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THE INTERPLAY OF ART AND RELIGION
IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART

by

Marjorie Kimball McCorquodale

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R. A. Tsanoff

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Art is a key with which to open history's treasure of man's desires and dreads, his ideals and aspirations. The secret feelings of his inmost heart speak out in his poems, can be discovered in his paintings, heard in his music, examined in his sculpture or his architecture. It has been recognized since the time of Plato that Art points beyond itself and has profound significance. A great modern philosopher, however, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, developed in his theory of art the principles of a complete philosophical system.

Art, according to Hegel, is the expression of Spirit in sensuous form. In a sense, art is a revelation, conscious or unconscious, of the artist's own racial and spiritual heritage, distilled by his imagination and given definite shape and form by his technique. Actually, then, in his art, man defines his conception of reality and the God he worships, that is, his own revelation of Truth. This revelation is not an accident of history, as Kant called it, but the only true knowledge of God possible to man. Man cannot know God as object but knows Him by realizing the divine qualities in his own intelligent nature. However, man expresses his revelation in many languages, sometimes so obscurely that he himself is only dimly aware of his own heart's meaning. When he voices his view of Truth in the language of imagery and poetic imagination, it is called RELIGION. When mind, heart and hand combine to give Truth sensuous form, we call it ART. The language is different but the Truth is one.
This unity can be seen more clearly if the history of esthetics and the history of religion are examined side by side, for then their single root is uncovered, the unfoldment of Spirit or *Geist* itself as the consciousness of man. The artist mines his art from this rich vein. Such an examination would reveal and evaluate the significance of art and establish its close relationship with man's deepest and most profound convictions.

This is the task which Hegel undertook in lectures to his students at the University of Heidelberg and later at the University of Berlin, on the Philosophy of Fine Art.

These lectures were not fully edited for publication by Hegel himself, and were not published until after his death. In fact, the only record we have of them is from his notes and those of students. For this reason, if for no other, it is of interest to compare them with Hegel's Philosophy of Religion and to examine this great thinker's estimate of the inter-relation of these two vital aspects of human life, esthetics and religious experience. To this theme, the interplay of art and religion in Hegel's esthetics, the present study is devoted.

The unfoldment of these two appears as an evolutionary process in which Hegel distinguishes three principal stages, which he calls the Symbolic, the Classical, and the Romantic. Man's idea of Spirit is at first so vague and formless that his art is symbolical in character, a yearning after rather than a defining of Spirit's true nature. At its next stage, the idea is clear but limited in scope, hence a sensuous form can perfectly define it at this, the Classical, stage. In the Romantic stage, a term not synonymous with the romanticism of literature,
art finds itself straining not, as in symbolic art, for clearer views, but for a form adequate to its ever expanding significance. But art here falters and finds no sensuous terms capable of expressing its new vision. It needs must speak a new language.

What we have, then, in this study is the story of the Geist, of its unfoldment in the hearts of men and a description of the terms in which they defined it.

And what is this Geist? Some English translators call it Mind. Others call it Spirit. Still other scholars find neither term satisfactory. It has been suggested, half in jest, that Hegel's real meaning is more nearly described by the word "yeast". Indeed, in his Philosophy of Fine Art Hegel pictures the Geist as leavening the whole measure of meal throughout history.
CHAPTER I

THE SYMBOLIC STAGE OF ART

In the beginning was wonder. And the wonder concerned the mystery, the mystery of nature—the sun, the moon, the stars, the flash of lightning across a dark sky, the rain, the new green springing out of the dead, brown earth. Man stepped back from his world and saw himself as a minute entity beaten by the rain, blown by stormy winds, stalked by wild beasts, now warm, now cold, today in the warm bright sunlight, tonight in the cold and lonely darkness. He saw evidence of strange forces all around him and his heart was filled with fear. It was then that he fell down and worshipped. This was the religion of nature, and its essence was power.

The beginning of art was man's attempt to give concrete form to these beings or forces whose effects he observed all about him. Art then became the first interpreter of the religious consciousness. It is easy to see that the cave man's drawings of a successful hunt may well have been the expression of magic to bring about the very success he pictured. And in other early artistic expression the religious basis is apparent, but even in later and more sophisticated cultures an open minded reader finds it difficult to refute the Hegelian thesis that it is the same Geist expressing itself as art and as religion, so penetrating an insight does the great German philosopher direct upon these areas and so enlightening are the connections he uncovers.
But man’s early conceptions of the Universal, which he conceived of as Power, no matter what name he called it, were vague and formless. The artist at this stage must separate the Universal from the immediate presence of Nature in which the Absolute was believed to be actually present. Man, the artist, does not himself clearly know what he wishes to express. His idea of what constitutes universality, power, force, or spirit, is still abstract and undefined. Therefore the content, essential idea, never can be wholly fused with a physical shape or art form. The artist must restlessly seek an adequate expression, and finds himself able only to hint at his content. Consequently, the work of art itself remains a riddle and a problem. And because it does not define, but only indicates or is a sign of, its content, Hegel called it symbolic art.

The symbol says: Look at me. What I am not is more important than what I am, for the Idea I represent is without dimension. Compared with it, I am as nothing. I surge, I move, I strain, but I cannot contain the Idea. What is its size? It is measureless. What is its true shape? I cannot assume it. What is its real substance? I do not consist of it. What is its complete significance? I cannot comprehend it. But I mean something, somewhere, somewhat. I have a meaning beyond myself. Therefore, look at me!

To the stranger, an alien in time or culture, the symbol may say nothing at all, nothing meaningful, or the wrong thing. It speaks the language of its time and place and speaks even that language in an ambiguous way. In fact, the moment its ambiguity disappears, when both its message and external form are clearly defined, it ceases to be a
symbol. Whole worlds of art, the Babylonian, Persian, Indian and Egyptian, may withhold their complete message from us just as the full significance of the Trinity would be hidden from a stranger to our culture who saw only a triangle on a church wall.

The earliest symbolism saw every event of nature as a symbol because it saw the visible world itself as a sign of something more. This idea was indicated by Emerson when he said: "Nature is the dress God wears".

But there is a view expressed both as religion and as art which appears to be, yet is not, truly symbolical. This conception, called by Hegel a primary unity of significance and form, makes no distinction between soul and body, notion and reality. Here what we call the corporeal or sensuous, the natural or human, is not a vessel containing or pointing to a significant idea but is itself viewed as the very presence and reality of the Absolute.

The worship of the Buddhist Lama is an example of this kind of religious practice sometimes incorrectly called symbolical. The living Lama is not a symbol but is thought in his bodily existence to be the Blessed presence itself. Neither can the sacrament be thought of as symbolical in the present day Catholic or "high" Episcopalian theology where the consecrated bread and wine are believed to be the actual body and blood of Christ who is thought to be sacramentally present. Nor can the Zoroastrian religion, where the god Ahura-Mazda is inseparably identified with Light (the sun, moon, stars, fire) and all its illuminations, be called symbolical.
Since this is not genuine symbolism, the myths embodying these teachings cannot be described as art. Here the sensuous representation is not the product of mind, as art requires, nor do the gods described have any individuality attributable to the imagination but are of a formal character only.

But where there is a separation between the Universal, the Absolute, and its immediate presence as a phenomenon, art is needed to make the connection between the two, to fuse them together and does so by means of sensuous expression.

Entire nations, notably Babylonia, India and Egypt, during certain periods of their history have expressed their most profound spiritual conceptions in what Hegel calls the characteristic art of symbolism, architecture. Architecture, Hegel believed, pioneers the way for the adequate realization of a nation's god. Its effect is to modify the external world by endowing it with symmetrical order showing the presence and characteristic activity of mind—the affinity to Mind of the external world. However, architecture cannot define but can only refer to and indicate the nature of the spiritual conceptions it represents. It remains for other forms of art to clarify them.

The Semitic religion of Babylonia, believed by some to be the parent of the Egyptian and Chinese religions, had an immense influence on later periods. It pictured the world as thickly populated with spirits who were responsible for every phenomenon in nature. Seven devils, semi-human monsters with animal heads, a lion, panther, dog, sheep, ram, bird and serpent, represented evil to the Sumerians. The
great gods of Babylonia represented the elements and the heavenly bodies. Temples were oriented and served as astronomical observatories. These buildings usually consisted of six or seven huge stages with their vertical faces connected by ramps which gave access to the shrine of the god on the top. This tower, called a ziggurat, was oriented so that its angles faced the cardinal points of the compass. The towers were built of unbaked brick, perhaps faced with glazed brick, each section colored with tones which increased in brilliance as they approached the top. Herodotus described one of these towers as having its stages colored white, black, scarlet, blue, orange, silver, and gold in that order. Like chapels in medieval fortresses, such ziggurats were included in Assyrian or Babylonian palaces.

The buildings, like the great temples of Egypt, were themselves symbolical of the spiritual life of the worshipers. Other symbolical art, observed in Babylonia, consisted of representations of gods standing on the backs of the animals with which they were formerly identified, for at an earlier stage animals were worshiped, and the gods rose from animal to semi-human to human form. It is in this area that the signs of the zodiac, astronomy and cuneiform writing are believed to have originated. Unfortunately, most of the buildings are now nothing but masses of rubble because, lacking both natural stone and the great emphasis on life after death characteristic of the Egyptian religion, the Babylonians did not feel compelled to preserve the body and used a less permanent material, sun-baked brick, for most of their constructions.
It is of interest to note that in Babylonia, as in Egypt at certain periods of history, the entire activity and life of the people were centered on the construction of these religious symbols, the temples. Such an activity united the people to the ruler and the people to each other while the construction was under way. A community engaged in such a project, as for example, the building of the tower of Babel, as told in the story in Genesis, had a sense of unity of thought and action which it would lose as soon as construction ceased. Each family would then return to its separate activities and aims.

A building which declares a general significance speaks directly to us of spiritual life, and the content of such a building is the religious idea which unites the nation. The function of symbolic art is to supply a sensuous form corresponding to this significance.

Because of his belief that the beginnings of art must be established from its notional rather than its historical significance, Hegel next turns to the art of India with its religion of what he calls fantasy and imagination, leaving the historically earlier but more characteristically symbolical art of Egypt with what he describes as its religion of mystery and negation for later consideration.

The fantastic symbolism of India is the expression of Hinduism. The element of the fantastic is due, according to Hegel, to the presence of the conflicting elements of both union and disunion. The religion of Hinduism, is wholly indefinite because it is the supreme of abstractions, without particular content and without concrete personality. Therefore, Brahman, the supreme godhead, is entirely
removed from the world of sense perception and is not even an object for thought.

The mode of union with Brahman is not a conscious reconciliation or identity with the Universal but a continually ascending process of exhaustion by which the human personality loses its entire concrete content and self-consciousness itself. The unity consists in that both consciousness and self-consciousness and with them the entire content of the objective world and personality totally disappear. This is emptying and annihilation to the point of absolute vacuity.

Although theoretically based on abstract monotheism, Hinduism is subject to distortions because of the misstatement or materializing of concepts in themselves spiritual. It is here frequently "the Universal living force of Nature, not the spirituality and might of consciousness but the productive energy of generation which is emphasized and revered".

The prevalence of this conception is evidenced by architectural symbols of the generative organs, the phallus and lingam. The Indian pagoda, not to be confused with the later Mohammedan structures, originated, Hegel believed, in this worship of the energy of generation.

The material for art found in this conception consists in imaginary events which might have happened to man as he seeks to achieve the goal of union with Brahman. The Bhagavad Gita or "Song of God", one of the religious writings basic to Hinduism, is itself an art form, a long poem in which the warrior Arjuna receives instruction concerning the way to holiness. Many references can be found in it
implying monism. For example, Krishna tells Arjuna:

"Whatever path men travel
Is my path:
No matter where they walk
It leads to me."

But to the degree that the fundamental objective of this religion is conceived to be unconsciousness rather than conscious, active intelligence, nothingness rather than somethingness, to that degree the religion must be called the opposite of Christianity, not its brother, nor even its cousin. The two travellers may be on the same path but they are going in opposite directions, for in the opinion of this writer many aspects of Hinduism more nearly approach a regression to the pre-conscious state of animal security within an imaginary, infinite womb, than the conscious effort to achieve identification with man's highest conceptions either of goodness or of intelligence.

The element of difference between the finite and the Divine has become the basic principle of the art of India. Here we find the content of the Absolute conceived as wholly represented in a particular thing. For this reason, animals such as monkeys and cattle are revered as Divine. This mode of conception is not truly symbolical because the true symbol indicates but does not encompass its content. Hindu art attempts to express the infinite by a distortion of measureless extension, in order that these images may express universality, showing a conception of infinity limited to enumeration ad infinitum. For example, in an effort to describe omniscience, the Vedic god, Varuna, may be portrayed with eyes all around his head, or as in Buddhism,
Kuan Yin is pictured with a thousand arms. But Hegel clearly explains that the true conception of infinity means something altogether unlike these materialistic interpretations. Infinity, he says, means the negation of limits.

Hegel attributes the confusion which appears in Hindu art to that at the root of the religion, that is, the interpretation of essentially spiritual conceptions in a limited, materialized way. In consequence of this confusion, not only the architecture of India but also its religious scriptures, the Vedic hymns and the Upanishads, express this surprising contrast. We are impressed by their great metaphysical insight, depth and spirituality. But we also note in their anthropomorphic expressions of the divine powers a certain baffling, almost primitive materialism.

Soapstone seals discovered at Mohenjo-Daro show carvings of rhinoceros, tiger, elephant, humped bull or serpent, and these animals are to be seen in carvings and decorations throughout India, indicating a sacred significance attributed to them. The confusion which Hegel pointed out is indicated in the bewildering number of decorations found on stupas, causing a sense of crowding in the composition. Perhaps Hindu artists found it difficult to give sensuous representation to the Brahma, soul and creator of the universe, for he is rarely seen in art. However, he is traditionally represented as having four heads and four arms, which hold the four books of the Vedas, seated upon a goose, and accompanied by his consort, Sarasvati, goddess of eloquence and music.
Vishnu, once a deity of the sun, is blue in color, perhaps to indicate his heavenly origin, and his four arms generally hold a mace, conch shell, lotus and disk. He rides on the garuda bird and his consorts are Lakshmi, goddess of beauty and fortune, and Bhumi-devi, goddess of earth. He appears also in his ten avatars: fish, tortoise, bear, lion, horse, dwarf, Buddha, Brahman hero Parasurama, Rama, the bowman, and Krishna, the herdsman.

Siva, developed from the storm-god Rudra, is both destroyer and generator and is represented by the linga stone. His vehicle is Nandi, the bull. He is often portrayed performing his divine dance of creation and destruction, on his head a skull, a crescent moon, the goddess Ganga and sometimes the fifth head of Brahma. In one of his four hands he holds a drum, the first sound in the universe, in another the flame of destruction, one hand raised with a serpent wrapped around the arm, the other pointing to the dwarf on whom he dances, representing an enemy overcome. In addition to two regular eyes, Siva has a third vertical eye in the middle of his forehead. His consort, Parvati, is as many sided as her lord for, as Kali, she is bloodthirsty and insatiable, wearing a necklace of skulls.

Monolithic raths at Mamallapuram near Madras are among the monuments commemorating these gods as is the famous relief, "Descent of the Ganges" carved on a nearby cliff. The latter is a seventh-century rendering of an older legend of how the Ganges came to water the dry plains of northern India. The sculpture is thirty feet long and twenty-three feet high, crowded with figures of gods, men and animals who
witnessed or participated in the wonderful event.

One of the most remarkable architectural works of Brahmanic inspiration is the Kailasa Temple at Elura, cut one hundred feet deep in solid rock. The temple itself and its sculpture depict the legend of the demon Ravana's attempt to dislodge Siva and Parvati from their great peak at the top of the Himalayas. This, like other Hindu temples of early as well as later periods, is characterized by a profusion and multiplicity of ornamentation, rich in symbolism.

Real symbolism requires a significance apart from the sensuous content and form and a consequent recognition of the particularity with which it is clothed as its negative aspect. This must dissolve as its essential Idea unfolds. Symbolism also assumes that the negative itself is "the absolute import of the object generally, as a phase, that is to say, of the Divine".

The advance in thought consists in that "the negative aspect is to be so ascribed to the Absolute that the true God appears as a process in which He negates Himself, and thereby contains this negative element as an inherent self-determination of His own substance". Through this enlarged conception "the Absolute is for the first time essentially concrete, that is self-determination, and thereby essential unity, whose particular antitheses, as parts of a process, appear to consciousness as the different determinations of one and the same God."

The first definition and essential negation of the Absolute is death.

In one sense, death can be viewed as the cessation of the
Spirit's immediate existence; in another, it is seen as the extinction of the exclusively natural and hence the birth of a higher, more spiritual type. In this sense, death is a resurrection, "an eternal process of Divine realization rendered possible by virtue of this evolutorial principle of negation". The dialectic of life, then, supplies the appropriate content for the true symbolic type of art, the origin, growth, then the collapse in death, and subsequent awakening.

No longer now are either individuals, the forms of nature nor events to be considered adequate to the significance referred to them, because their outward form is recognized as that which must disappear. Nor is the significant immediately identified with its object, but their union or identity is a product of mind. Nor is the inward, the essential Idea, any longer an ephemeral, now-here, now-there substance as heretofore. This inward is now independently secure; it is Geist conscious of itself.

The genuine impulse of art now begins to be a living fact, for the inward Idea is impelled to make clear to the imaginative vision its own essential nature. Thus the artist for the first time feels the necessity of embodying this Idea in a form "minted out of spirit (mind)".

A single example of symbolic art now may be described both as an actuality in the sensuous world, endowed with the characteristics natural to its kind, but also as a hint of something beyond and more than itself. The scarab or beetle, for example, a favorite decorative symbol in Egyptian art, was yet more than that, representing as it did
the idea of the resurrection. So too, the figures of animals, lions perhaps, who guarded the entrances to tombs or temples.

The Phoenix might be called the art object and the Egyptians, the people who most completely express the standpoint where we now find ourselves in the unfoldment of Spirit as Art. The Phoenix, bird of ancient Egyptian myth, is its own funeral pyre yet is ever resurrected, rising out of its own ashes to new life.

The myth of Osiris is the inner essential history of the nature of Egypt. Its importance both to religion and to art is apparent, for the betrayal and murder of Osiris by Set, and his restoration to life through the ministrations of Isis, provide the central theme of religious practices which persisted for thousands of years and which united an entire nation in an art expression unique in the history of the world.

Even the name "Egypt" reveals something of the preoccupation of this people with matters beyond the grave, for Egypt means "the house of the soul of Ptah". Ptah means "he who forms" and is thought by some scholars to be a pantheistic god who assumed many forms. In support of this view the following hymn to Ptah might be quoted.

"Oh let us give glory to the god who hath raised up the sky and who causeth his disk to float over the bosom of Nut (the earth), who hath made the gods and men and all their generations, who hath made all—lands and countries and the great sea in his name of 'Let-the-earth-be'." 

Another from a Turin papyrus:
"I am the maker of the heaven and the earth. It is I who have given to all the gods the soul which is within them. When I open my eyes there is light, when I close them there is darkness. I am Chepere in the morning, Ra at noon, Tum in the evening."  

There is some evidence that two different religious strains, one pantheistic the other polytheistic, existed side by side for many centuries in Egypt. It is generally acknowledged however that the Egyptians were the first to ascribe immortality to the individual. Hegel perceived another interesting fact: the Egyptians recognized that if Spirit were to be more than an empty concept, it must be individualized. Therefore, the whole focus of the life of that entire nation for thousands of years was upon the task of providing the Geist with a permanent and adequate home. And the making of that home became their Art—ranging from a pyramid to a single mummy.

"Singularity is the principle of the spiritual in its notion of independence because spirit is only able to exist as individuality, that is, personality." And "Preservation of the dead asserts the maintenance of singularity rather than its abandonment, because the body is nature's own mode of individuality."

In a sense, all construction work of temple or tomb in Egypt was a cultus in which both nation and king were united. The sun worshiping Egyptians erected obelisks which, according to Pliny and, after him, Creuser, were symbols of solar rays. They built memmoms, colossal human figures, one of which is said to have uttered a sound at the setting of the sun. Hegel calls these memorials to Memmon, son of the Dawn, a "living, significant and revealing thing", a revelation of
symbolic suggestion.

In true symbolic architecture, Hegel believed, architectonic purpose is an incidental feature, and the idea symbolized is primary. The pyramids, he describes, as crystals, mere shells which enclose a kernel, a departed spirit. These enormous edifices (that at Gizeh is 471 feet high) were the tombs of the pharaohs, whereas the mastabas were the burial places of the lower classes. It is said that the very measurements of these structures had meaning and significance to their builders and were numerically symbolical of the movements of the planets, the seasons, the history of the ruler for whom the pyramid was built, and the history of the god or gods particularly favored by that ruler. There has even grown up a cult attributing a prophetic character to their numerical measurements.

Neither symbolic art nor more specifically the art of Egypt can be considered without some mention of that monstrous and mysterious creature with the head of a man and the body of a lion, the sphinx. The limestone Sphinx at Gizeh (c2700-2600 B.C.) has the head of Ramses II and is 216 feet in height. Perhaps the Sphinx, with its implied combination of rationality and animality, most perfectly indicates the stage of development of both religion and art of Egypt.

All Egyptian art was considered by Hegel to be symbolical. It might be said that everything in Egyptian sculpture and architecture was itself, certainly, but was also something else. The labyrinths of temples indicated the movement of the planets and in some instances represented the path the soul must take for its purification. Hegel
called the Sphinx the Symbol of Symbolism itself.

But self-consciousness had not yet ripened to its fruit.

Only in the form that is commensurate with Spirit does Mind find satisfaction and its true definition in what it produces.

The Symbolism of the Sublime

Another people in a different age were to construct symbolic religious images, perhaps as enduring as the pyramids, though their building stones were words and their completed works, poems. The Hebrew prophets, singing of man's inability to attain unto the immeasureable transcendence of their God. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high; I cannot attain unto it," expressed their worship in what Hegel calls the Art of the Sublime. "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after Thee, oh God."

The conception of the sublime is one which has long interested philosophers, most of whom agree that the sublime implies the idea of boundless immensity or overwhelming power.

The former had been called by Kant the mathematical sublime. It is not the object which is thus described but an evocation in the soul, that, "the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense". This cannot be evoked by mere mathematical measure because mathematical measure is relative. The idea of the sublime is aroused when the imagination contemplates "an absolute measure beyond which no greater is possible subjectively (i.e. for the judging subject)". This might be illustrated from Isaiah: "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand and
meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth
in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a
balance?" or as in Psalms: "For a thousand years in thy sight are but
as yesterday".

The sublimity of might, Kant had described under the title of
the dynamically sublime. It is evoked by nature as might, appearing as
an object of fear when that might has no dominion over us. It is
sublime because it raises the imagination to the recognition of the
sublimity of the mind's realm, above nature.

The impact of the sublime, as A. C. Bradley tells us, shocks
us into awareness of our own finitude. Fear is the emotion which brings
us to a pause in the presence of the sublime, according to Edmund Burke.
Our individual selfhood, when brought face to face with the sublime, is
first negated by a recognition of its own inadequacy, then lifted out
of itself. "All sublimity," Bradley said, "is an image of infinity."
Bradley makes the following comparison of the sublime with the beauti-
ful: "Beauty is the image of the total presence of the Infinite within
any limits it may choose to assume, sublimity, the image of its bound-
lessness—one, the image of its immanence, the other, of its transcendence.

The symbolism of the sublime is a study in contrasts.
Because Hegel defined such a symbol as that which is annihilated by the
very thing it would set forth, he also called it a negative celebration
of power and glory which brings about the essential nothingness of the
phenomenon. It is the measureless quality of the content as compared
with the limited nature of the form which causes us to mount to an
uplifted view, spurning the stepping stone necessary to our ascent.
The negativity or inadequacy of the form, then, is an essential to the
sublimity of the content.

The Pantheism of India, the poetry of Persian Mohammedanism
and the mysticism of western Christianity manifest the affirmative
aspect of the symbolism of the sublime.

"I am the end of the path, the witness, the Lord,
the sustainer:
I am the place of abode, the beginning, the friend
and the refuge:
I am the breaking-apart, and the storehouse of
life's dissolution:
I lie under the seen, of all creatures the seed
that is changeless....
I am the cosmos revealed, and its germ that lies
hidden." 28/

Or as the Sufi poet Jalaluallah expressed it: "One knocked at the
Beloved's door; and a voice asked from within, 'Who is there?' and he
answered, 'It is I.' Then the voice said: 'This house will not hold
me and thee.' And the door was not opened. Then went the Lover into
the desert, and fasted and prayed in solitude. And after a year he
returned and knocked again at the door. And again the voice asked,
'Who is there?' and he said 'It is Thyself!' and the door was opened to
him." 29/ Man could, according to William Blake:

"...see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour." 30/

Here the Absolute is conceived as an indwelling substance, as
immanent, yet as One, and as above all particularity. The true annihilation of the form or particularity is achieved by absorption in that One.

The negativity of the sublime is expressed in Hebrew poetry. The religious restrictions forbidding the Jews any art which reproduced the human form, concentrated their artistic expression on poetry. The religious insight of the Hebrews conceived of the One as God. Hegel called their view "the root of subjectivity of the intellectual world, the way to truth". Their God was a God of wisdom and righteousness. This conception carried with it a sense of destiny and purpose in the world—that the well-doing of man resulted in his well-being. "He is the Lord our God; His judgments are in all the earth. He hath remembered his covenant for ever, the word which he commanded to a thousand generations."

The world was conceived to be created out of nothing, which is the absence of all differences, matter, which is the formless, that which is identical with itself. And this material creation must exist outside of God as His negative movement, because He is One. Therefore the world is without independence. Its whole existence has one purpose—to glorify God. The Psalmists in verse after verse extolled the greatness of the God of Abraham. "All the earth must praise Him," they sang. For example, Isaiah contrasts the immensity of the Lord's power in comparison with the insignificance of his creation:

"It is he that sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers."
Hegel calls the religion of sublimity the religion of ends, that is, the religion of purposes or destiny. At this stage, religion itself is the end—"that God become consciously known in self-consciousness, that He is object in it and had an affirmative relation to it." 

The Geist here reveals itself as self-consciousness and "Man, or finite consciousness, is Spirit in the character of finitude." "Man is accordingly self-consciousness," and himself becomes a symbol.

The presence of such free subjectivity in religions or in peoples is evidenced by the presence of universal laws of freedom, justice, and morality. Naturalism and immediacy have lessened in importance. "The brighter sun of spirit makes the natural light pale before it. Thus we pass outside the circle of the Religion of Nature and come to gods who are essentially founders of states and marriages, founders of peaceful life, producers of art which originates solely with them—gods who preside over oracles and states and who originate and protect law and morality. These people have torn from their eyes the bandage of sensuous perception, have escaped from the trackless maze which is devoid of thought."

Man now for the first time feels his consciousness to be at one with his Essence. He is at home with himself. And, awed by his conception of overwhelming wisdom and power, he listens for the Geist and sings:

"And behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earthquake; but
the Lord was not in the earthquake:

"And after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the fire a still small voice."

The relationship between man and God as conceived by the Jews, fulfilled the essential requirement of symbolism in that their God was seen as infinite power over all the earth and at the same time his earthly representation was obviously inadequate to express Him if limited to one family, that of Abraham, or one nation, the Jews. Then did not the failure of this nation to embody the fullness of Spirit, as the symbol has always struggled but failed to do, demand a clearer expression of the Geist?

Before we leave the realm of the symbol with its "restless fermentation" we may well ask whether or not it actually speaks of more than itself. Does it truly have universal significance? Or have we merely read into the myths, fantasies and poetry of other times, into the conceptions of God, Spirit, and its expression in Art, ideas characteristic only of our own age?

To find these myths to be symbols of universal significance, it is not necessary, according to Hegel, to prove that in their age the poets who expressed them were conscious of the particular form of universality which we now discover at the root of their symbols.

"Religion discovers its fountain-head in Spirit which seeks after its truth, dimly discovers it, bringing the same to consciousness by means of any form having affinity."

In fact, as the artist, be he poet, sculptor, painter or
architect, becomes conscious of his own use of symbols, the art of symbolism is beginning to disappear, for by definition it is the very generality of the content which makes the symbol what it is.

Certain literary art forms are consciously symbolic, such as the fable, parable, proverb, apologue, metamorphosis, the riddle, allegory, metaphor, image and simile. These forms have maintained their literary identities through many centuries and in many languages. The fables of Aesop and La Fontaine, and the Metamorphoses of Ovid immediately come to mind as examples from an earlier time. (See Footnote A)

The fable, parable, proverb, apologue, metamorphosis and, to a great extent, the riddle are figures in which earlier literature

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Note A: The following fable is a folk tale from northern Eritrea: A leopard wandered from his home into the grasslands where the elephant herds grazed. One of the elephants stepped on the cub by accident and killed him. Some leopards found the body and rushed to his father to tell him.

"Your son has been killed," they said.

"Tell me who killed him!" the father leopard snarled, "so that I can avenge his death."

"It was the elephants," he was told.

"What? The elephants?" the father leopard asked.

"Yes, the elephants," they assured him.

He thought for a minute, then shook his head.

"No, it is not the elephants. It is the goats who have killed him. Yes, it is the goats who have done this awful thing to me!" Then the father leopard went out in a terrible rage and slaughtered many goats from a herd grazing in the hills.

And even now, when a man is wronged by someone stronger, he often avenges himself upon someone who is weaker than he. (cf. The Fire on the Mountain, By Harold Courlander & Wolf Leslau)
abounds. The metaphor, simile and image, however, are so inseparable from verbal expression that a literature without them would seem arid beyond conception. The simile, beloved of genius in all ages, delivers the soul, for it is "that which lifts the immediacy of emotion to the level of forms that the soul may contemplate in freedom". And of the metaphor, Aristotle said: "The greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars."

The allegory, actually a lengthened metaphor, has maintained its popularity in all cultures and in all periods. It is to be found lending its deeper and more hidden meanings to poem, play and story in our own literature where sometimes it has gone unrecognized. That is an interesting characteristic of the allegory: to unfold its deepest significance only to him with eyes to see and the patience to peel away its more obvious meanings as one would peel away the petals of a tightly closed rose bud to reach its heart. The poems of William Blake, and Herman Melville's magnificent sea tale, Moby Dick, for example, hid their subtler implications for many years. Perhaps the renewed interest in such further exploration and the recognition accorded current works that are avowedly symbolical such as Christopher Fry's A Sleep of Prisoners, or T. S. Eliot's The Cocktail Party, imply dissatisfaction with today's more obvious definitions of spiritual values just as in ages past symbolism first blindly indicated, then later art more clearly defined the Geist.
CHAPTER II

THE CLASSICAL STAGE OF ART

Out of Chaos and old Night by Earth and Sky, obeying Eros' mandate, the Cyclopes came. Titans all, these and their brood long held their sway. But in Cronos (Time) lay the seeds of their destruction, for from him sprang the gods that were to become the guardians of Law, Justice, and Morality. And there was war on Olympus and the Titans were overcome, their power lessened, though they still dwelt beyond the mountain and sometimes interfered in the affairs of men.

This was the time when gods became men and men became gods, when art was religion and religion, art, when the inward and the outward were united. This was the time when man rose from his knees where he had groveled for centuries, first in fear and then in awe. He arose a free man and said: I think; I know; I understand; to be a man is so great a thing that to be a god could be no greater and the gods must be like me.

And so his poets sang of the gods and his sculptors chiselled them, free and mighty in power. Homer wrote of Zeus:

"He spoke and awful bends his sable brows,
Shakes his ambrosial curls and gives the nod,
The stamp of fate and sanction of the god.
High heaven with reverence the dread signal took,
And all Olympus to the center shook."
And the nation over which the gods of Olympus ruled was the Greek people, whose art was worship and their worship art.

Man saw the human as a moment of the divine itself and gods and men said of each other: "that is spirit of my spirit". And the human element became a delicate fragrance which spread itself over every action. Man recognized self-consciousness as his own essential characteristic. He found the stamp of Universality on all of his existence, on all his shapes and parts and perceived that this constituted his significance. Goethe called this view the essential character of classical art. Such a conception implies that the form "should be planned only in Spirit, should be produced out of it, brought into existence only by its mediation, that it should in short be ideal and a work of art". In classical antiquity, art and religion reached a balance, a fusion of content and form in perfect harmony. This is most characteristically expressed by the Greeks in their sculpture.

The Greeks could see Zeus himself in Phidias' gold and ivory god. "Those who approach the temple" says Lucian, "do not conceive that they see ivory from the Indies or gold from the mines of Thrace; no, but the very son of Cronos and Rhea, transported by Phidias to earth." This statue—forty feet of majesty—though made by the hand of man, was no less a divine product, the Greeks intuitively felt, than nature itself. And they believed that the god himself came and dwelt in that glorious body, just as they believed that Athena truly dwelt in her favorite temple-image on the Acropolis. To the Greek, the gods were more likely to inhabit a product of clear rationality and artistic
inspiration than an animal or a plant, though both of these latter were often associated with the gods. Athena, for example, is characteristically pictured with a serpent or with an olive branch or tree, or both. The serpent is believed to represent the earth-goddess the worship of which, and her powers, had merged with that of Athena. The olive was believed to be the creation of Athena and her gift to man and it was believed that she had revealed its uses to the Greeks, whose economy had largely depended upon the product of their olive groves.

Now what were these gods? They were formed, according to Hegel's view, by human imagination, the organ of the self-consciousness, made, invented, but not fictitious, for they were the living, active emotions of man himself—personified.

Zeus is the god of spiritual subjectivity, the god of laws, justice, morality and social order. He presides over the sanctity of oaths and represents the divine authority of conscience. But this was not always his character. We read in *The Iliad*: "Among the other gods fell grievous bitter strife, and their hearts were carried diverse in their breasts. And they clashed together with a great noise, and the wide earth groaned, and the clarion of great Heaven rang around. Zeus heard as he sate upon Olympus, and his heart within him laughed pleasantly when he beheld that strife of the gods."

Could this be the same god of which Aeschylus wrote the following lines in *Agamemnon*?
"Zeus the high God! whate'er be dim in doubt,
This can our thought track out—
The blow that falls the sinner is of God,
And as he wills, the rod
Of vengeance smiteth sore. One said of old
'The gods list not to hold
A reckoning with him whose feet oppress
The grace of holiness'—" 50/

Just as Zeus became the inward voice of conscience, the
Erinyes are not the Furies afar off. They personify the torment and
torture which a man experiences in his own consciousness when he knows
himself to have done an evil act.

The name Jehovah could well have been substituted for that of
Zeus in the above, and the following lines from the Eumenides by
Aeschylus have much of the character of Jehovahistic retribution. The
Furies say:

"Even so 'tis written:
(Oh sentence sure!)
Upon all that wild in wickedness dip hand
In the blood of their birth, in the fount of their
flowing;
So shall he pine until the grave receive him—
to find no grace even in the grave.
Sing then the spell,
Sisters of hell;
Chant him the charm
Mighty to harm,
Binding the blood,
Maddening the mood;
Such the music that we make:
Quail, ye sons of man, and quake,
Bow the heart, and bend, and break!
This is our ministry marked for us from the
beginning;
This is our gift, and our portion apart,
and our godhead,
Ours, ours only for ever!
Darkness, robes of darkness, a robe of terror
for ever!
Ruin is ours, ruin and wreck;
When to the home
Murder hath come,
Making to cease
Innocent peace;
Then at his back
Follow the sin;
And ah! we hold to the end when we begin!" 51/

Likewise, Pallas, who restrained the wrath of Achilles, is the warrior's own prudence. Nemesis, the principle of retribution, is, according to Hegel, the envy in the human heart which would bring down what is too lofty, the levelling influence. Nemesis is the might to humble the exalted, to restore equilibrium. It would put down what is too distinguished or exalted so that it may be on an equal basis with inferior things. These gods are the gods of moral law and of the state. Fate, destiny, or simple necessity pervades and dominates them all. It may be of interest to note here that such conceptions are not without their counterpart in our own views of life today. Alfred North Whitehead says: "The pilgrim fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists today are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides. Their vision of fate, remorseless and indifferent, urging a tragic incident to its inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by science.... This remorseless inevitableness is what pervades scientific thought. The laws of physics are the decrees of fate." 53/

The extent to which concepts of morality and ethics were intertwined with art is indicated in Strabo's statement: "It is impossible to be a good poet unless you are first a good man." The influence attributed to art on the morality of the individual is clearly expressed
in Plato's writings where he specifies that only suitable and uplifting harmonies shall be included in the music employed in the teaching of the young. In fact, harmony might well be called the keynote of the art, religion and ethics of the Greek. The Parthenon with its columns tilted to achieve the visual impression of perfect proportions, and stylobate upward curved to eliminate the illusion of sagging, is an outstanding example of harmonious symmetry and perfect union of design, purpose and materials so characteristic of Greek art. This wonderful balance was expressed philosophically by Aristotle in his doctrine of the golden mean.

The place of nature in Greek thought is revealed in the story of Prometheus (Forethought), a Titan, who made man from clay and taught him the arts. Prometheus angered Zeus by the favors he did for man, especially by his gift of fire. To punish the Titan, Zeus ordered Prometheus chained to a rock where he was to be tormented forever. Every day Zeus sent an eagle to feed on his captive's liver, which, however much it was devoured, always grew back again. Prometheus was released by Herakles, godlike hero, but his story was a warning that nature only taught man how to satisfy his natural wants for which there is no final satisfaction. It might be noted here that the Greeks must have discerned that mere physical and static continuation in time did not represent infinity or a type of immortality to be desired, since they pictured such a fate as a punishment.

The forces of nature which the Titans represented were subordinated to ethical forces and the story of their overcoming, the war
of the new gods with the old, is not an ordinary legend. Hegel calls it The Mythos, the essential parable of human life, for it represents man's recognition of the real elements comprising his nature and shows his increasingly successful effort to establish the dominion of reason over his own irrationality and mere base animality. The continued use of symbolic figures of animals, in conjunction with representations of the gods, revealed the typical Greek view which we have noted earlier, that life must consist in a harmony between the physical and the mental rather than an excessive subordination of either.

It may be interesting to realize that poets of today, as did the sculptors of Greece, are still concerned with the essential theme of the Mythos—man's efforts to differentiate himself from mere nature. A notable and recent example of the artistic use of such a theme was the adaptation for the ballet of T. S. Eliot's Wasteland. The first scene of this strikingly unusual dance showed the dancers costumed as dark green leaves that might have been painted by Rousseau, their pale veins pointing upward. They rose effortfully, like plants seeking the sun, and with insistent, rhythmic aspiration indicated growth to a fuller consciousness of their own capacities.

These religious views and attitudes toward the forces of nature were expressed most characteristically, so Hegel believed, in the art of sculpture, for this art expressed not merely the conscious attitudes of the artist but the spiritual standpoint, both conscious and unconscious, of the Greek people. Man, as a thinking being, was the most suitable form the artist could contrive by which to portray
his vision, which appeared as polytheistic worship of the forces and aspects of nature, portrayed anthropomorphically in sculpture, myth, in definite forms of lyric, and especially in dramatic poetry.

The classical ideal did not exclude the ugly, the incomplete or all that Hegel calls the negative aspect, but it suppressed or subordinated it. The material medium is neither killed nor suffers death, hence we cannot find in it the true resurrection of spirit. Since it has not embodied the full contradiction involved in the true notion of the Absolute and overcome it, classical art does not wholly satisfy the demands of Spirit. These unreconciled demands, stated in the situations and events found in Homer, were brought out, emphasized in their full horror in the great Greek tragedies of Aeschylus, in *Agamemnon*, for example, in which the author represents suffering as the punishment of sin, and in the works of Sophocles, who attempts to justify the law of God as against the presumption of man. These writers fulfilled what Aristotle felt to be the rules of tragedy—that suitable subjects or themes were the lives and fate of legendary heroes, or of the gods themselves, and that the heroes must always be presented as greater than ordinary men, of noble character and birth who must suffer dreadful penalty because through some fault in character or misguided action they have wrought their ruin.

The tragedy was actually the beginning of the end of Greek art—a beginning which was not apparent until drama became comedy—because the Greek tragedies clearly set forth the nature of the spiritual dilemma in which the thoughtful Greek found himself. The drama raised questions he could not answer.
In Greek sculpture, the artist asked no questions. He differed from his predecessors in that he knew clearly what he wished to portray. There were no hidden mysteries or infinite extensions there. And, also unlike his predecessors, his technique was developed into a perfection of craftsmanship and a command of his materials that has never been surpassed. Numerous examples of this perfection of form come to mind. The marble figure of Apollo, West Pediment, Temple of Zeus, at Olympia shows the godlike calm and repose of completeness. Apollo is here commanding, and majestic. The eyes, unlike historically earlier renderings, have lost their protrusion, the hair is just suggested by the raised surface. This figure in its serenity expresses the poise which actually characterized the Athenian himself, citizen in the "ordered inequality" of the greatest of the Greek city-states. In the same temple, that of Zeus, over the porches, a series of metopes recounts the twelve labors of Herakles of which that of Herakles and the Cretan Bull is perhaps the finest in design because of the dynamic tension of the struggle between the god-hero and the powerful animal.

Myron's Discobolus or discus thrower, which we know only through Roman copies, is another outstanding example of Greek artistic perfection. If this figure can be in any way criticized, it can only be said that the face fails to express the tenseness and concentration that might be expected from the body position. The height of Greek sculpture was reached however, in the work of the great Phidias of whose Zeus descriptions have already been quoted. It was Phidias who directed the sculpture of the Parthenon, that glorious triumph of Greek art with its perfect balance between strength and grace, its lightness,
like the Greek rationality it made concrete, rooted in the earth.

But what part does the artist play in Hegel's conception of the unfoldment of Spirit defined in art? Is he merely a puppet in the grasp of Spirit? Not at all, Hegel would reply. The Greek rested in a joyous sense of adequacy for the artistic task he undertook. With clear logic and lofty vision he conceived it and with tireless mathematical precision he chiselled the unyielding stone into the softest curves that Beauty could desire. That beauty was generally conceived as the male athlete in early youth just approaching his physical maturity or the male at the peak of his developed power. This emphasis on the physical ideal of combined strength and beauty in the human figure is also characteristic of Greek renditions of the female deities or athletes. Children, because of incompleteness, and the aged, because of their physical deterioration, were rarely the subjects for Greek art.

There is no process, movement or dynamic quality to be seen here, no fermentation or straining for something beyond itself. Art at this stage Hegel called the revelation of Spirit in immediate sensuous form, an idealization of externality which, by the very fact that it completely defined its idea, denied the true concept of Spirit, to know itself as unlimited. The Geist appears to be at rest in perfect beauty and peace. This was the embodiment in art of ideal harmony, which until then had never been defined. Nor is it possible for it to appear again, Hegel believed, because the art of the Christian religion does not have for its principle the classical ideality conceived as perfect balanced tension between the physical and mental, the human and the
divine. The Gothic cathedrals stretching their eager arms up toward the stars were yet to come. The pilgrim was still at home on earth.

These gods who walked and talked like men, who loved and hated like men, charm us with their humanness. But they were too much like men. They shared our deficiencies as well as our excellences and therein were the elements of their destruction. Can man worship that which is no better than himself, an idol made out of his own clay?

For a time, though, the gods were worshiped by the Greeks in a kind of joy of life in festivals, sports and activities of all sorts. In Greek life, poetry, the product of the thinking imagination, was the essential service of the gods. The muse to which Homer appealed was his own genius.

The Olympic Festivals were typical of the complete integration of the social, religious, political and art life of Greece. The name of the winner in the foot race at Olympia was first inscribed in 776 B.C., tradition says, and from that time this celebration, sacred to Zeus, was held at four year intervals. So important was this festival that events of Greek history began to be dated with reference to the first, second, third or fourth year of a certain Olympiad. The olive-crowned winners were immortalized in Greek sculpture and literature. The festival became a real focus of the art and poetry of Greece and at its core was reverence for Zeus, the god of honesty and justice, whose worship was appropriately expressed by Cleanthes in the hymn from which St. Paul quoted in Acts 17:28. Cleanthes describes Zeus as the father of all men, "who alone of mortal things that move
upon the earth" were created in his image.

The difficulties of reconciling anthropomorphic polytheism with the increasingly lofty conceptions of justice and ethics are historically evident as has been observed, in the writings of many of the Greek poets. For instance, in *Prometheus Bound*, Aeschylus attempted to reconcile the disobedience of the Titan hero in bringing fire to man. In *Oedipus Rex* and *Antigone*, Sophocles defined the growing Greek doubt as to the universal quality of the laws of their gods.

But the inadequacy of the seamed, patched and shrunken garment of Greek mythology to clothe the radiant body of spiritual Truth was made clearly apparent in the comedies of Aristophanes. What Jeremiah attempted to accomplish for Hebrew religious practices, by thunderous admonition, Aristophanes tried in Athens with the tools of comic humor and wit. The lines quoted below remind us that the attempt to reconcile religion and philosophy with current scientific theories is a perennial one.

"Chorus of Clouds:

'Our welcome to thee, old man, who would see
the marvels that science can show:'

Strepsiades:

'Oh, earth! what a sound, how august and
profound! it fills me with wonder and
awe.' (listening to thunder)

Strepsiades:

'But is it not He who compels this to be? does
not Zeus this Necessity send?"
Socrates:

'No Zeus have we there, but a vortex of air.'

Strepsiades:

'What! Vortex? that's something I own.
I knew not before, that Zeus was no more,
but Vortex was placed on his throne!'

The entire tone of this play is to ridicule not only the scientific theories of the day but philosophers as well. Its tenor was to advocate a return to the religious devotion of an earlier day.

A clear statement of the very real ethical problem facing the Greeks is to be found in the tale of Ion and Creusa which Euripides recounts in his drama Ion. The problem is this: How reconcile even with human, let alone divine ethics, the conduct ascribed for example, to Apollo, who was believed to have seduced and then abandoned a mortal woman, Creusa, forcing her to expose her baby for eagles to devour and leaving her in ignorance of its fate.

"Child of Latona, I cry to the sun—I will publish thy shame!
Thou with thy tresses a-shimmer with gold,
through the flowers as I came
Flucking the crocuses, heaping my veil with
their gold-litten flame,
Cam' st on me, caughtest the poor pallid
wrists of mine hands, and dist hale
Unto thy couch in the cave. 'Mother! Mother!'
I shrieked out my wail—
Wroughtest the pleasure of Kypris; no shame
made the god-lover quail.
Wretched I bare thee a child, and I cast him
with shuddering throe
Forth on thy couch where thou forcedst
thy victim, a bride-bed of woe.
Lost—my poor baby and thine! for the
eagles devoured him: and lo!
Victory-songs to thy lyre dost thou chant!—
Ho, I call to thee, son
Born to Latona, Dispenser of boding, on
gold-gleaming throne
Midmost of earth who are sitting:—thine
ears shall be pierced with my moan!
Thy Delos doth hate thee, thy bay-boughs
abhorr thee,
By the palm-tree of feathery frondage that
rose
Where in sacred travail Latona bore thee
In Zeus's garden close."

The contrast between the developing ethical sense of man and
the reputed immorality of the gods was so great by the time of Plato
that the great philosopher, it will be remembered, advised against the
reading of Homer by the young and impressionable, lest they be led into
unsuitable and immoral practices. Plato recognized that to attribute
immoral acts to the gods was, in effect, to deny their godliness.
Therefore, he said: "let us further compel the poets to declare either
that these acts were not done by them or that they were not the sons of
gods; (referring to Theseus son of Poseidon and Peirithous son of Zeus)—
both in the same breath, they shall not be permitted to affirm."

The gods were toppling from high Olympus. The Geist was mov-
ing again.
CHAPTER III

THE ROMANTIC STAGE OF ART

"Speak to Him, thou, for He hears, and
Spirit with Spirit can meet—
Closer is He than breathing, and
nearer than hands and feet.

"And the ear of man cannot hear, and
the eye of man cannot see;
But if we could see and hear, this
Vision—were it not He?"

What of the Geist? How does religion describe it and art
shape and color it in this new stage which Hegel calls Romantic,
though it must not be identified off hand with the period of romanticism
in literature directly preceding the era in which the German philosopher
lived and wrote?

As we have noted Hegel believed that in his art, man defines
God. In the religion of Nature, God is seen as an "Other", as present
in a natural shape. Art pictured him symbolically, often in an image
with human head and the body of a beast, for example, Adrommelech,
a god of the Sepharvaim, representing the male element of the sun.
Then again, He was worshiped as a simple beast of the field. Next, in
the religion of Spirit, He was a God afar off, conceived as power,
necessity, as self-consciousness. And then art formed the gods as
self-conscious finite individualities. We have seen how the conception
of the gods of Olympus developed and changed in the hands of Homer and
the great Greek dramatists. In the same way, the Hebrew prophets
defined Jehovah to themselves and to their people. Here was pictured the man-likeness of the gods.

But now the Geist comes into its own. It knows itself. Man, as a thinking being, recognizes his own God-likeness. Anthropomorphism becomes what we might call "themorphism". Man sees his own free self-consciousness, his rationality, as a "like-mindedness with Him" whom we call God.

This religion, the heart and soul of the new art, Hegel calls the true, the absolute, the revealed, the Christian religion. "It is the Christian religion which is the perfect religion, the religion which represents the Being of Spirit in a realized form. In it the universal Spirit and the particular spirit, the infinite Spirit and the finite spirit, are inseparably connected; it is their absolute identity which constitutes this religion and is its substance or content."

If the Infinite Spirit, which we generally call God, and the finite spirit, usually thought of as the soul or mind or consciousness of man, are identical, as Hegel believed, then Jesus was justified in voicing the demand: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect." Then the conception of self-realization as a moral ideal expressed in the idealistic philosophies of Green and Bosanquet as well as that of Hegel becomes Self-realization and an aim worthy of man's striving. It might be called the aim to recognize the Word (the universal) as the very ground of embodiment (individual personality) and therefore progressively to show forth the universal in individual life, that is, to make it concrete by making it particular, make
Justice live by being just, thus allowing the divine nature to appear as individual man.

The value attached to human personality or individuality came new born into the world, though first seen as through a glass, darkly, with the recognition of the capacity of individual man for infinite spiritual growth. The demand of Christianity upon man that he become God-like, and the vision that man can be so, is responsible for the importance newly ascribed to what is called human personality. It is actually a recognition of the kinship of every man, no matter how lowly, with the Divine. Man tacitly, though perhaps not consciously, recognizes God as a Being not wholly apart, as the essence of his own rational nature. Thus, man's new respect for his own worth and dignity and that of every other man (the ideal, incidentally, which, when expressed in government, is democracy) is grounded in his reverence for the Divine Spirit. It is the recognition of "the Infinite Presence as identical with me as this particular person, of knowing in short that I carry this self-consciousness of God as the seat of my own personality, that is to say my own self-consciousness, as certainly as I carry the sense of my own self identity."

Although Christianity is often presented as if man must get to know God as an outward object like the sun or stars or as a being like himself, yet the essential teaching of Christianity is the acknowledgment of the qualitative identity of God and man. "The same content is seen to exist in both sides, and it is this potential or true Being of the two sides which is religion."
This "is the standpoint of the age" as is proved, Hegel believed, by the increased emphasis upon individual morality, and upon the religious preoccupation even in men's daily affairs found in Protestantism. Thus God is not a being above and beyond this world, an Unknown, for He has told men not merely in history but in their own consciousness what He is. Therefore, this (Christianity) is the religion of the manifestation of God, since now He knows Himself in the finite spirit. Like St. Augustine, Hegel regarded God's creation not as a specific series of acts in space and time, but as eternal Self-revelation. "The Christian religion just means that we know God and is just the religion in which God has revealed Himself and has shown what He is", or in the words of St. Paul, "The Unknown God which ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you."

"Spirit is the living Process by which the implicit unity of the divine and the human natures becomes actual and comes to have a definite existence."

But it is the nature of consciousness to distinguish. Therefore, when religion is defined from the viewpoint of consciousness, by its own nature it considers all that it thinks of as something existing external to it. Therefore, revelation is for us as something "given and outward". Religious worship is man's effort to overcome his sense of remoteness, to draw close to God. The deeply religious man turns yearningly with his whole heart to God, and when that flooding rush of spiritual joy suffuses his whole being with the calm certainty of God's presence he may describe this enlightenment as God's grace or think of
it as coming from somewhere external to consciousness. This man is like the prodigal son of the parable. As long as the prodigal son pursued aims and activities different from those natural to one of his heritage, he remained self-exiled. But when he remembered that he was a son, not a hireling, and desired above all else the things to be found in his Father's house, he was reunited with the Father.

But, Hegel points out, it is possible to reach this sense that "He is closer to us than breathing; nearer than hands and feet" by way of consciousness itself. One who eliminates the sense of separation in this way is like the eldest son of the same parable who was told that he needed no welcoming feast because he had never left the Father's house (the conviction of identity with the God-consciousness). "Son, thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine."

The notion of Christianity itself, whether consciously perceived or not, is that it is within the capacity of individual man to eliminate this sense of alienation. "Dark is the world to thee; thyself art the reason why."

"It is in the subject (man) that the inseparability of subjectivity and of the Other (God) or objectivity exists" and this constitutes man's freedom.

Now that the Geist is at home with itself, knows itself as free self-consciousness and now that individuality or singularity is its leading category, how is this new conception to be expressed as Art?

The aim of the new art can no longer be beauty alone. It
must be spiritual beauty. Its true principle is absolute inwardness and the form which corresponds to it, the subjectivity of Mind. Therefore, Spirit must find an existence corresponding to its own principle and does so in the world of emotion or soul. Then, as man becomes aware of his essential identity with his "Other"—the infinity which opposes his particularity—and as he claims Spirit as his essential nature, his human spirit "achieves its own infinity and freedom".

Individual man must transcend his own sense of limitation, his merely selfish aims and desires, for these constitute his finitude. "Then as the actual subject (individual man) is the manifestation of God, anthropomorphism spiritually reinterpreted, reflects valid truth. Now, what is substantive is no longer to be known as merely beyond or merely relative to our humanity, for God is seen to declare Himself in the heart of finite condition.

Art now recognizes one God only, one Spirit. But the definite existence of God must be made manifest. The subjectivity of mind is made aware of its own actual presence (the Absolute) by no other means than its reality or embodiment as external existence. The Word must be made flesh. The new function of Art then must be "to make the consciousness of the Divine mind visible". Since the characteristics of absolute Truth are given definite, concrete existence only in individual man, it is the individual who is now accorded infinite worth. From this point on, the whole of Truth is made manifest to mankind not under the mode of nature, nor that of Beauty nor of heroic exploits but as the living experience of individual man, not seen as man only, nor as conscious
of God, but rather as the self-knowing and only Universal God Himself, become man, in whose birth, life, death, and resurrection He reveals to finite consciousness what Spirit, the Eternal and Infinite, are. Romantic Art presents this content in the history of Christ. The reality in this history, Hegel declared, is not confined to the individuality of Christ but unfolds throughout the entire history of humanity. ("Before Abraham was, I am").

Strain, conflict, pain and death are an essential feature of this history. As God separates finitude from Himself, so finite man starting on his journey outside the Divine kingdom, must rise to God to lose from himself the finite.

Such a content as the sacrifice of personal subjectivity contrasts profoundly with Greek art which subordinated all suffering or ugliness. The Christian, for example, viewed death as the negation of conscious spiritual life and therefore feared it. But Greek individuality did not attach such worth to its own self-consciousness, therefore feared it less. Neither did the Greeks conceive of death in a positive way as the prelude to immortality, for they did not give this idea serious consideration until the time of Socrates. The Greek felt at home in this present world. Achilles, for instance, says: "rather would I live upon the soil as the hireling of another, with a landless man who had no great livelihood, than bear sway among all the dead that are no more." Contrast this with the Hebrew Psalmist who sang: "I had rather be a doorkeeper in the house of my God, than to dwell in the tents of wickedness." Romantic art pictured death as "the negation of the negation"—the negating of that which is the negative of infinity,
The content of the new art is the positive aspect of Absolute Spirit, God becoming man. The negative aspect is the strain, the conflict and the putting off of particularity. Art presents both of these aspects in the life of the individual person. Human life in all its varying forms and activities, provides this content which is the Absolute in its universality seen in the conscious life of the human soul. At this stage, the material of art is the ongoing life of mankind in its whole development. But it is religion that is the revelation which makes Truth visible, not art in this instance, for "religion (the consciousness of Truth in its universality) is an essential premise of Romantic Art."

Romantic Art reveals two worlds. First, the soul kingdom complete in itself, finding reconciliation in its own sphere, the Phoenix-like life of the Spirit in its true circular orbit, birth-death-resurrection, doubled back in the return upon itself and second, external nature—empirical reality. As purely external matter the latter has no value and takes on worth only when the soul "has made itself a home in it", and it consequently expresses not only the ideal but spiritual inwardness. Because the principle of this art is that of an ever expanding universality, its most characteristic artistic expression is that of music, or epic poetry, or a lyrical tone in epic or drama. This ideality, focused to a point, is without externality, such as a single tone of music "a wavelet over waters, a ringing sound over a world". 
The inwardness or character of the individual himself also becomes proper material for romantic art. Then, because the inwardness or spiritual significance of things has become free from its externality—which has also become independently free—these two aspects begin to fall apart. Romantic Art here "commits an act of suicide and betrays the fact that conscious life must now secure forms of loftier significance than Art alone is able to offer, in which to grasp and retain truth."

The Religious Aspect of Romantic Art

The religious aspect of romantic art has for its characteristic content the history of Christ. This content contrasts in many ways with that of classical art. For instance, in the classical ideal, the Divine is restricted to pure individuality and the physical medium is conceived as the complete expression of the soul and spirituality of the gods. The Greeks revered Phidias' Statue of Zeus at Olympia, as was brought out in the chapter on Classical art, as if it were the very god himself, "the guardian of Hellas, at once mild and dread in his serene expression; the giver of life and all good gifts, the common father, savior, and guardian of mankind, Zeus both father and king," according to Lucian and others writing of that period.

The inwardness of the gods is completely expressed in their externality. The negativity, that is to say, the pain and suffering of the separation of inward and outward, cannot appear to classical art as a part of their experience. In romantic art, the situation is very different. The opposition between universality and personality is
inherent from the beginning. Unlike classical art where there is no universally recognized essence, the particular representation, man, no matter how considered, always has the task of resolving two contradictions, spirit and form, the Absolute in contrast with a world of sin, evil, finitude or limitation. Thus there is present the constant demand for reconciliation between these two aspects, because the subjective condition conceived as Mind immediately has the contradiction of the finite world, through the overcoming of which "the Infinite for the first time exists as Absolute Spirit".

Greek art reveals spiritual individuality through and as bodily shape, by events, in a way wholly external and sensible. Romantic art, however, demands that the soul must show its ability to withdraw from the external. Therefore the external can only express the inwardsness by making it apparent that the soul or mind can find completeness only in itself. In other words, those things which "the natural man receiveth not....for they are foolishness unto him" are now perceived to have the most profound significance for they are spiritually discerned.

In the light of this demand, it is interesting to see these characteristics in the art of portraiture where, although physical individuality remains and is recognizable, the artist in proportion to his true artistic insight takes as his primary consideration the presentation of the essential soul or mind of the individual portrayed. Yet, this soul or mind is never the self-absorbed whole of classical art but always presents its externality for the contemplation of some "Other". This soul must descend to the level of temporal existence in order to mediate and reconcile the absolute antithesis which is inherent in the notion of
the Absolute. Thus the externality must itself present the beauty of soul and at the same time must yield up itself to the realm of mind. Form at this point becomes the handmaid of Spirit, or to put it another way, it is the presence of the consecrated wine which sanctifies its container. The cup, no matter what its beauty, is glorified by what it holds.

The Idea is now conceived as soul in relation to another spiritual correlative. This content when expressed in terms of emotion is defined as the essential life of the soul—the inwardness of love. This is the content of the romantic in the sphere of religion. Love is ideally expressed when it reveals the positive reconcilement of Spirit in its immediacy—that is, in the world at hand.

This reconciliation is accomplished by the process of negation which is exemplified in the embodiment of the Universal (God) in the particular (Christ) and the consequent putting off of his particularity and reassumption of his Universality. This process, declared Hegel, must be repeated in the life-experience of every individual.

Love is the redemption-history of Christ, his existence giving concrete shape to the Absolute itself. Hence the "weight of body and limb" is not "sign and symbol of thy division from Him," as Tennyson wrote, for concrete form is a necessity for Spirit. Everything must come to us in some outward way. Everything spiritual comes to us as the spiritual in a finite form. Then the admonition that spiritual things must be spiritually understood does not mean to Hegel that these "spiritual things" may not be perceptible to sense. On the contrary,
he specifically states "matter is concrete spirituality". The spiritual discernment to Hegel would consist in the recognition of the spirituality of their content and their consequent true significance.

Love in the religious sense as expressed in romantic art is the feeling of reconciliation between the human and the divine as seen in the love of Mary, in the Holy Family, and in the reciprocal love of Christ and the disciples. This love is also manifest in the Christian community, where the Spirit of God is seen as present when the finite sense is put down and the union of God and man is achieved as the return of man to God.

"The revelation of God in the world makes visible to our senses the reconciliation of God, Infinite Mind, with man, finite self-consciousness." The content of this reconciliation is the unity of the essence of reality with individual man. "An individual man is God and God is an individual man." This fact implies that the human spirit or soul is intrinsically in notion and essence, Spirit itself. Such a view, that of Christianity and therefore of the religious aspect of romantic art, necessarily implies that every particular individual, because he is man, has the infinite significance of being "an object of God and in union with God" along with the corresponding obligation of attaining to this union as the "seal of his existence". Only then does man become free and infinite Spirit.

Here romantic art in its religious domain might be called the picture before man of his own reconciliation with God because of that unity which Hegel calls the origin or ground-root of both the human and
Divine natures. The religious consciousness sees in the life of Christ reconciliation, not merely as an idea in Mind, but as having attained objective actuality perceivable to the human senses.

This process by which individualized spirit or mind attains its universality had inevitably to be expressed as history in its absolute significance—the process of this attainment in the life of one single individual. This history consists of "the particular man casting on one side his singularity in its bodily and spiritual presence, in other words he suffers and dies, but furthermore through the agony of death rises again out of death and ascends as glorified God, very and real Spirit who now, it is true, has entered actual existence as this particular person, yet is with equal truth only very God as Spirit in His community."

This history is the fundamental content of the religious aspect of romantic art. "Faith consists in the conviction that it has in the organic movement of this history, the truth itself." Consequently, since this is the primary factor, the beauty of the presentation is of incidental value. Art, therefore, as compared with the importance of spiritual conviction or faith, retreats here to a secondary position.

But Art is in one sense truly necessary to the presentation of this content for by conceiving man as the embodiment of Spirit, art fulfills the demand of anthropomorphism by presenting to the senses a concrete image of the life and history of Christ. To the degree that the particularity rather than the universality of the Divine manifestation is emphasized, to that degree is the non-ideal necessarily presented by the artist.
When rendering the image of Christ, artists should, in the opinion of Hegel, picture him as possessing soul-intensity, pre-eminent spirituality in its widest comprehension, yet with intimate personality and individual distinction. The demand upon the artist here is to make "that which is spiritual and ideal within the content under the mode of Spirit shine forth through the presentation of ordinary experience.... and to bring this finer essence to our hearts and senses."

The content of this art—a history which makes objective in the real world bodily and spiritual singularity infused with the essential and universal nature of Spirit—is the reconciliation of man with God. Dissonance, that is the pain, torture and agony, is inseparable from the very nature of spiritual life. In fact this unity of the finite and infinite, this reconciliation asserts itself in its true depth and completeness by means of the severity of the contradiction which yearns for resolution. This process of Spirit, if accepted, is the Idea of Spirit which determines for conscious life the universal history, forever repeated in the spiritual activity of men. It is this consciousness as the universal mind or Spirit which is expressed or manifest in the multiplicity of individual life, reality and existence.

The extreme point of contrast between classical art and this religious domain of romantic art is to be found in the aspect of inherent contradiction, of negation—the concept that Spirit secures its truth by the sacrifice of the sensuous and its individual singularity. This non-beautiful aspect is wholly incompatible with the Greek type of
beauty. From the romantic point of view, death is to be regarded as only a point of transition by which the universal and the phenomenal individuality become one. This unity is actually a positive affirmation which is clearly expressed by the resurrection and the ascension.

Plastic art here finds itself with an impossible task. It must present absolute Spirit in its infinity and universality in union with an individual consciousness, exalted above immediate existence, and yet must express, in a form apparent to sense, these vast conceptions. If Spirit is to be made apparent through art in a way to be felt and seen as well as intellectually understood, it can only be so by way of the inner realm of Spirit itself, the soul and its emotional experience. And the state which is free Spirit in peace and joy with itself is Love. "The essence of love is surrender of the self-consciousness, in the forgetting of one's self in another self, yet to have and possess one's self for the first time in this very act of surrender and oblivion."

The unity to be sought and achieved in love is remarkably well illustrated by Hegel himself in his own attitude as expressed in a letter to his betrothed, of which the following is a free translation:

"Your love for me, my love for you, expressed from the point of view of the particularity of either of us, makes a distinction between us which separates our love; and love is neither mine nor yours but only ours; only this unity, only this bond! Turn away from contemplating this differentiation (or separateness) and let us hold firmly to this oneness."

Love took up the harp of Life and smote on all the chords with might, Smote the chord of self, which, trembling passed in music out of sight.
The content of the spiritual individuality which thus unites with another is Love itself, the Geist.

Such a content is particularly suitable for artistic presentation for no matter how spiritual they may be, soul-life, heart and feeling maintain a bond with the sensuous, therefore can reveal themselves as externality—as by a movement, a gesture, a look, the voice, a tone or a word unfolding their deepest meaning.

The essence of the ideal is the reconciliation of the inward life with its reality. The Ideal of romantic art in the sphere of religious consciousness is spiritual beauty in its pure emanation. The classic ideal expressed the perfect harmony of Spirit with its Other. In this, the factor opposing Spirit was its bodily organism. But now love reveals an opposing presence that is a spiritual consciousness, another subject, that is another individual. Here the realization of Spirit appears in a love that is first spiritual and then beautiful. For Spirit which is present in Spirit to itself, and aware of its own, which has spirit as the substance and ground of its very existence, abiding in intimacy with itself, is the inward being of Love.

St. John wrote: "God is Love" and as Divine love Christ is seen, in one aspect declaring God in his invisible essence as the object of love, and in the other, humanity redeemed. The idea of love is here presented in its universality, the Absolute, the spirit of Truth, in the form of emotion. But the difficulties are obvious of clothing, in sensuous vesture such concepts, which stretch to the utmost the capacities of the heart. It is because such feelings are beyond the ability
of the artist's brush to delineate that no portrait of the Christ truly satisfies the deeply religious person.

But there is a kind of love which art can more successfully present—the love of Mary, the mother's love—a love at the same time human, yet entirely spiritual. It is a love without longing, a natural feeling which has been glorified. Here we have maternal love embodied in romantic art and at the same time a picture of Spirit itself, because "Spirit is only apprehensible by art in the form of feeling". Some of the Madonnas by Italian artists can be described in this way, as combining the tenderness of human affection with a sweetness that seems wholly divine, as, for example, Filippino Lippi's painting in the Church of the Badia in Florence, of the Virgin appearing to St. Bernard. This exquisite work, considered Filippino's finest, wonderfully illustrates the combination of human and divine feeling. The radiance of divine compassion is to be seen in the face of the Madonna while St. Bernard struggles between abasement before her spirituality and adoration of her warmly human beauty. The roughness of the rocky background serves further to accentuate the delicacy of the faces.

Yet this form of love necessarily falls short, Hegel points out, because tinged with the human element, of that loftier love of the Holy Spirit found in Protestantism, whereby Spirit is brought before the human consciousness in its own native element, separated from all underlying emotion. This alone, he believes, can be the foundation for a free road to Truth.

Christ's disciples and the friends who followed Him, Hegel sees as embodying the positive reconciliation of spiritual life, by
The concluding content of the religious domain of romantic art consists in the expansion of the Christ-history to a history of humanity—or rather the application of the principles revealed in the life of Christ to the life of all men in their community, showing the reconciliation of the human consciousness as a whole (meaning the aggregate of humanity) with the Divine, by means of its annulment of the human through the positing of the finite and human as a negation which thereby annuls itself and achieves its reconcilement with God.

The putting off of finitude—or the negating of the negation—Hegel describes as taking place in three ways: First, a repetition in actual life of the history of the Passion—martyrdom; second, the same conversion but removed to the inmost soul—a spiritual mediation by repentance and conversion; third, the manifestation of the Divine conceived in Nature's reality so that the course of Nature is arrested in order to display the presence of the Divine—presented as wonder or miracle.

Martyrdom, Conversion and Miracle as Subjects for Art

The Divine process is first seen in the community in the life of the martyr who wishes to emulate the Passion of Christ in his own life in order to "break down the walls of his sinful flesh". The martyr "forms a mirror in himself of the Divine process". He presupposes his own unworthiness and that of humanity for the receiving of Divine grace.
Art, whether painting or lyric, describes in this phase the negative aspect in all its variations, the willing endurance of all kinds of torments. Pain is an object in itself to the true martyr who clasps eagerly to his breast the instrument for his wounding and finds in the very suffering his greatest joy. This attitude was expressed by Jacopone da Todi, a Penitente and follower of Francis of Assisi. Jacopone disdained self to the point of mortification and said: "What evil comes from Him is sweetness to me." Meister Eckehart, German mystic, also understood this point of view. "There is a marvelous comfort," he said, "to be had when adversity serves as well as fortune; then pain is like pleasure."

But perhaps Dante's words best describe the religious consciousness of this kind: The mountain trembles....

"...only when a soul feels pure,
So that it stands erect, or wills to move
To climb the mount; the cry then follows it.
The will alone gives proof of purity;
The spirit, wholly free to change its place,
Is taken by surprise, and given comfort.
It fain would rise ere then, but is prevented
By wish to expiate its sin through torment,
Instilled, like wish for sin, by heavenly justice." 113/

Since the content of this art is of suffering and torments of every kind, it is not surprising to find that beauty is hardly a characteristic of paintings showing these experiences, or at least our sense of their beauty is overshadowed by our horror of the tortures portrayed.

Yet this negative can be and sometimes is presented in a way that is both inspiring and beautiful. The hearts of men have been
lifted for more than two thousand years by Aeschylus' tragedy telling of the courage of chained Prometheus whose spirit remained steadfast as the eagle of ruthless Zeus endlessly pecked at the fire-bringer's liver.

Joan of Arc is another one whose heroism has inspired poets and painters. Is it only because we view Joan as a part of history and Prometheus as a myth that the story of the Maid of Orleans seems to have a deeper, richer content than the Greek legend, or is it perhaps the contrast of a young girl's helplessness with the magnificence of her courage which gives this story its sublimity? In any case, the national festival honoring Saint Joan on the eighth of May annually reminds the French people of the little maid whose love of her country spoke aloud to her and through her to the armies of France.

Hegel says of the martyrs of the former, not the latter type: "This intimate possession of their faith and love in its spiritual beauty is no sanity of soul which brings to them a sense of the sanity of their body; rather it is a sense of inward life...made manifest in their suffering and which even at the moment of their ecstasy, retains the experience of pain as an essential condition of their beatitude." His statement reveals his conviction that to overemphasize the negative or evil aspect of human life, as the pessimists have done, shows failure to understand the dialectical process. It also shows that one has failed to progress to the next step, or synthesis, in which the negative is seen to be a phase of growth.

In rendering this kind of martyrdom, Hegel admonishes artists to emphasize the Divine Presence "in the temple of the soul" rather
than the lacerations of the flesh. The kind of religious frenzy, as
Hegel calls it, which turns away completely from all things of the world,
all human obligations and activities, fails to see in the moral life of
man the universality of spirit, which Hegel believed to be the essence of
real religion. The demand of religion, as Hegel described it, is for
every man to make concrete in his experience the good he conceives to
be the essence of Divinity. This is the concrete universal, the embodi-
ment in the flesh which must take place before this universal can have
meaning, significance or even actuality in terms of human experience.
For this reason, art depicting the religious experience of the martyrs,
if their martyrdom is a flaying of self of their own choosing, was
regarded by Hegel as a one-sided, unbalanced presentation of religious
feeling. It is "deficient in comprehensiveness, that is, the piety of
the self-secluded soul, which has not yet attained in its growth to the
fully expanded self-reliance of maturity". This is a wholly selfish
standpoint in that it is concerned only with the individual's personal
salvation. In fact, the German philosopher describes this kind of
martyrdom as "simply mad".

The other aspect of martyrdom, the conversion in the inner
life of the soul by a withdrawal out of evil is based on the conviction
that faith is capable of converting the evil past action into some-
thing alien to the man who perpetrated it. This is accomplished through
a profound sense of humility, a kind of scorn for his former self,
which amounts to a separating of himself from it. This Hegel describes
as a return to the positive and is "the truly infinite content of reli-
gious love, the presence and actuality of absolute Spirit in the indivi-
dual soul itself".

This kind of a revolution is so inward that it belongs to the field of religion rather than to art though the art of painting can make visible such a history.

Two examples may be cited. The conversion of Paul on the road to Damascus, and the regeneration of Mary Magdalene. As pebbles dropped into a pond ripple its smoothness with widening circles, so these two experiences have provided the impetus for many works of art. Hegel himself comments on Carlo Dolci's painting of Mary Magdalene which to him exemplifies the very point we have just referred to—conversion by the putting off of the sense of sin as attached to a selfhood now out-grown from the point of view of newly won identification with "the Infinite Presence". Hegel points out that some of the Italian masters painted the Magdalene with the most consummate artistry and insight in that one can see that her sin was in a sense foreign to her, something external as it were, not a degradation of soul or a corruption at the very depths of her being. For that reason, through the vision of the Christ, she was enabled to recognize that what she had identified as her selfhood was no longer her self, which newly was "the self-consciousness of God" and therefore sinless. Having been "born again" the sense of sin dropped away along with the old sense of self. Osmaison's comment on this point, *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, shows a failure to understand the philosophical meaning of Hegel's statement concerning this experience, thus illustrating the truth of Bosanquet's warning: "The hardest of all lessons in interpretation is to believe that great men mean what they say. We are below their level, and what they actually say
seems impossible to us till we have adulterated it to suit our own
imbecility."

What Hegel actually says concerning Dolci's painting is this:
"We are not led to feel (when looking at these paintings) that the fact
that she has loved so much is her error, but rather that her fair and
fascinating folly is this, namely that she BELIEVES herself to be a
sinner."

The cataclysmic impact of Christian conversion on the human
personality is nowhere better exemplified than in the transformation of
Saul of Tarsus, proud Hebrew pharisee and persecutor of the Christians,
into Paul, the Apostle of Christ. Charged in a vision with persecuting
Jesus, Saul, on the road to Damascus, was stricken simultaneously with
a belief in his own sin and with blindness. But after the disciple Ana-
nias visited him, Saul was "filled with the Holy Ghost" and "immediately
there fell from his eyes as it had been scales and he received his
sight". As if born again, Saul had put off the old man and become a
new creature who went up and down the land preaching "Christ in the
synagogues, that he is the Son of God."

The final aspect, that of the miracle, Hegel calls the conver-
sion-history of the immediate existence of nature. It is the touching
of finite substance by the hand of God, transmuting what is external
and particular into something entirely different.

Hegel believed, however, that the Divine touches and dominates
Nature only as reason and in "the unalterable laws of nature herself....
for the Divine has no occasion to exploit Himself in particular circum-

stances which run contrary to these laws”. Certain events will be called miraculous, he believed, as long as the connection between things is not known or understood. But the true miracle in Nature is the manifestation of Spirit and the true manifestation of Spirit is the consciousness of man and his realization that in these scattered elements and in the manifold contingent things, conformity to law and reason are essentially present.

Art has taken innumerable subjects from this content. For example, the receiving of the stigmata by St. Francis, which Giotto, Van Eyck and others have immortalized, or the legend of the cherry tree which bent its fruit as the Holy Family passed by and which has been traced by painters in their Madonna of the cherries.

Although Hegel regards these experiences as suitable subjects for art, he found them unnecessary to religion; to him the witness of the Spirit is sufficient.

Chivalry

Not only in the religious but in the secular life of man, the Divine spirit is seen by the romantic consciousness to unfold itself, and this view man expresses in the world as honor, fidelity and human love.

These forms as they are conceived by the romantic consciousness were unknown to the classical mind. It is the independence of the individual which they express, the fact of individual personality, and this content is stated most characteristically in the art of poetry.
Honor is here thought of, not in its moral character, but as "the recognition and formal inviolability of the individual person". Love is seen as the passion of one individual for another, and it too is not pictured in the same sense that it appears in Classical art. Fidelity in romantic art is the faithfulness of an individual to his superior—for instance, of the vassal to his lord. These three modes form the content of Chivalry.

Honor

Honor, according to Hegel, is man's own view of himself; that with which he identifies his essential soul-infinity. When a "man of honor" makes a judgment, he thinks first of all about himself, and the question he asks, says Hegel, is not: Is this act right or wrong in principle; but: Is it in accord with the pattern of behavior I have set up as expressive of my selfhood? Since it is a personal view of himself which governs, honor is subject to individual caprice. A man may commit many wrongs and still be a "man of honor" in his own eyes or in the eyes of those who have his criterion as their own.

Honor is most idealistically pictured in the epic poems and ballads of the age of chivalry, the stories of King Arthur's court or their modern re-telling in the great Spanish work, Don Quixote, although in the latter the seeds of the dissolution of romantic art can be seen.

This aspect of romantic art might appear far removed from the real subject matter of this paper, the inter-play of religion and art,
but closer examination will reveal that even here the influence of man's conception of the essential nature of all Being, and his relationship with it constitutes the real content of this art.

Everything a man is, does or has done to him by others, affects his honor, points out Hegel. "Honor is the extreme embodiment of vulnerability" because this picture I have of myself must exist not only in my own mind but in the mind of another. When this "Other" attacks the picture I have of myself he actually negates the whole value of my personality, because I have identified the essential value of my selfhood with the very thing he has attacked.

But, it must be remembered, only my equal—another "man of honor" can insult me. Only a personality whose value I conceive to be the equal of my own can attack my personal view of myself in a way to wound my opinion of myself.

Honor, says Hegel, both in conflict and satisfaction, depends on personal independence conscious of itself as subject to no limitation, acting directly from its own resources, which are rooted in infinity. Hence an insult is in the nature of an infinite negation, or a negation of infinity itself and can be considered an insult only because of the infinite value of the essential nature of him who gives it as well as that of him who receives it. This fact was interpreted in chivalry as a necessity for equality before an insult could be given. A man's inferior could not insult him. For example, a peasant could not challenge a lord to a duel. Therefore, a refusal to recognize an insult was in turn the greatest insult.
Honor, then, is a preoccupation with individual selfhood seen as proud independence. It sees all its values at stake in an incident external to it.

What then, is the relationship between this concept of the self, expressed in honor, and the religious life of man? Hegel hints at the inner significance but the romantic art to which he refers us makes this relationship more explicit if carefully examined.

The false or limited concept of honor is seen to be an attachment of value to mere particularity, whereas value can have meaning and validity only as a universal, and exists in the life of man only in relation to, or as a concrete example of, a universal. Although "the universal is made living only when it is made particular", and therefore the particular is essential to the expression of the Idea, even the opposite of value can exist or have meaning only as a limitation of or a defining of a universal value. To the degree, therefore, that man conceives of himself as essentially at one with value itself, he can receive indignity only when "the good" or a similar value is attacked and only then should he take the insult "personally". Clearly nothing can rob the individual of his worth and dignity when these qualities are seen to be rooted in man's truly essential nature, his essence, his own divinity which is his very life itself, his own unity with the values which constitute his character. Therefore, man can lose the consciousness of his own worth and dignity only through his own act, never through the act of another—only by the abandonment of his characteristic values—those which to him constitute the essential good.
This is obviously both a philosophical conception, as exemplified in
the life and death of Socrates, and a religious one which was preemi-
nently expressed in the life of Jesus, who rose to the altitude of
universalism in his, "Father, forgive them; for they know not what
they do."

Actually, the basis for such a state of mind is a more univer-
sal standpoint, an abandonment of the exclusively personal. This
appears as a capacity to forgive or to refuse to retaliate when wronged.
A man at such a pinnacle might be called spiritually impregnable, for
one who will not wound cannot be wounded. In the opinion of this writer,
this is the meaning of Hegel's statement that the individual must rise
to the universal and of Hegel's claim that there is an altitude at
which all conflicts are resolved. This does not constitute a denial
of individuality yet is an assumption of universality by means of an
identification with the most supreme values.

On the other hand, the concept of honor taken in a personal
way and without reference to actual values is an empty form, meaning-
less, and in some of its aspects even ridiculous. This phase of
chivalry is concretely shown in Don Quixote. More recently, Mark Twain
in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court similarly pointed out
the incongruity of behavior based on form alone when taken out of its
context of time. Honor forbade Socrates to put the undeserved cup of
hemlock from his lips because he had identified his most essential
selfhood with reverence for law, for his citizenship, and with the con-
viction that what is of value in man (the soul) survives death. There-
fore the gesture of Socrates receives timeless recognition, while Don Quixote's brave willingness to risk his life in battle with imaginary enemies inspires us only with amused wonder. His self-sacrifice is meaningless and appears not heroic but ridiculous because by it no real principle is upheld.

Love

In Classic Art, love was the virtuous esteem of the marriage relationship or a passion, regarded as a criminal aberration of the senses. But in Romantic Art, love between individuals is complete devotion. At its most ideal, it is "a sacrifice (by the individual) of his independent consciousness and his personal isolation. For the first time in the consciousness of another, he is aware emotionally that he has thoroughly perceived and understood the nature of his own being."

Love, says Hegel, is "only true and complete when my personality, in abstract and concrete, is not only respected by another but when I in the entire significance of my personal resources (my past, present and future) both penetrate the conscious life of another and constitute the object of his real volition and knowledge, his effort and property." It is interesting to observe in this description of the love relationship the possible root of both Hegel's and Royce's theory of the uniting factor of history in community life. In his writings on the Christian community Royce emphasizes the acceptance of Christian history, shared past, and loyalty to Christian objectives, shared future, as important factors in the establishment of the Christian community. "Loyalty" said Royce, "is the finding of a harmony of the self
and the world." Hegel might describe this unifying of the many into one as a process making actual or concrete in human experience the metaphysical and ideal unity implicit in his view of the universe as one, and of its essence as Spirit or Mind (the Geist).

"A people is but the attempt of many
To rise to the completer life of one." 134/

"This state of a man's losing his own consciousness in another... by which he first really finds himself and comes to himself—that oblivion of his own so that the lover no longer exists or is careful for himself, but discovers the roots of that life in another, and yet only comes to the full enjoyment of himself in that other is what gives us the infinite relation of love." We may recall Hegel's letter to his betrothed, quoted earlier.

Hegel finds it difficult to point to a presentation of love which fulfills his sense of the ideal. For example, in Petrarch he finds love of fancy and religion, a rather artificial outpouring of emotion. Dante, he says, pictures a love of Beatrice transfigured to religious ecstasy. In Boccaccio, Hegel finds only frivolity, impetuousity and passion, without ethical aim. The German Minnesingers Hegel thought to be sensitive, tender in their love but rather monotonous and melancholy with little imagination. And the French! Their love is an affair of gallantry with a bias toward vanity, an artificial state of feeling converted to the use of poetry. It is a sophistry of the senses. Ah! but the Spanish, Hegel believed to be imaginative, chivalrous and enthusiastic.
But what has this human love to do with the interaction of religion and art? Hegel calls love the world religion of hearts. It is, he says, the loftiest expression of the freedom of personal life. Then, surely, romantic love is the ultimate value—perhaps the ultimate good. No, Hegel explains, for it is limited in that it lacks universality, because it is the love of a particular person and no other. To the degree that it is love of one and not love of all, a uniting with one and not with all, it lacks universality, and this constitutes its limitation. In other words, we can find the ideal anywhere only by finding it universally.

The content of romantic art is made up of a description of the collisions caused by the impact on love by the general conditions of life. For example, literature is full of the accounts of the sacrifice of love on the altar of honor. The clash of love with honor immediately brings to mind many famous loves: Tristan and Isolde, Lancelot and Elaine, Anna Karenina, Madame Bovary and many others. Love of country or family obligations may clash with love. Even what Hegel calls "the prose of existence", that is, the misfortunes, prejudices, follies, or its evil, ruthless and savage aspects may strike at the spiritual beauty of love. The love of Ophelia for Hamlet seems a perfect example of such a love destroyed by the ruthless demands of violated honor.

Fidelity

Fidelity as conceived in chivalry, like love, has the limitation of being a bond of person to person, rather than the bond of person
to a principle. As pictured in Romantic Art, it is the liege service to a lord as found in chivalry and is of supreme importance there. In the lord-vassal relationship of chivalry, the individual preserves his independence while at the same time he freely accepts subordination to one of higher rank. Kent's offer of allegiance to Lear and the fidelity of the swineherd to Odysseus exemplify these qualities.

The fundamental principle of this very personal relationship is the free choice expressed, both as to the subordinate's assumption of the bond and the conditions of his vassalage. The clashes of this relationship with love, honor or other commitments of personal life provide the material for this aspect of romantic art. Tristan's obligation to King Mark to bring Mark's bride, Isolde, from her father's house to her husband, is an example of such a conflict.

Except for religion—though at times interwoven with it—the idea of chivalry in its aspects of honor, love and fidelity contains the richest content for artistic expression. Its area is humanity, except when that human aspiration reaches beyond itself as in the search for the Holy Grail, in the adventures of the Knights of the Round Table, or in the Crusades: all of them expressing intensity of soul in the secular world.
The Development of Independent Individuality

The special interest of this paper rules out Hegel's lengthy discussion in this chapter of the development of individual characters, but we should examine the causes and process of this development especially as expressed in the Crusades and in the effort to extend the spirit of the Christian community. Autonomy was at first formal, was only gradually achieved, and was first expressed in art as an ideal.

It is as if the vision of the new art asked in the words of Elizabeth Barrett Browning:

"... What if even God
Were chiefly God by living out Himself
To an individualism of the Infinite?" 138/

It must be remembered that the whole content of art at this stage is believed by Hegel to show an inward tendency, the withdrawal of the soul from externality in its own realm—that of the emotions and feelings as if "each man is the world." (A Sleep of Prisoners, Christopher Fry)

The beginnings of determined individuality were seen in the preceding stage, that of chivalry. Now this individuality is carried to its ultimate where the inward life, individuality itself, carries within it the necessity for its own inevitable doom. The dark figures from Shakespeare's tragedies come to mind immediately as examples of this type of literary figure. Hegel describes them as having a kind of iron steadfastness—as being rooted in themselves, dependent only on themselves. "We have," says Hegel, "no word here of religion for religion's sake or action as the embodiment of human reconciliation" but individuals possessed by their own exclusive aims, carrying through to an end
"with the unmitigated consequences of passion, and with no incidental reflection on the principles involved". Macbeth, Lady Macbeth and Othello exemplify this type.

Another kind of individuality like Juliet, or Miranda of The Tempest, never completely reveals the depths of its soul and we catch only glimpses of its profound feelings.

The important fact to note for our purposes in regard to such individuals is that if they can be said to have any connection with universals, it must be called a "negative universal". For in their insistence upon their own particular aims they thereby negate their own universality and cut themselves off from their own infinity. They "remain staunch to their master passion—nothing making them veer around but what is in strict accord with their rigidly determinate character."

This doom consists not in that the individual fails to achieve his purpose but is to be found in the nature of the objective itself. By his alliance with particularity, such an individual, in proportion as he achieves his purpose, rushes the faster toward the lonely abyss he himself has so bitterly dug. It is as if he said with Cain:

"I am history's wish and must come true
And I shall hate so long as hate is history."

Cathy and Heathcliff of Wuthering Heights are surely of this brood. Another was Faustus who in his overweening passion for power said:

"Had I as many souls as there be stars,
I'd give them all for Mephistophilis,
By him I'll be great Emperor of the world!"
History no doubt will present Hitler as a modern incarnation of such an ego.

The fundamental independence of individual character is the infinitude of human consciousness. Hegel points out the particularity of the content, that is, the world of the individual mind and the "coalescence of the ego with this, its particularity, for its own wishes and objects", expressed as a living individuality in which the character itself determines its own fate.

Natures of this kind proceed with a kind of dreadful fatality toward a crescendo which might well be called the opposite of reconciliation. They are allied with the ultimate evil of which their natures are capable; this is their ruination.

The more unrevealed natures often show a kind of spiritual birth which takes place in love. Juliet is of this type, as are also some characters in German folk songs that reveal the depth of their soul-life in broken flashes which have the effect of symbolism, hinting at so much more than they reveal. The stupid and shallow individual who expresses little because he has no soul intensity to uncover is not to be confused with the true characterizations of genius. Of course, the symbol here is not a "sign" of a universal but only of further meaning within the personal, living individual. Hamlet, and Goethe's King of Thule are examples of such creations.

The Spirit of Adventure

One of the fundamentals of romantic art is that the spiritual
sense, the soul, thinks of the external world as something different from itself and apart from it. This conception, in effect, rejects the Divine from nature and makes it impossible for the soul sense of the individual to unite harmoniously with his externality.

In such a view the collisions which we call adventures appear inevitable. "The adventurous" is a fundamental type of romance for the romantic world. It is a two-fold adventurousness, religious on the one hand with its Galahad seeking the Holy Grail, or secular on the other with its Don Quixote tilting with windmills.

The Crusades are thus called by Hegel the collective adventure of the Christian Middle Ages, "fantastical, of a spiritual tendency, and yet devoid of a truly spiritual aim." "For in its relation to the processes of religion the supreme object of the Crusades is in the highest degree empty and external. Christianity purported to secure its salvation solely in Spirit...not in the grave of Spirit or...in localities of its former temporal abiding place." The aim and objective of the Crusades indicated a neglect of the Gospel admonition to worship God in spirit and in truth. They attached prime importance to the possession of a material locality.

This aim, essentially religious, though misconceived and materialized, was in sharp contrast to the passion for mere conquest, for personal gain and achievement which was also a part of the history of the Crusades. The confusion and contradiction of these conflicting aims produced all kinds of selfishness and barbarism on the one hand, and every kind of martyrdom, unselfishness and heroism on the other.
The participants in this collective adventure, drawn at the outset to search "for the health of their souls", were split apart by the very materialism of the means they used to obtain it. "They strained after a gain that was temporal and united this which was of the world to the pure substance of religion." This accounts for the discordant and fantastic note and the absence of all unity in the enterprise.

In fact, this very tendency to misconstrue true religions purpose supplies a key to a major demand which, according to Hegel, Christianity must meet. He says: "It is precisely this longing to find Christ and spiritual content in such places and spaces, even the grave itself, the place of death, which is itself, whatever essential worth even a Chateaubriand may make out of it, a corruption of Spirit out of which Christianity must rise in resurrection in order to return once more to the fresh and abundant life of the concrete world."

But every man goes through an adventure more exalted even than these, in his own life "in the course of which he determines his own eternal destiny". Dante, in the Divine Comedy, has pictured such a view from the Roman Catholic standpoint. Dante, says Hegel, by fantastic conceptions and through the authority of his art and of his church has constituted himself the judge of the world and of the best known individuals of the ancient and Christian eras. Dante, for example, quotes Publius Statius as follows:

"... avaricious in my life? ...
May, avarice was much too far removed
From me: for that excess I dwelt
For many thousand months in punishment."
The entire portrayal in "the adventurous" is that of change, variety, instability—except that of individual character—for right has not been asserted as a law or principle to be invariably applied nor as a system which progressively reveals its orderly and universal character. Individual caprice alone governs, and every particular case is judged only in accord with the varying criteria of individual judgment.

This is true not merely in regard to the choice of individual actions but also of the soul, for some individuals are capable of "accepting as the substance of their life that which is wholly contingent..." Even in chivalry where its content of love, honor and fidelity has a more truly ethical basis, the application to particular circumstances is so lacking in continuity, so wholly dependent upon caprice that it must be said that in this area too the content must be called self-dissolvent.

In Hegel's view, the next step is inevitably into the world of comedy: the world of Ariosto and Cervantes, and likewise the world of the novel. Chivalry was overturned by its own essential incongruities which were shown with such insight by Cervantes in Don Quixote de la Mancha. Here a noble person, through his isolation and failure to be at home in his rationally constituted universe, provides the theme for a major satire upon all empty forms.

It now becomes more and more apparent that romantic art itself is essentially the dissolving process of classical art.
Dissolution of the Romantic Stage of Art

The inwardness of Spirit progressively withdraws itself from the external world into its own realm—that of the feelings and emotions—until it becomes conscious of its own independence to the degree that separation between it and externality becomes complete. By this process, action in the external world no longer heeds the command of spirit; it is inconsistent and random, expressing every form of particularity. On the other hand, if the inward content of the soul is to be emphasized in the work of art, the feelings and emotions of the individual must be seen as rooted in their own nature carrying out inevitably their necessary course.

Because of this varied content, the more closely art verges on dissolution, the richer and more extensive its content becomes, in so far as a variety of deeds, episodes and emotions are presented and considered as proper material for artistic expression.

As the process of dissolution continues, the imitation of nature also becomes more extensive and art tends to focus more and more on the technique and on the presentation of the ordinary activities of everyday life. Diderot in France and the Dutch genre painters might be cited in their respective arts as exemplifying this tendency.

Hegel recognized in the genre painters an expression of the exclusively Protestant tendency to "find a home in the prose of life". At the beginning of this trend, Martin Luther undertook, as one of his reforms, to bridge the traditional gap between clergy and laity. Practice and profession should be one for both classes and no ecclesi-
astical mediator was required between man and God in Christ. The husbandman at his plough, the housewife with her pots and pans could glorify God as well as could the priest with his holy vessels.

The glorifying of daily tasks at first served to enhance their significance only in that they became an additional way of serving God, but gradually this vision faded. The tasks, the mundane activities of daily life became an end in themselves. What had at first served to bring religion and worship into the every day life of the common man became the very influence which drew him toward preoccupation with contingent and worldly affairs. This transition is expressed in the Flemish painting "The Moneylender and His Wife" by Quentin Matsys in which one can almost see, taking place before our eyes in this little rectangle, the transformation of religious into secular realism. In it the trend of western thinking of the age is crystallized into a capsule, a moment made eternal by the "time machine" of artistic genius. The moneylender with pious look weighs his gold. Beside him stands his wife, an illuminated psalter in her hand. But her eyes are not fixed upon the prayer book; they turn with sly interest toward the shining metal. Behind the pair wooden shelves, gleaming warmly in the light, hold tools of the jeweler's trade, once sacred to St. Eloi, the goldsmith. A little scene, glimpsed through the window, becomes a Tom Thumb landscape by reflection in the convex mirror on the table before this absorbed and righteous pair, perfect epitome of the fact that what once was godly has become golden.

From the prosaic to the comic is but a short step on the path of dissolution, and the comic is the disintegrating element. The comic
spirit must never be confused with the ridiculous. It is never mere
folly, stupidity or nonsense. The truly comic is inseparable from an
"infinite geniality and confidence, capable of rising superior to its
own contradiction and experiencing therein no taint of bitterness or
sense of misfortune". "It is the happy frame of mind, a hale condition
of the soul, which, fully aware of itself, can suffer the dissolution
of its aims and realization."

The basis of comedy is a world whose aims lack substance
because they are only personal and appear comic because at variance with
the character of the individual trying to attain them. It is this
element of incongruity between the aim, and the method used to attain
the aim or the personality of the individual making the attempt, which
provides the comic. In comparison with it, satire is arid and bitter.

The humor of the comic is often subjective in that the sub-
stance of the aim sought may be entirely within the imagination of the
comic fellow seeking it. This would be true in the character of Don
Quixote where only in his imagination were the windmills his enemies.
Another example used by Hegel to illustrate this type of the comic is
the Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes in which women, retaining all the most
unlovely characteristics often ascribed to them, attempt to found a new
political constitution. The comic in this situation is not to be found
in the nature of the constitution but in the incongruity of such a
rational conception arising out of the irrationality of such natures.

The comic does not describe the essentially rational as per-
verse and "coming to naught". Aristophanes, for example, does not ridi-
cule what is ethical in the social life of Athens, that is, genuine
philosophy or true religious faith, but only the sophistry, gossip, love of litigation which he saw around him.

The comic individual remains unbroken and rises above the recognition of the lack of substance of his aims or of his accomplishment and is irrepressible and respected to the end. Falstaff is the perfect example of such a character.

The life of the Greek gods supplies endless material for comedy because the thought of the divine in human impersonation has itself a contradiction essentially comic. It is comic to think of a god blowing his nose or dribbling ambrosia on his tunic.

Humor of the best kind must have spiritual depth of its own by which it strikes at the root of the main idea. John Keats paid homage to the teaching quality of the comedy in his poem to Beaumont and Fletcher quoted in part:

"Here, your earth-born souls still speak
To mortals, of their little week;
Of their passions and their spites;
Of their glory and their shame;
What doth strengthen and what maim.
Thus ye teach us, every day,
Wisdom, though fled far away."
The Particular Arts

The Geist has uttered itself in each of the particular arts, defined itself, clarified itself. As architecture it changed the face of the earth along the Nile and on the banks of the Ganges, but it spoke in symbols and its message was not clear. As sculpture it rested for a while in ancient Greece, satisfied until it had completely defined physical beauty to itself. But Spirit constantly demands an external expression more adequate for its own magnitude and variety. It found in painting a medium in which the "specific unity of creation can be expressed in particular forms." Yet these three arts all have their roots in the sensuous or external form of spirit, that is, the changing contingent universe with its natural objects.

Music, on the other hand, concentrates on this subjective, emotional content apart from the world of concrete objects. Yet, because of its very nature music finds itself unable to define these aspirations in conceptual terms. It must speak of the heart's feelings only symbolically unless it calls language to its aid. Without language, music is without particularity of feeling or idea and is necessarily subject to misunderstanding. Music, therefore, needs the definition of language to fulfill its own real potentiality. This it finds in the realm of poetry.

Poetry, then, fulfills both the aims of the plastic arts and of music, while at the same time satisfying the demands of spirit. Poetry, which Hegel defines as "the art of human speech" is the totality of art in that it unites and includes the life of the mind and the
life of the heart, for at its best its principle is intelligence and its expression, beauty in loftiest form.

Poetry might truly be called the language of philosophy, for philosophy also, must combine the aspects of feeling and imagery (art and religion) and that of reason (science) and see them as one integrated, harmonious whole. Poetry like philosophy, makes "the inner or ideal content" (that is, the spiritually significant) "perceptible to the ideal faculty", that is, consciousness. Poetry sometimes can express unforgettable significant or immortal conceptions. For example, Wordsworth's

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home." 159/

"Everything is now possible as art's subject matter in which man on whatever plane of life he may be, possesses either the need or the capacity of making his abode."
CONCLUSION

History has unfolded its long scroll and, under Hegel's guidance, we have glimpsed the artistic and spiritual treasure of more than forty centuries. We have observed Spirit as the living Process defining itself in the artistic creations of many races, concrete evidence of their concept of Spirit, for "it is from himself (his own Self-consciousness) that the artist receives his content, the Spirit of man assigning to himself his own boundaries". And what is the Spirit of man which he may define in art? "We ought to regard the Spirit manifested in the consciousness of mankind as the essential spiritual existence of God Himself." Individual man, then, according to Hegel, must be the Divine nature particularized.

But the recognition of this fact, which Hegel regarded as the essential Christian concept stretches art to its utmost boundaries to comprehend. Art and religion at this stage must point toward philosophy. The consciousness glimpsing the infinite finds the language of imagery inadequate for itself and Spirit feels the necessity for purely rational expression. "Immaterial things which are the noblest and greatest are shown only in thought and idea and in no other way." If, as Aristotle said, Divinity is "thinking, thinking on thinking", then man is most godlike when engaged in rational activity. Only then does he perceive the validity of Hegel's statement, "the rational is the real and the real is the rational". Hegel might well have written Goethe's poem:
"He who possess art and science, has also religion; He who these two does not possess, should have a religion."

In other words, Hegel believed that philosophy is the rational man's religion.

But, as we noted at the beginning of this study, the Geist is Self-revealing Life, or the living Process of Spirit defining itself in various terms according to a dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, or expressed in other terms, as subjective conviction, objection, and reconciliation, the last of which, in turn, becomes the thesis for the next triadic progression. It was Hegel's view that art must falter as must religion, and both acknowledge their own inadequacy to express the truly rational character of Spirit, Mind, the Geist, as this unfoldment continued. However, on the basis of Hegel's own description of the nature of reality, it is impossible consistently to set a finality or limit upon any aspect, language or unfoldment of Truth. To do so would be to deny the dialectical process. But there is still another fallacy in the contention that art or religion must give place to another way of defining reality, namely, to logic. We should realize that neither the language of feeling nor that of imagery is necessarily that of irrationality. In fact, it sometimes appears as if poetic insight leads thought to a higher rationale than reason dare attempt, yet which reason itself, immediately recognizes when the mist ahead is pierced by the poet's penetrating vision. An analogy might be cited of the various forms of geometry which are now accepted as different but not contradictory ways of describing mathematical data.
This criticism which has been merely indicated here, might be elaborated at greater length in a more detailed work.

Surely it should be apparent that if Spirit is of the character described by Hegel, constantly creative, ever active, unlimited in conception, and if this consciousness individualized is man, then if, as we quoted earlier, the artist draws out of his own Self-consciousness the material for art, this too must be as unlimited as the Spirit or Mind which is its source. Neither content nor form of religion or art can be described as limited in any way without tumbling the Geist from its dialectical, ever rising pinnacle. Then man is free, without apology, to interpret reality in the language most fitting to his theme or to his spiritual ideas. No single form or expression could exhaustively define the Geist any more than a teacup could contain the sea. As Hegel himself says, the witness of the Spirit may be present in various ways, and "we have no right to demand that the truth should in the case of all men be got at in a philosophical way. The spiritual necessities of men vary according to their culture and free development."

And art, since it is the product of Mind or Spirit, has for its limit only the limits of Spirit, the dynamic, ever creative, unlimited Geist itself, which expresses itself in art at any point in history for those who can discern the signs of the times. Art might say of itself:

"In the floods of life,
In the storm of deeds,
Up and down I fly
Either, thither weave
From birth to grave an endless weft,
A changing sea of glorious life.
Thus in the whistling loom of Time I ply
Weaving the living robe of Deity."
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. By Dr. Gustav Mueller, of the University of Oklahoma.

CHAPTER I

5. A III 39.
6. A II 65.
7. A II 66.
8. A II 61.
9. A II 68.
10. A II 71.
12. ibid.
13. ibid.
15. cf. A III 51.
16. A III 42.
17. A III 46.
21. ibid. 252: 5.
22. Isaiah 40: 12.
25. ibid. p. 62.
27. cf. A II 56.
28. Bhagavad Gita, trans. by Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood, Chapt. IX.
32. Psalms 105: 8, 9.
33. cf. R II 177.
34. Isaiah 40:22.
35. R II 190.
36. R II 165.
37. ibid.
38. cf. R II 125.
39. Ibid.
40. 1 Kings 19:11, 12.
41. A II 17.
42. A II 157.
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44. Homer, Pope's translation.
45. cf. R II 252.
46. cf. R II 253.
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48. Lucian, quoted here from The Greek View of Life, by
   Loves Dickinson, p. 207.
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   E. D. A. Morshead, 367.
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52. cf. A II 213.
54. cf. A II 282.
56. Euripides, Ion.

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58. Tennyson, "Higher Pantheism".
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61. A II 322.
62. R II 331.
63. ibid.
64. cf. R II 328.
65. R II 342.
67. R II 349.
68. R II 331.
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70a. Tennyson, "Higher Pantheism".
71. R II 332.
72.
73. A II 285.
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76. Ibid.
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78. A II 286.
79. cf. A II 288.
80. Homer, The Odyssey, XI 489.
81. Psalms 84:10.
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83. A II 295.
84. A II 296.
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87. cf. A II 298.
88. 1 Cor. 2:14.
89. cf. A II 300.
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91. Tennyson, "Higher Pantheism".
92. 
93. cf. A II 301.
94. cf. A II 302.
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96. cf. Ibid.
97. A II 302.
98. A II 304.
99. cf. A II 305.
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103. Ibid.
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108. cf. Ibid.
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147. A II 369.
148. Ibid.
149. A II 370.
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152. A II 371.
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161. A II 395.
162.
165. R II 340.
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