one never knows, working in these old tunnels, when one will strike mines."
Jünger never repudiates the Worker as one of the significant factors in developing history. Corrections are in the nature of diminishing the bellicose totality of the Worker's state and completely superseding the metaphysical supremacy of "Prussian anarchy" as a myth. Still, in less ideological moments, it becomes obvious that Der Arbeiter is a laborious cross to bear. He remarks modestly that he must have breathed some life into his books because they lead their own existence, astound and "also occasionally frighten" him (S 317). He considers Der Arbeiter a floor-plan which does not specify the style of architecture that may be built on it (S 317). It is a monument of his "dispute (Auseinandersetzung) with the technical world" (S 317), and like that world it will not obey him but functions automatically. Such an encounter cannot be evaded but must be traversed as a salamander goes through fire (S 317). Jünger feels that his sketch of the Worker's world is exact, but that a second part is necessary, an orientation of the dynamic principles toward an unchanging higher order (S 233). This "theological" supplement would aim at developing spiritual "organs" for the workers, who are energized and educated beyond their organic needs—and whose surplus dynamism bursts destructively into society (S 586). The workers in all European countries are rapidly becoming alike, subject to the same rhythm of total mobilization conceived in a non-military sense (F 53). The anarchy of the workers' forces and the nihilism of the "absolute bureaucracy" (H 176) can only be countered by a church, for the state requires a faith (F 68). This state church in Europe can only be the christian church (F 72), which must present
a new "theology of abundance" (AH 201) to supplement the sciences, which are concerned with man's lacks and cares. The alternative is the already experienced absolute bureaucracy which:

"Sees man as a zoological creature, and makes use of technology as a means that lends this creature form and power and keeps it in check. It is instinct elevated to a rationale. Consequently, its endeavour aims at the formation of intelligent insect states. The doctrine is well founded in elemental nature, as well as in rational, and therein lies its power."®

Such a bureaucracy is purely technical execution of the total mobilization, an ametaphysical solution (S 343) as opposed to the metaphysical basis of Der Arbeiter. That it came to this was in part the fault of the "conservative forces" who should have directed the current in its proper bed where power and spirit were unified (S 343). German youth also lacked instinct (S 343). Jünger does not fail to imply a certain guilt on his part. He speaks of "our common guilt; by robbing ourselves of binding ties we unleashed" the murderers, the demonic forces which no one had seen in the people. He refers proudly but uneasily to his nationalistic days "We lived then in the egg of the Leviathan" (S 308) and, more deprecatingly, to "the years in which I, too, with the scissors of concept, clipped life up into paper flowers."8 He openly admits now both the fascination and the horror which politically gifted personalities inspire in him (S 316), like gleaming idols on the roofs of burning temples.

Jünger does not reject his nationalistic activity. He leaves it behind. He recalls that he was "never in harmony with one of the reigning powers,"9 and that he was at that time "already tired of the
politico-historical kaleidoscopes and did not expect improvement from their turning. Any improvement must take place in the "core" of man and not in his systems (S 14), because mathematically and biologically considered we are lost (S 410).

In a limited sense perhaps it is true that Jünger, as he asserts, does not contradict himself:

"I move rather through various levels of truth, of which the currently highest subordinates the others."11

The symbols, scenes, and interests of his early years remain with him. Gradually, however, they have been supplemented by greater understanding or have undergone a sea-change, which leaves the word or symbol but encrusts it with new life. For instance, Jünger is more concerned than ever with aristocracy, but he no longer hopes to find it in the "tigers of the trenches." They have either defected to the Mauretanians, technicians of power, or been liquidated by the insect state which they were to lead. The new aristocracy will not be recruited from a group, but will be based upon spiritual qualities such as sacrifice, love, and the strength of mind which penetrates reality.

Jünger still professes to be a partisan of the Prussian state, but he admits that the general staff concept deteriorated into "pure energetics" (S 328) and that its members are excluded from the highest insight (S 69). He also sees the possibility of the Prussian officer becoming a "servant without a genuine master" (S 64), observing a "lazy idealism" (S 146) of obedience.

Jünger maintains the idea of "figures," but it diminishes in importance before a newer and more transcendental form of absolutism.
This is the doctrine of the "absolute human" (absoluter Mensch, H 116) presented by the Metaphysician Serner in Heliopolis. An individual represents the "absolute human" in a man which insures his freedom of will, the meaning of his work, and justice for him in a timeless sense. This substance is moral rather than political (S 508). To this concept corresponds an "absolute experience" (GS 49) in life, which is possibly comparable to the activity of a "figure." Belief in this being does not imply a denial of the substantiality of evil, which cannot, puritanically simply be rejected (S 365).

Jünger still accepts the Worker, but he no longer is an independent power. His society is to be ordered by the Christian church, whose symbols, developed over thousands of years, are not lightly to be discarded (S 570). To keep man from being enslaved by his own comfort and technical control there must be minority groups who introduce freedom into society (S 152) by asserting it in the form which historical necessity dictates (WG 66). Freedom is immortal (WG 65) but is continuous only in individuals (AH 21) and small classes (H 82).

In his post-Worker books Jünger no longer conceals his distrust of the technical world. In this respect he feels like a stowaway on the boat of modern society (AF 79). The machine becomes for him a great prayer-wheel which has emphasized the rhythm but destroyed the seasonal periodicity of life (S 399). Moreover, this great and dangerous structure has been thrown up planlessly on unsurveyed ground (S 431). Still, technology is so deeply entrenched that it will persist even after the domination of the technician has ended (S 152). But it must no
longer be an end in itself, controlled by the masses. Instead, an individual must be the task-master of the technical intelligence (AF 80).

The individual is accorded a wholly new importance. Even the acceptance of "love" and "freedom" as transcendental realities would imply this development. The individual is given additional metaphysical importance, then, by becoming in Der Gordische Knoten (1953) almost a "figure"—a protagonist of the great struggle between East and West, between the splendor of despotism and the illumination of the free spirit. Eastern despotism is, in Jünger's opinion, elemental, absolute, a matter of destiny. It blossoms to monstrous proportions at the cost of the individual will. In the West the power of conscious intellect cuts through the ties of nature, as Alexander's sword through the knot, turning destiny into history. In the West freedom must also come to terms with necessity, but it is by means of a contract (GK 20). This contract is loyalty, freedom's tangential point with obedience (GK 33). Western man lives through his relations with other men (H 394)—without the distance of despotism. The West honors true power, therefore, in the providing of protection (F 78) rather than in a capricious will. The most important concern is that "man" and his dignity do not "get lost" (S 71), because more holy than life itself is man's dignity (S 68).

The preceding discussion outlines Jünger's changed viewpoint only on issues directly touched in Der Arbeiter. Such were the individual,
technology, Prussianism, the Worker, the "figure." The expanding and enriched character of all his writing since 1933 has only been mentioned and hints given to the roots of this change in a growing permissiveness and emotional largesse.

"Love is the inmost coherency of things," Jünger concludes. Love holds the cosmos together under the armor of necessity (H. 364).

Considering Ernst Jünger's education and career this insight must be of an unusual validity.
NOTES

Where not otherwise noted, references are to the editions specified in the Bibliography.

Chapter I


5. Carl Zuckmayer in Pro Porno, Stockholm, 1938; quoted from Hafkesbrink, Unknown Germany, p. 33.


7. Ibid., p. 55.

8. Ibid., p. 24.


10. Ibid., p. 261 ff.

11. Contained in a letter from J. W. Goethe to C. F. Zelter, 6 June 1825:


20. In a recent edition of Nietzsche's works, edited by Karl Schlechta, doubt is cast on the authenticity of some of the aphorisms collected by Nietzsche's sister, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, and published as his posthumous *Der Wille zur Macht*. Ernst Jünger, of course, would probably not have questioned their authenticity, nor necessarily insisted on it. See the "Nachwort" in: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke in drei Bänden*, herausgegeben von Karl Schlechta, (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1954-56), Ed. III. Walter Kaufmann, in a recent work on Nietzsche, questions the organization of *Der Wille zur Macht*, the selection of aphorisms made by Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, and indeed the importance of the work as a definitive or final view (p. 4 ff.). For Kaufmann, "the will to power" is most accurately described as an "instinct of freedom," which can, of course, still lead to violent conflict (p. 215). See: Kaufmann, Walter A., *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).

22. Ibid., p. 339.


24. In Nietzsche's *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, *Nietzsche Werke*, VI, p. 309.

25. "...eine fortlaufende Polemik gegen den Marxismus."

26. "...Kampf um die Entstehung eines imperialistischen Deutschland."
Ibid., p. 256.


28. "...viel mehr von seiner Wald-Ursprünglichkeit."


34. Ibid., p. 16.


Chapter II

1. Much general information in this chapter is derived from Armin Mohler's biographical appendix to Gerhard Nebel's Ernst Jünger, Abenteuer des Geistes. Armin Mohler is a former secretary of Jünger.


3. "Das Auge, aus dem ein solcher Blick kommt, wird zur Linse." Ibid., p. 211.


10. "Es liegt an keinem Punkte der Zahlenreihe ein hinreichender Grund
vor, nicht noch eins zuschätzen."
Die Schleife, Dokumente zum Weg von Ernst Jünger, p. 27.

11. "Die ganze anschauliche und greifbare, und damit auch die unbe-
greifliche Welt wurde einem Verfahren unterzogen, das an das
Laugebad erinnert, in dem der Anatom das Fleisch von den Knochen
kocht."
Ibid., p. 27.

12. Related in Ernst Jünnerg's Afrikanische Spiele (1936).

13. "...sich der Kälte der heraufziehenden technischen Ordnungen zu
entwinden."
Die Schleife, p. 42.

14. "Wir hatten Hörsäle, Schulbänke und Werktische verlassen und
waren in den kurzen Ausbildungwochen zusammengeschmolzen zu
einem großen, begeisterten Körper, Träger des deutschen Idealismus
der nachsiebzigjährigen Jahre. Außergewöhnlich in Geiste einer materi-
alistischen Zeit, wob in uns allen die Sehnsucht nach dem Ungewöhn-
lichen, nach dem großen Erleben. Da hatte uns der Krieg gepackt
wie ein Rausch. In einem Regen von Blumen waren wir hinausgezogen
in trunken Morituri-Stimmung. Der Krieg mußte es uns ja bringen,
das Große, Starke, Feierliche. Er schien uns männliche Tat, ein
fröhliches Schützengeschehen auf blumigen, blutbetäubten Wiesen."  
Jünger, Ernst, In Stahlgewittern, p. 1.

15. "Eine lange Zeit der Ordnung und des Gesetzes, wie sie unsere
Generation hinter sich hatte, bringt einen wahren Heißhunger nach
dem Außergewöhnlichen hervor, der noch durch die Literatur
gestiegt wird. So hatte uns nebeneinigen anderen Fragen auch
die beschäftigt: Wie sieht wohl eine Landschaft aus, in der man
die Toten über der Erde läßt."
Ibid., p. 20.

16. "...in dem sich bald der frische, unbekümmerte Ton ausbildete, der
stets im preußischen Offizierkorps Sitte gewesen ist."  
Ibid., p. 58.

17. "In Krämerzeiten allerdings, wo es nur um Geld geht, verlieren
solche Dinge ihren Wert, der ja nur in der Idee ruht, die mit
ihnen verbunden ist."
Ibid., p. 280.

18. "...im Banne gewaltiger Urtriebe."  
Ibid., p. 235.

19. "...unentwirrbar vermischt."  
Ibid., p. 227.
Ibid., p. 281.

21. "...von außen Gewalt und von innen Barbarei sich in finsteren Wolken zusammenballen."
Ibid., p. 283.

22. "...stehen für das, was sein wird, und für das, was gewesen ist."
Ibid., p. 283.

23. "...bleibt zunächst im Rahmen einer der letzten verbliebenen Ordnungen, des Heeres. Von hier aus beobachtet er das aus der Zerstörung des Krieges neu Entstehende."
Die Schleife, p. 57.

24. "...incontestablement le plus beau livre de guerre que j'aie lu; d'une bonne foi, d'une veracité, d'une honnêteté parfaites."


26. Of the book Feuer und Blut Sephehn Spender says: "This novel is one of the best books I have read and also one of the most deeply repulsive. The action of the novel is as beautifully organized and described as a fine piece of engineering. One never loses the shape, the hardness, and the shine of it. Nothing could be better than the picture of the men as part of a machine performing an action, whose driving force comes from outside their control — and yet they still have feelings."


28. Detailed information concerning this journalistic period is to be found only in one book:

29. Ibid., p. 365.
30. "Nach dem Waffenstillstand, der den Konflikt nur scheinbar beendet, in Wahrheit aber alle Grenzen Europas mit ganzen Systemen von neuen Konflikten umzäunt und unterminiert, bleibt ein Zustand zurück, in dem die Katastrophe als das a priori eines veränderten Denkens erscheint."
Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 55.


32. "...reiner und unbedingter Wille zum Einsatz für die als einen zentralen Wert gefühlte und erkannte Nation."
From an article in the periodical Der Student by Ernst Jünger, entitled "Jugend und neuer Nationalismus"; see Der Student, Deutsche Akademische Rundschau, 10. J. Nr. 17, 1 Nov. 1929, p. 3; quoted in Loose, Gerhard, Ernst Jünger, Gestalt und Werk, p. 364.

33. "...ein großes und mächtiges Reich aller Deutschen."
From an article in the periodical Die Standarte by Ernst Jünger, entitled "Abgrenzung und Verbindung"; see Die Standarte, Beiträge zur geistigen Vertiefung des Frontgedankens. Sonderbeilage des Stahlhelm. Wochenschrift des Bundes der Frontsoldaten, Nr. 2, 13 Sept. 1925, p. 2; quoted in Loose, Gerhard, op. cit., p. 359.

34. Loose, Gerhard, op. cit., p. 358.

35. "Der große Führer ist noch nicht aufgetreten. Sein Erscheinen entspricht einem Naturereignis, es ist nicht vorauszusehen und lässt sich nicht beeinflussen. Ihm jedoch die Wege zu bahn, ist die nächste Aufgabe des Frontsoldatentums."
Jünger, Ernst, "Abgrenzung und Verbindung," (See Note 33.); quoted in Loose, Gerhard, op. cit., p. 363.


37. "...halte das Schreiben eines einzigen guten Verses für verdienstvoller als 60,000 Trottel zu vertreten."


39. In a letter to Ernst Jünger on 11 October 1932, after the appearance of Der Arbeiter, an admiring nationalist colleague writes:
"Es ist ein kühnes Buch, und wenn man besondere Umstände in Betracht zieht, muß man sagen, daß es kühner ist als das 'Kommunistische Manifest'." The same correspondent adds: "Mit diesem Buch haben Sie ohne Armee und ohne Tanks einen Sieg über Frankreich errungen." Die Schleife, p. 82.
Chapter III


2. Ibid., p. 51 f.

3. Ibid., p. 50.

4. "Im Sturme der Bewegung die herrliche Windstille der Einsamkeit." Jünger, Ernst, Das abenteuerliche Herz, p. 36.

5. "Ich habe das Gefühl, als ob ein aufmerksam beobachtender Punkt aus exzentrischen Fernen das geheimnisvolle Getriebe kontrollierte und registrierte, selbst in den verworrensten Augenblicken nur selten verloren."
Quoted from the introduction to the first version (1929) of Das abenteuerliche Herz, in: Die Schleife, p. 9.


9. "Afrika, ...das war die prächtige Anarchie des Lebens, die doch unter ihrer wilden Erscheinung eine tiefe, tragische Ordnung erfüllt." Ibid., p. 25.


13. "...wo man über sich selbst und über alle Attribute der Macht ungeteilt verfügen kann."
Die Schleife, p. 24.

14. "Vielleicht war es doch möglich, dachte ich mir, so zu leben, wie man es an den Tieren und Pflanzen sieht, ohne Hilfe, ohne Geld, ohne Brot, ohne alles, was Menschenhand je schuf und berührte—zu leben aus der innersten Kraft."
Jünger, Ernst, Afrikanische Spiele, p. 88.

15. "...ein starker Hang zur Selbstherrlichkeit."
Ibid., p. 20.

16. "Um diesen äußersten Grad der Freiheit zu verwirklichen, schien es mir nötig, jeder möglichen Beeinträchtigung aus dem Wege zu gehen, im besonderen jeder Einrichtung, die eine, wenn auch noch so entfernte Verbindung zur zivilisatorischen Ordnung besaß."
Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 118.

18. "Der Vorstoß in das Gesetzlose ist lehrreich wie der erste Liebeshandel oder wie das erste Gefecht; das Gemeinsame dieser frühen Berührungen liegt in der Niederlage, die neue und stärkere Kraft erweckt. Wir werden ein wenig zu wild geboren und heilen die gärenden Fieber durch Tränke von bitterer Art."

19. "...daß die freiwillige Teilnahme an der Disziplin auch meinen inneren Zustand kräftige wie eine gute Medizin."
Ibid., p. 184.
20. "Der unmittelbare Drang des Herzens, das sich an eine Sache zu hängen sucht und nach großen Worten verlangt."
   Die Schleife, p. 16.

21. "Willkürlich leben kann jeder, lautet ein bekanntes Wort; richtiger ist, daß willkürlich niemand leben kann."
Chapter IV


3. "Je mehr wir uns der Bewegung widmen, desto inniger müssen wir davon überzeugt sein, daß ein ruhendes Sein sich unter ihr verbirgt, und daß jede Steigerung der Geschwindigkeit nur die Übersetzung einer unvergänglichen Ursprache ist."
Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 34.

Jünger, Ernst, Das abenteuerliche Herz, p. 5.

5. "...eine Zeit hat ihr Siegel hinterlassen, das wieder aufglüht, wenn es von tieferem Blick getroffen wird."
Die Schleife, p. 19.

Jünger, Ernst, Das abenteuerliche Herz, p. 70.
Jünger, Ernst, Afrikanische Spiele, p. 199.


10. Nebel traces to this the lack of psychological articulation of Jünger's novel-characters. He describes this quality also as "classical frugality" and "epical, naive absence" as in a mask." Nebel, Gerhard, Ernst Jünger, Abenteuer des Geistes, (Wuppertal: Im Marees-Verlag, 1949), p. 200.

11. "Es fühlt sich schlaufend stärker und mehr existent als wachend."
Nebel, Gerhard, Ernst Jünger, Abenteuer des Geistes, p. 197.


Jünger, Ernst, Heliopolis, p. 17.

14. "Ich nehme gern am Leben der Menschen teil."
Jünger, Ernst, Strahlungen, p. 328.

Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 37.

17. "Der Mensch erfaßt seinen Wandel in der Perspektive des Notwendigen, zum ersten Male ohne Schatten und Licht."
Jünger, Ernst, Das abenteuerliche Herz, p. 153.

18. In a letter to his brother, Friedrich Georg, 18 November 1918, Jünger reports that his house in Hanover was searched by a revolutionary group. Confronted by their guns, he suffered only a "schläfriges Gefühl."

Der Schleife, p. 58.

19. "Wesentlich ist, daß das Gefühl der Nähe, das Gefühl nicht symbolischen, sondern in sich selbst begründeten Wertes verschwindet, und daß dafür die Bewegung der lebendigen Einheiten aus großer Entfernung geleitet wird."
Jünger, Ernst, Blätter und Steine, (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlaganstalt, 1934), p. 189; quoted from:
Brock, Erich, Das Weltbild Ernst Jüngers, p. 225.

Jünger, Ernst, Blätter und Steine, (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlaganstalt, 1934), p. 190; quoted from:
Brock, Erich, Das Weltbild Ernst Jüngers, p. 224.

Brock, Weltbild, p. 147.

22. "The inward sphere of things', implying a genuine reality under the apparent reality, is the condition of hero existence."
Lehman, B. H., Carlyle's Theory of the Hero, p. 44.

23. "...tritt die Geschichte in ihre höchste Bildhaftigkeit ein oder in das Zentrum der Zeit. Es kann sich daher des Menschen das sublime Gefühl bemächtigen Letztes und Endgültiges zu tun, ein Gefühl, das jeder guten Schilderung des Abendmahls ihr Licht geben muß."
Jünger, Ernst, Das abenteuerliche Herz, p. 131.

24. "bildhaftes Denken."


27. "...die unerhörte Dichte der Substanz enthüllt, die vertrauten Bildern eigen ist." Jünger, Ernst, *Strahlungen*, p. 165.


Jünger is here obviously referring to Goethe's ideas of "strebendes Bemühen" and "natürliches Verdienst."


36. "Es handelt sich vielmehr um eine neue Sprache, die plötzlich gesprochen wird, und der Mensch antwortet, oder er bleibt stumm— und dies entscheidet über seine Wirklichkeit."
Ibid., p. 131.

37. "...fällt es mir wie Schuppen von den Augen, es ist als ob aus ihnen der erste Gruß eines neuen, rätselhaften und gefährlichen Lebens spricht, das man mit Lust und Schrecken bejaht."
Jünger, Ernst, Das Käldchen 125, p. 82.

38. Nebel speaks of Jünger's view as seeing man as "das Werkzeug höherer Aktionen, den Knecht des Weltgeistes." Compare this with Nietzsche's views on the "hoher Mensch" Chapter V, p. 75.
Nebel, Gerhard, Ernst Jünger. Abenteuer des Geistes, p. 203.

39. "...Geistigkeit, Anteil zu nehmen am innersten Keime der Zeit."
Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 57.

40. "...eine höhere Art, sich den empirischen Verhältnissen zu entziehen."
Jünger, Ernst, Das abenteuerliche Herz, p. 36.

41. "Schürzung eines Knotens in der absoluten Zeit."
Jünger, Ernst, Heliopolis, p. 295.

42. "...die Oberfläche mit Tiefe zu sättigen, so daß die Dinge zugleich symbolisch und wirklich sind."
Ibid., p. 428.

Ibid., p. 327.
44. "...der gleichfalls ein Höheres, aber nicht Abstraktes wollte und dafür in Kauf nahm, daß dieses Höhere damit den Charakter des Einzelneins annahm."
Brock, Erich, 
Ernst Jünger und die Problematik der Gegenwart, p. 16.

Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 223.

46. This elemental need is not only Jünger's problem, but is characteristic of the modern situation, according to Erich Brock: "das elementare Bedürfnis—irgendo wo zu einem verlässlichen Abschluß zu gelangen";
Brock, Problematik, p. 10.

47. "Die Schöpfung wird aus dem Ewigen in das Unendliche, das heißt, aus dem Eins in die Statistik der großen Zahl verlegt. Das Wunderbare daran wird null."
Jünger, Ernst, Der Gordische Knoten, p. 151.

48. "Die andere Seite," published in:

"Alfred Kubins Werk,"

49. "Leben und Tod, Gesicht und Maske, Traum und Wirklichkeit fließen seltsam ineinander ein; das Bewegliche scheint erstarrt und das Starre irgendwie beweglich zu sein."
Jünger, Ernst, Blätter und Steine, p. 104.

50. "Das Leben der Personen wird in traumhaften Augenblicken gesehen; es ist von dämonischer Aktivität oder von einer dumpfen, pflanzenhaften Eingesponnenheit."
Ibid., p. 106.


52. "Von Nietzsche kommt der rasante Stil, das Denken in Sinnbildern, die blitsechnelle Kombination—die stilistische Unterkühlung, der einseig Blick bis ins Herz."
Hohoff, Curt, Geist und Uprprung, p. 147.
Die Schleife, p. 67.

54. "das zusammengezogene Weltbild."

55. "Die Bilder des Mythos müssen die unbemerkt allgegenwärtigen, dämonischen Wächter sein, unter deren Hut die junge Seele heranwächst, an deren Zeichen der Mann sich sein Leben und seine Kämpfe deutet."
Ibid., p. 160.

56. "Die historische Person wird durch eine Herkunft, eine Geschichte, ein Ende bestimmt. Die mythische Figur dagegen kann mehrere Väter, mehrere Lebensläufe haben, kann zugleich gestorben und lebend sein, und jeder Widerspruch, soweit er echt ist, wird sie in ihrer Genauigkeit erhöhen."


58. Spengler, Oswald, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, II. p. 444.

59. "...daß das Leben nicht einem praktischen Zweck, sondern vor allem mit seiner ganzen Haltungs dem Ausdruck der Symbolik von Zeit und Raum zu dienen habe und allein dadurch einen hohen Rang in Anspruch nehmen dürfte."
Ibid., II, p. 441.

60. "...sein Wesen in Worte gefaßt, der Sinn seiner Persönlichkeit als Lehre geformt, unveränderlich für sein Leben, weil es mit seinem Leben identisch ist."
Ibid., I, vii.

61. Ibid., I, p. 138-9.

62. Ibid., I, p. 147.
63. "...exakte sinnliche Phantasie."
Quoted from Goethe by Spengler without a source-reference: 
Ibid., I, p. 132. A similar passage concerning precise imagination is to be found in Goethe's conversation with Eckermann, 27 January 1930, see: 
A good presentation of Goethe's "method" of cognitive contemplation (Anschauung), as well as its application to organic morphology, has been made in: 
Victor, Karl, Goethe, the Thinker, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 11-32. Spengler and Jünger owe much to Goethe's notion of cognitive contemplation, which attempts the reconciliation of sensible reality and the ideal demands of human understanding in an image which combines inseparably the universal and a particular case. Goethe asserts the natural interpenetration of man's understanding and nature's forms, which are to be understood. The relation to Spengler's historical morphology and Jünger's "pictorial thinking" is close, but in both the method becomes more polemic and forced, with emphasis less on development and analysis, more on the changeless universal and the organic entity.

64. "...in ihrer erinnerten Gestalt."
Ibid., I, p. 129.
Chapter V


2. In addition to frequent, at times almost weekly, publication of political articles from 1925-1933, Ernst Jünger edited several volumes of essays on war as well as collections of war photography. Among these: *Die Unvergessenen* (1928), a memorial for the dead of World War I; *Der Kampf um das Reich* (1929), accounts of post-war fighting on Germany's border and in the interior; *Krieg und Krieger* (1930), a book of "philosophical" essays on war; *Das Antlitz des Weltkrieges* (1930), a volume of photographs.

3. "Irgendwie, dem zweckmäßigen Denken verborgen, scheint dort der eigentliche Sinn des Lebens zu liegen, in der Bewegung durch einen mit tausendfältigen Gefahren erfüllten Raum.... Die Pflicht macht die Aufgabe erträglich, aber die Lust an der Gefahr macht sie leicht."
   Jünger, Ernst, *Feuer und Blut*, p. 53.


5. "...die beiden großen Züge unseres Lebens und unserer Welt: die streng bewusste, disziplinierte Ordnung und die elementarische Entfesselung."
   Jünger, Ernst, *Strahlungen*, p. 413.

6. "Macht und Recht, die die Eigenart dem Fremden gegenüber zum Range des Gesetzes erheben."

7. "...die Unruhe, die das Kennzeichen des neuen Geschlechtes ist, und die keine Idee dieser Welt und kein Bild der Vergangenheit befriedigen kann."

8. "Darum laßt uns trinken, und uns in dem, was das Schicksal will, auch noch unseren eigenen persönlichen Willen sehen."
   Jünger, Ernst, *Feuer und Blut*, p. 47.


10. "...geschmeidige Tiger der Gräben, Meister des Sprengstoffes."
11. "...soldatische Oligarchie, ein Geschlecht der Soldaten aus freier Wahl und persönlicher Leidenschaft."

12. Especially in In Stahlgewittern (1920); see pp. xiv, 281-3.

13. "Es kommt darauf an, wollen und glauben zu können, ganz abgesehen von den Inhalten, die sich dieses Wollen und Glauben gibt."

14. "...Geist des preußischen Kasernenhofes."
Jünger, Ernst, In Stahlgewittern, p. 80.


16. "Das tiefste Glück des Menschen besteht darin, daß er geopfert wird."
Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 71.

17. "Was ist gut, fragt ihr? Tapfer sein ist gut"; "Der gute Krieg heiligt jede Sache."

18. This aspect is well presented in Jünger's essay, "Über den Schmerz," which appeared in Blätter und Steine (1934). Jünger here refers to an "economy of pain." Pain which is artificially avoided does not disappear but is merely distributed more finely, as ennui or a permeating fearful weariness. The brave, and forthright, man will confront and control pain in its immediacy.

19. A belief he finds characteristic of the German tragic spirit.
Mann, Thomas, This War, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1940), p. 44.

20. "Der Aufgang des Arbeiters (ist) mit einem neuen Aufgange Deutschlands gleichbedeutend."
Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 25.


22. Ibid., p. xxxiv.
By 1923, however, Thomas Mann was already soliciting support for the Weimar Republic; see "Von deutscher Republik" (1923) in: Mann, Thomas, Gesammelte Werke, (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1925), "Bemühungen, Neue Folge der Gesammelten Abhandlungen und Kleinen Aufsätze," p. 152.
23. "Er ist das kühne Spielzeug eines Menschenschlages, der sich mit Lust in die Luft zu sprengen vermag, und der in diesem Akte noch eine Bestätigung der Ordnung erblickt. An dieser Haltung, die weder dem Idealismus, noch dem Materialismus vollziehbar ist, sondern die als ein 'heroischer Realismus' angesprochen werden muß, ergibt sich jenes äußere Maß an Angriffskraft, dessen wir be-dürftig sind."
Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 34.

Ibid., p. 65.

Ibid., p. 25.

Jünger, Ernst, Das abenteuerliche Herz, p. 154.

27. "Wenn man vom Individuum das Individuum abzieht, bleibt das Nichts zurück."
Jünger, Ernst, Der Arbeiter, p. 133.


29. "Dagegen würde die neue Erziehung grade darin bestehen müssen, daß sie auf dem Boden, dessen Bearbeitung sie übernimmt, die Freiheit des Willens gänzlich vernichtete, und dagegen strenge Notwendigkeit der Entscheidungen, und die Unmöglichkeit des Entgegengesetzten in dem Willen hervorbrachte, auf welchen Willen man nunmehr sicher rechnen und auf ihn sich verlassen könnte."
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814), Reden an die deutsche Nation, (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1944), "Vom Wesen der neuen Erziehung," p. 28.

30. Jünger finds the desire to have a slave a basic one (GS 12). He sees the state of slavery as not unhappy (AF 55), although lacking finally---not freedom---but dignity (AF 55).
31. "Eine solche Beschränkung wird sich immer zugleich wie eine Verarmung ausnehmen."
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morgenröthe, in Nietzsches Werke, IV, p. 240.


33. "'Interesseloses' Arbeiten an ihrem Marmor."
Ibid., p. 350.

34. Ibid., p. 197.

35. See Chapter I, note 27.

36. Spengler, Oswald, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, I, p. ix.

37. Ibid., II, p. 496.

38. These ideas were first developed in 1919, in an essay "Preußen und Socialismus," published in Spengler's "Politische Schriften." Spengler found their recapitulation and interpretation necessary, which he undertook in Jahre der Entscheidung (1933).

Spengler, Oswald, Jahre der Entscheidung, p. 137.

40. Ibid., p. 135.
It is interesting, and a sign of Jünger's great debt to Spengler, that the theme of West against East becomes the occasion of Jünger's most specific pronouncements on individual freedom since the war—-in Der Gordische Knoten (1953).

41. Ibid., p. 138-40.
Chapter VI

1. "Wir haben die ungeheuren Mächte angerufen, deren Antwort wir nicht gewachsen sind."

2. "...das Bewußtsein der Ferne, das ihn von den Menschen trennte, und auf das er stolz gewesen war."
   Ibid., p. 413.

3. "Es gibt Grade des Selbstmords, bei denen man der Waffe nicht bedarf. Wenn Sie im vorigen Jahrhundert geboren wären, dann hätte Sie das Schicksal schon erreicht."
   Ibid., p. 413.

4. "Wir wollen in die Entwicklungen nicht eingreifen. Wir können auch nicht die Lösung sagen, denn diese Lösung ist nur richtig für den, der sie gefunden hat. Das ist der Grund, aus welchem der Regent auch geistige Mittel und geistige Übermacht nicht in Erscheinung treten läßt. Er ist zu suchen in der hohen Auffassung, die er vom Menschen hegt. Im Schmerz liegt größere Hoffnung als im geschenkten Glück."
   Ibid., p. 428.

   Jünger, Ernst, *Strahlungen*, p. 495.

6. "...sieht den Menschen als zoologisches Wesen und faßt die Technik als das Mittel, das diesem Wesen Form und Macht verleiht, es auch am Zügel hält. Sie ist ein in das rationale gesteigerter Instinkt. Infolgedessen zielt ihr Bestreben auf die Bildung von intelligenten Insektenstaaten ab. Die Lehre ist sowohl im Elementaren als im Rationalen gut gegründet, und darin liegt ihre Macht."

7. "...unsere gemeinsame Schuld; indem wir uns unserer Bindungen beraubten, entfesselten wir sie."

8. "...die Jahre, in denen auch ich mit der Schere der Begriffe mir das Leben zu Papierblumen zurechtstutzte."
   Ibid., p. 400.
9. "...nie im Einklang mit einer der herrschenden Gewalten."
   Ibid., p. 13.

10. "...bereits der politisch-historischen Kaleidoskopik müde war und
    Besserung von ihrer Umdrehung nicht erwartete."

11. "Ich bewege mich vielmehr durch verschiedene Schichten der Wahr-
    heit, von denen die jeweils höchste sich die anderen unterstellt."
    Ibid., p. 403.

12. "...erkennen, daß der innerste aller Zusammenhänge die Liebe ist."
    Ibid., p. 73.
I. Works by Ernst Jünger:


Am Sarazenenturm, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1955).


Atlantische Fahrt, (Zürich: Verlag der Arche, 1948).


Besuch auf Godenholm, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1952).


Feuer und Blut, (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1941).


Der Gördische Knoten, (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1953).

Heliopolis; Rückblick auf eine Stadt, (2. Aufl.; Tübingen: Heliopolis-Verlag, 1949).


Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis, (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1922).

Myrdun; Briefe aus Norwegen, (Tübingen: Heliopolis-Verlag, 1949).
Das Sanduhrbuch, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1954).

Die Schleife, Dokumente zum Weg von Ernst Jünger, zusammengestellt von Armin Mohler, (Zürich: Verlag der Arche, 1955); This work is composed of extracts from Jünger's works which are out of print and of previously unpublished correspondence.

Sprache und Körperbau, (Zürich: Verlag der Arche, 1947).


Über die Linie, (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1951).


Der Waldgang, (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1953).

II. Secondary Works about Ernst Jünger:


Brock, Erich, Das Weltbild Ernst Jungers, Darstellung und Deutung, (Zürich: Max Niehaus Verlag, 1945).


Loose, Gerhard, Ernst Jünger; Gestalt und Werk, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1957).

Nebel, Gerhard, Ernst Jünger, Abenteuer des Geistes, (Wuppertal: Märees-Verlag, 1949).

Nebel, Gerhard, Ernst Jünger und das Schicksal des Menschen, (Wuppertal: Märees-Verlag, 1948).


III. Other Secondary Works:


Haeckel, Ernst, Monism, as Connecting Religion and Science, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1894).


Hafkesbrink, Hanna, Unknown Germany; an inner chronicle of the First World War based on letters and diaries, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948).

Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, eine Abrechnung, (München: F. Eher Nachfolge, 1931).


Spengler, Oswald, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes; Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, (München: Beck, 1923).