SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

OF

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

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I

One of the most difficult problems of philosophy is that of the reality and nature of freedom. Subject to analysis from the most varying approaches, it succeeds in eluding the grasp of thinkers. This is not true of all problems. Answers have been found for some of them or else the questions have been dropped. But we cannot dismiss the problem of freedom, nor have we as yet found a satisfactory answer to all our queries. This persistence of the problem indicates how central it is. Before we can have an adequate account of it, we must have a satisfactory metaphysics. Not that this goal (i.e. finality) will ever be reached, but that as we fail to attain finality in metaphysics, so shall we find our account of freedom lacking. Since, then, the problem of freedom may serve as a vantage point from which to view entire systems of philosophy, we might hope that the difficulties encountered and the general solutions offered would reveal some of the earmarks of an adequate metaphysics.

As we might have expected, the mistakes run in pairs of opposites. Since the questions and answers of the problem of freedom focus themselves around the relation of man to the universe, we shall find that some of the errors to avoid are absolutism, in which all individuality is an appearance, and atomic individualism, in which we do not have a universe. Either way we lose one of the terms in our problem. Granted that we can maintain individuality and a universe, what is the character of this relationship? The kind of unity demanded
with the universe is a value relationship. The universe cannot come short of our highest aspirations. This raises the problem of the place of values in the universe and the relation of value to theoretical judgments. If in solving this problem we are led to naturalism, whether due to thorough-going materialism, to exclusive pre-occupation with efficient causes, or to other premises of philosophic method, we can admit no freedom. But there is also the other extreme of equating reality with perfection that would make the problem of evil insoluble. Thus throughout the problem we find contrary answers that create insuperable difficulties. Profiting by these errors, it might be possible to indicate some elements in a more adequate doctrine of freedom.
II

Plato's metaphysics is the fruition of Socrates' epistemological problems. If we can have real knowledge, reality must be such that it can be known, and the knowledge we have of it must reflect its character. Now we arrive at truth through defining our concepts and drawing inferences. Since these concepts are relatively stable, reality too cannot be in a state of flux. But the world which is all about us, the world of touch, sight, and hearing is never stable. The description which Heracleitus gave us of it is a true one. The sensible world is one of flux, ceaseless motion. It never settles down long enough to fit into our concepts; therefore, knowledge, not being of this world, must belong to a world in which we can move conceptually. It must be a world of Ideas, principles, forms, or essences, which form a hierarchy in reality and perfection, the highest being the Idea of the Good. It is the highest cause or infinite Reason.

Man occupies a position mid-way between the phenomenal world and the real world. In so far as he is rational and capable of knowledge, he belongs to the world of Ideas. As a creature swept by desires, he is a son of the sensible world. Previous to his earthly existence, man inhabits the region of pure Being. Some souls quickly forget their divine life and plunge themselves into sense experience. The part of the soul that strives to
regain its pristine elevation comes into conflict with the
debased part. And so before an object the soul is torn by
conflicting desires. This state of conflict is the condition
of the ordinary man who has not sought the best in conduct.
In the virtuous man we no longer have this alternation be-
tween extremes, but the contradiction is resolved into an
harmonious whole, in which each side of a man receives its
proper share. This is justice or true proportion, in which
alone can happiness be found.

The freedom of man is his citizenship in the world of Ideas.
The free man is the intelligent man, the virtuous man. By
turning himself away from the senses to the Ideas he realizes
his higher self. This is a process of self-determination,
soul-building, soul-creation. It is possible by virtue of
the immortal part of one's being. In the Symposium we are
given an account of the steps by which one rises to the
highest Idea from the lower manifestations of it. A man
cannot turn immediately from the sensible to the Real. To
do so would blind him. The process is gradual. At first he
perceives earthly beauty. Then he sees more and more the true
beauty, pure and untouched by mortality. Finally he contem-
plates absolute beauty, which is revealed in laws, institu-
tions, noble thoughts, wisdom, and the single science of
beauty.

The problem of freedom in Plato's philosophy is the prob-
lem of how man is caught in the world of appearance when he
belongs to the world of Ideas. How can his soul be both
rational and irrational? How does this foreign element creep into the rational soul? The distinction is not one of degrees but of kinds. This leads us to the doctrine of Ideas. The Idea transcends and is ontologically prior to its appearance. Thus arises the problem of the relation of the archetype to its exemplification. They cannot have equal ultimate significance, for the appearance is what it is only through its form. Still, the flux cannot be illusory, for it should then have no being at all. Plato's problem is one of maintaining a universe that is two-sided, but really one-sided. In order to distinguish appearance from Idea, he makes use of the concept of Non-being. The flux is a modification of this "somewhat", which is not a substance nor with a reality of its own. It has neither quality nor form and can be apprehended in no conceivable manner. Again Plato has tried to distinguish between an Idea and its appearance without admitting the reality of the latter as different. This is the problem of hypostatising a universal. As long as it remains abstract we see how it is realized in a particular, but when the universal is made concrete or transcendent, it no longer stands in the same relation to particulars that it did while considered abstract, and the problem arises of how they are related.

Plato's difficulty is to maintain two worlds without dualism or to recognize an ideal realm without throwing complete discredit on the world about us. The same problem in terms of evil and good is found in his philosophy. How can there really be evil in the universe, when the highest cause is the Idea of the Good? Stated in terms of the problem of freedom, how does the
purely rational soul ever become entangled in the world of sense? This is a perplexity that every ethical system encounters in maintaining the ideal character of the Real alongside the imperfect character of the world. We find here one condition that a philosophy must satisfy, if it is to be adequate in its account of freedom. It must not identify reality with perfection.

It was Aristotle's task to solve these problems that Plato posed. If knowledge is about the real, and we are led to disastrous results when we separate the real from our immediate world, then a satisfactory account must bring reality and appearance closer together. We have real knowledge, but it is about the world in which we move, not some shadowy realm. Thus Ideas are immanent not transcendent, and the form of an individual is not separate from it. It is the individual as actual, whereas Matter is the individual as potential. When the potential becomes actual, Matter becomes Form. The difference between the two is relative rather than absolute. What stands as Form in one relation may stand as Matter in another.

The same treatment is applied to the soul. Soul and body are not independent substances. They are two aspects of the same individual. The soul is the actuality of a living thing, while the body is its potentiality. Thus soul and body vary together, the soul being the principle of life in the body. The higher forms of life reproduce but go beyond the lower forms. Of the different faculties of the human soul, nutrition, sensitivity, appetite, locomotion, and reason, it is
reason that makes a well-directed life possible by mediating between desires. This introduces us to the ethics.

The naturalistic way of understanding a thing by its function is carried by Aristotle into ethics. The good is not some transcendent notion. It is the exercise of a natural function. Hence a good man lives a distinctively human life. This means the exercise of all faculties, especially that of reason. This will not involve the neglect of the senses nor the suppression of part of man's life, for his soul is not divisible, but is a unity. Thus this life is to be realized here in social, practical, human, everyday living. This is the virtuous life, in which man finds his happiness, his real self, and his true freedom.

Man is free, because there is given to him the honor and privilege of realizing his true being. Other living things unconsciously fulfil their ends. Man, alone, has the choice of voluntarily pursuing his own life. When he is successful, he lives a life of virtue. When he fails, he falls below the beasts. Either way it is his opportunity and hazard.

Aristotle's problem was to reconcile a rationalistic account of the world with a naturalistic treatment of processes within it. We see this problem in the transition from psychology to ethics. How can we proceed from a description of the soul to an account of how it ought to behave? Have we not entered another realm and unprepared for it? Must there not be some goal outside the process towards which it is moving and the proximation to which constitutes its value? This is what Aristotle seems to postulate in Pure Form, or thought eternally thinking itself. However this is inconsistent with the rest of his metaphysics,
which maintains the co-ordinateness of Matter and Form. He thought this assumption was necessary to account for the otherwise endless chain of Becoming. We have an analysis of this process in the doctrine of causation: there are final, formal, efficient, and material causes. Are all these causes required? Can we not get along with material and efficient causes or at the most with formal causes too? Is not this "final cause" a step back to Plato? But with all these causes operating how can man fail to fulfil his function? Is he able to be other than himself? Of course Aristotle wants to make a distinction between man as he is as a matter of fact and as he should be. But we ask: is he allowed to make this distinction? Should he say that man is potentially much more than he is actually, we would have the separation of form and matter, which he denied in his metaphysics. Other living things, unconsciously but perfectly fulfil their functions. Man alone does so meritoriously and because he usually fails. Do we have the same kind of function realized in both instances? If Aristotle is going to treat ethics seriously, he must make this distinction, for which he is unprepared. We find the same difficulty in the Politics. Although ideally and logically the perfect state would be one headed by a "king among men", actually a society governed by the middle class, a commonwealth, would be the best available. Whence this discrepancy between the ideal and the actual? And how can there be an ideal that is not realized or realizable? Aristotle was too much aware of the world around him to put much faith in idealistic speculation. And yet how is an ethics possible on a merely descriptive basis? In his psychology,
after showing the intimate relation of body and soul, he goes on to state that Active Reason is immortal. In the ethics the highest ideal becomes that of pure thought, undisturbed by any passion. It is important to see that these difficulties are due to the contest of the ideal and the natural for primacy in the Aristotelian system. This is in principle the problem of freedom.

Moving in the opposite direction from Aristotle in the development of the Platonic philosophy is Stoicism. Whereas Aristotle tried to reconcile the distinction between form and matter, the Stoics are materialists. Since this was a popular philosophy, Platonic thoughts were expressed in pre-Socratic phraseology. What was an Idea for Plato becomes a kind of matter for the Stoics. Thus when the Stoics speak of fire, Zeus, or Fate, they are thinking of the Idea of the Good or Pure Form. In the course of time this fire, which is the sovereign cosmic agent, degenerates into other elements, and they in turn are purified into it. Thus occur cycles of purification and coarsening, which take place under the strict necessity imposed by fire. It is because of this absolute necessity that the Stoic philosophy is a monism or pantheism rather than a pluralism.

A similar account is given of the nature of man, for the microcosm reproduces the macrocosm on a smaller scale. The various kinds of matter are held together by the rational soul, a part of the fiery element of the universe. Just as we found different kinds of matter governed by Reason so there are different parts of the soul, functions of the rational part.
must be the same ultimate unity in the soul that we find in
the universe. What seems to be its irrationality is due to the
perversion of the rational part. It mistakenly values what is
not good.

The rationalistic account of the soul finds its expression
in the ethics. Because the soul is pure reason, a spark of the
divine fire, the rational life alone is conformable to it.
Since virtue is not found in externalities and good and evil
are determined by the way anything is received, it depends on
the man alone to live a virtuous or rational life. The universe
being ultimately Reason, this would be in conformity with it.
This is the serene acceptance of one's destiny. To fret or
make any emotional disturbance is to show one's ignorance of
the final rationality of the universe. It was for this reason
that the Stoics founded their ethics on a metaphysics. In this
acceptance of his fate lies man's dignity, worth, and freedom.

The problem of freedom for the Stoics is similar to the
problem in the Platonic philosophy with the lines accentuated.
If the universe and man are rational, what is the source of
evil and the problem of conduct? Since there is no non-being
nor ultimate irrationality for the Stoics, there can be no
hedging in answering these difficulties. They remain insoluble.
This onesidedness is very clear in the account of ethics. The
sanity and balance found in Plato and Aristotle is lost, and
we have instead a system of moral idealism. This was the kind
of abstraction that Aristotle had no use for. The Stoics had
difficulties finding illustrations of their ideal of virtue.
The distinction between final and efficient causation, which Aristotle made, was also lost. The necessity in the universe being teleological, how can anything go astray? Since I am a part of it, how can I live other than by nature? This is the problem of the relation of you and me to the universe. In the metaphysics and psychology emphasis is placed on the unitary character of reality. In the ethics we are given the choice of "living according to nature", and this phrase takes on a new significance. These differences must be analyzed out and ordered. Such is the problem of freedom.

The Epicurean philosophy returns to the Democritean account of the world, which is the furthest remove from the lofty Platonic philosophy. Epicurus wanted to give a mechanical explanation of everything; so, he adopted a metaphysics of atoms and the void. Atoms, qualitatively the same, differ in size, shape, movement, weight, etc. Originally falling, by capacity to swerve they declined from their course, and this started the cosmic whirl of the universe. Coming together in different combinations they form the variety of the world. The soul atoms by virtue of their roundness, smoothness, nimbleness, and elusiveness are highly mobile, responsive to the least impression, and therefore sensitive. They are contained by the body like marbles in a sack, dissipating at death. Freed from the nightmare of immortality men can turn to the present world, trusting their senses. We thus learn that pleasure is the true good, and that the purest are intellectual. The virtuous or
free man will find his pleasure where he may, with due
attention to the pain involved. The highest virtue will
be found in philosophical discourse.

The problem of freedom is the problem of how Epicurus
can justify the noble aims which he ascribed to the virtuous
life. Since the only criterion is that of pleasure, by what
right does he speak of good, better and worse? Are not the
only descriptive terms allowed him those of the hedonistic
vocabulary? When we come to the ethics, we seem to have lost
touch with our mechanical reality and sensational psychology.
This same problem in other terms appears in Epicurus' account
of the soul. It is noticeable that the soul has one nameless
part along with its matter common to other things. 5 Epicurus
seems to recognize the limits of his materialism. Again in
the cosmology he leaves pure mechanism by introducing an
"imperceptible declination". The atoms have the power of
swerving undetermined by anything outside of them. Was this
a cosmological dodge or did Epicurus want to justify freedom?
Was it an attempt to avoid the new god, fatalism, that was
replacing the gods of religion? 6 However, Epicurus does not
want an orderless universe, for the declination is "imperceptible".
Moreover, after discarding polytheism as superstition, he intro-
duces the Epicurean gods. Did he feel the inadequacy of a purely
mechanical account of the world? When we have limited ourselves
to atoms and space, we cannot significantly speak of virtue,
freedom, or purpose.
We have traced the idea of freedom through the major systems of Greek thought. We saw that there had been a gradual decline in the emphasis on values and ideals until in the Epicurean philosophy there was no place for them. This breakdown of Greek culture is manifested in the scepticism of the New Academy. Through the loss of the prestige of philosophy and reasoning, the way was opened for religion and faith. It was in this atmosphere that Christianity obtained a foothold in the world.
The formulation of the doctrines of Christianity, so as to distinguish it from other religions, became the task of Augustine. Augustine's first problem was to avoid the heresies of Manicheanism and Pelagianism. The Manicheans worked out one possible answer to the problem of evil, which had troubled Greek thinkers. They gave the struggle of good and evil cosmic proportions. Refusing to sacrifice value judgments to unity, they looked upon the world as the battle ground of a power of darkness and of light. For ten years previous to his conversion by St. Ambrose, Augustine had been a Manichean. In leaning away from this position, he maintains that evil is not positive, but is a defect or perversion. It is the turning from a higher to a lower good. When writing against the Manicheans, Augustine approaches the Pelagian position, but cannot accept it. The Pelagians did not give enough attention to man's evil nature. Man contributed to his salvation, so they thought. But if this is so, then grace is not grace, but indicates a merit and claim, and Christ need not have died for men. As a Christian, Augustine had to emphasize man's corrupt state and his need of salvation. But he had also to believe in a perfect God and the non-ultimate nature of evil.

His solution of the problem is that God created Adam with the freedom to choose good or make evil real. Adam made a fatal choice,
and as a result original sin is the burden of his progeny. God foresaw what Adam would do and all that would follow. Since the choice was man's, God is not accountable for the presence of evil. And were it not for His love for man, no one would be saved. God, however, has elected to save some men. These are given the gift of faith and perseverance. They choose the good life, because they are chosen. They are not chosen, because they are good. It is God's grace which specially distinguishes one man from another. There is nothing that one can do to merit grace. It cannot be earned; it is a gift. To believe otherwise is to be guilty of the Pelagian error. Is there, then, no freedom? Was Adam alone free, and are all his descendants committed to sin except by the arbitrary will of God?

Augustine must and does believe in freedom. If there were no freedom, there would be no reason for precepts. Also, it would be impossible to judge the world. However, to put complete trust in one-self is the Pelagian error. "Do not uphold free will in such a wise as to attribute good works to it without the grace of God, nor so defend and maintain grace as if, by reason of it, you may lose evil works in security and safety." According to Augustine both grace and free will combine in the securing of continence. The will is truly free when it is not the slave of vices and sins. It is free through the grace of God. If deeds are evil, they are man's own; if good, they are gifts of God. The question of why God chooses some men for salvation rather than others is improper for a Christian. The ways of God are past finding out.

The problem of freedom for Augustine is that of maintaining
responsibility in the same system with original sin. If man
is incapable of good, how is he responsible for his evil? This
is the problem of having evil without good in man, and good without evil in God. Either Adam's choice was not representative or
God knew he would be (and made him?) deficient. As we saw above
Augustine tries to evade this dilemma by depreciating the reality of evil. As in other systems that identify the Good with the
Real, evil and freedom have a dubious existence.

The Catholic Church in reacting from the Protestant reformation went through a period of purgation. In this recovery the Jesuit order played an important part. The Jesuits gave themselves to the task of bringing the World back to the Church. In this crusade, if the World would not come to them, they were willing to go to it. Bringing the stray ones into the fold of the Church was the primary task, even if it would be necessary to make some concessions. Hence it was only to be expected that this accommodating creed would steer shy of the stern Augustinian doctrine and should incline toward semi-Pelagianism. Hence when the Jesuit Molina put forth his "Agreement of Grace and Free Will" in 1588, the work was attacked by the Dominicans. The controversy was held down by the papal veto. Upon the publication of Jansen's Augustinus in 1640 the old quarrel broke out. The Augustinus was denounced and five propositions taken from it were condemned as heretical in 1653. It was into this controversy that Pascal was drawn in 1656 in his immortal Provincial Letters.

Here we learn in the first four letters that the Thomists are
much closer to the Jansenists than to the Jesuits and that it is only through bantering with words for political reasons that Thomists side up with Jesuits. Thus the Thomists and Jesuits agree in saying that the just have the proximate power to keep the commandments. But the agreement is only verbal, while the Jansenists are condemned for not uttering "prochain pouvoir". The same is true in the account of grace, according to Pascal. The Jesuits hold that a "sufficient grace" is given to all men and that choice renders it efficient or inefficient. The Thomists maintain that "sufficient grace" is given to all men, but that "efficient grace" is necessary for action. Here again the Thomists are in substantial agreement with the Jansensists, who believe that grace is not given to all men, while they agree in language with the Jesuits. The Jansenists are not accused of believing in efficient grace, but of saying there is no power to resist it. To this Pascal replies that the Jansenists are distinguished from the Calvinists in that they do believe in the power of the will to resist efficient grace. Man by his own nature has the power of sinning. Thus Luther's impiety, that we do not contribute to our salvation, is avoided. But neither can the Jansenists take the semi-Pelagian position of the Jesuits. Against Molina Pascal maintains the efficacy of grace. The will is borne toward that which pleases it the most. What can this be but the unique good?

It may be asked if the reconciliation that Pascal attempts is not as verbal as the agreement he condemns the Thomists and Jesuits for. That some men should be saved and others not, Pascal admits
is a mystery. This seems to be an adoption of the Calvinist position, which de Soyres (p.23 The Provincial Letters of Pascal) maintains is essentially the same as that of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Jansen. All of these held that there was an eternal decree antecedent to all action, separating one portion of mankind from another.

To the modern mind the attempt to maintain freedom and divine decree in a system like that of Christian theology seems to be at the risk of self-contradiction. This is similar to the problem harassing modern idealism with the relation of finite and infinite. The world is a universe, but it must have real parts. The finite individual must believe in himself as a not insignificant part of the whole. There are great possibilities in him, but he must forever recognize that the better part of him is just "beyond the horizon". There is a profound truth in this attempt to reconcile the above two contrary positions. Perhaps in a different setting this might be achieved.

In Jonathan Edwards's theology we see how far one aspect of this controversy can be pushed. Edwards maintains a doctrine of complete determinism. Nothing can come into existence without a cause. There are two kinds of determination, natural and moral. Natural determination is without a will, and moral determination is determination through a will. Simply to will something is for the act of will to have a cause. The will follows the last dictate of the understanding. Moreover God's fore-knowledge of the free actions of moral agents implies their complete determination, for
contingent events cannot be foreknown. This necessity does not exclude or excuse evil. Evil is moral inability. It is only natural inability for which a man is excused. Just so there is full compliance of the will with duty, there is no blame. The words, "must", "cannot", etc. taken over from natural necessity, carry with them the connotation of non-accountable. This is a mistake, as necessity is not inconsistent with endeavor. Rather is endeavor inconsistent with arbitrariness. God is not any the less perfect for the determination of his will by the good. Indeed it is better that all things be determined by God than that they be by chance. All things happen for the best. Even evil is willed for the sake of good.

What is the individual's place, or are we permitted to speak of an individual? Edwards says that the conversion of a sinner is not owing to the man's self-determination but to God's determination. Virtue and holiness are gifts of grace. Although he speaks of the freedom of the moral agent and the power of doing as we please, it would seem to be more accurate to say that God alone acts. This is what he maintains: "God orders to be done the things that are done". 5 "It is better that all things be determined by God, than that they be by chance." 6 This is a doctrine of universal determining Providence. Hence it seems that there is no real individuality and therefore no individual freedom or responsibility.

Can it be that the theological setting of this problem is the reason for its apparent insolubility? If we look upon the world as the finished product of some being, what can "freedom" mean with
such a background? It seems that the only possible answer can be that God orders all, but all does not follow necessarily, at least in human willing. This is the Arminian account of freedom. Edwards has no difficulty showing how this doctrine is inconsistent with law, endeavor, and perfection. But if we take his own position, do we not make God the author of evil? If not to be the hinderer of sin is to be the author of it, then God is the author of sin. However, the cause of evil must be positive, and this is man. Is it presumptuous to suggest that the kind of unity demanded in the world is purposive and teleological, spiritual and not existential inter-dependence, and that this kind of unity is precluded by the theological background?
Rene Descartes was dissatisfied with the learning of the schoolmen. If there is any knowledge to be had, we will not find it in the scholastic philosophy, but must formulate the problem of the limits and nature of knowledge. And so Descartes doubted everything. Being unable to doubt his doubting, he was assured of his own existence. Since a finite mind implies an infinite center of thought and one that could not deceive, we may trust our knowledge of the external world. Confident now of the possibility of knowledge, Descartes proceeds to analyze the world.

Every event in the physical world occurs according to the laws of nature. The quantity of motion being constant, action and reaction are equal. All things falling within the one, boundless, material substance are determined by the laws of mechanics, which Descartes hoped to express in a universal mathematics. Even animals come within this category. Their actions may be explained by mechanical principles. Thus physiological processes and even perception take place by laws of physics. Man, too, except in his thought processes, is a material machine. But he is also a creature with passions, in which his body and his mind contend for mastery. The man who
does not know himself, his strength and weaknesses, does not know what is within his power and accordingly follows his passions. The virtuous man knows what it is reasonable to desire, what he can realize, and so he does not follow a will-o-the-wisp. This is the free man. It is not arbitrariness of will which constitutes freedom, but the complete accordance of the will with reason. Error and evil are due to the lack of accordance.

There are two aspects of the problem of freedom in the Cartesian system. First of all, why does not the mind have perfect control over the body? If the effect of the brain on bodily action interferes with the control of the body by mind, then the mutual exclusiveness of mind and matter has broken down. The independence of mind and matter cannot logically be maintained along with the hindrance of mind by the passions. Descartes saw this difficulty, and so he sometimes treated mind and matter in their union in man as if they were interdependent or really fused. The problem of freedom from this aspect is: Man's destiny being rational, what is the status of matter? If he maintains matter on a par with mind, then the second aspect of the problem of freedom arises, namely: In a decidedly naturalistic system tending toward materialism how can there be good or evil? If Descartes intended to be ethically neutral in his account of the passions, even though he did venture to judge them morally, how could he rise from descriptive analysis to ethics? Has he not simply tacked an ethics on to the last chapter of his physics? Considering the temper of the
system, this seems to be the problem. Does not the nature of freedom demand a revision in his metaphysics?

We saw how Descartes was faced with the problem of relating mind and matter. This becomes the central problem for his successors. Spinoza realized that by definition there could be but one substance ultimately. This may be called God, Nature, or Reality. Now if we try to set out God's attributes, we are limiting him, and he is by definition infinite. Hence God, being complete, must have an infinitude of attributes, two of which we are acquainted with viz., mind and matter. Since there is nothing outside of Nature, all that occurs in it must be completely determined. Arbitrariness in the world of physical events would contradict the monistic character of ultimate reality.

Each part of the whole is characterized by a unity and activity similar to that found in Nature. Every part has a tendency to maintain itself. This is its conatus, its innermost character. When the impulse to self-preservation becomes self-conscious in man, it is known as desire. There is, then, continuity between man and other things. The two differ in degree and not in kind. The same parallel series of mind and matter, aspects of one substance are found in both. The same necessity is found in the actions of a man as in those of a stone. Hence we should analyze men as objectively as if they were physical forces. This is what Spinoza attempted.

The passions of man are the expression of the conatus in its various relations. When the self-preservative tendency is successful
a man feels joy. When unsuccessful, there is pain. Feeling, then, serves as a barometer of the vital energy or power of the individual. Those emotions that increase it are good; painful ones lower vitality and are bad. Good and bad are to be taken here in a relative sense. The universe as a whole is ethically neutral.

Spinoza now proceeds to the ethics. Corresponding to the level of opinion in knowledge is the level of action, on which the good sought for is individual. Here individuals conflict, and the passive emotions carry a man hither and yon. Strictly speaking it is not the man who acts. From this, one should grow into rational knowledge of intrinsic relations. Here one takes his bearings and guides his passions. They are now active. On this, the social level, goods are common and regard for others finds a place. The wider the knowledge the greater is the degree of self-realization. The movement so far has been from personal opinion and narrow egotism to rational knowledge and benevolence with fuller and fuller self-activity. Finally, just as man cannot rest with discursive knowledge, so cannot he stop with a life which is external to God. There is a knowledge more direct or immediate, which is at the same time a way of living. This is the intellectual love of God. Here there is no longer particularity. The self expands into its true cosmic proportions, completing the evolution from passivity. Such is the life of the free man.

The problem of freedom in Spinoza's philosophy lays before us
his entire system with its guiding aims, its debts to previous systems, and its problems. No philosophy grows up in vacuo. It has its origin through the failure of its predecessors. Thus the immediate problem for Spinoza was the relation of mind and body as set by Descartes. He drew the only conclusions possible. This and the mathematico-physical character of the thought of his age caused him to give the universe an interpretation of rigid determinism. Final causes are reduced to efficient ones. The universe for which he found room was morally neutral. Thus "good" and "bad" are only relative terms, having reference to the preservation of the body, and "perfect" has meaning only in reference to a given pattern, to which something approximates. There is nothing really evil, faulty, or excellent in the world. These are terms without absolute meaning. The problem of freedom and also the central problem of Spinoza's philosophy is: How can we do justice to the higher side of man's nature in a universe which is indifferent to it? How can there be a destiny for man? How can Spinoza write a real ethics?

Within Spinoza there was an element determining his philosophy, other than those mentioned. This was his confidence in the spiritual unity of man and ultimate reality. It was this that found expression in the ethics as man's intuition of God with his regeneration into a new life, perfect and immortal. It was not by chance that Spinoza's main work is entitled Ethics. Here was a man "God-thirsty", seeking wisdom rather than mere knowledge, confident of man's worth, who was cramped by the prevalent natural-
istic approach to problems. In an age dominated by the geometrical methods of mathematics and physics, how was he to find room for that third kind of knowledge? Knowledge, as such, must not have quenched the thirst of his soul. However it is only through inconsistency that he can find room for all that he aimed at. In this ambiguity lies the problem of freedom in his philosophy.

We have seen how Spinoza was led to the position of one cosmic substance. To Leibniz this seemed to leave little room for individuals. Yet the other extreme of a quantitative metaphysics, atomism, gives one a chaotic world, a heap of parts, lacking unity. The problem Leibniz faced was that of finding room for real parts in a universe. He found the answer in the treatment of substance as active, rather than passive. The individual, indivisible parts are centers of action, differing qualitatively, infinite in number, and continuous from the simplest to the most complex. These, the monads, do not act directly on one another, but are cooperant. By means of pre-established harmony the change (appetition) of the relations in which any monad stands to the rest of the universe (perceptions) is in rhythm with the other monads. A good instance of this independent harmony is the relation of body and soul. The soul is the dominant monad of the body in that its distinct perceptions represent more clearly the perceptions of the body monads. Together they constitute an organism.

A monad is self-active and can be neither created nor destroyed, except by God. Its birth is an unfolding of the capacities latent in it. Death is an enfolding or diminishing of capacity. Change
is continuous; the perceptions of the monads are not broken.

Old ones are held over into the present; and the present is big with the future. Applied to theory of knowledge this means that ideas develop. They are neither pulled out of the mind nor are they impressed on the mind from without. Intellect is involved in knowledge, which is clarified perception. Thus monads differ in degree, not in kind.

The actions of monads can be explained completely only by final causes or according to the idea of the best. Those of confused perceptions subserve the spiritual monads which act according to the vision of the good. These latter are members of the City of God. With their clear and adequate perception they have the highest degree of order and self-determination from within and greater freedom. This is the determination of our \( \text{Will} \) to rational action. The passionate man, like the stone, takes the most direct way, which is often the worst. He shows passivity in the absence of integral self-expression, whereas the free or rational man knows the conditions and plots his course accordingly.

Leaving aside all criticism of Leibniz' ethics, we find the problem of freedom and responsibility to be as follows. If the doctrine of the monads is to be taken as an explanation of the world in all its variety, the monads differing only in degree, then Leibniz faces the problem of relating existential and value judgements. If there is perfect continuity from monad to monad and the simplest ones can be explained by the principle of
sufficient reason, then why not also those of clear perceptions? In proceeding from monads of confused to monads of clear perception is the difference one of kind or of degree? Leibniz recognized the necessity of separating the two kinds of activity in his distinction between those monads which could be explained by laws of matter and those which have higher laws, acting directly by the vision of the best. But to emphasize this distinction is to give up the continuity of the monads. Yet unless this distinction is taken seriously, Leibniz' ethics must "suffer from non-existence". If we try to maintain the ideal character of the highest monads along with their continuity, we are involved in the problem of evil. All actions being determined by final ends and in order that the best may result, how does a problem of good or bad conduct arise? If a finite creature is necessarily imperfect, God may be free from responsibility, but so is man. The general problem here is that of the incompatibility of the principle of non-contradiction and that of final causes as stated by Leibniz.
Thomas Hobbes saw in motion the answer to all problems about the universe. This is causation, transmission of motion from one body to another by contact, which it is the business of philosophy to study. The various kinds of bodies divide philosophy into the branches of physical science, psychology, and politics. All causation being motion, philosophy should begin by defining such concepts as space, time, motion, etc. From these it will deduce necessary propositions. Though the schoolmen have classified four kinds of causes, there is only one with which philosophy is concerned, efficient cause. Hobbes says that final causes are reserved for ethics, though again he hopes to reduce final causes to efficient causes. It is because all phenomena in nature are caused by motion that a deductive system with the postulates of materialism is possible.

The same bold materialism and determinism that we found in the cosmology likewise occur in the account of man. There is no line of demarcation separating human from inanimate action. Motions acting on sense organs and transmitted to brain and heart are accompanied by sensations. Emotions are a kind of motion, desire and aversion being respectively movements toward and away from objects. Hesitancy between desire and aversion is deliberation, while will
is the last prevailing impulse. e is absolute determin-
ation in the actions of man as well as in inanimate objects.
Man is not free if by freedom we mean indeterminacy of will.
He does have the liberty of doing what he wills.

The quarrel with Bishop Bramhall brings to light Hobbes' treatment of freedom. To Bramhall freedom is intrinsically bound up with value. He saw that a mechanistic materialism explaining everything by efficient causes made freedom vanish, but he was not sufficiently clear as to what were its postulates. Thus he made objection to the necessity in the system. Hobbes was unable to appreciate the intention of Bramhall. He upheld that one had the liberty of doing what he willed and concluded that if freedom was not that, it was a fiction. "Necessary" does not mean "against our will", he tells us. In no sense does he or could he give an ethical, value-treatment of freedom. Even reward and punishment are treated as social hygiene. "Good" is equivalent to "desired"; there is no absolute good and evil. Hobbes professed to be thorough in drawing his conclusions. His ethics and politics only expand his account of the mechanics of human action. As a consistent materialist what other account could he have given? For this reason the distinctive problem of freedom is not raised by Hobbes.

Locke was not satisfied by the solution Descartes offered for the problem of knowledge. To call an idea innate is to hide behind prejudice. Philosophy requires not only a subject matter
different from theology, but also different methods. Otherwise it too will stagnate. There must be some common ground for testing propositions. What can this be, but our experience? If a proposition can be reduced to ideas of reflection or sense, it may be verified. Those problems that cannot be given sense-content are pseudo-problems. Locke, the analyst, intended to show what the intellect of man could significantly treat.

It was as an empiricist that Locke approached the problem of freedom. He did not first formulate a metaphysics and then see what freedom could mean in his system, but set out to examine the concept. When a person cannot do what he wants to do, we say he is not free. To be free, then, must mean to have the power of doing what we choose. It is not the will that is free, but the man's power and action. Is this act arbitrary, as so many theologians have claimed? No. The will is determined by the mind and desires. Action indifferent to the situation would be fatal to the individual. The most pressing uneasiness (by definition?) determines the will. Gradually a system of actions is built up which represents the good of the person. The good ones yield pleasure; the bad ones pain. Thus each man necessarily pursues his happiness, but due to his passions may be disturbed in the determination of his good. Man's true happiness and freedom lie within the virtuous life.

The problem of freedom as formulated in Locke's philosophy, then, belongs to psychology rather than metaphysics. His question was: What is the definition of freedom, and is man free? Thus his method was different from that of most philosophers. His purpose throughout and that followed by Berkeley and Hume was to give a concept its
minimum or necessary interpretation. Thus he did not give
"freedom" more than its barest meaning, empirically verifiable.
Desiring to clear away what he considered to be unintelligible
problems, he analyzed the empirical conditions of freedom. But
we ask if he has not overlooked legitimate problems. Is not
his identification of freedom and virtue merely a concession to
tradition? Also, since he is describing the psychology of
volition, Locke need not and can not speak of the "good" of the
individual. Each man seeks something, and there is an end to
the matter. Describe it, if you wish, but do not judge. What
kind of sense-content can you give to value judgments? We have
seen his answer to the question of what man's nature must be to
make freedom possible. There still remains the question of its
metaphysical significance. This is more properly the problem of
freedom. That Locke was not entirely satisfied with the method
he outlined may be surmised from his treatment of ethics and
mathematics, which he regards as rational sciences.

In David Hume's philosophy we find the further application of
Locke's empirical method to philosophical problems. The objects
of our knowledge are of two kinds, impressions from the senses
and ideas derived from impressions, representing them. If an idea
cannot be traced to its impression it is empty of content. Thus
Hume agrees with Berkeley that abstract ideas of primary qualities
are empty of content or really non-existent. For example an un-
extended extension, an intangible point, is an absurdity. But
what about the unity of the mind that has the experiences. Can
this be given an account in terms of impressions? Hume writes that whenever he looked into his mind, all that he could find was a particular impression or idea of some kind. Since no philosopher would state through what sense he held the soul to be experienced, Hume suggests that we drop the concept of the soul, as something other than a flow of perceptions. It is a fictitious entity.

Hume turns to consider the important concept of causation, which had played so great a part in previous philosophical thought. He finds that for \( A \) to be the cause of \( B \), they must be contiguous, and \( A \) must precede \( B \). These two conditions are easily verifiable. However there is another condition which previous philosophers have held to be necessary for causation, and it is the necessary connection of cause and effect. \( A \) must have the force or power to make \( B \) exist. Turning to experience he finds nothing to warrant this belief. No impression points to any other. They only succeed one another. It is we, who observing \( A \) to be conjoined with \( B \), by force of habit come to expect \( B \) to follow \( A \). The necessity is due to us; it is not in the events. When we say that \( A \) causes \( B \), all we can mean is that \( A \) has been uniformly found to precede \( B \). We are not logically warranted to assert that \( A \) will cause \( B \) in the future.

When Hume comes to consider "liberty and necessity", as he calls the problem, he finds it difficult to understand how there could have been any difference of opinion. In such matters it can only be the definitions which prevent men from agreeing, as there can be no disagreement about the facts.
He marshals evidence to support his belief that men's actions are as uniform as purely physical events. He agrees with Hobbes and Locke that a man has liberty in so far as he can do what he wills. This is our commonsense meaning of free as "free from". In this sense Hume could give an empirical content to "freedom". This was all he was allowed by his principle which he expressed as follows: "If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

It should be clear that the problem of freedom cannot be raised by an empirical philosophy as outlined by the English philosophers. The world is reduced to a staccato of unrelated impressions. Not only is there no individual, but every sensation constitutes a universe by itself. The most important characteristic of knowledge, i.e. relations or structure, can not be recognized at all. If the analysis that Hume and Locke gave of experience is not adequate to the knowledge that experience yields, what is the proper account?
VI

Kant had belonged to the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition in epistemology, while leaning toward Newtonian physics in cosmology. Hume's "scepticism" challenged him to analyze the conditions of knowledge. By what criteria, if not Hume's, was he to test validity? Believing that we do have synthetic a priori knowledge in science, Kant asked how science is possible. He was led to the conclusion that nature is not something apart from mind, but is made possible through the understanding. The concepts and categories of the understanding are valid for phenomena, yielding real knowledge. However, there is another realm, that of things-in-themselves, to which the categories are inapplicable. This is the subject matter of metaphysics, the statements of which cannot be proved. Hence the traditional metaphysics yields no knowledge at all. How, then, are we to have knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality? Although we cannot understand the noumenal world, we can and must think it through theoretical reason. By means of practical reason we are most certain that an ideal world forms the basis of nature.

Kant has now justified science and laid the foundations of a new metaphysics. By separating their provinces he has prevented clashing. But how is he to treat the problem of freedom, since he has described the world of phenomena as one of causal necessity? In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant had shown how we might entertain the idea of freedom. There may be a phenomenon with a
faculty, not the object of sensible intuition, whose acts taken from the noumenal point of view are not determined by anything outside of itself. In moral activity we find commands, duties, which demand the existence of this freedom. Moral action is action out of pure respect for a universal law. It is possible through a faculty whose causality is autonomous. This is reason, positing its own law, legislating for the will. The free man is the man whose will is determined by the moral law, not by his sensible appetites. Although the moral act, as manifested in the phenomenal world, takes its place in the causal nexus, yet as an event in the noumenal world, it is self-caused and free.

Kant belongs to the list of great idealists. It was his problem to show how freedom and strict causal necessity are not incompatible. His answer was that man belongs to two realms of being, the noumenal and the phenomenal. As a member of the latter he is a part of the necessary connectedness of nature; as a member of the former he acts on principle, is responsible and free. His two-fold character makes him a moral being. Animals are non-moral; God is holy, not moral. We have here a serious difficulty. Do these realms overlap? And, if not, how explain the mixed character of man? Shall we say that really man is rational? Then there should be no categorical imperative. Nor can we overlook man's noumenal character, placing him simply in phenomena, as this would be to give up metaphysics. We would then be limited to the
purely descriptive statements of science. It is impossible for Kant to take either position. But how reconcile them? In so far as man is moral, he is self-determining; in so far as he is sinful, it is not he that acts. The problem of freedom is the problem of the relation of these two selves.

Kant thought that the certainty of scientific knowledge warranted its belonging to a special realm of the world. Having dichotomized the universe, the formidable problem of bringing the "halves" back into relation arises. It is in this separation that the problem of freedom is caught. How can a phenomenal and a noumenal self constitute the same self? We are forced to assume a "principle of harmony" under conditions similar to those of Leibniz. Does this not indicate a much more intimate relation between the two selves or "realms" than Kant has traced?

We find a similar problem in his ethics. As a metaphysics of morality, ethics is the study of how men ought to act, not what they do. Even if the moral law never was obeyed, we could still have an ethics. Empirical considerations belong to anthropology or sociology. Effects of actions are of no moral significance. However, since virtuous actions are represented in the phenomenal world as well as passionate actions, on what basis can Kant refer the former to a noumenal world, or having done so, avoid the conclusion that passionate actions are not subject to ethical judgment? Can we have good without evil? All the problems of squaring the transcendental ethics with moral
judgments in the phenomenal world are involved in his treat-
ment of freedom.

Kant came to see the inadequacy of his separation of the
two realms. They must be harmonized or mediated. Purposes
of freedom must be capable of realization in nature. This
is conceivable in inner teleology, which requires that cause
and effect be one and that there be a whole determining the
character of the parts. Both teleology and mechanism are re-
quired to interpret nature, an organism being such a whole.
"Nothing in such a creature is in vain". Design is immanent.
Even here, though, Kant does not want us to think of the idea
of purposiveness as objective. It is only regulative not
constitutive. Since the idea completes the discovery of
scientific causes, is it unreasonable to think that this cate-
gory would have helped Kant over some of his difficulties, and
that he would have recognized it, were it not for his love of
symmetry?

This separation of noumena and phenomena, disastrous as it
was to problems of metaphysics, could not be maintained. Post-
Kantian philosophy faced the problem of relating them. To
Fichte the thing-in-itself could not be as real as reason. A
ture philosophy must be monistic, deducing itself from a single
principle. The absolute Ego, pure activity, is such a principle.
The absolute Ego posits a divisible Ego and Non-Ego. The deter-
mination of the divisible Ego by the Non-Ego is the subject of
theoretical philosophy, while the determination of the Non-Ego
by the Ego is the subject of practical philosophy. There is no consciousness without the opposition of the Non-Ego to the divisible Ego, nor can the two exist independently.

In the theoretical sphere the subjective appears as merely recognizing something present. In intellectual abstraction it appears as freely determining. The subject determines the object through the causality of the concept, which is in and through itself, though it may be conditioned by the Non-Ego. The activity of the Ego when regarded objectively is a tendency or natural impulse; when regarded subjectively is a pure impulse. The natural impulse operates unconsciously and as a natural cause. When it determines the subjective Ego, the natural impulse is felt as a desire. This is the transition from necessity to desire and freedom.

The pure impulse opposes itself to the natural impulse. The latter seeks gratification or enjoyment, whereas the former aims at self-determination and self-sufficiency. The one is the content and the other is the form. The pure impulse has the power of absolute self-determination in the formation of purpose-concepts. Whether it will realize the natural impulse or not is in the power of the subjective Ego. If that impulse should predominate over the pure impulse, man would be simply a part of nature. If the pure impulse should realize the independence it seeks, the finite Ego would be annihilated. The moral impulse is a mixture of the two impulses. The consciousness of it is the categorical imperative, which commands that the activity
of the Ego approximate the pure impulse, according to the concept of absolute self-dependence. This is the free being, determined by a law of autonomous activity. Only a thinking being can be free, for it alone is what/is in and through itself. To act in consciousness of duty is never to act blindly nor indifferently, but according to conceptions and principles expressing spiritual character. The close relation of freedom and duty seems to warrant this rejection of "arbitrary" freedom, to which Fichte sometimes seems to incline.

The problem of freedom is thus bound up with the problem of morality. Both disappear together in natural impulse, but also in their complete realization. Perfect freedom would mean annihilation of the finite Ego with its contrary impulses. Though this ideal may not be realized in time, yet can the goal of freedom and morality be their cessation? This is a difficulty that Kant also had to face. It seems to be due to the separation of the content and the form of moral action. Can the higher impulse be simply one of constraint? If it is, can the subjective and objective Ego be two views of the same? But this is inconsistent with his calling pure impulse higher than natural impulse, their resistance to one another, and their different ends. Fichte cannot say that the natural impulse is due to finitude, for this would make evil unreal. Evil is painfully real in this world and is inborn in man. Moral inertia is natural to him. However, he has a power of freedom, which he ought to exercise. If he is per-
fectly free, he wills himself out of being, and only the absolute Ego remains. This reminds us of the problem of the divisible Ego in relation to the Absolute Ego. Is thoroughgoing monism compatible with personal freedom? How reconcile the positing of the finite Ego with a destiny of its own? The objective idealism, which sought to answer the problem Kant raised, raises difficulties of its own.

Schelling, like Fichte, rears a monistic system on Kant's epistemology. Whereas Fichte's Absolute was an impersonal Being like Spinoza's, Schelling's is that of a living, suffering God. "All history remains incomprehensible without the concept of a humanly suffering God." There is nothing outside of God, but within him we may distinguish two principles, that of darkness and that of light. The former tends to particularization; the latter to unity. This condition of God's existence, that makes him a person, is contained within himself. Schelling feels obliged to relate these two principles in God through a "groundless", which is indifferent to the predicates of either and in which they are united through love. Is this approaching Spinoza's substance? Schelling writes: "All antitheses disappear with respect to the Absolute when regarded as such." However we cannot take the concept of the "groundless" abstractly. To do so is to falsify reality and lose the personality of God.

That, which is an indissoluble unity in God, is dissoluble in man. This is the possibility of good and evil, without which real
freedom would be impossible. Evil is not caused by the principle of darkness as such. It is a false unity, due to the divorce of human will from the principle of light. The true destiny and freedom of man lies in the separation of good from evil and the exposure of the latter as being unreal. This freedom is neither accident nor compulsion, but an inner necessity, which springs from the essence of the active agent itself. The intelligible essence, being outside of time, is beyond all causal connections; therefore, it can never be determined by anything that preceded. "A man so acts as he has acted since eternity and already in the beginning of creation."

There are two aspects to Schelling's account of freedom, man in relation to nature and to God. What is the relation of the conditions of freedom, real evil and an act out of time? Was it necessary to put freedom outside of time, or was this just an uncritical adoption of the Kantian position? This brings up the question of the reality of the world in which you and I live. Being "time-soaked", how can it be real? We face the difficulties we thought we had left with Kant. But as Schelling said, the most perplexing problem concerns God and man. Schelling wavers back and forth in his statements trying to distinguish God from man and yet maintain his pantheism. The Absolute's personality makes it a well-nigh insoluble problem. How can one self include another? The problem of evil, relevant here, is just as difficult. God sometimes represents good alone, and evil is unreal; while again, good and evil are not predicable of God, but belong to the life of
of man. These are but some of the difficult problems in the
doctrine of freedom in Schelling's philosophy.

To Hegel the Absolute Ego of Fichte and the Absolute of
Schelling were "the night in which all cows are black". An
undifferentiated Absolute is indistinguishable from Spinoza's
Substance. Since phenomena and noumena, epistemology and
ontology are inseparable, an analysis of the categories should
yield a foundation for metaphysics. Taking the simplest cate-
gory, that of being, we find that undifferentiated being is the
same as non-being. A qualified being must be limited and thus
has an "other". In this way quality passes over into quantity,
which in turn calls for a higher category (essence) to explain
the variation of quality with quantitative relation. We are next
led to the identity of essence and external appearance, form and
matter. Through the category of causation we arrive at the idea of
self-directed activity, the notion. The notion, the most complete
characterization of the Absolute, is personality, purposefulness.
The Absolute is both beginning, end, and process of the dialecti-
cal movement.

Hegel gives a similar account of man; body and soul are one.
The soul is not a thing, but an inward constructive force, and the
body is its outward expression. This identity is not abstract, as
in A-A, but is identity through diversity. Similarly the soul
is not divided into faculties; the whole soul operated in each
activity. Cognition and volition are interdependent. Immediately
man is an individual; implicitly he is universal. There is a constant struggle to overcome the defect of life, particularity, in order that the idea may come to itself. This evolution is to be seen in the acquisition of forms of the mind. The categories of the understanding are not abstract forms which are filled by some content. Ethics since Kant has suffered from this defect. Will and intellect are produced in the human being in the ordinary course of existence. This introduces us to Hegel's ethics.

Form and content cannot be opposed to each other in ethics any more than in epistemology. The good life is not a pattern into which actual passions are fitted. The elements and regulative patterns are inseparable. Neither can exist apart. Thus the passions are not bad, and the ideal life is not one of pure rationality. It is one, in which there is a growth from subjective, selfish ends to universal ends. This is accomplished through the cooperation of men in the state. At first the universal is grafted onto the will through the idea of law. Here it is simply obedience and custom. Gradually the idea of the law as expressing one's own will arises in a man, and the social bonds are the expression of his self-legislative activity. This free participation in social institutions is assented to as the condition of the true self. Thus, it is in the state that freedom is realized. Liberty and equality are the foundations of the state, the aim of the constitution, while the system of law is the realm of freedom realized.
Hegel's ethics is that of the loyal, socially participating citizen rather than of the self-scrutinizing moralist. In emphasizing the genetic viewpoint, we must not mistake the origin for the achievement. Or, here, we must be careful not to lose morality in obedience. Considered as mere conformity to law, good and evil would not take on important dimensions, nor would "freedom" carry much significance. However, if the law is treated as freedom objectified, freedom would have the greatest significance.

Hegel succeeded in overcoming the dualistic tendency which had haunted metaphysics from Kant through Schelling. What had been regarded as radical antithesis came to be viewed as stages in a process of development. If we cannot dichotomize the world, we must give each part its proper place in the whole. It is around this that problems center in Hegel's philosophy. Thus the problem of freedom and the problem of ethics is: what is the place of irrationality in a world in which the "real is the rational and the rational is the real". The rational cannot be a mere "ought". It must be real; but how real is it? Shall we say that irrationality is an appearance (illusion?)? Is it an answer to this to say that there are degrees of reality and that there is nothing, not even irrationality, that does not have its quota of being? But if this is so, why bother ourselves about evil? Does not it have a minimum of reality? The risk we run here is one of condoning imperfection. Is there not plenitude of truth and perfection in the Absolute?
Hegel, according to A. Seth, is guilty of seeking reality in the eternal realm of absolute thought, rather than in the concrete world of human-social activity. To account for the incomplete harmony of the actual and real realms he says that there is an element of contingency in the actual world. But this is inconsistent with his account of reality. Expressed differently, this is the difficult problem of the relation of logical development to historical development. If they are the same, we seem to lose human personality, good, and evil in logical abstractions. If they are different, the explanation of their relation is called for. This is the same kind of problem that Platonism encounters.

Schopenhauer called himself the true successor to Kant. He believed he had discovered the nature of the thing-in-itself. It is a blind, driving Will without consciousness, plan, or purpose. Manifesting itself at different grades of existence, it appears as chemical attraction, gravitation, etc. and highest of all, human will. Under the principle of individuation what is one appears as many. According to the principle of sufficient reason, the phenomenal appearance has the forms of space, time, and causality. The Will appears as subject and object. Neither can be without the other. Subject can understand object, as "the world is my idea". Everything in the phenomenal world is absolutely determined, as it is possible through the category of causality. With the causal nexus binding the world of phenomena, what is the standing of persons?
Schopenhauer held it to be one of the two great merits of Kant that he had solved the problem of freedom. A persistent contradiction was overcome through the distinction between phenomena and noumena. As a member of the phenomenal world man's action is determined; as a member of the noumenal world, he is free. The necessity is in the doing (operari); the freedom is in the being (esse). What a man does follows from what he is: Operari sequitur esse. Every action is completely determined, since character is inborn and motives occur according to the order of the world. Intellect and concepts play the part of exposing the issues. They do not influence the will itself. "Change in will" is a contradiction in terms. Repentance proceeds from a change of knowledge. The individual must act in the same way in the same circumstances. In time he comes to know his character. Sometimes this knowledge is painful, as in anguish of conscience. However, I cannot resolve to be this or that, since I have made myself eternally. But if this is so, why try to reform myself? There is an acquired character, by which others know us. This is the mask we wear in the world, a system of social habits. This is the character that changes. The real character is immutable.

The problem of freedom in Schopenhauer's philosophy shows an open return to Kant's dualistic setting. A noumenal will and phenomenal intelligence somehow come together in the actions of a man. Though the intellect cannot influence the will, it can change the action. But if what one does follows from what one is,
it is hard to see how this can be. What one does must follow from what one is and what one knows. Besides what is willed is not simply good or evil in the abstract but some concrete deed. Hence intellect and will have a much closer relation than Schopenhauer makes out. These difficulties are due to the combination of an inadequate analysis of action into means and ends and a dualistic metaphysics. The former yields a misleading account of personality, while the latter takes us back to the insoluble problems of Kant. If intelligence was created for working with phenomena, how do we ever get to know our noumenal nature? Intuitively? But how articulate such knowledge in concepts belonging to phenomena? How write a metaphysics? Granted that we hurdle this difficulty, what is the status of the phenomenal world? It is an appearance but not an illusion? And you and I? Are we ultimately, really the Will? If so how are we free? It is evident that the problem of freedom is made insoluble in a philosophical system separating appearance from reality.
VII

The theory of the evolution of the species has had much influence on recent philosophical thought. It gives us a picture of more and more differentiated forms of life springing out of less complicated forms, finally rising to man. Even in man the process does not stop, but continues in his conscious life. Can we look upon the conscious life of man as being a clue to the structure of the universe, a universe which has risen by tedious and arduous steps until it finally breaks forth in man as free creativity? If we take evolution seriously, are not the life of a man and the process of evolution significantly similar? In both instances we find the movement from simplicity to complexity. Each temporary resting place is taken as a stepping stone for a higher form. If we should identify this creative force in man with that of the universe, and give it ontological priority, we should arrive at a philosophy like that of Henri Bergson.

The evolution of the universe is due to a surging, pushing force, the *élan vital*. As it forced its way up, it had to overcome resistance, matter. Where the force was overcome it crystallized into different living patterns, the species. In man the *élan vital* finally conquers matter. It is because this is the real nature of man, that a quantitative psychology is doomed to failure. The continuity of "states" of consciousness
cannot be broken up into separable units, mechanically asso- 
ciated. Even though we do build up habits and conditioned reflexes 
for purposes of action, the real individual is an integral whole 
of blended "states". As such he is free. Were all of his states 
blended, he would be absolutely free. Now, if we carry this 
out to its logical conclusion, we see that freedom becomes un- 
ordered and unpredictable activity. Bergson makes statements to 
this effect. It would be life without any habits or fixed ways 
of acting. It is only as "materialized" or "crystallized" that 
one becomes predictable or determinable. As really himself, he 
 isIn immersed in the life-pulse of the universe. Free activity is 
accordingly formless and contentless.

A part of the problem of freedom in Bergson's philosophy is 
the relation of the free self to the self as a system of deter- 
mined actions. This introduces us to a difficulty which pervades 
his entire thought. If we take change and growth to be central, 
we have the problem of stable forms. The "crystallization" of 
life into species would be inexplicable. For this reason he pos- 
tulates "matter" as a resistance. But "matter" must have a very 
precarious existence in a philosophy such as Mr. Bergson's. This 
is the same problem as the relation of "homogenous time" to pure 
duration. Are they two different "times" or more and less adequate 
ways of understanding the same time? In the life of man this is 
the problem of how there comes to be any stability or form in 
a man's self at all. How are habits possible? This is the same 
bias that leads to the intellect-intuition contrast. How can a
concept represent anything? How can anything be stable enough to "fill" one? Is association psychology adequate as an explanation of conceptual thought? On the other hand what is the content of an intuition? How can one intuition differ from another? These are problems that arise when one takes "becoming" as ontologically prior and separate from what becomes.

An attempt to do justice to the structural features of reality as found in the sciences is what we find in Samuel Alexander's philosophy. The world is fundamentally a matrix of Space-Time. Within this ocean empirical objects are whirlpools or vortices. They are crystals of point-instants possessing various characters. The pervasive characters are categories; the variable ones are qualities. At various degrees of complexity the qualities of materiality, life, and mind arise. We may say that a quality is correlated with a specific space-time complex, but it is more accurate to say that the two are identical. Thus, consciousness is identical with a "constellation" of neural processes of a certain order. Though expressible without residue in terms of the conditions from which it is formed, the new quality of character is genuinely new.

Where two qualities of different orders are compresent the higher is said to "enjoy" itself and contemplate the lower. This is the cognitive relation. Wherever the distinction between enjoyment and contemplation is found, freedom is found. The higher quality, that knows the lower, is said to be free. This is not indeterminism, but complete determination of the effect by the cause. Thus freedom and knowledge do not belong to man alone, but are found wherever two different "levels" are compresent.
There is nothing in freedom that is incompatible with thorough determinism. It is theoretically possible to predict the course of the future in terms of space and time, but what the new qualities of character will be cannot be said. It is conceivable that my actions could be predicted in terms of physiological processes, but what these processes would mean in terms of thoughts and ideas could not be said.

We seem to run into a difficulty here which is important in Alexander's system. Can the relation of qualities to Space-Time be so loose that we can separately calculate Space-Time complexes without considering the kind of quality? When a neural complex takes on the character of mind, can it still be adequately expressed in terms of neural process alone? Without residue? Are my actions a set of point-instants? Only? Or are they not just those feelings, thoughts, and ideas that do not fall into Alexander's formulae? One must conclude that not only mental, but vital, and material qualities are very much like epiphenomena. What we demand here is an account of the relations of the qualities to one another and to their space-time. How does the motion of the matrix vary as qualities arise? Under what conditions can we say that a new quality has arisen? What constitutes a new or emergent quality? The deficiency here is complementary to that which we found in Bergson. Whereas he could not account for stability, Alexander is likely to lose all movement in the rigid motion. There is no need to understand the present in the light of the future, since present and future are contained in the past.
An adequate account of evolution and freedom should take account of both the movement and the character of the changing parts in their relation to the whole.

We demanded from Bergson a more adequate account of the nature of the change and of that which changes. Taking man's conscious life as typical of reality, we see that any part of it points to something beyond. For example, we can understand a part of a story only by seeing the place it plays in the whole. Throughout man's activity we find this to be true. If we should take the whole—self-completeness—as the clue to reality and value, we would have a philosophy like Mr. Bosanquet's. This clue, the principle of individuality, is the spirit of totality or logic. Only when an object is seen in the light of the whole do we see it as it really is or give a correct value. Even in science do we see the spirit of the whole penetrating. The abstract universal—"same causes, same effects"—is a false universal. It misrepresents the character of science as a system of connected members. The concrete universal has the character of a world. The whole, towards which the incomplete parts are striving, is the Absolute. It is not the negation of the finite, but more and more of the finite at its best. It is "the high-water mark of fluctuations in experience."

The soul is not a ready-made machine, but is a growth of material moulding itself. Out of clashing appercipient systems grows up the more and more unified person. This is an unending process. In it lie the hazards and hardships of the finite being. In the
movement toward a whole is man's freedom. In moral, rational action he aims at attaining self-consistency and consistency with the whole of experience. In science a coherent system of inter-related laws is established. In art the material of experience and the forms learned from previous art works are transcended in a greater organic work. Where man fails to reach the totality that was possible, there is evil, error, or ugliness according to the kind of coherence sought. As finite, man is found lacking. However, as in the Absolute he is perfect. In the religious experience we realize that our defects are not ultimate, but that we are safe in the perfection of the Absolute.

The problem of the relation of the finite to the infinite is central in a philosophy like Mr. Bosanquet's. Good and evil belong to finiteness; therefore, the perfection of the Absolute is not that of man. How, then, can we speak of the value of the person being conserved in the Absolute? Although the individual is impoverished if treated as an independent substance, still is it doing him justice to speak of the fusion of individuals or of expansion into the Absolute? Does he gain in substantiality only as he recognizes himself as adjectival? Despite his protests and intentions to the contrary, Bosanquet seems to leave little room for the finite individual and his values. This is seen in what he has to say about war. He somehow feels that war should be justified. However if there is real evil, war would seem to come under this heading. Has not the religious experience of "safety" been given importance to the ill fate of moral experience and the finite
self, which is necessarily lacking?

An attempt to give the finite individual more importance might result in a system like that of Dr. MacTaggart. Here the finite self is taken as ultimate. It is not transcended by some higher reality, and no self can be a part of another self. They are eternally “at arm’s length”. The central problem is that of the relation of the selves. Do they constitute a universal substance? If they do, how are we to maintain their mutual independence? For to alter a self is to alter the universal substance and thus every other self. What significance is in their contents? How do we seem to move in the same world? How can one self affect another? These are just some of the difficulties that a theory encounters, when emphasizing the substantial character of the self in contrast to its experiential content. We get an empty formalism as when we take time to be fundamental. That is, the richness of the self and its freedom, such as we get when emphasizing content, is lost. The self becomes a point, and its freedom a fiat of the will. A sane treatment of the self must allow for both existentially distinct selves together with common experiential content.
The problem of freedom is a problem of metaphysics. There are the psychological problems of what man does in his different activities of thinking, perceiving, acting, creative imagining, etc. This is what the English Empiricists would have made the problem out to be. Without doubt these are important questions; the answers to them should clarify man's cosmic status, but they do not exhaust the problem of freedom, which leads beyond them, to metaphysics.

Now it should be evident that any metaphysics that loses man's individuality or finds that it cannot speak of him ultimately does not face such a problem. It has forfeited the right to it. This is an objection against a philosophy such as Spinoza's. Where everything in nature necessarily is as it is, God alone is free as undetermined by anything outside him. The path of freedom for man is one of expanding his self into cosmic proportions until his love for God is God's love for himself. Thus to become what one really is, is to be absorbed and extinguished as a self. But strictly speaking, there is no real self to absorb! There is only the one infinite Substance and its modes.

Granted that we maintain man's existence in reality, what definitely is his position? Are there other existences besides man, and are they "free"? What is there in man's nature that
warrants our use of this adjective? This is the problem of man's relation to the universe. How are we to express this? This is the main problem for a philosophy like Leibniz'. What is there that binds together the monads into a universe without destroying their uniqueness? Here the error to avoid is that of losing the universe.

It is not so much the task here to decide whether these problems have been solved as to point them out. Granted that we continue to distinguish between ourselves and the whole, how are these two related? What can we say about both? If we describe the relations between man and the rest of the universe in terms of efficient causes, where does a man begin and where does he end? That is, how are we to know when we are talking about individuals, Tom, Dick, or Harry and not simply about reflex arcs, conditioned responses, physiological processes, etc.? If our science is to be simply one of efficient causation, why bother to make the distinction between part and whole or how can we make this distinction? Laws of uniform changes are trans-individual. They have no respect for persons. They answer the question: how is a definite variation related to other variations? That these changes involve you or myself is of no interest to the psychologist. The behaviorist describes how an animal acts in a given situation. "Infinite" or "finite" ego means nothing to him. This preoccupation with efficient causes may be part of a metaphysics as with Thomas Hobbes, or of methodological doctrine as with John Locke. Hobbes limited his scientific terminology to the category of motion. Given a push from behind, matter strives to
maintain itself. And so it bumps around. Sensation, perception, will, all are a form of motion. A complete account of the world will be given by physics. Freedom, as persistence in motion, belongs to all forms of matter. That Hobbes had nothing to say about personality is clear. The British Empiricists found themselves preoccupied with efficient causes due to the limitation of "intelligible problems". David Hume begins the analysis of the concept of "causation" as used in the sciences. But as was said above, the scientific concept of cause as "efficient cause" respects no individuals. An illustration of this is found in Alexander's theory of levels. Though I may not know what qualities your spatio-temporal configuration is stippled with, I can predict your behaviour. Thus we lose personality in Alexander's philosophy, too.

If we cannot admit that the relation of finite and infinite is one of efficient causation, what shall we say it is? We do not have to look far to see that the greatest philosophers have tried to express a relationship of value in their systems. There is a hierarchy of perfection in the universe, and in becoming himself, man comes into more intimate contact with the heart and soul of reality. There is spiritual communion between the finite and infinite. But what are we to say of the perfection of the universe and man? Has either fully realized itself? Is either capable of fullness and reality? Is there an inherent contradiction in value-activity?

We have seen that many philosophers have identified reality with perfection or rationality. This is a Platonic strain. As was pointed
out when we treated Plato, this is to run the risk of making evil non-existent. Shall we say with the Stoics that evil is due to the perversion of reason? But what perverted it? What is a corruptible reason doing in a completely rational universe? Can we say with Bosanquet that evil and good belong to finitude, whereas the Whole is perfect? But the only perfection we know of is yours and mine. Any other kind is unfamiliar to us. In squaring the evil in the world with its ultimate perfection, can we lay the former at the foot of man and the latter by God, as Augustine does? But how could a perfect God have made a fallible creature? If evil gets into the picture anywhere along the way, how can we but trace it to the only cause that had anything to do with it? It should be clear that we cannot take the universe as perfect. The history of thought is strewn with brilliant errors of this kind.

We must maintain that there is an ideal and a factual element in the universe, the latter approaching the former. That is, if we are going to take value-judgments seriously, we must recognize perfection in the universe and unless we intend to make evil an appearance, there must be a discrepancy between the actual and the ideal.

But what about the finite individual? Is he 'really' perfect, worthless, or "a god in germ"? If we take the first of these alternatives with Plato, Kant and the Stoics, we have trouble in reconciling it with our everyday observations. Man is not perfectly rational. Though it may make good sense to say with Bosanquet that man really is not what he is in fact, we must realize that here 'reality' does not connote existence. We are using it in the sense of what is ideal,
not of what is actual. It is relevant here to observe that Bosanquet, who runs this risk, takes the religious experience of 'safety' as having more cosmic significance than the experience of moral endeavour. But it is not only moral, but also intellectual, aesthetic and other activities that must suffer by such an account. Can we rest in the assurance of our knowledge of the absolute? Our perfection in the absolute does not help us when we view our deficiencies.

If we should go to the other extreme, we would have an account of man like that of Saint Augustine in his anti-Pelagian reasoning. Self-satisfaction is the sin against the holy ghost. Man is full of evil. There is no good in us. But we cannot play to this tune forever, since what could we expect of man if we did? We do not expect anything from him who has nothing. Man cannot be utterly worthless. Though he is not perfect, neither is he without merit. Somewhere in between is his position.

The problem arises of the relation of final and efficient causes. What are the actions that can be valued and why are they subject to judgment? This problem should have been faced by all philosophers who found a place for value in their metaphysics. Aristotle was the first thinker to give an answer to this. There are final, formal, efficient, and material causes. But why so many causes for a single event? Will not material and efficient causes do? Are we not multiplying our principles needlessly? This same difficulty was central in Leibniz' philosophy. The monads are continuous. They differ only in degree not in kind. But if the lower ones are explainable by the principle of contradiction, why not the higher ones, too? And if
final causes work all the way through nature, why not evaluate as well as describe chemical processes, etc.? It was this problem that Kant set out to answer. He had ample evidence that efficient causation held throughout nature. Everything in the world described by science falls within the causal nexus. But how are we to value anything that is thus causally determined? How reconcile final and efficient causes? Kant's answer makes use of the distinction between noumena and phenomena. The noumenal world is one of values; the phenomenal world one of necessity. But, as we have seen, this answer will not do. The origin of evil is a mystery, and values are found in the world about us, not in some transcendental sphere. Besides, by definition we could know nothing at all about such a realm. In the post-Kantian idealists we find an attempt to bring teleology and determinism together. In Bosanquet's philosophy teleological wholes are constituted by mechanical relations. Within the whole there is perfect determinateness of the parts. A science, such as physics, tries to determine the relations holding between parts of the material world. The correct view of this science is that of a system of laws. The relation of part to part is not that of determinism, "same causes, same effects", but determination through the whole. In the finite individual this whole is not completed, but negates itself in a nisus toward plenitude. Hence it is not possible to describe all the actions of the finite self in mechanical causes, since it continues to grow. These mechanically unpredictable events can be understood only in the light of the whole toward which they are aiming. That is, the expansion of mind is understood through final causes.
Summing up this criticism, we can point out that a satisfactory account of freedom must give us real, finite selves, incomplete and imperfect, but progressively realizing themselves in carrying on the work of a universe, which is not finished, but is in the making. In this reaching out to a higher and higher being lies man's greatness and freedom. It is not through absence of causal necessity, but by breaking through inadequate stages of existence that freedom is possible. It is the movement from one 'world' of action to another, the latter incorporating the former as reorganized. On any given 'level' of action the relation of part to part within the whole may be described by means of efficient causes, but the relation of 'world' to 'world' in the self-transcendence of man can be understood only through final causes, or in the light of the whole.

One of the most important points, of which we must continually remind ourselves, is, as Bosanquet warns us, not to forget our abstractions. Thus if we are going to describe the self, naming only those features that fall into a schema, we must not forget that we are using a schema and mistake our "laboratory self" for the real self as it is. Or having selected out some feature, we must not look upon this portrayal as being an adequate one. By neglecting some aspects we may find it easier to formulate others, but we must remember that finally we are giving an account of the whole. Thus if we describe the universe as containing real, finite individuals, we do not stop there. The universe is that and a great
al more. Bare, abstract identity is found only in books on logic. 

The real world is one of unity in and through difference. If this 

so, can we take conscious creatures as an example of the diversi-

and unity of the universe? Certainly any logical analysis that 

nds itself forced to suspect the reality of persons, because they 

not fit into its schema, is so far inadequate. If we do take 

e person as a clue to the structure of reality, what can we say 

out this structure and what is the place of individuals within it? 

A dominant characteristic of personality is its self-contradic-

on. To be conscious is to select, to change, to grow or recede. 

soon as an act is standardized, perfected, finished, it is done 

throughout attention or consciousness. A "thing" goes through the 

tions to which it is subjected without any alteration in its 

racter. Quite otherwise is it with a conscious being. Such a 

ng is at no two moments the same. Every situation is a new one 

very response original, for the spiritual being gathers up its 

nt into its present. It persists, endures. The whole self is 

sent in every conscious act. Thus time is real to the self. 

existence is not momentary like moving pictures thrown on a 

en. Activity is inconceivable apart from real time. 

Far the account we have given of man (especially) has given 

too much credit. There is not only this urge to change and 

but there is also an inertia or drag, a most unspiritual 
satisfaction or stolidity. In fields of knowledge we see this 
e tendency to accept answers, methods, problems, etc. as they 
earned. In artistic production it is found to be imitation,
resting satisfied with someone else's technique, etc. In ethical relations it is "mere conformity to law". It is clear that no matter where this internal resistance is found, it is the very obverse of what is distinctive of man as a spiritual creature. This is what pettiness is.

But what is the character of this change? Is it without order? Is it susceptible to organization? There is a definite order in the change. If we should take a great body of knowledge, such as is found in the history of philosophy, we would have a good example of how this growth occurs. A system of thought is proposed, accepted for a time, and then found inadequate. Not that it is completely false or it could never have been offered as a solution; but that it needs correcting. Hence a new system is put forward, utilizing the truth of the former but avoiding its errors. In this way a body of knowledge grows up which is through and through organic. We see here the function of "intellectual inertia". The growth of knowledge (public or private) is by stages. Each result serves as a step from which to push off. In moral endeavor we find a similar feature. It is not enough to act well once. We must form good habits; but we can never let our conscience grow dull. We must ever be on the lookout for possible improvements. Thus spiritual drag is not without purpose. It helps us keep our growth from being chaotic.

How are we to understand this growth? Spiritual process does not fit into the abstract formulae of science. It is far too complex and concrete. Moreover it never quite repeats itself. Where there are a
number of individuals sufficiently alike, we may correlate the suicide rate to economic factors, etc. Or where the individual has "hardened" into fixed actions, it is possible to predict what he will do. Or if we find certain factors in the individual's life, we may know that his future life will show their influence, but just how this will be cannot be said in advance. Then what is the nature of this growth? It is teleological. Not in the sense of some far off divine event, but in the sense of the realization of some purpose. Stage after stage dovetails in an organic growth.

We can understand each part only through its relation to the higher whole to come. Thus Locke takes on his true significance when we have had a Hume and a Kant. Or we appreciate the first two movements of César Franck's Symphony in D minor all the more because we grasp their relation to the whole. That is, spiritual growth can be understood only through final causes, not in terms of efficient causes.

Granted then that in this movement, which is the essence of his being, lies man's value and freedom, what can we say about the universe as a whole? As we said above, we are going to take the human being as the most adequate analogy to the universe. We find in it evolution through arduous steps in real time. This evolution too has been from homogeneity to heterogeneity. And just as in man, it has pushed out in all directions, finally to be self-limiting. Thus thousands of theories and mutations are put forward to every one that fills the need. The story of the universe in the past is written in the rocks. There are the discarded "experiments". Thus
evolution has not progressed down a high and dry road, but has been a series of "trials and error", in which the different forms of life have their places. We cannot fully understand what a mammal and a fish are until we see them in their evolutionary significance. Each stage forms a temporary resting place before pushing on to new heights. Where there is a solidified level in the history of the universe, there is an organic relation of parts which may be expressed in laws. These are the laws of science. We see the reason why these formulae of the sciences fall into systems. It is because the different "levels" which are their subject-matter are of the nature of "worlds" or "wholes". There remains the problem of describing the relations holding between the different "levels" (or sciences since they are intra-levular). This is a philosophical problem. We have already seen what the general nature of this growth is.

Why cannot one take evolution to be a "mechanical" affair, as many biologists do? We do not object to this kind of relationship holding between the mutant individual and his world of reaction. This is the province of the sciences, and such events should be explained only in terms of "efficient" causes (functional equations). There even may be something as "mechanical" in any kind of selection in human life. All that one asks is that the whole process be viewed and the kind of order in it examined. The world at least is such that these are the results obtained, and they do not seem to fit into any mechanical function. Moreover such a view of the development as Darwin held would preclude any serious account of values.
If we take the growth in the universe to be teleological, ideal, or if we take values seriously, what is the place of the ideal in the universe? A merely factual account suffers from abstraction but so does an account that makes "reality" synonymous with "perfection". We must first of all recognize each to be an abstraction when taken separately. Though it is necessary for analysis to hold them apart, to treat them as really separate is misleading. We must not dichotomize the world into a goal, unachieved but perfection itself, and a movement, imperfect but factual. There is no ideal or goal simply as such. An ideal always involves a concrete situation for which it is ideal. The converse relation is true for at least some "facts". They are "facts" only within a teleological system. It is only because we are usually interested in one aspect at a time that the seeming divergence occurs. The actual and the ideal are two inseparable aspects of the real, which is teleological growth. We have already seen what the nature of this development is. What we take to be the actual is the real at some stage of its being. What we take to be the ideal is the real viewed in its movement. Fundamentally the real is both actual and ideal, both start and finish. I really am not only the "set of operations" (visual, auditory, theoretical, etc.) that I can at any moment make; I am also those that I strive to make. I must be seen to be a spirit, growing, developing.

If we have indicated some of elements of a true metaphysics of value, there still lies before us the problem of finding real finite selves, which realize these values in a universe.
The old substantial self dies hard. If we take the category of substance as the most adequate to reality, we are forced to end with a Substance that absorbs everything or a multitude of independent substances that form a collection rather than a universe. If, however, we should make activity, process the category by which we interpret reality, we do not encounter the above-mentioned difficulty. The dependence of the individual on the rest of the universe for his content does not reduce him to a mere appearance. Nor does his self-adjusting nature prevent the universe from being a whole. The unity of the universe is one of spirit, teleology, not mechanical causality. The various causal orders to be found in it are causally independent, but as making up a single universe they belong to antorganic whole.

If we succeed in holding both personality and a universe, what is their relationship more explicitly? Like all causal orders falling within the universe, the person has his place in the history of the cosmos, and hence has significance in that order. However, his character as a "world" (or set of responses) that is continually developing, growing gives him increased cosmic importance, for in the realization of his "ideal" self he is carrying on the purpose of the whole. It is for this reason that we call the relation of man to the universe a value relationship. The fundamental judgments that can be made about him are value judgments. It is in this position of his to realize his "true" being that man's freedom lies.
FOOTNOTES

Section II

1 Cf. the Phaedrus.
2 Cf. the Timaeus.
3 Aristotle's Metaphysics, 1071, 1072.
4 Cf. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, Chap. on "Moral Idealism".

Section III

3 Cf. introduction to de Soyres' edition of The Provincial Letters.
4 Cf. letter 18 of the Provincial Letters.

Section IV

6 R. Latta, op. cit., p. 240.
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Section V


Section VI

Section VII

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Section VII


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