MECHANISM, TELEOLOGY, AND PERSONALITY
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE

by

Fred William Hagen

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

Houston, Texas
June, 1954
TO

MY MOTHER AND FATHER
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1

CHAPTER 1

MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY .............................................. 12

CHAPTER II

VALUE AND PERSONALITY ................................................... 41

CHAPTER III

GOD AND THE WORLD OF FINITE PERSONS ............................... 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................. 75

QUESTIONS .................................................................... 79
Rudolph Hermann Lotze, the son of a military doctor, was born on the twenty-first of May, 1817, in Bautzen. During his years at the gymnasium, he had the intention of preparing to follow his father's profession. At the University of Leipzig, he combined medical and philosophical studies. He attended the lectures of Fechner in physics, E. H. Weber in physiology, Volkmann in anatomy, and Weisse in philosophy. In July, 1838, at the early age of twenty-one, he received his doctorate concurrently in medicine and philosophy. The next year he spent as a practicing physician. Late in 1839, he qualified as a docent in the faculty of medicine and the next year he also became docent in philosophy. It was at this time that he developed a close friendship with Fechner and Weisse and was introduced to their more mature philosophical ideas through the Friday Circle, a philosophical discussion group attended by faculty and graduate students. In 1842 as a consequence of the very favorable reception of his General Pathology and Therapy as Mechanistic Natural Science, he was appointed assistant professor at Leipzig. In 1844 he was called to Göttingen as professor of philosophy. After many years of negotiation and indecision, Lotze accepted an appointment to Berlin; but he died during his first semester there, on July 1, 1881.

Lotze's earliest publications were in the fields of physiology and psychology, with the exception of the Metaphysics (Leipzig, 1841). The article entitled Life appeared in Wagner's Dictionary of Physiology, the General Physiology of the Bodily Life in 1851, and the Medical Psychology or Physiology of the Soul in 1852. There can be no doubt that Lotze's detailed observations and experiments in the medical sciences taught him the value of precise empirical data and of the scientific method. It was
Lotze's scientific caution and critical empirical approach to the problems of traditional philosophy that above all else distinguished him from the idealists of his own day. Lotze is significant for his application of the empirical scientific method to such problems as mechanism and teleology and the relation of mind to body. This has been expressed by the German historian of philosophy, J. Hirschberger, as follows:

Lotze, like his friend Fechner and as Helmholtz, Mach, and Wundt, set out from the natural sciences. He had prepared himself originally for medicine and particularly pursued his studies in psychology in the scientific spirit, through which he brought new life to philosophy. 

Friedrich Ueberweg in his History of Philosophy suggests that Lotze and Wundt were the two German philosophers who did most to restore German idealism to academic favor after its loss of prestige at the hands of Schelling. Schelling's speculative abuses and his disregard for scientifically established facts had earned idealistic philosophy the contempt of men of science in Germany and abroad. Now a prominent man of science with an established reputation in the field of physiology was championing a teleological idealism grounded on the empirical facts of natural science. But Lotze's choice of language in his early physiological publications was not entirely free of ambiguity and with the appearance of his Medical Psychology in 1852 he was hailed as a new recruit into the ranks of the materialists. Lotze was quick to correct this misunderstanding of his position. In a letter to Fechner dated October 2, 1854, he expressed his indignation: they could not have even read his work, so grossly they misrepresented his views. 3

1 All notes and references are assembled at the end of the thesis.
The comprehensive character of Lotze's erudition and interests can be indicated by a reference to some of his leading publications. His *Logic* appeared in 1843. Several aesthetic treatises followed: the first, *On the Conception of Beauty*, in 1846, and later in the same year, *On the Conditions of Beauty in Art*. Lotze's most popular metaphysical work, the *Microcosmus*, appeared during the years 1856-1858. The *System of Philosophy* divides into two parts, the *Logic* of 1874 and the *Metaphysic* of 1879. In addition to the above-mentioned works are to be found numerous essays on logic, aesthetics, psychology, cultural anthropology, and the history of philosophy which are scattered through numerous German periodicals, many of them to be found in the *Journal of Philosophy* (*Zeitschrift für Philosophie*). These were later assembled and published in book form. Curiously enough, a collection of Lotze's poems was published in 1840 while he was docent in medicine at Leipzig. Towards the end of Lotze's life, he turned to the problems of ethics and the philosophy of religion. His *System of Philosophy* was to have consisted of a third part devoted to ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion; but unhappily that was never completed. The only portion of it which was found suitable for publication was *The Principles of Ethics* which appeared in *North and South* (*Nord und Süd*) for June, 1882.

Lotze's early works reveal two major interests operating simultaneously in his intellectual life: the scientific study of natural fact and a keen interest in the creative processes involved in the spiritual life of value. Through the obduracy of physical fact, Lotze perceives the abiding character of worth in man's spiritual quest. How are we to do justice to both fact and value in the life of man? Lotze would not succumb to the "nothing but" philosophies of his day in Germany. Life cannot be less than it is revealed to be in the most comprehensive experience of man. He was an
avowed opponent of a dogmatic materialism that was content to reject as illusory whole areas of man's life, indeed the most significant, the experience of value. Lotze's position with respect to materialism in Germany has been summed up by Wilhelm Windelband as follows:

The two most important systems of philosophy which Germany witnessed in the nineteenth century originated in the defense against materialism. They were Lotze's teleological idealism and Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious.

Both philosophers fell heir to the major problems of reconciliation in German philosophy after Hegel. Lotze's philosophy endeavored to reconcile the mechanism of materialistic monism with the teleology of idealism. His philosophy has been called a synthesis of Hegel's pan-spiritualism and Herbart's realism. However, Lotze is no mere eclectic anxious to please the philosophical tastes of everyone. He does not give expression to contradictory affirmations and then proceed to reassure us that in some incomprehensible way both must be true. Lotze does not believe that it is the philosopher's task to make a reality, but only to render a consistent description of its structure and behavior. Consequently, he rejects certain metaphysical problems as insoluble, e.g., how reality originated; and he rejects certain methods of approach to the problems of philosophy as fruitless and unsound. According to Lotze, Hegel erred in his attempt to deduce reality from abstract categories by the application of a formal dialectic. The enterprise was doomed to failure, since the problem is beyond the range of metaphysics or any other discipline, and an excessively formal a priori approach to philosophy can never assure us that we apprehend the existent. Philosophy must approach its problems through the living tissue of fact; it cannot be content with "an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." But Lotze's
method was no narrow empiricism, nor would he smother speculative enquiry under the restraints of a too provincial positivism.

We must beware of that doctrinairism, which will allow no conclusion to be valid, unless it is reached by the method of a logical parade-ground, reminding us of Molière's physician, who only demanded of his patient, "qu'il mourut dans les formes." 6

At the conclusion of his System of Philosophy, Lotze himself gives expression to his ideal of what philosophy should be.

In the face of the universal deification which is bestowed at the present time on experience, and all the more cheaply and confidently the less chance there is of finding any one who does not understand its importance and indispensableness -- in face of this fact, I at all events desire to close with the confession, that I consider that very form of speculative intuition, which is so very much despised, as the supreme and not simply as the unattainable end of science; and also by expressing hope that German philosophy will continue, with more moderation and self-restraint, but with equal enthusiasm, to address itself anew to the attempt to understand the course of the world, and not merely to describe it. 7

Lotze's major problem, then, is to describe and understand the world in terms of that mechanism which is demanded by the investigations of natural science and of ends and purposes which are required by man's moral, religious, and aesthetic experiences. His philosophy marks a monumental effort to achieve this synthesis. His readers must decide for themselves the extent to which he is successful in this ambitious enterprise. The high regard which philosophers of widely differing schools of thought have had for his work may be indicated in this tribute by Santayana:

It has been urged by some critics of Lotze that indeterminism is inconsistent with monism and mechanical law. And this in general would have to be admitted. But it is the beauty and peculiarity of Lotze's system that he modifies each of these doctrines just enough to make it consistent with the others. 8
Now it is sufficiently obvious that not every doctrine of mechanism can be made consistent with any other doctrine of teleology. Lotze recognized that some form of mechanism in the sense of orderliness and uniformity was not only indispensable to natural science but was also necessary to render intelligible the concepts of teleology and human freedom of choice. A chaotic universe in which random spontaneity prevails can never yield genuine human freedom. Neither chance nor fatality can secure real freedom and moral responsibility for man. The universe must be a coherent system of things regulated by general laws, if with the best of intentions we are to choose reliably the proper means for achieving the worthy end. But there is also that form of teleology which is fatally consistent with a thorough going mechanism. This type of teleology is a fatalism as rigorously deterministic as a materialistic mechanism, for both render human choice a delusion and make nonsense of man's moral life by ignoring his striving and his productive spiritual endeavors.

It is interesting to inquire how far Lotze succeeds in avoiding the Scylla of mechanism and the Charybdis of fatalism. But he is not unaware of the perils involved in such a task of reconciliation, especially as regards the integrity and autonomy of the moral will. Lotze maintains that we are not warranted in supposing that moral freedom means no more than the absence of external compulsion. The destiny of finite spirits is not contained in their inner nature on the analogy of the acorn which contains potentially all that it is to become. We must beware of any preformationist view of the moral career of finite persons. The self-determinism of spirit must mean that real alternative courses of action are available to man. Consequently, our moral decisions will aid in making us the person we become, but no primordial and given human nature inexorably decrees our choices. Lotze examines the process of scientific
inquiry to ascertain the precise nature of the conception of mechanism that is required by it and eliminates everything in the current notions of mechanism that seems superfluous and without factual basis. He also examines human activity in the process of evaluation and moral conduct to see what conception would make this activity genuinely significant. He then must show how teleology and mechanism, in the precise sense in which he intends them, are both possible and present together in a single all-embracing Reality!

The extremely peculiar and vexing character of the problem of teleology and mechanism soon became apparent to Lotze. He saw the futility of trying to decide between the two alternatives by a purely formal analysis, since the notions were not in themselves logically inconsistent; nor did they of necessity constitute two mutually exclusive alternatives. The real issue is not to be resolved in senseless controversy between advocates of determinism and of indeterminism. On the other hand, a simple empirical appeal to the facts seemed to fare no better in solving the problem. Mechanism is undoubtedly an established trait of the physical world; however vast the mechanism ascertained by natural science, it is limited, and one cannot inductively infer from it the universal reign of mechanism. Indeed the problem of ascertaining the cause of any given event is a difficult problem in itself. It was the principal subject of Mill's inductive logic. It would appear that universal mechanism is a fundamental postulate of science, and the final goal of science would appear to be the exhibition of the precise operation of this mechanism in detail. But human strivings, hesitations, decisions, and hopes are also unassailable facts of experience. How are these facts to be properly understood in a setting of absolute mechanism? What is it that distinguishes a mechanistic system of fact from a teleological system of fact? It was soon apparent to
Lotze that the concept of teleology was an appeal to value. We discriminate teleology by the unique values which an activity comes to realize. It is only in a teleological perspective that we can distinguish between means and ends. A teleological system tends to realize a goal; the intrinsic value of the goal is the sufficient reason for the system; the mechanism involved is the means by which the goal is realized.

Professor George T. Ladd perceived the intimate relation of value to Lotze's teleology in the following passage:

The idea of value everywhere dominates and makes intelligible those conceptions of mechanism with which it is the business of all science to deal. 9

Lotze's treatment of teleology marks a natural transition to the problems of value and of ethics and religion. Windelband maintained that Lotze was responsible for placing the conception of value at the "summit of logic and metaphysics as well as of ethics," 10 in contemporary philosophy.

Lotze's attitude is expressed in his well-known Platonic utterance: "I feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which ought to be the ground of that which is." 11 It becomes evident that to understand Lotze's metaphysics we must pay close attention to his concept of value; this in turn requires an examination of his ethics. Value and purpose can not be treated adequately apart from personality and moral responsibility. The Socratic dictum, "Virtue is knowledge," expresses a fundamental insight into the moral life of man. Spirit becomes responsible for its conduct when it knows and adequately appreciates the respective worth embodied in different types of action. Likewise, Augustine spoke truth when he said that man's sinfulness consisted in the fact that even knowing the best he frequently chooses the worst. The totality of facts constitutes the less significant aspect of reality. Facts confront us
with the question of their worth. The real question for spirit is not so much what are the facts; but, given the facts, how am I to act with respect to them so as to realize the greatest worth?

Lotze has been regarded by some critics as an advocate of an ethical hedonism; his teleology has been divorced from any reference to spiritual personality or to deity. These have been considered Lotze's concessions to popular religion. In opposition to this interpretation, we shall find that Lotze's ethics is one of self-realization and that a thorough understanding of Lotze's conception of personality is indispensable to his position. We shall see how Lotze is led to predicate full personality to God alone and assign a limited use of the category of personality to man. He has frequently been criticised as being inconsistent in the interest of popular religion. The logic of his position should have led him to some form of absolute idealism very much as it came to be expressed by Bosanquet. According to this view, Lotze was struggling to reach this position, but failed to attain it owing to his preoccupation with finite personality. Frankly, this view strikes one as utter confusion. However, these various criticisms do indicate a very real problem in Lotze. Some critics object to Lotze's extreme Leibnizian pluralism, while others object to his monism of the Absolute. Lotze seems to be treading a perilous path. He faces towards a cosmic spiritualism that threatens to engulf finite personality and render it but an aspect of infinite personality, making man but instrumental to the remote and inscrutable goals of the cosmic whole. But he is also confronted by a pluralism which, by emphasizing independence and discontinuity in the world, raises the question of whether God and man can co-operate effectively towards common ends. It will be of interest to see how successful Lotze is in avoiding these two extremes, and to discover the precise relation between finite persons and
the Cosmic Person that he envisages. We shall inquire what provisions Lotze makes for such a relation in his teleology. Perhaps we shall find some equivocation in his position at this point. But when it comes to be a crucial issue between the integrity of finite personality and the absolute sovereignty of God, it is the latter that becomes qualified. The prominence of personality in the philosophy of Lotze links him with the American personalists upon whom he exerted a major influence. Borden Parker Bowne was Lotze's student at Göttingen. Bowne says of his metaphysics of personalism: "The conclusions reached are essentially those of Lotze." The problem of the relation of finite persons to Deity was a serious one for Bowne. It led his follower, Brightman, to the conception of a finite God. This should serve to convince us that here is no mere academic question, but a serious problem with far-reaching consequences for religion, especially in dealing with the problem of evil. At issue here is the question of the accessibility of Lotze's God as an object of religious devotion. It is only after an examination of this issue that we can judge of the extent to which his philosophy is a concession to the demands of popular religion.

Lotze had a keen understanding of his relation to other thinkers in the history of philosophy. He regarded Weisse as the greatest single influence in the formulation of his thought. It was Weisse who first gave articulate expression to Lotze's strongly felt convictions about the role of the aesthetic experience in life. Weisse also introduced him to the genius of Hegel. Lotze admired the historical range of Hegel's philosophy and was impressed with his emphasis on the socially shareable character of cultural values. Lotze also had a high regard for the monadology of Leibniz; the two systems do invite comparison in some significant respects. However, Lotze himself objected to drawing too close a comparison between
his system and that of Leibniz. He also resisted Herbert's pluralism of "reals," but on several rather important issues he took sides with Herbert against his opponents.

The British idealists of the recent past displayed a lively interest in Lotze's philosophy. T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet collaborated on an English translation of his *Metaphysik*. Sir Henry Jones wrote an early critical account of his epistemology; it appeared in 1895 with the title, *The Philosophy of Lotze*. Aside from the question of direct influence, many of Lotze's ideas were congenial to the general tenor of philosophy in England during this period. The German historian of philosophy, Erdmann, comments on the fact that Lotze founded no school of thought in Germany, although he influenced German theology through his disciple, Albrecht Ritschl. Lotze had little interest in schools of thought with their allegiance to pet orthodoxies. He says, quoting Hegel, "Ideas have hands and feet." Valid ideas survive personalities and particular schools of thought. Lotze would agree with another saying of Hegel's to the effect that the history of the world is the world's court of judgment. Lotze's own ideas have certainly entered into the main stream of contemporary philosophy. The verdict of the present world court would seem to assure Lotze a place of prominence among nineteenth century philosophers.
If we examine the order of exposition in the *Metaphysics*, we discover that Lotze gives a detailed analysis of the relation of Being to Becoming before he treats of the basis for our distinction between the mechanical and the teleological in nature. Permanence and change are both found to characterize the order of nature. Indeed, it seems impossible to refer to the order of nature, that is, the uniformity exhibited by events, without recourse to the notion of relative stability or permanence in the midst of change. Neither permanence nor change may be regarded as prior in the processes of nature; both are equally natural and necessary. Hence, our problem is not to start with one and derive the other, but rather to clarify and relate the two concepts. So Shelley expressed it in his poem, "The Cloud:" "I change, but I cannot die." What does it mean to be the subject of ceaseless change? Lotze regards this as the major problem of ontology. The solution of it should decide the possibility of reconciling mechanism with teleology.

Herbert had previously tried to dispose of the problem by assuming an original plurality of unrelated "reals." Each of these reals was a miniature replica of the static and eternal Being of Parmenides. These primordial hermetic reals enter into relations with each other in virtue of the positions they come to occupy and so give rise to the world of natural processes. The reals remain unchanged in themselves; only their relations change. The changes we thus perceive are only apparent changes in the things, the only real changes being in the relations between the reals that constitute the things.

Lotze proceeds to attack this view where it is most vulnerable, namely
in its implicit doctrine of relations. Herbert talks as if relations were independent of their terms and only adventitiously become imposed upon them. But if relations are thus always external to their terms, how can terms inherently discrete and isolated be ever really joined? If relations make no difference to the plurality of reals which are their terms, then how can such ineffectual and otiose relations give rise ever to the appearance of change? Had not Herbert himself proclaimed, "Whatever appears has its intimation in Being?" What can such relations as taller than, and the cause of, signify apart from the terms which they relate? Herbert has failed to make adequate provision for the metaphysical status of relations. Terms are thus found to be indispensable for relations; they cannot exist apart from each other.

Things are now found to be in relations, and they must have been in relations from eternity, though not necessarily in the same relations. We can understand why a determinate thing is what it is only if we assume prior relations determining it to be as it now is. A thing is constituted in part by its relation; things and relations as found together constitute the system of nature. Lotze is enabled to introduce real relations into the structure of reality by maintaining a realistic theory of perception. The mind does not impose relations upon the things of experience, but rather it discovers them. Things persist in their own independent character when no longer present to us in consciousness. Perception makes a difference only to the percipient and not to the objects. "To be means to stand in relations, and being perceived is itself only one such relation beside other relations." 

How are we to understand the tissue of objective relations exhibited by the world of things? Lotze answers that relations for us are symbolized versions of the interactions that take place between things. Lotze does
not adhere to a simple-minded realism. Perception itself is a reciprocal interaction between the cerebro-neural mechanism of an organism and the things of its immediate environment. We do not copy the nature of external things in our mental imagery; but we do come to grips with real external things. Lotze’s realism consists in affirming that for every perceptual difference that we can discern there is some corresponding difference in external nature. This relationship between things in physical nature is independent of mind and of the cerebro-neural mechanism that apprehends it by interacting with it.

Reality is the all-inclusive system of things in reciprocal active relation. That all things constitute a single unified system or whole can be shown to be the case by an analysis of what is meant by a thing. When we inquire into the nature of a thing, we find that we have returned to our initial problem of change. We have said that a thing is in part constituted by its relations, which in turn are real and undergo change. But to change the relations, then, is to change the thing itself. Are we then hopelessly committed to a Heraclitean view of the world, a world dissolving in endless flux?

We must speak more accurately and distinguish between a thing and its modes of appearance. Actually, the changes observed are changes in the properties of a thing. Can we intelligibly speak of a thing in abstraction from its properties, i.e., is there a legitimate basis for our ordinary distinction between a thing and its qualities? If these qualities remained unaltered, then we would identify them with the thing itself and our problem would not arise. But the properties do change, and this poses the problem, what, if anything, remains constant amidst change? The secret of substantiality is to be found in the self-identity of a thing. If we identify a thing with the complex of observed attributes said to characterise
it, then we must give up the distinction between the thing and its attributes, for the thing is no more to be found underlying the attributes than Locke's substance is to be discovered beneath his primary and secondary qualities. And since the complex of observed attributes may and often do change together, we must say that the thing has undergone change and given rise to something entirely new. We thus lose all semblance of permanence in the world, and things would seem to pass in and out of existence. But Lotze regards this procedure as wanting. We can never identify a thing with its merely observable properties. We never know a thing exhaustively, and it may consist of an infinite or inexhaustible set of such attributes as well as a whole host of relations in which it stands to other things.

Are we then to assume that the essence of a thing lies in some simple supra-sensible quality or qualities which remain identical during the changes of its sensible qualities? Lotze refuses to make use of such an ad hoc assumption to save the distinction between a thing and its properties. In the first place, it seems probable that all qualities undergo change at some time or another, and secondly, even if there were such a static essential attribute it could not serve for our ordinary distinction between a thing and its attributes, since such a static quality remains unknown and stubbornly defies our endeavors to discover it. Moreover, the relation between such a static essence and the changing attributes remains as unintelligible as ever. We would appear to be reintroducing surreptitiously the static unrelated reals of Herbart in the guise of static essential attributes of the various things. The basis for our distinction between a thing and its attributes is not to be found by appealing to intrinsic differences among the attributes. Lotze concludes that the basis for our long-sought distinction is to be found, if at all, in the nature of the
change itself.

It is a fact that the attributes of a given thing do change, but it is equally a fact that this change is not a capricious chaos of ever-shifting attributes. The changes which the attributes of a given thing undergo always involve an orderly and closed sequence. Two pieces of sodium metal will react in an identical fashion under the same set of conditions. A piece of sodium metal may undergo the most varied changes, but it is always possible to regain the original metal with all of its original properties. Moreover there are certain properties which the metal cannot be induced to assume at all under the most varied conditions, e.g., sodium metal will never assume the properties of liquid bromine, argues Lotze. Change is limited to certain definite directions, in a certain order and according to certain principles.

The essence of a thing consists in the fact that it is restricted in change to a limited sphere of qualities. A thing operates as a serially correlated system of qualities. The qualities of a thing are always present either potentially or actually. The actuality of some qualities at a given time excludes the simultaneous actuality of other qualities of the thing and submerges them in potentiality. The qualities which are to be actualized at any given time are determined by the relations in which the thing stands. Thus Lotze regards it as more accurate to speak of the predicates of a thing as unchangeable, while its essence or substance is that which admits of change. It is precisely this orderliness of change that compels us to assume the existence of things as the sustainers or causes of this continuity. The essence of a thing is thus not given in immediate perception, but only in the logical form of a concept which expresses the permanent uniform conformity to law in the succession of states assumed by the thing. The order of which we speak is always a particular order as exhibited by
the succession of states of the thing. An identity of particular order exhibited in the behavior of two or more things will define a type or kind. A difference in order will define two distinct types or kinds. Two things before me may both be instances of graphite, or one may be graphite and the other an instance of lead. Thus the world is constituted both by real diversity and by real similarity. Law is not to be regarded as a transcendent form which convenes upon matter and imposes its order; it is rather the living immanent pattern which things concretely exemplify in their behavior. We must not regard a law as something prior to its application, else we mistake our abstractions for the concretely real in nature.

Law as an abstraction from experience is general, and nevertheless it applies to a number of specific cases. How is this relation of application to be understood? A law is to be understood as possessing both form and content. The form alone remains invariant and corresponds to the general character of law, but in order to apply the law in a given instance we must give it some particular content. Any physical formula illustrates this. Consider, for example, \( v = gt \), which expresses the relation between speed, \( v \), and the time, \( t \), elapsed after a start from rest for a freely falling body, where \( g \) is the universal gravitational constant. The law as it now stands is perfectly general and abstract. In order for the law to hold or rather to apply to a given case, we must substitute particular values for the variables that occur in the formula. Our choice of values for the variable is not arbitrary; it is dictated by the nature of the case to which the formula is intended to apply. The resulting statement of the application of the law is itself a law even as the general formula. This is all that is meant by an instance of the law. This is the individual law for the thing under the given conditions. In modern logical terminology, the general law corresponds to a propositional function, and its applications are
the propositions which result from the appropriate substitutions in the function. This explains how Lotze regards the relation between conceptual thought and Being, or a reality which is the object of that thought. The relation is mediated by a concept or general law which expresses the describable behavior of a thing. The adequacy of a concept is determined by the accuracy of the description for all observed instances of application. Laws are nothing apart from their actual instances, and are descriptions of the manner of reciprocal interactions of things. The actual determinants of this manner of reciprocal interaction must be found in the nature of the things themselves. This is why Lotze regards the Principle of Sufficient Reason as an ontological principle rather than as a mere heuristic principle of discursive reasoning. More succinctly, the principle states that the determinant must always arise from the real alone. The causal relation then is one of sufficient reason and consequence, but our problem is to show how the sufficient reason becomes efficient cause.

We are thus confronted with the problem of causality. Experience teaches us that things are implicated in a nexus of reciprocal determinations. The changes which a thing undergoes are determined not only by the nature of the thing, but also by the conditions to which it is exposed. Events cannot be regarded as simply self-originated since this conception will never yield an ordered universe without recourse to the dubious provision of a preestablished harmony among things. For the same reason, creation ex nihilo, although a possible primordial source of the existent world, cannot be admitted in science as an explanation of particular things or events. The objective Reason of Hegel becomes for Lotze that complex of all relations obtaining between things and their natures; it is not itself a thing or a single fact. Causes are all those real things of which connection with each other leads to the occurrence of facts that were formerly
not present. The co-existence of things involves more than mere spatial togetherness.

How do things thus together determine one another and interact? Some mechanical theories assume that we can explain such interaction by spatial contact of things alone. Lotze rejects this type of mechanism. In the first place, such a view cannot account for phenomena like magnetism and gravitation which appear to involve action at a distance. It is a familiar fact that spatial contact between two bodies may give rise to such action as the displacement of one of them by the other, but the familiarity of the fact does not render it any more intelligible than action at a distance. It is customary to assume that the cause of a given effect is an active agent which exerts an influence upon something passively receptive to that influence. But how are we to conceive of this transfer of influence? Let us take the example of a lighted match and gunpowder giving rise to an explosion. Neither the match nor the gunpowder alone gives rise to the explosion. Both seem necessary and hence may be regarded as co-operating causes. The ignited match and the gunpowder lose their individual identity and merge indistinguishably in the new event, the resulting explosion. Where in this process is the active agent and the passive recipient of the influence?

There is no absolute distinction between active agency and passive recipience in causation. Nothing is purely receptive or passive in causation. That which is acted upon or responds in a causal process must be a co-operative tendency in the thing. It is time to abandon the occult cause transiens or influxus physicus of the medieval schoolmen. "What each does in the causal process is the consequence of its completely determinate structure and constitution upon the occasion of the outward excitement." Causality consists in nothing more than reciprocal interaction among things.
as determined by their relations and their own intrinsic dispositions to action. These relations must not be regarded as invisible threads connecting discrete things. The term "between," Lotze says, is "meaningless in this sense; things can produce their reciprocal modifications immediately." We can regard these intrinsic dispositions of particular things to particular actions as analogous to the sympathetic rapport among persons. Things, as persons, may stand in various degrees of appropriateness in their relations. We find that the operation of reciprocal interaction is a self-contained activity propagating itself from moment to moment. This operation means that the actuality of one state is the condition for the realization of another. Since there is no unrelated being, the factual detailed plurality of the world must find its final essential unity in a monism.

It has been pointed out that Lotze intends by causality the operation of things according to universal and necessary laws. The descriptive accounts of the concrete and specific sciences, in expressing the idea of law, can yield no more than this statement. The delineation of the precise manner of causal efficacy is a speculative enterprise in metaphysics. Lotze champions the cause of mechanism when he maintains that universal laws hold absolute sway over all of nature. To renounce this supposition of all scientific inquiry is to despair of understanding the world at all, and to place definite strictures on the possible extent to which man can gain dominion over nature in his practical activity. Lotze's famous prefatory remark to the macrocosmos anticipates the conclusion to which the whole work tends. He would demonstrate "how absolutely universal in the extent and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfill in the structure of the world." 24

The marvellous achievements of classical dynamics left little doubt
that the inanimate world of physical nature manifests its conformity to certain universally valid laws. In his law of gravitation, Newton was able to encompass the behavior of the least object in our midst and the movements of the remotest stellar bodies within a single unified system of physical theory. The great French mathematician and physicist Laplace, was quick to infer from this his conclusion of universal mechanism. In his *Treatise on Celestial Mechanics*, published in 1799, he boasted that given the location, velocity and direction of every material particle in the universe at a given instant, a sufficiently powerful intelligence could calculate the entire future history of the universe. When asked by Napoleon what room this left for the Creator in his cosmology, he replied, "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis." 25 Laplace had felt confident that all of nature including life and mind would be reducible to the simple laws of dynamics.

This view which has been known as mechanistic materialism was held by many scientists of the nineteenth century. It implies a stark fatalism. It was challenged first in the sciences of biology and psychology. Biologists like Julius Sachs (teacher of our German-American physiologist Jacques Loeb) endeavored to give a strictly materialistic and mechanical account of life. 26 Sachs’ hopes for a purely materialistic account of the life processes had been kindled by Wöhler’s synthesis of the organic compound urea from inorganic substances in 1828. Prior to this no organic product of living metabolism had been synthesized in the laboratory from inorganic substances. It had been thought by many that there was an absolute gulf between the chemistry of living and non-living systems. This conclusion was disputed. Many besides Loeb have followed Sachs in drawing the conclusion that life is but a highly complex form of physico-chemical activity. They became interested in the tropistic behavior of plants in response to certain
physical stimuli. It was well-known that plants reacted with mechanical movement in the direction of a source of light, moisture, or other appropriate stimuli. Animal behavior was interpreted in an analogous fashion as the resultant of a complex of interacting tropisms. The thesis of animal automatism introduced into modern philosophy by Descartes, was extended to include not only human life but also man's higher mental processes. Jakob Haleschott (1822-1893) developed this view to its ruthless conclusion in his work, The Cycle of Life: "No thought without phosphorus;" later he added fat and water. Karl Vogt bluntly described thought as an organic secretion of the brain, analogous to the production of bile or urine. The great popularity of Ludwig Bolkner's exposition of materialism in his work Force and Matter testified to the esteem enjoyed by such views in the general reading public of the time.

Among the opponents of this mechanistic account of life were the so-called vitalists. The chief exponent of their position in biology was Hans Driesch. According to him, no mechanical account of life was adequate. Living activity was the result of something unique entering the world process. The self-regulating activity of living organisms, the self-repair of injured tissues, and the many subtle adaptations of the organism to the environment cannot be explained by having recourse to any mechanical scheme. He maintained that the activities of organisms were directed and governed by a transcendent non-physical vital force which inserted itself into material systems and converted them into stable living organic systems. In mechanical systems the whole is the result of the mechanical interaction of the parts; but in a living organic system the parts are really members, subordinate in function to the needs of the organism as a whole. Ernst Cassirer reviewed the history of the vitalist controversy in the nineteenth century, in a chapter of his work The Problem of Knowledge, and pointed out
that vitalism was strongly championed in philosophical circles, "though
a sharp critic had arisen therein in the person of Lotze." 29

We must be careful in considering Lotze's relation to this controversy.
His position may be clearly indicated if we compare and contrast it with
that of his elder French contemporary, Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Comte's
views on this issue are clearly set forth in his hierarchy of the sciences.
The sciences are arranged in the order of decreasing generality and in-
creasing complexity as mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and
biology. This is also the order in which the sciences have attained to
the positive scientific stage in human thought, i.e., to the stage at which
they are susceptible of rigid interpretation according to universal laws.
In Comte's hierarchy each science rests on the basis of the more general
and less complex sciences, but it is not reducible to the lower sciences.
Comte completes the list by adding sociology or the science of human relations
and institutions and putting it at the top of his list. The life sciences
being the most complex are the last to disclose the universal laws that
prevail in their sphere.

Lotze shared Comte's faith that universal laws are operative in all
spheres of activity, and that mechanism will be found to reign absolutely
in all living processes. Likewise, Lotze agreed that the higher sciences
are not completely reducible to the lower ones. The principles that operate
in living systems are not merely the principles of Laplacian mechanics that
apply to inert bodies, but they are new principles which apply to uniquely
organized systems. Yet these principles do not mark the introduction of
something alien into nature, for they nowhere contradict the principles of
classical mechanics when properly understood. The error of the vitalist
consists in renouncing mechanism in favor of a vital force and thereby
violating the principle of parsimony in scientific theory by introducing
unwarranted entities in order to fill the gaps in our knowledge of living processes.

The confusion of reductionist materialism lies in what A. N. Whitehead later called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness." The materialist mistakes the classical abstract account of the dynamics of bodies, relatively independent of one another, as an adequate statement of the concrete biological facts of interdependence and organic wholeness. Here we meet with conditions of a special order which are ignored in the formulation of the mechanics of bodies in dynamic but independent interaction. The biological sciences must modify these principles to take account of the unique conditions that sustain vital activity. This greater complexity of living activity, sustained by many environing factors, is an aspect of that we mean by the greater concreteness in facts.

Lotze realized that life is not an isolated phenomenon in nature but an activity involving reciprocal interaction and exchange with the surrounding natural environment. The phenomena of life and growth testify to the fact that nothing exists in independence of the whole of nature. The environment of a world of things is indispensable to the maintenance of life and biological development. The satisfaction of organic needs can only be accomplished by a cosmic economy that operates impartially according to universal laws. The harmonious reciprocal interaction of things presupposes a system of universal laws which determines the quality and quantity of this operation. Thus life is not exempt from the mechanical mode of conception employed everywhere in scientific descriptions of nature.

Hardly ever has any serious attempt been made to withdraw inorganic nature from this mechanical mode of conception; a longer resistance was made to bringing organized beings also under it. But the same reasons compel us to admit it here too. Animals and plants produce neither from themselves nor from nothing the substances through whose
aggregation their outward form grows; they borrow them from the common storehouse of nature. 31.

Life as a very possibility is dependent upon certain physiological conditions obtaining within the organism, not upon any occult vital force. Nature as a unified totality of interacting things does not admit of any fundamental bifurcation among its contents. Life is dependent upon certain physico-chemical processes, but it is not reducible to them.

The causal sequence of events in nature is not the mere succession of elements driven by the blind rancour of necessity. The universal laws of nature are not only factual generalizations, but they are also intelligible expressions of an order according to sufficient reason. Also each individual existent does not evolve sui generis and constitute a law peculiar to itself. The world is not a "pluriverse" of isolated phenomena; things do not behave according to their own unique predispositions. Mechanism asserts the unity of the world under the reign of universal law. Divergent conditions result in manifold changes, but all changes converge to a single all-pervasive law. The world as a system of mechanical order is the conception at the foundation of all science.

How the really crucial test for any mechanical account of life is its ability to explain the regulatory and adaptive processes of the organism. The vitalists had accurately pointed out that living systems do not act in a blind fashion, but respond in an appropriate intelligent manner to the environment. The organism does not act like a pilotless ship that destroys itself upon the rocky island crags. The demands of the organism as a whole dictate the functioning of the subordinate parts. Life consists of many delicately balanced systems in constant interaction. As Lotze pointed out, these systems are involved in the repair of injured tissues, in maintaining the oxygen content of the blood, and in maintaining the hydrogen ion
concentration and the isotonic properties of the blood. If the equilibrium in these systems is disturbed from without, the body strives to restore it to its initial state. Lotze himself described many of these systems, and tried to exhibit the mechanical principles that are at work. In a passage that is remarkably prophetic of present day developments in cybernetics, Lotze outlined his mechanistic interpretation of these regulatory processes.

Machines can be constructed so that the unequal expansion of different metals at the same degree of temperature does away with the injurious effects which variations in temperature might have on the precision of their operations; the steam engine can be compelled while in motion to not going a contrivance by which the lubricating oil is supplied to the wheels in just such measure as is required by the velocity of the train. If we look on these achievements with a certain pride, it shows the narrow tether of human power that we can be proud of such results; they certainly are exceedingly trifling in comparison with the infinite delicacy and versatility with which the living body resists innumerable minute disturbances all at once; but this difference in value does not entitle us to infer an equally wide difference in the method of working. 32

In this discussion of auto-regulative processes, Lotze makes use of a principle that later came to be known as Bunsen's law; "A system tends to change so as to minimize an external disturbance." 33 Systems of equilibria, when disturbed, initiate compensatory activities that tend to restore the system to its original state. Hunger and thirst resulting from the depletion of the organism's store of food and water cause the animal to seek and secure those substances essential to its welfare as well as to the relief of those bodily cravings. The very structure of elastic substances causes them to develop an effort to return to their prior condition when subjected to tension. This effort is, within certain limits, directly proportional to the amount of deviation from the normal.
Thus the forces of elastic distortion are attended by a remedial reaction that grows along with the disturbance.

Lotze's ingenuity in establishing mechanism in the life sciences may excite our admiration, but on the other hand, we might be led to wonder where this view differs essentially from crude materialism. Lotze regards matter as an abstract conception derived from our everyday experiences with things. The origin of this concept is well described in the *Metaphysics*. The existence of bodies in space consists in a variety of objects which differ in their sensible qualities. Despite these differences, we soon discern a number of properties common to all bodies and yet consistent with their manifold sensible differences. They all possess spatial extension, yield resistance to forces that tend to change their direction of motion, and are more or less impenetrable to other bodies. These common properties taken together constitute all we mean by matter. "Matter would then be a general term standing for anything which participated, to whatever extent, in the above-mentioned modes of behavior." The materialist err when he infers from these general properties of all things a homogeneous substratum which differentiates itself into distinct things with varying properties. The materialist reifies the general properties abstracted from things and then proceeds to endow this occult and homogeneous matter with all causal efficacy and potentiality that expresses itself in nature. Matter is a convenient construction for ordinary scientific purposes, but we must not endow it with primordial and generative being; it possesses no causal efficacy itself. Rather is causal efficacy to be recognized in the nature of the interacting individual things themselves. The things of the world belong to different orders which are related in the most diverse ways. This relatedness is not simply co-ordinate relatedness, but relatedness of a more fundamental kind. This is the
explanation of that variation in the intensity of interaction which conceals
the unfailling sympathetic rapport by means of which all things reciprocally
interact at a distance. Materialistic mechanism denies action at a dis-
tance and explains events as the result of the spatial juxtaposition of
things involving a transmission of force from one to the other. Materialism
also suffers from a vagueness in the employment of the term force; force
seems to attach itself to things in a wholly unintelligible manner.
Dürckner struggled with the problem of the relation of force to matter in
his materialistic cosmology, but never succeeded in making their relation
clear. Lotze makes himself quite clear on this issue in the *Macrocosmus*.

--- Forces do not attach themselves to a lifeless inner
nature of things, but must arise out of them; nothing
can take place between the individual elements until
something has taken place within them. All external
incidents of union and separation must hence rest on
or find their reflection in an inner life of things;
and, even if physical science breaks up the unity of
compound substances, each single part of the mosaic
which she puts instead is a living point inwardly in
a state of movement. 35

This passage has the merit of indicating another interesting aspect
of Lotze's thought, namely, his tendency to favor some kind of parapsychism
at the basis of causal activity. He was impressed by the psychological
studies of Fechner and was inclined to honor his parapsychic speculations.
His major objection to materialism was based on the fact that it failed
to give an adequate account of the unique character of man's higher mental
life.

--- For the evil materialism that is the real destroyer
of all cosmic conceptions consists exclusively in the
wealth of mind being held to spring from the reciprocal
action of material substances as substances, from impact
and pressure, from tension and expansion, from componi-
tion and decomposition, in its being supposed as self-
evident that the endless variety of the inner life arises
from the mutual crossing of physical processes, as that the resultant of two equal forces tending in opposite directions is rest, or of two that are different, motion in a third and intermediate direction. 35

Man is a fragile physical system in nature but also one that is unique in its mental life. One is reminded of Blaise Pascal's remark, "Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed." 37 The remarkable character of the inner life of mind led Lotze to infer a super sensible soul as the basis for our mental activity. We shall proceed to an examination of the arguments Lotze mustered in support of his conception of a super sensible soul, and also examine the nature of this entity in the light of his mechanism and the unity of things in nature. At this point, we should notice an important divergence in the conceptions of Lotze and Comte regarding the relations of the sciences. Comte had no provision for psychology in his hierarchy. He believed that the data dealt with in the traditional psychology could be apportioned between biology and sociology. This seems to be inconsistent with Comte's assertion of the irreducibility of the sciences. The content of man's mental life must be explicable, according to this view, in terms of biological factors involved in social interaction. This seems to indicate a certain materialistic bias in the thought of Comte. Lotze more consistently held to the irreducible character of psychic phenomena, and requires a separate science of psychology to treat of the laws governing mental processes.

Lotze was greatly impressed with the experimental researches of G. Th. Fechner (1801-1887) in psycho-physics. Fechner had succeeded in establishing a correlation between the degree of perceptual discrimination in sensory differences and the intensity of the physical stimulus. But this did not obscure for Lotze the absolute qualitative difference in the character of the physical stimulus and the mental response. Mental activity
is dependent upon bodily processes and states, but it is not reducible to them. There is a radical gap between sensations and their material physical correlates in the neuro-cerebral system. The light energies employed in vision consist of certain vibratory motions, and these only effect changes in the movements of the nervous system and brain. But the sensation that is a distinct color quality is something very different from vibratory motion. It is not a definite light frequency and movement that we are aware of, but something radically different from this. If this is true for sensation, how much more so is it in the case of thought?

Consciousness nowhere shows anything resembling what we see in nature, viz., the resultant of two forces producing at one time a state of rest, at another a third intermediate motion, in which they have become merged beyond recognition. 33

Recalling the ontological principle that real differences are to be explored in the nature of the specific interacting things, we must attribute the unique character of our mental life to the activity of what we call the self; Lotze refers to it as a supersensible (sometimes suprasensible) soul.

We should note here the unity of self-consciousness displayed in any mental act. Kant had already pointed out the organic unity of all conscious content in thought. According to Lotze, every intentional act of mind involves an unavoidable reference to a transcendent ego that lies beyond the contents of consciousness, but unifies the manifold of intuition into a single related whole. The ability to retain two diverse sensory contents together in a single act of mind seems to be the necessary condition for any act of relating and comparing contents. If we compare two sensory contents, two different colors for example, their individuality must be distinctly preserved in each case. Consciousness retains the two diverse contents together in a single act or mental span without merging the two
contents into a third. This alone makes possible perceptual discrimination of similarity and difference. Furthermore, the sensory contents of consciousness are ordered in a spatial field and change their relations to other contents in respect to localization in an orderly fashion.

Consciousness in these respects is not at all comparable to physical forces. The diverse plurality of physical forces, in nature, becomes for mind an integrated unity which retains the individuality of the constituent parts. Physical forces behave as vectors described by the laws of the composition and resolution of forces, but not so with sensory contents. Colors at opposite ends of the spectrum do not neutralize each other and result in gray as they would if analogues of physical forces of equal magnitude and opposite direction. Acoustical phenomena such as the presence of harmonic overtones in music have no proper analogues in the realm of physical forces. These examples are not meant to deny the presence of universally valid laws for optics and acoustics, but to bear witness to the disparity and the two realms of soul or spirit and matter. The inner life of spirit, according to Lotze, testifies to the immense gulf between the superconscious soul and the corporeal world.

We must resist the temptation to model the activities of mind after the fashion of familiar physical processes. It is a mistake to think of consciousness on the analogy of a light beam that plays upon the surface of things and illuminates them. As we have already demonstrated, mind is not a passive mirroring of things involved in relations, for if it were, there would be no discrepancy in our accounts of the inner life of spirit and that of the external play of physical forces. Ideas in no way resemble physical forces that push each other about. The strength of conviction carried by some ideas is no measure of intensity of physical force. To describe such processes as indecision and belief is the business of the
psychologists; but when we raise the question of the right of an idea to raise conviction within us, we appraise the idea in terms of evidence, consistency and other logical criteria which are essentially normative or evaluative and involve no reference to intensity of conviction. To speak of the strength of ideas is to employ language in a purely metaphorical manner, and we must beware of being misled by the metaphor into conceiving consciousness as a stage for the mechanical play of forces.

The inner life of soul introduces us to something radically new in nature. For the first time, we find reason to doubt the universal sway of mechanism. Clearly, the higher mental faculties are not governed by any mechanism. The familiar activity of recall involved in memory affords a formidable obstacle to any mechanical theory. Memory leaves the soul unfettered to the present; it makes the rich storehouse of past experience available to our present needs by preserving the past dormant but intact along with the present. Efforts to localize a mechanism for memory in the brain tissues have ended in failure, and there is reason to believe that further efforts in this direction utilizing the same principles of explanation will fare no better. Moreover, memory seems to follow principles of relevance rather than principles of mere force in its operation.

It is important that I recall which of two objects is the heavier, but not the exact sensory differences in pressure. But this is precisely the customary in recall, for I may remember that one object weighs twenty pounds and another fifteen pounds without being at all able to distinguish the differences in muscular tension. Memory is purposive and adaptive to human needs in a peculiar way; it does not record detail in an indiscriminate mechanical fashion, but it notes what is peculiarly relevant to the soul as the occasion demands. This activity of memory introduces the recognizable pervasive unity of the self throughout the successive stages
Lotze insists upon the integral unity of consciousness as the basic fact of mental life. He repeatedly resists endeavors to interpret his psychology after the fashion of the older faculty psychology. The soul is an indivisible unity and should not be regarded as a loose plurality of faculties. We can distinguish different activities of the soul and refer to them as imagination, cognition, and volition, but we must not endow each activity with a substantial counterpart or divide the soul into isolated and self-contained compartments. Mental life involves an inner coherence which Lotze compared to the synthetic unity of a melody. It is true that perception, memory, and phantasy force the essential and accidental alike upon us, but this is not true of the higher mental activities of creative imagination and thought. Thought always pursues that which is essentially connected and tends to exclude the accidental. Thought seeks a unified account of things in the logical concatenation of ideas which somehow corresponds to the inherent relations of things.

This activity of mind cannot be reconstructed in terms of a mechanical association of ideas. The association of ideas depends upon such accidental circumstances as the repeated sequence of ideas in time. But it is just such accidental features as those that thought seeks to eliminate and in practice successfully ignores. Only particular ideas or mental events could be associated in contexts according to this view, whereas our meanings always involve a reference to universals. Thought employs concepts in referring contents to their universals. Contents alone cannot refer to anything; they simply are. The concept thus has a logical and universal existence apart from particular contents. An act of judgment employs concepts and enables us to go beyond the immediate datum of perception. Thus the individual content for mind does not remain uniquely and solely that of its career.
it is, but it announces itself as an instance of a type. We have not
merely this individual thing with this unique color and that unique taste,
but the fruit orange which is like other things in the world. Thought
and creative imagination are liberated from immediacy and testify to the
independence of the soul from mechanical nature. No mechanism can explain
the facts of psychical transcendence of the present.

Lotze insists that the thought of cognizes Reality as mechanism
which can be no mechanism itself. Truth and error could not be distinguished
if this were the case, since both truth and error would be the result of
an inevitable mechanism. We could not imagine two mathematicians arguing
over the validity of a proof in geometry since the proof of one, if we
are now permitted to speak with great license, is just as much the factual
outcome of a mechanical process as the other. We may argue over procedures
that involve norms, but not over purely causal sequences of events. Our
scientific accounts of nature are assuredly only descriptions of nature,
but these descriptions are not just our passive recording of events as they
transpire in perceptual experience. The descriptive laws of science in
their universality of application transcend all immediate occasions of
concrete experience. No scientist comes to formulate scientific laws by
merely entering the laboratory and passively recording his observations
in experiment. Kant is essentially correct in pointing out that the whole
paraphernalia of scientific apparatus and method is but an organized means
of posing questions to nature. The scientist himself must decipher nature’s
all too frequently baffling answers.

Scientific laws are frequently the result of long periods of mental
incubation, and that, for lack of a better phrase, we may call creative
insight. Genius in whatever sphere, be it literature, art, science, or
religion, involves an element of spontaneity and novelty that is irreducible
to any form of mechanism. As Cicero long ago asserted, one might shake
up the letters of the alphabet for an eternity and they would never form
a single line of a great epic. The discovery of a proof in mathematics
may be a long and arduous process, and it may long evade the keenest of
mathematical minds. But once forthcoming, the proof may easily be checked
in an almost mechanical fashion by any one with sufficient skill in math-
ematical reasoning. A computing machine may measure quantities and work
out many assigned calculations for which it has been equipped. But no
computing machine has ever become absorbed in the meaning and various
implications of a problem or proceeded beyond the specific evidence to
formulate a new theory, much less develop a whole new branch of a science,
as did Descartes or Leibniz and more recently Henri Poincaré. Genius
possesses the old, but is not bound to it; it advances to radically new
ground. How often do we find formalized rules in artistic and scientific
endeavor to be barrenly unproductive! One is reminded of the occasion
when Beethoven was warned by his teacher not to strike a certain chord on
the piano, since it was not allowed in music. Beethoven struck the chord
once again and retorted that it was permissible from then on. Lotze re-
garded the failure to fathom the unusual character of creative genius as
a strange lack in the materialists of his day. In an eloquent passage he
described the strange paradox of men busily engaged in reasoning away their
own reason.

So long as we have this experience (creative genius),
Materialism may prolong its existence and celebrate its
triumphs with the schools where so many ideas estranged
from life find shelter, but its own professors will be-
lie their false creed in their living action. Among
all the errors of the human mind it has always seemed
to me the strangest that it could come to doubt its own
existence, of which alone it has direct experience, or
to take it at second hand as the product of an external
nature which we know only indirectly, only by means of
Satisfied that he has refuted the interpretation of mental activity in merely physiological terms, Lotze’s next problem is to examine the relation between mind and body. The facts of our everyday experience testify to the reciprocal interaction of the soul with the organism. Our problem is to account for this reciprocal interaction in terms of Lotze’s own metaphysics. He appears to be confronted with all the problems of a Cartesian dualism. But we shall find some significant differences in the two positions, which safeguard Lotze’s doctrine from the criticisms to which the Cartesian account is liable. We are warned not to think of the basis of reciprocal action between body and soul as some sort of bond connecting the two. We should beware of seeking to find the localized point of their interaction in some organ such as the pineal gland. The soul is linked to the body by its actual forms of reciprocal interaction and by nothing more. We need no more go beyond these forms of reciprocal interaction and seek for a bond than we need go beyond the facts of friendly social intercourse to seek the bonds of friendship, or beyond the reciprocal action between planets and sun in seeking the bond of their unity.

Descartes’ dualism involved the two basic substances, mind and matter. The former alone is res cogitans and the latter alone is res extensa. Mind is thinking but unextended substance; matter is extended but unthinking substance. The problem for Descartes was to explain how two such absolutely heterogeneous substances could ever interact. How could that which is spatially extended ever act upon the unextended and vice versa? The problem of interaction stated in these terms seems to be insoluble.

Lotze too has a dualism of two qualitatively different substances, soul and body. Soul is still thinking substance and matter is unthinking
substance; but Lotze alters our conception of their spatial properties.
Lotze follows Kant in maintaining that space and time are but the sensuous
modes of intuition. They are the universal forms of human intuition and
the absolutely necessary preconditions of all experience. But Lotze is
unambiguous in giving a final realistic interpretation to these basic
categories. Space and time as we perceive them may or may not exactly
characterize external nature as it is in and for itself, but they do
correspond to some relations in things. Space and time are called "our
mental translations of external relations between objects." Lotse calls spa-
tial relations as we perceive them either apply finally to both soul and
body or to neither. The objection that was leveled against the Cartesian
dualism is not now applicable to Lotze. The difficulty with the Cartesian
dualism lies not in the dualism itself, but in the gulf between the spa-
tial and the non-spatial. It would be an error to suppose that reciprocal
interaction can only take place between homogeneous things. It is just
as intelligible to recognize interaction between heterogeneous things.

Yet we may seek to understand the exact relation of the soul to the
corporeal body. Is the soul localized in the heart, in the liver as the
Mohammadans claim, or in the brain as some of our more naive contemporaries
believe? Any localization of the soul involves us in certain perplexities.
The soul moves the arm at one time and at another time it moves the toes.
If the soul acts at different places and sometimes simultaneously, how are
we to conceive this action of the soul upon the body from its seat in the
body? This problem becomes particularly acute if we consent to the dictum
that a thing acts only where it is. Lotze converts this to read, "A thing
is where it acts." After all we can only localize a thing in practice
by reference to where it exerts an action or effect. Since this seems to
be the case, we must recognize that a thing may be located at several places
simultaneously. This is the repudiation of what Whitehead later comes to
call "the fallacy of simple location." Thus the soul does not have a
central seat in the body. It is more accurate to speak of the omnipresence
of the soul in the body. The soul develops with the body and is limited
to the confines of the body in the control it exacts upon things. But
we should not regard the soul as moulding or influencing the embryological
development of the body. The body unfolds its development in accordance
with the corporeal mechanism of life. Lotze professes his ignorance as
to the origin of souls, and believes that the problem is no more soluble
than the problem of the origin of matter.

The universe now consists of a plurality of souls or what Lotze calls
the realm of spirit and the realm of mechanical matter. Are we to regard
this cleavage of Reality as final and enduring? The world of physical
nature is coldly mechanical and only the blind play of forces in inter¬
action, without beauty or warmth. On the other hand, the inner life of
spirit is rich and vital with warmth, beauty, and goodness. Must we deny
to the contents of our inner life any objective existence in external
nature? Must we deny to the things of external nature any real feeling
and joy of their own? Must we regard all nature as instrumental to the
inner life of spirit, deprived of the joy of participating in the life
of things? Are some parts of nature to be regarded as purely instrumental
in ministering to the needs and joys of other parts? Is the distinction
between instrumental values and intrinsic values final and absolute, or
is the distinction relative, so that things which are instrumental to the
purposes of others can nevertheless share in a life of intrinsic worth
of their own? Lotze is inclined to believe the latter, and here we approach
the most daring and fascinating parts of his speculations.

Lotze speculates that it is probable that there is an inner life in
all things, so that there is no part of Being that is devoid of life and animation. The most primitive form of reciprocal interaction in bodily movements is experienced by the soul as feeling. Feeling is the primordial inner form assumed by reciprocal interaction, which outwardly manifests itself as motion. Feelings of the most diverse sorts pervade the inner life of spirit. Lotze maintains that feeling is at the basis of all higher mental life and culture. Both morality and art must finally rest on feeling.

A considerable part of our higher human culture is the result of this pervading presence of feelings; it is the basis of imagination, whence spring works of art, and which make us capable of entering into natural beauty; for productive and reproductive power consists in nothing else than the delicacy of apprehension by which the mind is able to clothe the world of values in the world of form, or to become instinctively aware of the happiness concealed under the enveloping form. Lotze regards man as a microcosm or miniature model of the whole of reality. Men mirrors in the depths of his soul the whole range of existence. If we would understand the secret inner life of things, we must consult our own inner experience. Feeling is in this respect one of our surest guides as to the nature of things. It is through feeling the interpenetration of all things in nature that we come to learn of the underlying unity of all things.

The many sounds that animate the earth blend to the preoccupied or inattentive ear into mere noise; but the thoughtful listening that discriminates them recognizes in the several voices of nature utterances in which, though they are untranslatable into any other tongue, yet a mysterious inner nature of things speaks to us with all distinctness. Nature is then a systematic coherent unity of parts bound together by universal law. This plurality of the world is involved in a myriad of
relations, and each part is affected by these relations. Viewed from the outside, nature is one vast mechanism, but inner experience reveals it as participating in a vast inner life of its own. The inner life of the spirit unfolds into a republic of souls, just as external nature is disclosed as a plurality of things. The final unity of the world is revealed in reciprocal action and interpenetration of all things. But this final unity is not accomplished by insubstantial laws that hold sway over all reality, but by an infinite, eternal Substance which is the ground of all reciprocal interaction. This final ground of all reciprocal interaction, according to Lotze, is God.

The formulation of a cosmic spiritualism and teleology must finally consider the status of value in the world, and the relation of finite personality to God. It is to these problems that we turn in the next two chapters.
Kant asserted that two things never ceased to fill him with awe: the starry heavens above him and the moral law within him. This is a fitting description of the prevailing tone of Lotze's own philosophy. Our scientific description of the world is mechanistic, but our valuation of the world is teleological. Scientific explanation answers the question how, or the means by which things come to pass; but metaphysics is engaged with ends and considers the goals that are being realized in the world process. A positive estimate of the goals being realized in the world is what we mean by teleology. The really crucial issue for any teleology is contained in the question: What is the status of value in the cosmos? This is the central problem to which we now turn.

Lotze's analysis of human experience leads him to problems that are strikingly like those which confront the Kantian analysis of human experience. The scientific understanding is limited to the phenomenal world of possible experience. It deals and can deal only with a causally connected system of events in space and time. But our moral judgment, or "practical reason," in our everyday activity reveals a realm of values. Man's moral duties imply an objective realm of absolute values which are rooted in the very structure of the universe. The reality of the moral life of man requires the postulates of God, Freedom, and Immortality. Without them the moral struggle is reduced to an enigmatic illusion, and ethics loses its meaning. So for Kant, we have on one hand the phenomenal world of descriptive science and on the other hand the world of values. Kant's problem is the relation of the "realm of ends" to the phenomenal world. Do we have two worlds finally, or do we find that the two realms
are ultimately related in a single system? If the latter, what is the precise nature of their relation?

Lotze's analysis of experience reveals three distinct and irreducible components.

All our analysis of the cosmic order ends in leading back our thought to a consciousness of necessarily valid truths, our perception to the intuition of immediately given facts of reality, our conscience to the recognition of an absolute standard of all determinations of worth. 45

We note here a certain correspondence to Lotze's psychological analysis of the self. There are three irreducible elements in human psychology: cognition, volition, and feeling. Lotze despairs of finding any common denominator for these three activities of the soul. Cognition discovers necessarily valid truths; feeling in the form of perception intuits facts; while volition acts in accordance or with respect to an absolute standard of worth as revealed by conscience. At the close of a luminous analysis of human experience as involving mechanical nature and also a realm of value, Lotze says of his own theory: "After all, what satisfaction could this theory afford if it were unable to unite the two great contrasting parts that together make up the world -- Nature and the sphere of Ethics." 46 Lotze himself feels certain that the two are intimately related in a single whole, but he admits his inability to demonstrate this ultimate synthesis. This results in part form the insufficiency of human knowledge. But if Lotze is correct in maintaining the irreducible character of cognition, volition, and feeling, then we should never expect to synthesize universally valid truths, facts of perception, and our standards of worth, since cognition can never encompass the data of feeling and volition nor discharge their function. Lotze argues that this unity is intimated in moments of
aesthetic experience; but since, as we shall later find, the aesthetic experience rests on feeling, it is no more qualified than cognition to achieve this synthesis. Just as cognition fails to encompass feeling and volition, so feeling fails to encompass cognition. It has been maintained that Lotze's metaphysics poses the impossibility of ever uniting the two spheres of nature and of ethics; but this is questionable. Lotze's difficulties seem to spring from the fact that he did not take his own advice seriously in warning us against abstraction and slipping into the attitudes of a faculty psychology. Lotze insists upon the fundamental unity of the soul and tells us in the Microcosmus that we are to regard cognition, feeling, and volition as activities of a single soul. They are different ways in which the same soul apprehends one world in one life. It would appear that the natural solution suggesting itself for Lotze's problem is to recognize that necessary truths, and values, do merge to form a single whole in the concrete life of the self. There is, however, a fundamental problem which should not be obscured: the final compatibility of these three components in human experience. How do we pass from concrete fact to universally valid truths -- the Kantian problem of synthetic a priori judgments all over again -- and how does prediction in science accomplish the converse and pass from universal truths to concrete facts? Furthermore, fact often appears to be in conflict with our valuation of what the world ought to be. This poses the problem of evil for man. It is the harmonious integration of these three factors in this sense that Lotze despairs of accomplishing. But that value and nature form a single world in human experience is accepted much as Bernard Bosanquet later expressed it:

All finite minds focus and draw their detail from some particular sphere of external nature --- Every instinct
of what we call the lower creation, every feeling of joy, of energy, of love, even throughout the animal world, is the outcome of some set of external conditions as focused in life and mind, and is fitted to pass as their crown and climax into that complete experience which is the life of the whole.  

Value is experienced by finite persons in terms of feeling. Lotze includes both the good and the beautiful under the category of value. He also regards valid principles of logical inference as normative, and we may hazard the conjecture that this in part is the reason why he thinks that our highest felt yearnings cannot be finally opposed to the nature of the Real. The very principles of logical validity are also grounded in feeling as the medium for the apprehension of value. In treating of his theory of value, we must keep in mind that he never formulated a systematic axiology. Lotze left no treatise on ethics, and only a few articles treating of his theory of beauty. Unfortunately, he never clearly distinguished the good from the beautiful, and it is difficult to separate the two in his thought, although it is equally true that he never intended that the two should be too sharply separated. Lotze uses the term aesthetic in a somewhat loose fashion. Sometimes it even has its original reference to the sensuous content of experience.

Though Lotze's theory of value involves feeling, we should be careful not to confuse it with an emotive or subjectivist account of value. Value has both an objective and a subjective aspect. Values subjectively considered reside in feeling; but objectively considered they are ends conforming to the ultimate world-aim. They are thus never reducible to feelings without residue. Moreover, feeling for Lotze never meant bare emotion, but feeling pervaded by reason. Lotze called feeling in its capacity for apprehending value "reason appreciative of worth." Bare feeling itself is never a reliable guide to truth, beauty, or the good
for Lotze. Lotze takes the case of a sweet poison and points out that feeling only reports the immediate and local effect, neglecting the consequences. His phrase "reason appreciative of worth" points out an important distinction in his theory of value, for it indicates a strong rationalistic component in his view.

As was mentioned earlier, Lotze has been charged with professing a crudely hedonistic ethics, and there are some passages which give substance to the charge, but there are other factors that definitely rule out this interpretation. Lotze usually prefers the term happiness or enjoyment to pleasure in indicating its spiritual significance. Pleasure is only an index to value, and certainly not an infallible one. Lotze asserts that pleasure as an end in itself is a logical absurdity! Like John Stuart Mill, but with greater consistency, Lotze insists that there are qualitative differences in pleasures. These qualitative distinctions rest objectively on a scale of values which implies a gradational view of value. We must also recognize conscience as a factor in the moral life; it appears to be a rational principle resting on an original sense of obligation.

The final end of all reality or the ultimate purpose Lotze affirms to be "Eternal Blessedness." Blessedness along with the good and the beautiful combine to form "one complex of all that has value." The supreme principle of human conduct is Benevolence. We respond to feelings with judgments of value which estimate the social worth of the facts of experience. Our judgments of value are to be distinguished from feelings which occasion them. Value judgments (Beurtheilungen) organize our scale of values which serve to enlist the action of the personality through feelings. Values then are, in the fine phrase of A. N. Whitehead's, "objective lures for feeling." Value judgments, although oriented upon
individual feelings, tend to rise above egoistic self-interest. There is "a tendency to see in the nature of external things a virtue peculiar to themselves, an immediate worth or the reverse, recognized by our pain or pleasure, but not dependent on their presence." Feeling finally transcends the self in the higher reaches of the spiritual life and recognizes an objective intrinsic worth in things, i.e., it reveals a realm of objective values.

Lotze deals with anthropological and sociological data on these principles. He recognizes the variety of ethical customs that prevail in different cultures and at different historical periods, but does not draw the hasty conclusion that ethical values are merely relative. He admits that our ideas of right and wrong, as well as of the beautiful, are influenced by our culture; but they also transcend it. Conscience is essentially social in derivation and it reflects the prevailing values of the time; but conscience embodies the hard won value discoveries of man. There is real progress in history in the discovery of values, and these insights into the objective moral order become incorporated into the social conscience. But the good for Lotze is always in the highest degree personal. To be spiritual is for Lotze to exist for self, and value can only exist for a spirit which is capable of apprehending it. Values alone without reference to spiritual personality are simply meaningless. We see how far Lotze is moving in the direction of an ethics of self-realization. But Lotze falls short of such an ethics by his failure to see what it does and does not entail. He thinks that an ethics of self-realization is committed to an egoistic view of life. He protests that "the self-enjoyment of one's own fair personality" can never be the true end of life. Apparently the term self-realization is a source of confusion for him. An ethics of self-realization must insist upon the socially shareable character of the
higher values. Such an ethics does have a healthy sane regard for the welfare of the individual personality, but this is also a universal respect extending to all persons. It follows Kant's maxim: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only." 52 The French used to reflect this difference in their everyday language. *Amour propre* referred to a sort of base selfishness and had a definitely unsavory connotation, whereas *amour de soi* referred to self-regard or normal self-consideration and implied no opprobrium. Had Lotze paused to consider this possibility, he may have been led to formulate an ethics of self-realization himself.

Lotze's criticism of formalism as an ethical theory is instructive. He protests that it is abstractly empty and cannot possibly serve as a guide in our everyday moral life. Our individual acts must be evaluated with reference to their harmony with an ultimate cosmic goal. This can never be done unless we consider the general consequences of an act. But on behalf of formalism, it should be remarked that the cosmic goal cannot be indifferent to the goals of finite personality. It is inevitable that we judge the cosmic goal by the extent to which it takes cognizance of our intrinsic human values. Failure to take seriously human values would constitute good grounds for atheism!

When we turn to consider Lotze's treatment of the problem of evil, we are greatly disappointed. He is indeed aware of the problem, but he regards it as insoluble for finite minds. We are baffled with the problem because the great plan of the universe is hidden in its detail from us. But Lotze is convinced that the universe is dominated by the Idea of the Good, which will prevail. "All metaphysical truth consists only in the forms which must be assumed by a world that depends upon the principle of the Good." 53
Lotze warns us that although the *Summum Bonum* guarantees the validity of all metaphysical principles upon which the world depends, we cannot convert the axiom into a principle of cognition and profitably employ it as a major premise from which to deduce the sum of all metaphysical truth. What stands in the way of such inferences is the fact that although we know the ultimate cosmic goal, we do not know the best possible means by which it may be realized in finite persons. Our ignorance in this regard results in our arrogant impatience with the obscure means employed by God in achieving the general good. Lotze's attitude here tends to assume that stubborn benediction of actuality which marked the well-known lines of Alexander Pope with their insensitiveness to the depths of moral and physical evil:

Submit: in this or any other sphere,
Secure to be as blessed as thou canst bear;
Safe in the hand of one disposing power,
Or in the natal or the mortal hour.
All nature is but art unknown to thee,
All chance, direction which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good;
And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite,
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right. 54

Such a summary dismissal of one of the major problems of value theory is certainly disappointing; one feels that Lotze's arguments for teleology are seriously impaired by this omission. In view of his inadequate treatment of the problem of evil, Lotze's ethical argument for the existence of God, his confident assertion that the Highest Good directs the mechanism of the world, appears to be an enormous *circulus in probando*.

Lotze's inspiration that the world is governed by a divine and absolute Good is largely drawn from his rich aesthetic experience. The discordant tones which we perceive in the world, moral and physical evil, are at least
partially resolved and mitigated in those moments when beauty enters into our life. We can better appreciate Lotze's firm assurance that the Good is the kernel of the Real, if we now turn to consider his aesthetics.

Lotze and Vischer have been credited with introducing the theory of *Einfühlung* (translated "empathy" by Titchener) into aesthetics. 55 This theory, better known to us in Lipps' statement of it, seeks to account for our experience of beauty by maintaining that the perception of works of art is never a purely passive and contemplative process. To treat the aesthetic experience as passive contemplation of objects that is attended with feelings of satisfaction is to obscure those features of the aesthetic experience that serve to distinguish it from intellectual and religious contemplation. There is a dynamic factor in the aesthetic moment that is quite unique. We become aware of this dynamic feature when we attend to the motor processes involved in the perception of satisfying works of art. The apprehension of a painting, a piece of sculpture, or a symphony may all involve tactual and motor images. A musical composition may be pervaded with tactual imagery; certain measures suggest the smoothness of satin or the softness of velvet. We frequently speak of tones that are soft and of melodies that are smooth. Were we attentive to the attitudes assumed in listening to music and looking at paintings, we would observe kinesthetic changes in bodily feeling associated with muscular tonus. The dynamic tension of the muscles with their incipience towards movement constitutes a major factor in the conveyance of a particular feeling or mood as embodied in a work of art. Our eyes in passing over the contours of the Laocoön set up muscular tensions and strains in the body that convey to us the impression of an intense struggle being enacted before us.

This is the basis for the identification of the self with the aesthetic object. It enables us to enter into the object of our contemplation
sympathetically. The grace and charm of much of classical sculpture may be attributed to the continuous imperceptible merging of the bodily contours which set up no sharp tensions in our bodily musculature. The mood of mystery and impending violence in some of Turner's sea-scenes seems to be associated with the fact that there are no sharp breaks in the contours of the foreground, but as we pass into perspective the lines of the waves become sharper though fainter and subtly fuse with dark amorphous masses of clouds. This creates the impression of calmness in the foreground and of tension and turbulence in the background. The faintness of the sharper lines that yields the perspective also results in our straining to make them out, and this resembles peering into the distance or the darkness and may aid in suggesting mystery.

Lotze regards the aesthetic experience as the most intimate form of reciprocal interaction among things. In such moments, we are in sympathetic rapport with the innermost nature of things. We are not merely projecting our feelings into things, but we enter into the secret inner feelings of others. The progressive action of feeling ourselves into something (Sich in etwas einfühlen) constitutes the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic experience makes a man feel at home in the universe by revealing the two as made for each other (Füreinandersein). Beauty is the structure of the world felt as a harmony. Beauty thus has the impress of subjectivity upon it, but this is only in its terminal aspect for us as subjects. Beauty also has its objective aspect in its grounding in the nature of things.

Yet our judgments of the beauty of things is not a mere mechanical assent to them extracted from us by nature. The aesthetic worth of types of order and relation depend on the values we assign to them in judgment. This act of valuation by the personality does not hang on a measuring of physical proportions, and hence beauty eludes all calculation. Degrees of
beauty are qualitative differences within a larger genus, and not quantitative differences.

Perhaps we are now in a better position to understand Lotze's romantic emphasis on the role of feeling in man's understanding of the world. Feelings are never merely subjective caprices bereft of all moorings in the objective world of nature. Feeling is the mode by which finite spirit communes with finite spirit and with the infinite Spirit in an act of immediacy. It is the vehicle of beauty, not beauty itself. It intervenes as the effect of beauty, although temporally for us it is prior to beauty. To beauty is assigned the role of synthesizing universal principles, fact, and value into a harmonious whole.

We can therefore designate beauty— as the appearance to immediate intuition of a unity amongst those three powers which our cognition is unable completely to unite.

This unity reveals a cosmic spiritualism and teleology.

This is at the very core of Lotze's theory of music. Music is the representation to spirit of physical movement. In its movement of tones it reflects the varied movements of the world: its rapidity and slowness, its smoothness and abruptness, its continuities and discontinuities, its massiveness and its sparseness. The sublime in music is the reflection of the great movements that pass through the universe. Dvořák, the composer of the popular "Humoresque," jotted it down while traveling in a railway car and listening to the movement of the wheels on the rails. Listening to the melody will easily recall similar railway trips of your own. But what of the movements of the pilgrims in Wagner's "Tannhäuser?" Can you not hear echoes of resolute stirrings in the cosmic Soul? Lotze's ready critics of his "complacent optimism" had perhaps best
pause and recall their own experiences with music before passing stern judgment. Lotze would have readily endorsed Edmund Spenser's resolute affirmation:

That beauty is not, as fond men misdeem,
An outward show of things, that only seem. 58

The reality of values is absolutely essential to Lotze's cosmic teleology. But he cannot be content to rest with having established the reality of values. The problem of the relation of value to mechanism now appears in a fresh perspective. Do values present real alternatives to the careers of finite spirits? If the moral struggle in the life of man is to be taken seriously, are we not bound to answer this question in the affirmative? Then to what extent does the presence of value in the world introduce an element of contingency into things? If values are to be significantly realized in the life of man, then human freedom seems to be a necessary corollary of value.

We can see the import of the issue if we pause to consider Santayana's separation of the realms of existence and essence. 59 Values are ideal realities belonging to the realm of essence, while nature or the realm of existence consists of matter and mechanical law. Only matter is empowered with causal efficacy and can determine the course of history. We behold values in the realm of essence in moments of contemplative vision as in a dream. Values engage our aesthetic sense, but not our lives. Values are powerless to exert any influence in the realm of existence; they cast only a pale radiance of "narcotic charm" across the face of existence. Santayana warns us not to mistake our attractive ideals for the harsh conditions of material existence. Man rooted in mechanical nature is powerless to realize his ideals, unless by happy chance it should be so decreed by
mechanical nature. The moral life of man must be a futile illusion. This intolerable situation created by Santayana's emasculated Platonism is not countenanced by Lotze's metaphysics.

Teleology alone, however, is no guarantee of real freedom for the life of spirit. We should consider Bergson's grave warning:

The doctrine of teleology in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibniz for example, implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism.

Lotze's criticism of Leibniz's monadology is based on considerations similar to those of Bergson. The doctrine of pre-established harmony implies a relentless determinism for each monad. The monads being denied any reciprocal interaction among themselves must be eternally adapted to all changes that transpire in the other monads. Each monad simply mirrors the whole of nature from its individual perspective. Lotze protests that since the process of mirroring and adaptation by each monad is a passive submission to a pre-established harmony, Leibniz's cosmology becomes an inane activism. It denies to the monads the joy of active realization of freely chosen ends. Such a world, he frequently repeats, would gain nothing by being realized. Individuality cannot be completely sacrificed to the demands of the cosmic whole. Finite spirits have an intrinsic worth of their own; they cannot be merely instrumental to the goals of an indifferent cosmic spirit. Lotze is intent upon the preserving of the dignity of individual human worth in his metaphysics. Unfortunately, he devotes little attention to the concept of personality in relation to value and freedom. What little analysis he does give the idea is entirely too
abstractly formal. However, his chapter on the meaning of history in the Microcosmus insists that history is of individuals and for individuals. No philosophy of history can afford to obscure the role and worth of each individual person in history. The worth of personality demands a degree of self-determination by each person.

That in the actual passage of events something should actually come to pass, something new which previously was not; that history should be something more than a translation into time of the eternally complete content of an ordered universe—this is a deep and irresistible demand of our spirit, under the influence of which we all act in life. Without its satisfaction the world would be, not indeed unthinkable and self-contradictory, but meaningless and incredible. 61

Lotze insists that the perceptual facts of change, and the processes of change which are the objects of both scientific and historical study compel us to take time seriously. Time, like space, characterizes the phenomenal world of our perception and is an ordering relation for sense contents. But time is also a representation of real relations in the world. It originates in the changes which occur in things. Objectively considered, it is a relation within things; subjectively considered, it is a symbolic structuring of the felt relations among things. Time cannot be dismissed as an illusory appearance of eternity to finite minds. Lotze, like Bergson after him, objects to the assimilation of time to space. 62 Our intellectual representations are all too apt to spatialize time in treating it as a geometrical figure such as a straight line, or after the analogy of a moving stream. Lotze would have us speak of time as in things, not of things as in time. Unfortunately, he does not pursue this line of thought any further, and he fails to exploit it in his discussions of freedom.

Genuine novelty and freedom are required in some sense to render history a real drama and not a puppet show. Yet Bergson seems at times to
prize novelty for its own sake and to exult in the aimless wanderings of spirit. Lotze regards freedom as necessary to the realization of purposes by persons. But the very possibility of reaching these ends rests on an intelligible order of nature upon which spirit can rely in choosing its aims.

It is curious in this regard that Lotze never dealt with the problem of evolution. But as James Ward has pointed out, Lotze would deny that the facts of evolution afford any basis for tychism, or any radical fortuity in nature. He examines the theory that the present mechanical world-order has originated out of a primordial chaos and concludes that it is improbable. This theory supposes an original abyss of indefinite possibility which spontaneously gives rise to the forms actualized in the course of evolution. But Lotze asserts that an original abyss of sheer possibility is an abstraction without metaphysical efficacy, hence it could not serve to bring a thing out of its dormant potentiality and into concrete realization. Things then are not chance products cast up on the shores of existence by the tide of evolution. Things are partly determined to rise to actuality by something inherent in the primordial world-ground, and this he finds to be God.

Nevertheless he does not exclude all possibility of chance from the world. He thinks it quite probable that absolutely new beginnings are introduced into the world where they are then subjected to the mechanical action of the whole. This concession to basic fortuity seems to be in contradiction with the rest of Lotze's metaphysics. True, the appearance of new beginnings in the world becomes subject to the mechanical action of the whole; but we may ask, where do they originate? Lotze never undertakes to answer this question. If these things or events were originally related to the order of nature, they must have been subject to the mechanical
order of the whole from the very beginning. If they were originally unrelated to the rest of the world, they have the character of Herbartian "reals" which Lotze has explicitly repudiated.

We may raise the question as to what extent finite persons are independent of the infinite Spirit or the Absolute. An interesting passage in the Philosophy of Religion maintains that finite persons do initiate new processes that do not proceed from the Absolute. Lotze's essential analysis of a thing leads him to ascribe to all things some degree of self-determination. The manner in which a thing reacts to the conditions in its environment is in part determined by external circumstances and in part by the nature of the participating things. There is clear evidence here of a strain of monadism in Lotze's thinking. Causal efficacy finally resides in the nature of each individual thing. What else do we mean by freedom but the ability to express our true individuality?

This notion of the ability to freely express our individuality is also related closely to Lotze's doctrine of conatus which is derived from Spinoza. Each individual thing endeavors to persist in its own individuality and to impress its individuality upon the world. There are certain felt needs peculiar to the nature of each individual thing. There is a dynamic urge to satisfy these needs and to realize completely the individuality of the self. But this impetus in all things is not to be identified with the blind insatiate world-will of Schopenhauer. The internal relatedness of the whole of reality means that there is no genuine individuality apart from the cosmic whole. The impetus in individual things to satisfy the needs of their nature is the command to discover the true self in the nature of the whole. Needs require us to divest ourselves of hermetic discreteness and enter into the life of others. Our own peculiar individuality is also the contribution of those things with which we enter into
intimate communion. The societal relations of spirits give history a
dramatic meaning and make the world truly "a vale of soul-making," in
the words of Keats. This is what makes society a true community rather
than a mere aggregate of individuals.

Lotze's philosophy emphasizes the practical demands of spiritual
life. His cosmic spiritualism is also an ethical idealism. The concept
of conatus expresses the subordination of mechanism to value and individ¬
uality; Spirit's great defeats are signalized by the triumph of mechanism
over individuality. "A moth's self-immolation makes an uncanny impression
on us, because its feeble individuality is so dominated by its phototropic
automatism in the presence of a flame." This concept of conatus also
raises the ultimate issue of human destiny, the problem of immortality.
To what extent is finite personality destined to prevail over the mechanism
of nature? Or does death really signalize the final triumph of mechanism
over the individuality of persons?

Lotze never treats the problem of immortality thoroughly. He regards
the problem as an issue in value and individuality, rather than an issue
to be resolved by an appeal to an ontological dialectic. Immortality is
not so much an inalienable property of the soul; it is an achievement by
the individual in his course of self-realization. A teleological spiritual¬
ualism admits of only one principle in deciding personal immortality.
"Every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance
belongs to the meaning of the world ---" but "we certainly do not know
the merits which may give to one existence a claim to eternity, nor the
defects which may deny it to others." 66

The charge has been made against Lotze that his metaphysics has no
provision for immortality, although it is clear from his own statement
that he regarded his metaphysics as consistent with the possibility of
immortality. In order to evaluate the criticisms that have been leveled at Lotze, we must first examine his account of the relation of finite persons to the Absolute.

Lotze throughout his writings identifies personality with the soul. Each soul is an individual substance in virtue of the unity of consciousness. This unity of conscious life is nowhere paralleled in the physical world of material aggregates, and so we must regard it as a spiritual substance distinct from material substance. But how are we to understand the term substance? We have noted that Lotze denies the existence of material substance in the pre-Kantian sense and regards it as a phenomenalistic construct from certain uniform properties exhibited by percepts. Likewise, as we would expect, he repudiates the notion of a soul substance as a self-existent soul-atom. The category of substance is applied to the behavior of that which gives the appearance of acting as a substance, i.e., as a self-identical subject. The soul is a spiritual substance for the simple reason that it knows itself as this identical subject.

But the unity of our conscious life is never complete, and to that extent we fall short of being persons. The category of personality applies only conditionally and in a very restricted sense to finite spirits. God is the only completely real person, with complete unity of consciousness. Finite spirits and the world of things are in reciprocal interaction; and this, so Lotze argues, requires an infinite Spiritual Substance as its ground. The interrelatedness of things in reciprocal interaction demands the sort of unity which we find manifest only in consciousness. Therefore, this infinite substance must be self-conscious Spirit; and since there is nothing outside it, its self-consciousness must be complete. The ground of Being or the Absolute is thus a Spiritual Person, and furthermore it is the unique instance of personality. Lotze's doctrine of personality
evoked many critical reactions, especially by British idealistic philosophers. The problems he raised were explored and developed systematically in an important Symposium of the Aristotelian Society as well as in some systematic treatises. It seems to be appropriate to examine here in some detail these comments and criticisms, as they indicate important directions of thought that were either outlined or suggested by Lotze's interpretation of personality.

Stout maintained that Lotze is finally forced to regard his originally monadic units or things as modes of an infinite Substance. The only unity which Lotze finds in a thing lies in its inner being; but since things are receptive to each other, the resulting world-order is possible only if they are immanent in a single all-embracing mind.

McTaggart agreed with Stout and detected a fundamental contradiction in Lotze's metaphysics. On the one hand, Lotze treats the individuality of conscious beings as something which tends to separate them from God, and not as something which expresses their unity with Him. But, on the other hand, he makes the finite world God's manifestation rather than his creation. McTaggart argued that the unity of a whole does not depend on its plurality in the same sense that a plurality depends on the unity of the whole. Consequently, God could manifest himself in other selves, and no self is then essential to the world. Since, as McTaggart believed, the existence of a Creator would unsettle the belief in human immortality, which he firmly maintained, he was led to atheism.

Before examining the validity of McTaggart's criticism, let us turn to the criticisms of Bernard Bosanquet, who found just the reverse error in Lotze. Bosanquet judged Lotze guilty of testing his abstractions too literally and inadvertently committing himself to an irremediable pluralism. Bosanquet asked where in our analysis of a thing do we arrive at
Following Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, he asserted that the ultimate subject of any proposition must always be Reality. "When this is considered, we are driven to treat highly subordinate existences as adjectival to their superordinate existences." Consequently, we must regard finite individuals as possessing an adjectival, rather than a substantival, mode of existence.

Bosanquet declared that Lotze is interesting in this respect because he follows Herbert and cannot relinquish the idea of a soul-atom or substance which "acts out of itself." Bosanquet continued to point out that our unity of self is a "puzzle and unrealized aspiration." It is a demand of the moral self, but we cannot find it in existence. Moreover, finite spirit goes astray when it believes itself to have a self-centered independent existence. This is the essence of sin, man's self-alienation from the Absolute. The moral self must will the "universal object," since it alone is free from contradiction. Treating individual existence as self-substantial results in the attitude expressed by Swinburne in his prologue to *Songs Before Sunrise*: "Because man's soul is man's god still."

Bosanquet is not only denying unrelatedness but also "co-ordinate relatedness."

Pringle-Pattison rejoined that the denial of "co-ordinate relatedness" does not imply an adjectival theory of the self. It is true that individuals do qualify the whole to which they belong, but they are nonetheless individuals. He agreed with Stout that Bosanquet had confused whole and part with substance and accident. Everything is concretely a unique "this." Stout agreed with Bosanquet that "What is a character of a part is *eo ipso* and *pro tanto* a character of the whole." Yet Stout maintained that what is required to be proved on Bosanquet's account of the self is not only that all adjectives of the part are adjectives of the whole, but that
the part itself is an adjective. The second proposition does not follow from the first. The dog is not identical with its tail and the universe is not identical with the dog, and in general "the whole cannot be identified with its part." 78 So although it is true that a thing is nothing apart from its relations to the whole, the converse is also true. "The relatedness of a thing is nothing apart from its nature." Relations require something which is related. A grain of sand is not "merged and overwhelmed by the Sahara of which it is a part." 79 Stout's criticism is very much to the point, and it vindicates Lotze's own position. As we have seen, Lotze maintained that a thing is determined in part by its relations, and in part by the nature of the individual thing so related.

Pringle-Pattison, who concurred with Stout's criticism of Bosanquet, pointed out that Bosanquet's criticism is really applicable to McTaggart rather than to Lotze. It is McTaggart who held to the notion of eternal soul substances, and that is why he thought Lotze guilty of making individuals only modes of the Absolute. McTaggart's criticism is actually more applicable to Bosanquet than to Lotze. It is McTaggart who is guilty of "co-ordinate relatedness" in his failure to see that a thing is partly determined by its relation to the whole. Pringle-Pattison quoted Lotze with evident approval on this score:

So far and so long as the soul knows itself as this identical Subject, it is, and is named, simply for that reason, substance. The attempt to find its capacity of thus knowing itself in the numerical unity of another underlying substance is not a process of reasoning which merely fails to find an admirable aim; it has no aim at all. That which is not only conceived by others as unity in multiplicity, but knows and makes itself good as such, is, simply on that account, the truest and most indivisible unity there can be. 80

McTaggart was puzzled as to why Lotze should object to individual immortality
on the ground that it implies the "highly improbably and strange idea of pre-existence." 81 Actually Lotze objected to an immortality that implies pre-existence, and his reasons are not far to be found. Pre-existence, as Pringle-Pattison suggested, is a corollary of immortality only on the view that "finite selves --- possess an inherent and inalienable immortality" as "unitary and indiscernible substances." 82 Lotze, like Pringle-Pattison, thought that Kant had dealt the death-knell to any such view.

But if McTaggart's criticism failed of application to Lotze, there is a very real sense in which it applied to Bosanquet. Bosanquet emphasised relatedness to the exclusion of the terms related. Individuals as adjectives are related to the Absolute in a way in which they are not related to each other; two adjectives as adjectives must be related in a sense different from the relation of one part of the Absolute to another, since the Absolute does not admit of parts. The result is that we have a complex of relations with nothing which is related. Lotze and Pringle-Pattison would not sacrifice individuality before the altar of that "logical transparency," the Absolute. Pringle-Pattison pointed out that sin and error are impossible according to Bosanquet's view. How can I as a mode of the Absolute oppose it? How can anything other than the "universal object" of which Bosanquet speaks be willed? The facts of error and sin would seem to be contradictory appearances which even the all-absorbing Absolute must fail to reconcile.

Bosanquet agreed with Lotze in maintaining that the soul develops pari passu with the organization of the body. 81 But Bosanquet had the added advantage of emphasising the role of individual realization by the self. In reference to the individuality of the self, he says, "Its real character consists not in individuality, but in a claim to it." 83 He
regarded cosmic development as the progressive articulation and realization of the parts in the whole, where "the rule is for the stream to rise higher than the source." Lotze seemed to differ from Bosanquet in maintaining that the particular can will the universal consistently. The universal is realized and embodied in the particular. The individual is not a manifestation of the Absolute as a monotonous repetition of the universal. Man as a microcosm mirrors the universe in a unique manner, and therein consists the individuality of the self. To understand the infinite fullness of Being, we must understand individuality and finitude. Lotze resembles Goethe in this respect.

Wouldst thou in the infinite abide,
Seek it in the finite on every side.

Lotze's position suffered from his failure to treat adequately of the problem of individuality in his statement of the relation of finite persons to the infinite Person. This is a defect which we have seen him to share with certain other idealists. Precisely at this point Josiah Royce is most instructive. Royce was nearer to the position of Lotze than either Bosanquet or McTaggart. He suggested a way of viewing the relation of finite persons to the Absolute which reconciles the claims of individuality and personal immortality with the notion of the Absolute. Royce followed Leibniz in his doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles and asserted that to exist is to be different from the rest of the world of existences. Stout maintained that we are justified in believing in a future life only in so far as the universe is a teleological order directed to the fulfillment of value. Royce maintained that the crux of the whole matter lies in a recognition of the relation of value to individual persons. "Values are of, for, or in a person." Love attaches itself to the individual
and not to an abstract universal. Each individual as an irreplaceable and
induplicable "this" is a center for the realization of value in a unique
way, and contributes its individuality and its peculiar worth to the whole.
McTaggart was wrong when he maintained that every self as a mode of the
Absolute is thus equally dispensable. Both individuality and the infinity
of the Absolute are aspects of Being. Neither is to be regarded as prior
to the other. "In God you possess your individuality." Royce asserted
that the axiom that the part cannot be equal to the whole does not apply
to infinite systems. There are "finite infinites" and there are "infinite
infinites." The relation of persons to God is that of "finite infinites"
to the infinite Infinite that includes them all. The self may recognize
in God its own fulfillment, while still clearly distinguishing other
selves within the Absolute. "And the One and the Many are so reconciled,
in this account, that the Absolute Self, even in order to be a Self at all,
has to express itself in an endless series of individual acts, so that it
is explicitly an Individual Whole of Individual Elements." Royce was led to formulate a conditional immortality which depends
on how "completely and adequately" an individual "realizes and expresses
a purpose." The moral career of a real person is never completed,
and logically requires eternity for its endless realization. There seems
to be nothing in Lotze's metaphysics which would prevent such an inter-
pretation of the relation of finite persons to the infinite Person. And
his emphasis on the integrity of individual selves would seem to indicate
that he would be favorably disposed to such a resolution of the problem.
But this has led us far into the subject of our last chapter, Lotze's
conception of God as the fulfillment of his cosmic teleology.
It is now time to examine more closely what Lotze understands by the Absolute, the infinite Substance. As has been noted already, Lotze begins his metaphysical inquiries with the apparent plurality of the world as given to us in perception. Experience teaches us that there are both similarity and diversity in the world of things. Similar things behave in the same fashion in the same set of circumstances. Similar things constitute a class of things; dissimilar things belong to diverse classes. The things of the world are suffering incessant change. The changes of the world proceed according to universal laws. Such change we call mechanism, and mean thereby to deny capricious spontaneity. Laws are formulated with respect to the conditions in which a thing is placed. The changes which a thing undergoes are correlated with the conditions to which it is subjected. Consequently, the relations in which a thing stands have a peculiar relevance to the way a thing changes. But things belonging to diverse classes will undergo different changes in the same set of circumstances.

Lotze concludes that all change results from the interplay of two factors: (1) the unique inner nature of the thing which changes, and (2) its relation to the unique natures of other things as immediate contributory causes. As in the case of any chemical reaction, two or more diverse things will undergo change together. Thus change involves reciprocal interaction of diverse things. Lotze reduces the varieties of relatedness to instances of reciprocal interaction. The reciprocal interaction of diverse things is an evident fact of experience, but how are we to account for this fact? Lotze speaks of the "sympathetic rapport" or receptiveness of the inner nature of things. But this is descriptive of the fact and not
explanatory. If all change is determined by the inner nature of things and the relations in which they stand, and if furthermore all relatedness is analysable into forms of reciprocal interaction, then change involves only diversity in reciprocity. But this again describes the fact of change and does not explain how this reciprocity among things is possible. A thing is all that it becomes, and all that it becomes is potentially present in what it is. The actuality of a thing is its present existence as determined by its relations to other things. What attains to actuality is determined by all its environing relations, and its status in actuality is sustained by these relations. The nexus of relations which sustains one state in actuality suppresses the other possible states of a thing in potentiality. But how do basic attributes of things modify each other in a terminal act of immediacy? Here we are brought to a metaphysical conclusion important for our present problem. Lotze answers that this reciprocity in all change requires an infinite underlying substance as the ground of this relatedness.

This emphasis on the inner nature of things betrays a strong monadistic strain in Lotze's metaphysics. This raises the problem of reconciling a plurality of individuals with their unity in a comprehensive monism. Russell asserts that, "A monism is necessarily pantheistic, and a monadism, when it is logical, is as necessarily atheistic." 90 McTaggart likewise maintains that once we recognize the universe as a system which possesses spiritual significance and value, there is no need of a directing mind to account for the traces of order in it. 91 Indeed McTaggart does follow his monadism to an atheistic conclusion. The universe is a society of persons, but it is not itself a person. Despite many metaphysical disagreements, McTaggart and Russell both argue that order is an immanent and natural feature of the world, and hence we cannot infer a cosmic mind that
does the ordering. We should note that this does not in itself establish atheism. It is only a severe criticism of the teleological argument. Lotze agreed that order is an immanent feature of the world of things, and he too rejects the usual formulation of the argument from design in nature. But by order we mean change according to universal laws, and this, so Lotze has argued, involves reciprocal interaction. It is inconceivable that discrete monads should causally interact in any way. How can an atheistic monadology account for change and the apparent fact of interaction? In terms of this theory, such interaction must remain a baffling and ultimate fact opaque to human understanding. Lotze demands a sufficient reason for the fact of reciprocal interaction, and he finds it in his infinite underlying Substance.

Pantheism and monadism are not two mutually exclusive and exhaustive metaphysical positions. A strict monadism is unable to account for change, and likewise a pantheism that maintains the eternal and immutable character of the Absolute is committed to a denial of the reality of change. Lotze takes the position that the reality of change requires us to deny both theses: that the world is only manifold, and that the world is only one. The world is both one and many, and the relation of the many to the one gives rise to change. Change is possible only if the world is both one and many at once. The world is manifold because in it individuality is real and not mere appearance. The world is unitary because it can include real changes without losing its basic active nature. Since changes are real, individuality involves relatedness and dependence; since individuality is real, change involves self-preserving unity. Lotze regards Being as self-maintaining movement. The world is finally and irretrievably dynamic, but it is a dynamism with order and continuity of patterns in which the past survives in the present. We find such a self-conserving
unity in the midst of change when we turn to the conscious life of spirit. Spirit is that which exists distinctively and has a conscious unity of its own. Thus the world is a plurality of spirits or persons. But they are not complete persons, since they do not possess full conscious unity. The unity of the world exhibited in its relatedness is the conscious unity of an infinite Spirit. The unity of this Spirit is complete; it alone has full Personality. The plurality of finite spirits is immanent in one Absolute Spirit. God is thus more than the chief Person, primus inter pares; He is the ultimate unity of the world.

For Lotze, there is no finite reality that is ultimately apart from God. The world is immanent in God, not external to Him. The doctrine of the mutual transcendence of the world and God would maintain that things have a real existence essentially independent of the immanent Infinite. But Lotze thinks that the individuality of finite persons consists in their own existence as finitely distinguishable. There are unique finite selves, and they are ultimately one in God. This leads Lotze to the conception of degrees of reality:

Beings, detaching themselves from the Infinite with varying wealth and unequal complexity of self-existence are Real in different degrees, while all continue to be immanent in the Infinite. 92

The conception of degrees of reality and degrees of perfection, together with the mutual relatedness of all things in their "sympathetic rapport," leads Lotze to the idea of the great chain of being.

McTaggart has accused Lotze of leaping the gulf from the metaphysical Absolute to a personal God. 93 But Lotze maintained that for any metaphysics which regards value as central in the world the Absolute must be conceived in terms of personality. This is the basis for Lotze's rejection
of the traditional arguments for the existence of God. The cosmological and teleological arguments at most succeed in establishing the metaphysical attributes of unity, eternity, omnipresence, and omnipotence. But such a metaphysical Absolute is not available as an object for religious devotion. We must in addition to these metaphysical attributes establish the ethical attributes of Deity: wisdom, justice, and holiness. These attributes are reflected in the valuational experiences of man. The ethical, aesthetic, and religious experience of man affords him the conviction of a personal, living God who realizes the values of history.

Lotze objects to the barren Hegelian deification of philosophical reason such as we find in this expression of McTaggart's: "No religion is justified unless based on metaphysics. This involves that religion is justified for few people." Only in our recognition of the value character of the world can we conclude a personal God. In this respect, abstract and formal dialectic can be no substitute for the wealth of concrete value experience. Lotze denies that there are progressive stages in the manifestation of Absolute Spirit. Art and religion do not find their culmination in philosophy. All three activities are integral parts of life, and they are complementary phases of man's experience.

Lotze is interested in examining the traditional arguments for the existence of God in the light of his own metaphysical presuppositions. The cosmological proof infers from the contingent and conditioned character of everything in the world the existence of a necessary and unconditioned Being. It asserts that only a perfect Being can be unconditioned. Lotze argues that God cannot be treated as though he were under any necessity to exist. Thought can never discern any efficacy external to God that could determine Him to exist. Lotze recognizes only relative necessity. There is nothing which is necessary and of which the non-existence is impossible,
except the conditioned, which as consequent or effect is determined by some antecedent cause. The notion of a being which is in and by itself, conditioned by nothing external to it, and yet under necessity to exist, is sheer fantasy. Lotze prefers a revised version of the cosmological argument. Contingency and necessity also have a valuational significance which is pertinent to the question of God's existence. The contingent is that which exists but has no significance for the sake of which it need exist. The necessary is not something which must be, but that which has such unconditional value that it seems in virtue of this value to deserve also unconditional existence. God is the Supreme Reality which ought to exist. Now if with Lotze we are committed to a cosmic teleology where value is regarded as ultimately determinative of fact, then we must recognize the existence of that Supreme Efficacy which makes for Good. Only a conscious Spirit can sustain the order of value and make it assume the guise of concrete actuality in fact.

Just as Kant was impressed by the teleological argument for the existence of God, so likewise was Lotze impressed by the ontological argument. Lotze agreed with Kant that we cannot deduce existence from the analysis of any idea. The idea of God is indeed the idea of the greatest Being conceivable, and this idea must involve existence among its attributes. But this is merely to argue that we must conceive of the most perfect being possible as existing, but to conceive of Him as existing is not to guarantee His existence in fact. Lotze insists that the ontological argument must be supplemented by the argument from perfection. Values are objective realities, and they constitute a scale of perfections which ascend to the Ultimate or Supreme Perfection. This Supreme Perfection must exist, since it is the ultimate standard of all our judgments of what is better or worse. This Supreme Perfection is also the metaphysical
Infinite. Albert the Great gave eloquent expression to this Platonic vision of the Perfection at the core of reality. "All creatures cry out to us that there is a God; for the beauties of the world bear witness to a supreme beauty, its sweets to a supreme sweetness, what is highest in it to something higher than all, what is pure to purity itself." 97

Lotze concurred in this belief that the God of religious devotion is revealed in man's experience of values that always point to a greater worth beyond themselves. But what is it that justifies the identification of the Absolute of metaphysics with the God of religious devotion? Lotze answered that this is the outcome of the philosophic quest to contemplate life integrally. The demand of life itself is for a unified vision of the world which leads to "this attempt to blend the Existent and the Worthy into the notion of the living God ...." 98

The circular reasoning involved in these arguments is obvious. The problem of evil returns to haunt Lotze's reflections. The world is affirmed to be ultimately good, for God exists and He is infinitely benevolent. But now God is affirmed to exist since He is required to sustain the realm of value, and He is the absolute measure of all perfection. Granted the reality of value and of a greatest perfection this may fall far short of the Perfection required for religious devotion. Lotze was aware of his difficulty and did not regard his arguments as conclusive demonstrations. The existence of God is an affirmation of faith based on the reality and worth of the highest goals of human aspiration.

Lotze strongly protested the attempts of Fichte to substitute an objective moral order for a personal God. He argued that an objective moral order is impotent to sustain itself in history. Values have genuine meaning only in reference to Spirit. Only an infinite Spiritual Person can realize the supra-individual values of history.
It has been objected that the Absolute cannot be a Person, since personality is a social category; it involves self-consciousness and this requires a non-ego. Now since there is nothing external to the Absolute there can be no non-ego for it. Lotze agreed that there is no non-ego for God, but denied that a non-ego is necessary to the existence of God as a Person. Only finite persons require a non-ego for existence. The finite ego does require an environment, and it is dependent upon it for its data of sense. The finite ego does require the non-ego in order for it to know itself as ego, since it discriminates itself as ego only on the background of a contrasting non-ego. But the infinite Person is self-subsisting and is dependent upon nothing else for its existence. Furthermore, He experiences the life of the world as part of the fullness of its own life. The non-ego is a necessary condition for finite persons to recognize themselves as persons, but it is not a necessary condition for being a person. There is no non-ego for God, but God's personality does not require it. The ambiguity in Lotze's use of the term personality, as finite and as infinite, is evident here.

Lotze also objected to a pantheism that regards spirit as the "bloom on the stem of matter." Spirit must be taken as the ultimate fact of the world; all else is derivative. Pantheism is too concerned with the metaphysical attributes of eternity, omnipotence, immutability, infinity, and unity. Cosmic spiritualism is more concerned with the ethical attributes of God such as goodness, wisdom, and holiness. Lotze denied the immutability of God. He took time, history, and the facts of change seriously. God does not repose in His own static perfection; He has an inner life and development of His own. God shares in the life of the community of finite spirits. Lotze's ideas in this respect suffer from some difficulties of expression which are involved in much theistic
reflection. The theist must avoid the hazards of mythology in his use of personal categories when applied to God. So Lotze writes that the joys of the world are God's joys; the crucial moral struggles of our lives are his concern. God shares in all the tragedies of human history. His goodness is expressed in His concern with the universal, which is not a divine abstraction, but is His wise and holy plan for the resolution of the claims and counter-claims of the commonwealth of individual finite spirits. Man's power to act is derived from God; but how he acts is the contribution of his individuality to history.

God subordinates the cosmic mechanism to the Summum Bonum as the final good. But man's devotion to whatever he values will determine the intermediate stages taken on route by the cosmic mechanism. Man's sinfulness may temporarily disrupt the harmonious movement of the whole, but God sets aright the course of history and salvages all that is of worth. Whitehead has well expressed this conception of Lotze's.

He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage. 100

Lotze's cosmology ends in a vision of Johannine mysticism. God is divine Agape. God is living love that wills the blessedness of all dependent beings, and by the continual outpouring of active energy He sustains and fills all finite existence with His own abounding life. God's love is the creative source of all existence. Only through temporality and relatedness can finite spirits receive the benefits of His love and retain their own distinctive individuality and existence.

The relatedness of the world in God's love involves all creation in one vast chain of being. Every finite spirit has its own intrinsic worth
and enjoys its own individuality; but no existence is self-complete. The devotion to ideal values takes personality outside itself and makes each life also contributory to the larger life of the whole.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES


--------, *Grundzüge der Naturphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1889.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES


The Value and Destiny of the Individual, London, 1913.


Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics, New York, 1898.


Jones, H., The Philosophy of Lotze, Glasgow, 1895.


Lindsay, J., Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion, Edinburgh, 1897.

Lohan, M., Die Gottesidee Lotzes, Marburg, 1888.


---------, The Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays, Edinburgh, 1907.


Royce, J., Studies of Good and Evil, New York, 1898.

---------, The Conception of Immortality, New York, 1900.

---------, The World and the Individual, New York, 1912.


---------, Mind and Matter, Cambridge, 1931.
Walther, H., *Der Zweckbegriff bei Lotze*, Breslau, 1901.


---------, *The Realm of Ends*, New York, 1912.


INTRODUCTION


3. Fromann, Klassiker der Philosophie, Vol. I Lotze, Ed. by Falckenberg, p. 46


5. F.H. Bradley's reference to Mc Taggart's Hegelianism.

6. R.H. Lotze, Metaphysics, p. 114


8. George Santayana, Lotze's Moral Idealism (Mind, 1890 Vol. 15) p. 204


14. Ibid. p. 305


18. Chapter I


35. Ibid., p. 49.

36. Ibid., p. 151.


39. Ibid., p. 263.


43. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, p. 244.

44. Ibid., p. 346

CHAPTER II


46. Ibid., p. 396.


64. R. H. Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, Sec. 56.
65. J. S. Fulton, *op. cit*.
72. Ibid., p. 485.
75. Loc. cit.


77. Loc. cit.

78. Ibid., p. 536.

79. Loc. cit.


82. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, op. cit.


86. T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 4th Ed., p. 218.


CHAPTER III


92. R. H. Lotze, Micrcocosmus, p. 646.
93. V. F. Moore, *The Ethical Aspects of Lotze's Metaphysics*, (Cornell, 1900).


