RICE UNIVERSITY

Proposed Physical Environment
For a Specific Cultural Setting

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PROPOSED PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
FOR A SPECIFIC CULTURAL SETTING

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of formulating and implementing development plans has always been, in its outcome, an effort to ensure the continuity and maintenance of cultural growth. Development planners, however, have always concerned themselves with the environmental aspect of development in terms of its social context. They have continued to disregard that aspect of the man-made environment which is manifested through physical form.

In this effort, the attempt is concentrated at identifying the nature of the relationship between culture and development. This frame of reference is then employed in viewing cultural change and development in Kuwait over the last two decades.

The overriding concern, here, is the endeavor to identify the specific nature of the Kuwaiti cultural milieu through close inspection of the changes that have been affectuated on the major component structures of the Kuwaiti setting, namely: the economic, the social, the political, the psychological and the environmental structure. The quest becomes one for identifying relevant constraints and directions that would guide the process of planning the physical environment relevant to the Kuwaiti conditions of our time, and as these conditions are expected to develop in the near future.
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Introduction

Culture and Development:

Of all the elements throughout man's cultural history, that of change has been constant. The rate and the specific nature of change does, however, vary from one to another locale, and in conformity with the nature of the specific cultural setting. Any cultural setting comprises a relatively large number of factors. A limited number of these factors are considered here as major structures which serve to identity the overall character of the cultural setting. These structures, in their entirety and their continuous interaction, form the actual indicies which reflect the dynamism of said cultural setting existing within specific conditions of place and time.

The dynamism of any cultural setting depends entirely on the processes of growth and change of the respective society. These processes of growth and change are, in fact, linked directly to the concept and realization of development planning. And the purpose of formulating and implementing development plans has, in its essence, been to ensure the continuity and maintenance of cultural growth.

Development planners have traditionally concerned themselves with the economic, social, and political component structures of respective cultural settings. More recently, and within the realm of cross-cultural studies, another dimension has been added, where: "... to the extent that comparison with the standards of living in the more advanced societies leads to a revolution of rising expectations in the less advanced societies: a degree of internal pressure for innovation is almost certain to be generated and to be accompanied by a readiness to accept innovation. From this perspective, the process of modernization becomes less a technological
an economic or even a political problem than a social-psychological one.\textsuperscript{1} This "new" dimension of the development milieu at this formative stage of its conceptualization forms another component structure of the cultural setting: The Psychological Structure. This psychological structure is controlled by the value system of the specific society. Society's value system is passed on from one generation to the other through child-rearing practices and processes of socializations of individuals and groups alike. And the most significant aspect of any value system is that it delineates people's tastes and life styles. Hence, the psychic income, accruing to groups and individuals from activities they engage in, becomes a tangible reality organically related to the specific economic, social, and political activities of these people.

Even with the new image of the cultural setting in mind, development planners continue to be concerned when addressing themselves to environmental matters, with the social rather than physical environment. The lack of concern for the physical environment has led to reducing all processes of environmental development to entries that require merely financial considerations. However, it is people's tastes, their life styles, the economics of their daily activities, their social relations and political processes that specifically delineate the environmental structure of any one society. This is true of the smallest environmental unit as it is true of the environmental structure for an entire society. The environmental structure is thus seen as a direct, organic response to economic, social, political and psychological needs. In fact, the environmental structure forms an ordered,\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}Contributing Consultants. Society Today, (Del Mar, California: Communications Research Machines (CRM), Inc., 1971), pp. 462-3.
dynamic whole which varies with respect to the distinctive character of the specific cultural setting. Such conceptualization of the environmental reality explicitly indicates that policies for environmental development are part and parcel of the overall policies for cultural development. Also, processes of environmental planning are intrinsically related to processes of developmental planning.

The specific implication, here, is that the policies needed to guide and influence the processes of growth and change of the environmental structure (as do other component structures of the cultural setting) allocations and use of capital resources available to society as a whole.

Once this frame of reference for identifying the specific nature of the environmental structure becomes acceptable, then this structure becomes, by necessity, another major component factor of the specific cultural setting.
Part One

The Kuwaiti Cultural Setting:

The growth of the Kuwaiti Cultural setting can be identified in terms of two distinct stages.

Stage One extends from the time Kuwait Town was originally established in early 18th Century and up to the mid-mark of the 20th Century. This stage is characterized with slow evolutionary growth when compared with the overall evolutionary momentum of the processes of cultural change initiated around 1950.

Stage Two, 1950-1970, where radical changes have been affectuated within the domains of certain component structures (economic, environmental) of the cultural setting; while in other domains (social, political, psychological) the processes of change have been enacted on the periphery of the respective structures.

Oil was discovered in Kuwait in 1938. In 1946, the first shipment of Kuwaiti oil was transported to Europe. Oil revenues accrued in abundance directly to the Government of Kuwait. The decision to commence large-scale development in Kuwait became a reality by the mid-mark of the 20th Century. The availability of capital; the moderate attitude of the people, their pre-oil regional and international contacts and knowledge of the world; a ruler responsive to the needs of his people and to the demands of changing times --- all these factors made the path of development adopted by Kuwait inevitable.1

In less than two decades, the transformation of the cultural setting and its physical manifestation has been enacted rapidly and extensively that what was recognized as Kuwait by the mid century mark has changed beyond recognition. The general, overriding objective of the Kuwaiti development programs, as set out by the government of Kuwait in the early 1950's, was the primary concern for bettering the living conditions of the Kuwaiti people.

The institutional structure of the Kuwaiti economy and more specifically, specialized government authorities concerned with planning and implementation of the development programs, though badly needed, were not organized till the early 1960's. In fact, the first decade of the Kuwaiti experience with development was enacted on ad-hoc basis. This was almost inevitable due to lack of local skills, and in part due to the inability of the traditional leadership to deal with the highly complex nature of development operations. As much as this was inevitable, it was also unfortunate; for during the decade of the fifties the massive operations for the development of the socio-physical infrastructure were initiated. The various operations of urban expansion included the construction of road networks, power and water distillation plants, housing, schools, hospitals, harbors and other such vital facilities which were initiated with great urgency, considerable overlapping, and an abundance of complications.

Yet, behind this dramatic change lie fundamental problems which have rarely, if perhaps ever, been faced by an affluent community before.

The various component factors of the traditional cultural setting have been continually subjected to processes of change. The ensuing pressures have elicited a wide spectrum of response: negative response in opposing change where some measure of conflict with prevailing cultural norms
existed, and positive response where change seemed compatible with cultural norms.
The Economic Structure

- Patterns of Wealth Distribution

- Property Ownership

- Employment
Change of the traditional economic structure has by far been most influential, not only in upsetting the performance of other structural components of the traditional cultural setting, but also in generating radical as well as peripheral transformation of the various domains of the cultural setting. The most significant operation in this respect resulted from the decision that the new wealth be used for the welfare of the people.

Patterns of Wealth Distribution:

The development of the socio-physical infrastructure constitutes one measure of wealth distribution which benefited the Kuwaiti society as a whole. Other measures of wealth distribution were undertaken by the Government where benefits such as property ownership and employment opportunities accrued directly to individuals and households.

Property Ownership:

This primarily relates to the Government's housing policy. A new road network was planned for old Kuwait Town, and was cast upon the traditional residential areas of the Town. This operation was started in 1954. As a consequence to this, a large number of the courtyard houses which accommodated a large number of extended families in the old residential areas had to be demolished, making way for the new roads. Said property had to be purchased by the Government. This measure triggered a massive operation where "The total amount spent on the program (of land purchase) reached over one billion dollars between 1957 and 1964."^2 In addition to the extremely handsome compensation which individuals received for their demolished dwellings, they were also automatically entitled, free of charge, to a plot of land in the newly-developed suburbs of Kuwait Town,

^2El Mallakh, op. cit., p. 76.
at 1000 metre square in area.

Two other groups of Kuwaitis later came to benefit from this type of activity. High-ranking civil servants were entitled to a plot of land 1000 metre square (10,764 ft.\(^2\)) at the very low cost of KD 0.500 a square metre (12\(\frac{\$}{a\ square\ foot}\)). In addition to this, they could apply for a loan from the Credit and Savings Bank up to KD 20,000 ($ 56,000), interest free and payable over 30 years. The next echelon of civil servants received very similar accommodations, with a slight reduction in size of plot and loan, (750 metres\(^2\); KD 15,000 - $ 42,000)

The other aspect of the Government's housing policy deals with the construction of low-income housing. This operation was (is) financed by the Credit and Savings Bank. 10\% of the space allotted to building plots within new suburbs was devoted to receive this type of facility. This low-income designation included individuals, in and out of Government service, whose nominal monthly income did not exceed KD 150 ($ 420). The dwellings are assigned to these individuals - as heads of households - with the provision that they pay for the cost of construction over a period of 25 years. Construction cost per unit (the majority being single, detached) ranges between KD 2500 ($10,000) to KD 8000 ($22,400). In size, these dwellings vary from one to four bedroom units. Plot sizes are predominantly 450 metre square. Other programs to provide housing accommodations for lower income groups as well as for Bedouin settlers are currently under study.

Employment:
The oil industry is capital-intensive and offers employment to only 7000 or so (less than 4\% of total labor force in 1965), of whom approximately
5,000 are manual and unskilled laborers.

There is no agricultural sector to absorb labor. Industry is still in its formative stages, and small-scale industrial enterprises were only started in the early 60's. Hence, the Government's next effort to distribute oil wealth was to expand governmental jobs, but not without hazards. By law, every Kuwaiti was guaranteed employment. The Government's readiness to accept virtually any applicant for employment, regardless of his qualification, has inevitably resulted in over-staffing in the government sector. In 1964, the Government employed 73,779 persons, slightly over ten times the number employed in the oil industry. In 1965, there were 80,000 government employees for a total population (Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis) of 467,339, with one civil servant to every six persons. Unfortunately, the efficiency of a significant portion of the Kuwaitis employed in Government service is not high, partially because of the low educational standards of the vast majority. And yet, this is not the key factor, as is sometimes publicized in government publications. The development of the welfare state in Kuwait, and the Government's policy of maintaining an open payroll for Kuwaitis has greatly complicated the manpower and labor problems in the country.

It is understandable why a rich country like Kuwait should provide basic services (education, health and sanitation, housing, water, power) free or at subsidized prices in a desire to make the population benefit from the ever-swelling flow of oil revenues. But this has resulted in increasing emphasis on distribution to the point that the link between distribution and production is only barely recognized by the work force. Furthermore, there exists among the Kuwaitis a tendency to leave the uninteresting tasks and the positions that involve the actual running of the government
and business in the hands of non-Kuwaitis, while retaining the positions of status and authority.
The Socio-Demographic Structure

Demographic Factors
- Population Growth
- Ethnicity
- Birth and Death Rates
- Age-Sex Composition
- Settlement

Social Factors
- The Apparent Breakdown of the Extended Family
- The Dual-Community Structure
Population Growth:
Over the last two decades, the total population of Kuwait has increased several times over its original size, Table 1. The socio-demographic structure has been so radically altered that in 1965 the native population was already a minority in its own country, making up 47% of the total population.

Ethnicity:
The rapid population growth can in small part be attributed to the element of natural increase. Also, in part, this phenomenal growth has been the result of permanent settlement of nomadic Bedouins who, until recently, had been in constant movement within the Kuwaiti hinterland. However, the factor of net migration has been, by far, the most dynamic element of this rapid rate of population growth, and specifically in terms of its implications on the nature and the rate of ensuing cultural change of the entire Kuwaiti Community, Table 2.

Birth and Death Rates:
"For 1965 the crude birth rate was 51 per 1000 population for Kuwaitis and 39 per 1000 for non-Kuwaitis. For the Kuwaiti population this can be accepted as a stable level in the short to medium term, but for the non-Kuwaitis the rate can be expected to change as the structure of the population changes.

Crude death rates were 7.3 per 1000 population for Kuwaitis, and 3.4 per 1000 for non-Kuwaitis, the latter low figure being a reflection of the low-proportion of older people in the non-Kuwaiti portion of the population"\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Nature of Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>10,000 to 12,000</td>
<td>Approximate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>Approximate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>206,460</td>
<td>First official census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>321,621+</td>
<td>Approximate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>467,339</td>
<td>Second official census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>733,196</td>
<td>Third official census</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kuwait Planning Board Publications
### TABLE 2

**POPULATION GROWTH, Ethnic Composition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kuwaitis</th>
<th>% of Kuwaitis</th>
<th>Non-Kuwaitis</th>
<th>% of Non-Kuwaitis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>113,622</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>92,851</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>206,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>161,909</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>159,712</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>321,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>220,059</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>247,280</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>467,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>345,898</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>387,298</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>733,196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kuwait Planning Board Publications
Age-Sex Composition:
According to the 1965 census, male and female members of the total population are born with almost equal number. The increase in the ratio of males to females between the ages of 15-60 years is mainly due to large number of male immigrants coming to Kuwait.

Settlement:
The first master plan of the early 1950's, as well as its further extension in later years, allowed the Government of Kuwait with a very limited number of guidelines to provide for the settlement of the rapidly increasing immigrant population. With the exception of a limited number of government employees, the majority of the immigrant population depended for settlement purposes on facilities provided by the private sector.

Residency in the super-blocks of the first master plan has been restricted, by legislative act, to Kuwaiti citizens. Also, there are certain restrictions against rent of residential units in these areas to non-Kuwaitis. Space available for rent by non-Kuwaitis is provided by privately-financed housing developments within Kuwait Town limits and several suburban areas and coastal villages. Such provisions have accommodated for middle-income immigrant families and individuals. Still a great majority of the non-Kuwaiti population, the low-income groups, have had to take up residency within the physically-deteriorating, traditional residential areas of Kuwait Town, and within shanty town developments on the outskirts of urban areas.

Social Factors:
Various institutions of the traditional social structure began to yield
to pressures exerted by the operations of development and change. The
traditional community as a whole, as well as its basic unit, the extended
family, are two domains where significant modifications have taken place.

The Apparent Breakdown of the Extended Family:
The extended Kuwaiti family was, by far, the most attributive institution
of the traditional social structure. Relations within the extended family
were characterized by authoritarian, paternalistic attitudes. The inner
dynamics of the extended family were primarily linked to patterns of
interaction among its members.

Today, the extended Kuwaiti family no longer exists as it always had up
to the mid-50's: a small community of people comprising a number of
related nuclear families sharing the same dwellings. The major causal
factor responsible for the apparent disintegration of the extended family
is reflected by the relatively direct access of most of its members to
the new wealth accruing to the society as a whole. This direct access
to wealth is clearly manifested in a number of ways that are consequential
to patterns of wealth distribution. Members of nuclear families are now
provided with far greater opportunities for employment. Hence, they are
less dependent than their traditional counterparts upon a sole provider,
nor upon a communal effort to amass the capital required for household
economy.

The government's housing policy where residential plots were distributed
by lottery, has brought about the dispersion of related nuclear families,
and so caused ties to loosen with more opportunity for individual and
nuclear family privacy. The dispersion of nuclear families 'intended'
by the planners of the physical environment is being counterbalanced by the availability of means of communication, namely the automobile and the telephone. Exchange of visits and telephone conversations, though, seem to imply a lesser frequency of interaction among nuclear units of former extended families; this exchange is considered as an imperative ritual, keenly observed by all. This will, perhaps, continue for some time to come. Role relations still subscribe to an authoritarian, paternalistic, traditional hierarchy. Consultation of elders on such highly personal decisions regarding education, employment and marriage is not only observed by younger members of former extended families, but is also expected of them by their elders. A wide range of sanctions is employed to ensure that such practice continues.

The peculiar lottery system employed in housing distribution may be envisioned as a tool that allows certain measures of interaction, and hence a trend toward an alternative uniformity of behavior amongst unrelated, yet neighboring nuclear families. In practice, however, such interaction is sex-oriented, sex-conscious. Men interact, so do women, but rarely a mixed social gathering. Such types of interaction that reflect integration of the sexes are, for the great majority of Kuwaitis, still confined to gatherings of members of former extended families. Hence, the windows of single, detached residential units are heavily draped, and balconies rarely used. For in essence, the extended family, as the most attributive institution of the social structure, has only undergone peripheral structural change: change that has not yet brought forth any radical departure from traditional norms.

Whether radical structural change of the extended family is required for more productive development, or that such development can be achieved
through the maintenance, enhancement and productive reorientation of the extended family institution is an issue that is hardly recognized in Kuwait, today. It is, in fact, the issue which, when resolved, can further accelerate rates of productive growth of the Kuwaiti community. The society in Kuwait, as whole, offers no incentives that would enable organizations and/or individuals to resolve these issues along either of the two possible paths mentioned above. The Kuwaiti sector of the population still subscribes rather strongly to the principle of the extended family in terms of economic, social and political activities. In fact, Kuwaitis recurrently refer to their community as the Kuwaiti family, emphasizing community cohesiveness of pre-oil days. On the other hand, the non-Kuwaiti sector of the population exhibits far greater ethnic heterogeneity as well as greater emphasis on the individual and the nuclear family.

The Dual Community Structure.

With respect to life styles, the social structure of the Kuwaiti community is broken down in the following manner:

Urban/Suburban: Kuwaitis; non-Kuwaitis subscribing to an urban/suburban culture in their respective countries and maintaining the same in Kuwait.

Bedouin/Rural: Constituting the lower economic groups. Kuwaiti Bedouins; non-Kuwaitis migrating from rural agricultural areas in their respective countries -- employed as non-skilled labor in Kuwait.

The two major ethnic groups, Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, in as far as they constitute distinct social entities, employ a dual social structure explicitly implied above:
Kuwaitis: Urban/suburban --- Bedouin

Attitudes and value systems of each group not only influence, but also dictate the nature and extent of interaction one group experiences with one and/or all other groups. Cultural norms play an exceedingly significant role in controlling cultural interaction between the two major ethnic groups: Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis.

The privileged status of the Kuwaitis produces less anxiety amongst non-Kuwaiti urbanites than amongst the non-Kuwaitis of rural origin, since the non-Kuwaiti urbanites are usually employed in consultative capacity in the higher echelons of both the public and private sectors. Non-Kuwaiti urbanites experience minimal interaction if any at all, with Kuwaiti Bedouins. Both groups view each other with some degree of antagonism. The educated, progress-oriented, middle/upper-middle, non-Kuwaiti urbanites have little in common with the mostly illiterate, tribal, recently-settled, non-urban Kuwaitis. In housing, employment, and other social activities, each group is well-shielded from coming in direct contact with the other. And yet, the nature and type of service these non-Kuwaitis render to the State of Kuwait is very closely linked to problems of the non-urban Kuwaiti community. For these are professionals who give counsel as well as play a decisive role in implementing development programs.

Kuwaiti Bedouins regard all non-Kuwaitis as inferior; for they, the Bedouins, are after all citizens of the country to whom all privileges accrue, and the non-Kuwaitis are transient immigrants hired to do a job, and are quite dispensable. This attitude towards non-Kuwaitis prevails, to a lesser degree, amongst non-Bedouin Kuwaitis as well. Furthermore, the Bedouins
consider themselves genuine, thoroughbred Arabs, and so superior to non-Kuwaitis of mixed blood.

The socialization of the Kuwaiti Bedouins - who constitute more than a third of the native population - surfaces as one of the major problems facing the community in Kuwait today. Social institutions that are expected to implement the socialization process can not rely very heavily on the participation of non-Kuwaiti professionals simply because of prevailing animosities, as well as the absence of viable means of cross-communication. (A language barrier exists. Arabic spoken by Bedouins is almost a new language to non-Kuwaitis.) Adequately trained Kuwaitis are not yet available to assume this responsibility. The complexity of the situation is further increased by the Government's population policy, namely: a far greater rate of absorbing Bedouins into citizenry than the rate of development of social institutions which are required for the socialization process. And in the ensuing flow of events, social standards of community activity, of performance, of participation 'suffer'.
The Political Structure

- The Persistence of Traditional Politics
- The Elite
The demand for a decisive break with traditional politics, a wider participatory range of the decision-making process often referred to as 'democratization' of political and governmental activities, dates back to the mid-30's, when one of the earliest major confrontations between rulers and ruled took place. The intensity of this demand for changing the political structure has fluctuated over time in response to internal events as well as to major, regional developments throughout the Middle East.

The implementation of the policy for distributing the newly acquired wealth has brought the great majority of Kuwaitis rallying around the flag. The provision of the various opportunities for a better life, already enacted with considerable urgency, finds the majority of Kuwaitis apathetic to any type of political activity where "Long Live the Sheikh" is not only widely reiterated, but is also suffixed with "For a Long Time to Come."

No political parties exist. Political factions, tribal in nature, do, however, exist. The all-powerful merchant community of the pre-oil era seems, at first glance, to have lost its effectiveness in affecting major policies now that the ruling family (and/or government, controlled by the ruling family) has emerged as the new provider of employment and other opportunities for enhanced existence.

This transfer of loyalties may seem to suggest a power struggle of sorts. In actual fact, however, no such struggle exists. An extremely handsome portion of the new wealth accrued directly to the merchant elite whose members have now become financiers, bankers, general contractors and large-scale importers of goods. Representatives of the merchant kinship groups have been brought to cabinet and other high-ranking government posts.
They have further been tapped for participation in boards of directors and as directors and general managers of government subsidized companies.

The two most effective political factions of the Kuwaiti community, the ruling family and the merchant elite, have come to reconcile their differences - emerging today as the ruling elite, definitely in agreement on major issues and policies, though not necessarily a homogeneous institution. Concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elite has been accomplished via subscription to tribal, traditional measures. Appointments in key positions of the civil service hierarchy and other such concerns controlled by the ruling elite have been carried out according to inherited status rather than individual capabilities. Though, in few cases such appointments have turned out to be extremely successful in bringing the right people to the right positions. The majority of cases, however, stand as clear evidence to the ineffectiveness of such measures, where the office in question is almost always heavily staffed with non-Kuwaiti professionals, referred to as consultants, to counterbalance the dismal performance of the top Kuwaiti 'administrator'.

The ineffectiveness of the civil service and other concerns rarely hinders the various transactions of the ruling elite. Their high-ranking representatives carefully distributed in various offices and circles manage to bypass routinary and other such obstacles - leaving the greater majority of Kuwaitis to battle the enormous machine with all its complex operations. The Kuwaiti 'commoners' do not take issue with the ruling elite for the rigidly bureaucratic and almost non-productive government apparatus, but rather blame it on the overwhelming presence of the non-Kuwaitis, "the foreigners," without whose participation the administrative machine would
definitely come to a halt.

Two developments pose serious threat to the continued prestigious existence of the ruling elite:
- the shadow elite
- the alternative elite

The Shadow Elite:
Non-Kuwaitis have their own social hierarchy with its own power structure, though it is not as easily discernible as the Kuwaiti counterpart, nor is its structural composition as simple and clear-cut. In fact, there are as many non-Kuwaiti social hierarchies as there are non-Kuwaiti ethnic groups in the country.

Closed, ethnic enclaves exist within the civil service. Membership in these administrative cliques, which in essence means being employed by the Government of Kuwait, is usually acquired in much the same manner characteristic of the native model. Influential non-Kuwaiti administrators attempt to staff their departments with relatives, members of the same community in their respective country, or simply fellow countrymen. Penetration of these enclaves by 'ordinary' Kuwaitis and by members of other ethnic groups is barred.

In the absence of any serious effort to upgrade the capabilities, performance, and efficiency of the Kuwaiti cadre with the eventual goal of Kuwaitization of the system, the variety of interests and the attempt to pursue them, on the part of the non-Kuwaiti groups, can create a far more serious bureaucratic disruption which can further paralyze the entire system. The majority of Kuwaitis, with close to zero range of maneuv-
ability, may begin to shift the blame for the chaos from the non-Kuwaitis to the ruling elite. This can lead to greater measures of anxiety, decline, and gradual ineffectiveness of present control measures. The attempt pursued here has not been directed to project the outcome of events, but rather to indicate, in general outline, certain grave complications that, if left unattended to, may assume uncontrollable measures where "Long Live the Sheikh" becomes replaced by other, not so complimentary expressions of anxiety, despair and/or subversive act.

The Alternative Elite:
Generations of Kuwaiti students pursuing their college education in neighboring Arab countries have come in contact with life styles quite different than what prevails in Kuwait. They have witnessed a totally different political process in operation. Furthermore, they have been actively involved in political agitation that is omnipresent in the majority of Arab universities since the close of World War II, and beyond. Kuwaiti students, receiving their college education in England, other European countries and in the U. S., have and are going through similar experiences.

Upon completion of their course of study, and eventual arrival in Kuwait, the majority of these change-oriented, potential leaders have been and are being absorbed by the system, the establishment, the ruling elite. The transition is not an easy one for those who are aware of the complexities of the situation. Some have been appointed in key positions and have been given a free hand to run the affairs of their respective departments. Their initial efforts to bring about change have not been successful. Their efforts are characterized by the same urgency they exhibited while letting off steam at college. Change is not a process that isolated
individuals can bring about overnight. On the whole, the majority of college graduates have come to accept the status quo as the norm, and no doubt have been contributing just as much to the ineffectiveness of the entire system.

A limited number of Kuwaiti college graduates, while acknowledging the peculiarities of their dilemma, have not lost their genuine interest in advocating and working towards some measure of reform. A few of them have vigorously pursued their interests, over the last fifteen years, while in and out of government service. They have persistently advocated their views in the local press, in private gatherings and other channels that are open to such type activity.

Whatever opposition that exists to the ruling elite and/or the higher seat of power is such that can safely be termed "loyal" opposition - loyal in the sense that no subversive effort with the intent of total takeover of power and authority can be detected. Even the most pronounced advocates of change and reform envision such transformation as happening from within the system. This is no more eloquently demonstrated than in the present composition of the Third National Assembly, elected in January, 1971, where a sizeable and quite active minority (20%), comprising some of the most articulate opposition leaders, have been elected.

In this respect, the role of educated, change-oriented Kuwaitis becomes exceedingly significant in the effort of providing not so much an alternative to the ruling elite, as a gradually increasing frequency of alternative approaches to decision-making and problem-solving policies. What is equally important is the initiation of some measure of rapport between young, potential leaders and members of the ruling elite who can be quite
sympathetic if some demonstration can be achieved to convince them that they too can benefit from reform. Isolated instances of such interaction, though quite rare, can presently be detected. What is more specifically required, however, is a gradual intensification of the same effort on a collective basis, and in such manner that would not trigger a violent reaction from the ruling elite.
The Psychological Structure
Change, in Kuwait, has often been referred to in terms of the more manifest aspects of the ongoing transformation aspects that denote seemingly abrupt changes. Reference here is to the more immediately discernible manifestations that have registered a definite discontinuity of traditional life styles, namely patterns of wealth distribution where the individual household economy has been extremely enhanced, and also manifestations of the phenomenal transformation of the physical environment. On the other hand, changes of attitudes and values have tended to be latent in character.

No effort has been exerted to identify such changes as have resulted from the inevitable interaction between the Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti sectors of the population.

Effects of the expanded educational program, dispersion of mass media, and the rather staggering dependence on the automobile as a means of transport are indeed impressive in terms of the change they have brought about to Kuwaiti life styles. Yet, these influential agents of change are taken for granted, and their contribution considered commonplace.

Fundamental human values and how they affect life conditions in a particular setting play a leading role in the process of cultural transformation. Changes in the Kuwaiti value system are almost imperceptible, despite the readily noticeable change in life styles. Role relations and attitudes, which are closely linked to the value system, have registered no clearly manifested departure from traditional norms.

The initial stage of development did not rely on the unrelenting performance of transitional groups, innovators and entrepreneurs. Instead, development operations depended totally on the role of the government as
the all-powerful, omnipotent provider. In this manner, the Kuwaiti value system has only been peripherally associated with development operations. This is crucial with respect to the persistence of local standards of performance.

Standards of performance reflect specific, deeply held values that people employ to gauge achievement - individually and/or collectively. Standards change only when the value system that governs them changes. And unless the value system warrants the occurrence of specific human activities, said activities are not expected to be performed productively. Unless fundamental human values are conducive to development, no changes in the political, social, and economic structures will, by themselves, bring about any significant measure of cultural development.

A clearer assessment of the Kuwaiti value system requires another look at pre-oil conditions. The activities of sea-borne trade, pearl-diving, boat-building and fishing in Kuwait prior to oil production deeply affected the Kuwaiti mode of life, their social relations, their customs and norms. The Kuwaitis were also engaged in fending off Bedouin invasions from the interior of the Arabian Desert. All the above activities required group effort. The most outstanding example of this collective behavior was manifested when the Kuwaitis built a fourteen-foot high mud wall around Kuwait Town, as a defensive measure, in the early part of this century. The wall stretched over a distance of five miles and was completed in a record time of two months. The unpredictable conditions of the sea-oriented economy, in as far as not providing the community with guaranteed sources of income, helped bind the Kuwaitis even closer. A general feeling of cohesiveness and solidarity prevailed.
The traditional social structure was characterized by the presence of three major groups: ruling family, merchants, and sailors. Each group has its own distinguishable role in the community. However, they were all generally subjected to similar living conditions. They all shared similar values and attitudes. Individual members of these groups could not be distinguished from one another in terms of social behavior. A normative standard of behavior prevailed. Even the place of residence did not offer much distinction, at least in its external form and general internal layout. The houses followed a basic plan that employed a courtyard; building materials were similar. And the prevailing "pre-industrial" urban character of one residential neighborhood to another was virtually the same. Good conduct and favorable reputation were probably the only measure of distinction.

Within this small and unified community, where everybody knew everybody else, and where individuals were identified with their respective extended families and clans, violation of social norms was rare. Furthermore, it was accepted procedure that deviant behavior was publically exposed, criticized, and condemned. The traditional value system, as it was reflected through the realm of social relations, was perhaps the strongest and most effective deterrent to crime in Kuwait, during that era.

Further discussion of the traditional value system, in Kuwait, requires a clear distinction between two normative structures, one characterizing the extended family, the other the community as whole. To be more precise, however, mention should be made of a third normative structure, that of the

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individual clan.

Authoritarian, paternalistic attitudes prevailed within the institution of the extended family. The same applies to those attitudes and relationships that bound the related extended families within the structure of the individual clan. However, differences could be detected amongst the normative structures of individual extended families belonging to the same clan. And while relationships and roles were clearly defined within the individual extended family, where authority was exercised and submission enforced, hierarchical authority within the clan, beyond that of the head of the clan, was characterized by mutual respect rather than submission.

Outside the realm of the extended family, in particular, and that of the clan in general, there was hardly any identifiable communal authoritarian order. What characterized the normative structure of the society as whole was a spirit of cooperative yet competitive effort; cooperative in the face of elements external to society, competitive on a clan and an extended family scale in local business, trade, hospitality, and reputable conduct. And in this respect, upholding the name of the clan/family was a major behavior regulator.

Meteoric increase of employment opportunities, over the last two decades, coupled with the government's housing policy, have helped to finally disband the extended family, if only in form. No significant change in values and attitudes pertaining to the normative structure of the extended family has appeared. The telephone and automobile help counteract what physical planning and patterns of wealth distribution sought to destroy, namely hierarchical, authoritative, extended family relations. Innovation, as generator, has been slow in appearing and only on a relatively small and
and somewhat ineffective scale. The government emerged as the largest
glemployer (over 60% of total labor force in 1965). The intent was
to provide employment to every Kuwaiti, able or otherwise, with no emphasis
whatsoever on productive performance.

The Kuwaitis have been receiving this extremely handsome reward simply
for being born Kuwaitis. No reciprocal relationship, in as far as
obligations and expectations, exists between citizen and state. No re¬
lationship exists between local and universalistic criteria and standards
of productivity, efficiency, not even minimal performance. The situation
has become more complex when the country has to import skilled and non¬
skilled labor to keep the newly established machineries of the state in
operation. Even well-reputed international planning consultants, drafting
out proposals for future growth in Kuwait, have fallen prey to this
extravaganza. In their projections for various community needs over the
next twenty years, these consultants are making allowances for a large
non-Kuwaiti community to be present, twenty years hence, in much the same
fashion as it does today, excluding any possible developments where the
Kuwaitis might upgrade their skills and begin to replace the non-Kuwaitis.

The most prominent feature of the Kuwaiti development program has been
the extreme emphasis placed on the individual, not as a productive member
of society but as recipient of welfare endowments. And as might be expected,
pursuit of personal interests, in terms of how best to make use of these
welfare benefits, became the only preoccupation.

Building a new house on a newly-acquired plot of land was one such personal
interest with which a very large number of Kuwaitis were and are still
engaged. It is often reiterated that physical form, whether of city or
individual housing unit, is a reflection of socio-economic and other needs that individual and society seek to satisfy. One might add, perhaps, that a search for identity is also involved. On the other hand, the construction boom, and the endless variety of forms and colors of housing units, throughout the country, were generated by a need for doing-as-others-do. The size and form of the house, the materials that were used and the way the dwelling was furnished became grounds for endless, seemingly non-productive, competition amongst Kuwaitis. Demand for consumption increased. The house became the new status symbol; the well-kept garden and the ever-so-green lawn became the time consuming hobby. Construction costs skyrocketed. Government loans were no longer sufficient to meet the construction of the house and its prestigious, status-oriented, though not comfort-providing, additives. A peculiar dilemma soon appeared. Should the decision be to scale down the quest for prestige and status, or to purchase an additional loan with interest to keep up with the Abdul's? And as yet, this dilemma is still unresolved.
The Environmental Structure
The Kuwaiti environmental structure can historically be identified in terms of three stages, Figures 1, 2, & 3. Stage one corresponds to the first phase of cultural growth, categorically terminating around 1950. Pre-1950 Kuwait Town exhibited all the major characteristics of traditional Arab towns, as well as some distinctive features specifically its own. Town growth responded to the slow rate of population growth and to the limited range of socio-economic and political activity of the traditional Kuwaiti society.

The original settlement, in early 18th Century, clustered around the centrally located dhow harbor. It later extended along a northeast-southwest coastal axis. Further growth was thrust inward and largely to the south and southwest of what later became the harbor-souq core. The entire development was eventually surrounded by a 14-foot high mud wall.

Plans for the development of stage two of the Kuwaiti environmental structure were prepared in 1951. The implementation of these plans commenced in 1954. The main feature of this stage of growth was a master plan prepared by British consultants. The plan provided a clear-cut land use distribution. Kuwait Town remained as focus, housing governmental and commercial activities. A strip of land 250 metres wide adjacent to the old wall was reserved for recreational activities. Along the southern limits of the Old Town, the first of a series of four concentric ring roads was proposed. Roughly, at right angles to these rings, radial roads were planned to converge on and give direct access to the town. This created a 'super-block' system of development areas between rings and radials, each about 1500 metres square, which were intended to be developed primarily for residential uses, with their own infrastructure of roads, social facilities, and
Figure 1: Kuwait City
Figure 2: Kuwait City
Figure 3: Kuwait City
public utilities.

Over time, this plan represented a closed system of growth which made no allowances for any possibilities of future expansion. The various considerations for land use operations as proposed by the plan were exhausted to their extreme limits within less than ten years of the initial implementation operation. In the early 1960's, the Kuwaiti planning authorities attempted to remedy the situation by proposing measures for accretive growth. The attempt was soon halted as the proposed development began to infringe upon the off-limits oil activity area.

Stage three of the Kuwaiti environmental structure commenced in 1965, when a team of British planners were invited to Kuwait to provide counsel regarding policies for future growth. Two major developments soon followed:

a) A need for a second master plan was identified.

b) An advisory group was formed with the purpose of providing counsel to the Government of Kuwait on matters of environmental planning.

In early 1968, two more major developments took place:

a) The British firm of Collin Buchanan and Partners (hereafter referred to as CBP) was invited to prepare a National Physical Plan for the State as whole and Master Plans for Urban Areas. CBP were asked to provide for future growth through the year 2000 A.D. A tentative date for completion of CBP proposals was set for December, 1970.

b) All major operations of environmental development were frozen until the completion of CBP work.

In October, 1968, CBP set up shop in Kuwait Town, and commenced their research operations thereafter. Simultaneously, a counterpart team of local
specialists was formed for the purpose of complementing the CBP team. A preliminary presentation of the CBP work took place in late December, 1970, (which event the Author attended). Two major recommendations were introduced:

a) The most feasible path for further environmental growth must extend southward along a narrow strip between the oil activity area and the eastern coastline.

b) [This] is purely a physical plan. It can not work alone, but needs to be coordinated with an economic plan.

Following this draft presentation CBP requested reactions to their work from the various ministries of the Government of Kuwait. The completed CBP proposals were scheduled to be presented to the Government of Kuwait in mid-summer 1971.

In March, 1971, a new department was formed within the framework of the Kuwait Planning Board. It was called The Department of Environmental Planning.\(^5\) Its task is to conduct research on problems related to housing needs, pollution and urban planning.

April 15, 1972: The completed CBP proposals were still not presented to the Government of Kuwait.

\(^5\)The Author joined the Department of Environmental Planning on January 3, 1972, and is presently a member of a three-man technical team in charge of implementing Department tasks. The major task of the Department of Environmental Planning has since been rephrased to read as follows: "Formulation of State policy to guide and influence the processes of growth and change of the Natural and the Man-Made Environment."
Part Two

Physical Response to Specific Cultural Norms

- Preface
- Review of Part One
- Analysis
- Synthesis of Intention
- Physical Intentions
Part Two

The Problem:
In June, 1971, and upon the request of the General Secretariat of the Kuwaiti National Assembly and the recommendations of the Government of Kuwait, the Planning Board invited seven consulting firms (Appendix A) to submit proposals for the development of an area which would house the permanent quarters of the Kuwaiti National Assembly. (Program entered as Appendix B).

Following is a proposal by the Author prepared for the above program.

Review of Part One:
Over the last few decades, cultural change in Kuwait has occurred along extremely peculiar dimensions. In certain domains (economic, environmental) this change has been radical; while in others (social, political, psychological) the processes of change have been enacted on the periphery of the respective structures.

The present stage of cultural growth is categorically characterized as follows:

1. Indications of the vulnerability of a single-resource economy.
2. Apparent stability of the political structure.
3. The precipitation of the dual-community (Kuwaiti, non-Kuwaiti) social structure.
4. The persistence of the "traditional" value system.
5. Need for coherent manpower development policies.

These factors have very grave implications on the maintenance and further
development of the environmental structure. What are even more crucial, however, are the serious implications these same factors have on further productive development of the Kuwaiti cultural setting.

The public and private sectors, in Kuwait, have both been concerned, with extensive detail, at indicating the necessity for productive developmental planning. This practice has been carried so far as to render the concept of "planning" a household commodity.

The problem at this time of Kuwaiti development is, as ever, one of identifying not only new productive "ways" of formulating plans, but, most important, improved methodologies for implementing plans.

Analysis:

I - External Factors
   - Study Area
   - Identification of External Factors
   - Implications of External Factors

II - Programmatic Directions

External Factors
- Study Area

In an attempt to identify those external factors which would affect the nature of development on the proposed site, the area of study has been enlarged to cover Environmental Area 13 (CBP Draft, 1970), Figure 4.

It is the nature of master plans that they are either followed to the letter or altered. Both procedures depend on how these plans were formulated in the first place, and also on how they are implemented. Hence, it would
Figure 4: Environmental Area 13
serve no purpose to speculate on the advantages of the original location of the site for the National Assembly as proposed by CBP, Figure 4. What needs to be considered here, however, is the manner in which the CBP proposals for the area are going to be affected by the change of NA site.

- Identification of External Factors
The first order of external factors, Figure 5, comprises:
1. Proposed Primary Road, (CBP).

The next order of external factors, Figure 5, includes:
3. Gulf Street as Secondary Road (CBP).
4. Proposed Private Development southwest of site.
5. The Sief Palace Complex and CBD development northeast of Study Area.

- Implications of External Factors
1. Primary Road
The CBP Structure Plan is looked at as a diagram of intentions. It will no doubt require a whole series of planning-policy decisions, tests, and adjustments before it can be developed into a plan that can be productively implemented. And in the absence of any relevant information in the program brief and/or any concrete evidence elsewhere regarding the outcome of such urgently needed operations, the decision is:
**Develop the National Assembly site independently of any direct linkages to the Primary Road.**

2. Waterfront Development
The CBP Structure Plan introduces a coastal ribbon of reclaimed land with an average width of 200 metres, reserved as public open space and assumed
Figure 5: External Factors

1. Private Development
2. Proposed site for Government Offices
3. Project Site
4. Waterfront Development
5. Secondary Road
6. Primary Road
7. Sief Palace Complex
8. Central Business District
to house recreational facilities. By its very nature, the National Assembly is one of the most, if not the most, public-oriented institution. The need here, then, is one of:

Providing adequate linkages between the National Assembly site and Waterfront Development.

3. **Secondary Road**

The strip of Gulf Street is to be upgraded as a Secondary Road, (CBP). In this manner, it is expected to service the greater part of the Study Area as well as the Waterfront Development. Such treatment will greatly limit the options for the type of linkages discussed above. Hence, the need is to: investigate possibilities for alternative access to both the NA site and the Waterfront Development area.

4. **Private Development**

This type of development (walk-up motel) is of a special commercial nature. It can be successfully incorporated, on a new site, within the coastal recreational ribbon and brought closer to the NA site. This would provide an opportunity for productive neighborly relationships to that part of the NA site which would best relate, i.e. the Conference Hall and its support facilities, where the overall character of any proposed linkage would provide for: Convention-Type activity.

5. **Sief Palace and CBD**

To establish neighborly association of urban facilities similar to those discussed above, the northeast area of the NA site needs to house that part of the program which would:

Symbolically relate to the Sief Palace Complex.
Programmatic Directions

The program comprises three clusters:

1. The National Assembly
2. The Conference Hall
3. The Audit and Control Commission

The controlling factor here is the National Assembly Cluster. Any attempt to identify the nature of this public institution needs to take into account the Kuwaiti political process.

Politics occupies a rather commanding position in everyday life in Kuwait, at least that aspect of it which promotes the persistence of "traditional" values. At the same time, the State of Kuwait advocated that it harbours democracy, and has in fact developed, to a certain level, an institutional structure for (a) democracy.

The conflict between "traditional" politics and institutionalized democracy, as it exists in Kuwait, may be genuine and in turn productive. It may be superficial. The issue here is not one of identifying the specific nature of the conflict. Though this does not necessarily imply that the resulting uncertainty as expressed in the program brief regarding the possible future increase in the number of public representatives in the NA needs to be taken as a sound planning parameter. The increase in the number of representatives would require major amendments to the Constitution of the State of Kuwait. Furthermore, such an increase would result as a natural outgrowth of the hitherto unresolved population policy.

Speculation on the outcome of possible constitutional amendments and population policy can not be an issue here. Instead, the concern is with
the enormous implications this type of ideological conflict, as referred to above, has on the physical form. The attempt here is to: Reinforce the positive aspects of this conflict.

In terms of site development, this reinforcement can be realized by making the grounds of the National Assembly Cluster accessible to the public at any and all times.

The relevance of the Conference Hall Cluster is no less than that of the NA, though the two institutions deal with two different levels of the political process.

There is an inherent organic relationship between the two levels of activity and, consequently, the two clusters. The concept of neighborly relationship between them needs to be strongly emphasized, without sacrificing the specific nature of each.

The Audit and Control Commission Cluster is, perhaps, less commanding than the other two clusters in terms of symbolic significance. It does, however, offer opportunities for symbolic linkages with the Sief Palace Complex and the CBD development northeast of the Study Area.

Synthesis of Intentions:
1. Cultural
   a. Action Area development needs to respond to the specific nature of cultural norms.
   b. Make allowances for the manner along which these norms may develop.
   c. Respond to the Kuwaiti political process and its underlying conflict.

2. Urban
   a. Area to be developed independently of CBP Primary Road.
b. Establish adequate linkages to Waterfront Development.
c. Consideration of neighborly associating of urban facilities.

3. **Programmatic**
   a. Establish neighborly associating of programmatic clusters.
   b. Make the grounds of the "site" accessible to the public.
   c. Provide Communal services to all three clusters.

Physical Interpretation of Intentions:

1. **Re-routing of Secondary Road** (Gulf St.) around part of the site allows:
   a. Extending the boundaries of the action area.
   b. A layering of activities between the road and Kuwait Bay.
   c. Optimum opportunities for linkage of programmatic clusters and waterfront development.

These measures help create a pedestrian-oriented environment within reasonable proximity to parking areas and road.

2. **Parking:** All parking is on grade, and consists of three layers:
   a. Uncovered; next to road.
   b. Uncovered with covered walkways; middle layer.
   c. Covered; closest to the buildings.

3. **Pedestrian Movement System:** The entire action area is linked by a combined linear and spatial movement system. The linear movement occurs along covered walkways which become arcaded around the ceremonial plaza, and also along paths leading to The Chamber.

The spacial movement system comprises open and partially sheltered areas of special interest.
4. **Utilities:** A 15-metre wide strip is reserved to house service equipment, maintenance, and storage facilities. The strip is divided into smaller area which are surrounded by thick walls. The alleys between the walled areas lead to, and in great part signal the presence of, the pedestrian movement system.

Alongside the utility strip runs a major service and maintenance tunnel. Branching off from this tunnel is a series of distribution tunnels which carry utility runs to the multitude of enclosed spaces of the program. These distribution tunnels exist beneath walkways running northwest-south-east. Additional access doors are incorporated within the paving pattern of the walkway floor. The tunnels are wide enough to allow the use of either small, electrically operated service vehicles, or service carts on rail.

5. **Landscape:** Planting is reduced to a minimum. The resulting green spaces are essentially of two types: gardens and tree clusters.

6. **Water:** Water is extensively employed as an environmental element as well as providing buffer zones in specific locations in the area.

A controlled water system is introduced. It comprises two major canals that start at the new edge of Kuwait Bay. Narrow waterways branch off from these canals and penetrate the domains of the three programmatic clusters. These waterways terminate in fountains and/or water pools which occur within internal courtyards.

7. **Enclosed Space (Architecture):** The partially enclosed courtyard, enhanced with water pools, fountains and potted plants, is the dominant structuring element of all enclosed spaces within the three clusters.
With the exception of The Chamber and The Conference Hall, all building is limited to either one or two stories high.

8. **Chamber Environment**: A slightly elevated plaza, surrounded by water, houses The Chamber and the Mosque, and so forms the "sacred precinct" of the entire development. Walkways and covered arcades bridge across the water canals and link the Chamber plaza with the rest of the action area.


APPENDIX I

List of Competitors

1. Studio Nervi
2. Sir Basil Spence, Bonnington and Collins
3. B. V. Doshi
4. Mohamed Ramzi Omar
5. Chaderchi and Sherzad
6. Jorn Utzon
7. Associated Kuwaiti Offices
   - Kuwaiti Engineer's Office
   - National Engineering Bureau
   - Kuwait Architectural Consultant
   - Pan Arab Consulting Office
   - Gulf Engineering Office
APPENDIX II

Competition Program

The General Requirements of the National Assembly are:

1.1 The Architect should investigate the potential of local traditional forms of architecture, and the extreme climatic conditions of the area.

1.2 It is quite conceivable that the number of members of the National Assembly will increase in future. Therefore, the possibility of expansion should be seriously considered in the layout of the buildings.

1.3 It is important that all office spaces and committee rooms be flexible, so that they can be increased or reduced in dimension to meet the changing requirements.

1.4 The quality of finishing should be excellent throughout the structure and the material used should require the least amount of maintenance.

1.5 All services (air conditioning, heating, electrical, water, etc.) should be easily accessible for maintenance purposes and provide for expansion in the future.

1.6 All spaces should be designed with adequate janitorial, storage and toilet facilities.

1.7 These requirements should be considered as the minimum outline requirements only. The architect is encouraged to examine in depth the needs of a modern parliament complex and to add to these requirements should he see the necessity to do so.

1.8 Special attention should be paid to the development of the site, bearing in mind the requirements of the proposed Master Plan of Kuwait (copy enclosed). In particular, please note the limitations of the proposed road structure, the floor space index and the height limitations imposed on the area.

2.0 The requirements of the National Assembly fall into 10 distinct spatial areas:

2.1 a) The Chamber
b) The Reception Areas
c) The Conference Hall Complex
d) Offices for the Members of the Assembly
e) Committee Administration Department
f) The Library
g) The Cafeteria
h) The Mosque
i) The Guards Quarters & General Information Area
j) Parking (shaded and unshaded)
a. The Chamber

The Chamber consists of the following areas:

a.1 Main Seating Area

i. The seating area for the members of the Assembly. This area is to be used for sessions of the National Assembly, with the seating for the Council of Ministers facing the members. It should be designed to offer multiple number of seating arrangements, thus assuring flexibility in the positioning of the President's dias.

The area should be preliminarily designed for 100 members, but it should be possible to increase the seating capacity to 150.

As at presently there are only 50 members in the National Assembly, it should be possible to reduce the space of the room by the use of flexible space dividers.

ii. A seating area for senior State officials, who attend to assist Ministers in discharging their parliamentary duties.

Close to the members seating area, but separate from it, adequate area for 25 seats to be used by State officials and Ministers' assistants.

iii. A seating area for visiting Heads of States of Governments.

This is the seating area for visiting Heads of State, separate from other areas, with a seating capacity of 25 people.

a.2 Gallery Seating Area

i. A seating area for important visitors and members of the diplomatic corps.

This is a seating area reserved for important visitors and heads of the diplomatic corps - capacity of 100. This could be part of the main gallery or could be designed as separate small gallery.

ii. A seating area for the Press. An area with work tables for 50 members of the Press.

iii. An area for radio and TV dissemination.

An area specially designed and equipped for radio and TV transmission of the session.

iv. A seating area for the general public.
An area for the general public with a seating capacity of 1000 - that could be reduced to a smaller area by the use of a partition system.

v. Sufficient toilet space, information and cloak rooms, should be provided in the Chamber area.

b. The Reception Areas

b.1 A special reception area for the Amir, the Prime Minister and the President of the National Assembly to be designed as a group of reception areas directly connected to the Chamber.

b.2 The reception area for H.H. the Amir should consist of two rooms - one for 10 persons and the other for 30 persons.

The reception area for the Prime Minister should consist of two rooms - one for 10 persons and the other for 30 persons, and be convenient for meetings, if necessary, of the Ministers during the sessions of the National Assembly.

The reception area for the President of the National Assembly should accommodate 10 persons.

All these reception areas should be of a common control area that leads to either of the reception areas. If possible, these three reception areas should be located very near to the dias of the Assembly - all reception areas should have access to a private toilet.

b.3 A general lounge for the members of the Assembly, to seat about 150 persons.

Attached to this lounge should be five other rooms with a seating capacity of 30 persons each, to be used by the members for private consultations during intervals.

b.4 Two lounges for the General Secretariat and its personnel. Attached to them, three rooms for typing, distribution, recording, etc.

b.5 A lounge to accommodate 50 members of the Press, especially equipped with work tables and direct telephone lines, etc.

b.6 The above should all have access to toilet, storage and janitorial spaces.

c. The Conference Hall Complex

c.1 This is a separate hall from the chamber and will mainly be used as the centre for all government conferences, regional, local or international.

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c.3 It should have an observers gallery with a seating capacity not less than 500.

c.4 Attached to the conference hall should be 10 conference rooms, 2 of which should accommodate 100 members and 8 of which should accommodate 50 members. The latter 8 should be designed with a flexible partition system between them so as to facilitate the enlargement of the room for large committees.

c.5 Attached to this hall should be sufficient secretarial and administrative space, as the hall will be an independent organization, with its own staff (See United Nations Hall for space requirements).

c.6 This hall should be sited apart from the Assembly Complex and should have its entry and exit points clearly defined; preferably underground.

c.7 Attached to the hall should be a reception space large enough to entertain 1,000 people. The space should be designed with a food preparation room at the one end of it (not a kitchen as most of the food will be brought from outside). Ample storage and adequate toilet facilities to be provided. If possible, the conference hall and reception hall should have one common entry and control area.

d. **Offices for the Members of the Assembly**

d.1 An office suite consisting of two rooms should be assigned for each of the 50 members of the Assembly. This complex should be designed with the possibility of addition of another 50 suites to it in the future to take into consideration any increase in the members of the Assembly.

d.2 This complex should be spatially close and easily accessible to the administrative offices of the Assembly.

d.3 Attached to this complex should be 12 committee rooms, each complete with

- an office for the head of the committee
- an office for the secretary of the committee
- an office for the technical advisor of the committee
- adequate space for filing and storage
- toilet facilities.

**Note:**

Two of the committee rooms should be designed to accommodate 50 members. Ten of these committee rooms should be separated by a flexible partition that could be removed to enlarge the
size of the committee rooms.

e. **Committee Administration Department** - as detailed in appendix i.

f. **The Library**

   A library with its required facilities should be designed to house 50,000 volumes.

g. **The Cafeteria**

   A cafeteria and kitchen with a maximum seating capacity of 200 people should be so located as to conveniently serve both the members of the Assembly and the administrative staff.

h. **A Mosque**

   A mosque with a capacity of 300 people should be designed as part of the Assembly Complex.

i. **Guards' Quarters** - as detailed in appendix ii.

j. **Parking**

   Parking to be provided for 1,000 cars, distributed at key routes all over the site, with underground or shaded parking for the National Assembly members and staff.