RICE UNIVERSITY

THOMAS AQUINAS' DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY
A NEW INTERPRETATION

by

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The Thomistic doctrine of analogy is multidimensional and intimately related to Thomas' total metaphysical thought. To grasp its fullest meaning, one must turn to the whole of the Thomistic corpus with the question: what role does analogy play in Thomas' metaphysics?

Analogy in the Thomistic sense is both a mode of speech and a basic metaphysical concept, functioning as a mean between two extremes. As a form of speech it enables one to talk about infinite and finite reality while avoiding anthropomorphism and agnosticism. It asserts that when terms are predicated of Infinite Being they are used in a sense which is neither precisely the same nor completely different from the sense in which they are predicated of finite things. As a metaphysical concept "analogy of being" is neither monistic or pluralistic, but says that reality is both one and many, unified within diversity.

In Aquinas' system there are two principles which underlie and ground analogy: the doctrine of creation and the principle of potency-act. Creation is an effect of God pre-existing in Him both intellectually and naturally and thus resembling Him in some way. There is neither equivocation nor univocation, for though God is truly Agent and His effects are linked to Him through a real relation of likeness, nevertheless no effect perfectly resembles its cause, and God and world remain essentially diverse.
The principle of potency-act is the metaphysical expression of the doctrine of creation. All Thomistic arguments for creation are based on the principle that God alone is Pure Act and all other things are composed of potency-act. If God is Pure Act in whom essence and the act of existing are identical, it follows that if any other beings exist they depend upon Him and receive their being from Him. Every being, an analogue of God the Pure Act, participates in Him and imitates Him existentially. Existential participation is intrinsically analogical: there is a community of existence, but not of essence.

All four types of analogy in Thomas are properly metaphysical in the sense that they demonstrate and explicate the principle of potency-act and the doctrine of creation. Aquinas is fundamentally concerned to speak of both sides of the God-creature relation, using various modes of analogy in relation to each other and supplementing each other. Analogy of metaphor can speak of God through its use of finite terms: it is man in his most creative and distinctive way expressing something of his relation to God. Analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality are used in mutual relation with some definite overlap in function. The analogy of attribution is used in contexts where the supereminence and transcendence of God is carefully guarded, while in cases where the analogy of proportionality is used, the concern is to guard the integrity of creation. Both analogies tell us that a certain perfection, e.g. love, belongs intrinsically both to God and man and that Love and love are similar. The analogy of attribution, however, tells us that Love belongs first to God, that God is Love,
and that man's love is always an imperfect imitation of God's Love. On the other hand, the analogy of proportionality tells us that there is a similarity between God's relation to His Love and man's relation to his, so that though God = Love, yet man also has love fully and in proportion to his being. Both these analogies are necessary for Aquinas, whose single aim in using analogy is adequately to account for all aspects of the God-creature relation.
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INTRODUCTION

The object of this study is to investigate in detail Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. This undertaking arose out of the growing belief that a correct understanding of analogy is important for modern philosophy. Such a belief takes into account several factors.

First is the modern concern with language and meaning. Linguistic analysis has presented the question of meaning in terms of verification and has raised serious doubt about the ability of language to speak of other than finite realities. The scope of philosophical language as well as the validity of metaphysics itself is at issue. Can finite words be used to speak about transmundane reality and experience? If so, how?

In this regard, Aquinas' metaphysical thought is concerned not only with man's knowledge of Infinite Being, but also with man's ability to speak about this Being. He asserts that it is valid for man, in terms of his finite, natural language, to speak about infinite and transcendent reality and holds analogy to be the method whereby this can be accomplished. Analogy, claims Aquinas, is a "mean" which enables man to bridge the gap between finite and infinite on both the metaphysical and epistemological levels.

In addition, in a time when theological language is a prime subject in all church scholarly circles, Thomas' assertion that analogy, as a form of speech, enables one to talk about God while avoiding anthropomorphism and agnosticism needs careful examination.
This certainly is even more necessary in light of the fact that several of the modern day efforts to make religious language meaningful have turned in some manner to the concept of analogy. Karl Barth has the *analogia fidei*, Rudolf Bultmann speaks of existential analysis plus analogy and Charles Hartshorne wants to speak about God in strict analogy to the human person.

A second factor involved in the undertaking of this study is the question of the "Christian truth" and its relation to modern day thought and structures of meaning. How can the Christian kerygma be translated into meaningful terms for this day and age? Thomas Aquinas represents an unique attempt to translate the Christian message for the time. The choice of his day was to reject Aristotelianism in the name of a dogmatic Platonism or seize the newly emerging viewpoint as a means for expounding the Christian message. The statement Aquinas forged made it possible to speak the language of a world rapidly becoming accustomed to the Aristotelian mode of thought.

From the viewpoint of an adequate understanding of the Christian faith, Aquinas' translation has several interesting features. First, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, the doctrine of creation is the root concept of his system. He attempts to deal with the ontological question of how the God who has acted in history is related to ultimate reality? The proofs of God's existence are, in some sense, asking how it is possible to believe in the God of the Christian proclamation in light of increasing knowledge of the structure of reality as described by Aristotle. Aquinas answers this question in terms of causality.
Secondly, Aquinas is concerned with the problem of transcendence-immanence and, as will be shown in the thesis, he tries by using the various modes of analogy in inter-relation to do justice to both God and creature. Third, in relation to the Hebrew-Christian emphasis on God as acting, Aquinas has built his thought upon the understanding of God as Pure Act and as the ground and sustainer of all action.

Aquinas, in his metaphysical thought and especially in his doctrine of analogy, does represent an unique translation of the Christian kerygma for man in his secular environment. It must be recognized, however, that the structure he forged is a combination of Aristotle and Plato and represents a certain metaphysical stance. It is evident, then, that a better understanding of Thomistic metaphysics is important to this era of Protestant-Catholic dialogue when the Roman philosophical and theological foundations are being challenged by the comprehensive world-views of men like Karl Barth and Paul Tillich. This is especially true also in that one must finally ask the question: "if a metaphysical framework is necessary to the interpretation and communication of the Christian message, which one does justice to the modern secular environment and yet safeguards the integrity of the Christian kerygma? In this regard, the importance of analogy for Thomas' philosophy cannot be underestimated, for as Cajetan and others have asserted, anyone who wishes to deal adequately with Thomas' metaphysics must search out an answer to the important question: "What is Thomas' doctrine of analogy?"
It is for these reasons, then, that this detailed study of Thomistic analogy was undertaken. The task must, however, be acknowledged from the beginning to be a difficult one, for though Thomas dealt with analogy in almost every one of his works and in a variety of contexts, he never wrote a general treatise on analogy. In addition, though there has been an endless variety of subsequent scholarly work on the subject, the issues have not been clarified. Indeed, even today aspects of Thomas' doctrine of analogy are being debated among both Catholic and non-Catholic scholars.

It is hoped that this treatment of analogy will at least present a new perspective on the issue by affirming, in contrast to most Thomistic treatments of analogy, that the problem of the proper metaphysical analogy is an improper query. In fact, it will be asserted that within the Thomistic scheme all forms of analogy must, in some manner, be considered properly metaphysical.

With this objective in mind, the study will begin with a review of the theories of other thinkers such as Cajetan, Suarez and contemporaries like Hampus Lyttkens and Klubertanz. The second chapter will deal primarily with the role of analogy in Thomistic metaphysics and will seek to explicate in detail the metaphysical principle which is its ontological ground. The final chapter will present Thomas' doctrine of analogy from the viewpoint of this investigation. Its main thesis will be that, for Aquinas, analogy is a basic metaphysical tool, one grounded upon the principle of potency-act and the doctrine of creation, and used by him in numerous ways to solve a complexity of problems.
Let us start with a review of the theories of other thinkers; for the proofs of a theory are difficulties for the contrary theory. Besides, those who have first heard the pleas of our adversaries will be more likely to credit the assertions we are going to make.

Aristotle, On the Heavens, translated by J. L. Stocks, 10:279b

Chapter I. Interpretations of Thomas' Doctrine of Analogy

The proper beginning of this study is with the traditional interpretation of Thomas' doctrine of analogy, explicated primarily in the De Nominum Analogia of Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan. In this account, analogy signifies a certain likeness in difference. It is a mean between the two extremes of pure equivocation, which is mere likeness in name or homonymity, and univocation, which is perfect likeness in meaning or conceptual identity.

For Cajetan, there are only three modes of analogy: inequality, attribution, and proportionality. These correspond to Aquinas' division in the Sentences: analo gia secundum esse et non secundum intentionem, et non secundum esse, and secundum intentionem et secundum esse.


2. Analogy is the relationship that a term (called the analogon) has to things of which it is predicated (called analogates).

3. "Since analogy is a mean between pure equivocation and univocation, its nature should be explained by means of the extremes." Cajetan, p. 30.


5. Thomas Aquinas, I. Sententiariurn, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1, Opera Omnia, volume 7, p. 257.
The analogy of inequality, as described by Cajetan, involves a common notion, but this does not belong equally to each of the analogates. For example, the term "body" is properly said of all bodies, but there are inferior and superior bodies and the notion "body" is not equally and similarly possessed by all bodies. Animal is said rightfully of both a horse and a man, but animality is possessed by horse and man under different conditions of existence and degrees of intensity.

Things analogous by attribution also have a common notion, but each of the analogates has a different relationship to the analogon. Cajetan's example for this analogy is the predication of the term "healthy" to medicine, urine and animal. The notion is the same for all three analogates, but it expresses the different relationships of these to one term, health. Animal is the subject of health, urine its sign, and medicine its cause. The primary characteristic of the analogy of attribution is that the analogous perfection (health) exists properly only in the primary analogate (animal) and secondarily in the others. This is seen in the predication of "being" and "good". Materially (in reality), good is an intrinsic property of all things, but formally (from a logical point of view) the notion of good may be considered to be verified intrinsically only in the essential good. The others are called good by extrinsic denomination because of their relation of

6. *De Nominum Analogia*, 1, 4: "Analoga secundum inaequalitatem vocantur, quorum nomen est commune et ratio secundum illud nomen est omnino eadem, inaequaliter tamen participata."

7. *De Nominum Analogia*, 1, 4: "Analoga autem secundum attributionem sunt quorum nomen est commune, ratio secundum illud nomen est eadem secundum terminum et diversa secundum habituidines ad illum."

8. *De Nominum Analogia*, 1, 4: "Analogia ista fit secundum denominationem extrinsecam tantum, its quod primum analogatorum tantum est tale formaliter coetera autem talia denominatur extrinsec."
causal dependence on the essential good. Thus Cajetan writes:

Simile enim de bono. Licet omnia entia bona sint bonitatibus sibi formaliter inhaerentibus, in quantum tamen bona dicuntur bonitate prima effective, aut finaliter aut exemplariter, omnia alia non nisi extrinseca denominatione bona dicuntur illa bonitate, quae Deus ipse bonus formaliter in se est. 9

Cajetan is insistent on the point that every name analogous by attribution is common to the analogates only in pertaining to the primary analogate formally and to the others by extrinsic denomination. 10 He also enumerates other characteristics of this analogy. In it, the primary analogate is one in reality as well as in the mind. The primary analogate is put into the definition of the secondary analogates. The only thing in common among the secondary analogates is the external word, which implies an identical term diversely referred to. The analogous name signifies the primary analogate distinctly and the secondary analogates only in a confused manner. There is nothing prior to the primary analogate in which the whole perfection expressed by the analogous term is formally realized.

In the concluding section of Chapter Two of the De Nominum Analogia, Cajetan maintains that the analogy of two to a third (duarum ad tertium), the analogy of many to one (plurium ad unum), the analogy of one to another (unius ad alterum), and the analogy of proportion (analogia proportionis) can all be reduced to analogy of attribution.

In the analogy of proportionality each of the analogates possesses


10. De Nominum Analogia, 2, 5: "Omne nomen analogum per attributionem ut sic vel in quantum sic, analogum est analogatis sic, quod primo convenit formaliter, reliquis autem extrinseca denominatione."
the analogon in proportion to its own nature. An example of this analogy is the predication of the verb "to see" of the eye and of the intellect. To see by corporeal vision (the eye) and by intellectual vision (the intellect) are indicated by the common term "to see," because just as to understand presents something to the mind, so to see presents something to the animated body. There are, however, two kinds of proportionality, namely, metaphorical and proper. Cajetan points out the two types in the following paragraph:

Analogia fit metaphorice quidem, quando nomen illud commune absolute unam habet rationem formalem, quae in uno analogatorum salvatur, et per metaphoram de alio dicitur, ut ridere unam secundum se rationem habet, analogum tamen metaphorice est vero risui et prato virenti aut fortunae successui; sic enim significamus haec se habere, quaeamadmodum homo ridens. ...Proprue vero fit quando nomen illud commune in utroque analogatorum absque metaphoris dicuntur, ut principio in corde respectu animalis, et in fundamento respectu domus salvatur. Quod, ut Averroes in Com. 7 primi Ethic. ait, proportionaliter de eis dicitur.12

The analogy of metaphorical proportionality is one in which a notion, univocal in itself, formally signifies a subject or group of subjects and is transferred or carried over and applied to another subject or group of subjects. The ground of the transfer is likeness of relations or the production of similar effects. For example, a man may be called "Achilles" metaphorically because like Achilles, he is strong or swift, but the name "Achilles" applies properly only to Achilles himself.

11. De Nominum Analogia 3, 1: "Dicimus analoga secundum proportionalitatem dici quorum nomen est commune et ratio secundum illud nomen proportionaliter eadem. Vel sic analoga secundum proportionalitatem dicuntur, quorum nomen commune est, et ratio secundum illud nomen est similis secundum proportionem; ut videre corporali visione et videre intellectualiter, sic intelligere rem animae offert ut videre corpori animato."

Cajetan concludes his Chapter Three with an enthusiastic eulogy on the excellence of the analogy of proper proportionality, which alone deserves the name of analogy in the proper sense.

This analogy excels above the other mentioned above both by dignity and by name. By dignity, because it arises from the genus of inherent formal causality, for it predicates perfections that are inherent to each analogate, whereas the other analogy arises from extrinsic denomination. It excels above the others by name, because only terms which are analogous by this type of analogy are called analogous by the Greeks, from whom we borrowed the term.¹³

Inequality and attribution are incorrectly called analogous, because from a logical point of view they are univocal predications. Only the analogy of proper proportionality has true metaphysical value, for it enables us to know the intrinsic entity, goodness, and truth of things.¹⁴

Cajetan's classification of analogy was accepted as definitive by many philosophers. In the 17th Century, John of St. Thomas wrote:

Difficultates de analogia, quae satis metaphysicae sunt, ita copiose et subtiliter a Cajetano disputatae sunt in opusc. de Analogia nominum, ut nobis locum non reliquerit quidquam aliud excogitandi.¹⁵

Those that followed Cajetan were content mainly to reiterate and defend Cajetan's position against opposing schools of interpretation. They asserted that Thomas knew only two types of analogy: attribution and proportionality, and recapitulated the most important

¹³. Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, p. 27.

¹⁴. De Nominum Analogia 3.4: "Scimus siguident secundum hanc analogiam rerum intrinsecas entitates, bonitates, veritates, etc., quod ex priori analogia non scitur."

Cajetanian definitions, as does John of St. Thomas in the following passage:

*Due sunt principales CONDITIONES in analogia attributionis et proportionalitatis, ex quibus aliae accessoriae pendant. In analogia attributionis seu proportionis ex multis conditionibus, quae illis tribui solent, illa est præcipua, quod in principali analogato inventur forma intrinsèce, in aliis vero extrinsèce et per denominationem. Ex qua conditione sequuntur aliae tres: Prima, quod forma analoga in istis debet esse una numero, utpote quæ solum reperitur in uno analogato. Secunda, formae principalis analogati debet poni in ceterorum definitione, quae ab illa denominatur. Tertia, quod illa analoga non sunt unus conceptus, sed plurium, habentium aliquam connotationem inter se, et non sicut acquivoca a casu. Quae omnes conditiones videri possunt in "sano" respectu animalis et medicinae vel herbae etc...*

In analogia autem proportionalitatis propriae præcipua conditio est, quod in omnibus analogatis intrinsece et formaliter inventur aliqua ratio proportionis, secundum quam assimillantur inter se modo proportionali. Ex qua sequuntur aliae tres conditiones oppositae conditionibus analogiae proportionis: Prima, quod ratio analoga non debet solum reperiri in uno analogato formaliter et in aliis per denominationem, sed in omnibus formaliter suo modo. Secunda, quod non debet unum poni in definitione aliorum. Tertia, quod possunt habere conceptum unum unitate imperfecta et secundum quod, quae dicitur unitas proportionalis, quae ex parte objecti se tenet.*

The analogy of attribution was held to have two primary characteristics: (1) that the secondary analogates are designated extrinsically; and (2) that there is a *primum analogatum*. This


18. Manser, p. 447; Penido, p. 37; Ramirez, 24, p. 343; and Phelan, p. 35.
analogy was rejected as metaphysically unimportant because of its extrinsic denomination.\textsuperscript{19} It could state nothing proper of God, though it was agreed that the causal relation does give it a place in the relation of God to the world. It could be used as between creatures and God in the sense that creation may be designated extrinsically after God.\textsuperscript{20}

In regard to the analogy of proper proportionality, the truly metaphysical analogy, it was emphasized that in this case there is proportional likeness and the analogous concept is properly realized in all the analogates. The following points was also stressed:

1) The relevant perfection has only a proportional unity, as it is realized in many different ways. The analogous concept can, therefore, only have a unity of proportionality.\textsuperscript{21}

2) The analogous concept, being a proportional unity, can only express something proportionally common to the analogous thing. It says no more of one than of the other, only that the same is in all, indeterminately and proportionally.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} Penido, p. 37; Manser, p. 444.


\textsuperscript{22} Ramirez 25, p. 30 and p. 36.
3) The proportion of the included analogous perfections are mutually independent, in contradistinction to the analogy of attribution where all depend on the primum analogatum. Accordingly, there is not, as in the analogy of attribution, any first term.23

An interesting feature of the traditional school is their discussion of "mixed cases" in which an analogy of proportionality virtually comprises an analogy of attribution. Penido argues that the two types are intimately and indissolubly connected in the relation of creation to God because analogy between God and creation presumes both extrinsic dependence and intrinsic participatio on the part of creation.24 He would go so far as to say that the analogy of attribution can prove the presence of a primary ens (or the existence of God). However, like the rest of the traditional school, Penido holds that it can give no real knowledge of God's essence as can the analogy of proportionality.25 Feckes also acknowledges that the analogy of attribution can demonstrate the existence of first cause, but he too places this analogy after that of proportionality in respect to one's knowledge of God.26

In summary, the traditional Cajetanian school of interpretation allots to the analogy of attribution, at most, a subordinate role in the analogy between God and the world. The analogy of proportionality alone touches its essentials, i.e. it enables us to say something of God Himself properly rather than only something about his relation to the world.

23. Feckes, p. 161; Manser, p. 460f; Penido, p. 46f; Ramirez 25, p. 28.
25. Penido, p. 146.
The influence of Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia was extraordinary. Yet, from the beginning, there was a powerful dissenting voice, that of the Spanish Jesuit, Franciscus Suarez (d. 1617). In his Disputationes Metaphysicae, Suarez claims Cajetan has misinterpreted Aquinas on both the analogy of proportionality and the analogy of attribution. According to him, Aquinas does not teach any analogy of proper proportionality, in which the analogous name is predicated properly and intrinsically of all the analogates. Every true analogy of proportionality includes an element of metaphor and of impropriety, just as "smiling" is said of a meadow through metaphorical reference. This analogy requires the two proportions to be unlike in such a way that the analogous property exists perfectly in one term and in the other on account of a proportion or a comparison. It is for these reasons, says Suarez, that Aquinas refuses to recognize any analogy of proportionality between God and creatures. Creation is called being in a proper and not a figurative sense. It is being not because of any kind of proportionality to God, but because it is something in itself. Cajetan is wrong in giving such prominence to the analogy of proportionality. "Being" and all other names of absolute perfections are predicated properly and intrinsically of both God and creatures.

28. Suarez, disp. 28, sect. III-X; disp. 32, sect. II-XII.
29. Suarez, 28, Sect. II, XI.
30. Suarez, 29, Sect. III. X-XI.
On the analogy of attribution, Suarez demonstrates that Aquinas teaches both an extrinsic and an intrinsic form of this analogy. The latter is one where the denominating form exists intrinsically in both (or all) the terms, in one absolutely and in the other or others relatively, through intrinsic relation to the former. This kind of analogy is frequently illustrated by Aquinas through the predication of "being" of substance and accident. Whereas substance is being in the primary and absolute sense, accident is not designated "being" by extrinsic denomination from the being of substance, but from its own proper and intrinsic being. The analogy between God and creatures is of the intrinsic attribution type. Cajetan is wrong in subordinating attribution to proportionality and in leaving out intrinsic attribution from his classification of analogy.

For centuries Suarez's view was an isolated one, but in recent years others have joined in his criticism of Cajetan's version of analogy. In 1921, Blanche's essay, "Note sur le sens de quelques locations concernant l'analogie dans le language de St. Thomas d'Aquin," tried to show that Aquinas distinguishes only between two modes of analogy: (1) analogy of many to one and (2) analogy of many to many. Their common trait is that the predication takes place according to priority and posteriority in both of them. Some years later Gilson's

31. Suarez, 28, Sect. III.XI: "Alter est quando forma denominans intrinsece' est in vtroq; membro, quamvis in vno absoluti', in alio vero per habitudinem ad aliiu, vt ens dicitur de substantia a accidente, sed a proprie et intrinsece entitate, quae talis est vt tota consistat in quadem habitudine ad substantiam acci- dens enim non denominatur ens extrinsece' ab entitae substantiae."

paper "Cajetan et l'Existence," attacked Cajetan's Aristotelianism and essentialist interpretation of Aquinas, as well as the minor problem of Cajetan's version of analogy.

Gilson claimed that this interpretation of the philosophy of St. Thomas had been "the main obstacle to the diffusion of Thomism." By explaining Aquinas in light of and according to Aristotle, Cajetan missed the great novelty of his philosophy: the discovery of being (esse). Encouraged by Gilson's authority, more and more Thomists denounced Cajetan's version of analogy and have expounded some new interpretations of Aquinas' teaching.

One of the most impressive of these new studies is Hampus Lyttkens' *The Analogy Between God and the World.* After a detailed examination of the pre-Thomistic sources of analogy, a presentation of the other interpretations, and a full analysis of the Thomistic corpus, he sets out his own threefold division of analogy, based on causality.

All St. Thomas' analogies between God and the world are ultimately based on the relation of cause to effect. The likeness of an effect to its cause is the prerequisite of our knowledge and designations of God, and likewise of our conceiving creation as in relation to God. Ontologically, the analogy between God and the world is accordingly the likeness of cause to effect. 38

The three types of analogy which Lyttkens claims to discover in St. Thomas are:

1. An analogy (proceeding from God) in which the concept is drawn from Him and used to designate creation extrinsically. 39

2. An analogy in which the image is designated from its archetype because of an analogous perfection which exists perfectly in God, imperfectly in creatures. This also proceeds from God, but unlike the first, the original import of the concept is not retained, but allowed to vary. 40

3. An analogy in which the First Cause is designated from its effects, the perfections of which exist in a higher way in this cause. This analogy proceeds from creation and the inherent limitation of the concept, its modus significandi, is disregarded, leaving only what is designated, res significata, to be said of God. 41

Lyttkens also asserts that the analogy of proper proportionality plays only a subordinate role in Thomas' metaphysics.

Summarizing the above, we find that St. Thomas only uses the analogy of proper proportionality as a logical aid in stating of God certain properties taken from creation, viz. in De Veritate 2, 11. The analogy of proportionality must accordingly be said not to play the central part in St. Thomas which is ascribed to him in Thomistic quarters. 42

Another recent study which deserves mention is the full scale

38. Lyttkens, p. 245.
39. Lyttkens, pp. 245-266.
40. Lyttkens, pp. 266-283.
41. Lyttkens, pp. 283-310.
42. Lyttkens, p. 475. See also pp. 415-475ff.
textual analysis of Klubertanz. His primary conclusions may be summarized as follows:

1. Analogy is neither to be predicated of knowledge taken by itself nor of things simply as by themselves; analogy arises only when the mind and things both enter into the picture. That is, analogy is primarily an affair of judgment rather than concept.

2. Thomas does speak of an intrinsic analogy of proportion, as well as an extrinsic one. The case of the former is substance and accident related by an analogy of proportion, and since in both cases what is predicated is the direct nature of the analogates, this is an intrinsic analogy of proportion.

3. The most adequate name of the analogy between God and creatures is an analogy of causal participation.

4. Metaphor, at face value, is extrinsic, univocal predication, not properly to be included under analogy.

Concerning the analogy of proper proportionality, Klubertanz says this:

For a period of some months around the year, 1256, St. Thomas either held or considered holding proper proportionality as the intrinsic analogy explaining the ontological similarity between God and creatures. This position he had not held previously and would never again develop in subsequent writings. Proper proportionality is therefore a Thomistic analogy in the sense that it is a doctrine taught by St. Thomas for a brief period early in his career.

From a textual standpoint the absence of any subsequent texts which teach proper proportionality between God and creatures contributes strong evidence that St. Thomas quietly abandoned this doctrine after 1256. More positively, the numerous texts (prior and subsequent to the two proportionality texts) in which Thomas clearly teaches more direct analogies between God and creatures indicate that proportionality is not the exclusive analogy between Creator and creatures as these texts teach.


44. Klubertanz, pp. 112-116.

45. Klubertanz, p. 131.


47. Klubertanz, p. 147.

48. Klubertanz, p. 94.
From this survey of the major interpretations of Thomistic analogy, it is obvious that this doctrine is not easy to come by and that no one of these has the whole answer. Each needs critical examination in order to determine the valid contributions which they make to a correct understanding of Aquinas' thought.

Turning to the *De Nominum Analogia*, the first thing to be noted is the dominant theme of this undertaking: *ut a Graecis accepimus*. Cajetan proposes a trimembered division of analogy which will comprise every use of analogy, and which will enable him to discuss each type by moving from what is least properly analogy to what is true analogy. That which dictates what is properly analogy is *ut a Graecis accepimus*. Speaking of the analogy of proportionality, Cajetan writes:

> It excels above the others by name, because only terms which are analogous by this type of analogy are called analogous by the Greeks, from whom we have borrowed the term.⁴⁹

This heavy reliance on the Greek form of analogy is understandable in light of the long history of its use from the time of Plato, but it is clear that Cajetan's interpretation is biased. He neglects the Platonic and Neoplatonic contributions to the history of analogy and concentrates on the Aristotelian. The argument that proportionality alone is truly and properly analogy is based on Aristotle's use of the Greek term.⁵⁰ This argument, however, is open to question by anyone who holds that the Platonic and Neoplatonic influences on Thomas' thought cannot be neglected.


⁵⁰. This is pointed out by Ralph McInerny in his *The Logic of Analogy* (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1961), p. 3.
What about Cajetan's division of analogy? Is it textually sound? The first analogy treated by Cajetan is the analogy of inequality, an analogy secundum esse tantum. The analogates are considered equal in the notion signified by the common name, but not in the esse illius rationis. The generic notion exists more properly in one species than in the other. Cajetan makes this enigmatic observation:

Haec pro tanto analoga vocantur, quia considerata in-equali perfectione inferiorum, per prius et posteriorius ordine perfectionis de illis dicitur illud nomen commune. Et iam in usum venit, ut quasi synonyme dicamus aliquid dici analogice et dici per prius et posteriorius. Abusio tamen vocabulorum haec est; quoniam dici per prius et posteriorius superius est ad dici analogici.

The analogy of inequality is called such only by a misuse of language, and it is implied by Cajetan that it is really univocal in nature:

In analogous terms of this sort, there is no need to determine their position as regards unity, abstraction, predication, comparison, demonstration, etc., for as a matter of fact they are univocal, and therefore the rules of univocal terms must be observed with respect to them.

There have been a number of recent objections that Cajetan has misunderstood Thomas on the true metaphysical value of the analogy of inequality. Aquinas' clearest account of this analogy and its worth is in his Commentary on the Sentences:

52. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, p. 13, n. 7.
...aliquid diciture secundum analogiam...secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpore parificantur in intentione corporeitatis. Unde Logicus, qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit hoc nomen corpus de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari; sed esse hujus naturalis non est ejudem rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, qui considerat res secundum sum esse, nec hoc nomen corpus nec aliquid aliud dicitur univoce de corruptilibus et incorruptilibus.55

All bodies, says Thomas, share equally in the notion of corporeity or "bodiness"; accordingly, there is a univocal "body" which is predicated of everything corporeal. Bodiness, however, does not exist equally in all bodies, for in the heavenly bodies it exists more perfectly than in the earthly ones. Since the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician consider things in their actual existence, they will not predicate the name "body" or any other name univocally of what is corruptible and what is incorruptible. The logician, on the other hand, considers conceptions or intentions alone; he does not regard things in their actual existence. He predicates "body" univocally of all bodies while the philosopher of nature sees "body" as predicated analogically, not according to conceptions, but according to esse.

A distinction needs to be made between a logical and a natural genus. Thomas writes concerning this in the following passage from the Summa Theologiae:

Ad quartum dicendum, quod substantiae immaterialis creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantis materialibus, quia quidem non est in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae; conveniunt tamen cum eis in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in predicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non sit earum esse.56

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55. Aquinas, Thomas, I. Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, ad. 1, Opera Omnia, Vol. 7, p. 257.

From a logical point of view, "substance" is predicated of all univocally, whether immaterial or material substances. With respect to the definition (ratio) of substance, they all belong to one univocal genus, but in reality, immaterial substances have greater perfection as substances than those that are material. The metaphysician who considers things as they actually exist and not logically will not place all created substances in the genus "substance," for though all created substances are in the same logical genus, they are not in the same natural genus.

Thomas would carefully delineate, in this matter, between the order of logic and the order of reality. A genus can be considered in two different ways by the intellect. Considered logically, all its existential conditions such as the matter in which subjects exist in reality are abstracted away.\(^57\) The genus considered as a natural genus will take into account the diverse types of matter and potencies and the modes of existing of the things in that genus.\(^58\)

Concerning this Thomas writes:

\[\text{Sciendum tamen quod cum illud materiale, unde sumitur genus, hebest in se formam et materiam, logicus considerat genus solum ex parte ejus quod formale est, unde ejus definitiones dicuntur formales, sed naturalis considerat genus ex parte utriusque. Et ideo contingit quandoque quod aliquid communicat in genere secundum logicum, quod non communicat secundum naturalem. Contingit enim quandoque quod illud de similitudine primi actus quod consequitur res aliquis in materia tali alii consequitur sine materia, alii in alia materia omnia diverse. Sicut patet quod lapis in materia quae est secundum potentiam ad esse, pertingit ad hoc subsistat, ad quod idem pertingit sol secundum materiam, quae est}\]

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57. Schwartz deals with Thomas' distinction between the two orders from the viewpoint that the logician ignores the diversity of potency in which any transcendental perfection has its real existence.

in potentia ad ubi, et non ad esse, et angelus omni materia carens. Unde logicus inveniens in his omnibus illud ex quo genus sumebat, ponit omnia haec in uno genere substantiae. Naturalis vero et metaphysicus qui a considerant principia rerum, omnia non invenientes convenientia in materia, dicunt ea differe genere, secundum hoc quod dicitur X Metaphys., quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt genere, et quod illa conveniunt genere, quorum est materia una et generatio ad invicem.59

Another related passage is Thomas' discussion in *De Malo* in reply to the question: "Are all sins equal?" The question is put as follows:

Praetera, genus aequaliter participatur a suis specibus. Sed peccatum est genus omnium peccatorum. Ergo omnia peccata sunt aequalis, et aequaliter peccat quicumque peccat.60

St. Thomas replies:

Ad decimum sextum dicendum quod omnia animalia sunt aequaliter animalis, non tamen sunt aequalia animalia, sed unum animal est altero majus et perfectius; et similiter non oportet quod omnia peccata propter hoc sint paria.61

Thomas, in effect, is arguing that the genus "animal" may be predicated equally and univocally of all animals, and so too the genus "sin" of all sins, but, as some animals exist some are more perfect than others, and so too, some sins are worse than others.

Thomas' teaching in the *Commentary on the Sentences* is that a genus is predicated analogically when it is considered naturally and concretely as involved in subjects in which it is realized. It is predicated univocally only when it is considered logically or mathematically, in abstraction from matter and esse. Cajetan has apparently missed the full significance of this passage, for he no-


where brings out the role of esse in this analogy. He falsely concludes the analogy to be a pseudo analogy or an analogy by abuse of the terms. Thomas' own writings nowhere deny this to be a true analogy. Not only does he call it a distinct mode of analogical predication, but he imitates that it is of particular interest to the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician because it has to do with things as they exist. The analogy of inequality does have a true metaphysical value for St. Thomas.

What then about the analogy of attribution? This analogy is described by Cajetan as "secundum intentionem et non secundum esse." It has four conditions: (1) It is according to extrinsic denomination only;\(^62\) (2) The term in this analogy is one not merely in concept, but numerically;\(^63\) (3) The first analogate from which the others are designated must be placed in the definition of the others so far as they are signified by the common name;\(^64\) (4) The name in this analogy does not have one definite meaning common to all its analogates, it signifies distinctly or quasi-distinctly the primary analogate and only confusedly the secondary analogates.\(^65\)

There have been a number of objections raised against Cajetan's interpretation of this analogy, including the insistence of Suarez upon an analogy of intrinsic attribution as the only proper metaphysical analogy. Lyttken's, for example, would maintain that although St. Thomas does discuss an analogy of attribution, he does not do so in the texts usually cited by the commentaries. These

62. Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, p. 16.
63. Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, pp. 18-19.
64. Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, pp. 19-20.
texts and others like them deal with intrinsic analogies between
cause and effect. There is also the curious doctrine of "mixed"
analogies which regards one ontological situation as grounding
two or more distinct analogies. Valid enough in principle, this
doctrine is usually interpreted by Cajetan's followers so that all
intrinsic analogies are automatically proportionalities by their
definition, and all direct one-to-one analogies are necessarily
extrinsic. This procedure not only indicates a strong tinge of
uncertainty in the position itself, but that the Cajetanists have
been reductionists, reducing other types of analogy to the analogy
of proportionality because Thomas presents them as intrinsic
analogies.

The problem may also be considered textually. The text used
by Cajetan as the basis for a purely extrinsic analogy of attribu-
tion is I. Sententiarum d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1:

Dicendum quod aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam
tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non
secundum esse; et hoc est quando una intentio refertur
ad plura per prius et posterius, quae tamen non habet
esse nisi in uno; sicut intentionem sanitatis refertur
ad animal, urinam, et dietam diversimode, secundum prius
et posterius, non tamen secundum diversum esse, quia
esse sanitatis non est nisi in animali.

This text appears to describe a purely extrinsic denomination.
A perfection existing in one being is the terminus of various re-
lations; the beings so related to this perfection are denominated
from it, though they do not possess it. A similar text is found
in De Principiis naturae where the language of attribution and the

68. Aquinas, Thomas, I. Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1,
"health" example again seem to describe a purely extrinsic denomination:

Analogice et definitiones dicitur praedicari, quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes sunt diversae, sed attribuuntur alicui uni eidem: sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus tribus: dicitur enim de urina, ut de signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subjecto, de potione ut de causa; sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur uni fini, scilicet sanitati. Aliquando enim ea quae conveniunt secundum analogiam, et proportionem et comparisonem, attribuuntur uni fini, sicut patuit in praedicto exemplo sanitatis, aliquando uni agenti, sicut medicus dicitur de eo qui operatur sine arte, ut vetula, et etiam de instrumentis, sed per attributionem ad genus, quod est medicina, aliquando autem per attributionem ad unum subjectum, ut ens dicitur de substantia, quantitate, qualitate, et aliis praedicamentis: non enim ex toto est eadem ratio qua substantia est ens, et qualitas, et omnia alia. Sed omnia dicuntur ens ex eo quod attribuuntur substantiae, quae est aliorum subjectum. Et ideo dicitur per prius de substantia, et per posterius de aliis. Et ideo ens non est genus substantiae et aliorum praedicamentorum genus praedicatur secundum prius et posterius de suis speciebus, sed ens praedicatur analogice. Et hoc quod dicius quod substantia et quantitas differunt genere, sed sunt idem secundum analogiam.69

In another context, however, Thomas clearly uses a similar language of attribution to describe a likeness which is intrinsic.

He writes:

Dicendum quod "esse" dupliciter dicitur, ut patet per Philosophum in V Metaphys, et in quadam Glossa Origenis super principium Joan. Uno modo, secundum quod est copula verbalis significans compositionem cujuslibet emuntiationis quam anima facit: alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, ideo est quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura; sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno modo ut sicut et quod proprie et vere habet esse vel est, et sic attribuim soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quod vere est, dicitur substantia in I. Phys., text com. xxvii, omnia vero quae non per se subsistent, sed in alio et cum alio, sive sint accidentia, sive formas substantiales, aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut

ipsa vere sint, sed attribuitur eis esse. Alio modo, id est ut quo aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse albus.\textsuperscript{70}

A passage similar to this one also describes an intrinsic attribution.

Illis enim proprie convenit esse quod habet esse, et est subsistens in suo esse. Formae autem et accidentia et alia hujusmodi non dicitur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed quia eis aliquid est, ut albedo ea raetone dicitur ens, quia ea subjectum est album. Unde, secundum Philosophum, vii \textit{Metaph.} text 2, accidentia magis proprie dicitur entia quam ens. Sicut igitur accidentia et formae, et hujusmodi quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam entia, ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata proprie vero creata sunt subsistentia.\textsuperscript{71}

In the following passage Thomas uses attribution terminology to discuss intrinsic analogous perfections possessed, according to priority and posteriority, by both God and creatures:

Tertium est quod nomina de Deo et aliis rebus dicta, non omni univoce, nec omni aequivoce dicuntur. Univoce namque dici non possunt, cum definitio ejus quod de creatura dicitur, non sit definitio ejus quod dicitur de Deo. Oportet autem univoce dicer eorum eadem definitio esse, similiter autem nec omni aequivoce. In his enim quae sunt a casu aequivoce, idem nomen imponitur uni rei, nullo habito respectu ad rem aliam, unde per unum non potest rationcinari de alio. Hae autem nomina quae dicuntur de Deo et de aliis rebus, attribuuntur Deo secundum aliquid ordinem quem habet ad istas res, in quibus intellectus significata eorum considerat, unde et per alias res rationcinari de Deo possimus. Non igitur omnino aequivoce dicuntur ista de Deo, et aliis rebus, sicut ea quae sunt a casu aequivoce. Dicuntur igitur secundum analogiam id est secundum proportionem ad unum. Ex eo enim quod alii res comparamus ad Deum sicut ad suam primam originem, hujusmodi nomina, quae significant perfections aliarum rerum, Deo attribuimus. Ex quo patet quod, licet quantum ad nominis impositionem hujusmodi nomina per prius de creaturis dicuntur, eo quod ex creaturis intellectus nominis imponens ascendit in Deum; tamen, secundum rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo, a quo perfections descendunt in aliae res.\textsuperscript{72}


In those texts in which the examples of reference to a common goal or agent are used, Thomas gives the impression that a purely extrinsic denomination is meant, but the discussion of substance and accident as being indicates that intrinsic denomination is not excluded by the analogy of attribution. In the following passage Thomas does indicate that the analogy of attribution is open to both extrinsic and intrinsic denomination:

A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdem assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter, ut ex superioribus patet. Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae bonitates.

A certain polarity is evident in the analogy of attribution. If only the relationship to a common source or goal is stressed, the analogy becomes almost purely extrinsic denomination. On the other hand, if the intrinsic perfection which each analogate possesses as a result of its relationship to the common source or goal receives the major emphasis, the analogy becomes an expression of the intrinsic likeness between secondary and primary analogates. In the following passage, Thomas gives a summary explanation of this difference:

Dicendum quod dupliciter denominatur alicuius per respectus ad alterum. Uno modo quando ipse respectus est ratio denominationis, sicut urina dicitur sana per respectum ad sanitatem animalis; ratio enim sani, secundum

\[\text{References:}\]


74. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, I., Q. 6, A. 4c, Opera Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 43.
quod de urina praedicatur, est esse signum sanitatis animalis, non denominatur ab aliqua forma sibi in-harente, sed ab aliquo extrinsieco ad quod refertur. Alio modo denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum, quando respectus non est ratio denominationis, sed causa; sicut si aer dicatur lucens a sole; non quod ipsum referri aerem ad solem sit lucere aeris, sed quia directa oppositio aeria ad solem est causa quod luceat; et hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad bonum; unde ratio non aequitur.75

It is evident from the ensuing discussion that the analogy of attribution is more multidimensional and complicated than Cajetan's interpretation would allow.

Concerning the analogy of proportionality, which Cajetan considers the only properly metaphysical analogy, there are a number of questions which can be raised. First, there is the textual basis of the Cajetanian claim. Much of this claim lies in the textual identification between the analogia secundum intentionem et secundum esse in I. Sententiarum d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1 with the analogy of proportionality discussed in De Veritate q. 2, a. 11. An examination of these two passages in relation to the passage in Sententiarum Prologue q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2, indicates that Cajetan's interpretation is inconsistent with the evidence. First, the passage in the Prologue to the Sentences:

...una scientia est unius generis, sicut dicit Philosophus in I. Posteriores. Sed Deus et creatura, de quibus in divina doctrina tractatur, non reducuntur in unum genus, neque univoce, neque analogice. Ergo divina scientia non est una. Probatio mediae. Quaecumque conveniunt in uno genere univoce vel analogice, participant aliquid idem, vel secundum prius est posterius, sicut substantia et accidens rationem entis, vel aequaliter, sicut equus et bos rationem animalis. Sed Deus et creatura non partici-pant aliquid idem, quia illud esset simplicius et prius utroque. Ergo nullo modo reducuntur in idem genus.76


76. Aquinas, Thomas, Sententiarum Prologue, Q. 1, a. 1, ad. 2, Opera Omnia, Vol. 7, pp. 5-6.
In this passage Thomas says that creation has being only in so far as it has received this from God, and is only called being (ens) in so far as it imitates the divine being. The same applies to wisdom and everything else said of creation. Creation is called ens because it is like ens primum, but its esse is imperfect in comparison with the esse of God. On account of its likeness to God's esse, however, creation can with some justification be designated ens. This particular passage is usually referred to the analogy of attribution by Cajetan and his followers. The passage would certainly lend itself to such an interpretation.

In the discussion of analogy secundum intentionem et secundum esse in I. Sententiarum, it is said that everything in creation exists in God in respect of its esse, and in creation only to different degrees of perfection. But is it not the same thing to say that a thing imitates God's esse and that the proper esse exists only in God? Creation is called ens either because it imitates God or because its esse is of a different, though less degree of perfection, than the divine esse. The passage in I. Sententiarum is as follows:

Vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentionem communis, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habeat aliquod esse in unque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed different secundum rationem maioris vel minoris perfectionis. Et similiter dico, quod veritas, et bonitas, et omnia huiusmodi dicuntur analogice de Deo et creaturis. Unde oportet quod secundum suum esse omnia haec in Deo sint, et in creaturis secundum rationem maioris perfectionis et minoris ex quo sequitur, cum non possint esse secundum esse utro-
It is evident that it is the same analogy that is discussed in these two passages. If so, to call the analogy in the Proloque an analogy of attribution and the analogy in the above passage an analogy of proportionality is a direct contradiction. The example used by Thomas in I. Sententiarum, that of ens as stated of substance and accidents, also raises questions about Cajetan's interpretation of the text. Lyttkens indicates that Thomas has never exemplified the analogy of proportionality in this way. The textual analysis of Klubertanz would verify this conclusion.

The identification of the analogia secundum intentionem et secundum esse in I. Sententiarum with the analogy of proportionality in De Veritate Q. 2, a. 11, is a misinterpretation. The analogy secundum intentionem et secundum esse would, in this case, seem more properly related to the analogy of attribution, if not even to an analogy of intrinsic attribution. This does much to undermine Cajetan's textual claim for the analogy of proportionality. It also raises questions in general about Cajetan's treatment of Thomistic analogy in the De Nominum Analogia since this treatment itself follows the pattern of I. Sententiarum d. 19.

Before leaving the analogy of proper proportionality, the main textual passages from which the Cajetanians have drawn this form of analogy need to be viewed briefly. They are all in De Veritate:

77. Aquinas, Thomas, I. Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1, Opera Omnia, Vol. 7, p. 255.

78. Lyttkens, p. 258.
Unde dicendum est quod nec omnino univoce, nec pure aequivoce, nomen scientiae de scientia Dei et nostra praedicetur; sed secundum analogiam, quod nihil est aliud dictu quam secundum proportionem. Conveniencia enim secundum proportionem potest esse duplex; et secundum hoc duplex attenditur analogae communitas. Est enim quaedam conveniencia inter ipsa quorum est ad invicem proportio, eo quod habent determinatem distantiam, vel aliam habitudinem ad invicem, sicut binarius cum unitate, eo quod est eius duplum; conveniencia etiam quandoque attenditur duorum ad invicem inter quae non sit proportio, sed similitudo duarum ad invicem proportionem; sicut senarius convenit cum quaternario ex hoc quod sicut senarius est duplum tenarum, ita quaternarius binarum. Prima ergo conveniencia est proportionis, secunda autem proportionalitatis; unde et secundum modum primae convenienciae invenimus aliquid analogice dictum de duobus quorum unum ad alterum habitudinem habet; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente quum substantia et accidens habent; et sanum dicitur de urina et animali, ex eo quod urina habet aliquam similitudinem ad sanitatem animalis. Quandoque vero dicitur de visus corporali et intellectu, eo quod sicut visus est in oculo, ita intellectus est in mente. Quia ergo in his quae primo modo analogice dicitur, oportet esse aliquam determinatum habitudinem inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune, impossible est aliquid per hunc modum analogiae dici de Deo et creatura; quia nulla creatura habet talem habitudinem ad Deum per quam possit divina perfectio determinari. Sed in alio modo analogice nulla determinata habitudo attenditur inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune; et ideo secundum illum modum nihil prohibet aliquod nomen analogice dici de Deo et creatura.  

This passage makes a distinction between determinate proportion and proportionality and claims that the latter is the type of analogy which can be properly used to speak of the relation between God and creature. Thomas again makes a distinction between determinate proportion and proportionality in the following text:

Dicendum quod Philosophus, in II Topic, ponit duplicem modum similitudinis. Unum quod invenitur in diversis generibus; et hic attenditur secundum proportionem vel proportionalitatem, ut quando alterum sicut aliud ad aliud, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Alium modum in his quae

sunt ejusdem generis, ut quando idem diversis inest. Similitudo autem non requirit comparisonem secundum determinatem habitudinem quae primo modo dicitur, sed solum quae secundo modo; unde non oportet quod primus modus similitudinis a Deo removeatur respectu creaturarum. 80

In another passage Thomas seems to indicate that the reason that the analogy of proper proportionality can be used to speak of the relation between God and creatures is because it has an indeterminate quality. He writes:

Dicendum quod similitudo quae attenditur ex eo quod aliqua duo participant unum, vel ex eo quod unum habet aptitudinem determinatam ad alium, ex qua scilicet ex uno alterum comprehendi possit per intellectum, diminuit distantiam; non autem similitudo quae est secundum convenientiam proportionum: talis enim similitudo similiter inventur in multum vel parum distantibus; non enim est major similitudo proportionalitatis inter duo et unum, et sex et tria, quam inter duo et unum, et centum et quinquaginta. Et ideo infinita distantia creaturarum ad Deum similitudinem praedicatam non tollit. 81

In a fourth text Thomas speaks of proportionality in terms of a similarity between God’s relation to his esse and the creature’s relation to his esse, or of the infinite related to the infinite and the finite related to the finite. The text is as follows:

Dicendum quod homo conformatur Deo, cum sit ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus. Quamvis autem propter hoc quod a Deo in infinitum distat, non possit esse ipsius ad Deum proportio, secundum quod proportio proprie in quantitatis inventur, comprehendens duarum quantitatum ad invicem comparatarum certam mensuram; secundum tamen quod nomen proportionis translatum est ad quamlibet habitudinem significandam unius rei ad rem aliam utpote cum dicas esse proportionem similitudinem, sicut se habet princeps ad civitatem ita gubernator ad navim, nihil prohibet dicere aliquam proportionem hominis ad Deum, cum in aliqua habitudine ipsum ad se habeat, utpote ab eo effectus, et ei subjectus... Vel potest dici quod finiti


It cannot be denied that in these texts proportionality is intended to express intrinsic similarities between God and creatures. Not only is there a common relationship, but an analogously common perfection is also involved. The analogy of proportionality is presented as an intrinsic analogy and other forms of more direct similarities are rejected.

The only alternatives explicitly considered, however, are (1) mutually determining proportion in which one thing has such a determinate relation to another that from the one the other can be grasped by the intellect; (2) common participation of two things in a common but prior third perfection. Both of these forms are easily shown to be unacceptable descriptions of the similarity between God and creatures. The question, however, is whether these are clearly the only alternatives to proportionality. The textual evidence demonstrates that this is not the case, for Thomas makes use of such forms as direct proportion and participation in subsequent discussion of the analogy between God and creatures. He does not claim proportionality as the exclusive analogy between God and creatures in any other works subsequent to these texts in De Veritate.

82. Aquinas, Thomas, De Veritate, Q. XXIII, a. 7, ad. 9, Opera Omnia, Vol. 15, p. 190.
Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas is inadequate. Not only are there inconsistencies within his position, but his Aristotelian bias causes him to miss the full complexity of Aquinas' position, thus neglecting the meaning and significance of the analogies of inequality and attribution. As for his claim for the analogy of proportionality, this is yet to be justified.

What then about Suarez? The texts do verify the possibility of an analogy of intrinsic attribution as one of the Thomistic analogies and this form certainly does more justice to the Platonic and Neoplatonic influences upon his thought. However, Suarez gives exclusive metaphysical value to this analogy, as Cajetan does to proportionality. The textual evidence raises serious question about any interpretation which would reduce Thomas' doctrine to one proper metaphysical analogy. Considering Suarez' intrinsic attribution, a number of critics have implied that the "analogous concept" in Suarez' analogy of attribution is really univocal. In addition, the question can be raised as to whether exclusive emphasis on the analogy of attribution, even in its intrinsic form, leads dangerously close to univocity and monism. Such borders on Christian heresy, stressing the intimate relation between God and creation and not pointing to the necessary infinite distance between God and man.

Both Cajetan and Suarez are one-sided. What, then, about Lyttkens and Klubertanz? Lyttkens' suggestion concerning the importance of causal relationship in the Thomistic doctrine of analogy is an important one. Despite this, however, his discussion of

analogy with its division into three causal types seems an over-simplification of the texts. In addition, Klubertanz' textual analysis and the recent works on the role of participation in Thomas' metaphysics would indicate that Lyttken's treatment of the participatio texts in Thomas is all too brief and not at all adequate. There is also an over-emphasis on image-prototype terminology.

As for Klubertanz, his textual analysis is certainly helpful as well as carefully done. His stress on the importance of causal participation is a good one, especially in pointing out the need for more observance of the Platonic and Neoplatonic side of Thomas. His assertion for one proper metaphysical analogy, however, seems unjustified, even if it be the analogy of causal participation. Lyttkens and Klubertanz have also missed the full significance of the analogy of inequality and "metaphor" in Thomas' system.

If anything, the Thomistic doctrine of analogy is multidimensional. In light of this, the proper method is not that of "key texts," seeking to work out the doctrine on analogy from selected texts. It has been demonstrated that such an approach has not worked for the Cajetanists or Suarezians, and even Klubertanz and Lyttkens tend, in some respect, to be reductionist. Each emphasizes one aspect of Aquinas' thought to the neglect of other necessary elements. Neither proportionality nor attribution, Aristotelianism nor Platonism, inequality nor metaphor, causality nor participation can be left out of our consideration. A new approach to the topic is needed. The real starting point is not with the specific "analogy texts" but with the whole Thomistic corpus and the major thrust of his thought,
Rather than ask what Thomas considered to be the proper metaphysical analogy, it is more relevant to ask: "What role does analogy play in Thomistic metaphysics?" To this question we now turn.
CHAPTER II. The Role of Analogy in Thomistic Metaphysics

Introduction

Analogy in the Thomistic sense is both a mode of speech and a basic metaphysical concept. It functions in each case as a mean between two extremes. As a form of speech it enables one to talk about infinite and finite reality while avoiding both anthropomorphism and agnosticism. It takes into account both sides of the finite-infinite relationship by asserting that when terms are predicated of Infinite Being they are used in a sense which is neither precisely the same nor completely different from the sense in which they are predicated of finite things. As a metaphysical concept "analogy of being" is neither monistic nor pluralistic, but says that reality is both one and many, unified within diversity. "The analogy of being" founds the analogy of predication of being:

\[ \text{ens est multipliciter ergo ens dicitur multipliciter.} \]

In Aquinas' system there are two principles which underlie and ground analogy: the doctrine of creation and the principle of potency-act. The former asserts that there is both connection and distinction between God and world. The actual division of the world is the result of creation, the continuous divine act of giving existence to things, but herein also is real causal relation. The creation is an effect of God, pre-existing in Him both intellectually and naturally and thus resembling Him in some way. There is neither equivocation nor univocation, for though God is truly Agent and His effects are linked to Him through a real relation of likeness, nevertheless, no effect perfectly resembles its cause and God and
world remain essentially diverse.

The principle of potency-act is the metaphysical expression of the doctrine of creation. All Thomistic arguments for creation are based on the principle that God alone is Pure Act and all other things are composed of potency-act. If God is Pure Act in Whom essence and the act of existing are identical, it follows that if any other beings exist they depend upon Him and receive their being from Him. The act of creation is the positing in existence of analogues of the Author of that act. Since the very existence of every being is given to it by Him who is existence, every existence is a created analogue of its Author and as such it participates in Him and imitates Him existentially. Existential participation is intrinsically analogical: there is community of existence, but not of essence. Creation introduces essential diversity and actual multiplicity. To say that analogy of being follows from the very act of creation really signifies that the ultimate ground of analogy is none other than the divine act of existing itself; the unique act which in and through itself is imitable analogically in infinite ways, since its existence knows no bounds. As Pryzwara suggests, creation is open upwards.

Analogy of being is a metaphysical presupposition for Aquinas. Reality in its very structure is analogous. Thomas' metaphysics is built on the doctrine of creation, which is expressed metaphysically in terms of the principle of potency-act. This chapter will examine in detail these two elements, dealing first with the metaphysical principle and then with the theological doctrine. It will be shown that Thomas sees potency-act as encompassing all being, accounting for both its similarity and diversity. This principle is the ground
for the basic structural relationships of reality: essence-existence, form-matter, and substance-accident. It also underlies such concepts as hierarchy of being, ordo, and causality, all relationships of likeness within difference. Potency-act will be discussed in terms of the doctrine of creation and two other concepts of likeness within difference, exemplarism and participation, will be outlined. The chapter will close with a brief discussion of the nature of our knowledge of God.

I. Potency-Act as the Ground of the Structure of Reality

For Aquinas "being" has two basic meanings: being-in-potency and being-in-act. Potentia has both an active and passive sense, but it is basically an ability that may be actualized. It is not to be identified with non-being, but rather is seen in the sense of an intermediate between esse and non-esse.

Ens enim in potentia est quasi medium inter purum non ens et ens in actu. Quae igitur naturaliter fiunt non fiunt ex simpliciter non ente, sed ex ente in potentia non autem ex ente in actu, ut ipsi opinabantur.\(^1\)

Potency cannot achieve its own actualization, but is brought about by an agent already in act and distinct from itself. Act and potency thus are correlative concepts\(^2\) which are not on the same plane of existence. Act is related to potency as the more perfect is related to the imperfect, achievement to capacity. It perfects and forms the things in a state of potency and these are always regarded as

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deficient in some way to the perfecting actuality. The actual makes the potential like itself (\textit{actus autem terminatur ab aliquid simile}) and conversely, the potential must have some likeness to the actual to make any effect possible. Potency has its fullest meaning with reference to its corresponding act. Every potency is not reduced to act, but each one is ordered to an appropriate act which is its end or goal.

One of the most important and far reaching aspects of Thomas' potency-act principle is the concept of the limitation of act by potency. In the \textit{Compendium Theologiae} he writes:

\begin{quote}
Nullus enim actus inventur finiri, nisi per potentiam quae est ejus receptiva. Ipvenimus enim formae limitari secundum potentiam materi.
\end{quote}

And in the \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles} he says:

\begin{quote}
Omnia actu alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est, quia quod est in altero est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur.
\end{quote}

Act is an ultimate irreducible principle by which something is called perfect. It cannot limit itself. It if did, it would follow that a thing could be both perfect and imperfect from the point of view of one and the same principle of being. Every act, in itself, is unlimited and one. If there were some act which was pure act, such would be absolutely perfect and one, as Thomas' God is. The source of limitation is in some principle other than act. The only other principle


in things distinct from their acts or perfections is potency.

How does potency limit act? Potency and act are mutual causes operating in the realm of created existence, excluding any consideration of God. At no point can real potency prescind completely from the act of existence. As a component principle of a real being, it is always related to existence in a positive way. It is in an existing subject. Actualization is a limitation of both potentiality and actuality. It is an intrinsic interplay between potency and act, with both limiting each other in the realized thing. The recipient characterizes the received, potency limits the act it receives. A boy playing a violin is no longer in potency to act, but even as he is playing the act is limited by his potency to play the instrument. He cannot play faster or better than he is able.

Act limits potency in two ways. It is prior to potency in a causal sense, for potentiality is brought to actuality only by means of something actual. The boy could not have played had he not been taught how to do so. The act of teaching was necessarily prior to the actualization of the boy’s ability. Also his potency to play is a function of his actual bodily and mental construction. Potentiality is also limited by act in that not all possibilities are realized. When matter has been shaped into one form, it has been limited with its other possible forms being excluded. All the possibilities originally presented by the potential element have not been actualized. This, in turn, is


9. This implies that there is always an element of potency and deficiency in creation; it is always waiting to be fulfilled. Final causality is implied.
the limitation of actuality that it does not become pure, but is reduced to a lower plane, being the realization of some limited possibility.

There is a limit to the possibility of actualization. There is an ultimate point in the possibilities of the potential element to be actualized. Matter, for example, may first be realized in elementary forms, but this does not exhaust the possibilities. Matter strives continually to achieve the highest possible realization and this is only attained when matter is united with its highest form, the human soul. At this stage, matter has reached its highest degree of actuality and it has then become perfect of its kind. The reaching of the limit, however, does not mean that, from an absolute point of view, the degree of actuality attained is the highest possible. Even when matter has reached its highest possible degree of actuality in man, what has then been realized can be described as a mixture of potentiality and actuality. There is no more possibility in the sense that no more possibilities remain, no higher degree can be achieved by matter. There is potentiality in the sense of a lack of full actuality appertaining to higher beings than man.

This doctrine of the limitation of act by potency is placed in an interesting new light in an article by Clark who claims that this Thomistic concept represents not only an innovation beyond Aristotle, but a blending of Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism. He suggests that there are two elements in Thomas’ potency-act limitation principle: (1) Aristotle’s doctrine of act and potency, without its exclusive

attachment to a "change context." To this Thomas adds a dynamic
function of potency, namely, potency limiting the act it receives.
(2) The Neoplatonic participation-limitation framework which Thomas
interprets in terms of the ontological perfection of the universe:
the act of existing being participated in various degrees through
out the universe. Clark concludes his article with this statement:

...we feel with an increasing number of contemporary
Thomists that, at least in metaphysics, St. Thomas has
taken Plato—or more accurately, Plato transformed by
Plotinus—into so intimate a partnership with Aristotle
that the metaphysical system of the Angelic doctor can
legitimately be described, in the words of a recent
historian of participation in Thomas, either as an
Aristotelianism specified by Platonism or a Platonism
specified by Aristotelianism. And in some way, the
latter is perhaps the more exact.

The limitation of act by potency is important enough to the
Thomistic metaphysical system that he sees fit to deviate from
Aristotle on this point. This would indicate again that the Platonic
and Neoplatonic elements in Thomas' thought cannot be neglected, for
his doctrine of analogy, or for his philosophy in general.

In Thomas' system the potency-act distinction permeates all
existence. There can be pure actuality without potentiality, but
there is never in nature a potentiality that is not related to
some actuality. Thus Aquinas writes:

Omne autem cui convenit actus aliqua diversam ab eo
existens, se habet ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum:
actus enim et potentia ad se invicem dicuntur.

This means that every act given in existence is always act somehow
in potency and thus limited and divisable. The source of limitation

14. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Cap. 22, Opera Omnia,
Vol. 12, p. 30.
in existence is the combination of potency and act which always occurs under the conditions of existence.

A. Essence and Existence

The first and primary combination of potency-act present in the structure of existing things is essence and existence. Essence expresses precisely and definitely what a thing is, or at least what it was meant to be. It is known through activity. Characteristics actions enable things to be classified into species and to be distinguished as things of different kinds. "To exist" means to be something actual. It is the act by which things, with all their differences, are. Every real thing has and exercises an act of being, that is proper to itself alone.

Essence and existence are correlatives. Existence gives actuality to essence, as making what is possible to be real. Essence is a capacity to exist in a certain way or as a being of a definite kind; it is potency of being while existence is the ultimate actualization of essence itself. Existence is the perfection, making every potency to be in the fullest sense. Thomas, in fact, calls it the source of all good, true, and beautiful for each existing thing.

Ad nonum quod hoc quod dico "esse" est inter omnia perfectissimum, quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectior potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc est perfectus omnium perfectionum. Nec intelligendum est quod ut eo formalis ipsum determinans, sicut actus potentiam; "esse" enim quod huiusmodi est, est alium secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determinandum. Nihil autem potest addi ad esse quod sit extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi non ens, quod non potest esse nec forma nec materia. Unde non sic determinatur esse per alium sicut potentia per actum,
sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. Nam et in definitione
formarum ponuntur propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut
cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis physici organici.
Et per hunc modum hoc esse ab illo esse distinguuntur, in-
quanto est talis vel talis naturee.  

Yet, as act is limited by potency, so also is existence by its
cooprinclue essence. In every being there is a proportion between
that which is and the act by which it exists. Not only are the act
of existing of a stone and a man different, but so are the existence
of this man and that man. The existent subject limits existence to
itself and to its own finitude: "participated existence is limited by
the capacity of the participator." Thomas writes:

Esse autem aliquod potest dici terminatum tripliciter...
vel ratione suppositi in quo esse recipitur: esse enim
recipitur in aliquo secundum modum ipsius, et ideo
terminatur, sicut et quaelibet alia forma, quae de se
communis est, et secundum quod recipitur in aliquo,
terminatur ad illud, et hoc modum solum divinum esse
non est terminatum, quia non est receptum in aliquo,
quod sit diversum ab eo.  

Existence is limited by the subject into which it is received.
Essence is actualized and fulfilled by existence. Everything given
in existence is ultimately composed of essence (the kind of being it
is) and existence (the kind of being it has).

B. Form and Matter

That there is composition within substance itself between its
primary matter and its substantial form is revealed to us in Thomas' 
analysis of substantial change. In this type of change the loss of
being of one thing entails the generation of something else. Food

15. Aquinas, Thomas, De Potentia, q. 7, art. 2, ad. 9, Opera Omnia,

16. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, q. 75, art. 5, ad. 5,
Opera Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 457. "Esse autem participatum finitur ad
capacitatem participantis."

17. Aquinas, Thomas, I. Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 2c, Opera Omnia,
Vol. 7, p. 106.
when it is eaten loses its identity and becomes part of the organism that consumes it. There is actually change of substance. If so, what is it that remains the same? Some carry-over and continuity is necessary or we could hardly speak of one thing becoming another. If substance itself is changed, then, there must be some principle within the substance that is the underlying subject of the change. Considering the example, digested food is not food -- it is no longer the same substance. However, the very same matter that once existed as food has been converted in various ways into something that is new and different; it is the very same matter which now exists under a new form. What Thomas proposes is that the element of sameness in substantial change is the "matter" and that the element of difference is the "form."

Aquinas, however, has two concepts of matter: matter as prime matter and matter as informed matter. Informed matter is nothing else than the substance itself with all of its concrete forms; it is a composite whole. Every material thing has some definite proportions whether they be quantitative dimensions like weight or qualities like color or shape. Materia prima is matter in its more ultimate sense, matter which considered in itself is uninformed. It is the substrate of substantial change. It is not a substance, but a principle which is part of a substance and part of every material thing. It is potency, a capacity for receiving an act. That which it receives is substantial form. Prime matter is in potency for becoming a substance of a certain and definite kind. It is the principle which enters into composition with substantial form.

In correspondence to the two concepts of matter, there are two
kinds of forms. Substantial form is that principle which determines or actuates primary matter to be the kind of thing that it is and determines a thing as a substance. It is a primary determination or act. Accidental form does not constitute a thing as a substance, since it is merely an added determination to a substance that already exists. It is a secondary act. Substantial form is to be distinguished from essence, though both are related to that which a thing is. The essence of a composite substance, things composed of form and matter, is the union of these two elements. Thomas distinguishes between substantial form and essence in the following passage:

Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentia in substantia compositis, significat illud quod est ex materia et forma compositum. Et huic positori consonant verbum Boetii, in Comment. 1 Praedicam, ubi dicit quod Ousia significat compositum. Ousia enim, quod Groccos, idem est quod essentia quod nos, ut ipsum in 3 de Duabus Naturis fatetur. Avicenna autem dicit quod quidditas substantiarum compositarum est ipsa compositio formae et materia. Commentator autem dicit in 7 Metaphys. * Natura quam habent speciea in rebus generalibus est aliquod medium, id est, compositum ex materia et forma. Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantia compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed opsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam res dicitur esse. Unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis hujus modi esse sive essentiae sola forma suo modo sit causa. 

The essence of the pure intelligences, the angels, on the other hand, is their form alone. 19

C. Substance and Accident

Accidental change reveals in things a composition between substance and its accidents. In this type of change the underlying subject is no


different in kind than originally. Mild cheese turns to bitter, silent dogs begin to bark and a person with a pale skin gets a sunburn, yet aged cheese is still cheese, a barking dog a dog, a victim of sunburn is still the same person. Take the instance of a

ature rise from 50 to 400 degrees. As the mercury changes from "cool" to "hot" it is not the same and yet it is the same mercury. In spite of the change of temperature, the mercury continues to exist as mercury; the principle of sameness here is the very substance itself. It is the same substance (mercury) which undergoes change and persists at the end of the process.

The principle of difference in this change, therefore, cannot be the substance itself (mercury). It must be some new principle which the substance receives and to which it is potentially related. This new principle is some new act or form which, in the case of our example, is the condition of "being hot." It is the heat that the mercury receives that determines the substance "to be hot." Substance is the potential principle of whatever "accidents" it may be said to receive. The accidents are the actuating principle which modify or determine the substance taken as their subject.

Substance is capable of receiving or possessing various non-essential determinations or accidents. Reflection shows that the reason why a being can possess and appropriate to itself various accidents is that it is, so to speak, "self-possessed." It exists in itself and not in another being and thus is itself a subject of modifications. Substance is existence in itself and is related to essence in the sense that while essence is that whereby a being is fundamentally what it is, substance is essence considered as existing in itself and as a capacity for re-
ceiving accidental determinations. Accident does not exist in itself, but rather needs a substance in which to inhere. It is this fact that explains how an accident can modify the essence of a thing without being identified with essence. There are two ways in which an accident inheres in a substance: (1) necessarily, i.e. so intimately connected with the essence of a being that the being could not exist without it; and (2) contingently, or not necessarily. Examples of "necessary" accidents are the intellect and will as faculties inhering in the human soul. Examples of "non-essential" accidents are the particular weight of a man, his facial profile, a mood of anger, and the redness of his hair.

D. Summary

For Aquinas, potency and act truly encompass all being:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{act} & = \text{existence} :: \text{substantial form} :: \text{accident} \\
\text{potency} & = \text{essence} :: \text{primary matter} :: \text{substance}
\end{align*}
\]

As seen from the preceding analysis, act in general is a principle of actuality or perfection, while potency in general is a principle of capacity or perfectability. Yet, not every act is a principle of determination, i.e. a principle of formal perfection, nor is every potency a principle of determinability, i.e. a principle receiving formal perfection. For example, in the order of existence, determination comes from essence and not from the act of existing. Essence (entitative potency) determines existence (entitative act) by limiting it to a particular mode of existence. Existence, therefore, is "act" but not "form." Existence, substantial form and accidental form are all "act" but each is a different type and kind of act from the others. Substantial
form (the first formal act) determines the being to be fundamentally what it is. Similarly, accidental form (the second formal act) determines it to be superficially what it is.

Act is either pure or mixed. Pure act exists without any admixture of potency and as such Pure Act is unlimited and perfect; it is also unique and one in the sense that it has no composition. By contrast, a mixed act is one that is limited by potency and is a composition of potency and act. Entitative act is act in the order of existence and this is act in its most primary sense, namely, that act by which everything is said to be or to have esse. Formal act, or act in the order of form, is any act which causes a thing not simply to be, but to be specified according to one or another of the determinate modes of being. Formal act may be taken in two senses. The first formal act is the one which determines or specifies a thing according to its essence or nature. It is that act by virtue of which a thing is one kind of being rather than another. The first formal act of material things is their substantial form. The second formal act is a further modification or determination of an already existing subject. The addition of a second formal act, though it genuinely affects its subject, does not in any way change the nature of the subject that it modifies. Any accidental perfection that a thing has is related to it as a second formal act. Finally, there is received and unreceived act. The former is received in a potency, the latter is not. For example, the substantial form of every material thing is a received act because it is received in the potency of prime matter. On the other hand, a pure form is not received in potency and hence is an unreceived act. In the order of being, every act of being (with the exception of Pure Act) is
received and participated act. Hence the esse of every finite thing (even that of pure spirits) is regarded as a received act because it is received in an essence distinct from itself.

Essence, prime matter and substance (second matter) are all potency, but each is a different kind of potency, corresponding to the different kinds of acts which they receive. Entitative potency is the principle which receives the act of being; it is potency in the order of existence. Since the essence of finite things is the recipient, the limiting principle of the very act by which they are, it is the essence of finite things which is their "entitative" potency. Corresponding to the two types of act in the order of form there are two kinds of potency. The potency for receiving an accidental form is the potency in an already existing subject for receiving any act that is superadded to its nature or essence. The potency for receiving a substantial form is primary matter which is pure passive potency.

The following diagram illustrates the subtle differences and relations involved in the potency-act structure of reality:

**Act:**
(1) **Entitative:** perfection in the order of existence (act of existence)
(2) **Formal:** perfection in the line of determination or specification.
   (a) **Substantial:** perfection in the line of essential determination -- substantial form.
   (b) **Accidental:** perfection in the line of accidental determination -- accidental form.

**Potency:**
(1) **Entitative:** capacity in existing subject to receive the act of existence -- essence.
(2) **Formal:** capacity in existing subject to receive or possess determination.
   (a) **Substantial:** capacity to receive essential determination -- prime matter.
   (b) **Accidental:** capacity to receive or possess accidental determination -- substance.
The potency-act relationship is the ground of the structural relations of reality. Essence-existence, matter-form, substance-accident are all relations of potency-act. The structure of reality is analogical in nature, embodying both similarity and difference. Things share in a community of existence, but differ in essence. Things share in a common matter, but things are determined and specified by form. Likeness and difference is also seen in change. In substantial change it is matter which serves as a principle of sameness while form provides the difference. In accidental change substance provides for sameness and accident for difference.

II. Potency-Act as the Ground for the Unity-Diversity Relational Concepts

A. Hierarchy of Being

When potency-act is related to Pure Act in regard to the universe, we have Aquinas' view of the structure of the universe as hierarchial. At the top is God, Pure Act, and at the bottom, materia prima, pure potency, and between them the things, each on its own level, each with its own composition of potency-act. The hierarchy of being is an intricate interplay of potency and act. There are different degrees of potency and act involved. The relationship of potency-act in the hierarchy is one of inverse proportion: an increased degree of potentiality means reduced actuality and vice versa.

The hierarchy itself is usually spoken of as a hierarchy of forms, with the individual places of things in the hierarchy being determined

by their forms, yet the difference between forms is the different
degrees of potentiality and actuality. The more actuality and the
less potentiality of a form, the higher that form will be.\(^{21}\)

The hierarchy of being also includes the relationship of essentia
and esse, for it is headed by God as the first being and followed by
different degrees of esse in a continuously dwindling scale in which
materia prima is the lowest. Viewed from this angle, the hierarchy
of being is divided into two parallel lines, one associated with
essentia and the other with esse. The place of essentia in this scale
is determined by the form and consequently by the place which the form
constituting the essence occupies in the hierarchy of forms, which is
determined, in turn, by potency-act. In material things, where essentia
is a combination of form and matter, it is the form which determines
the character of essence. To each form belongs a corresponding matter
and not vice versa.\(^ {22}\) In immaterial things, on the other hand, the
essence consists of form alone. Here the position of the essence in
the hierarchy coincides with that of form. Form also decides the degree
of esse. Each form has its corresponding esse. The higher the form on
the scale, the greater will be the degree of the esse of the thing.\(^ {23}\)


\(^{22}\) Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, Cap. 97, *Opera Omnia*,
Vol. 12, p. 383. "...forma sit secundum quam res habet esse...Non
autem possent materia et forma ad aliquid unum constituiendum con-
venire, nisi esset aliqua proportio inter ea. Si autem proportionata
opertet ea esse, necessum est quod diversis formis diversae materia
respondeant. Unde fit ut quaedam formae requirant materiam
simplicem, quaedam vero materiam compositam.

\(^{23}\) Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, Cap. 97, *Opera Omnia*,
*Opera Omnia*, Vol. 12, pp. 189-191; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III,
The hierarchy of being corresponds to the hierarchy of forms. The form is what determines the difference in the degree of esse found in creation: *Esse sequitur forma.*

Grades in the hierarchy of being may also be said to be determined by the degree of likeness to God, the forms differing in their different degrees of perfection and likeness to God. This degree of perfection and likeness of the form to God, of course, is determined by potency–act; the less potency involved with the form, the closer it is to God, the Pure Act.

The hierarchy of forms is also a hierarchy of *simplicitas.* The higher the form the more "simple." At the same time, it can comprise and include more in its unity than can a form of lower grade. It has more comprehensiveness or actuality. In a sense, creation and God form a rising series, the top of which it God as *actus purus.* God could be likened to an infinitely large number to which nothing more can be added. He is absolutely simple, pure act, pure Being. Creation, then, would be comparable to a series of numbers, all at a greater or smaller distance from infinity, with a varying number of units that must be added to reach up to God, to the *actus purus.* Each created thing, when compared to God, is always deficient and incomplete, yet each is related to God as to its end and meaning. There is difference and yet relation.


27. Here is the Aristotelian thought of a hierarchy of forms and the Platonic thought of different participation in the ideas.
B. Ordo

Closely associated with the idea of hierarchy is the concept of the universe as *ordo*. An ordo presumes a plurality of things related in some definite way in a superior and subordinate manner. Things in an ordo are interrelated as *prius et posterius*. The ordo relation implies a valuation, for one member of an ordo is, as a rule, in some way superior to its other member. Thus Thomas writes:

> Respondeo dicendum, quod talis est ordo in rebus quod superiores in entibus sunt perfectiora inferioribus; et quod in inferioribus continetur deficienter et partialiter et multipliciter, in superioribus continetur eminenter; et per quandom totalitatem et simplicitatem.  

The ordo concept, however, does not imply merely a general superiority and inferiority. It connotes *proportio* between the members,\(^\text{29}\) because they are in some way dependent upon one another for their existence or perfection. Matter and form constitute an ordo because the one cannot exist without the other.\(^\text{30}\) So do cause and effect because the cause determines the nature and types of effect, which strives to revert to it as its end.\(^\text{31}\) The things in the universe constitute an ordo because the higher dominates and uses the lower which in their turn do their best to attain the perfection of the higher.\(^\text{32}\)

\(^{28}\) Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 57, art. 1, Opera Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 359; Sententiarum I, d. 20, art. 1, q. 3, Opera Omnia, Vol. 7, p. 266.


evident that the *ordo* concept is ultimately grounded in the relationship of potency-act, for it is actuality which perfects and forms something one way or another and that which is perfected is regarded as deficient in something which the actuality perfecting it already possesses.

Regarding the *ordo* of the universe, Aquinas held that it must be based on a principle or cause, since fortuitous relations are not sufficient to establish an *ordo*. He accordingly refers the order to God as its cause. \[33\] It is a God-created order, and God thus has determined the different grades of the respective things and also their mutual relations. \[34\] This ordering comes under his providence, but may also be said to be an expression of his divine justice, which gives to each according to his determined conditions.

For Aquinas, the ultimate prerequisite of order in things is the relation of all things to God as their end. There is a double order: (1) Things are reciprocally ordered; and (2) God has appointed them all to fulfill the object of His creation. This *ordo ad Deum* is the primary order of things. \[36\] There is unity and relation among things in the universe on the basis of a common relation to God as the cause and end of creation.

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C. Causality

Things are related and unified in Thomas' system not only on the basis of hierarchy and ordo, but also on the basis of causality. In various texts Thomas describes what he means by "cause." In his Commentary on the Physics, he says that those things are called causes upon which other things depend either for their being (esse) or for their coming into existence (fieri).\(^{37}\) In the Summa Theologiae he shows that the name cause implies a diversity of substance and a dependence of one on the other.\(^{38}\) In his Commentary on the Metaphysics, he demonstrates that the word "cause" means some kind of influence upon the things caused.\(^{39}\) Finally, he defines cause through the notion of sequence in the things caused, saying that a cause is that after which something else follows. These different notions of cause are really various aspects of causality and the following definition might be drawn from them: a cause is that from which something proceeds with dependence.

For Thomas, there are four kinds of causes that make a being intelligible: two, the formal and material, related to the intrinsic structure of being; and two, the efficient and final refer to its origin and end. In the Commentary on the Metaphysics, he gives descriptions of each of the four causes,\(^{40}\) which we shall paraphrase.

\(^{37}\) Aquinas, Thomas, Physics I, lectio 1, art. 1, no. 5, Opera Omnia, Vol. 22, pp. 294-5.

\(^{38}\) Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 33, art. 1, ad. 1, Opera Omnia, Vol. 1, pp. 288-89.

\(^{39}\) Aquinas, Thomas, Metaphysics, V, lectio 1, artl. 1, Opera Omnia, Vol. 24, p. 512.

\(^{40}\) Aquinas, Thomas, Metaphysics, V, lectio 2, passim, Opera Omnia, Vol. 24, pp. 514-520.
Material cause is that of which something is made. It does not, however, come from nonbeing, because the matter has a reality of its own before it becomes the subject of a new form and a new act of existence. Material cause is found only in things pertaining to nature where generation and corruption take place. A formal cause may be intrinsic to being or extrinsic. If intrinsic, it is the principal part of the definition of something, for it, more than material cause, tells what a thing is. The material cause has a potency to new being, the formal cause actualizes this potency.

Efficient causality is applied only to the production of something outside the agent through what is called transitive activity. Efficient causality is found only among beings of the categories. It is of the essence of this kind of cause that it refers to imperfect being in which change takes place. An efficient cause is correlative to an effect; it thus implies a multiplicity in substance, dependency of one thing upon another, a priority and posteriority in the order of being and a movement from potency to act.

Living beings possess immanent activity, activity which remains totally within and whereby the very being is perfected, yet there is a radical contingency even in the most perfect created beings. There is always a real distinction between their potency and act, between their being and operation. The contingency of a composite being shows that it is dependent on and caused by an external agent. Whatever comes to be in a way is caused by something other. A contingent being must have its existence communicated to it by another being, but that which communicates existence to another is an efficient cause. In Thomas' system every contingent being must have an efficient cause.
For Aquinas, as will be shown, God is the Primary Efficient Cause of all there is. God alone is Creator and all that exists is created by Him. Nothing is except by virtue of the Divine Being, and nothing can do anything except by virtue of divine efficacy. For all beings, God is the cause and reason for their operating. Every operation presupposes God as cause. Thomas does, however, argue for the efficacy of created things, for they do involve act as well as potency. There is an immanent activity which each being uses to gain perfection within its kind. God has not created beings deprived of causality. But how can the same single effect derive simultaneously from two different causes, God and the natural agent that produces it? There are, says Thomas, causes at the same time, but under a different aspect. God confers upon all things their being, their form, their movement and their efficacy; and yet, this efficacy belongs all the same to them. Once they have received it, it is they that perform their operations. Neither element in this double causality is superfluous. This is true because, for Aquinas, the existence of secondary causes is not evidence of God's lack of power, but of the immensity of His goodness. Love is the deepest spring of all causality. As Dionysius says, "omnium divinus in Dei cooperatorem fieri." If God has imparted to existing things efficacy as the highest mark of their divine origin, what urges them and moves them to act is a constant effort toward an assimilation to God.

In Thomas' system, every part in the universe exists, in the first place, for its own proper act and its own proper end; but, each of the inferior parts exist for the sake of superior parts -- all these creatures

taken singly exist only for the sake of the collective perfection of the Universe -- and finally, this collective perfection of creatures, taken in its totality, is there only as an imitation and representation of the glory of God Himself.  

This brings us to final cause. It is that for the sake of which something else takes place. Final causality is the foundation of all other causes. It is the first among all causes, as all causes depend on it to exert their own causality. This Thomas says in the following passage:

Secundum autem est quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in causalitate tamen est prior semper. Unde dicitur causa causarum quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Et enim causa causalitatis efficientis, ut jam dictum est. Efficiens autem est causa causalitatis et materia et formae et formam inesse materiae. Et per consequens etiam finis est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae.  

The final cause is found not only in the end that is absolutely last, but in any intermediate goal on the way. One goal points to another and the intellect is compelled by the laws of being to find an absolute end through which all intermediary ends are established. Every agent acts for an end and efficient causes act only to attain a good. Thus Aquinas writes:

Si agens tenderet ad aliquam effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei indifferentes. Quod autem indifferenter se habet ad multa, non magis unum eorum operatur quam alium, unde a contingente ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis effectus, nisi per aliquid quod determinatur ad unum. Impossible igitur esset quod ageret. Omni igitur agens tendit ad aliquam determinatum effectum, quod dicitur finis ejus.


In the created order, each potency is ordered to an act; creation, because of its potential element needs some final reference or purpose. God Himself, as Pure Act, is the absolute end of all creation. Act is thus both prior and final, for God is both efficient and final cause.

Potency and act encompass all being; it is the basis of the relationship and order within a universe which is composed of a plurality of existents. Things are related in a hierarchy of being based upon their degree of potency and act. They are also connected in an order of prior and posterior in which that which has more act is rated superior and prior to that which has less act and more potency. Finally, all beings are causally related, for as potency requires act, so effect requires cause; potency implies contingency and thus also causality.

III. Potency-Act and the Doctrine of Creation

Thomas' understanding of analogy cannot be fully comprehended without a knowledge of his doctrine of creation. Following the Christian tradition, Aquinas teaches that God created the world out of nothing; creation is the act whereby all things pass from non-being or nothingness to being. He wishes, by this notion, to guard against two mistaken concepts about creation: (1) that of creation as an emanation from the essence of God; and (2) creation as a fashioning or ordering of an existing substratum, some matter or the like. To say God creates ex nihilo is an expression of sequence and does not mean that God caused creation to issue from nothing as a sort of pre-existing matter. Aquinas understands creation to be an unique act; God is Pure Act and corresponding to this unique mode of being, there is a unique mode of causality. God alone can create; He is the only

being per se and He is the only one who can produce the very existence of other beings.

Arguing against the Arabic position of his time, Aquinas asserts that creation is not a necessary act. God has brought creatures into being out of His own free will and without any natural necessity. Three reasons require us to hold this view, says Thomas:

(1) It must be admitted that the universe is ordered with a view to a certain end. If it were otherwise, the universe would be the result of chance. Nature tends toward an end only because it is moved and directed to it by a being endowed with will and intelligence. Now whatever is by or through something else is always posterior to something existing of itself. If, therefore, nature tends toward an end assigned to it by an intelligence, the First Being who gave it its end and disposition in view of this end, must have created it not out of a necessity of His nature, but out of His intelligence and will.

(2) Nature operates always, unless prevented, in the same invariable way. It does so because everything acts according to its nature, and since everything acting by nature is determined to a single mode of being, nature performs always one and the same action. If God, a being not determined to a specific mode of being, acted by necessity of nature, he could produce a sort of infinite and indeterminate being. However, two simultaneous infinites are impossible. God acts voluntarily according to His intelligence and will.

(3) Effects pre-exist in their cause only according to the mode of being of the cause. Now the Divine Being is His very intelligence; His effects pre-exist, therefore, in the intelligible mode of being and therefore in the last resort by will. For the inclination of God to accomplish what His intelligence has conceived falls into the sphere of His will. Consequently, it is the will of God that is the First Cause of all things.\(^{46}\)

But if creation is not a necessary act, a diversity of finite things must pre-exist in the simplicity of the Divine Intelligence.

In the case of every production which is not the result of a mere

accident, the form of whatever is produced constitutes the end of the productive process. The agent in this process could not act with a view to this form unless he had in himself the resemblance of, or the model of the form. If God does not act in creation by natural necessity there must exist in the Divine Intelligence a form in resemblance to which the world has been created. But not only one idea of the created universe must exist in God, but a plurality of ideas corresponding to the various beings constituting the universe. This follows from the fact that it is impossible to have the idea of a whole without having an adequate idea of the parts composing it. Since God's intention was to create the order of the universe, He would have in His mind the idea of the universal order, but also the proper ideas of all things would be contained in His mind. The plurality of ideas can exist in the mind of God, says Thomas, because a form may be possessed in two ways. In some beings the form to be realized pre-exists according to its natural being; thus man begats man. In other beings, however, the form pre-exists in a purely intelligible mode, as resemblance or the model of a house pre-exists in the mind of the architect. The plurality of ideas in the mind of God are of the purely intelligible mode and therefore do not conflict with the Divine simplicity.

Creatures, then, do derive from the one God. But how can this be so without these somehow fusing with Him or being superadded to Him? This is not a real question for Aquinas, for though creatures have no goodness, no perfection, no being, which they do not hold from God, none of these are in the same mode as in God. God is Being

absolutely, and creatures hold it merely in a participated and defective manner which keeps them at an infinite distance from the Creator. The created beings can neither form an integral part of God nor be added to or subtracted from Him.

All creatures exist only because all essence is derived from the Divine esse: *omnis essentia derivatur ab essentia divina.*\(^{48}\) No being could exist unless God were virtually all beings: *est virtualliter omnia.*\(^{49}\) Divine Being contains, by reason of its perfect actuality, the sufficient reason for the analogous being of things; it contains them as the mind of the artist contains his works:

> Emanati creaturam a Deo est sicut exitus artificiatorum ab artifice; unde sicut ab arte artificis affunt formae artificiales in materiae, ita etiam, ab ideis in mente divina existentibus fluunt omnes formae et virtutues naturales.\(^{50}\)

Each being is perfect in the very measure in which it participates in the Divine perfection. Since God is existence itself, each thing participates in a likeness of God inasmuch as it exists.\(^{51}\) The goodness by which beings are formally good is a certain participation of the divine goodness and the wisdom by which we are formally wise is a certain participation of the divine wisdom. God alone is being by His very essence; all other beings participate in being.\(^{52}\) Being is predicated essentially of God, since the divine esse is subsistent. Being is said of all creatures by participation: no creature


\(^{49}\) Aquinas, Thomas, *Sententiarum II,* d. 18, q. 1, art. 2, Opera Omnia, Vol. 8, p. 236.

\(^{50}\) Aquinas, Thomas, *Ibid.*

\(^{51}\) Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 14, art. 9, ad. 2, Opera Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 98.

is its own existence, but rather is a being which has existence. God
alone is Creator and Cause; He alone possesses a perfection by His
essence, while creatures possess it only by participation.

God is Pure Act and thus the one and the simple. A perfection
which is in God is simply and uniformly while in creatures it appears
in many partial forms.

Nam bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter,
in creaturis est multipliciter et divisio. Unde per-
fectius participat divinam bonitatem et representat eam
totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura.53

Participation, because it is based upon and the result of the
potency-act combination which always occurs under existence, means
that what is possessed by participation is possessed partially and
imperfectly. God is Cause and He is One, and because He is these He
possesses all perfections absolutely and perfectly. Creation, however,
is effect and many, and thus what perfections created things possess
are possessed imperfectly. Thus Thomas writes:

Quia igitur id quod in Deo perfecta est, in rebus aliis
per quandam deficientem participationem invenitur, illud
secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Deus quidem simpliciter
est, non autem creatura.54

Quod causae et effectui convenit, eminentius invenitur
in causa quem in effectu; a causa enim ineffectus deriva-
tur. Quid quid igitur in inferioribus causis existens
primae omnium causae attribuiter, excellentissime con-
venit ei.55

God possesses perfections per essentiam and universaliter while created
beings possess them per participationem and partialiter and particu-
lariter. The creature as effect participates less perfectly or de-

53. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I. q. 47, art. 1, Opera
Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 422.

54. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Cap. 29, Opera
Omnia, Vol. 12, p.

ficiently in the analogous perfection which God, or the Cause, possesses
more perfectly or in a higher or more excellent fashion.

The very grounding of participation, of course, is the potency-
act principle. The plurality and imperfection of created things,
evident in participation, are obviously grounded in receptive potency:

Ad primo ergo dicendum, quod primus actus est universale
principium omnium actum, quia est infinitum virtualiter,
in se omnia praehabens, ut dicit Dionysius, c.v. De div.
Nom. 4, c.o. 818, t. 1. Unde participatur a rebus non
sicut pars, sed secundum diffusionem processionis ipsius.
Potentia autem, cum sit receptive actus, oportet quod
actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, quid procedunt
a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes ejus,
sunt diversi. Unde non potest esse potentia una quae
recipiat omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens omnes
actus participatos.56

God, the first, efficient, and exemplar cause of all creatures and their
ultimate goal, possesses being, goodness, and similar perfections by
His very essence, in a most perfect manner, as identical with that
essence and with each other. Creatures, the effects of God's causa-
lity, participate or share in an imperfect manner in such analogous
perfections. These creaturely perfections, however, are multiple and
distinct from each other because they are received in the creatures'
potencies.

Every participant is compared to that which is participated
as potency to act: for through that which is participated
the participant is made an actual participant.57

There is between creatures and Creator a relationship of causality,
one of participation, and finally, one of exemplarity. Thomas connects
exemplar causality with efficient causality or telic causality, using
exemplarity as part of an integrated explanation of the likeness

56. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 75, art. 5, ad. 1, Opera

57. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, Cap. 5, Opera Omnia,
Vol. 12, p. 111.
which an effect bears to the intellectual agent who produced it and
to the telic cause to which it is ordered. The relationship between
creation and Creator is a caused relationship whereby they imitate the
creative intellect who is their efficient cause.

God is the efficient and exemplar cause of creatures: "...et
ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum
effective et exemplariter manat." Thus Thomas writes:

Deus non potest habere aliquam relationem ad nos, nisi
per modum principi. Cum autem causae sint quatuor, ipse
non est causa materialis nostra; sed habet ad nos in
ratione efficientis et finis et formae exemplaris, non
autem in ratione formae inhaerentis...59

Thomas believed that the exemplar relationship took into full account
both sides of the relation between creature and Creator, for exemplar
causality when joined with efficient causality produces intrinsic
likeness in its effects. This he argues in the following passage:

Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina,
sicut primo principio exemplari effectivo et finali
totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur
bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente,
quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum.50

Thomas' doctrine of exemplarity does go beyond the merely nega-
tive criticism of Platonic exemplarism to transform Plato's doctrine
into a causal exemplarity which respects both the intrinsic perfect-
ion of the creature and the complexity of the causal lines which lead
from the creature back to God, the creative intelligence.

...quod omne agens inventur sibi simile agere: unde si
prima bonitas sit effectiva omnium bonorum, oportet quod
similitudinem suam imprimat in rebus effectis; et sic
unumquodque dicitur bonum sicut forma inhaerente per

58. Aquinas, Thomas, Sententiarum I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, Opera

59. Aquinas, Thomas, Sententiarum I, d. 18, q. 1, a. 5, Opera

60. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 6, art. 4, Opera
Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 44.
bonitatem primam, sicut per exemplar et effectivum
omnis bonitatis oratae.61

God and creation are distinct and diverse and yet they also are related. Cause produces effects similar to itself, potency must have some likeness to the act which it receives. Creatures are related to God, the Efficient and Final Cause; they are like Him even though they only have a partial and participated likeness. "Likeness" when applied to God must be carefully clarified. In the language of Thomas "to participate" does not mean to be a thing, but not to be it. To participate in God does not mean to be God.62 There is relation between God and His creature, but there is also infinite distance between them. Creation is everywhere and always dependent upon God, but God is in no way dependent upon creation. If the superabundance of His Being and of His Love leads God to will and love Himself even in the finite participation of His Being, Aquinas holds that we must see therein nothing but a free gift and nothing even remotely resembling a necessity.

God is Pure Act and thus is separate and distinct from all that is external to Him, and yet there is nothing external to Him which was not in its essence and existence derived from Him. God is wholly beyond, tamquam ignotus, yet His effects are revealed in creation and the fact that "God is" is the foundation of creation itself. Creation is a likeness which testifies to a Deity who is beyond similitude, who by an inscrutable decree has chosen this likeness and can choose a thousand others if He will. The creature is an analogue of God. It is like Him, through the possession of a unity of essence and existence, but even in this similarity it is unlike Him because in Deity the unity of


of essence and existence is that of identity whereas in that of creation the unity is one of tension.\(^3\) God is Primæ Cause and all effects in some way resemble their cause, but always imperfectly. Created things participate in the Divine existence and in the absolute perfections, but always incompletely. Created things are exemplaries of the Divine Exemplar, but are always deficient images.

IV. Our Knowledge of God.

There is relation and yet infinite distance between Creator and creation. What then is the status of man's knowledge of God? In his commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, Thomas tells us there are three degrees in our knowledge of God: the lowest, the knowledge of God as He is active in creation; the second, the recognition of God as mirrored in spiritual beings; the third and loftiest, the recognition of God as the Unknown, *tamquam ignotus*. In order to fully understand what Thomas means by this statement, one needs to begin, as Josef Pieper has rightfully pointed out,\(^6^5\) with the doctrine of creation as related to Thomas' understanding of knowledge.

A basic notion in Aquinas' system is that nothing exists which is not *creatura*, except the Creator. This *createdness* determines the inner structure of reality. Applying this concept to truth and knowledge, it can be seen that, for Thomas, everything which can be made the object of human knowledge is either *creatura* or Creator. Further, things have been fashioned by thought; the essence of things is that they are *creatively* thought.\(^6^6\) Essence and existence cannot be separa-

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66. Pieper, p. 53.
ted in created things, because and in so far as God has creatively thought things, just so and to that extent do they have a nature. We can speak of the nature of things only when they are expressly considered as creatura.

This means that, for Thomas, the "truth of things" is a double concept. First, it means the creative fashioning of things by God — that they are creatively thought by God. Secondly, it connotes their intrinsic knowability for the human mind. Things can be approached and grasped in human knowledge. The reality of things is that they be understood as created being. It is the creative fashioning of things by God which makes it possible for them to be known by man.

Man's knowledge, then, is imitative knowledge. The truth of things primarily and properly consists in the mind of God and it is this that renders human knowledge possible. *Cognitio est quidem veritatis effectus:* knowledge is a certain effect of truth. The essence of all created things is that they are formed after an archetypal pattern which dwells in the absolutely creative mind of God. What the human mind knows is the copy of this archetype. In this sense, then, man knows things, but cannot formally know their truth. There are really two kinds of truth — one can be the object of human knowledge, the other cannot. "The essential ground of things are unknown to us, *principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis ignota.*" *We do not know substantial forms, as they are in themselves, formae substantiales*


per se ipsae sunt ignota." "Essential differences are not known to us, differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae."

Man has no proper means of knowing the distinctive element in things -- the essence of things. The ultimate reality is something to which we can never fully penetrate because we can never fully grasp these likenesses of the Divine Ideas precisely as likenesses.

There is, then, for man, a certain unknowability in things. It is not, however, a type of darkness which connotes that nothing can be known. On the contrary, things are created intelligible and knowable. For Thomas, the very nature of things is that their knowability cannot be wholly exhausted by any finite intellect. Things are *creatura*, the inner lucidity of Being has its ultimate and exemplary source in the boundless radiance of Divine Knowledge. The human mind does attain to things, but in doing so it enters into an unfathomable light, and to the extent that it does attain to the reality of things, it discovers that they cannot be fathomed. It is like the Socratic "learned ignorance." Only when a man comes into visual contact with light does he realize that the sun's brightness altogether transcends his power of vision.

The following passage from the *Summa Theologicae* provides a good summary of Thomas' thought on this matter:

Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum; sicut sol qui maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione propter


excessum luminis. Hoc igitur attendentes quidam posuerunt quod nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest. Sed hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudine in altissima ejus operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si nuncquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel nuncquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio ejus beatitudo consistat quam in Deo, quod est alienum a fide. In ipso enim est ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quid est ei principium essendi; in tantum enim unumquodque perfectum est, in quantum ad suum principium attingit. Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest enim hominum naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane, desiderium naturae. Unde simpliciter concedendum est quod beat Dei essentiam videant.

Aquinas, then, begins with the assumption that men know God, but indeed that they know Him finally as the Unknown, tamquam ignotus.

Man can know God as He is active in creation, though he can never, of course, attain the essence of God. Consider the following passage from the *Summa Theologiae*:

Respondeo, dicendum, quod naturali noster cognitio a sensu principium sumit. Unde tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, in quantum manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere quod divinam essentiam videat; quia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus, Dei virtutem non aequantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec ejus essentia videri. Sed quia sunt effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci possimus ut cognoscamus de Deo an est, et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea quae necesse est ei convenire, secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata. Unde cognoscimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et differentiam creaturum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse, non est aliquid eorum quae ab eo causantur; et quod haec non remoyentur ab eo propter ejus defectum, sed quia superexcedit.

Natural knowledge can seek after God from sensible things. Indeed this is the way of human knowledge. This is why Aquinas insists that the existence of God is not self-evident to man, but must be demonstrated.


72. Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I., Q. 12, art. 12, ad. 2, Opera Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 84.
from an analysis of experience. Knowledge is either of the creature or of the Creator. One can know that God exists by looking at the effects observable in the world and then moving back to the cause necessary to account for these effects. Thomas offers five proofs of God's existence, each supplementing and interpreting the others.

The first proof proceeds from the analysis of motion or change in general. To cause motion is to bring something from potentiality to actuality. Now nothing is at the same time and in the same respect both potential and actual; therefore nothing is at the same time and in the same manner both that which causes motion and that which is moved. In other words, there is in the strict sense no self-mover. Everything then which is moved is moved by something else; that which is moved is potential and that which causes motion is actual, in respect in which motion takes place. If, in turn, that which causes motion is itself moved, it must be moved by another mover. But there cannot be an infinite series of such movers, for then there would be no motion at all since the intermediate (whether one or many) can be the cause of motion only by the virtue of the first mover. Hence one must come to a first mover which is itself unmoved and this we call God.

The second proof derives from efficient causation. We find an ordered arrangement of efficient causes. Here again, nothing can be the efficient cause of itself, nor can there be an infinite regress, since that would render impossible both the intermediate causes and the effect; for to remove the cause is to remove the effect. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a first efficient cause, which we call God.
The third proof derives from the analysis of the possible or contingent, and the necessary. The contingent are those things which come into being and pass away; they have the possibility of being and non-being. They cannot exist always. Therefore, if all things are contingent, there was a time when nothing existed. But then nothing could exist now, for the nonexistent can not begin to be except through the action of the existent. There must, then, be a necessary being, as well as the contingent, and this necessary being we must call God.

The fourth proof considers the degree of perfection or value found in experience. For anything can be called more or less good et cetera, only because it approaches closer to or recedes from the highest good, et cetera. There is, therefore, a highest which is the cause of goodness, et cetera, of all others, and this we call God.

The fifth proof derives from the orderly arrangement and governance of the world. For nature could not by chance attain the end and purposes maintained. Hence, there is an intelligence by which all things are ordered toward an end, and this we call God.

Each of these proofs starts from a different order of effects and consequently throws light on a different aspect of Divine Causality. In the first two proofs God is established as the Moving Cause and the Efficient Cause of all things. The third proof establishes that God is a necessary being. The fourth proof leads us to recognize the First Being, above all beings, as the cause of all the perfections which appear in secondary things. In the fifth proof we see this First Being as the end and final cause of all things.
By following up human experiences to the source which explains them, we have established these descriptions of God the Creator. From these concepts, Thomas believed, we could move to make out more explicit conclusions about the attributes of God. Knowing that God is both first and final cause of all creation, one can determine that He is Pure Actuality, having no passive potentialities. He is the necessary Pure Act referent of the potency-act of existence. Because God is pure actuality, He is also immaterial, for matter is always related to form as the potential to that which actualizes. As Pure Act, God is First Cause, the necessary referent of all creation and all cause. Because of this, He cannot be in any manner or degree composite, for there would then be required something outside God to bring the elements together and He would not be the First Cause. God is absolutely simple and because He is, His essence and existence are identical. Further, since in genus essence and existence are not identical, God does not fall into any genus. This means that no definition can be given of God, for definition proceeds from the giving of the genus and then the difference. As fully actual, God must be perfect and as first cause He must be the ground of all perfections in all other beings. It follows that He is also infinite, for while infinite as applied to matter denotes imperfection, as applied to form it denotes perfection. As perfect, He is eternal, for eternity means simultaneity, that is, lacking beginning or end and all succession. That He is One follows from His simplicity, the infinity of His perfections and the unity of the world of which He is the cause.

Man's knowledge of God always comes through creation, through the
sense world. This knowledge is intrinsically analogical. It is so first because reality is analogical, both in its structure and in the fact that created things are imperfect exemplaries of God, like Him and yet always different from Him. Secondly, human knowledge is imitative knowledge; it imitates the Divine Knowledge and thus though it knows things, it never knows them in their ultimate and deepest reality. Thirdly, human knowledge is analogical since God is both known and yet unknowable. True knowledge of God consists in knowing that He far surpasses all we can know. We cannot help think¬
ing of God in human terms, for this is the only way we can know Him. We know our finite terms do convey knowledge of God, but we also know their primary meaning is always determined by our human and finite experience.

V. Summary

In establishing the principle of potency-act and the doctrine of creation as the ultimate underlying concepts of Thomas’s under¬
standing of the analogy of being and the analogy of predication of being, we are given some concrete guide lines in dealing with the question of the proper metaphysical analogy. If a form of analogy were properly metaphysical, it would demonstrate characteristics of these two principles upon which it is grounded. It would deal with the analogical relationships of reality grounded upon potency-act, such as essence-existence, matter-form, and substance-accident, or it would contain within itself such concepts as hierarchy, ordo, causality, exemplarism and participation. A proper metaphysical analogy would seek to guard the integrity of both Creator and creature,
demonstrating the Creator as always prior, always Pure Act, always full reality, truth and goodness, and yet pointing out that created things too have truth, reality, and goodness which is a real form of these, though not the Truth of Truths, the Good of all goods, the Final and Ultimate Reality.
CHAPTER III. The "Proper" Metaphysical Analogies

In setting out Thomas' doctrine of analogy, this chapter, rather than concentrating on the classification of types of Thomistic analogy, will accept analogy as a proper metaphysical tool which is used in various contexts to solve diverse philosophical or theological problems. It will work on the premise that Thomistic analogy is grounded upon the potency-act principle and that each "type" of Thomistic analogy is properly metaphysical as it is based upon this principle and manifests its various characteristics. Each of the Cajetanian "types" will be examined in detail in light of the textual statements by Aquinas in order to determine their validity and to check any misinterpretations or misunderstandings. Each of the "types" will be viewed as analogy used in specific contexts to deal with a specific problem or problems.

In the De Nominum Analogia, Cajetan divides analogy into three main modes: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, and analogy of proportionality. He identifies these three modes with those explicated by Aquinas in I. Sententiærum.¹

The analogy of inequality is present when the name is common, but nevertheless unequally possessed by each of the analogates. This is analogy according to being and not according to intention. For example, all bodies are considered equal in the intention of corporeity, but the being (esse) of material bodies is different from the being (esse) of the celestial (or immaterial) bodies. Cajetan claims that in the last analysis this analogy is really univocal in nature.

¹ Aquinas, Thomas, Sententiærum, I, d. 19, q. 5, art. 2, ad. 1, Opera Omnia, Vol. 7, p. 257f.
It was pointed out in Chapter I that Cajetan neglects the very important distinction between a logical genus and a natural genus. Certainly from a logical point of view, all bodies share equally in the notion of corporeity or bodiness; but metaphysically, bodiness does not exist equally in all bodies, for in the heavenly bodies it exists more perfectly than in the earthly bodies. A logician can abstract from all existential conditions, but the metaphysician is called upon to take into account diverse types of matter and potencies and the modes of existing. Thus Thomas writes:


Thomas makes this difference between the view of the logician and the philosopher quite clear in another passage:

...analogia secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parficantur in intentione alicius communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omne corpora parficantur in intentiones tantum, dicit, hoc nomen corpus de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari: sed esse huius naturae non est ejusdem rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, qui considerat res secundum suum esse, nec hoc nomen corpus nec aliud aliud dicitur univoce de corruptibilibus, ut patet X Meta et Philosopho et Commentatore.  


3. Aquinas, Thomas, Sententiarum, I, d. 19, q. 5, art. 2, ad. 1, Opera Omnia, Vol. 7, p. 257.
The logician places things in the same logical category which the natural philosopher, whose knowledge extends to the different modes of the actual existence of things, must describe as generically different. For example, corruptible and incorruptible bodies have a different mode of existence because they have in their very essence different kinds of matter. The logician can place them in one genus, the philosopher cannot:

Nam corruptibilium et incorruptibilium non potest esse materia una. Genus autem, physice loquendo, a materia sumitur. Unde supradictum est, quod ea quae non communicant in materia, sunt genere diversa. Logice autem loquendo, nihil prohibet quod conveniant in genere, inquantum conveniunt in una communi ratione, vel substantiae vel qualitatis, vel alicuius huiusmodi. 4

Dicendum quod si genus consideratur physice corruptibilia et incorruptibilia non sunt in eodem genere propter diversam modum potentiae in eis, ut dicitur X. Meta., Text 26. Secundum autem logicam considerationem, est unum genus omnium corporum propter unam rationem corporeitatis. 5

Another example of this analogy given frequently by Aquinas is that of the "form in the agent and the form in the effect." 6 The notion of what is in the mind of the artist is the same as the notion of the thing realized, but the form existing in the mind of the artist has a different mode of being (esse) from the form existing in matter. Thus, although the notion of the material house is the same as the notion of the house in the mind of the builder, the two houses have a different being (esse).

The predication of "body" and "house" then is univocal from the logical point of view, but analogous from the ontological point of view.

Logic studies things as they are conceived by the mind and the mind can conceive them in the same way even when they are actually different. The predication is analogous from the physical standpoint because physics considers things as they are in themselves, as they actually are according to their mode of being and not as they are conceived. The physicist cannot bring under the same genus things which have different modes of being, such as the house in the mind of the artist and the house on the side of the street.

Another way of looking at this distinction is to note the difference in our manner of knowing and in the mode of existence itself. Species and genus are found nowhere in rerum naturae, but are universals and universally belong to essences only as they exist in the intellect. They are formed by intellectual abstraction, by which the species is considered without considering the individual differences, or the genus without considering the specific differences. The natures are considered within the intellect without the addition of differences, but they cannot be, they cannot exist in rerum natura, without the addition of the differences which are prescinded from by abstraction. And even in thought the nature must be conceived as capable of, or receptive of the additions by which they are contracted, either as to species or to the individual.

Animality when predicated of gnat means essentially the same as animality when predicated of elephant. That is, the generic perfection, as such, remains essentially unchanged when contracted to the species which share in the generic nature. Yet this does not mean that
among the several species there is not found a most perfect or a maximum. Among animals we are able to trace a hierarchy in the perfection of sentient life beginning with the amoeba and proceeding up an ascending scale to the maximum measure of sentient life, the rational animal. Other species within the genus are more or less perfect according as they approach the maximum measure. "All animals are equally animal, but not all are equal animals." 7

The essential trait of analogy according to being and not according to intention is, then, that a difference in being (esse) gives rise to a physical analogy even when the notions are logically the same. Difference in being is what counts in this analogy. In the analogy of inequality the notion is exactly the same but unequally participated in; it is realized according to different degrees. Corporeity is more noble in plant than in mineral. The notion unequally participated in is predicated according to priority and posteriority.

The potency-act grounding of the analogy of inequality is evident. The foundation of the analogy is the communicability of form. "It is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter." 8 Genus is form which defines and determines matter into species; species is form which defines and determines matter into individuals. As form-matter is a manifestation of potency-act, so is genus-species and species-individual. Another characteristic of the potency-act principle found in analogy of inequality is the hierarchical scheme, in which there is an ascending

scale of species. Aquinas himself hints at the hierarchial scheme involved in the analogy of inequality in the following passage:

Facit autem mentionem de univocatione, quia quandoque contingit quod effectus non pervenit ad similitudinem causae secundum eandem rationem speciei, propter excellentiam ipsius causae. Sicut sol est causa caloris in istis inferioribus: non tamen inferiora corpora possunt recipere impressionem soli aut aliorum caelestium corporum secundum eandem rationem speciei, cum non communicent in materia. Et propter hoc non dicimus solem esse calidissimum. Nomen autem veritatis non est proprium alicui speciei, sed se habet communiter ad omnia entia. Unde, quia illud quod est causa veritatis, est causa communicans cum effectu in nomine et ratione communi, sequitur quod illud, quod est posterioribus causa ut sint vera, sit verissimum. 9

In addition, there is in this analogy a participation of the species in the genus, the species being obviously deficient from the genus in varying degrees. "What is predicated of many univocally by participation, belongs to each one of them of which it is predicated; for species is said to participate the genus, and the individual the species." There is also exemplarism, for the species strive to imitate the genus, animality, in whatever way they can.

The analogy of inequality, as a demonstration of the potency-act principle upon which analogy is built, is a proper metaphysical analogy. In addition, it exemplifies the likeness within difference characteristic of analogy. There is an imperfect objective similitude involved in this analogy, for the species, though imperfect imitations of the genus, do maintain some likeness to it. Since act must find some likeness in the potency in order to be received, the species could not have come about unless they bore some common likeness to


10. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Caput 32, Opera Omnia, Vol. 12, pp. 41-42.
the genus. As far apart as they are, the gnat and the elephant nevertheless retain and share some minimum basic characteristics of the genus, animality. With this similitude there is also difference; the integrity of each species is maintained. The gnat and the elephant are basically different as regards their being; each manifests animality under different existences and to a greater or lesser degree.

It is true that the analogy of inequality is not considered by Aquinas to be applicable to the relation between God and creature. This he makes clear in the following passage:

Ad quartum dicendum quod substantiae immaterialis createae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae; conveniunt tamen cum eis in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immaterialis sunt in praedicamento substantialis, cum earum quodditas non sit earum esse. Sed Deus non conveit, cum rebus materialibus neque secundum genus naturale, neque secundum genus logicum, quia Deus nullo modo est in genere, ut supra dictum est. Unde per similitudines rerum materialium aliquid affirmative potest cognosci de angelis secundum rationem communes, dicet non secundum rationem speciei; de Deo autem nullo modo. 11

The analogy of inequality is a true metaphysical analogy which enables Aquinas to speak more adequately of the complexity of likenesses and differences within the created world, such as those involved in the distinction between the corruptible and the incorruptible. Indeed, the analogy of inequality enables us, from our knowledge of material things, to know something about the angels.

What, then, about the analogy which Cajetan calls "analogy of attribution?" This is analogy secundum intentionem et non secundum esse in which the analogates have a common name, but each analogate

has a different relationship to this term. Cajetan identifies this analogy with the example of the term "healthy" predicated of medicine, urine, and animal. Health exists properly only in animal, and is applied to the other two analogates by virtue of the relationship obtaining between them and the primary analogate (animal). Medicine is a cause of health and urine is a sign of health. Cajetan maintains this analogy to be one of extrinsic denomination only because the name in the analogy does not have one definite meaning common to all analogates. It signifies distinctly or quasi-distinctly the primary analogate and only confusedly the secondary analogates.

It was shown in the first chapter, however, that serious question can be raised in regard to the branding of the analogy of attribution as one of extrinsic denomination only. A number of texts were examined in which Aquinas seemed to be speaking of an analogy of attribution in which intrinsic denomination was involved. For example, in the following passage from *Compendium Theologiae*, Thomas discusses, in attribution terminology, intrinsic analogous perfections possessed, according to priority and posteriority, by both God and creatures.

Quod nomina de Deo et aliis rebus dicta non omnino univoce, nec aequivoce dicuntur. Tertium est quod nomina de Deo et aliis rebus dicta, non omnino univoce, nec omnino aequivoce dicuntur. Univoce namque dici non possunt, cum definitio ejus quod de creatura dicitur, non sit definitio ejus quod dicitur de Deo. Oportet autem univoce dictorum eandem definitionem esse, similiorem autem nec omnino aequivoce. In his enum quae sunt a casu aequivoce, idem nomen imponitur uni rei, nullo habito respectu ad rem aliam, unde per unum non potest rationcinari de alio. Hae autem nomina quae dicuntur de Deo, et de aliis rebus, attribuuntur Deo secundum aliquem ordinem quem habet ad istas res, in quibus intellectus significata eorum considerat, unde per alias res ratiocinari de Deo possimus. Non igitur omnino aequivoce dicuntur ista de Deo et de

aliis rebus, sicut ea quae sunt a casu aequivoce. Dicuntur igitur secundum analogiam, id est secundum proportionem ad unum. Ex eo enim quod alias res comparamus ad Deum sicut ad suam primam originem, hujusmodi nomina quae significant perfectiones aliarum rerum, Deo attribuimus. Ex quo patet quod, licet quantum ad nominis impositionem hujusmodi nomine per prius de creaturis dicantur, eo quod ex creaturis intellectus nomina imponens ascendit in Deum, tamen, secundum rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo, a quo perfectiones descendunt in alias res. 12

Further evidence for the intrinsic quality of the analogy of attribution is Thomas' consistent application of this analogy to express the community of relation existing between substance and accidents as beings.

Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ei quod proprie et vere habet esse vel est. Et sic attribuitur soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quod vere est, dicitur substantiae in I. Phys. Omnia vero quae non per se subsistunt sed in illo et cum alic, sive sunt accidentia, sive formae substantiales, aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsa vere sint, sed attributur eis esse alicio modo, idest ut quo aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album. 13

Et propter hoc huiusmodi dicuntur analoga, quia proportionantur ad unum. Et similiter est de multiplicate entis. Nam ens simpliciter dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia. Alia vero dicuntur entia, quia sunt huius quod per se est, vel passio, vel habitus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Non enim qualitas dicitur ens, quia ipsa habet esse, sed per eam substantia dicitur esse disposita. Et similiter est de aliis accidentibus. Et propter hoc dicit quod sunt entis. Et sic patet quod multiplicitas entis habet aliquid commune, ad quod fit reductio. 14


The analogical community existing between substance and accident is a relation of one to another, of the prior to the posterior. Substance is that whose nature is to be in itself, whereas accident is that whose nature is to be in another, that is, in substance. There is a direct and mutual relationship or proportion between substance and accidents. They are related in an intrinsic analogy of attribution, for that which is predicated (being) belongs directly to each of the analogates.

Another indication that Thomas includes an intrinsic analogy of attribution within his system is the fact that he uses this analogy in speaking of the most important of metaphysical and theological relations, the relation between God and creature. Cajetan would hold that proportion or attribution could not be used in this manner because proportion implies a measured or limited distance which would threaten the sovereignty and supereminence of God. Thomas, however, had already dealt with Cajetan's objection and had given answer to it. In an important passage in the Commentary to the Sentences, he deals with the objection that human intellect cannot know God because there is no proportion between finite and infinite. His answer is twofold according to the two different meanings which the term "proportion" has. If "proportion" is used in its original mathematical connotation of a definite relation of one quantity to another, as when we say that four is twice as much in proportion to two, then it is true that there is no proportion between finite and infinite because the distance of the infinite from the finite is unlimited. If, however, the term "proportion" is used in a wider meaning of any relation of similarity
between two things, as when one says that there is a proportion between matter and form, then one may be justified in saying that there is a proportion between finite and infinite. The passage is as follows:

Praetera, cum intelligibile sit perfectio intellectus, oportet esse proportionem aliquid inter intellectum et intelligibile, visibile et visum. Sed non est accipere proportionem aliquid inter intellectum nostrum et essentiam divinam, cum in infinitum distent. Ergo intellectus noster non potest pertingere ad essentiam divinam videndam. Ad sextum dicendum quod quamvis finiti ad infinitum non posset esse proportio, quia excessus infiniti supra finitum non est determinatus; potest tamen esse inter ea proportionalitas quae est similitudo proportionum; sic enim finitum aequatur aliqui finito, ita infinito infinitum. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid totaliter cognoscatur, quandoque oportet esse proportionem inter cognoscens et cognitum; quia oportet virtutem cognoscentis adequari cognoscibilitati rei cognitae; aequalitas autem proportio quaedam est. Sed quandoque cognoscibilitas rei excedit virtutem cognoscentis; sicut cum nos cognoscimus Deum, aut e custodio, sicut cum ipse cognoscit creaturas; et tunc non oportet esse proportionem inter cognoscentem et cognitum, sed proportionalitatem tantum; ut scilicet sicut se habet cognoscens ad cognoscendum ita se habeat cognoscibile ad hoc quod cognoscatur, et talis proportionalitas sufficit ad hoc quod infinitum cognoscitur a finito, et e converso. Vel dicendum, quod proportio secundum primam nominis institutionem significat habitudinem quantitatis ad quantitatem secundum aliquem determinatum excessum vel aequationem; sed ulterius et translatum ad significandum omnem habitudinem cujuscumque aliud; et per hunc modum dicimus quod materia debet esse proportionata ad formam; et hoc modo nihil prohibet intellectum nostrum, quamvis est finitus, dici proportionatum ad videndum essentiam infinitam; non tamen ad comprehendendum eam; et hoc propert suam immensitatem. 15

De Veriate 23, 7, ad. 9 also makes this distinction between two types of proportion. In answer to the objection that since man is infinitely distant from God, there can be no proportion between him and God, Aquinas points out that there is no doubt that man is

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15. Aquinas, Thomas, IV Sententiarum, d. 49, Q. 2, ad. 1, ad. 6, Opera Omnia, Vol. 11, p. 485.
conformed to God since he is made to God's image and likeness. He then goes on to determine the nature of this conformity. It cannot be considered as a direct measurable proportion, but it can be understood as an indefinite proportion. Thomas writes:

Dicendum quod homo conformatur Deo, cum sit ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus. Quamvis autem propter hoc quod a Deo infinitum distat, non possit esse ipsius ad Deum proportio, secundum quod proportio proprie in quantitatis invenitur, comprehendens duarum quantitatum ad invicem comparatarum certam mensuram; secundum tamen quod nomen proportionis translatum est ad quamlibet habituidinem significandam unius rei ad rem aliæm, utpote cum dicimus hic esse proportionem similitudinem, sicut se habet princeps ad civitatem, ita gubernator ad navim; nihil prohibet dicere aliquam proportionem hominis ad Deum, cum in aliqua habituidine ipsum ad se habeat, utpote ab eo effectus, et ei subjectus. 16

Two other passages are relevant to the discussion at this point. First, in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas speaks again of two proportions, one which is a determinate measure of two quantities. This is only applicable to finite things. Proportion, however, as a relationship of order (matter-form) (cause-effect) can be applied to the relation between God and creatures. The passage is as follows:

Ad tertium dicendum, quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo idem est proportio quod certitudo mensurationis duarum quantitatum; et talis proportio non potest esse nisi duorum finitorum, quorum unum alterum excedit secundum aliquid certum et determinatum. Alio modo dicitur proportio habitudo ordinis. Sicut dicimus esse proportionem inter materiam et formam, quia se habet in ordine, ut perfeciat materia per formam, et hoc secundum proportionabilitatem quamdam: quia sicut forma potest dare esse, ita materia potest recipere idem esse: et hoc modo etiam movens et motum debent esse proportionabilia, et agentes et patiens, ut seilicit sicut agentes potest imprimer aliæm effectum, ita patiens possit recipere eundem. Nec oportet ut commensurate potentia passiva recipentis ad potentiam activam agentis; nec

secundum numerum, sicut unus artifex per artem suam potest inducere plures formae, ut formam arcae et formam servae; sed lignum non potest recipere nisi unam illarum; nec etiam secundum intentionem: quia artifex per artem suam potest producere pulchram sculpturam, quam tamen lignum nodosum non potest pulchram recipere. Et ideo non est in conveniens ut hic modus proportionis inter Deum, et creaturam salvetur, quamvis in infinitum distent et ideo possibilis est ino utriusque. 17

In a passage in Boethius de Trinitate, Aquinas makes it clear that the kind of attribution or proportion proper to express the relation of creature and God is causal, the proportion of effect to Cause, one to another. He writes:

Dicendum quod proprie nihil aliud est, quam habitudo duorum ad invicem convenientium in aliquo, secundum hoc quod convenient aut differunt. Possunt autem intelligi esse convenientia dupliciter. Uno modo ex hoc, quod convenient in eodem genere quantitatis aut qualitatis, sicut habitudo superficie ad superficiem, aut numeri ad numerum, in quantum unum excedit alius aut aequalis ei, vel etiam caloris ad calorem, et sic nullo modo potest esse alicum proportio inter Deum et creaturam, cum non conveniant in aliquo genere. Alio modo possunt intelligi convenientia, ita quod conveniant in aliquo ordine, et sic attenditur proportio inter materiam et formam, faciens et factum, et talis proportio requiritur inter cognoscentem, et cognoscibile: cum cognoscibile sit quasi actus potentiae cognoscentis, et sic etiam est proportio creaturae ad Deum ut causati, ad causam, et cognoscentis ad cognoscibile, sed secundum infinitum excelsam creaturam super creaturam, non est proportio creaturae ad creatorem, ut recipiat influentiam ejus secundum totam virtutem ejus, neque ut ipsum perfecte cognoscat, sicut ipse seipsum perfecte cognoscit. 18

In Aquinas' thought the analogy of attribution is a proper instrument for enabling man to speak of God and of the relationship between Him and creature. It is, in fact, the tool which lets man predicate the divine names.


In the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas takes up the question of speaking about God. There he shows that since creatures are related to God as effects to their cause, one can be led from them to a knowledge of God, which includes knowing whether He exists, and what must necessarily belong to Him as the First Cause of all things which exceeds its effects. The text is as follows:

Respondeo dicendum, quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit. Unde tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, in quantum manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere quod divinam essentiam videat; quia creaturae sensibles sunt effectus, Dei virtutem non adaequantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec ejus essentia videri. Sed quia sunt effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci possimus ut cognoscamus, de Deo an est, et ut cognoscamus de ipso quae necesse et ei convenire, secundum quod est prae omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata. 19

This text reveals one of St. Thomas' basic approaches to the analogy between God and creatures. Creatures resemble God because they are proportioned to Him as effects to their cause. Attribution does offer one simple way of describing the similarity which obtains between God and creatures as a result of the creatures' relationship to their First Cause.

Thomas also deals with the question of how it is possible to talk about God and to give Him any name if all our language is taken from creatures, which are neither part of God nor His adequate image. He argues that since we know God from creatures and as their cause, we can name Him from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. He writes:

Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiae, et remotionis. 

What, then, is the meaning of the words we apply to God? The fact that we name God by means of creatures is no justification for holding the view that by the divine names we signify merely the relationship towards creatures. By the words "God is good" we do not merely mean God is the cause of goodness in things. This would be extrinsic denomination. By the name "good" we express God so far as our intellect knows Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. But since creatures represent Him imperfectly, the name "good" signifies God in an imperfect manner.

Et ideo alter dicendum est, quod hujusmodi quiden, nomina significant substantiam divinam, et praedicantu de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius. Quod sic potet, significant enim sic nomina Deum secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum representant. Ostensum est autem supra, quod Deus in se praehabet omnes perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter perfectius. Unde quaelibet creaturae in tantum eum repraesentat, et est ci similis, in quantum perfectionem aliquam habet; non tamen ita quod reprehendent eum sicut aliquid ejusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cujus forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen alialqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut formae corporum inferiorum representant virtutem solarem. Et hoc supra expositum est, cum de perfectione divina agebatur. Sic igitur praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen, sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam representant. Cum igitur dicitur, Deus est bonus, non est sensus; Deus est causa bonitatis, vel: Deus non est malus; sed est sensus: id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod Deo competat esse bonum in quantum causat bonitatem, sed potius e conversio, quia est bonus, bonitatem rebus diffundit.

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Divine names are not predicated of God by extrinsic denomination. They predicate of God perfections which belong to Him formally, but they signify these perfections in an imperfect way. Therefore with respect to divine names two aspects ought to be distinguished: (1) The perfection signified, and (2) The mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly apply to God, for their mode of signification applies to creatures. Thus Thomas writes:

Quantum igitur ad id quod significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo: habent enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit. 22

Thomas also deals with the crucial problem of the nature of the predication of the divine names. He argues that theological language is analogous. The passage is as follows:

Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem, Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus: vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina inquantum hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa: vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut dicitur de medicine et animali, in quantum medicine est causa sanitatis, quae est in animali. Et hoc modi, aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque pure univoce. Non enim possimus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc quod dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordine creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam in quae praexistent excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones.

Et ita ista modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim

22. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I., Q. 13, art. 3c, Opera Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 90.
What Aquinas is concerned to do here is to find a mode of analogy which safeguards God's absoluteness and uniqueness, even when language taken from creatures is applied to Him. Aquinas in this case uses the analogy of one to another, or the analogy of attribution as suitable to this task. By ascribing to God the position of primary analogate it guarantees His priority and eminence over His creatures.

One must not be confused in this passage with the example Thomas uses to illustrate the analogy of attribution, that of "health" said of medicine and animal. Cajetan would argue that "healthy" is predicated extrinsically of the secondary analogates (diet, color, medicine) and intrinsically only of the healthy body. Here, however, it is evident that the ground for the analogy between healthy medicine and healthy bodies lies in the causal relation between medicine and organic body: medicine is the cause of health in the organic body. The relation of cause and effect, such as has been seen, is an analogous one, for the effects always retain some similarity to their cause. Thomas would argue that this similarity between cause and effect holds for the predication of the names of absolute perfections of both God and His creatures. The analogous predication of these names is in fact based metaphysically on the relation of efficient causality between God and creatures and thus the perfections are said of both God and creatures intrinsically, though analogously.

In Chapter 34 of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book I, Aquinas also asserts that names are said of God and creatures analogically. There he explains that by analogous predication he understands a predication "according to an order or reference to something one." (secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquod unum). He then distinguishes between two modes of analogous predication: (1) analogy of many to one, and (2) analogy of one to another. He writes:

Sic igitur ex dictis relinquitur quod ea quae de Deo et rebus aliis dicuntur, praedicantur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice: hoc est, secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquid unum.

Quod quidem dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, secundum quod multa habent respectum ad aliquid unum: sicut secundum respectum ad unam sanatatem animal dicitur sanum ut eius subiectum, medicine ut eius effectivum, cibus ut conservativum, urina ut signum.

Alio modo, secundum quod duorum attenditur ordo vel respectus, non ad aliquid alterum, sed ad unum ipsorum: sicut ens de substantia et accidente dicitur secundum quod accidens ad substantiam respectum habent, non quod substantia et accidens ad aliquid tertium referantur.

Huiusmodi ergo nomina de Deo et rebus aliis non dicuntur analogice secundum primum modum, oportet enim aliquid Deo ponere prius: sed modo secundo. 24

In the remaining section of this chapter in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas recalls the distinction between the mode of signification and the perfection signified by a name. Then he concludes that because we come to a knowledge of God from other things, the reality in the name said of God and other things belongs by priority in God according to His mode of being, but the meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority. God is, in this sense, said to be named from His effects. The passage is as follows:

In huiusmodi autem analogice praedicatone, ordo attenditur idem secundum nomen et secundum rem quandoque, quandoque vero non idem. Nam ordo nominis sequitur ordinem cognitionis: quia est signum intelligibilis conceptionis. Quando igitur id quod est prius secundum rem, inventur etiam cognitione, prius, idem inventur prius et secundum nominis rationem et secundum rei naturam. Sic substantiae est prior accidente: natura, in quantum substantia est causa accidentis ponitur. Et ideo ens dicitur prius de substantia quam de accidente et secundum rei naturam et secundum nominis rationem. Quando vero illud, quod est prius secundum naturam, est posterius secundum cognitionem, tunc in analogicis non est idem ordo secundum rem et secundum nominis rationem; sicut virtus sanandi quae est in sanativis, prior est naturaliter sanitate quae est in animali, sicut causa effectu. Sed, quia hanc virtutem per effectum cognoscimus, ideo etiam ex effectu nominamus. Et inde est, quod sanativum est prius ordine rei, sed animal dicitur per prius sanum secundum nominis rationem.

Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius, unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis.25

Here again it is evident that it is the analogy of attribution, in its form of one to another, that is used to predicate intrinsically both of God and creatures the names of absolute perfections.

In the De Potentia, Aquinas shows that the analogy between God and creatures rests on two principles: (1) creatures are effects of God's agency; (2) there is some kind of similarity or analogy between cause and effect(s). Because creatures are images of God, man can know Him. But since creatures are only imperfect images of God, man can know Him only imperfectly. Therefore, although these terms which our intellect attributes to God from such conceptions signify the divine essence, they do not signify it perfectly as it is in itself, but as it is conceived by us. Accordingly, we conclude that

each of these terms signifies the divine essence, not comprehensively, but imperfectly. A sharp distinction must be made between the mode of signification and the thing signified. The thing signified may be attributed to God, but the mode of signification must be denied.

Thus Thomas writes:

Cum omne agens agat in quantum actu est, et per consequens agat aliquid simile, oportet formam facti aliquo modo esse in agente: diversimodo tamen: quia quando effectus adaequat virtutem agentis, oportet quod secundum eadem rationem sit illa forma in faciente et in facto; tunc enim faciens et factum coincidunt in idem specie, quod contingit in omnibus univocis; homo enim generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Quando vero effectus non adaequat virtutem agentis, forma non est secundum eadem rationem in agente et facto, sed in agente eminentus; secundum enim quod est in agente habet agens virtutem ad producendum effectum. Unde se tota virtus agentis non exprimitur in facto, relinquitur quod modus quo forma est in agente excedit modum quo est in facto. Et hoc videmus in omnibus agentibus eavimformis, sicut cum sol generat ignem.

... Nulla ergo forma alicuius effectus divini, est per eadem rationem qua est in effectu, in Deo: nihilominus oportet quod sit ibi per quaedam modum altior: et inde est quod omnes formae quae sunt in diversis effectibus distinctae et diversae ad invicem, in eo uniusur sicut in una virtute communi, sicut etiam omnes formae per virtutem solidis in istis inferioribus productae sunt in sole secundum unicum ejus virtutem, cui omnia generata per actionem solidis secundum suas formas similiarii. Et similiter perfectiones rerum creatarum assimilantur Deo secundum unicum et simplicem essentiam ejus. 26

(Ea nomina) Deo autem conveniunt sublimior mal ...

Rursum quia sapientia non negatur de Deo quia ipse deficiat a sapientia, sed quia supereminentius est in ipso ... quam dicatur aut intelligatur ideo oportet dicere aut intelligatur, ideo oportet dicere quod Deus sit supersapiens. 27

This view is not to be confused with Maimonides' theory of negative predication. Maimonides excludes all affirmative predications


with regard to God. Aquinas excludes affirmative predicates only with regard to the mode of signification, but with regard to things signified, if they are names of absolute perfections, they are properly predicated of God.

One may ask what we can know of God in this way, but Aquinas is very clear on this point:

... illud est ultimum cognitionis humane de Deo quod sciat de Deum nescire inquantum cognoscit, illud quod Deo est, omne ipsum quod de Deo intelligimus, excedere. 28

In a passage in De Potentia, Aquinas again speaks of absolute perfections predicated of God and creatures by means of the analogy of attribution. Here, however, he makes a distinction between two modes of the analogy of attribution: (1) two with respect to a third (or many to One); and (2) one to another. The former mode of attribution is rejected as a proper analogy to speak about God. It is thus disqualified because in this analogy the two analogates, God and creatures, would be referred to a third term, meaning that something prior to God would have to be posited. The analogy of attribution in the form of one to another, however, is regarded by Aquinas as quite proper for the predicating of perfections of God and creatures. The latter mode of the analogy of attribution is able to safeguard God’s uniqueness and pre-eminence; the former mode would degrade Him to the level of other beings and would subject Him to the categories of His creatures. The passage is as follows:

Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod de Deo et creatura nihil praedicetur univoce; non tempore ea quae communiter praedicantur, pureaequivocepraedicantur, sed analogice. Huius autem praedicationis duplex est modus. Unus quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad

aliquod tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad substantiam. Alius modus est quod aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate. In primo autem modo praedicacionis oportet esse aliquid prius duobus ad quod ambo respectum habent, sicut substantia ad quantitatem et qualitatem in secundo autem non, sed necesse est unum esse prius altero. Et ideo cum Deo nihil sit prius, sed ipse sit prior creatura competit in divina praedicatione secundus modus analogiae, et non primus. 29

In Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 54, the analogy of attribution in its mode of one to another is used to describe the relation between human intellect and divine intellect.

Proportio autem intellectus creati est quidem ad Deum intelligendum non secundum commensurationem aliquam proportione existente, sed secundum quod proportion significat quacumque habitudinem unius ad alterum, ut materiae ad formam, vel causae ad effectum. Sic autem nihil prohibet esse proportionem creaturae ad Deum secundum habitudinem intelligentis ad intellectum, sicut et secundum habitudinem effectus ad causam. 30

A similar passage in De Veritate also uses the analogy of attribution in the mode of one to another to describe that proportion of the created intellect to the sight of the divine essence.

Dicendum quod proportio, proprioe loquendo, nihil est aliud quam habitudo quantitatis ad quantitatem, sicut quod aequalis sit una alteri, vel tripla; et exinde transitum est nomen proportionis, ut habitudo cuiuslibet ad rem alterum proportio nominetur; sicut dicitur materia esse proportionata formae inquantum se habet ad formam ut materia eius, non considerata aliqua habitudine quantitatis. Et similiter intellectus creatus est proportionatus ad videndum divinam essentiam, inquantum se habet ad ipsum quodammodo ut ad formam intelligibiliem; quamvis secundum quantitatem virtutis nulla possit esse proportio, propter distantiam infinitum. 31


Concerning the second mode of the analogy of attribution, that of many to one or two to a third, the texts indicate that Thomas did not use this to speak of the relation between God and creatures because it might threaten God's transcendence. This, however, does not mean that this form of analogy is not properly metaphysical. Its precise nature needs to be clarified. In the *Commentary to the Sentences*, Aquinas says that science may be predicated analogically of both God and creatures, but there are two kinds of analogy: (1) A term may be predicated of two things because they have in common a *tertium quid*, which is predicated of them according to priority and posteriority; (2) A term may be predicated of two things which are similar since one is the image, i.e., the perfect imitation of the other. Terms like "science" are predicated of God and creatures only according to the second mode of analogy. The analogy of attribution in its second mode involves a third term predicated of the analogates according to priority and posteriority. Such an analogy, of course, could not be used in reference to God, for, as indicated previously, it would necessitate a positing of something prior to God. The passage in the *Sentences* is as follows:

Et ideo dicendum, quod scientia analogice dicitur de Deo et creatura, et similiter omnia huiusmodi. Sed duplex est analogia. Quaedam secundum convenientiam in aliquo uno quod eis per prius et posterius convenit; et haec analogia non potest esse inter Deum et creaturam, sicut nec univocatio. Alia analogia est, secundum quod unum imitatur alius quantum posse, nec perfecte ipsum assequitur; et haec analogia est creaturae ad Deum. 32

In another passage in the *Sentences*, Aquinas speaks of the analogy of two to a third according to priority and posteriority and the analogy of imitation. He writes:

Ad secundum dicendum, quod Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse duplex. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis et similiter substantiae et accident; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur. 33

It would seem that predication according to priority and posteriority is a distinctive characteristic of the analogy of two to a third, but not of the analogy of one to another, or of imitation. However, in later texts, Thomas does include predication according to priority and posteriority as part of the analogy of one to another. Klubertanz has noted this terminological shift of the phrase *per prius et posteriorius* and his explanation regarding it is satisfactory:

In those texts in which it is accepted, the expression seems to mean only that a perfection possessed by God in a more perfect manner and according to (causal) priority is shared by creatures in a less perfect manner and only consequently upon that possession by God. In those texts where it is rejected it implies that both God and creatures share in some common perfection which is somehow distinct from both and prior to both. 34

It is because the analogy of two to a third includes a distinct and prior third term, and not because it is predication according to priority and posteriority, that it is rejected for speaking about the


relation between God and creatures.

Aquinas supplies two examples for the analogy of two to a tertium quid: (1) The sharing of both act and potency in being; and (2) the sharing of both substance and accident in being. Both clearly indicate that this analogy is metaphysical and ontologically grounded in the metaphysical principle of potency-act. The second mode of attribution, however, is more commonly expressed as many to one rather than two to a third. Its most familiar example is that of "healthy" as predicated of animal, medicine, food and urine. Consider the following passage:

Proporzione vero vel analogia sunt unum quaecumque in hoc conveniunt, quod hoc se habet ad illud sicut aliud ad aliud. Et hoc quidem potest accipi duobus modis, vel in eo quod aliqua duo habent diversa habitudines ad unum; sicut sanativum de urina dictum habitudinem significat signi sanitatis; de medicina vero, quia significat habitudinem causa respectu eiusdem, vel in eo quod est eadem proportio duorum ad diversa; sicut tranquillitatis ad mare et serenitatis ad aeram. Tranquillitas enim est quies maris et serenitas aeris. 35

In this analogy "healthy" exemplifies the analogy which exists between medicine, food, and urine because of their relation to the same end, the healthy body. Involved in this analogy is the priority-posteriority relationship with the primary analogate, animal, being the prior meaning of healthy, and healthy being said of medicine, urine, and food only secondarily. This priority-posteriority relationship implies a relationship to the potency-act principle. One might think of it in terms of genus-species or species-individual. Healthy would be the species, and urine, animal, food and medicine the various individuals exemplifying the species, though imperfectly and in a

hierarchial scale. There is causality involved in the sense of final causality -- food, medicine, and urine working in some way toward a healthy body. Then, too, although health is not in medicine, urine, and food in the way it is in animal, they possess some form or perfection which makes one the cause, the other the sign, and the third a preserver of health.

In his Commentary to the Metaphysics, Aquinas speaks of three different modes of the analogy of many to one: (1) Analogy of many through different relations to one end, e.g., "healthy" is predicated of diet, medicine, and urine because of their different relations to the same end, the health of the animal; (2) Analogy of many through different relations to one efficient cause, e.g., "medicative" is predicated of medicine and medical instruments through their different relations to the same efficient cause, the physician; (3) Analogy of many through different relations to one subject, e.g., "being" is predicated of various kinds of accidents because of their different relations to the same subject, substance. The passage is as follows:

Item secundum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicitur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod est solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura. Et hoc patet in exemplis infra positis. Ponit enim primo unum exemplum, quando multa comparantur ad unum sicut ad finem, sicut patet de hoc nomine senativum vel salubre. Sanativum enim non dicitur univoce de diaeta, medicine, urina et animali. Nam ratio sani secundum quod dicitur de diaeta consistit in conservando sanitatem. Secundum vero quod dicitur de medicina, in faciendo sanitatem. Prout vero dicitur de urina, est signum sanitatis.
Secundum vero quod dicitur de animali, ratio eius est, quoniam est receptivum vel susceptivum sanitatis. Sic igitur omne sanativum vel sanum dicitur ad sanitatem unam et eadem. Eadem enim est sanitas quam animal suscipit, urina significat, medicine facit, et daeta conservat.


Et sicut est de praedictis, ita etiam et ens multipliciter dicitur. Sed tamen omne ens dicitur per respectum ad unum primum. Sed hoc primum non est finis vel efficens sicut in praemissis exemplis, sed subiectum. Alia enim dicuntur entia vel esse, quae per se habent esse sicut substantiae, quae principaliter et prius entia dicuntur. Alia vero quia sunt passiones sive proprietates substantiae, sicut per se accidentia unius cuiusque substantiae. Quaedam autem dicuntur entia, quia sunt via ad substantiam, sicut generationes et motus. Alia autem entia dicuntur, quia sunt corruptiones substantiae. Corruptio enim est via ad non esse, sicut generatio via ad substantiam.

Et quia corruptio terminatur ad privationem sicut generatio ad formam, conveniuntur ipsae etiam privationes formarum substantialium esse dicuntur. Et iterum qualitates vel accidentia quaedam dicuntur entia quia sunt activa vel generativa substantiae, vel eorum quae secundum aliquid habitudinem praedicatarum ad substantiam dicuntur, vel secundum quamque alim. Item negationes eorum quae ad substantiam habitudinem habent, vel etiam ipsius substantiae esse dicuntur. Unde dicimus quod non ens est non ens. Quod non diceretur nisi negationi aliquo modo esse competenter. 36

It is evident that the analogy of attribution is an important part of Thomas' metaphysical system. One of the basic approaches to

the analogy between God and creatures is that of the analogy of attribution in its form of one to another. Creatures resemble God because they are proportioned to Him as effects to their cause. The basis of this form of the analogy of attribution is efficient causality. It is founded upon the doctrine of creation, which is itself a theological expression of the metaphysical principle of potency-act. As for the two to a third or many to one mode of the analogy of attribution, it is also based upon this principle. Thomas uses the sharing of potency-act in being as an example of this mode of analogy as well as that of substance-accident. The many to one form demonstrates the causal principle which itself is a manifestation of the potency-act principle. The analogy of attribution is a proper metaphysical analogy, ontologically grounded in the potency-act principle.

Turning to the third type of analogy which Cajetan calls analogy of proper proportionality, it may be noted that he identifies this with the analogy according to intention and being, the last of the analogies enumerated by Aquinas in I. Sententiarum. Cajetan defines this analogy as one in which several things have a common name and the notion expressed by the name is proportionally the same. He gives the example of "vision" when predicated of the eye and of the intellect. Cajetan recognizes this analogy as the only properly metaphysical one. He writes:

This analogy excels above the others mentioned above both by dignity and by name. By dignity because it arises from the genus of inherent formal causality, for it predicates perfections that are inherent to each analogate, whereas the other analogy arises

37. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, p. 3.
from extrinsic denomination. It excels above the others by name, because only terms which are analogous by this type of analogy are called analogous by the Greeks from whom we borrowed the term. 38

Analysis of the Thomistic texts shows that Cajetan's claim for the analogy of proper proportionality is not textually supported. Aquinas held other analogies to be intrinsic, as well as properly metaphysical. This has already been demonstrated to be true of the analogy of inequality and the analogy of attribution. What, then, of Cajetan's identification of the analogy of proper proportionality with the analogy secundum intentionem et secundum esse? Aquinas defines this analogy as one in which a common element exists in each one of the things of which it is predicated, but this element differs according to a higher or lesser degree of perfection. His example is that of "being" when predicated of substance and accident. 39

Comparing this definition with that of Cajetan, the only common element in both definitions seems to be that in both the predication is made according to intrinsic denomination in all analogates. The conclusion that the two analogies in question (proper proportionality and analogy according to intention and according to being) are the same is valid only on the assumption that intrinsic denomination of all analogates is found only in analogy of proportionality and in no other mode of analogy. This assumption, however, is not textually supported. There is similarity between these two analogies, but not a sufficient one to authorize the conclusion that they are the same mode of analogy.

38. Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, p. 27.
Actually, as has been previously indicated, the analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse* is really the analogy of attribution.

First of all, the characteristic of being predicated according to degrees of perfection is neither for Aquinas nor for Cajetan a distinct characteristic of analogy of proportionality; where something is formally predicated of each analogate according to its own nature without reference to any higher or lesser degree of perfection. It is, indeed, more characteristic of the analogy of attribution. Secondly, looking at Aquinas' example for this analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse*, it is that of "being" predicated of substance and accident. This is the example used frequently by Thomas as an illustration of the analogy of attribution.

Cajetan, believing the analogy of proper proportionality to be the only analogy in which predication takes place according to intrinsic denomination in all analogates, mistakenly identified the analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse* in the *Sententiarum* with the analogy of proper proportionality. Despite this mistaken identification, however, Cajetan's claim for the analogy of proper proportionality is not entirely wrong; Aquinas did hold it to be a true and proper metaphysical analogy.

The main textual passages from which the Cajetanians draw this analogy of proper proportionality are in *De Veritate*. In *De Veritate*, Q. 2, art. 11c, Aquinas makes several interesting distinctions regarding proportion and proportionality. First, he notes the distinction between what he calls "determinate proportion" (which we have identified as the form of analogy of attribution known as two to a third) and proportionality. The passage reads:
Unde dicendum est quod nec omino univoce nec pure aequivoce nomen scientiae de scientiae Dei et nostra praedicatur; sed secundum analogiam, quod nihil est aliud dictu quam secundum proportionem. Convenientia enim secundum proportionem potest esse duplex; et secundum hoc duplex attenditur analogiae communitas. Est enim quaedam convenientia inter ipsa quorum est ad invicem proportio, eo quod habent determinatam distantiam vel aliam habitudinem ad invicem, sicut binarius cum unitate, eo quod est eius duplum; convenientia etiam quandoque attenditur duoorum ad invicem inter quae non sit proportio, sed similitudo duarum ad invicem proportionem, sicut senarius convenit cum quaternario ex hoc quod sicut senarius est duplum tenari, ita quaternarius binari. Primo ergo convenientia est proportionis, secundum autem proportionalitatis; unde et secundum modum primae convenientiae invenimus aliquid dictum de duobus quorum unum ad alterum habitudinem habet: sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente ex habitudine quam substantia et accidente habent; et sanum dicitur de urina et animali, ex eo quod urina habet aliquem similitudinem ad sanitatem animalis. Quandoque vero dicitur aliquid analogia analogice secundo modo convenientiae; sicut nomen visus dicitur de visu corporali et intellectu, eo quod sicut visus est in oculo, ita intellectus est in mente. Quae ergo in his quae primo modo analogice dicitur, oportet esse aliquam determinatam habitudinem inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune, impossible est aliquid per hanc modum analogice dici de Deo et creatura; quia nulla creatura habet talem habitudinem ad Deo per quam possit divina perfectio determinari. Sed in alio modo analogae nulla determinata habitudo attenditur inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune; et ideo secundum illum modum nihil prohibet aliquod nomen analogice dici de Deo et creatura.

Then he notes a distinction within proportionality itself.

Sed tamen hoc dupliciter contingit, quandoque enim illud nomen importat aliquid ex principali significantione, in quo non potest attendi convenientia inter Deum et creaturam, etiam modo praedicto; sicut est in omnibus quae symbolice de Deo dicuntur, ut cum dicitur leo, vel sol, vel aliquid hujusmodi; quia in horum definitione cadit materia, quae Deo attribuit non potest: quandoque vero nomen quod de Deo et creatura dicitur, nihil importat ex principali significato secundum quod non possit attendi praedictus

convenientia modus inter creaturam et Deum; sicut sunt omnia in quorum definitione non clauditur defectus, nec dependent a materia secundum esse, ut ens, bonum, et alia hujusmodi. 41

Again in De Veritate II, Art. 11, ad. 2, Aquinas distinguishes between the determinate proportion (analogy of two to a third) and proportionality.

Dicendum quod Philosophus ponit duplicem modum similitudinis. Unum quod invenitur in diversis generibus; et hoc attenditur secundum proportionem vel proportionalitatem; ut quando alterum se habet ad alterum sicut alius ad alius, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Alium modum in his quae sunt ejusdem generis, ut quando idem diversio inest. Similitudo autem non requirit comparisonem secundum determinatum habitudinem quae primo modo dicitur, sed solum quae secundo modo; unde non oportet quod primus modus similitudinis a Deo removeatur respectu creatura. 42

Proportionality has an indeterminate quality about it.

Dicendum quod similitudo quae attenditur ex eo quod aliqua duo participant unum, vel ex eo quod unum habet aptitudinem determinatum ad alius, ex qua scilicet ex uno alterum comprehendi possit per intellectum, diminuit distantiam; non autem similitudo quae est secundum convenientiam proportionum: talis enim similitudo similiter invenitur in multum vel parum distantibus; non enim est major similitudo proportionalitatis inter duo et unum, et sex et tria, quam inter duo et unum, et centum et quinquaginta. Et ideo infinita distantia creaturae ad Deum similitudinem praedictam non tollit. 43

In relation to the analogy of proper proportionality, there is an interesting and enlightening passage in Aquinas' commentary to Aristotle's Ethics. It is as follows:


42. Aquinas, Thomas, De Veritate, II, art. 11, Opera Omnia, Vol. 14, p. 374.

Aliquid dici de multis secundum diversas ratione contingit dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationes omnis diversas non habentes respectum ad unum. Et ista dicuntur aequivoce a casu, quia scilicet casu accidit quod unum nomen unus homo imposuit un rei, et alius alii rei, ut praecipue patet in diversis hominibus uno nomine nominatis. Alio modo unum nomen dicuntur de multis secundum rationes diversae non totaliter, sed in aliquo uno convenientes. Quandoque quidem in hoc quo referuntur ad unum est instrumentum militis, sicut gladius, vel quia est tegumentum eius sicut lorica, vel quia est vehiculum eius, sicut equus. Quandoque vero in hoc, quo referuntur ad unum finem sicut medicina dicitur sana, eo quod est factiva sanitatis, dicta vero eo quod est conservatia sanitatis, urina vero eo quod est sanitatis significativa. Quandoque secundum proportione diversae ad idem subiectum, sicut qualitas dicitur esse ens, quia est dispositio per se entis, idest substantiae, quantitas vero eo quod est mensura eiusdem, et sic de aliis, vel secundum unam proportionem ad diversa subjecta. Eamdem enim habent proportionem visus quo corpus, et intellectus ad animam. Unde sicut visus est potentia, organi corporalis ita etiam intellectus est potentia animae absque participatione corporis. Sic ergo dicit, quod bonum dicitur de multis, non secundum ratione penitus differentis, sicut accidit in his quae sunt a casu aequivoce, sed magis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem eamdem, inquantum omnia bona dependent ab ens primo bonitatis principio, vel inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Non enim voluit Aristoteles quod illud bonum separatum sit idea et ratio omni bonorum, sed principium et finis. Vel etiam dicuntur omnia bona magis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem eamdem, sicut visus est bonum corporis, et intellectus est bonum animae. Ideo hunc tertium modum praefert, quia accipitur secundum bonitatem inhaerentem rebus. Primo autem duo modi secundum bonitatem separatam, a quia non ita proprie alicud denominatur.

Here in this section of the commentary to the Ethics, Aquinas is dealing with the problem of the predication of names of absolute perfections with regard to creatures. How is the absolute perfection "good" predicated of creatures? Although creatures possess absolute perfections in different degrees, they all enjoy them independently and individually. The only mode of predication which thus can do justice to the intrinsic possession of absolute perfections by

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creatures is a mode of predication which ascribes perfections to them by formal possession.

Aquinas' concern here is different from that of the problem of the predication of names of absolute perfections with regard to God. In that case he sought modes of analogy which would not endanger God's absoluteness and thus chose the analogy of attribution, an analogy which could do justice to God's priority over His creatures, to His supereminence and uniqueness. God, in this case, is the primary analogate. In the case of the predication of names of absolute perfections with regard to creatures, Thomas needs to find a mode of analogy which will not threaten the ontological coexistence of creatures and yet which is capable of indicating the intrinsic possession of perfections like being and good by creatures. The analogy which Thomas chooses to indicate the proportional possession of absolute perfections by different creatures is the analogy of proper proportionality.

In his commentary to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Aquinas once again writes of the many to one form of the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proper proportionality. In this particular passage he is considering analogy as an ontological principle of unity. Things can be one by analogy in two ways: (1) through diverse proportions to one subject, e.g. urine as a sign of health and medicine as a cause of health are one through their different relations to the health of the animal's organism; (2) through one proportion to diverse subjects, e.g. the serenity of the air and the tranquillity of the sea are one with respect to calmness. The passage reads:
Proportione vero vel analogia sunt unum quaecumque in hoc conveniunt, quod hoc se habet ad illud sicut aliud ad aliud. Et hoc quidem potest accipi duobus modus, vel in eo quod aliquid duorum habent diversas habitudines ad unum; sicut sanatimum de urina dictum habituidinem significat signi sanitatis; de merdicina vero, quia significat habituidinem causse respectu eiusdem. Vel in eo quod est eadem proportio duorum ad diversa, sicut tranquillitas ad mare et serenitatis ad aerem. Tranquillitas enim est quies maris et serenitas aeris.45

The characteristics of the analogy of attribution are evident in the first example given in this passage. There is the primary analogate, possession of the analogon according to various degrees of perfections, and efficient and final causality. The characteristics of the analogy of proper proportionality are also seen in the second example. There is the absence of a primary analogate and possession according to various degrees of perfections. In place of the primary analogate, there is a relative perfection which has only a proportional unity, as it is realized in different ways. The analogous concept, being a proportional unity, can only express something proportionally common to the analogous thing. It says no more of one than of the other, only that the same is in all, indeterminately and proportionally. The proportions of the included analogous perfection are mutually independent, in contradistinction to the analogy of attribution where all depend on the primum analogatum. There is not, in the analogy of proper proportionality, any first term.

What is the metaphysical basis of the analogy of proper proportionality? It is rooted in the doctrine of potency-act. This analogy is based on the real distinction between essence and existence of every being, a distinction which is the result of potency-act.

This analogy also has its causal basis: the hierarchial structure of creation, in which a certain degree of *essentia* results in a certain degree of *esse* is a consequence of the order in which creation stands to God as its cause. The same applies to the proportional likeness between God and creation. That there is intrinsic correspondence in everything created is due to its being united in dependence on God as the creator.

The analogy of proper proportionality is metaphysically and ontologically grounded. This being true, what part does it play in illustrating the relation between God and creatures? In *De Veritate* II, art. 3, it is used to explain God's knowledge of creation and the knowledge of the blessed of God. The proportionality here is of greater or less degree of identity of proportions. There is absolute identity in the knowledge God has of things through regarding His own essence, and as regards the knowledge of the blessed of God there is identity in so far as the same object of knowledge is regarded.

In *De Veritate* 23, 7, ad. 9, Aquinas uses proportionality to describe how man's will can be made to conform to the will of God. In this passage he indicates that although the finite and the infinite cannot be proportioned, they can be proportionable, because the finite is equal to the finite just as the infinite is equal to the infinite. There is a likeness of the creature to God, because the creatures stand to things which are their own as God does to those things which belong to Him. This passage is particularly noteworthy because it does indicate in a very real sense that there is priority-posteriority even in the analogy of proportionality. It is indicated that the creature is
conformed to God by participation or a sort of imitation. The conformity is not reciprocal; creatures are similar and conformed to God, but not God to creatures. *De Veritate* 2, 11, where proportionality is used to speak of the attributes attributed to both God and creatures, also indicates that the conformity is not reversible. Creation is like God, but God is not like creation. The fact that the analogy of proper proportionality, like all other Thomistic analogies, is based upon the doctrine of potency-act (creation) is evident. God alone is cause. Creatures are always effects. There is in a sense a prime analogate in the analogy of proper proportionality, since one side of the proportionality $\frac{\text{God's essentia}}{\text{God's esse}}$ is really an identity.

It should be noted again, however, that when Thomas uses the analogy of proper proportionality, he is concerned not so much with the God side of the God-creature relation, but with preserving the creaturely side. He wants to indicate the proportional possession of absolute perfections by different creatures. Creatures, because they are effects of the First Cause, God, do possess the absolute perfections which are God's. God possesses all infinitely in proportion to the identity of His essence and existence. Creatures possess perfections such as goodness, knowledge, and will, finitely in proportion to the separation of their essence and existence.

Many scholars have pointed out that the similarity exemplified by the analogy of proportionality is not one of a direct similarity of natures, but one of a direct similarity of relations. For example, if it is said that being is to a dog as being is to a man, what we
intend to compare are not the two beings, but the relation: being/dog
to the relation being/man. If this is true, say some, then what value
is the analogy of proper proportionality in the light of an analogy of
intrinsic attribution? For example, when wise is predicated of both
God and man, is it the intent to set up a similarity between the
relation of the wisdom to man and the relation of wisdom to God, or
do we really mean simply to say that wisdom belongs properly and
intrinsically to both God and man, and that therefore there is a
similarity between Wisdom and wisdom? If it is the latter, it must be
asked what use is the analogy of proper proportionality since the
analogy of attribution explicitly signifies the similarity between
primary and secondary analogate. The secondary analogate is an
imperfect imitation of the primary with respect to the property
causally caused by the primary in the secondary analogate. The analogy of
attribution between God's wisdom and man's wisdom reveals that man's
wisdom is an imitation of God's wisdom, and also implies that the
relation of wisdom to man is an imperfect likeness of the relation
of wisdom to God. What more, ask some, does analogy of proper pro-
portionality reveal?

It is true that there is a definite overlap in these two
analogies, but this does not mean that one is either useless or not
properly metaphysical. It has been said before that the analogy of
attribution is used more in contexts where the supereminence and
transcendence of God is carefully guarded, while in cases where the
analogy of proper proportionality is used, the concern is to guard
the integrity of the creation. Both analogies would tell us that a
certain perfection, i.e., love, belongs intrinsically to both God
and man, and that Love and love are similar. The analogy of
attribution would, however, tell us that Love belongs first to God,
that God is Love and that man's love is always imperfect and an
imitation of God's love. On the other hand, the analogy of proper
proportionality would tell us that there is a similarity between the
relation of love to God and the relation of love to man, meaning
that though God = love, yet man also has love fully and in pro-
portion to his being. One analogy speaks primarily concerning
God while the other concentrates on man. Both analogies are signi-
ficant and properly metaphysical for Aquinas whose single aim when
he deals with analogy is to be able adequately to account for all
aspects of the God-creature relation.

Cajetan speaks of a fourth type of Thomistic analogy, that of
metaphorical proportionality. He describes this analogy as an im-
proper manifestation of proper proportionality, an analogy of one
or of several to one. In this analogy, he sees a notion univocal
in itself formally signifying a subject or a group of subjects,
which is carried over and applied to another subject or group of
subjects. The ground of the carry-over is likeness of relations or
the production of similar effects. Cajetan recognizes the common
term as having only one formal meaning which is realized in one of
the analogates and predicated of the other by metaphor. For example,
a man may be called "Achilles" metaphorically because like Achilles
he is strong or swift, but the name "Achilles" applies properly only
to Achilles himself. Cajetan, as well as most Thomistic scholars,
are quick to dismiss this type of proportionality from the field of
analogy and they do not consider it to be of any value to metaphysics or theology.

This form of analogy, however, at least should be examined. It is explicated briefly in De Veritate 2, 11.

...et ideo secundum illum modum nihil prohibet aliquod nomen analogice dici de Deo et creatura. Sed tamen hoc dupliciter contingit: quandoque enim illud importat aliquid ex principali significacione, in quo non potest attendi convenientia inter Deum et creaturam, etiam modo praedicto; sicut est in omnibus quae symbolice de Deo dicuntur, ut cum dicitur leo, vel sol, vel aliquod hujusmodi; quia in horum definitione cadit materia, quae Deo attribui non potest...\(^46\)

Examining this passage carefully, the most it seems to be saying in a negative manner about the analogy of metaphorical proportionality is that if this analogy is used to describe the relation between God and creatures it must be used with extreme care, because terms such as "lion" or "sun" involve matter in their definition and matter cannot be properly attributed to God. The passage does not actually say that this analogy cannot be used at all to describe the relation between God and creatures.

Another passage may be considered:

Respondeo dicendum, quod de Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, quaedam metaphorice. Ea quae proprie de ipso dicuntur, vere in eo sunt, sed ea quae metaphorice, dicuntur de eo per similitudinem proportionabilitatis ad effectum aliquem, sicut dicitur ignis Deuter. 4 eo quod sicut ignis se habet ad consumptionem contari, ita Deus consumendum nequitiam.\(^47\)

In this passage Aquinas again makes a distinction between two kinds of proportionality, proper and symbolical. The latter he calls a


\(^{47}\) Aquinas, Thomas, I. Sententiarum, d. 45, q. 1, a. 4c, Opera Omnia, Vol. 7, p. 537.
"similitude of proportionality with regard to some effect. He cites a scriptural example from Deutueronomy 4 where God is called a "fire." The basis of the predication of the term "fire," a term which involves matter and imperfection, is a similarity of effects; as fire is related to the consumption of its opposite, so too God is related to the destruction of wickedness.

In a similar passage Aquinas points out that what is involved in the analogy of symbolical proportionality is a transfer from the realm of corporeal beings to the realm of the divine. The transfer is based on a similitude of effects. Again the example of fire is used with the comparison between fire which liquifies material by its heat and God who diffuses his perfections to all creatures. The passage is as follows:

Dicendum quod similitudo est duplex: quaedam enim est per participationem eiusdem formae; et talis similitudo non est corporalium ad divina, ut obiecto probat. Est etiam quodam similitudo proportionalitatis, quae consistit in eadem habitudine proportionum, ut cum dicitur: sicut se habet octo ad quatuor, ita sex tria et sicut se habet consual ad civitatem, ita se habet gubernator ad navem, et secundum talem similitudinem fit transmutio ex corporalibus in divina: ut si Deus dicatur ignis ex hoc quod sicut se habet ignis ad hoc quod liquefacta effuerre facit per suam calorem, ita Deus per suam bonitatem perfectiones in omnes creaturas diffundit, vel aliquid huiusmodi.

Another case of transfer from the corporeal to the spiritual realm is given in IV. Sententiarum:

Duplex est convenientia vel similitudo, una quae est per participationem ejusdem qualitatis, sicut calida ad invicem conveniunt: et talis convenientia corporalium ad loca corporalia esse non potest. Alia per

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48. Aquinas, Thomas, I. Sententiarum, d. 3^4, q. 3, a. 1, ad. 3, Opera Omnia, Vol. 12, pp. 413-14.
quamdam proportionalitatem, secundum quam in scripturis metaphoris corporalium ad spiritualia transfereuntur; ut quod dicitur Deus esse sol, quia et principium vitae spiritualis, sicut sol vitae corporalis; et secundum hanc convenientiam quaedam animae quibusdam locis magis conveniant, sicut animae spiritualiter illuminatae cum corporibus luminosis; animae vero obtenebratae per culpam cum locis tenebrosis.  

Aquinas hints at a possible clarification which must be made in regard to the analogy of symbolical proportionality in the following passage:

Dicendum quod de his quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, quaedam sunt quorum res significatae per prius inveniuntur in Deo quam in creaturis, quamvis nominae prius fuerint creaturis in Deo quam in talia proprie dicuntur de Deo, ut bonitas et sapientia, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt quorum res significatae Deo non conveniunt sed aliquid simile illis rebus et huiusmodi dicuntur metaphorice de Deo, sicut dicimus Deum leonem vel ambulantem.  

In this passage he speaks of those predicates which existed in God first rather than in creatures, even though the names were applied to creatures first. He indicates such predicates to be absolute perfections as goodness and wisdom. These are predicated properly of God because their primary and full meaning are in God and only imperfectly and secondarily in creatures. The hint is that the other predicates, those said metaphorically of God, have their primary meaning in creatures and only secondarily in God.

A passage in the *Summa Theologiae* speaks more clearly of the distinction between predicates which can be applied to God "properly" and those which can be applied to him figuratively or metaphorically. It is as follows:


Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quaedam nomina significant hujusmodi perfectiones ab Deo procendentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus imperfectus, quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso nominis significato includitur; sicut lapis significat aliquid materialiter ens; et hujusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi metaphorice. Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones absolute absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum, vivens, et alia hujusmodi; et talis proprae dicuntur de Deo.51

The "proper predicates," those expressed in proper proportionality, are absolute perfections which do not contain the mode of participation in their predication. There is nothing material or imperfect within these perfections themselves. The "metaphorical" predicates, however, contain something of the creaturely, the material, the participated, within their meaning or signification. These are mixed perfections and since God is without composition their signification cannot be related to Him primarily, only secondarily.

What is involved here is priority and posteriority, a primary signification and a secondary one. In one case the signification is primarily to God, in the other it is primarily to the creatures. Absolute perfections have their fullest meaning and signification in God, while "mixed" perfections find their fullness in relation to creatures and creaturely things. In another passage in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas discusses this in more detail.

Respondeo dicendum, quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum. Et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys, text 28, necesse est quod illud nomen primo dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum,

et per posterius de aliis secundum ordinem quo appro-
prinquant ad illud primum vel magis, vel minus; sicut
sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione
sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana, in
quantum causat sanitatem in animali; est in definitione
sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana, in quantum
est signum sanitatis animalis.

Sic ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur,
per prius de creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta
de Deo nihil aliud significant quam similitudinem ad tales
creaturas. Sicut enim ridere dictum de prato nihil signi-
ficat quam quod pratum similiter se habet in decorum fli-
oret, sicut homo cum ridet, secundum similitudinem pro-
portionis: sic nomen leonis dictum de Deo nihil significat
quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut fortiter operetur in
suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet quod
secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri
non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur.

Here it is clear that Aquinas considers the analogy of metaphor
proportionality to be one which proceeds primarily from creatures to
God. Thus if applied to God the signification of these names can be
defined from what is said of creatures. When we call God a "lion"
we do not gain the full significance of this statement except by
looking at the lion and his strength and then thinking that God mani-
manifests strength in His works as does a lion in his. The mode of signi-
fication applies to God and the things signified to creatures.

The passages on metaphorical proportionality which we have been
considering do imply that there is a causal basis for the analogy.
The ontological ground for the analogy of metaphorical proportionality
is a likeness of action. In fact this ontological grounding is
asserted by Aquinas himself. In De Malo 16, 1, ad. 3, he speaks of
it as being a likeness consisting in similitudo operationis; in De

52. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 13, art. 6c, Opera
Omnia, Vol. 1, p. 93.
Potentia 7, 5, ad. 8, the likeness is said to be in *similitudo* effectus. We predicate "lion" of God because we believe there is something in God's behavior or His way of acting that resembles the behavior or way of acting of a lion. The similarity of action, as has been pointed out, is the basis of the transfer of a term from one thing or mode of being to another. It is in this likeness of action that the mind finds a sufficient reason for ascribing also to the secondary analogate (God) a property (strength) which we know properly belongs to the primary analogate (lion).

Underlying this more obvious grounding of the similarity of actions, however, is causal grounding. It has been pointed out earlier that God is the ground of all causality and action which belongs to creatures. As First Cause He is the foundation of the chain of causality which is operative in creation, and as Final Cause He is that incentive toward which all things act and move. There is a causal grounding for the analogy of metaphorical proportionality. There is also grounding in the doctrine of potency-act. Certainly the very reason why metaphoric predication is necessary in regard to God lies in the doctrine of potency-act. Because the created always continue to have potential elements and always have participative natures, terms taken primarily from creation and containing a creature-ly element within their meaning can only be predicated metaphorically of God, Who is Pure Act, containing no limiting element. Yet, it is proper to use terms taken primarily from creation to speak about God and His actions because the created bears relation to the Creator, the effects to the Cause. Act produces that which is similar to itself,
despite the fact that it is received in the potential. Indeed, the very basis of metaphorical predication, the transference of a term from one mode of being to another, lies in the fact that there is related hierarchy of being in which all beings, despite their differences, have something in common. One can also see in this analogy the functioning of the priority-posteriority doctrine. And is not metaphor itself a combination of subject-predicate, a form of potency-act.

Metaphorical proportionality is a proper metaphysical analogy, ontologically grounded upon the doctrine of creation and the metaphysical principle of potency-act. It is a useful form of analogy in that it can point out the likeness of action between creature and creature and between God and creation. It can speak of the more dynamic side of God’s nature. Metaphorical analogy, being also the fundamentum poeticae, may be the place where the creation really comes into its own. In its own unique way and from its own resources it provides symbols of God. Here it achieves its fullest actualization, for in this creative act it imitates in a profound way the First and Primary Creative Act of the Creator.

It must be noted briefly in closing that some scholars have objected that the analogy of metaphorical proportionality presupposes knowledge previously obtained of how God is related to His effects and properties. In answer to this, it may be pointed out that all forms of analogy must be used in order to get any kind of good picture of God and His relation to creation. All must be used together, though even then, we, as creatures, can never fully speak of God. In addition, Thomas would not deny that some form of reve-
lation, special or general, is necessary if men are to know anything of God. He would not start with a blank in the place of God and try to fill it in with analogy.

In this chapter we have dealt with Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of analogy, seeking to come to some concluding statements about its nature and extent. Our main thesis has been that for Aquinas analogy is a basic metaphysical concept necessary to his system, built as it is upon the principle of potency-act and the theological doctrine of creation. Analogy, in Thomas' system, is a basic metaphysical tool, one which he uses in various ways to solve various problems. Each of the "four types" of analogy enumerated by Cajetan were examined. They were looked at, however, as analogy used in various contexts to solve specific problems, and not as "specific types" which were to be called metaphysically proper or improper.

The results of our investigation are the following. (1) Aquinas teaches all four "types" of analogy: analogy of inequality, analogy of proper proportionality, analogy of symbolic proportionality, and analogy of intrinsic attribution. (2) All of these types of analogy are properly metaphysical, as all are based upon and manifest the principle of potency-act and the doctrine of creation. (3) The analogy of inequality is used by Aquinas to describe the complexities of likenesses and differences that exist in the created world. He uses it to speak of the relationship of similarity and dissimilarity between corruptible and incorruptible and it is also the tool by which one can move from the material world to speak of the angels. (4) The analogy of proper proportionality is used to speak of the dynamic and active side of God's nature. It is an analogy
based upon the relationship between God and His essence and God and His actions and man and his essence and man and his actions. The analogy of symbolic proportionality is used by Aquinas to predicate of God "mixed" perfections which primarily belong to creatures, or which are understood primarily from creaturely terms. This analogy is based upon the hierarchy of being, as it involves a transfer of perfections from one realm of being to another. (5) The analogy of intrinsic attribution has two main forms: that of one to another and that of many to one (sometimes expressed as two to a third). The first form is properly used of God and creation, being based upon the principle of similarity between cause and effect. Finite reality (creatures) point to God, since it is caused by God. Being caused by God, finite reality bears some similarity to Him because every effect resembles its cause. The second form of attribution speaks of such important relationships within the created order as that of substance-accidents and being predicated of various accidents.
CONCLUSION

Our investigation ended, it is now proper to turn again to the issues which prompted its undertaking and to relate them to the results of the study.

One of the crucial issues for philosophy throughout its history has been the question of the relationship between finite and infinite, immanence and transcendence, becoming and being. Men like Erich Przywara have suggested that this is really the question of analogy or of the analogia entis.

Analogia entis thus unfolds here its final appearance of a riddle: the creation as essentially 'becoming' is unthinkable without that which 'is' and this 'is' has of equal necessity its source in the pure 'Is', since otherwise the motion of becoming would merely hang up in the void; whereas the 'is' of creation excludes such a notion. And again in the pure 'Is' (of Deity), on the other hand, neither can the latter itself be in some way its emanation, because this pure 'Is' (as being what It is) is essentially separate from and above all that 'becomes'; and cannot, as it were, emanate, for otherwise it would be transitory. God, therefore, as the pure 'Is', is on the one side so inward to the creation that the transient 'is' of the creation is only from Him and in Him -- yet on the other side, differentiated from the creation, above it as the pure 'Is', for Whom no relationship to anything which is 'becoming' is in any way possible. God in us and over us, in regard to the last problem, the synonym of analogia entis.

Our investigation has demonstrated that the analogy of being is a basic concept for Thomistic metaphysics. This is true as his system is grounded upon a principle of potency-act, a philosophical expression of the theological doctrine of creation. For Aquinas there is always within reality both likeness and difference, one and many. Potency-act encompasses all being and accounts for both its multiplicity and its relation. Existence is always a combination of potency-act and thus

1. Przywara, Erich, Polarity, p. 33.
limited, divided, and individuated. Yet potency-act in its various combi-
inations in created existence is ultimately related to Pure Act in a
hierarchy of Being, which includes relationships of priority and posterior-
ity, participation, exemplarism, and causality.

Put theologically, the division of being is the result of creation,
the continuous divine act of giving existence to things. If God is
Pure Act, in Whom essence and the act of existence are identical, it
follows that if any other beings exist, they are dependent upon Him
and receive their being from Him. The act of creation is the positing
in existence of analogues of the Author of that act. Since the very
existence of every being is given to it by Him, Who is existence, every
existence is a created analogue of its Author; and as such it partici-
pates in Him and imitates Him existentially. But existential participa-
tion, the only possible mode of metaphysical participation in God
open to the creature, for there is no community of essence whatever be-
tween them, is intrinsically analogical. There is real causal relation
between God and creature and this prevents equivocation, for God is
truly an Agent and His effects are linked to Him through a real relation
of likeness, even though that likeness is purely analogical. This
causal relation also prevents univocation since God and the world are
essentially diverse. The ultimate ground of analogy is none other than
the divine act of existing itself, the unique act which, in and through
itself, is imitable analogically in infinite ways, since its existence
knows no bounds. As Przywara suggests, creation is open upwards.

*Analogia entis*, interpreted in terms of potency-act and a doctrine
of creation, and containing both Aristotelian and Platonic elements
could be at least the beginning of an answer to the problem of being and
becoming, the infinite and the finite, transcendence and immanence.

The most compelling question facing contemporary philosophy is the question of language and meaning. With the advent of logical positivism and linguistic analysis, the power of language to express truth about realities which transcend mundane experience has been seriously questioned. In this regard, it is interesting to bring forth Aquinas' assertion that human language can be used to speak of infinite reality because finite reality itself points to infinite reality. There is between the finite and infinite a relationship, first, of potency-act. The infinite is Pure Act; the finite is received and participated act, the result of Pure Act having manifested itself and thus being received into the potency of the finite. Based upon the potency-act relationship there is a causal relationship between the finite and infinite. Pure Act is First Cause, Efficient Cause and Final Cause; the finite are thus created effects, similar in some way to their cause. Because of the potency-act causal relationship between finite and infinite, there are other relationships, that of prior and posterior, of form and matter, of essence and existence, substance-accident, and subject-predicate. Each of these relationships are reflected in some way in the various realms and modes of being and are related in a hierarchy of being pointing to First Being and the Ground of all Being. Human language can be an instrument for speaking of infinite reality. Its method is analogy.

Aquinas' contribution in this regard can be clarified if the question of theological language is considered. Is there a tool available to man which is capable of giving an adequate interpretation of the God-creature relation? The problem is the meaning of words applied to God and to creature. If our words mean exactly the same thing when
applied to God and to creatures, then God's transcendence is eliminated: God ceases to be God in order to be a creature or vice versa. On the other hand, if our words bear an altogether different meaning when applied to God, then God's immanence is obscured: man is no longer in a position to know God.

It is evident from our investigation that Aquinas is well aware of the problems of theological language and that he is careful to guard both God's transcendence and immanence. He does this in several ways: (1) through a doctrine of efficient causality connected with participation and exemplarism; (2) through a distinction between modus significandi and res significata; (3) through various modes of analogy used in relation to and supplementing each other.

According to Aquinas the most importance of the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is God, because He is the primary and *per se* cause. As primary and *per se* cause God brings out effects like Himself. God, however, is not a univocal but an equivocal cause, since every creature must fall short of the perfection of the divine goodness. Creatures only participate in the divine perfections; they are exemplars related to the *exemplar*. God contains the perfections of His effects virtually or eminently, rather than specifically. Since God

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contains all the perfections of His creatures, man can use the names of the
perfections of the creatures to describe God's perfections.
But, because the perfections of the creatures are only present in God
either virtually or eminently man must impose some qualifications to his language when he applies it to God.

Thomas makes the distinction between perfections possessed by God virtually and those possessed by Him eminently, or between specific or mixed perfections and analogous or simple perfections. Mixed perfections, those possessed by God virtually, denote a perfection taken precisely under its specific mode of finite realization. These are perfections that can be realized only in a creature, that belong to the specific nature of creatures and their proper actions. Names of these perfections are predicated of God metaphorically. For instance, the names "lion," "repentance," "hand," etc., are names that are predicated of God metaphorically. They express God's dynamic attributes, i.e. the perfections relative to God's external action. We can express some of God's actions only by using names like "repentance," punishment, "anger," etc., but these names are not predicated of God as names of perfections that constitute His divine nature, but because God in His relations to man acts in ways that resemble repentance, punishment, anger. In metaphorical analogy man uses what is peculiarly his, his creaturely words and terms, to describe God's action toward him.

Analogous or simple perfections are those which denote a perfection independently of any specific mode of realization; these are possessed by God eminently. For example, the word "knowledge" does not imply any limitation either to human or angelic knowledge; it does not and is not restricted to any particular mode of realization and can, therefore, be
predicated of God properly. Other such perfections are "being," "goodness," truth,""beauty," "person," and "life."

Besides this distinction between "simple" and "mixed" perfections, Aquinas also distinguishes between res significata and modus significandi. Names of simple perfections can be predicated of God properly, but only with respect to the thing or perfection signified, not with respect to the mode of signification. For example, we take the term "knowledge" from man, but we do not identify the perfection "knowledge" with the human way of knowing. We can conceive of some more perfect realization of the perfection of knowledge, although our imagination is incapable of visualizing it. We are able to read off from the creatures those aspects that are identical with their finite realization from the perfections as such. Of course, this is possible in the case of simple perfections because only these are not restricted to a specific mode of realization. We can attribute to God the perfections in an absolute sense.

Thomas, however, recognizes this as a difficult enterprise. We do not have a concept of these perfections in an absolute sense; our knowledge is essentially dependent on creatures and we cannot understand the meaning of the name of any perfection without thinking of some particular mode of realization of the perfection in creatures. Perfections taken absolutely cannot be conceived, but only affirmed by a human mind. When a simple perfection is attributed to God it is done so with an implicit reference to some finite mode of realization. The finite mode is always


co-signified, it is always meant in oblique. The finite mode is meant negatively, by denying it; the simple perfection in its absolute sense is meant positively, by affirming it. Affirmation and negation are inseparable when man seeks to predicate something properly of God.

All names, in their mode of signification, apply primarily and properly to creatures, only secondarily and metaphorically to God. But names of simple perfections, with respect to the perfection signified, apply primarily to God and only secondarily to creatures. The reason is that with regard to the mode of signification the primary analogue is always a creature, but with regard to the perfection signified, in the case of simple perfections, the primary analogue is God. For example, with respect to the perfection signified by the name "beauty," the primary analogue is God. God is the most beautiful of beings and the cause of all beauty; His beauty is without alteration or vicissitude, without increase or diminuation. It is not like the beauty of things, which all have a particularized beauty (particulatam pulchritudinem et particulatam naturam). He is beautiful by Himself and in Himself, absolutely beautiful. He is exceedingly beautiful (superpulcher) because there is pre-existent in a superexcellent way in the perfectly simple unity of His nature the fountain of all beauty. The beauty of the creature is nothing but a similitude of the divine beauty shared among things (ex divina pulchritudine omnium derivatur).


For Aquinas the *via negativa* and the *via affirmativa* must go together in theology. Since our knowledge of any perfection is necessarily a knowledge of a particular mode of realization of the same, man may always take either a negative or positive attitude with regard to the attribution to God of the name of any perfection. He may deny or he may affirm it. For Thomas the first attitude is always correct; the second is correct only if the perfection is simple and the affirmation is restricted to the thing signified (*res significata*). The negative and positive attitudes should not be separated, but must always go together. The positive way alone leads to anthromorphism, to idolatry, to blasphemy; the negative way alone leads to agnosticism and atheism. The negative way, in relation to the positive, is the expression of the transcendence of God's perfection, which is beyond any concept man may form either from material or spiritual beings. Human concepts of perfections, because of their very origin, always maintain an implicit reference to the limited modes from which they are abstracted only imperfectly. Human concepts never positively signify the divine mode of perfection. Even the perfection of all perfections, "being" (*esse*) cannot be predicated of God *sic et simpliciter*. It must be excluded from God with respect to the mode in which it is realized in creatures (*secundum quod est in creaturas*).  

Although the modus significandi must always be excluded from God, there are names that can and must be affirmed of God with respect to

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the res significata. These are the names of simple perfections. The
res praedicta by these names belong to both God and creatures but belong
to God eminently (eminenter). This eminence is threefold, i.e. of
universality, plenitude, and unity. In God there are assembled all the
perfections scattered in many finite beings. In God each perfection is
free from all imperfection. In God each perfection constitutes one and
the same reality. The eminent way according to which God's perfections
are realized cannot be conceived by man. It can only be asserted. God
always remains beyond man's comprehension (supra intellectum).\(^{10}\) The
modus of His being is absolutely unknowable.

Aquinas is concerned to speak of both sides of the God-creature
relation. This is seen in the fact that he uses the various modes of
analogy in relation to each other and supplementing each other. Analogy
of metaphor can speak of God though it uses finite terms; it is man in
his most creative and distinctive way expressing something of his relation
to God. As for the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proper
proportionality, they are used in mutual relation, with some definite
overlap in their functions. The analogy of attribution is used more in
contexts where the supereminence and transcendence of God is carefully
guarded, while in cases where the analogy of proportionality is used,
the concern is to guard the integrity of the creation. Both analogies
would tell us that a certain perfection, i.e. love, belongs intrinsic-
ally both to God and man, and that Love and love are similar. The analogy
of attribution would, however, tell us that Love belongs first to God,
that God is Love, and that man's love is always imperfect and an imita-

\(^{10}\) Aquinas, Thomas, \textit{I. Sententiarum}, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, ad. 2, \textit{Opera
Omnia}, Vol. 7, p. 35; \textit{De Divinis Nominibus}, I, lect. 7, no. 83,
tion of God's love. On the other hand, the analogy of proportionality would tell us that there is a similarity between God's relation to His love and man's relation to his, meaning that though God = love, yet man also has love fully and in proportion to his being. One analogy speaks primarily concerning God while the other concentrates on man. Both analogies are significant and properly metaphysical for Aquinas whose single aim, when he deals with analogy, is to be able to adequately account for all aspects of the God-creature relation. In addition, the analogy of intrinsic attribution stresses both God's transcendence (God is the primary analogate) and immanence (the secondary analogate is an image of God).

Analogy is Thomas' answer to the problem of the meaning of words applied to God and to creatures. Our language is not applied to God either univocally or equivocally, but analogically. In some of our names the mode of signification is distinguishable from the perfection signified. The perfection signified is the analogous element that can be applied to both God and creatures, though primarily to God and secondarily to creatures. The analogy between God and creatures is based on the principle of similarity between cause and effect. All reality, both natural and supernatural, as an effect of divine causality, bears a likeness to God and can be the medium for an analogous knowledge of God.

Thomas' analogy stresses both God's transcendence and His immanence. Like Tillich's symbolism it seeks at one and the same time to prevent any segment of creation from making itself God and to reveal the image of God in every aspect of reality. Also like symbolism, analogy gives a negative picture of God rather than a positive one. It affirms cate-
gorical reality of God but promptly denies the limiting connotation of the category. It affirms the perfection signified but denies the mode of signification. Like *analogia fidei* Thomistic analogy stresses the priority of the divine over the creaturely; the secondary analogate owes all its reality to the primary. Aquinas, like Karl Barth, insists that every image of God is a grace of God, but he sees the grace of God wherever there is being and nature and not in revelation alone.

Analogy, as a form of theological language, in a sense, involves faith and reason in a most interesting way. Reason, after all, is responsible for the creation of theological language; faith is responsible for the acceptance of theological language as a symbol of meanings which are beyond the grasping power of reason as such. In theological concepts formed in an analogical way there is, in a sense, a sort of epistemological incarnation.\(^\text{11}\) The form of the concept (a product of reason) remains human, whereas the content (a product of faith) is divine. This seems not inappropriate to the Christian faith which demands that the Incarnation must remain the ultimate point of critique for all revelation and for all words spoken about God, or about His relation to the creation, a fact most cogently stated by Paul Tillich.

All this suggest that ultimately the meaning of theological concepts is always a mystery; they are not finally verifiable by human empirical experience, but by a revelatory experience alone. Thus Aquinas writes: "the highest point to which our knowledge of God can attain in this life is to acknowledge that He is higher than all we can

\[^{11}\text{Battista Mondin, in his *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 184, also suggests this phrase.}\]
think." (Hoc enim est ultimum ad quod pertingere possimus circa cognitionem divinam in hac vita, quod Deus est supra omne ad a nobis cogitari potest). 12

I. Works of Thomas Aquinas

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- In decem libros Ethicorum expositio, vol. 25
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- In octo libros Physicorum expositio, vol. 22
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- Quaestio disputata de anima, vol. 24
- Quaestio disputata de malo, vol. 13
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- De ente et essentia, vol. 1
- De principiis naturae, vol. 1
- Expositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus, vol. 1
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B. Other Texts: Latin

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C. Translations


II. Other Sources

A. Books


B. Magazine and Journal Articles


