MAN PLAC'T IN A PARADISE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MILTON, ST. AMBROSE,
AND HUGH OF ST. VICTOR

by
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Approved,

George W. Whiting

Houston, Texas
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Gentle to me and affable hath been
Thy condescension, and shall be honour'd ever
With grateful Memorie.
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The religious purity and high purpose of the dedicated poet are apparent in Milton's account of the ode that he made to celebrate the birth of Christ. Although this letter in the form of an elegy exhibits some of the formalities of the conventional Latin Epistles in prose, the intensely personal acceptance of the code of the epic poet is unmistakable. Almost inevitably, moreover, Milton's lines about the Saviour's high seriousness in His youth are interpreted autobiographically to refer to Milton's aspirations in his own youth. The prayer to Christ, with the reference to His visit to the Temple, which the founders of St. Paul's included among the devotions for the school, suggests that the pupils were encouraged to imitate Christ. In the light of Hanford's valuable warning against the sentimental fallacy of reading too much of Milton's life into the "lines composed by a poet aged sixty-three as a holy meditation appropriate to the Son of God," however, it must be admitted that the only passage in Paradise Regained that applies unquestionably as well to the young Milton as to Christ is

Childhood at St. Paul's was spent in acquiring an education in Christian humanism. Such was the purpose of Colet when he specified
that the pupils were to read "good litterature both latyn and greke, and good auctors such as have the veray Romayne eliquence joyned with wydome, ... specially Cristyn auctours that wrote ... cleane and chast laten ... as Lactantius, Prudentius and Proba," and not the corrupters of the "very Romayne tong which in the tyme of Tully and Sallust and Virgill and Terence was used, whiche also Seint Jerome and Seint Ambrose and Seint Austen ... lernyd in theuyr tymes." The tradition behind Colet's innovations is clearly brought out by Leach's comment that his reaction against the sophistical dialectic of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries took him back to such a library as Alcuin would have approved. Although the amount of this program that remained in effect in Milton's boyhood is conjectural, Leach considers it probable that Proba and her contemporaries "of the leaden age" (whatever their use to Milton) survived, and almost certain that Lactantius and Prudentius were a valuable part of Milton's early education.3

From a study of sixteenth and seventeenth century education and Milton's own statements about his childhood, Clark offers a more complete account of what Milton probably studied at St. Paul's. His studies were both religious and humanistic; he learned the trivium—grammar (which meant literature as well as the structure of the language), logic, and rhetoric—in Latin and Greek, much as Ovid did in his grammar school; and in addition he studied some Hebrew. Milton speaks of his early education in humane letters and Christian precepts and his interest in the "elegantest authors"—orators and historians as well as poets.4 Indeed Clark conjectures, in view of criticisms in Colet's time that the study of secular poets made the school a house of
idolatry, that the emphasis on the Christian poets was a concession to prevent further objections to the substitution of classical Latin for the mediaeval Latin that Colet deplored. In all probability Cato (the author of the Disticha Moralia), Erasmus, Virgil, Cicero, Ovid, Horace, Juvenal, Persius, Caesar, Lily, Sallust, and perhaps Justin and even Terence, and in Greek, the New Testament, Homer, Hesiod, and Isocrates and perhaps Euripides had some place in the curriculum. No evidence corroborates the plan to include Lactantius, Prudentius, and the other Christian writers, unless a few sentences from them were brought in to furnish the moral themes and divine themes that were undoubtedly assigned for composition. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the pupils at St. Paul's did not devote some time to the hymns of Prudentius.

That Milton "had to become a little Roman boy of sorts" in translating and memorizing passages of Latin and Greek and composing in imitation of the authors did not mean, however, that his education was classical as opposed to mediaeval, for similar methods were practised in the more enlightened mediaeval grammar schools. In the seventeenth century, teachers applied the advice of Quintilian:

The teacher should leave nothing unnoticed which is important...as to the thought or the style. He should point out...what clearness, brevity, and apparent sincerity is displayed in the statement of facts; what design there is in certain passages, and what well-concealed artifice...how subtle and frequent are the points of argument...what words are appropriate...He should frequently ask questions and test the judgment of his students.

Quintilian would have had little cause to stare and gasp at the school of Bernard of Chartres, however, where rhetorical devices, sophistical quibbles, nice points of style, and appropriate diction received due
consideration according to Quintilian’s advice. Aside from recitations and explications of the text the pupils had compositions to write on subjects "edifying to faith and morals." Imitation of, but not copying from, the poets and orators was carefully taught. In these instructions Bernard was accustomed to quote the precepts of both Quintilian and Augustine. Undoubtedly Milton had much practice at St. Paul’s in composing moral themes—he later deplored the overemphasis on theme writing for schoolboys who had nothing worth saying—in writing letters by formularies that recall the twelfth century emphasis on the ars dictaminis, and in imitating Ovid in verse. Later he continued to imitate Ovid so skilfully that Rand believes that had his Latin verses been discovered in his day on a parchment, they would have been assigned to Ovid. In his moral applications of Ovidian myths, moreover, Milton was in accord with the mediaeval and Renaissance practice of allegorizing and Christianizing Ovid.

In addition he studied at home with his tutors, notably the Puritan divine, Thomas Young, whom he pictures (in Elegy IV) sitting with his family and reading the Bible or the Church Fathers. Since Milton was destined already for the Church, he probably learned from Young especially

How charming is divine philosophy.

Before he entered Cambridge, he had also written, probably not as a school exercise, his paraphrases of the Psalms. What he wanted from Cambridge was the opportunity of tranquil and absorbing study in literature and philosophy. Instead he found that the education for the ministry was centered around scholastic disputation and complicated by political factions. If Milton’s early education was comparable to
that in the twelfth century school of Chartres, his university education was closer to that of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in which Aristotle took precedence over Plato, and dialectic, metaphysics, and theology superseded belles lettres. In his Third Prolusion and correspondence of the period, Milton explicitly denounces the monkish subtleties and hair-splitting controversies of scholastic education, and in the Seventh Prolusion, in which he defends learning against ignorance, he censures the misguided teaching of the trivium:

How many despicable quibbles there are in grammar and rhetoric!...What about logic? That is indeed the queen of the Arts if taught as it should be, but unfortunately how much foolishness there is in reason!... [Metaphysics] is, I say, not an Art at all, but a sinister rock, a quagmire of fallacies.

Before Milton has finished, the reader suspects that Ignorance, though in "her final efforts and her dying struggle," fights from a securely entrenched position at Cambridge. It is no wonder that, in spite of his acquaintance with some wise and humanistic professors like Mede, and his success at oratory, Milton was on the whole profoundly discouraged with education at Cambridge, and that, "Church-outed by the Prelate," he abandoned the proposed calling of a clergyman in favor of poetry.

At Horton he had the leisure to begin his own intensive preparation for "guiding men through eloquence and wisdom." The breadth and intensity of his reading and his researches in early Christian history and dogma are evident in the Commonplace Book which he began at Horton. Even in the absence of the theological index, citations appear from Eusebius and Socrates Scholastici on the history of the Church. Bede is the source of much of the ecclesiastical history in Milton's History of England. Of the approximate hundred writers listed, it is
indicative of Milton's religious studies that more than ten are Church Fathers or early Christian authors, among them Augustine, Basil, Chrysostom, Clement of Alexandria, Cyprian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ignatius, Justin Martyr, Lactantius, Prudentius, and Tertullian. Moreover the Commonplace Book by no means does justice, it need hardly be said, to his researches.

Milton's most frequent use of the Church Fathers is in his controversial writings. Here the reader may feel that Milton entered patristic studies in much the same spirit in which Cato entered the theater—for the purpose of departing from it at once with scorn. Why should we consult the Fathers? "If they assert anything which has not been alleged by Scripture, we rightly reject their authority." Certainly he regards no comment of theirs any more "than if any other and ordinary man had said it." Moreover he spares no opponent guilty of unexamined acceptance of misguided authority: "To Ambrose's incompetence," he accuses, "you join your own ignorance." Abundant evidence could be cited for Milton's condemnation of errors and vanities in the Fathers and corruption in the times, the men, and the writings; marginal stuffings of ostentatious references to them; and the great bulk of unsifted material:

Whatever time, or the heedless hand of blind chance, hath drawn down from of old to this present, in her huge drag-net, whether fish, or seaweed, shells or shrubs, unpicked, unchosen, those are the Fathers.

Such words were, like much of Milton's vigorous and satirical language of controversy, written for a specific occasion. As Miss Hartwell points out, the main object of Milton's attack was not the Fathers themselves so much as his contemporaries' blind veneration for
their authority. As a true Protestant he deprecates the substitution of their tradition for the Bible or the implication that the Bible was not supreme and sufficient. That they were valuable if not essential to the controversialist, however, in refuting his opponents, Milton realized. Frequently, as Pritchard observes, Milton could show that his opponent had misquoted or misunderstood his authority. Then, although he disliked Ambrose's "High-priestly Popish pride," for example, he found Ambrose's resistance of the Emperor a useful example of opposition to a tyrant. In showing that the Fathers themselves acknowledged the Bible to be supreme or in noting that the earlier Church Fathers permitted the reading of profane letters, furthermore, he gives them some measure of approval. Both in the Argument of Paradise Lost, Book I, and in the Christian Doctrine (XV, 33) it is stated that many of the Fathers believed that angels existed long before the creation of the material world. In the discussion of tragedy that precedes Samson Agonistes Milton notes that Gregory of Nazianzen saw fit to write a tragedy.

In Tetrachordon Milton drew heavily upon Patristic opinion, citing among many other discussions the "grave sayings" of St. Ambrose in his commentaries on Luke and the Epistles of St. Paul. Of the references to Ambrose—more than twenty specific ones—most treat of his ecclesiastical administration, especially his relations with the Emperor, and therefore imply a reading of the Church historians rather than Ambrose. The citations from Tetrachordon, however, indicate that Milton consulted Ambrose directly on passages that interested him. That he regarded Ambrose as personally admirable is evident in his note in Mary Milton's Bible: "Ambrose constructed from the Holy Scriptures, and
first of all from St. Paul, his doctrine; innocence of life together with mildness; gravity of conduct, and an episcopal, yea, an apostolic spirit." There is no evidence, however, although there is a possibility, that he consulted Ambrose's *De Paradiso*. In the *Christian Doctrine* Milton refers once indirectly to Ambrose's Biblical interpretation (which he says that Erasmus explains in the light of the text which Ambrose used) and once (probably) directly, with approval. (XIV, 265, 267) Provided that the reader weighed the Fathers in the balance of the Scripture, and not the reverse, Milton felt that it was "the part of a well-learned man to have read diligently the ancient stories of the Church, and to be no stranger in the volumes of the Fathers," and his was "no mere passing knowledge." In addition to the Fathers, Milton had at his command numerous other critical materials for the interpretation of the Bible, including a number of versions of the Bible in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, English, and possibly the Aramaic Targumim of the Old Testament, and commentaries by a variety of Christian and Rabbinical writers. That his education familiarized him with the scholastic writings has already been noted. Here as with the Fathers, he needed such information for his theological and ecclesiastical controversies, although he speaks characteristically in the *Christian Doctrine* of the ambiguities of "the scholastic distinction which ascribes a two-fold will to God," (XIV, 109) and denounces the "futile subtleties" and "juggling artifices" and obscurantist assertions of absurd paradoxes with the help of sophisms and distinctions "borrowed from the barbarous ignorance of the schools." (XIV, 209) Nevertheless Deutsch (who observes that Milton's preference of Spenser to Scotus and Aquinas as a teacher does not
necessarily preclude, but rather implies, a study of the scholastics) shows that Milton and his contemporaries, having inherited a complete technical vocabulary from the schools, could be just as abstruse (and possibly less consistent) in applying it to make distinctions.²⁵

Milton's profound concern with religion may be seen in the number of pamphlets he devoted to ecclesiastical subjects; in the Christian Doctrine, "addressed to all Christian churches [and] perhaps intended to furnish the reasoned theological basis of [the] new religious unity";²⁶ in the subjects that he chose for his greatest poetry; and in his placing highest value on the knowledge of God with this purpose:

- to love him, to imitate him, to be like him, as we may the neerest by possessing our souls of true vertue, which being united to the heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest perfection.

How closely he was related to the main Christian tradition as it developed in the Middle Ages, however, it is more difficult to determine. The very next lines after the passage quoted indicate a more secular education than most of the mediaeval teachers thought necessary: the best method to arrive at a knowledge "of God and things invisible" is by "conning over the visible and inferior creature."²⁷ A further departure is his assertion in the Christian Doctrine that the way of salvation is open "only to the individual faith," that he depends on the Bible and the revelation of the Spirit of God alone, and that his purpose is to separate the pure, original Christian doctrine from traditional errors. (XIV, 5, 9) Hilton's acceptance of the individual layman's right and responsibility of immediate voluntary collaboration with God marks his religion as essentially Protestant and Puritan.²⁸

Undeniably Milton's independence led to some heterodoxies that are inconvenient, as Conklin observes, for critical interpretation of his
thought as "Augustinian, hierarchical, and Catholic." His denial that God created the universe out of nothing; his affirmation that the whole man dies, with no continued existence of the spirit, until the Resurrection; the subordinate position he attributes to the Son and even more inferior position of the Holy Spirit—these and other opinions mark his divergencies from orthodoxy. The best concise summary of Milton's theology is given by Hanford:

Milton's theology is the historic Catholic system as modified by Reformation thinkers, including the fundamental doctrines of the special creation of man, his fall from grace, his salvation through the atoning sacrifice of Christ. The part played by Satan...the facts of Christ's incarnation...the last judgment...are the cornerstones of Milton's religion as they had been of St. Augustine's and of John Calvin's.

Rejecting the doctrines of Purgatory; the mediation of saints; the supremacy of the Pope; transubstantiation; the concept of marriage, confirmation, penance, unction, and orders as sacraments; and other Catholic teachings, and opposing prelacy and the form of worship in the Church of England and many other doctrines and practices common to both churches (the baptism of infants, for example), Milton nevertheless departed from certain Presbyterian doctrines, notably reprobation, and denounced intolerance and corruption in all organized churches:

New Presbyter is but Old Priest writ large.

Although Milton was well versed in an amazing number of diverse religious writers, his departures from tradition can be partly explained as a result of the new textual criticism and application of philology to Biblical exegesis; for, as Conklin shows, the Puritans sought to determine the accuracy of the text and to understand the plain sense of the words. (As with the mediaeval exegetes the literal meaning included the import of figures of speech.) Milton's avowed
intention to discard reason in sacred mysteries is, moreover, no
denial of the faculty of reason, with which man ought to follow the
Scriptures, but a repudiation of rationalistic dispute on matters
beyond reason; he was neither legalistic like Socinus nor mystical.33
(He does not say in effect, "Down reason," but "vain reasonings
down." This principle would have been accepted, although perhaps not
always carried out, in the Middle Ages.) Thus the fact that bara does
not literally mean "to create from nothing" —a fact previously noted
only to be explained away—led him to explain that God created the
universe from matter, which originated from Him, and to declare that
in this conclusion "both Scripture and reason concur."34

Although Kelley's study makes valuable use of the more individualis-
tic Christian Doctrine as a gloss on Paradise Lost, the poem is considera-
bly more orthodox. The differences Kelley explains as the outcome of
Milton's necessity as a poet of presenting imaginative truth beyond
the narrow and abstract limits of his theology.35 To Kelley's arguments
that Christ in the poem does not differ irreconcilably with Milton's
account in prose of his Arian views about Him, Howard replies, however,
that the logical construction of the poem does not demand that the
relationship between the Father and Son be explicitly presented, and
that "a strict Trinitarian who accepted the Ramean system of logic"
would have had little reason to object.36 Furthermore Milton's sub-
ordination of his private system of doctrine to the tradition, far
from derogating from his integrity, bears out his purpose in writing
the epic: "to build creatively on the common truth" of a rich pattern
of beliefs which his audience might share.37

With considerable justification, therefore, a number of critics
have contributed to an interpretation of that Christian background. In applying the tradition to *Samson Agonistes*, Krouse explains that Milton, being well versed in the Christian interpretations through the centuries, expected as much of his fit audience. "He must not forget the profoundly religious cast of Milton's mind nor forget the extent to which, in an age strongly tinctured with mediaevalism, his personal outlook was mediaeval." Similarly Elizabeth Pope has related *Paradise Regained* to the mediaeval and Renaissance interpretations known to the seventeenth century because "Milton...united a profound independence of intellect with an equally profound love of tradition" and used as much past authority as was in accord with reason and conscience. *Paradise Lost* has been examined in the light of the hexameral tradition by George Coffin Taylor, Grant McColley, and Sister Mary Irma Corcoran, who found reason to consider "Milton's concept of the nature and end of man...fundamentally religious rather than narrowly humanistic." Although similarities to the Fathers had been noted by some of Milton's editors, the first to study that relationship at length was Pritchard, who referred especially to Augustine. More specifically Kathleen Hartwell sought to establish Milton's debt to Lactantius. To elucidate certain disputed questions, such as the corporeality of Milton's angels and the relation of the Father to the Son, other scholars have turned to various commentaries of the Fathers. A recent thesis has been devoted to the scholastic elements of Milton's thought. Milton's Heavenly Muse belongs to the Christian tradition.

Since, as Rand observes, the humanist serves his own age however deeply his sympathies are rooted in the past, it may be noted that
the tradition remained a vital influence even for those reformers who were most eager to restore the original purity of the Church. Although Douglas Bush warns against blurring all distinctions in favor of continuity and acknowledges a tendency toward secularization, individualism, and rationalism among the heterogeneous and frequently contradictory movements of the Renaissance, he believes that insufficient attention has been paid to the orthodoxy of an age of "the continued strength of mediaeval attitudes and ways of thought in union with a richer and fuller appreciation of the classics than medieval men ordinarily possessed." Christian humanists of the Renaissance agreed with those of the Middle Ages in caring chiefly for inner values, for the good life; letters were to supplement the teachings of the Bible, and education was directed toward conduct. Hooker's adjustments of reason and divine inspiration are comparable. In opposing the broader tradition, however, many Puritans exhibited the vehemence of a Tertullian or a Gregory denouncing the pagan learning. That Milton is "mediaeval" in the derogatory sense of "obscurantist," needless to say, Bush emphatically denies: if Milton's Puritanism is brought into conflict with his Renaissance classicism, he does not hesitate to set "the Hebrew revelation" above the "classical light of nature"; but his place is with those who opposed the Aristotelians with the tradition of "Cicero, Plato, and Christ."

In support of Bush's assertion of the humanism of the Middle Ages, it may be added that for the Church Fathers (however much they might fear condemnation as Ciceronians instead of Christians) pagan education was an intellectual necessity, that the formulation of dogma required methods of reasoning found neither in the Old Testament nor in
the teachings of Jesus, but in Greek philosophy and Roman law and ethics, and that although the new faith and love transformed the surviving classical elements, the inclusion of whatever was appropriate to Christianity in the pagan poets and philosophers began with St. Paul. In spite of the intervening years of barbarisation and narrowing culture, the classics remained, as Taylor says, a great storehouse (especially open to the twelfth century) from which men might draw discipline and rich appreciation of "every human love and human interest not directly connected with the hopes and terrors of the Judgment Day" without departing too obviously from the recognized standard of holiness, not culture, as the goal.

That the mediaeval synthesis of intellectual and emotional interests in a hierarchical pattern directed toward salvation represents the ideal achieved only at best in the Middle Ages and that this unity was subsequently disrupted does not contradict Bush's belief that the outstanding contribution of the Middle Ages was the Christian humanistic tradition. Undeniably his emphasis is more attractive (and juster to the Middle Ages) than other evidences which he suggests for the continuity of the ages: "we might defend the Middle Ages by saying that they were full of rebels, or that the so-called enlightenment did not banish...irrational and uncritical beliefs... or that although the mediaeval church was often repressive, it was less so than Protestantism, as soon as the latter achieved organization and power."

Having urged that the Renaissance differed from mediaeval Christianity in degree rather than in kind, he proceeds to the rather dangerous generalization that "the Reformation was only the climax of a widespread mediaeval movement." Luther, it is true, primarily
opposed St. Thomas. In doing so, he turned to St. Paul and St. Augustine with the characteristic Protestant acceptance of patristic as well as apostolic teaching and rejection of mediaeval scholasticism, and rather because he found a reasonable basis for agreement with Augustine than because he venerated as such the authority of Augustine, or of "a thousand Augustines and a thousand Churches." Both Luther and Aquinas, then, drew heavily upon Augustine, and both displayed reason and originality in reevaluating the tradition, but in their attitude toward authority they diverged widely.

To Paul and Augustine, Calvin also turned when he wrote the Christian Institute, a summa "only somewhat less inclusive and universal than the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas." Making use primarily of the Scripture "rationally and acutely interpreted," Calvin drew heavily on his predecessors in the Reformation; on Paul and the Fathers, to whom he added little "doctrinally, but much institutionally"; and even on the scholastics, to whose method of organization and argument as well as vocabulary he was indebted however much he deplored their metaphysics. With grim logic and "scholastic narrowness," he worked out the doctrine of reprobation as a corollary to the long-accepted doctrine of election to salvation. Yet in his rejection of the mystic element in the sacraments he departed a long way from the tradition; and in his reliance on the Scripture (which tenet Willey terms "that last infirmity of noble Protestants") he argued simply and directly about the testimony of the Holy Spirit, with an astonishing certitude, to be sure, about the "remarkable things this sixteenth century man of God conceived himself to know." In view of his advance in "piercing through superstitions and the distortions of the glosses of tradition
to the text and significance of the Scripture, therefore, it must be acknowledged that he reshaped considerably the materials he took from the mediaeval tradition.

From Calvin many of these elements were transmitted to the English Puritans, who continued to draw upon St. Paul, St. Augustine, and even St. Thomas. Needless to say, "Calvinism" and "Puritanism" are not interchangeable terms, but the influence of Calvin's teachings can scarcely be overestimated. At the same time Popery, however dreaded, continued its influence. The Anglican Church, the philosophical tenets of which the moderate Hooker was the last to formulate in its period of reform, took a middle way toward rationalism, in which most of the Thomistic principles were kept, in a defense against both Rome and Geneva to support the "reformed descendant of the primitive Church." His chief contribution was an exposition of the theory of the eternal Law observed by God in opposition to the Calvinist belief in His unlimited free will. Like "so much Renaissance theoretical thought [it] had its origin in a practical situation." A discussion of the English Reformation and the seventeenth century controversies obviously lies outside the scope of this thesis, but it may be noted that in Milton's time, at least, most of the religious controversy was ecclesiastical and inseparable from politics rather than primarily theological. The fundamental interest of the age, however, was religion.

That much of the mediaeval tradition survived in the seventeenth century is brought out by Basil Willey's summary: the period began with the Gothic St. Paul's, interests mediaeval and modern, and a religious-political division--Cavalier and Roundhead--that emphasized religious differences; it ended with Christopher Wren's classic cathedral,
predominantly "modern" interests, and the division into political
parties. In an age in which sermons were "a popular diversion as
well as a devotional and intellectual stimulation," men might hear
the Anglican divines preach in the Catholic tradition, with virtue
and vice "defined by the historic dialectic of medieval moral
science," and with frequent allusions to the classics, the Fathers,
the medieval writers, the sixteenth century humanism, and the con-
temporary political situation. The Puritan preachers, also educated
in the scholastic tradition, deplored the Anglicans' stylistic vir-
tuosity but employed a "modified but not less imaginative style arising
naturally out of medieval and Elizabethan practices." Skeptical
though they were about human authority, they found an excellent model
for style in both Calvin and St. Augustine, nor did they hesitate to
employ the material and dramatic style of the medieval preachers.

Other evidences of the survival and strength of the medieval
tradition can be mentioned only in passing. Not only the moralists
drew heavily upon the Book of Genesis, Arnold Williams declares, but
also the agriculturists, who traced farming from Adam; the historians,
who began with the first historian, Moses; and the authors of political
tracts, who referred to Nimrod, if not to Adam but to them the Book
of Genesis meant not only the Bible but also the vast hexameral ma-
terial of the Fathers and the medieval writers, especially as pre-
ounced conveniently in the numerous commentaries. With the political
pamphlets, whose authors conceived of the strife in their own times
as the war of Christ against Belial and Satan; with Purchas, Raleigh,
Ortelius, and other historians and geographers, who preserved classical
and Christian lore about the pagan gods, the geography of the Holy
Land, and the Creation and Fall of man; and with such thinkers as Bacon and More, who sought to reconcile the account of the Creation in Genesis with the science and philosophy of their times, Milton's *Paradise Lost* has, as Mr. Whiting demonstrates, evident affinities. 62

How often "we, in our modern arrogance, are pleased to term 'modernity' what is in reality mediaevalism" is further demonstrated in Mr. G. C. Taylor's chapter on the "Medieval and Renaissance Commonplaces in *Paradise Lost," an impressive collection of points about God, the angels, time, chaos, man, evil, and other topics which occur in the hexameral literature. 63 Finding a number of characteristics of the tradition that Milton shared with the moralities and mysteries, Ramsay and Gilbert conclude, without asserting Milton's indebtedness to these as sources, that in working with the mediaeval interpretation of the Bible rather than with the text by itself, Milton must have been "something of a mediaevalist," and that *Paradise Lost* represents "the summation of whatever of permanent value they [the mysteries] had for the world." What Gilbert says of the mysteries might be applied to the entire "celestial cycle," for Milton, organizing all his interests around Christian theology and ethics, and writing his great epic for an age in which only a Scriptural subject could have been sufficiently inclusive, sums up the combined classical and Christian tradition. 64

II

St. Ambrose belongs to the period of the western patristic formulation of dogma, which, having reached its culmination in Augustine, remained essentially untransformed by restatement until the twelfth
century. Revising, ordering, and expanding the more original work of the Greek theologians, the fourth and fifth century Latin authorities established "the doctrines as to the 'sacred mysteries' [and] the functions of the Church and its spiritual authority...; the principles of symbolism...; the great mass of allegorical Scriptural interpretations...; the spiritual relationship of man to God's ordainment...; and man's need and love of God."65 Although indubitably overshadowed by St. Augustine, and more notable as the Bishop of Milan, a practical administrator and moral teacher, than as a theologian, Ambrose shared with the Greeks, to whom he owed much of his theology, "something of their subtlety...and love of metaphysical speculation,"66 and he deserves much credit for transmitting and popularizing Eastern theological doctrines for the West. Perhaps his greatest distinction is "that he was by far the richest and greatest of the tributaries which fed that mighty river of Augustinian thought."67

Ambrose's De Paradiso (which is the main work of his to be discussed in this study) is among those of his exegetical works which have been frequently criticized for excessively allegorizing the Scriptures. In his use of the Alexandrian method of commentary, however, Ambrose may be justified to some extent along with his predecessors and contemporaries; for the method led to a spiritualization of the cruder or more anthropomorphic passages of the Old Testament, a systematic correlation of the Old Testament with the New, and a reconciliation of the Scriptures with Greek philosophy—results that enabled the pagans to adopt Christianity without sacrificing their own culture, and Christians to avoid discarding their own more primitive tradition.68 The faults, to be sure, are obvious: frequent submerging
of the moral content in an overabundance of trivia; arbitrary and capricious distortion of the obvious meaning; and disregard of the letter, the historical perspective, and the life of man on earth.69

In Ambrose's writings, a new pattern is imposed on the Bible through Ambrose's remarkable ability to adduce evidence—not always reliable—from other parts of the Bible to support his reading of the text under consideration. Moreover even the literal or natural sense of a passage, to say nothing of its moral and mystical meaning, was extended considerably beyond what we should call literal to include the symbolic significance of numbers and indeed to include symbolism referring to material objects, not to spiritual truths. As a result of this method, which required modification in favor of the letter before it could be wholly accepted by his successors, the Fall is nowhere demonstrably described in Ambrose's discussion as actually historical,70 but it is amply treated for its universal significance.71

Among Ambrose's most significant contributions to the doctrine of the Fall is his description of the original perfection of man. From Philo, from Origen's allegory of the celestial state of the soul before birth, and from other Jewish and Christian literature, he derived and expanded his account of the heavenly Adam in the state of grace.72 Although he treats Adam as one endowed with only "half-enlightened innocence," Ambrose does emphasize his freedom to choose between good and evil and his responsibility for violating the natural law written on his heart. Sometimes treating the Fall as the subjection of reason by the senses (as Philo does) and sometimes treating it as the result of pride, he stresses the loss of the divine image and the expulsion from Paradise among the results.73
His most distinctive contribution, however, is his discussion of original sin. Not always does he treat of it consistently, for sometimes original sin is explained as a hereditary taint transmitted through conception, elsewhere all men are said to have existed seminally in Adam, and again all particular men share the guilt because Adam as the abstract universal "humanity" sinned. The resultant state is that of the subjection of reason to the senses and debilitation of the will. Free will and responsibility are not, however, abolished; fallen man may avail himself of divine grace and achieve virtue. Thus Ambrose can conclude that God predestinated rewards to those whose merits He foreknew.\(^7\) And in speaking of the innocence of children even before baptism, he apparently minimizes the need for baptism to remove the taint and the guilt of original sin. Nevertheless he bases virtue on faith in the redemption by Christ, and personal salvation on the acceptance of His redeeming grace, which turns the evil of the Fall to good.\(^7\)\(^5\)

Brief mention should be made of other doctrines which he transmitted. Significant for the allegorical explanation of the first marriage is the treatment of Christ as the bridegroom and the soul, the bride, and of Christ and the Church as bridegroom and bride, for which the Song of Solomon provides the Biblical basis, and Tertullian and Clement, the application.\(^7\)\(^6\) In addition to clarifying for Western mediaeval Catholicism the doctrines of Purgatory, the Eucharist, and the Eastern teachings about the Holy Spirit, Ambrose prepared the way for such mystics as Bernard of Clairvaux and Hugh of St. Victor in his treatment of love, personal union with Christ through the sacraments, and the mystic experience, even during this life, of Paradise.\(^7\)\(^7\)
Two further contributions of Ambrose make him more significant for comparison with Milton: his application of Stoic ethics to the Christian life, and his hymns. In *De Officiis Ministrorum* he combined Hebraism and Hellenism, Christian and Stoic teachings. According to Cochrane, the spirit is Hebraic and most of the illustrations Biblical although the form deliberately imitates Cicero. Characterized by "puritanism...sturdy common sense...a reasoned view of the good," it departs from non-Christian humanism in building its ethics around man's duty to God and in emphasizing the role of divine grace in determining the will of the believer.78 Dawson gives Ambrose a place among those Fathers who utilized much of the civic culture of Rome in founding Eternal Rome: his writings "are as full of reminiscences of the classics as those of a Renaissance scholar."79 Taylor finds the work more characteristic of pagan reason, although it goes beyond and sometimes against Stoic teachings, than of Christian piety deeply embued with the love of God.80

To Dudden, however, the absence of a philosophic reconciliation between Stoicism and Christianity does not detract from the essential Christianity of the work; although Ambrose sometimes places the *sumnum bonum* in the vision of God and sometimes in the inner life of virtue, which he treats more as a divine gift than as a human achievement, the Christian precept ranks evidently higher than the Stoic. Although he includes the Stoic cardinal virtues, he emphasizes kindness in discussing justice, and knowledge of God as the highest prudence, and adds humility, chastity, and above all, charity. Stoic in emphasizing the seemly and social character of virtue and reconciling virtue and utility, he is Christian in stressing loyalty to a personal God through
love of Him rather than obedience to Providence for the sake of wis-
dom. His juxtaposition of the two sets of standards is not evidence
that the Church surrendered to the Stoa, Rand reminds us, but that it
included Stoic ethics "in its own larger and purer thought." Here,
then, is part of the tradition behind Milton's alleged Stoicism: he
takes some of its virtues for the inner Paradise and counsels, "Nor
love thy Life, nor hate," (P.L.XI, 549) but he gives precedence among
the virtues to "Charitie, the soul of all the rest." (P.L. XII, 584 f.)

The possible relation between the hymns of Ambrose and Adam's
prayers in *Paradise Lost* must remain outside the scope of this paper.
Sister Mary Irma Corcoran suggests that some of the hymns of the
Breviary for Lauds, Matins, Prime, and Vespers as well as the Psalms
may have contributed and mentions specifically, *Aeterna rerum condi-
tor.* Hutton notes the importance of Ambrose in juxtaposing (although
without explanation) the music of the spheres and the song of the angels.
Although in Milton there is no concert of the heavens and the angels,
the five wandering fires move in dance "not without song," and the
angelic harmonies celebrate the Creation. He, too, suggests that
the Morning Hymn of Milton has a parallel in the morning hymns of
Ambrose. It seems likely that an important part of the rich tradition
behind Milton's beautiful praises of holy light was Ambrose's hymn:

Sheer Splendour of the Father's might,
Light out of Light delivering,
O Light of Light and fiery fount
O Day illuminating Day.

The hymns of Ambrose were available to Milton both in the Breviary
and in the collected works of Ambrose. A number of editions of Am-
brose were published in the Renaissance from 1485 (?) and 1490 on.
Milton's possible use of Ambrose has already been mentioned. That Ambrose continued to be generally known (if indirectly) in the seventeenth century is indicated by his frequent appearance in Renaissance commentaries, especially those of the Catholics, but also those of the Protestants. 87

III

Hugh of St. Victor belongs to the twelfth century, the period of the most original organic restatement of the patristic and antique material until that of Thomas Aquinas.88 "A second Augustine,"89 and one of the more important Platonic Christian mystics, he continues the tradition of the preceding centuries, but in his analysis of abstraction, which is "Aristotelian in spirit,‖90 and in his systematic syntheses, he anticipates the thirteenth century scholastics. Since his great treatise On the Sacraments is highly allegorical and symbolic, it is probably an overestimate to call it "a veritable summa of theology," in spite of its systematic logic.91 Although Hugh has been praised for subtlety, precision, and "sufficiently noteworthy talents for dispute,"92 he was somewhat skeptical about some of the results of dialectic. Moreover his wide knowledge of the humanities, his studies of Greek and possibly Hebrew, or at least of the Rabbinical commentaries,93 were all directed in a reasonable and ordered progression toward that which transcended reason.

Aside from his mystic writings, which do not concern us here, his most influential work was On the Sacraments, in which he expounds at some length his sacramental and symbolic theory of the creation of the universe. Here, as in several of his other writings, he devotes the
first part to a discussion of man's creation and Fall. The *Summa Sententiarum* is an important intermediary between Abelard's *Sic et Non* and the *Sentences* of the Lombard, because it contains a number of summaries of opposing views without Abelard's controversial method of presentation. In his corresponding secular treatise (which lies outside the scope of this discussion) he treats of secular education as a preparation for Bible study.  

"His thought is Biblical," and he wrote a number of exegetical works. According to Smalley, his *Notule* "mark a revival of scholarship."  

The study of the Bible might be divided into letter and sense, and meaning, which might be allegorical or simply moral or theological. To understand the literal sense (which includes the author's metaphors, he drew upon history and geography and other studies. For the allegorical sense, he studied doctrine. Then he could proceed to the tropological meaning. His important service, however, was to stress the literal meaning, not that it was more important *per se*, but that it deserved more emphasis than it had received in comparison with the spiritual meaning. The mystical sense, after all, could be learned only from the letter, and the author's intention should be preferred to subjective explanations. In the *Notule*, therefore, Hugh confines himself to the literal sense.  

Although editions of Hugh were published in 1518, 1526, 1588, 1617, and 1648, there is no evidence that Milton consulted them. Hugh deserves comparison with Milton, then, not as a possible source, but as one of the best representatives of an important era of Christian humanism. His interest in the Fall, his comprehensive studies, and his
Biblical exegesis make his contributions to the Christian Hexameral tradition valuable. In his formulation of the purpose of education, to restore the divine likeness and mitigate the weaknesses of fallen man, Hugh is close to Milton, although their methods differ:

The end then of Learning is to repair the ruineg of our first Parents by regaining to know God aright.99

IV

In the following chapters my purpose is to examine Milton's treatment of the creation, original innocence, and Fall of Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost in relation to discussions of the same topics by Ambrose and Hugh. Since Milton probably read some of Ambrose's writings but not positively his De Paradiso, and since he makes no reference to Hugh, this study obviously does not presume to tag Milton's sources. Instead it seeks to indicate Milton's comprehensive use of one part of his cultural background by showing his relation with the patristic and mediaeval Christian tradition as it appears in two representatives of significant periods. In view of the distinctions of Taylor and Dawson,99 it has seemed advisable to make the comparison with a writer from each of the two main creative ages; that of the patristic construction of dogma and that of the mediaeval philosophical synthesis. Ambrose and Hugh were selected partly because some of the more extensive contributions of Augustine and Aquinas, the major theologians, are anticipated, writ small, in their respective works. In each, according to the mediaeval system of what Mr. Lear terms "respectable and saintly borrowing,"100 much of what has gone before is embodied, although they were individually significant as well, Ambrose for the fullest Christian
treatment before Augustine of man's original state and the allegory of
Paradise, and Hugh for the revived study of the literal meaning of the
Bible and a systematic exploration of the state of innocence and the
Fall.

It need hardly be added that in view of Milton's immense incul-
siveness, no attempt is made to categorize him as narrowly mediaeval;
for as a true poet he preserved the ideal relation to his sources:
"The main point is to have a soul that loves the truth and perceives
it wherever it finds it."101 Neither is it assumed that the poem can
be broken down into a set of dogmas to be explicitly correlated with
the prose writings of the theologians. On the contrary, the attempt
is made to demonstrate by comparison that Milton makes sufficient use
of traditional interpretations as well as materials to preclude ex-
cessive modern glorying in his "modernity" or poetry of personal idio-
synorasy, and that his permanent and vital interpretation of Christian-
ity transforms in a profoundly original and imaginative way the patri-
tic and mediaeval elements of his culture.

In the comparison Paradise Lost is the main work of Milton's to
be examined, although occasional references to the Christian Doctrine,
Tetrachordon, and Areopagitica have been made in relation to the poem.
Of the works of Ambrose, De Paradiso, Letter XLV, and Chapters VII and
VIII of the Hexameron have provided the main basis for comparison.
Comments on Adam and Eve, Paradise, and the Fall that Ambrose makes in
his commentaries on the Psalms and Luke and in his other letters and
sermons have been cited. Philo Judaeus seemed a sufficiently important
influence on De Paradiso to be cited several times in relation to it.
One or two references have even been made to Apologia Prophetae David
Altera, an imitation of Ambrose's *Apologia David* by another author, and the commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles, now ascribed to Theodore of Mopsuestia (works classified in the *Patrologia Latina* among the writings of Ambrose) and to a letter previously ascribed to Ambrose but rejected by the *Patrologia*, since these works were traditionally attributed to Ambrose until and beyond Milton's day. Most of the discussion of Hugh refers to *De Sacramentis*, I, VI and VII, *Summa Sententiarum*, III, *Anotationes Elucidatoriae*, and *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei Dialogus*, with occasional citations from *Allegoriae in Vetus Testamentum*, I, *Quaestiones in Epistolae Pauli* (traditionally ascribed to Hugh and now, tentatively, to Walter of St. Victor), and the sermons and miscellaneous writings. It must be admitted that in locating scattered relevant comments made in passing in the unfamiliar writings of Ambrose and Hugh, I have been one of those "Moushunts of an Index" for whom Milton had no use.
CHAPTER II

"A HEAVEN ON EARTH"

I

To Ambrose, who read the Bible on four levels at once,
Paradise was not only God's Garden in Eden, watered by rivers identifiable as the Ganges, Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates, but also a spiritual state of pleasure and virtue. Allegorically it could be taken as the fruitful soul, the Church, possibly the Book of Genesis, and the abode of the just. As the ineffable realm to which St. Paul was caught up, it was a perilous subject to scrutinize too solicitously. With the assistance of other Biblical passages in addition to Genesis, notably the writings of St. Paul, and even such authors as Philo Judaeus, however, Ambrose undertook to discuss the non-material Paradise.

Established by God in Pleasure, Paradise was watered by the river of His pleasure whose waters shall gladden Jerusalem, and shaded by trees that are types of the saints. Man in Paradise represents the pure mind set among the virtues, or Paradise itself may be identified with the soul implanted with virtues and wisdom, the Tree of Life. Elsewhere he declares that Paradise contained vigorous, breathing Trees, endowed with reason (not just the Trees of Life and Knowledge, but the others as well), which never grew in a real garden on earth, but only in the soul of man, animated by the infusion of God's breath and the spiritual virtues. Thus Solomon located Paradise in the spirit of man when he expressed the mystery of the soul and the Word, or of the Church and Christ: "Paradisus clausus, soror mea sponsae, paradisus clausus, fons signatus"—a closed Paradise, sister, my spouse, a closed
Paradise, a sealed fountain. The state of the virtuous soul in true pleasure is of course very different from the false pleasure with which man was tempted. External delights Adam enjoyed abundantly in a garden of perpetual morning (before the evening of man's sin), but he was to maintain his own virtue and that of his descendants.

By a more explicit analysis of the allegory, Ambrose takes the fountain as Christ and the four rivers as both the ages of the world and the cardinal virtues. Just as Philo appropriated prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice from Plato's *Republic* for his account of Paradise, Ambrose transformed them somewhat for Christianity both in his *De Officiis Ministerum* and his *De Paradiso*. By "temperance," for example, is meant the virtue of chastity, symbolized by the Paschal Lamb, rather than that harmony whereby the higher elements of the soul rule the lower. Here Ambrose is not following Philo exactly, however, for Geon suggests temperance to Ambrose, but courage to Philo, and Tigris is fortitude to Ambrose, and self-mastery to Philo. Phison for both is prudence, and Euphrates, the fruitful virtue of justice, although in Philo's more elaborate allegory it does not rank first as with Ambrose, who calls it the right ordering or harmony of the virtues.

From the beginning to the Flood was the era of prudence, exemplified by Enoch, Noah, and Enos. Next was the age of temperance, as practiced by the patriarchs Isaac, Jacob, and Abraham, to whose seed, that is, Christ, God made His promise. The third was the age of fortitude, that of Moses, David, Solomon, Samuel, Samson, and other "prophets," who were strong both in fighting and in bearing afflictions. The fourth division is the period of justice, not really a separate age
because justice is the principal virtue, typified by Moses, Solomon, Daniel, Abel, Abraham, Enos, Enoch, and Noah. This division of history into periods (later seven in the typical mediaeval periodization) is absent from Philo's account, although both Philo and Ambrose identify the gold and jewels mentioned in Genesis with Biblical figures.

In addition to identifying the fountain with Christ, Ambrose states that the garden was eastward in Eden because that is the direction of the rising sun, that is, Christ. Elsewhere in calling Paradise an allegory of the Church, he identifies the Tree of Life with Christ, an identification by no means inconsistent with his previous explanation of that Tree as wisdom. In another account, he identifies the Tree of Life with the Cross. (Probably this statement does not represent acceptance of the legend whereby the tree of the Cross is literally supposed to have grown from the seed of a tree in Paradise, but rather means that Christ's sacrifice was as the Tree of Life to mankind.) The Tree of Life may also be goodness among the other virtues.

The Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil, by contrast, was not good for man, since this knowledge may lead man into the practice of guile. Consequently it was forbidden, that man might learn instead the discipline of piety. If the Tree of Life was Christ, however, the Tree of Knowledge was Satan. Thus Eve preferred the Tree of Knowledge just as many who are tempted by Satan prefer the delights seen by the physical eye to the glories of Heaven that the spiritual eye perceives. Why was the Tree so named if it gave knowledge of evil but not of good? The first angel had the knowledge of good at his creation, but was cast out of Heaven for finding the knowledge of evil for
himself; the first man ate of the Tree when he followed the suggestions of the devil, who had this knowledge. For certainly not the Tree but the devil gave man the knowledge of evil when he persuaded man to break God's command.\textsuperscript{12}

In De Paradiso Ambrose faces a number of problems about both trees. To the objection that the Divine Afflatus must have been inadequate if man could obtain something more efficacious from the Tree or by his own efforts, Ambrose replies that by God's plan trees of life and death grew in Paradise, and that only by keeping God's commandments could man, who was in the shadow of life and had the pledge of life through God's inspiration, obtain future immortality.\textsuperscript{13} The Tree of Knowledge, moreover, gives rise to objections that God either willed a contradiction in making man liable to die through eating the fruit of knowledge or caused death Himself, and that He was harsh in His prohibition. In reply Ambrose uses the analogy of a wise physician who orders a patient to abstain from something harmful. Man, not God, caused his own death through disobedience.\textsuperscript{14} Yet the Tree of Knowledge is a recurrent problem. (The problem of man's moral knowledge before the Fall will be discussed later in Chapter 7.) Surely the Tree was not made in vain, especially as it stood in the middle of Paradise. If it had been made for anyone, it would not have been forbidden to Adam (generic man); therefore it was made for Adam if he had but known the right use for it. (Here Ambrose describes the right use as use in combination with other fruits, although later, denying that it was beneficial at all, Ambrose treats the right use as abstention in token of obedience to God's will.) Since even the most desirable gifts may be used for the wrong purpose, the user, not the
Although God planted a Paradise of Pleasure "from the beginning," Hugh does not think (as St. Jerome did) that it was created before the heaven and the earth, but on the third day. Before there was rain (caused by nature) or tending on man's part, the plants were watered by the fountain, Abyssus, that is, the matrix of all waters. The river that went forth is the same as that fountain, or else derived from it. Whereas Bede could not comprehend how the fountain could be the source of rivers with known fountainheads on earth, Hugh cites certain holy (but unspecified) authorities who believed that Paradise was a definite place in a part of the earth where the rivers took origin and, absorbed by the earth, reissued by sources known today. The theory of these authorities that the whole earth would have been Paradise but for man's sin he notes without committing himself. In addition he states that many writers have located Paradise on so high an elevation in the East that the Flood could not reach it.

In addition to this historical Paradise, Hugh discusses Paradise as an allegory of the Church, which contains many pleasures: abundant grace, the fragrance of virtue and good works, the melody of the praises of God, the hope of future blessedness, and the contemplation of Heaven. Both the fountain and the Tree of Life signify Christ for Hugh as they did for Ambrose, but the rivers are the four Gospels, and "pleasure" signifies grace. Elsewhere Hugh distinguishes three Paradises: the sweet pleasure of visible things; the sincere purity of spiritual things, whereby man is preserved; and that true celestial
Paradise (to which Ambrose refers) where Paul heard the arcane words.

Hugh's account of the Trees of Life and Knowledge is close to Milton's. The Tree of Life, if rightly eaten, had the power to preserve man's life or to prolong temporal life and to protect man from sickness and injury. The Tree of Knowledge, however, was not so called because of its nature, but because through it man's nature was to be proved good or bad, man's recompense was to be determined, and man's experience was to include evil as well as good. Unlike Milton, Hugh calls both trees sacramental, with the distinction that one was to sustain temporal life only, whereas the other was the means for man to prove himself worthy of eternal life. As the test of man's obedience, it derived its name from the occasion, since man was to gain his experience by obeying or disobeying. In his allegorical explanation, Hugh calls the Tree of Knowledge a symbol of the command itself, which gave man the opportunity to experience the good of obedience or the evil of disobedience.

III

Unlike Ambrose, who could deny that Paradise was material, Milton, "Standing on Earth, not rapt above the Pole," (VII, 23) was under the poetic obligation of embodying the Paradise myth concretely. Like Ambrose, he thinks of the garden in the Song of Solomon: Paradise surpasses not only the "Gardens feign'd" (IX, 439) by the classical poets, but also that

not Mystic, where the Sapient King
Held dalliance with his faire Egyptian Spouse. (IX, 442 f.)

Undoubtedly Verity is right in explaining "not Mystic" as the antithesis of "feign'd," that is, Scriptural and therefore true, unlike the
Hesperian fables, true, if true at all, only in Paradise. Yet there may be the added significance that the Song of Songs is not just an allegory of the soul or the Church and Christ, but also a true epitaphalamium of King Solomon and his Egyptian bride, with reference to an actual garden. It is suggested that Milton was also thinking of the Song of Solomon when he composed Adam's address to Eve, "Awake my fairest, my espous'd." (V, 17 f.)\(^2\) Not until the end of the poem, however, does Milton treat Paradise explicitly as a state of mind, in his reference to the "Paradise within thee, happier farr." (XII, 587)

His "Heaven on Earth," therefore, is more comparable to Hugh's discussion of the literal Biblical Paradise. Whereas Hugh believed that it was elevated so high that the Flood could not harm it, Milton's Paradise, according to Michael, is to be washed into the Persian Gulf to take root as a barren island, "The haunt of Seales and Orcs, and Sea-mews clang." (XI, 831) Originally, however, it is described as elevated on

the champlain head
Of a steep wilderness, whose hairie sides
With thicket overgrewn, grotesque and wilde,
Access deni'd. (IV, 134 ff.)

Not the fountain but a mist first waters the earth; and the river that goes southward through Eden passes underground beneath the "shaggie hill" and divides in two, so that part becomes the fountain in the garden and then flows down the slope to meet the other part as it emerges from underground. The beautiful symmetry of Paradise is especially evident in Milton's description of the fountain: the river that went underground
Rose a fresh Fountain, and with many a rill
Waterd the Garden; thence united fell
Down the steep glade, and met the neather Flood,
Which from his darksom passage now appears,
And now divided into four main Streams,
Runs divers, wandering many a famous Realme
And Country whereof here needs no account. (IV, 229 ff.)

Although Milton does not treat the river or fountain as the source of all the rivers of the world or Paradise as the whole earth before the Fall,28 he makes a symbolic use of the garden, which reflects the right order and harmony in man's soul before the Fall and the changes that result from the first sin, when

Nature from her seat
Sighing through all her Works gave signs of woe,
That all was lost. (IX, 782 ff.)

Furthermore Paradise is included with the rest of the earth in God's instructions to the angels to derange the universe appropriately. Only when there shall be a new Heaven and a new earth will all the earth be Paradise. The consistent treatment of Paradise as a part of earth makes it evident, it may be added, even though Paradise is not specifically mentioned in the story of the creation, that it was created with the rest of earth. Nevertheless it is set apart, possibly designed as Adam's capital seat, and endowed with the wealth of nature "in narrow room." (IV, 207) Here God as "sovran Planter" (IV, 691) framed everything for man's delight and chose the nuptial bower.

In Milton we do not expect to find Ambrose's elaborate allegory of the rivers and ages. Many virtues may be observed in Adam and Eve before the Fall, but the main catalogue or code of Christian virtues is found in the advice of Michael to Adam, in which prudence, temperance, justice (particularly in the sense of righteousness), and fortitude are stressed along with the more important and specifically Christian
Christian faith and love. The periods of history are likewise reserved for the angelic revelation, in which they correspond to the usual seven Christian ages, although "time is measured, but not too obviously," in a free narrative pattern that omits the numbers. Finally, Milton's Christ need not appear allegorically in Paradise as the rising sun or the fountain since He creates the universe and judges Adam and Eve in His own person as the Word of God. Some echoes of the Christian identification of the rising sun with the Son of God may, however, be found in Satan's address to the sun as the apparent god of the new world; in the metaphor:

\[
\text{on His Son with Reyes direct} \quad \text{Shon full;} \quad (VI, 719 f.)
\]

and in such identifications of God with light as

\[
\text{Fountain of Light, thy self invisible, (III, 375)}
\]

and the description of Christ in His Resurrection as "fresh as the dawning light." (XII, 423) The most outstanding identification of Christ with the sun occurs not in Paradise Lost but in the Nativity Ode:

\[
\text{He saw a greater Sun appear} \\
\text{Then his bright Throne, or burning Axletree could bear. (83 f.)}
\]

No formal allegory of the birds and animals in Paradise is, of course, to be expected either. Here again the original harmony in man has its counterpart in nature, with the result that the rapacity of the predatory animals results from man's sin, and the grim creatures glare at Adam as he passes. A trace of the mediaeval bestiaries remains, however, in the description of the "Parsimonious Emmet" as the "Pattern of just equalitie," (VII, 485, 487) and the mention of the serpent's "Gordian twine" that gave "proof unheeded" of his guile.
In a similar way Paradise is not made an allegory of
the Church (in spite of one farfetched attempt to identify Adam, Eve,
and Satan as the laity, the Episcopal clergy, and the Pope, respectively),
but the parallel is carried over into Milton's description of
Satan's entry:

So clomb this first grand Thief into Gods Foulde; 
So since into his Church leud Hirelings climbe.* (IV, 192 f.)

Once in the Garden, Satan perches on the Tree of Life like a cormorant.

Since aside from explaining Paradise allegorically, few of the
patristic and mediaeval writers felt that they had the authority to
expand the descriptions in Genesis, Milton turned rather to Renais-
sance and classical authors for concrete details from geography and
travel lore, and the richness of fable, with overtones of the golden
age. Treating his Paradise as a historical place devastated by the
Flood (except for the amaranth, which was providentially transplanted),
he displays the greatest artistic unity in giving it a local habitation
and a name. By no means a pagan pleasure ground, it offers all imagin-
able delights to man, provided that he maintain a wise order and tem-
perance in his pleasures, but at the same time it is the setting for
man's moral trial, and an image of "all the right things" in the
myth.*

Concrete imagery, therefore, is essential; for it would disrupt
the artistic consistency if the jeweled rivers suddenly vanished into
allegory. Such is the fear of Raleigh, who feels that the poem would
disintegrate under the scrutiny of a child, and who is apparently
troubled as it is by the suggestions that earth is the shadow of Heaven,
and that Hell and Paradise may be but states of mind.* Nevertheless,
the suggestions of something beyond the physical are a safeguard
against too literal a reading of the poem. Thus symbolically Paradise reflects innocence and harmonious relations of man with God in a small-scale image of the cosmos. A place which, if not more justly preferred to Heaven, is celestial as a "myth of natural sympathy and order," it is watched over by "Millions of spiritual Creatures." (IV, 677) Yet neither static nor sentimentalized as the object of fruitless yearning, it is intermediate between Heaven and Hell, only a part of the whole pattern of the poem; for Milton is presenting a state of mind "through the metaphorical creation of an image of the archetype." 35

The basic myth of Paradise which Milton elevates and transforms, in much the same way that Aeschylus treats the myth of Prometheus, is that of the magically efficacious Trees of Life and Knowledge. The original story, it is conjectured in The Interpreter's Bible, presented God as the Forbidder who feared for his supremacy, and the serpent as a benefactor who enabled man to obtain moral knowledge. Revised, it presented the Serpent as a lying demon who offered godhead as the result of eating the fruit, whereas the actual result was consciousness of sex; the implication is that the desire for power, Eve's actual motive, was rationalized as desire for knowledge. 36

Frazer pushes the story further back below the level of moral significance to a version in which an amiable if somewhat careless deity gives man the option of obtaining immortality from the Tree of Life and warns him against the Tree of Death; and the Serpent, either by imposing upon the woman's credulity or by distorting God's message, induces her to eat of the wrong tree in order that he may obtain for himself the benefits of the Tree of Life. In subsequent versions that
splendid Tree of Life has been sadly neglected. Even further back (if possible) lies the myth of a central tree or vine (of life or of the universe) connecting Heaven and earth, at the top of which sits the Lord of the World. From these small myths were derived Milton's Tree of Life, the tallest tree, in the center of Paradise, and his Tree of Knowledge.

A goodly Tree far distant to behold
Loaden with fruit of fairest colours mixt,
Ruddy and gold. (IX, 576 ff.)

If rightly used, the Tree of Life might have been "the pledge Of immortalitie." (IV, 200 ff.) Probably its fruit was among those which were to nourish Adam and Eve's bodies and so spiritualize them that Adam and Eve would be fit for life in Heaven, provided that they remained obedient. This gradual progress towards immortality is reminiscent of the sage and serious doctrine of virginity in Comus: converse with Heaven turns "The unpolluted temple of the mind" gradually to the souls essence,

Till all be made immortal. (Comus, 461 ff.)

That man is only in the shadow of life in Paradise, as Amphiexpresses it, is suggested by Raphael's intimation that earth may be the shadow of Heaven. A final indication that the Tree of Life is not literally efficacious occurs in the expulsion of Adam

Least therefore his now bolder hand
Reach also of the Tree of Life, and eat,
And live for ever, dream at least to live
For ever. (XI, 93 ff.)

Hitherto Adam and Eve have not tasted its fruit; only Satan has used it, not for true life, but for "prospect," as he sat devising death. (IV, 196-197, 200) In the Christian Doctrine Milton calls this tree the symbol of eternal life, although it is possible to regard it as a
sacrament, and possibly the nutriment to sustain eternal life.

(XV, 115) When man's sin has rendered him unfit to live in Paradise, much less to proceed naturally by himself to immortality, he is rightly denied the fruit of the Tree of Life. Instead, it is Christ who will redeem man (although there is no such elaborate parallel in Milton as there is in Ambrose between Christ and Adam, and the Tree of Life or of Knowledge and the Cross)\(^{39}\) by bringing him through the worlds wilderness Safe to eternal Paradise of rest. (XII, 313 f.)

The fruit of the Tree of Knowledge Milton treats as real, ambrosial in smell and taste (although Eve's high expectation perhaps enhances it) and as intoxicating as wine in its effect—in short, a "crude apple." Nevertheless, it is most probable that Milton intended the intoxication not as the physical effect of the fruit, but as the psychological result of the sin.\(^{40}\) Here as Ambrose says, the user is to blame, not the giver. Raphael's admonition about Eve might be applied here as well:

\[\text{Accuse not Nature, she hath don her part; Do thou but thine, and be not diffident Of Wisdom.} \text{(VIII, 561 ff.)}\]

It is only Satan who suggests any use (and Eve, who wonders whether it was reserved for beasts) other than abstinence as a sign of obedience. The Tree of Knowledge or its fruit may not even be regarded as a sacrament for the reason that a sacrament is to be used. It is simply "the pledge of obedience," named only "from the result," since men now know evil by experience, and good only by evil, as the result of man's disobedience. (C.P. XV, p. 115) Here (except for the use of the term sacrament) Milton's treatment of the fruit is closer to Hugh's than to that of Ambrose, who admits, however, that man acquired the
knowledge of evil by yielding to Satan's temptation, not from the Tree of Knowledge.

Only by Satan and by Eve after her reason has been corrupted is the fruit invested with its mythical efficacy. More will be said later (in Chapter V below) about man's possession of moral knowledge before the Fall and about Satan's sophistry in misrepresenting the fruit. Milton does make further use of the myth, however, to enhance the imagery. Brooks observes that the fruit is taken as a symbol of knowledge; examples of this use include:

But Knowledge is as food, and needs no less
Her Temperance over Appetite; (VII, 126 f.)

Eve's description of the Tree as

Fruitless to me, though Fruit be here to excess; (IX, 649)

and of its fruit as "This intellectual food"; (IX, 768) Adam's reference to sapience,

Since to each meaning savour we apply; (IX, 1019)

and the terming of the results of the Fall "Bad Fruit of Knowledge." (IX, 1073)

Basil Willey makes a similar observation to the effect that although Milton as a humanist had to recast the original myth of what a humanist would regard as man's emancipation from the "Eden of Unconsciousness" by the sciential fruit, because this action is treated as a sin in the Bible, "he was prepared to use a portion of the significance of the original myth." Milton "by way of compensation" attributes the "speculative hybris" to Adam in showing his curiosity about the stars rather than the fruit, and afterwards in having Adam ascribe his fall to his quest for knowledge. Arguing on the basis of Areopagitica that had Milton not found a more acceptable version of
the myth, he would have endorsed Satan's seventeenth century rationalizing about the prohibition (just as Tillyard speculates whether Milton himself in Paradise might have eaten the apple and written a tract to prove himself right). Willey concludes that Milton explained away the literal and Satanic portions of the myth "in the light of that Spirit within which is 'a more certain guide than Scripture,'" even though his treatment of the deceptive trees as mere tokens led him into a "nonchalant sophism" about the Tree of Life.

It is true that Milton parallels Eve's wrongly motivated desire for what she takes to be godlike knowledge with Adam's misguided tendency to speculate about astronomy, but Adam in referring later to his foolish aspirations toward knowledge simply means his questions to Raphael, not his Fall. It will be indicated later (in Chapter V below) that Milton's argument in Areopagitica that man needs a thorough knowledge of good and evil is not contradictory to his treatment of man in Paradise Lost, in which man, already possessing moral knowledge before the Fall, incurs the doom of knowing good by evil. Willey is right, however, in observing that Milton would have thought it Satanic had man been first denied moral knowledge and then doomed for a sin for which he could not justly be held morally responsible. It is by no means certain, however, that the story in Genesis represents so primitive a level of the myth or is so interpreted in the Christian tradition as Willey evidently believes. On the contrary, as the previous discussion in this chapter has indicated, the knowledge promised by the Serpent is discredited in Genesis as fallacious; knowledge of evil (though taken by Ambrose to be the result of the Fall and not an original endowment since it leads to the practice of evil) is
interpreted as the result of disobedience, not of the fruit; and the
treatment of the trees as symbolic, not magic, and the promised
knowledge as a misleading rationalization (according to Hugh of St.
Victor) was already part of the Christian tradition which Milton in-
herited. Milton, therefore, avoids that radical novelty of seventeenth
century rationalism which, it is feared, might bring him close to the
position of Satan; his magnificent originality lies in his development
of the moral implications of the story into an elevated epic presenta-
tion of Christian humanism, and his transformation of its primitive
symbols into a richly significant artistic pattern of imagery.
CHAPTER III

"SON OF HEAVEN AND EARTH"

I

The account of the creation of man Ambrose did not consider an appropriate topic to be treated of at length in De Paradiso since Adam, having been created outside Paradise, was brought in to be its inhabitant. Here Ambrose does make the curious distinction, however, between the two Adams of the two accounts of the creation of man in Genesis: God did not place the man made after His image, but the man moulded according to the body, in Paradise, for the incorporeal does not belong to a place. Probably Philo's Platonized Jewish account influenced him here, since in accord with the Jewish interpretation of the two accounts as referring to the separate creations of two distinct Adams, Philo differentiates between the man moulded from the earth and the earlier man in the image of God: the second is an object of sense-perception, a composite... of earthly substance and of Divine breath...mortal in respect of body, but in respect of the mind, immortal... He that was after the Divine image was an idea, or type, or seal, an object of thought only, incorporeal [and] incorruptible. Ambrose, who refers only this once to the two Adams, does not introduce both Adams into Paradise as Philo does, although he may have been influenced by Philo in expounding the allegory of the pure mind set among the virtues. More literally, the first man was a cosmopolitan, the one inhabitant of his country, the one entire created world. Ambrose's most extensive discussion of the creation of man occurs in the Hexameron. Having explained that in saying, "Let us make man
in our image, "God was referring to Himself and the Son (and not to the angels, who do not share the image of God), Ambrose describes the image as power, divine wisdom, and eternal justice, for the image of God is Christ, who has His likeness and divinity, and who is of the same substance and is one with Him. God is spirit, not body, and His image is spirit; and we, who are created in God's image should realize that we are mind and soul, whereas we merely have body and senses; through his soul man dominates the animals, for the body, mere useless dust without the soul, is in the image of the animals, but the spirit, which betokens rightful imitation of divinity, is in the image of God. Nevertheless Ambrose praises the free, open forehead and bare temples, the face, which shows the disposition of the mind and indicates by external signs the inner will, so that the image of the mind is said to be in the face. Physical vision is weak and limited, but the soul is free to wander here and there with extensive thoughts and plans and to consider all things. That soul is a precious picture, well painted, which reflects the grace of virtues and the splendor of piety, and which shines according to the image of God. Such was the soul of Adam before the Fall; but in sinning he set aside the heavenly image and put on the appearance of the earthly.

II

To Hugh of St. Victor, the creation of man represented not only the culminating work of the sixth day, but also the third step in God's ways of creating; first was the work itself ("In the beginning God created..."), next, the fiat ("Let there be light"); and finally there was the consilium, or consultation ("Let us make man..."). This
consultation, which does not derogate from God's power but enhances the importance of man's creation, possibly refers, Hugh suggests, to the collaboration of the angels, but more probably to the work of the Trinity. With reference to God the idea of time cannot properly be applied, since His power, wisdom, and goodness have co-existed eternally, and since He always willed and planned what He did at a specific time. Only with reference to the creation is it proper to speak of God's foreknowledge, since from our point of view the creation was an act in time. Nor should it be literally understood that He required rest, which is symbolic; He set a pattern for us in the acts of creation that we might expect a future reward for good works. His creation of man was, moreover, a symbolic anticipation of the birth of Christ; among other parallels, the first Adam was made of virgin soil, whereas the second was born of the Virgin Mary, and the first was created on the sixth day, whereas the second was born in the sixth age of the world.

Although created last, man was causally first, since the world was created for man, just as man was created for God. Unlike God, who is perfect and not subject to decrease or diminution, man requires help to keep and increase what he has. He is the intermediary between God and the world, serving God and served in turn by the world. The creation of rational beings included not only men but also angels, sharers in that same nature, created with the same cause and source of origin. Unlike the angels, man was given a habitation on earth to suit the body associated with his soul, as a symbol of the degrees in creation, with everything depending upon God, and as a reminder by means of the contrast between the excellent soul and vile body, of the
greater distance between God and the soul of man, which likewise may be united. Both men and angels, moreover, were created not through necessity, but through God's goodness, and given a rational soul, that they might share in His blessed state.¹³

Further purposes are apparent in the creation of man: he was created last that he might enter a mansion already prepared for him and there rule; he was created outside Paradise and placed in it that he might realize that it was his not by nature, but by grace, and perhaps in token of his short sojourn there;¹⁴ he was made of earth as a sign of his mortality and humble status.¹⁵ God created man's soul from nothing at the time when He made his body.¹⁶ When God inspired him with the breath of life, He breathed upon his face because in the face the soul operates through the senses.¹⁷ Only one man was created, in contrast with the angels, who were created separately at one time, in order to further human unity and humiliate Satan's pride the more.¹⁸

Man was not created as God's image, for only the Son is His image, but in God's image, as a mirror reflects the object.¹⁹ It should not be thought that he was made exclusively in the Father's image, Hugh observes, although Genesis speaks only of God, but in the image of the Trinity.²⁰ Likeness refers to the soul, for corporeal substance cannot take on the likeness of divinity. Likeness may, in addition, refer to the love of unity, and image, to man's recognition of the truth.²¹ Like God, man had a simple substance; and just as all things are ultimately derived from God, so all men were to be derived from Adam. Like Him, too, man was dominant in Paradise. (After the Fall, he lost his dominance over the largest animals, lions, for example, and the
smallest, such as flies, but kept his control over those in between "for consolation." Man was also endowed with manifold knowledge.²² (The discussion of man's knowledge and virtue before the Fall is reserved for a later chapter.) Hugh makes an important Platonic distinction, however: man may be like God only through imitation and sharing; he may be wise, good, and just; but God is Wisdom, Goodness, and Justice.²³

The most godlike quality that man possesses is his reason, by which he can find Him in whose image he was made. He attains to a knowledge of God by considering himself and the world around him, and in addition he may receive instruction from God through miraculous revelations or an inner illumination that makes him aspire to knowledge. By himself, however, man sees only part of himself; yet is aware that he has invisible parts; just so, he knows that he did not always exist and that he did not make himself; hence he arrives at the idea of a Creator, existing eternally. His observations of unity in nature strengthen his belief in God. Finally, the mind, beholding and loving its own wisdom, arrives at some idea of the Trinity.²⁴

III

With one important exception, the writings of Hugh provide more points for comparison with Paradise Lost than do those of Ambrose on the creation of man. Milton considers the implications of time and rest: when Adam reverently inquires what moved the Creator in "his holy Rest" to create the universe, so late begun and so quickly finished, Raphael explains that God is free to put forth His goodness in action or not, and that His acts are immediate. "More swift Then
time or motion," they must be related in process "as earthly notion can receive." (VII, 90 ff.; 176 ff.) Unlike Hugh, Milton does not speak of time as originating with the creation:

(For Time, though in Eternitie, appli'd
To motion, measures all things durable
By present, past, and future). (IV, 580 ff.)

In the Christian Doctrine he also defines time as the measure of motion and expresses a belief that there are inadequate grounds for supposing that motion and time did not exist before the world.  

According to Satan, God's motive in creating the world was spite (IX, 177), and God does announce that He can repair what Satan foolishly regards as His loss, lest Satan should become too exalted. (VII, 750) The method God used was a humiliation to Satan: another world was created "in a moment"; and from one man would come forth "a Race of men innumerable." (VII, 155 ff.) Nevertheless it is clear that God's purpose in the creation was to share His good and to bring forth good out of evil:

in stead
Of Spirits maligne a better Race to bring
Into their vacant room, and thence diffuse
His good to Worlds and Ages infinite. (VII, 188 ff.)

Although most orthodox theologians are unwilling to admit the Platonic description of phenomena as the reflection of eternal ideas, even ideas in the mind of God, Hugh's reference to God's willing and planning the creation from eternity has a counterpart in Milton's allusion to "his great Idea." (VII, 557)

That God made Adam for Himself and endowed him with reason that he might attain a share of His blessedness is also evident in the description of Adam as
Magnanimous to correspond with Heav'n,
But grateful to acknowledge whence his good
Descends, thither with heart and voice and eyes
Directed in Devotion, to adore
And worship God Supream, who made him chief
Of all his works. (VII, 511 ff.)

Although Adam is lord of Paradise, the "mansion" that needed him, and
although he praises God's bounty in conferring so much upon him, he never
does presume to regard the earth as his, but God's. Nor was the whole
universe made entirely for man; for although Raphael suggests:

Yet not to Earth are those bright Luminaries
Officious, but to thee Earths habitant, (VIII, 98 f.)

he also points out the spaciousness of the creation, that man might
realize

he dwells not in his own;
An Edifice too large for him to fill,
Lodg'd in a small partition, and the rest
Ordain'd for uses to his Lord best known. (VIII, 103 ff.)

In that small partition, however, Paradise was designed as Adam's
"Capital Seate," and Adam, as Ambrose says, was truly cosmopolitan, given
the whole earth to "possess and rule, No despicable gift." (XI, 339 f.)
And although man was to concern himself only with what pertained to his
daily life, not with "matters hid," nevertheless of the entire creation
he was

the Master work, the end
Of all yet don. (VII, 505 f.)

In his account of the fulfillment of these purposes of God
through the agency of His Son, Milton is closer to Ambrose than to
Hugh. Ambrose explains the statement "Let us now make man..." in ac-
cordance with most of the Greek theologians as a reference to the Father
and the Son. (Unlike many Greek theologians, however, he does not
subordinate the Son to the Father.) In Paradise Lost the Omnipotent
and Omnipresent Father "thus to his Son audibly spake," in the creation of man, whereas the third Person of the Trinity played no part. "Milton's idea of the Trinity seems to approach those comparatively early stages in the evolution of the dogma when the Son, partly identified as the Logos of Greek philosophy, was regarded as inferior to the Father, though sharing his essence." The idea of a consultation (consilium), as Hugh calls it, comes out in Milton's Christian Doctrine: "As if to intimate the superior importance of the work [of creating man] the Deity speaks like to a man deliberating." (XV, 37)

The two accounts in Genesis of Adam's creation Milton synthesizes in accordance with the usual Christian interpretation, so that the Adam who was created "in the Image of God Express" is the same Adam in whose nostrils He "breath'd The breath of Life." (VII, 525 ff.) Adam's origin from the dust is not especially emphasized until his sin. Although Satan is bitterly aware of man's advancement from his lowly origin, it seems unlikely that Adam knew it until the Son's words:

know thy Birth,
For dust thou art, and shalt to dust return. (X, 207 f.)

Adam recalls his awakening, but not his origin, "for who himself beginning knew?" (VIII, 251) Likewise he does not fully realize the significance of being the head of all mankind until he recognizes that he has corrupted the race as their "frail Original." He does realize his position almost immediately, however, in relation to the animals and to God; he is aware of the contrast between God, who is infinite, absolute, and perfect, and man, "In unitie defective," who needs to propagate his image and to solace his defects by conversation with his like. (VIII, 418 ff.) The best description of the order of
the universe and the relation of body and soul occurs in Raphael's speech:

O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed... Each in thir several active Spheres assignd, (V, 469 ff.)

and his explanation of how the grosser feeds the purer and body works up to spirit. Man, whose reason differs from the angels' rather in degree than in kind, and whose food the angels can assimilate, may expect to become so spiritualised gradually that he can participate with the angels.

In keeping with this rejection of the dichotomy of body and soul, Milton treats Adam's expression of God's image as reflected outwardly, although mainly mental and spiritual. Satan's first view of man in Paradise is the sight of

Two of far nobler shape, erect and tall,
Godlike erect,

who seemed rightly the lords of all,

for in thir looks Divine
The image of thir glorious Maker shon,
Truth, Wisdome, Sanctitude severe and pure,
Severe, but in true filial freedom plac't;
Whence true autoritie in men. (IV, 288 ff.)

Both the spiritual likeness to God and the difference of purpose in the creation of man and woman are seen in their physical appearance, for Adam's "fair large Front and Eye sublime" showed dominance, whereas Eve's hair, curled like vine tendrils, "impli'd Subjection." (IV, 300 ff.) In the Christian Doctrine Milton states that "it was chiefly with respect to the soul that Adam was made in the divine image." (XV, 45)²⁸ Needless to say, Milton keeps the distinction clear between Adam, who was created in God's image, and the Omnipic Word, who is the visible expression of God, and in whom all His Father shines.
The consequence of man's creation in God's image, Milton declares in the *Christian Doctrine*, was his being endued with "natural wisdom, holiness, and righteousness." (XV, 53) When Adam asks for a mate, the Creator, well pleased with the knowledge and reason Adam has displayed, praises him for

> Expressing well the spirit within thee free,  
> My Image. (VIII, 1740 ff.)

Although most of the discussion of the consequences of Adam's Fall is reserved for a later chapter, it may be noted here that in sinning Adam and Eve delete the divine image, but not entirely. In the *Christian Doctrine* Milton says that part of the punishment was loss of innate righteousness and obscuration of the original right reason; but undeniably, as evidenced by some free will to do good works, "some remnants of the divine image still exist in us." (XV, 207-209) In *Paradise Lost* Adam asks Michael why man, who still retains the divine similitude in part, should be debased to unsightly sufferings and not be exempted from deformity for the sake of that image. In reply, Michael points out that it is man's own likeness, not God's, that is defaced as a punishment when man forsakes God's image and defaces the divine likeness by serving appetite. (XI, 504 ff.) Nevertheless reason in man is not wholly lost, but only "obscur'd, or not obey'd" when man permits unworthy powers to rule; (XII, 86 ff.) Adam learns of a few righteous men even before Christ; and Michael explains how God will send His Spirit to write on men's hearts the Law of Faith. (XII, 486 ff.)

Although man's knowledge will be treated of in a later chapter for the most part, one parallel may be made between Hugh's account of how man arrives by reason at the idea of God (cited above) and Adam's
story in Book VIII of *Paradise Lost*. His first consciousness of being was the awakening from sleep; his first action was to rise, and then to look about him and to examine himself, although he did not know his identity or the cause of his being; his first comprehension was expressed in his naming the things about him, starting with the sun (Significantly, he could name the things inferior to him, but not God). At once he knew that since he did not make himself, he owed reverence to


some great Maker then,
In goodness and in power preeminent,

Then at Adam's desire to know Him, God revealed Himself to Adam by means of a dream. (VIII, 278 ff.)
CHAPTER IV

"DAUGHTER OF GOD AND MAN"

I

St. Ambrose discusses in several contexts the creation of Eve. Part of God's purpose in allowing Adam to name the animals was that Adam should realize that by nature there are two sexes and that he needed the companionship of a woman. In view of St. Ambrose's ingenious allegorical explanation of the beasts as irrational passions and the birds as "the empty thoughts that fly about in our soul, "it is no wonder that Adam found here no fit help. He needed woman—that is, the mind requires the help of the senses. To the problem of why God would permit passions and fluctuating thoughts in Paradise, Ambrose replies that man had both power over them and judgment about them, ability to "discern by sober definition the types of all individual things." Hence Adam was unwilling to claim kinship with unlike creatures.1

Since Adam required a wife, God created her from his side. In so doing He cast a sleep over Adam, a kind of abstraction from the affairs of this world and a repose in divine things. (Ambrose adds that when we consider the meaning of marriage, we reflect on the Kingdom of God and turn to a dream of this world.) And the Lord built the rib which He had taken into a woman— "built" (aedificavit) as one might build a home, for the home thereby came into perfection. (The man is more adept in public affairs; the woman, in domestic affairs— "He for the sword, and for the needle, she.") Finally, it is clear to Ambrose that God took a rib from Adam's body, not a part of his soul;
for Adam calls Eve "bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh," not "soul of my soul." The origin of Eve's soul (although presumably he considered that she had one) Ambrose does not explain.\(^2\)

Why did God withhold His approval of man until the creation of woman? For He knew that she would be the first to sin. Why was it not good that man should be alone? Finally, why was Eve created from Adam's rib? Although Adam himself was good, God did not say, in view of His plan for the whole human race, that Adam's creation was good; it was better for the race that she should be created even though she should sin, for man needed woman for the propagation of the race. God preferred that there should be many, some of whom would sin and some of whom would be saved, than that there should be one sinless Adam. And indeed the woman herself was to be saved through the generation of her children, for among them would be Christ. Woman, then, was a good help although she is said to be inferior, for often those who are superior in dignity may receive "help from inferior merit." And Eve, taken from Adam, was of his nature, that the source of the race might be Adam.\(^3\)

More directly relevant for a comparison with Paradise Lost is Ambrose's distinction between man's creation outside and woman's creation inside Paradise. That God took Adam and placed him in Paradise instead of leaving him in the place where He made him signifies that he was "taken" in the sense of "breathed upon by the divine power" (\textit{quasi afflatum...divina virtute}) or taken by God's power and by increased virtue. This interpretation Ambrose considers significant of grace, won by virtue, not by nobility of birth or position. Man, made outside Paradise, was found superior to woman, a native of Paradise,
but the first to fall, deceived. The upshot of the situation was
that woman, made as a help for man, lacked manly protection from him
who was ordained her head, whereas he, thinking he had in her a help,
fell because of her. And the moral of that is, no one should presume
too much upon himself, but, on the other hand, no one should readily
trust another whose virtue is unproved. Unlike some other patristic
and medieaval theologians, Ambrose does not add, never trust a woman;
rather, he goes on to say that anyone who finds the person under his
protection stronger than himself should borrow grace from that person,
and that man should honor their wives as lesser vessels but co-heirs
to grace. Eve, to be sure, was guilty of presumption in making claims
for herself when she should have been a help to her husband. As for
the superiority that she might have claimed, she derived her grace
along with her existence from Adam.

Eve is further explained allegorically. Her creation, according
to St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, is a mystery of the Church.
for the creation of Eve from Adam signifies the derivation of the
Church from Christ. Moreover Ambrose contrasts her with "bliss Marie,
second Eve" in a series of parallels: by Eve, we were seduced to earth;
by Mary, elevated to Heaven; through Eve, we were drowned by means of
an apple; through Mary, absolved by the gift of a tree (that is, Christ
hung on the tree, or cross, like a fruit); the mother of all mankind,
including Mary, was Eve; the mother of Christ and our salvation, Mary.

According to Hugh of St. Victor, the historical creation of Eve
presumably took place on the sixth day, although Adam had had time to
see a great many other things first. Whereas Adam had had other help that was not like him, he was given Eve as a help for him and like him. In casting a deep sleep over Adam, God was avoiding the appearance of injury to Adam. Was that rib destined to be made into Eve, or did God take a rib that Adam did not need when the occasion arose? The argument that Adam's rib must have been either originally useless (in which case he was created with something unnecessary) or else natural and useful (in which case he was diminished at Eve's creation) Hugh refutes by the analogy of baby teeth, which are natural and temporary, but not superfluous. Moreover, God planned the creation of Eve — indeed, the creation of everything—from eternity. It is true that in the course of nature the rib would not have produced Eve without God's direct operation in the way that a seed produces a tree; but it obviously had the potentiality of being so formed at God's will. Being located in the middle, the rib symbolized Eve's status as Adam's companion, not his mistress or his handmaid, as the head and foot respectively would have suggested. If anyone is perplexed to imagine how a woman could be made from a single rib (and surely we would have been informed of it had God used anything in addition), Hugh replies that the creation of the whole universe from nothing was more remarkable. Like Ambrose, Hugh asserts that Eve was created from Adam so that the human race might have one origin. Was her soul as well as her body created from his? Not wishing to settle the question dogmatically, Hugh reviews the opinions that all souls are propagated by traduction, and that God created all souls at once; but he seems to prefer St. Jerome's opinion that each soul is separately created by God.
The statement that a man shall leave his father and mother and adhere to his wife Hugh interprets as a prohibition of the union of mother and son or father and daughter, rather than an exhortation to depart from the same household. Certainly the man does not abandon the love of his family, but he foregoes with them that privilege of love which is properly the wife's. "And the two shall be one flesh" signifies that man and wife are united in love so as to wish themselves one flesh, and that they generate one flesh, their child.\(^1\)

Marriage Hugh treats as a two-fold institution, a duty before the Fall and a remedy afterwards. The first symbolic marriage was a union of love, ordained for the generation of children.\(^2\) Marriage is a sacrament for the sake of instruction (propter eruditionem) and a duty in practice (propter exercitatem). Both marriage itself and the duty of marriage, however, may be regarded as sacramental; for the former, which consists in a social union, symbolizes the spiritual society through love that will exist between God and the soul, and the latter, the union of the flesh, symbolizes the association of Christ and the Church through His assumption of a mortal body. The first bridegroom and bride symbolizes both God and the soul, united in love, and Christ and the Church. In each situation the bridegroom, the superior, is drawn by piety to love the inferior, the bride, who receives great benefit thereby, for she is insufficient to stand alone. Hence man, being stronger than woman, becomes here the image of God in the relationship; and woman, having the greater need, but entering voluntarily into a union of love, takes on the form of the rational soul.\(^3\) Moreover the physical union (a duty only in the first marriage, and a concession rather than a necessity in marriages after
the Fall signifies that the soul becomes fruitful when it receives the seed of virtue from God. Thus God ordained both the sacrament and the duty from the first in order that Adam and Eve might be the parents of the race and that their marriage might be sanctified by the pure love of the mind.

In different contexts Hugh finds, then, a number of allegorical interpretations of Adam and Eve; Eve's creation symbolizes the mystery of the Church, which had its origin when Christ's side, struck by the spear, poured forth water and blood, symbols of the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist; and reference has just been made to Adam and Eve as types of God and the soul. Most commonly Adam, Eve, and the Serpent are explained respectively as the spirit, the flesh, and Satan, with the apple as worldly pleasure, and the expulsion from Paradise as the loss of good and the affictions of conscience. After the Fall, Adam may be taken as God, with Abel as a type of Christ, and Cain, a prefiguration of the Jews; or Adam and Eve may, as spirit and flesh, be said to co-operate in the production of good works (an interpretation which presumably excludes Cain). More complimentary to Eve is the explanation that she expresses not the senses, but prudence. Reason, which treats of abstract and invisible things, is supreme in man, but subject to it is another kind of reason which has to do with corporal and visible things and which dominates sensuality. Hence man represents wisdom, or reason about divine matters; woman, prudence, or reason concerning human affairs; and the animals, including the serpent, sensuality, or appetite toward earthly things.
Aside from the fact that Milton is closer to Hugh in emphasizing love and companionship in marriage, the account of Ambrose provides more points for comparison with Milton. In the first place just as Ambrose relates the creation of Eve to Adam's naming the animals, so Milton treats Adam's experience with the animals as an advance in self-knowledge; for when Adam, being endowed with an immediate comprehension of their nature, sees them, he realizes how they differ from him. Perceiving the fitness of God's plan of combining them in pairs, for

they rejoice
Each with their kinde, Lion with Lioness, (VIII, 392 f.)
Adam recognizes his need of companionship with someone who can share his rational delight and "help or solace his defects." In comparing his own solitude with his Creator's, Adam sees more clearly his place in the scale of being, for the animals are far less inferior to man than man is inferior to God; and the comparison fails because God does not need to propagate, "already infinite," whereas

Man by number is to manifest
His single imperfection, and beget
Like of his like, his Image multiplied,
In unitie defective. (VIII, 422 ff.)

The "deep sleep" that God cast over Adam, which some commentators translate "an ecstasy," and which Ambrose treats as a kind of abstraction from this world and contemplation of divine matters, becomes in Paradise Lost a type of trance, during which Adam sees by means of "the Cell Of Fancie [his] internal sight." Having promised Adam his likeness, other self, and "wish, exactly to [his] heart's desire," God creates Eve from Adam's rib while Adam witnesses His work.
On waking and opening his eyes, Adam finds that she has disappeared, but as soon as she reappears, Adam, overjoyed, thanks the Creator in words that show his high comprehension of her and of marriage: "And they shall be one Flesh, one Heart, one Soule." (VIII, 460 ff.) In explaining this dream as an example of the prophetic power in effect during sleep, Hunter cites the Renaissance theory of the operation of fancy in dreams, and the Rabbinical theory of how the imagination can be divinely inspired in dreams when the senses are at rest and the imaginative faculty beholds things as though the bodily eye were seeing. (The latter tradition, from which Milton here differs, held that the reason also operates during the dream.) In addition, the Platonic and Neo-Platonic theories supported the use of fancy or imagination in divine revelations. Just as Neo-Platonic authors held that the bright light of divinity closed a person's eyes, so Milton shows Adam "Dazed and spent" from the "celestial Colloquie." Although Adam's reason is not mentioned as operating during the dream, Stein calls attention to Adam's "exercise of reason and free will" before it and his "share in this last act of creation"; for the dialogue before the dream helps Adam to use his reason and to formulate his heart's desire. Adam's active share in Eve's creation is doubtful; he is "a passive participant," but Adam's recognition of his need for her may constitute, as Stein says, "a kind of responsible action for Adam." Although Milton was obliged to make literal use of the primitive story of the creation of woman from man's rib, he endows it with spiritual beauty. Several references to the rib occur after the story of Eve's creation; she declares that if she is never to part from
Adam's side, she might as well have remained there, "a liveless Rib." (IX, 115ff.) When Adam, in despair, thinks that all her virtue was but show, he denounces her as but a Rib
Crooked by nature, bent, as now appears,
More to the part sinister, from me drawn,
Well if thrown out, as supernumerarie
To my just number found. (X, 864 ff.)

Previously he has accused nature to some extent in wondering whether too much was taken from his side in the creation of Eve. But for the most part Adam speaks more graciously about the side that lent Eve being as the side nearest his heart. And in a more inspired moment he has declared his wish to have her by his side "Henceforth an individual solace dear." (IV, 486) Milton also explains this mode of creation elsewhere in prose. Describing Adam and Eve's marriage as a nearer alliance than that of any subsequent husband and wife, he declares: "No other woman was ever moulded out of her husband's rib, but...they com to have that consanguinity which they have by wedlock." Certainly it would be absurd to assign only a corporal meaning to the words "bone of my bone," because to all men after Adam, "the rib of Marriage...is a relation much rather then a bone."26

Unlike Ambrose, Milton does not emphasize the distinction between Adam's creation outside Paradise and Eve's creation inside it when he describes the creation of Eve, but he does make use elsewhere of the distinction of place. On learning that they must leave Paradise, Adam and Eve lament with this difference: Eve sorrows that she must leave her "native soil," the flowers of her tending, and the nuptial bower that she has adorned, whereas Adam is grieved that he will no longer see God and that he may not stay to build a monument in the place where
he has beheld the Divine Presence. The angel corrects both, Eve especially, for thinking in terms of place; for wherever Adam goes, God, being Omnispresent, will compass him round.

With goodness and paternal Love, his Face Express, and of his steps the track Divine, (XI, 353 f.) and wherever Adam goes, Eve may think there (quite literally) her "native soil." (XI, 292) Subsequently, in predicting the fate of Paradise during the Flood, Michael explains how Paradise will be cast as a barren island into the gulf.

To teach thee that God attributes to place
No sanctitie, if none be thither brought
By Men who there frequent, or therein dwell. (XI, 833 ff.)

Of the questions of presumption and the relations of superior and inferior Milton has much to say, but these topics will be discussed later in relation to the Fall.

Although Milton states that Eve was created "Female for Race," it is clear that she was not made solely as a help in propagation. Indeed, he rejects as a "crabbed opinion" the statement that except for propagation the companionship of another man would have been a better solace than that of woman. Most of the discussion of Adam and Eve's descendants occurs after the Fall (although Empson is mistaken in regarding children as a consequence of the Fall.) at which time Adam dissuades Eve from suicide or barrenness as contrary to God's will and to His promise of the adversary's defeat through Eve's seed. Even before the Fall, however, the marriage of Adam and Eve is consummated, and several times they allude to the hope of having children. In his prayer Adam mentions the promise of a race "To fill the Earth" (IV, 733); Raphael hails Eve as the "Mother of Mankind" (V, 388); and Adam and Eve look forward to the time when there will be more hands to help them
Reference has already been made to Adam's addition to the words of Genesis: "And they shall be one Flesh, one Heart, one Soul." In contrast with Ambrose, Milton has Adam address Eve as "Part of my Soul." (IV, 487) Possibly the words have a more literal meaning than Horace's reference to Vergil, for example, as half of his soul; Sister Mary Irma Corcoran sees a strong probability that Milton implies that Eve's soul was derived from Adam's, especially in view of his acceptance of the theory of traduction of souls. The creation of Eve as Adam's "likeness, [his] fit help, [his] other self" (VIII, 450) is significant of the close unity of Adam and Eve and of the solidarity of the race, but it is also significant, according to Stein, of man's liability to fall, for Adam was in danger of loving Eve as his own image (or himself mirrored in her) instead of loving her and himself with reference to God, in whose image he was made. As his likeness and image, she was created for Adam only, whom she addresses as her author and disposer; but in her looks as well as in his the image of the Creator is reflected. (The danger that Adam may think her too absolute in herself will be discussed later.) At her creation Adam, inspired with love, experiences "Sweetness...unfelt before." (VIII, 475) Like him in many ways, Eve is complementary to him, inferior, and designed for a different purpose:

For contemplation hee and valour formd,
For softness shee and sweet attractive Grace. (IV, 296 f.)

From Raphael Adam learns that Eve was endowed with charm so that he might duly honor her and by love of her higher qualities ascend to heavenly love.

Although Eve is capable of what is high, she is not Adam's equal.
in abstract reason. Part of her beautiful humility is her eagerness to learn from her husband. Prudence in the study of "household good" is her best accomplishment. When Raphael pays a visit, she demonstrates her domestic skill in preparing and serving dinner, and she has a way with flowers. As C. S. Lewis reminds the reader, the refreshing simplicity of the scene in no way detracts from the portrayal of Adam and Eve as a great lord and lady: Eve stands "unabashed" before the angel to do the honors of her home as befits "the matriarch of the world"; as the sort of lady of whom Ruskin approved, she displays true courtesy in contrast with the false standards of court life. To this extent she fulfills both Ambrose's description of woman as the homemaker and Hugh's identification of woman with reason applied to daily human concerns; nevertheless Milton does not oversimplify the problem; for Eve is admonished that her home is with Adam, wherever he goes, and Adam, having been advised to forego speculations about astronomy and to consider what concerns him and his being, displays more genuine prudence than Eve in his attitude toward work.

It is not to be expected that Milton would accept altogether any of the allegories of Ambrose and Hugh about the marriage of Adam and Eve. He does treat the Biblical account, however, as possessing rich moral significance; and it is probable that he took the allegories into consideration in his treatment of Adam and Eve. Not surprisingly, he ignores the allegory of Christ and His Church in the account of Eve's creation, for it would be most inappropriate to the narrator—Adam. Somewhat skeptically Milton suggests elsewhere that if anyone wishes to interpret marriage as a high mystery, according to Paul's reference to Christ and the Church, he is welcome to do so; but certainly
marriage is "then only mysterious, when it is a holy, happy, and peaceful match." So in *Paradise Lost* he hails "wedded Love, mysterious Law." (IV, 750) In accordance with the mystery, nevertheless, "The wife must honour and obey her husband, as the Church honours and obeys Christ her head," and the husband is to "love and cherish his wife, as Christ his Church."32

As it was noted in the discussion of the image, it is possible to see in Adam's relation to Eve some analogy to God's relation to Adam. Moreover, Milton points out that man is the image of the glory of God, whereas woman is the glory of the man, from whom and for whom she was made. (*Christian Doctrine*, XV, 121) It would be misleading, however, to carry the analogy too far; Adam and Eve are incomparably nearer to equality than are Adam and God. Stein's analogy between God, Adam, and Eve and the Neo-Platonic triad of the One, Intellect, and the Soul, offers more valuable suggestions about the true hierarchy and the dangers of violating it than the allegory of God and the soul; but it would be a mistake to interpret the Fall wholly by the substitution of the symbolic terms for the vital characters in the epic.33

Eve's participation in Adam's rational delight precludes the identification of her with the senses, as opposed to mind (Adam), although she is deceived through trusting a delusive sensory appearance, whereas Adam's reason is not misinformed or deceived. The identification of Adam and Eve with higher reason and prudence has already been described above as more applicable, but inadequate. Some analogy between Eve and Mary is a strong part of the tradition: Milton does not emphasize Mary as much as a Roman Catholic author would have done; but Raphael's address to Eve is reminiscent of the "Ave Maria," and Jesus
is called "Son of Mary, second Eve." (X, 183)

In his prose writings, also, Milton, like Hugh, stresses the spiritual purpose of marriage above the physical. In the passage already cited from Tetrachordon, he calls loneliness "the first thing which God's eye nam'd not good," and explains it as the lack of woman; for Adam, who had "the company of God himself, and the Angels to converse with; all creatures to delight him seriously," was not truly alone; and the opinion that Eve was provided solely for propagation, not for friendship, Milton rejects. In the Christian Doctrine he states that marriage was instituted "for mutual love, society, help, and comfort of the husband and wife," although woman was made for man, her superior. (XV, 121) Moreover in creating Eve God did not speak impulsively, but "like to a man deliberating," to indicate that His action was founded on natural reason; and He requires man and wife "so to live together, and to be united not only in body, but in mind also, with such an affection that none may be dearer...among...mankind, nor of more efficacy to the mutual offices of love, and loyalty."

The words "Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother..." Milton explains not as a law or commandment, but an account of the natural consequences of the intimate union that would have existed in the perfect state of man, and as an explanation of the origin of the family. (Christian Doctrine, XV, 121-123) In Tetrachordon he gives an extended commentary on those passages from Genesis which he uses in the poem. (Here again he stresses the spiritual purpose of marriage, but unlike Hugh, he argues for divorce on grounds other than physical.) Man and wife, he states here, cannot be made one flesh except through
"fitness of mind and disposition, which may breed the Spirit of concord, and union between them." Likewise he says in the Christian Doctrine that marriage is not a command binding on everyone, though honorable for all, nor can everyone realize a true marriage. (XV, 155-157) Moreover the fact that a man should love his wife as himself does not destroy his individuality of soul, nor should he "ruin himself by anguish and sorrow, without any benefit to her" — a highly significant passage with regard to Adam's Fall. Finally, the most valuable statement in relation to the poem, in which Adam speaks a more spiritualized version of the words in Genesis, "Bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh," is the following passage:

Adam spake like Adam the words of flesh and bones, the shell and rind of matrimony; but God spake like God, of love and solace and meet help, the soul both of Adam's words and of matrimony.
According to Ambrose, man in Paradise was not only innocent and immortal, but also, as it has been noted above, celestial. As ruler of the garden, he dominated the animals: the domesticated herds of cattle by means of human diligence, and the birds and wild animals by divine operation. Whether the animals and birds are to be understood as physical creatures or passions and empty thoughts, man both controlled them and discerned their nature by defining them. In addition he understood his need for a mate. Likewise Adam's task of keeping and dressing the garden lends itself to an allegory in addition to the literal meaning. Citing Philo's explanation that Adam was to work in the field and guard the home, Ambrose observes that Philo, being Jewish, was more concerned with moral than with spiritual truth; certainly Adam did not need to practice farming in the country. Nevertheless Ambrose admits that Philo may be partly right because Adam's work represented rightful labor even in Paradise, and because, as Philo says, Adam had to give the law to his descendants, who were to work and keep their property and transmit it to their successors. Ambrose prefers to interpret dressing and keeping to mean the labor of attaining something and the task of guarding it; Adam, endowed with a perfect nature and full virtue, was expected at least to watch and pray lest he enter into temptation. Read the passage either way, then, Ambrose advises, but remember that "Except the Lord build the house, they labor
in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh in vain." The taking of man to Paradise he finds significant of a kind of Divine Afflatus.\

Much of De Paradiso is devoted to a discussion of the command, a number of objections that had been raised concerning it, and the problem of man's knowledge before the Fall. For the most part Ambrose argues that man did not have the knowledge of good and evil before the Fall because God foresaw its bad results for man. Elsewhere he is obliged to admit that in some sense man did have moral knowledge — at least, that he had the knowledge of good impressed on his heart, and a command as to what he should avoid. Since these topics are inseparably related, it seems preferable to consider Ambrose's discussion of them according to his own sequence of chapters. Two exceptions may, however, be taken first: in the chapter on death, Ambrose observes parenthetically that it has been objected that a command about food is scarcely in keeping with man's spiritual blessedness in the supraterrrestrial Paradise; but Ambrose solves this problem with an allegorical interpretation (that man was commanded to live according to God's will), supported by such Biblical passages as "Man did eat angels' food." (Psalm 78:25)\

Among the first problems about the command is a discrepancy in the wording, to which Ambrose offers an ingenious solution: Why did the Almighty tell man (in the singular number) to eat of every tree but forbid men (in the plural) to eat of the fruit of knowledge? The answer seems to be that Adam and Eve were united when they stood and divided when they fell. (Ambrose expresses it in somewhat more Platonic
terms: "Unity cannot transgress...but the opinion of the many is
diverse."^6 Closely related is the problem of the Tree of Life: Was
the Divine Afflatus inadequate that man should be able to obtain some¬
thing more efficacious? If man was imperfect but perfectible, should
he have received the credit for perfecting himself by his own efforts?
Finally, until man tasted death, was it not a vain terror? In answer
Ambrose declares that according to God's plan man was given life only
through working and keeping God's commandments. Since "Life was
hidden with Christ in God," man in Paradise was only in the shadow of
future life, of which he had the pledge through God's inspiration.
Future immortality lay outside his experience. Not having sinned,
man was not in the shadow of death, but he was not inviolable either,
since afterwards he did sin. What he might acquire for himself was
provided by God's bounty, but in fact what he had, he lost, so that
subsequent men must labor to regain it. To the objection that man
would not have feared death, Ambrose replies that the fear of death
is instinctive in all animals.7

In the sixth chapter Ambrose replies to several heretical objec¬
tions about the command. Samuel Butler once complained of the in¬
justice toward the Devil in that God had, after all, written all the
books, but the Church Fathers, whether or not they believed in dia¬
bolical inspiration, were of the opinion that Satan had more than
enough writers on his side. Many of these heretical opinions are of
interest in comparison with the arguments of Milton's Satan. The main
questions raised were whether Adam should have obeyed a command which
appeared to withhold a good from him, and whether it was just to hold
man responsible if he lacked moral knowledge. The first objection is
that the knowledge of good and evil is good since God has this knowledge; that the Tree was good since it could effect this knowledge (that it could is evident from God's words, "The man is become as one of us..."); that the command, therefore, was wrong; that Adam, consequently, was not wrong, for it would have been just as wrong to obey a bad command as to disobey a good one. This objection Ambrose refutes by declaring that it is always wrong to disobey God, and that one should not assume too readily that the acquired knowledge was good for man or that man was capable of knowing as God knows. Perfunctory knowledge is worthless in comparison with real knowledge of the operation of those things that must be done, and God was right to restrain the sudden knowledge of good and evil.

The next objection is that Adam in the state of innocence was no more blamable than a child. But even a child, Ambrose replies, need not trust malice; even a child may do good and so be perfect before knowing good and evil: "Before the child shall have the knowledge to cry, My father, and My mother, the riches of Damascus...shall be taken away." (Isa. 8:14) (This example is unfortunate, for it is hard to see how the child can be praised or blamed, or how he can be thought to have effected personally the despoiling of Damascus and Samaria. Perhaps Ambrose merely means that he was perfect in not sinning even though he lacked moral knowledge and moral responsibility.) Moral knowledge may lead to sin, for Paul would not have known lust if the Law had not said, Thou shalt not covet, and Paul states: "I did not know sin except by the law." (Rom. 7:7) Thus God may have forbidden moral knowledge lest man be unable, once he knew of it, to resist sin. But Adam was not innocent as a child is, for he had a knowledge of good
and evil, even though it may have been perfunctory. Whether it was perfunctory or profound, man's knowledge was superior to that of a child.\(^8\) (Unless I have misinterpreted him, Ambrose denies Adam's childlike innocence by the affirmation that Adam had some knowledge of good and evil, whereas he defends the forbidding of such knowledge because it would have led man into sin. Probably the objector meant that Adam gained moral knowledge by transgressing, but that since he lacked that knowledge previously, he did not know that it was wrong to sin and was therefore not to blame. To condemn Adam on the basis of knowledge he did not have when he transgressed suggests the Looking-Glass World standards for trials.)

The problem reappears, however, in the objection that if Adam did not know good and evil, he could not have known that it was good to obey and bad to disobey the command. Adam ought, Ambrose retorts, to have been sufficiently grateful for the many benefits God gave him, including the breath of life and the Paradise of Pleasure, to keep faith with God. What God asked of him was not knowledge (\textit{peritia}, that is, knowledge from experience), but faith. Whether or not Adam understood the command or knew how to distinguish good from evil, he knew enough to reverence God according to natural judgment. So did Eve, for her words to the Serpent prove that she knew about the command and understood that it was evil to transgress. And if the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge was effective, she knew her moral guilt afterwards, at least, and was doubly guilty in seducing Adam. (If Ambrose meant, in refuting the objection that man was like a child before the Fall, that Adam and Eve were justly condemned after the acquisition of knowledge for their subsequent sins, the argument is logical if it is
admitted that Adam lacked moral knowledge and responsibility before the Fall. But Ambrose expressly blames him for the sin of eating of the forbidden Tree of Knowledge.) In his discussion of Eve's second sin, however, he pronounces moral knowledge not evil in itself unless it is wrongly acted upon, but adds the qualification that he who knows what evil is will, if not immediately guilty, act sooner or later upon this knowledge. Thus Eve sinned knowingly after she had eaten the fruit. (And presumably the bad results of the act of eating it prove that the act was sinful.)

The problem of whether the knowledge of good and evil was good or bad recurs in the seventh chapter. Here Ambrose meets the objection that unlike harmful foods forbidden by the doctor, the fruit of knowledge was beneficial since it is good to know good and advisable to know evil in order to avoid it. Ambrose declares that certainly the knowledge of evil is not good by itself, for by it man may be defrauded of his knowledge of good. The knowledge of both good and evil is, he admits, good in that those who know good will be more likely to avoid evil, and those who know evil will be more likely to appreciate the grace of good. Such knowledge must, however, be profound, not perfunctory, he repeats, or else even ignorance is preferable. ("Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian Spring.") The knowledge must be rightly applied, for what could be worse than to know good and yet be unable to put it into practice, to know evil and yet be unable to avoid it? Therefore he reaches the same conclusion: the knowledge must be judged good or bad according to its appropriate or inappropriate use.

So far Ambrose has been arguing on the assumption that man ought to have kept the command out of gratitude, but that he did not acquire
moral knowledge, which had bad results for him, until he ate the fruit. Now, in the eighth chapter, he asserts that God did impress on man opinions of good and evil, so that man identified what is good with what nature commands. This knowledge God impresses on man's heart by His Spirit, so that "our human judgment is as God's law for itself." This mention of God's gift of knowledge or reason causes the objectors to suggest that God, if He created man, gave him a pernicious gift that led him into sin. Ambrose replies that God both created man and endowed him with moral knowledge (for the assumption that God did not create a sinner puts his objectors in the position of assuming that God either created or permitted the creator of a sinner, the problem of evil remaining unsolved), and that the knowledge of evil given man was simply the knowledge of what to avoid.

The possibility that the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge was forbidden by itself but not in combination with other fruits is worth considering in view of the fact that the knowledge of good and evil can lead to wisdom if combined with the practice of virtue. It is even possible to read ex eo solo as "of that by itself" instead of "only of that." In view of Eve's explanation to the Serpent that the fruit was altogether forbidden, however, Ambrose is obliged to conclude that it was forbidden in combination with other fruit as well as separately. Doubtless man did eat of the other trees before the Fall, for he did not lack virtue. Nevertheless all men are imperfect and therefore unable to profit from the knowledge of good and evil, which would be of benefit only to a perfect man. (For even Paul was imperfect, as he admits: "I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I do not will, that I do." Even a perfect man may be unable to avoid sin.
Thus in Adam God foresaw the whole race, which would not have benefited by the knowledge of good and evil, which man could not have put into practice except through vice of the flesh. Such knowledge, therefore, was rightly forbidden.  

In considering the question of whether man was forbidden to touch the fruit as well as to eat it, Ambrose suggests that possibly it would have been better to touch it and consider it carefully, if that might have served as a warning. This point leads him to digress briefly on the dangers of a little learning. A catechumen wishing for greater faith and doctrine, and preferring the authority of teachers to his own weak judgement, had better beware, Ambrose warns, lest he accept the teachings of Sabellius, Arius, or Photinus. For that matter, if he reads certain isolated texts or takes certain parables literally, he is much worse off than if he had read nothing. It is best for him to read the Bible carefully, scrutinizing well what he reads, just as it would have been better for Adam and Eve to scrutinize the apple or "handle it with the hands of the mind."  

It is not surprising to find Ambrose in similar opposition to fruitless scientific speculations. The following passage is from the *Hexameron*:

To discuss the nature and position of the earth does not help us in our hope of the life to come. It is enough to know what Scripture states, that "He hung up the earth upon nothing." (Job 26:7) Why, then, argue whether He hung it up in air or upon water, and raise a controversy as to how the thin air could sustain the earth; or why, if upon the waters, the earth does not go crashing down to the bottom? Not because the earth is in the middle, as though suspended on even balance, but because the majesty of God constrains it by the law of His will, does it endure stable upon the unstable and the void.  

This passage is given in translation by Henry Osborn Taylor in his
chapter "The Patristic Mind," in which he goes on to cite Ambrose's explanation that God did not fix the earth's stability "as an artisan would, with compass and level, but...by His command...We must not try to measure Creation as with a compass, but must look to the will of God. 'Sufficeth for our salvation, not such disputa-
tion, but the verity of the precepts.'" The example is typical of the patristic view of cosmogony.

Knowledge for salvation, not knowledge for its own sake, was the Christian standard. But in order to know God and the soul and to comprehend the Bible, the Fathers drew upon the available secular education, which was necessarily classical, and frequently so attractive that the Fathers made a place for it whether or not it was particularly saving. In a handmaidenly way, as Taylor observes, pagan philosophy was useful for Christian dialectic and necessary to refute pagan opponents. Astronomy was also capable of conversion to Christian use, if only to determine the date of Easter. And so forth. Now the two subjects most radically transformed by Christian-
ity were history and natural science, for if God's will is taken as the cause of everything, history becomes a record of His ways to men from Creation to Judgment, and in science the line between the probable or predictable and the miraculous vanishes to leave all phenomena miracles of God's will.¹⁵

Furthermore the mediaeval allegorical habit of mind organized science "on a basis of mechanical correlations, which were estab-
lished by artificial analogy, not by logical analysis."¹⁶ Based on uni-
versals, mediaeval science was "deductive and authoritative in character,
establishing its proof by dialectic, not inductive and analytical...
Also the supernatural world was real and demonstrable...whereas the
material universe was relatively unknowable, since no importance could
be attached to the faulty evidence obtained through sense-perception.\footnote{17}

Although the religious and otherworldly direction that Ambrose
gives to science is apparent in the passage previously quoted from the
*Hexameron*, it is no less evident that he was conversant with the
theories of equilibrium, for example, of his era. In addition he took
a keen interest in natural history, and the fact that the phoenix
appears in the *Hexameron* along with the crane and the swallow, all of
which furnish moral types, is inevitable in view of the science of the
time. Certain scientific hypotheses, not natural law itself, Rand
points out, caused Ambrose to protest. Ancient science, Rand explains,
"without experimentation, was the prey of arbitrary speculation...It
would generate a kind of mythology less interesting...than the ordinary
kind, and no whit more valid...An intellectual Christian like Ambrose
rejected such science precisely as he rejected the history of the
Olympians, not because it was Pagan and wrong, but because it was stale
and untrue...There is little sympathy for excogitated science."\footnote{18}

II

Hugh discusses man's nature before the Fall as the first of his
three states: innocence; fallen nature (a fall rather than a status,
\textit{i.e.} standing); and redemption after the Resurrection, a state even
better than the first. Man was made rational and as perfect in the
knowledge of things as his first state of perfection required. With
the passing of time, he would have gained more knowledge, not by study
but by God's inspiration. Man's soul, in accordance with its union with the body, is twofold in its ability to receive the knowledge of visible things through the senses and invisible things through reason. His knowledge was threefold: knowledge of God; knowledge of himself, his condition, and his needs; and knowledge of the world and its relation to him. Of the Creator man had more knowledge from contemplating His presence than has subsequently been revealed as articles of faith, though less than he will have after the Resurrection from direct contemplation of God. Man was also taught visibly through inner inspiration. His knowledge of himself included a comprehension of his duty of governing and providing for the inferior creatures, and his obligations, which were of benefit to him, to obey and revere God. Man's naming the animals, which were made for him, revealed his understanding of their nature, not only for the sake of usefulness, but also for the sake of knowledge.

Moral knowledge also man possessed, for in knowing his own nature, he knew the ways he should walk in, what he should do and what he should avoid. Foreknowledge, to be sure, he lacked, for who would sin in the knowledge that he would thereby lose his pure obedience and free will? But man did know good and evil: good both by knowledge and by experience, and evil only by abstract knowledge. The ability to distinguish between good and evil was one of God's natural gifts to the soul.

The soul was made as the source of life and the ruler of the body. Free will, according to God's plan was to direct the reason; reason, the senses; and the senses, the body. The mind was free to move by itself, although its duty was to move in accordance with God's will. Sin
results from the departure from the right order whereby the soul rules the senses. (After the Fall, God punished the mind by opposing the senses to it, although it was left in control of the body.) The free will given man was the ability to turn to good or to evil, with a weakness toward evil, but with help given him to turn towards good. (Future free will after the Resurrection will be not only the ability not to sin, but the inability to sin, for man will then be fully strengthened against evil. After the Fall man kept his weakness toward evil but lost the original ability to avoid sin, until God gave him grace.)

Free will really depends both on will and on reason. The rational will chooses good with the help of grace. Freedom resides in the will, which desires, and choice, in the reason, which appraises what is to be chosen. Far from dominating the will, reason is but a counselor, which may be drawn into consent with the will in matters contrary to reason. Two different kinds of freedom are freedom from necessity, which is the negation of both freedom and will, and freedom from sin. Before the Fall, man had both types, for nothing could hinder him from good or compel him to evil, reason could judge perfectly, and will was able to desire the good. (After the Fall he lost freedom from sin until grace enabled him to overcome concupiscence and will the good, for otherwise the will would have chosen evil through inability to attain good and through imperfect desire for good, although man still kept the freedom from necessity.) Since freedom to do evil implies a contradiction, a discord between will and reason, which warns against evil, Hugh is also inclined to accept Augustine's definition of free will as the ability of the rational will, with the help of grace, to choose the good. Although man did not lack an abundance
of good, such was the human condition that he had the opportunity of deserving more, and an aspiration toward the greatest good.²⁶

Had man any virtues before the Fall? The discussion above implies that he had. The only evidence for inferring that he had not is the first sin, for Adam did not persist in the love of God, with the result that sin extinguished his original virtues. Thus it is alleged that if man had had courage, he would not have yielded to temptation; temperance, he would not have desired something different to eat; prudence, he would have been on guard; and justice, he would have kept the command. Since these virtues and the endowments that Satan envied in man, modesty, moderation, and charity, were nullified by man's sin, they were evidently impermanent; but since man was not immediately exiled from Paradise, they were nevertheless real.²⁷ Virtue Hugh defines as a mental emotion ordered according to reason and based on will. Man at first had natural virtue bestowed on him through creative grace (gratia creatrix). (This natural virtue, which man lost through sin, is restored by saving grace.) When the will moves according to nature, it merits nothing beyond nature, but when it moves according to God's will, it displays its excellence. Whereas man after the Fall can demonstrate the goodness of his will only by accepting the gift of the Holy Spirit, which is responsible for his good works, man before the Fall had good emotions, ordered according to justice, so that he naturally desired to pursue the good. As for the virtues moved by good will that acts through the love of God, Hugh hesitates to pronounce in the absence of authority or incontestable arguments about the works performed through love.²⁸

Adam, who was created a full-grown adult, perfect in body and in
mind, was both mortal and immortal. In that he was subject to exter-
nal violence and to sin, he was at least potentially mortal; but in
that he was given the Tree of Life to protect his body from harm and had the opportunity to win eternal life through obedience, he was potentially immortal. Man was divinely guarded from external violence and inwardly fortified with reason; had he not "opened the gate of negligence" by the abuse of reason, he could not have fallen. When he did so, he was justly deprived of God's protection. The first immortality, or hope of immortality, was from nature, whereas the second is from grace. The Tree of Life did not provide man with immortality; it sustained corporeal life and preserved the body from injury until man should be transferred and confirmed in immortality. That the imperfect immortality of man before the Fall was the result of the Tree, not the inherent quality of his body, is shown in God's order that man be cast out of the Garden lest he eat of the Tree of Life and be preserved. Thus man's mortality or immortality depended on his sinning or refraining from sin.29

The test was his obedience or disobedience of one precept of discipline. God gave man the precepts of nature along with his temporal gifts that man might practice discrimination about what he needed; He proposed eternal blessings to be won by keeping the precept of discipline. Thus it would have been no proof of merit if man had kept a command to use what nature already directed man to use or to avoid what nature bade him to avoid. The command to use something harmful against the precept of nature would have been a contradiction. Therefore the precept of discipline had to be given concerning something neither harmful nor essential, but of the class of things granted
man to use or not at his discretion. Objectors have asked: Why did God not bestow His blessings on man without qualification or without exception of the one fruit? Why did He command man to abstain from the fruit rather than to eat it? This command would have been more natural and easier to keep, yet it, too, would have tested man's obedience. Hugh replies that in view of the fact that God might have forbidden many things, the terms were easy. Had man been commanded to eat the fruit, Satan might have objected that man was obeying for the pleasure of eating the fruit, not for the love of God. The negative command was a test of "pure obedience." Moreover, it would have been more to man's credit to merit good by his own action than to receive it passively. In choosing for himself man had the opportunity of winning eternal happiness and immortality (or through disobedience, the danger of suffering the loss of both temporal and eternal welfare) and the opportunity of acquiring self-knowledge.

Much speculation has arisen about what man's body and soul would have been like and what sort of immortality he would have had if he had not sinned, and many conjectures have been made about the propagation, life, and merits of the children he would have had. Although such questions might be discussed in relation to the results of the Fall, it seems appropriate to consider them briefly in this discussion of man's life in the state of innocence. Although Hugh does not explain the Fall as the result of excessive and unlawful curiosity, nor does he, in his discussion of Adam and Eve, introduce any strictures against scientific investigations, he does condemn fruitless speculations in theology. In discussing the creation of Adam's soul, he affirms that it is best to accept the opinion that prevails in the
catholic faith (instead of those manifold opinions that are considered supervacuum et infructosum—superfluous and fruitless) that Adam's soul was created instantaneously from nothing at the same time that his body was made. But whether it was made inside or outside the body, "quanto difficilius est scire, tanto minus est periculosum ignorare"—it is as much the more difficult to know as it is the less dangerous not to know. And it is no less folly to presume to inquire into those matters which cannot be known than to be deficient in those matters in which there is no excuse for ignorance. Therefore it is more prudent to consider first what will satisfy a sound faith and to exclude matters of mere curiosity. Such questions as what sort of children Adam and Eve would have had if they had not sinned, however, Hugh finds a place to discuss because even though they are admittedly a sign of curiosity, they might be of use if discussed discreetly; since they are remote from our understanding, the best answers will be only probabilities, not dogmatic statements.

Following St. Augustine, Hugh declares that conception would have taken place without lust, and childbirth without pain. Had man persisted in obedience, he would have won immortal happiness. Probably the children would have been born before the parents were given immortality. Presumably the children would have been more mature physically and mentally at birth than children are now; possibly they could have walked and talked immediately. Although it is possible that they would not have been so small as babies are now, since God did not create a little wife, but a full-grown woman, from Adam's rib, it seems most unnatural that they should have been born with the same mental and physical status as their parents, although they would soon have
developed. To anyone who might object that the ignorance or comparative ignorance presupposed here is inappropriate to the state of innocence, Hugh replies that "ignorance" is inaccurately applied to children who do not know right and wrong, and should be applied only to those who do not know things that they ought to know. Although some believe that Adam and Eve could have had only good children, it seems unlikely that the children could have inherited their parents' justice, for the parents could not have been called perfect beyond the possibility of sin until they had fulfilled their obedience and had been confirmed in goodness and immortality. Moreover it seems unlikely that only the first man's obedience would have been tested. Although the parents' resistance of sin would possibly have given the children assisting grace, is it not likely that they and their descendants would have been tried in turn? But these suggestions are only theories. 38

III

For Milton's Adam and Eve, life in the Paradise of Pleasure was delightful and constructive, but by no means idle. Until after the Fall, painful, burdensome, or frustrating work was unknown in a garden where it was always spring; God was no hard taskmaster; an abundant harvest and leisure and refreshment were freely bestowed. Adam explains to Eve:

God hath set
Labour and rest, as day and night to men
Successive ...
...other Creatures all day long
Rove idle unimploid, and less need rest;
Man hath his daily work of body or mind
Appointed, which declares his Dignity. (IV, 612 ff.)
Although their "sweet gardening labour" is only enough to make them appreciate rest and the cool of evening, a certain amount of pruning and clearing is necessary if they mean to tread at ease in the almost too luxuriant garden. Eve's abilities at landscape architecture, too, help to make Paradise even more beautiful than the Garden of Adonis. Reference has already been made to Eve's other skills. There is also work of the mind: Adam, formed for contemplation, is eager to learn from Raphael, and Eve, to learn from Adam. Both rejoice in the willing service of prayers of thanksgiving, and both know that spiritual endeavor is required:

God made thee perfect, not immutable;  
And good he made thee, but to persevere  
He left it in thy power.  

(V, 52ff.)

Although Adam and Eve do refer several times to their hope of having children, it is not to be expected, in view of Milton's condemnation of fruitless theorizing as well as the unity of the poem, that Milton should allot much space to Hugh's question of the children that might have been born in Paradise. Michael just briefly mentions the possibility:

this had been  
Perhaps thy capital Seat, from whence had spred  
All generations, and had hither come  
From all the ends of th'Earth to celebrate  
And reverence thee thir great Progenitor.  

(XI, 342ff.)

This opportunity of a personal visit to Adam, C. S. Lewis especially regrets missing: "To you or to me, once in a lifetime perhaps, would have fallen the almost terrifying honour of coming at last, after long journeys and ritual preparations and slow ceremonial approaches, into the very presence of the great Father, Priest and Emperor of the planet Tellus; a thing to be remembered all our lives." That all descendants
would have had this privilege is not, to Hugh at least, a foregone conclusion, since the children would not have been exempted from the same trial of obedience. This same implication may be found in Raphael's warning

least the like befall
In Paradise to Adam or his Race,
Charg'd not to touch the interdicted Tree. (VII, 44 ff.)

More probably, however, the meaning is that Adam's fall would involve that of his race, not that his descendants would have to prove their obedience to the same command, for Milton states in the Christian Doctrine that just as "in the covenant, that is, in receiving the commandment of God, so also in the defection from God, he either stood or fell for the whole human race." (XV, 183)

Like Hugh, Milton treats Adam and Eve as potentially mortal or immortal according to their moral choice. Man's disobedience brings death into the world, for after his sin, unless redeemed, he must die, "Die hee or Justice must." (III, 210) Just before the Creation God proclaims his plans for a better race than the fallen angels to repeople Heaven. In addition to the happiness of remaining in Paradise if obedient, man is given reason to hope that in time he "With Angels may participate." (V, 494) Nevertheless the bread of angels is not so ethereal that Raphael may not partake of the fruits and liquors of Paradise "with keen dispatch," even after the ambrosial fruits and mellifluous dews of Heaven, since men and angels differ in degree, not in kind. Reference has already been made (in Chapter II above) to the Tree of Life, which, perhaps in combination with the other fruits, would presumably have turned the bodies of Adam and Eve to spirit. The fruit of this tree Adam and Eve did not taste. That Adam and Eve were
not susceptible to pain or injury until their sin, rendered Adam "Foe not formidable" from Satan's point of view, although this preservation was not the result of the fruit of the Tree of Life. The divine protection, unspecified in what form by Hugh, that prevents external violence, takes the form in *Paradise Lost* of

Angel wings,
And flaming Ministers to watch and tend
Thir earthie Charge,

(IX, 155 ff.)
as Satan has good reason to know from his recent encounter with Ithuriel, Zophon, and Gabriel. Of man's inner fortification of reason, more will be said later; Eve might have given the Adversary the same retort that the Lady gave Comus: "Thou canst not touch the freedom of my minde." (Comus, 663)

Just as Hugh attributes to man natural virtues founded on reason and will, Milton presents Adam and Eve as perfect although free to fall. By no means "stupidly good," they are neither ignorant nor childlike, although there is possibly some justification for a comparison between Wordsworth's happy child and best philosopher, trailing clouds of glory from Heaven, and Adam, who admits that he feels that he is happier than he knows. Adam and Eve are, however, impressively mature. The creation of man in the image of God resulted in his being endued with "natural wisdom, holiness, and righteousness... extraordinary wisdom." (C.D., XIV, 53) So in the poem Adam and Eve, who are just and right, exhibit "Truth, Wisdom, Sanctitude severe and pure." (IV, 293) Whether these virtues are the result of grace and if so, what kind of grace, it is difficult to determine, according to Sister Mary Irma Corcoran; but "it is most likely that [Milton] regarded Adam's original spiritual perfection as complete in itself without any addition of
actual graces." Adam did not receive supernatural assistance in good works before the Fall, but he is said to have suffered "loss of divine grace." (G.D., XV, 205) Abundant evidence of man's virtue might be cited from the poem: in their first conversation Adam and Eve reveal gratitude toward God and humble willingness to obey Him; they express love for each other; and Adam fulfills his duty as Eve's "Guide And Head" in reminding her of the command, whereas she expresses beautifully her humble love for him. Adam, still sinless in his desire to know, readily accepts Raphael's counsel of temperance in knowledge as in food. Although immune to pain, nevertheless he displays courage in his willingness to oppose Satan vigorously. Courtesy, sincerity, and purity characterize the relationship between Adam and Eve. Even after the Fall they retain sufficient virtue that with the assistance of grace they are contrite toward God. Eve reconciles Adam with her by her humble and unselfish love, and he forgives her. Adam is filled with compassion for the sorrows of his race. With renewed hope and trust in God, both depart ready for a life of Christian fortitude, patience, and charity.

For man's actions to have moral value, it was necessary that he should be free to choose between good and evil, else he would have been reduced, as Milton comments in Areopagita, to "a mere artificial[1] Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions." Just as Hugh uses freedom as the ability to choose between good and evil, and the ability to desire and follow the good, Milton also uses freedom to mean unrestrained moral choice (e.g. "free to fall") or obedience to reason and the law of God (e.g. "What obeyes Reason, is free") according to the context. (III, 99; IX, 352 f.) Hugh's statement that free will really
implies both reason and will has a counterpart in Milton's explanation that "Reason is also choice." (III, 108) God could not have been satisfied with the virtues of an artificial Adam or artificial angels constrained by necessity, for what proof could they have given of obedience, faith, or love unless they had been free to choose in accordance with a fully informed reason? Whereas Hugh states that Adam's reason was subservient to his will, which ought to have functioned according to the dictates of reason and God's will, however, Milton treats reason as the higher faculty. Nevertheless they agree that will and reason go together. The function of reason is described by Adam:

the fancy shapes images from sensory information;

She forms Imaginations, Aerie shapes,  
Which Reason joyning or disjoyning, frames  
All what we affirm or what deny, and call  
Our knowledge or opinion.  

(V, 105 ff.)

Reason, however, is not infallible, Adam warns:

But God left free the Will, for what obeys  
Reason, is free, and Reason he made right  
But bid her well beware, and still erect,  
Least by some faire appeering good surpris'd  
She dictate false, and misinforme the Will  
To do what God expressly hath forbid.  

(IX, 351 ff.)

Adam is warned by Raphael to beware

least Passion sway  
[His] Judgement to do aught, which else free Will  
Would not admit.  

(VIII, 635 ff.)

While innocent, Adam subordinates his lower faculties to reason; that Milton does not disparage sensory knowledge in itself is further illustrated by Raphael's statement that the angels possess "every lower facultie Of sense." (V, 410 ff.) As Adam tells Raphael, he is able to "Approve the best, and follow what [he] approve[s]." (VIII, 611)

Even though his will was capable of turning toward evil, and his reason
was not infallible, Adam was not hindered nevertheless from choosing the good.

Although the question of how reason and will were responsible for the Fall will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, it may be noted here that Adam's assertion of self-will contrary to his better knowledge is closer than Eve's sin to Hugh's account of sin as the result of overriding will in conflict with reason. To make the dichotomy between "intellectualism" and "voluntarism," corrupted reason in Eve's sin and corrupted will in Adam's, as Green does, however, is to ignore the full complexity of the problem. To be sure, Eve errs most in reason and Adam in will. But it is well to remember that right reason is loyal not only to the standards of intellect, "logical or empirical integrity," but to beauty and goodness, and that it is a mistake to make all morality the province of the will as separate from intellect, for that "would make the will intellectually irresponsible and science morally irrelevant." In our best tradition, established by Plato and given spiritual depth by Christianity, reason and morality are inseparable, "virtue is self-knowledge," and knowledge aims at truth and results in wisdom and righteousness. Thus in Paradise Lost Adam's supreme and most godlike faculty, reason, in which true love was located (VIII, 590), and in which his soul had its being, was to maintain order and harmony among the lesser faculties and to guide his soul in accordance with right Reason.

Man was endowed with comprehensive knowledge of God, of himself, and of his world. The parallel has already been drawn (in Chapter III) between Hugh's account of man's ability to know God through reason and Milton's treatment of Adam's recognition of the existence of a Creator.
even before God revealed Himself. Whereas Hugh, believing that Adam had more knowledge of God by direct contemplation than has been subsequently revealed, would probably have agreed with the opinion that with the exception of the second Adam, the first Adam was the "greatest philosopher and greatest divine" ever born. Milton's Adam at first conceives of God by reason only as the great First Cause, and although he contemplates the Son of God he is chiefly taught by Him through revelation. Hugh's statement that Adam was informed "visibly by inner inspiration" and Ambrose's explanation of Adam's transportation to Paradise as a kind of abstraction by the Divine Afflatus have some parallel in the dream that stood at the head of Milton's Adam and enabled him to know what was taking place.

This account of the beginning of man's knowledge from the time when he first rose instinctively to his feet as a mature adult is especially revealing since Adam explores the difficult subject of his first consciousness from the point of view of his greater maturity. Characteristically he looked first to Heaven; then he explored his surroundings; he became conscious of himself, though not of his origin; finally he inferred the existence of his Creator. His degree of perception then is evident in the recognition: "[I] feel that I am happier than I know." (VIII, 282) It has already been noted (Chapter III) that Adam could name the sun, and later the animals, but not God. For the naming of the animals, Adam received divine enlightenment of his "sudden apprehension." This action was also a step in self-knowledge, for Adam realized that he was, as Raphael describes him,

\[
\text{a Creature who not prone} \\
\text{And Brute as other Creatures, but endued} \\
\text{With Sanctitude of Reason, might erect} \\
\text{His Stature, and upright with Front serene}
\]
Govern the rest, self-knowing, and from thence
Majestic to correspond with Heav'n. (VII, 506)

It is Adam, incidentally, who truly realizes the import of man's superior endowments, not Eve, who thinks that the animals do not look incapable of reason. Reference has already been made to the knowledge and reasoning ability he displayed in requesting a mate. Although not formed, like him, for contemplation or as eager to acquire abstract knowledge from Raphael, Eve argues intelligently and is evidently capable of "what [is] high."

Unlike some commentators who asserted that Adam was perfect in knowledge, Milton treats Adam as excellent but perfectible. He has, however, as much knowledge as is consonant with his first state of perfection. In his explanation of Eve's dream and in his later discussion of reason and will, he shows a sound knowledge of psychology, although understandably he is unable to explain a dream of diabolic inspiration. Night and the purpose of starlight he can explain to Eve's satisfaction. Heaven is "as the Book of God" to him, but not everything is revealed, for when Adam would push his inquiries about the stars too far, with some suggestion of criticism, Raphael is obliged to counsel temperance in knowledge. Farfetched and fruitless speculations are a "fond impertinence" that interrupts the "sweet of Life." Instead of seeking to "know at large of things remote," Adam should recognize that

Heav'n is for thee too high
To know what passes there; be lowlie wise;
Think onely what concerns thee and thy being. (VIII, 172 ff.)

Milton in his own person has commented:

O yet happiest if ye seek
No happier state, and know to know no more. (IV, 774 ff.)
Later Michael directs Adam to add "Deeds to [his] knowledge answerable." (XII, 582)

In knowledge as in other respects, man has what is fitting for him in his place in the scale of being. God's omniscience is infinitely beyond man's capacity; the angels, who use intuitive reason more often, whereas man uses discursive reason more, have higher reasoning ability, "Differing but in degree, of kind the same"; (V, 490); and man may learn more both for himself in the "Book of God" and by revelation. Eager to learn more, he hears from Raphael the story of creation, some valuable comments on man's place in the universe, and the account of Satan's fall. Although he accepts the angel's warning about knowledge, he disregards the advice about his relationship with Eve. After the Fall Michael unfolds the course of history and the plan of salvation to him and furnishes him with a moral code.

In view of Milton's zeal in learning and his comprehensive grasp of knowledge, one would expect him to deprecate learning without judgment, but not to set any bounds to inquiry. Especially in Areopagitica, in which he relegates Plato's censorship to the "aigrie Burgomasters" of an imaginary commonwealth and champions Galileo's independent research in astronomy, he does not appear to consider Heaven too high. He further approves scientific studies in Of Education, in which natural philosophy (the study of meteors, minerals, plants, and anatomy of living creatures), physics, astronomy, the physiology of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and such applied sciences as physic (medicine) and "enginery" are part of the curriculum. Moreover the pupils are not to acquire natural knowledge wholly from the
fabulous Pliny, but rather they are to gain as often as possible "the helpful experiences of Hunters...Apothecaries, [etc.]." Not natural science itself, then, but the excogitated hypotheses of cycle and epicycle, and the pedantry and sophistry of many of the scholastic trivialities, he attacks as Bacon did, preferring the study of the manners of men, of volcanoes, clouds, and comets, and the virtues of stones and plants, and above all, the mind itself and "those holy minds... with whom hereafter it is to enter into everlasting companionship."59

Yet Adam is warned by Raphael not to seek "to know at large of things remote." (VIII, 191) The study of nature in itself is praiseworthy, but some matters God has set beyond man's grasp. To inquire into these to the exclusion of more important concerns indicates a faulty system of values. Moreover Raphael detects a note of criticism of the divine plan in Adam's suggestion of "disproportion." By contrast the curiosity of the supposed "stripling angel" merits Uriel's praise "The more it seems excess" because his purpose is to glorify God. Thus knowledge itself, for all its excellence, Milton does not regard as the highest good or the greatest source in itself of human happiness. It must be measured in relation to other values. The test of its worth is its use and the motives for which it is sought. Likewise Francis Bacon warned that knowledge must not be sought for pleasure, power, or superiority, but for the "benefit and use of human life"; whereas the angels fell through lust for power, and man, through lust for knowledge, charity knows no excess.51 Although Adam's motives are not sinful, it will generally be agreed that Adam could "do better at this stage than become a learned astronomer."52
In view of Milton's condemnation of the "new limbo's and new hells" which censorship provided for books, and his assertion that gold may be found in the "drossiest volume," it is to be expected that he would have had little sympathy with Ambrose's condemnation of the heretical books. "Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with lesse danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity then by reading all manner of tractats, and hearing all manner of reason?" For that matter, Milton did not believe that anyone had a monopoly on truth, but that it was wise to tolerate all writings (short of arrant intolerance and superstition) in the hope of thereby learning some part of the truth. Nevertheless he would have been in sympathy with Ambrose's recommendation of careful scrutiny and his exhortation to the catechumens not to be confused by perfunctory citations of the Bible and heretical doctrines; for what is useful to the wise man as a trial of virtue and truth may be vain and dangerous to an untried intelligence. Therefore "children and childish men, who have not the art to qualify and prepare these working mineralIs, well may be exhorted to forbear, though hindered forcibly they cannot be."53

With Hugh's opinion that it is more foolish to presume too far in pursuing abstruse matters beyond man's ability to discover than to be ignorant of matters that do concern man, Milton would have been in sympathy. At Cambridge he was opposed to the smattering of theology acquired by young men of "raw and untutored judgment,"54 and especially to the "warty controversies of the sophists" in the "almost monstrous
volumes of the subtle doctors"—trivialities that blunted the mind, "enforced vanities," studies excluded from Parnassus, unless relegated to the unlovely foot of the hill, "overgrown with thistles and thick nettles, far removed from... the sound of Apollo's lyre." Here his objections to the scholastics are carried further probably than Hugh, who belongs with the pre-scholastics at least, would have admitted, but Milton did devote more study to them than the passage indicates. With Hugh's willingness to accept the Roman Catholic dogma as it stood, he would naturally not have agreed, although he would have approved of Hugh's acknowledgment that it is often necessary to be content with probabilities rather than to attempt to assert incontestable dogmas.

Milton's principles for achieving a sound faith are best formulated in his introduction to the Christian Doctrine; he took the grounds of faith from divine revelation alone; he studied the Scripture thoroughly; then he turned to theological writings, and finally with increased confidence to the more copious treatises (where frequently he found "adverse reasonings either evaded by wretched shifts, or attempted to be refuted... by an affected display of formal sophisms... or the quibbles of the grammarians"). Believing that God prefers diligent inquiry to "indolent credulity" and that the Church benefits from freedom of discussion, since we are ordered to "prove all things," he hoped to contribute to the progress of religion and to the restoration of the Church, after over thirteen hundred years, to something of its original purity. Relying on his individual faith and the hope of divine assistance, he adhered only to the Bible. (C.D., XIV, 5-15)

Finally, a clarification of Milton's attitude toward knowledge
in comparison with Plato's may be summarized from Miss Samuel's Plato and Milton. For Plato the greatest good was knowledge or wisdom in a hierarchy in which lesser knowledge, if not dispensed with, was subordinated to the knowledge of first things—not abstract knowledge, but ethical knowledge to be put into practice. Plato's standard of knowledge as the measure of temperance Milton converts into a higher ethical system whereby man ascends to the knowledge of God, but faith replaces knowledge, and conduct is governed by love of God and neighbor. Lack of faith reverses the scale of values and corrupts reason and in turn will. The key to Milton's attitude is to be found in Areopagitica: "The knowledge cannot defile...if the will and conscience be not defiled," and in Paradise Regained, in which Christ rejects the final temptation, partial and pagan knowledge, in favor of the true wisdom—light from above.56

The excellence of man's moral knowledge before the Fall may be inferred from Milton's definition of education as an attempt "To repair the ruins of our first Parents by regaining to know God aright." Even apart from the command, which will be discussed below, man's knowledge of good and evil may be amply illustrated from Paradise Lost. Here Milton is closer to Hugh, who believed that Adam and Eve knew good directly and by experience, and evil, abstractly, than to Ambrose, who considered the knowledge of evil an incentive to sin, and hence rightly forbidden. Only after the Fall is man told how Law evinces sin and how it can "discover sin, but not remove" (XII, 290); this danger is absent from the first knowledge of evil. Adam and Eve are aware of evil as a potentiality in their own nature:

Evil into the mind of God or Man
May come and go, so unapprov'd, and leave
No spot or blame behind. (V, 117 ff.)
Both know that they are not immutable. They have had the express
warning from Raphael of their danger from Satan, of the nature and
consequences of evil as illustrated in his fall, and of the sort of
arguments with which a righteous being (in this case, Abdiel) can
oppose the forces of evil. Although Eve is not present for the useful
advice about moderation in the desire for knowledge, she hears the
warning against disobedience from Raphael and later the cautions of
Adam about the deception of reason. Adam is capable of judging from
his own as yet sinless experience how upstart passions may catch the
government from reason. Both are aware that the real danger lies
within themselves; they do not know evil by experience; they know
evil "by good."

Of the good, they have abundant knowledge by experience. With
gratitude they reverence God as

infinitely good, and of his good
As liberal and free as infinite. (IV, lll f.)

It has already been noted that on first beholding his Creator, Adam
asked how he might worship Him. In addition to their own sense of
gratitude and happiness, Adam and Eve learn from Raphael of their
prospect of even greater future happiness and of the wisdom of content-
ment:

Mean while enjoy
Your full what happiness this happie state
Can comprehend, incapable of more. (V, 503 ff.)

Thus Adam and Eve were not living in a fool's Paradise (else we should
conclude that the fruit, like the bitter prophetical book in the Apocalypse,
was worth its cost); they had simply not yet fallen into the "doom...
of knowing good and evil, that is to say of knowing good by evil", 58
they possessed the highest good: ethical knowledge and the love of God. 59
For man to affirm the good, it was necessary that his virtue be
tested and perfected by a positive choice of good and rejection of
evil. Therefore he was commanded not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge.
Adam and Eve both know this command and regarded it as an easy charge.
Adam, who has heard the command directly from God, reminds Eve in his
first speech (evidently not his first discussion of it) that God re-
quires "This one, this easy charge." (IV, 421) The ease of keeping
this command is emphasized: "The only sign of our obedience"; "One
easy prohibition"; "...whose command Single, is yet so just"; "that
sole command So easily obey'd." (IV, 428, 433; V, 551 ff.; VII, 48)
Nor is there any mistake about the Tree; for Eve, recognizing it
immediately, repeats the command to the Serpent, and Adam on hearing
Eve's account of her trespass, exclaims:

How art thou lost, how on a sudden lost
Defac't, deflourd, and now to Death devote? (IX, 900 ff.)

In the Christian Doctrine Milton explains why man was tested by
"an act indifferent in its own nature": man being naturally good,
needed no formal covenant to bind him to do right and so could not
prove his obedience except to an arbitrary command, which was not
actually a covenant, but "a pledge, as it were, and memorial of
obedience." (XV, 113-115) Except for this pledge, although God is
the source of moral law, Adam and Eve lived by the innate law of
conscience written on their hearts. (C.D. XV, 179) So in the poem
Eve explains:

God so commanded, and left that Command
Sole Daughter of his voice; the rest, we live
Law to ourselves, our Reason is our Law. (IX, 652 ff.)

With that exception, "God and Nature bid the same." (VI, 176) Milton's
treatment here is in accord with Hugh's explanation of the command as
a test of pure obedience, differentiated from what was both pleasant to man and in accord with natural law.

The arbitrariness of the command, nevertheless, gives rise to some objections. The myth, although transformed by Milton, treats of the arbitrary taboo imposed by Jehovah. Obedience as Milton conceived of it, however, meant loyalty to the source of value as expressed in a good life in accordance with right reason. Moreover God is not identified with Nature, regardless of the command; and Adam exercised moral responsibility anyway in ordering his life according to the right scale of values, for it required conscious choice for him to approve the best and follow what he approved. Nor was it necessary that reason be the sole guide, for through divine revelation man could be brought to comprehend matters beyond even his god-given reason. Therefore one would not expect the command to be given about an indifferent object invested by God's definition with adventitious significance, but with respect to an action whose moral significance was absolute. Yet to be sure, the command was not at variance with reason and conscience (like the demand that Isaac be sacrificed, for example), or, especially in view of God's bounty, in itself unjust. Only to Eve's reason, deluded by Satan, did it appear to involve a deprivation. That man could not comprehend a reason for the prohibition, moreover, gave him an opportunity to affirm the highest value in the system—faith in, and love of, God. This love and reverence Adam and Eve expressed at first so completely that the fear of death (but vaguely apprehended as "Som dreadful thing no doubt") counted as only a very secondary motive for obedience. (IV, l26) By contrast, after Eve's sin Adam weighs his love for her only against the prospect of
death, not against the love of God.) Even in the absence of an explanation on God's part, Adam and Eve, who acknowledged God to be perfectly good and wise and the source of good, heard enough from Raphael to perceive the justice of His ways and to appreciate Abdiel's question: "Shalt thou give Law to God?" (V, 819) Finally, although the command itself dealt with an indifferent matter, man's obedience to God was an obligation based on the most reasonable grounds.

Although the main discussion of the Fall is reserved for the following chapter, it has seemed best to relate the problem of knowledge to the temptation, since Satan's sophistical arguments, based on a wrong view of man's knowledge, are comparable with some of the objections, cited by Ambrose, to the command. While seeking to plot against man by subtlety, Satan finds his opportunity when he overhears the command. In tempting Eve, he feigns great indignation at God's petty and envious prohibition, but in truth he does find it unjust since he cannot comprehend God's motive:

Knowledge forbid'd'n?
Suspicious, reasonless. Why should thir Lord
Envie them that? can it be sin to know,
Can it be death? and do they onely stand
By Ignorance, is that thir happie state,
The proof of thir obedience and thir faith? (IV, 515 ff.)

Although he deliberately lies about the Tree, and although he boasts later of having defrauded man with an apple, he apparently takes the Tree of Knowledge as magically efficacious.

In the temptation scene his arguments about knowledge are based on three false premises: man does not know good and evil; the Tree can supply such knowledge; and man will both escape blame, for he cannot justly be held morally responsible, and benefit from the knowledge.

What knowledge and happiness can Eve expect to gain? Satan offers her
scientific knowledge of "Things in thir Causes" and the ways of God and the angels (IX, 681 f.), and such moral knowledge as will enable her to avoid evil, "since easier shunned" if known (IX, 699), and to attain a higher and happier life. He has already spoken of the vast speculations on "All things visible in Heav'n, Or Earth, or Middle" (IX, 601 f.) that he has gained along with new godlike insight. Although not wholly convinced that she can escape the penalty, she believes that she has been denied good, for good unknown is as though it were not had, and that she lacks the knowledge to be morally responsible:

What fear I then, rather what know to feare
Under this ignorance of Good and Evil,
Of God or Death, of Law or Penaltie? (IX, 773 ff.)

Thoroughly skeptical of the arguments that she knows to be founded on reason and moral law, she is wholly credulous of the one kind of knowledge through which her reason is deluded—sensory experience. That her courtly Serpent is a real snake, wondrously elevated by the fruit, she does not doubt, although he does not so much as touch it in her presence. And although she has eloquently expressed her realization of happiness in the beautiful lines beginning:

With thee conversing I forget all time,
All seasons and thir change, all please alike, (IV, 639 f.)

it does not now occur to her to refute Satan's pragmatic arguments from her own experience, much less from her moral knowledge. She has forgotten her former gratitude to God, now termed "Our great Forbidder," along with her obligations to Him and to Adam.

Since she has not previously cared excessively for abstract knowledge (she prefers her information on astronomy in a sugar-coated form) and since she does not really want moral knowledge in order to
practice virtue (not Eve but Satan suggests that she will want to
know evil that she may shun it), it is evident, however, that those
"glittering generalities," happiness and knowledge, are but rationali-
zations of her desires for pleasure, new adventures, and gratification
of her vanity. The advantages of godhead obviously attract her. It
is unnecessary to point out here that the knowledge, happiness, and
godhead resulting from the sin are but temporary illusions. Having
chosen the expedient "Cure of all, this Fruit Divine," (IX, 776) for
the "wrong purpose, on false grounds, and at the cost of a higher
good,"\(^61\) she praises first the fruit, for its supposed usefulness,
and second, significantly, experience, her "best guide."\(^{62}\)

A final note on man's knowledge (although referring to a topic
nominally outside this chapter) may be added. Having learned from
Michael's revelation how good may overcome evil and what fortitude
a Christian must practice, Adam acknowledges his contentment with
this knowledge and deprecates the knowledge to which he was previously
foolish enough to aspire (i.e. the speculations on astronomy). Michael
replies:

> This having learnt, thou hast attained the summe
> Of wisdom; hope no higher, though all the Starrs
> Thou knewest by name, and all th'ethereal Powers,
> All secrets of the deep, all Natures works,
> Or works of God in Heav'n, Air, Earth, or Sea. (XII, 575 ff.)

Not this knowledge, but the wisdom described by Adam, when practiced in
"Deeds to his knowledge answerable," (XII, 582) will secure him the
Paradise within.

In conclusion, Milton's treatment of Adam and Eve in the state of
innocence is in accord with the mediaeval view of them as impressive in
their wisdom and righteousness. Most of the comparisons have been made
between Milton and Hugh, since Hugh's account is more systematic and comprehensive than that of Ambrose, and since Milton is closer to Hugh in his interpretation of man's moral knowledge. Whereas Ambrose reads the passage on keeping and dressing the garden as the type of right labor and a wholly spiritual endeavor, Milton's Adam and Eve perform both constructive physical work in the garden and the spiritual duties of worship. Ambrose's allegory of the soul in harmony among the virtues is, however, illustrated in the purity and spiritual beauty of Milton's Adam and Eve before the Fall.

Ambrose's discussion of man's moral knowledge contains some ambiguities: man was forbidden moral knowledge because unless it is perfect (like God's) it results only in sin; yet man was held responsible for sinning because natural judgment taught him to revere God, the command defined the evil to be avoided, and opinions of good and evil were impressed in his heart so that human judgment was as God's law. Man understood "evil" simply as something to be avoided, for not knowledge by experience but faith was required of him. Nevertheless the knowledge of evil, which is bad if it defrauds man of good, may be good if it enhances the good by contrast; the test of its value is its use. With much of this, Milton agrees: knowledge of evil by experience, forbidden to man, defrauds him of good; before the Fall, men's reason is his law (except for the command); by nature, he reveres God. Yet Ambrose differs from Milton in not regarding man as originally perfect, in treating the law written on man's heart more as instinct than as reason, in arguing that man originally lacked moral knowledge, and in treating moral knowledge (rather than the experience of evil) as the result of the Fall.
Much closer to Milton is Hugh's account of man as originally rational and perfect but capable of increasing in perfection. Hugh and Milton agree in a high estimate of man's knowledge. Milton does not say as Hugh does that Adam knew more about God from contemplation than subsequent men have had revealed, but he has Adam recount how natural reason led him to recognize a First Cause, his Creator, and how God then appeared to him, and he treats education after the Fall as the attempt to regain Adam's knowledge of God. The dream of God corresponds to Ambrose's statement that in being placed in Paradise, Adam was taken by the Divine Afflatus, and to Hugh's discussion of inner inspiration. Milton's Adam also learns by observation, reason, and revelation, as in Hugh's account. Hugh's description of man's moral knowledge as the knowledge of good both abstractly and by experience, and only the abstract knowledge of evil until the Fall provided the experience of evil, is a clear formulation of the doctrine which Ambrose suggests in part and which Milton presents. Milton's Adam and Eve experience the highest good, knowledge and love of God, and are further instructed by Abdiel's refutation of Satan; they know evil only by good. They have the knowledge appropriate to their place in the scale of being, which they also understand. In setting the bounds to knowledge, Milton does not oppose sensory knowledge or science as such, but (like Ambrose) stale, flat, and unprofitable ex-cogitations, just as his strictures against the barren theological disputes of the scholastics are in accord with Hugh's rejection of overactive curiosity about matters outside the province of reason. For Milton the test of knowledge is (as Ambrose and Hugh agree) its use and relation to other values, of which the highest is light from above.
Although Milton assigns the supremacy to reason, and Hugh, to will, they agree that "Reason is also choice." Both think of freedom not only as the absence of necessity but also as the ability to follow right reason; and both make virtue, the harmonious ordering of man's nature to follow the highest good, the province of will and reason combined. All three writers treat man before the Fall as potentially mortal and immortal, living (as Ambrose says) in the shadow of eternal life ("What if Earth Be but the shadow of Heav'n [?] [P.L.V., 574 f.]), divinely guarded from external harm and inwardly enlightened, and capable of meriting or forfeiting immortality by his moral choice. In discussing the command as the opportunity for that choice and for man to acquire self-knowledge from the results, both Hugh and Milton agree that only an arbitrary command about a matter naturally indifferent could have been a test of pure obedience as distinct from what was natural and pleasant to man, although both treat the sin as a violation not only of this precept of discipline but also (in the motives for disobeying) of the natural law of reason.

This interpretation makes Satan's sophistries apparent. In arguing that Adam and Eve have been unjustly deprived of moral knowledge, which the Tree can supply, and that lacking it, they cannot be held morally responsible, he induces Eve to suppose that she can learn the ways of God and the angels and things in their causes, that she might as well not possess good as not know it, and that she needs knowledge of evil to avoid evil. In these subtle arguments of Satan's, Milton is closer to Ambrose, who cites them as objections raised by heretics. In the clear refutation which the poem provides, however, he is closer to the well reasoned discussion by Hugh of St. Victor.
CHAPTER VI

"THE MORTAL SIN ORIGINAL"

I

Ambrose's account of the temptation treats more of the motivation of Satan and Eve than that of Adam. Satan, the Adversary, appears as the Serpent, the type of pleasure and the wisdom of the flesh in opposition to both the senses and the divine command. In offering illicit delight, he feigned the appearance of nature. Ambrose does not refer here to his appearing as a serpent, but to his offer of what appeared to be natural—pleasure. He gained access through man's failure to distinguish illicit pleasure from the natural delight of the Paradise of Pleasure. His motivation was envy that man, an inferior creature of mud, should be given Paradise and the hope of Heaven, whereas he, a superior being, unable to retain his original grace, had been cast down into the world. Considering man's origin and his soul's imprisonment in corruptible matter, Satan though to deceive him into desiring a better state. Finally Ambrose attributes to him this vivid piece of soliloquizing: "In what respect do I seem to be wiser than all others if I do not ensnare man and gain him by fraud and subtlety?"

Therefore he decided to begin with Eve and deceive Adam through her, because she knew the command only indirectly, whereas he had heard it from God. Elsewhere Ambrose observes that Satan dared not tempt Adam but hoped that Eve could overcome him with female charm (feminis illecbris). His method of procedure with her was his accustomed sophistry, "the poison of knowledge,...that men may think
true those things that are false," and pretended friendship, which incites men to "sins that arise from pleasure or a certain mental levity." True and false he mingled, for sometimes Satan lies, and sometimes he speaks the truth of his envenomed heart.

Whereas he appeared to use God's words, in reality he said something very different: "Of every tree ye shall not eat." To be sure, Eve was inaccurate in attempting to correct him, for she added, "...or touch it, lest ye die." Moreover an addition to God's command implies a suspicion that it was imperfect. Possibly, Ambrose concedes, the addition was the fault of Adam, who wished to make his wife more cautious; if so, he erred. Why should man not have touched it, though it was the source of evil, since handling any strange food or drink may serve as a valuable warning? The fault, however, was probably Eve's, for we do not have Adam's words on record, but we do know that the first error, sin, and lie were Eve's.5

Although one of the most persuasive inducements to sin was gluttony,6 it is doubtful that that alone could have swayed Eve without the added temptation of illicit ambition.7 Satan's offer that the eyes of Adam and Eve would be opened was true, though a harmful truth, for it might have been predicted, "They shall see, and not see." His assurance that Eve need not fear death, however, was false. Finally, the promise "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil" was not only false but also an instigation to idolatry in the mention of many gods. Eve's poor judgment and credulity are evident both in her acceptance of all these suggestions and in her belief, even before she had tasted the fruit that it was good to eat.8

Adam was not deceived but fell through his wife. What motive did she have for tempting him? By implicating him in guilt, she did not
escape punishment. None of the usual motives for sin—wrath, greed, and fear—seems exactly applicable. Greed for fruit, which partly motivated the first sin, was satisfied when she ate; so was her desire for knowledge, else the whole discussion of the Tree would be invalidated. Certainly she had no anger towards Adam. Only in a sense did fear influence her, for she was afraid of being cast out of Paradise alone. Although if she had really loved him, she should have prevented his eating the fruit, nevertheless her chief motive was love and the desire to have Adam with her. Even those who would mistakenly exonerate her from guilt in eating the fruit because they believe that she lacked moral knowledge and responsibility must admit that in corrupting Adam she sinned intentionally in the knowledge of the bad results of the first sin.  

Without exonerating Adam, Ambrose does blame him less than Eve, for until her creation he remained innocent in solitude. ("Two Paradises 'twere in one To live in Paradise alone.") Paraphrasing God's rebuke to Adam, Ambrose condemns him for abandoning "speculum mundi, incolatum Paradisi, et gratiam Christi"—the mirror of the world, the habitation of Paradise, and the grace of Christ—for the sake of a woman. To be sure, his fall is not surprising, for were not even the mighty Samson and the wise Solomon deceived by their wives? Nevertheless Adam's sin differs little from idolatry and includes desire for illicit pleasure and ambition. Certainly the consequences were disastrous, for Adam's irresponsibility made the steps whereby the Robber may ascend to attack Adam's children. Both Adam and Eve violated the natural hierarchy: Eve, in acting on her own initiative, and Adam, in following her instead of taking the lead.
Hugh also discusses the temptation from the standpoint of Adam, Eve, and Satan. (His discussion of the problem of God's permission of evil is reserved for the following chapter.) Having fallen through pride, Satan envied man the opportunity through obedience to take the place that the rebellious angels lost. Although the temptation was permitted (since it would have been less to man's credit to stand untempted than to resist evil), he acted here through free will just as in the beginning he was free to make his choice and express his judgment of God for his immutable persistence in evil resulted from his own obstinacy. Nevertheless he was not wholly unrestricted; he could not appear in the shape of a lamb, for example, or a dove (aside from the fact that the Holy Spirit had already appropriated that bird), but was compelled to take the form of a serpent as a warning to Adam and Eve, who knew its guile. The temptation was, moreover, his only way of harming man, whom he could not surpass by virtue or, because of the divine protection, harm by violence. Instead his part was to provide the external temptation which co-operated with man's internal temptation to cause sin, whereas he himself had fallen without external temptation (in Milton's words, "Self-tempted") and therefore without hope of pardon.

Wishing first to corrupt Eve, the weaker vessel, Satan sought diligently until he found her apart from Adam. But consider how great the confusion of wickedness is in the presence of virtue. Satan, standing face to face with the woman, was so fearful that his malice would be detected that he dared not persuade her to sin until he had
tried her out first with questions. Even though she was inferior to Adam in reason as well as physically, it may be questioned why she was not alarmed at a talking serpent. Hugh suggests that in view of her inexperience, she might have believed that it was newly created and endowed by God with the gift of speech. Cautiously Satan began by pretending to question God's command and by inducing Eve to doubt God's love. At her hesitant substitution of "lest perhaps ye die" for "lest ye die the death," he dared to contradict God by asserting, "Ye shall never die." It has already been observed in the preceding chapter that Eve's words here, though less sure than they should have been, indicate nevertheless that she knew the command; the Biblical implication is that she had it from Adam, the intermediary between her and God, since she was subject to Adam's counsel and had been absent, indeed not yet created, when God gave the command to Adam.

Cleverly Satan first denied evil in order to overcome her fears and then sought to persuade her that he was freeing her from evil. To appeal to her gluttony, vainglory, and covetousness, he offered the fruit itself and promised likeness to God and the knowledge of good and evil. This knowledge Hugh explains as the divine cognition whereby God knows the nature of all things perfectly by one intuitive process. The incentives may also be called the desires for elevation and abundance, which incited Eve to pride and covetousness. Gluttony constituted disobedience to the disciplinary precept to abstain from the fruit, but avarice, that is, inordinate desire, and pride were transgressions of the precepts of nature as well. Now God never forbade man to be like Him or to know good and evil; it was inordinate desire of these things against reason, as well as the means, disobedience
and the wrong attitude, that made the act sinful. At first genuine desire of excellence obtained, but then along with pride and inordinate desire came the suspicion that God had forbidden the Tree from fear lest man equal Him. Such desire for likeness to God is perverse, for it involves not reverent imitation, but competition. Besides, Eve valued the utility of the fruit above obedience to God's precept.

Finally, disturbed and hesitating, weighing the command against the devil's promises, Eve caught sight of the Tree. So pleasing was its appearance that she ate, more influenced perhaps by gluttony than by all the promised rewards. Thus inward inclination to sin for the sake of wrong pleasure co-operated with external temptation by words and signs. Although the gravity of man's punishment was lessened in proportion to the extent of the external temptation, Satan nevertheless could not have cast man down had man not had that pride or elation that precedes actual sin but that in itself is sinful; for man could not have been blamed for external temptation that did not meet with his willing compliance. This sinful attitude, however, did not precede the temptation although it did precede actual sin; only by Satan was man roused to pride, the root of sin.

But it was not pride in desiring to equal God that led Adam into sin, but the love of Eve. All his plans were changed when the woman associated with him held out the fruit and he accepted her petition rather than make her sad. Which sinned the more? If Adam thought that he would let Eve have her way before he made peace with God for both of them through penitence and hope of God's mercy, and if he was neither proud nor credulous, then apparently he sinned less. Was he seduced or not? Hugh believes that he was, though not as Eve was,
by Satan. That, he thinks, is what St. Paul meant, for frequently the New Testament will deny categorically that which the Old Testament simply does not affirm. Therefore Eve was guilty of the additional crime of seducing her husband to sin. Moreover since God's justice is perfect, her heavier penalty implies deeper guilt. Adam, on the other hand, sinned in consenting instead of refusing and correcting the sinner. Moreover, as Isidore explains, more allowance should be made for Eve since she sinned in ignorance, a less blamable fault than weakness on the part of one who knows better, to say nothing of intentional sin. Adam sinned knowingly and deliberately, in spite of his greater responsibility and his greater deliberation before sinning. Hugh finally casts his vote with those who condemn Eve more, however, because her ignorance proceeded from sin.29

The actual sin, the eating of the fruit, Hugh does not blame since abstinence from a tree which God had ordered man to use would have been equally an act of disobedience -- an argument evidently directed against some writers (including Ambrose) who would make the first sin an eminent example in favor of fasting.30 As for the attitude that preceded the sin, how could a sinless nature consent to evil? Man had two desires implanted in him by God, the desire, by necessity, of convenience, and the desire for righteousness, which, since it depended on his will, enabled him to show his merit. Even the convenient was not desired by necessity in excess,31 nor was it sinful in itself since everything in existence is good. The desire of both the convenient and the just makes it appear a contradiction that man could abandon justice. Yet he must have willed it if we are not to assume that the sin resulted from external compulsion. Here is Hugh's
solution: the desire for convenience should be measured by the desire for justice, which is a love of measure or moderation. Man was immoderate both in desiring likeness to God and the knowledge of good and evil beyond measure and in preferring convenience to what was right. Thus his sin was not so much the positive will to be unrighteous as the cessation of the will to be just in favor of the will to have convenience. In this sense only was the sin an act of will.\(^\text{32}\)

III

Like Hugh, Milton treats the Fall as the result of man's own susceptibility to sin, combined with external instigation by Satan. Although a good deal might be said about the "Pride and worse Ambition" that first threw Satan down, he concerns us here only as the instrumental cause of man's Fall. Had the trial of man's virtue and the ultimate results of his sin not been in accord with God's purpose of bringing forth good from evil, Satan could never have lifted his head from the burning lake, much less have been left at large "to his own dark designs"; (I, 213); but not knowing that he is only incurring deeper damnation for himself, he conceives of his designs as a counteraction to bring forth evil from good. To Satan, man is the whipping boy, the means, if corruptible, of an uncommon revenge against God. Even at first envy is a secondary motive since man is

less

In power and excellence, but favour'd more. (II, 349 f.)

The sight of "Creatures of other mould, earth-born, perhaps," (IV, 360) advanced into the place of the fallen angels increases his vexation and grief. Although for a moment, wonder and pity interrupt his purpose, hatred of God and responsibility to carry out the policies
of Hell turn his prospective friendship for man into the ironic "mutual amitie" with which he invites man to Hell. (Such an attitude is not wholly hypocrisy and self-delusion since Satan can still manifest some of the qualities he has perverted. Later Eve momentarily renders him "stupidly good." The love of Adam and Eve "Imparadis't in one another's arms" (IV, 506) rouses him to further jealousy. As he becomes progressively more degraded, he considers it solace as well as revenge to corrupt man; he is so envious that he believes Paradise preferable to Heaven; and he is sufficiently tormented by good to find his only ease in destruction. Here he plots a counter-revenge against God, who, to repair His losses,

Determin'd to advance into our room
A Creature form'd of Earth, and him endow,
Exalted from so base original,
With Heav'nly spoils, our spoils. (IX, 148 ff.)

Satan finds no action too base provided that can vent his spite on him who

Provokes my envie, this new Favorite
Of Heav'n, this Man of Clay, Son of despite,
Whom us the more to spite his Maker rais'd
From dust: spite then with spite is best repaid. (IX, 175 ff.)

Satan is not wholly unrestricted. The divine protection from external violence (mentioned, though not specifically described, by Hugh) takes the form of the angelic guard, which Satan thinks performs a service unworthy of angels, but which he is ready to combat until deterred by the sight of the heavenly scales. Moreover he seems to be under some restrictions in his appearing as a serpent. Whereas Hugh explains this shape as a choice imposed on him as a sign of his guile, Milton has him select it for the opposite reason: the serpent's natural guile will allay possible suspicions of diabolic power.
Previously Satan has appeared, after trying various other animal shapes, as the imaginary toad in the real garden. Here the serpent, though before the Fall "not nocent," is not the symbol of pleasure (as with Ambrose), but of guile. Since angelic beings can change their shape and density at will to execute "their aire purposes," it may be questioned why he had to possess the "spirited sly Snake." Whether this method was a precaution to deceive man the better or to escape punishment, or a necessity of his debasement, Satan realizes that for him the way up has indeed proved the way down, for he who ranked with the highest angels and aspired to the height of godhead has been so far degraded that he is now constraind

Into a Beast, and mixt with bestial slime. (IX, 164 f.)

In view of the Son's curse on the Serpent, Satan's possession of it has a logical place in the poem.

Having previously attempted either to taint Eve's spirits or to delude her fancy by means of a dream calculated to appeal to her vanity, curiosity, and desire for elevation, all to be satisfied by the forbidden fruit, Satan in the Serpent deliberately seeks, though without much hope, to find Eve alone, since Adam's "higher intellectual," heroic courage, and exemption from pain render him "Foe not informidable." (IX, 486) Even alone, Eve in her "graceful Innocence" disarms him temporarily. "We know," observes Anna M. B. Guthrie, "that Eve almost made a puritan of the Devil." Not quite a Puritan, Satan does remain "stupidly good" for a moment in the presence of Eve's spiritual beauty before praising her loveliness rather more in the manner of a Cavalier poet. Although he begins his address with the injunction, "Wonder not, sovran Mistress," (IX, 532) she is of course amazed to
hear human language from the Serpent, which she knew to be a subtle, and possibly rational, creature, but to the best of her knowledge mute. Milton's Serpent offers the remarkably effective explanation that he was mute until he tasted a certain fruit—a fallacious "proof" from experience of the virtue of the Tree.

Having disarmed her first with his graceful notions, next with his flattery, and finally with the mention of the fruit, he leads her to the forbidden Tree. At first he finds her obedient but wistful, repeating the command accurately and declaring that the Tree, though abounding in fruit, is "Fruitless to [her]." (IX, 648) Having tried to incite her to pride and discontent through "Vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires," (IV, 807-808) when she was asleep, and having praised the pleasure and elevation that the fruit had given him, however, he proceeds to feign sympathetic friendship and indignation on her behalf at God's arbitrary restriction to keep them low. His elaborate sophistries about knowledge (discussed above, Chapter V) and offers of a happier state are really rationalizations of what she wants — not godlike wisdom and virtue, but adulation as

A Goddess among Gods, ador'd and serv'd
By Angels numberless,
as the Tempter has already glozed in his proem. (IX, 517 ff.) Other prerogatives of godhead mentioned in his address to the Tree are godlike food and the use of superior advantages. Doubtless the exhilarating flight to Heaven as experienced in the dream is still as effective a temptation as the exalting possibility of superiority over Adam. The final appeal of the savory fruit, which "Might tempt alone," (IX, 735) is to appetite, with the result that Eve resolves to feed body and mind with the expedient "Cure of all, this Fruit Divine." (IX, 776)
Both the delusions involved in the offered knowledge and the corrupt use of it are evident in Eve's second sin, the corruption of Adam. Whereas Ambrose argues that the knowledge of evil should have made her prevent, not incite, Adam's sin, Milton does not attribute to Eve any new moral knowledge after she has tasted. Having missed the useful homily in which Adam is warned, "Heav'n is for thee too high," (VIII, 172) she pleasingly imagines that she perhaps is secret since "Heav'n is high." (IX, 811) Idolatry ensues when, in imitation of the Serpent's panegyric to the "Sacred, Wise and Wisdom-giving Plant," (IX, 679) she pays homage to the Tree:

O Sovran, vertuous, precious of all Trees, (IX, 795) as though to the "power That dwelt within." (IX, 820 f.) Conditioned by the Serpent's words to "expectation high" of godhead, knowledge, and sensory delight, she is deluded into imagining that she has gained what she wanted from the Tree. So delicious does the flavor of the fruit seem that she does not scruple to ingorge without restraint.

But what about Adam? Defiled in will and conscience, she shows her degradation most in the motives that she considers. If her new omniscience— or what will be omniscience after she has grown more mature, "dieted" by the fruit— will make her Adam's superior, then she will keep it for herself; if it brings death, she had better see to it that he shares her fate instead of living to wed a second Eve. Her deluded reason soon rationalizes this somewhat less than altruistic love (C. S. Lewis says its common name is murder) as a desire either to share bliss or to risk her own life in offering Adam the fruit.

Doubtless self-delusion as much as hypocrisy prompts her to tell Adam
that she sought godhead chiefly for him and would willingly renounce it without him. According to Stein, in spite of her temporary desertion Eve is so dependent on Adam that, impelled to return to her source and other self, she paradoxically "affirms the moral order." Thus her defective unity is a partial cause of her sin of tempting Adam.

Undeceived by Satan's promises and untempted by knowledge, godhead, and pleasure, Adam falls, "fondly overcome with Female charm." (IX, 998) Realizing that she has been beguiled, he is filled with sorrow to think that she must die. Feeling the link of nature, he resolves to die with her:

How can I live without thee, how foregoe
Thy sweet Converse and Love so dearly joyn'd? (IX, 908-909)

To say that Adam's reason is not deceived, but that his sin is a corruption or suppression of reason through passion or will, is not to reject the Socratic dictum that no one willingly chooses the worse alternative; for although Adam's reason is proof against Satan's sophistry as presented by Eve, he makes a wrong evaluation in preferring Eve "to God, that is, to all good." Although he tries to rationalize the penalty as a meaningless threat, he seems convinced that he must die and that he is right in preferring death to life without Eve. Just as Hugh rejects the excuse of Eve's ignorance because it proceeded from a sinful attitude, so Stein calls the self-deception of Milton's Adam and Eve a kind of "willing ignorance."

What sins are comprised in the "mortal Sin Original" of Adam and Eve? What sin, indeed, may not be named in their transgression of the whole law? Under "Mans First Disobedience" may be subsumed
distrust in the divine veracity, and a proportionate credulity in the assurances of Satan; unbelief; ingratitude; disobedience; gluttony; in the man excessive uxoriousness; in the woman a want of proper regard for her husband; in both an insensibility to the welfare of their offspring, ...the whole human race; parricide, theft, invasion of the rights of others, sacrilege, deceit, presumption in aspiring to divine attributes, fraud in the means...pride, and arrogance. (C.D., XV, 161-183)

This formidable list illustrates the results of evil concupiscence, the product of error in both will and reason. In both Adam and Eve the sin shows a disregard of right reason, the natural hierarchy (violated "upward" by Eve in her perverse imitation of God, and "downward" by Adam in his yielding to Eve, as will be discussed further below), and a false scale of values. "Both...had lacked that entire and humble love of God that would have strengthened their moral judgment and moral will."[42]

Which sinned the more, Adam or Eve? Ambrose clearly blames Eve more; Hugh, after weighing arguments on both sides, is finally more severe toward Eve; Milton does not state explicitly which is guiltier. The point of view of Hanford, who thinks that Adam's fall is presented as nobler than Eve's, seems particularly sound:

Milton points to what he believes the characteristic weaknesses respectively of man and woman. Adam's act was to Milton in no sense noble or heroic. It was indeed less pardonable than Eve's in proportion to his superior intelligence and moral strength. There is no gainsaying the fact, however, that the poet bears a grudge against woman as the perverse occasion of man's entanglement.[43]

The Son, pronouncing unerring judgment upon the two, simply sentences Eve, whereas He answers Adam's attempted accusation of her with the stern rebuke:

Was shee thy God, that her thou didst obey Before his voice, or was shee made thy guide? (X, 145 f.)
Eve appears in a more degrading light, however, in that her greed and the execrable reasoning that causes her to offer Adam the fruit are especially emphasized. After her beautiful apology, the beginning of their reconciliation with each other and with God, she admits her guilt toward both God and Adam, but Adam acknowledges that her guilt against God resulted from his failure in his responsibility to protect and guide her.

Both Adam and Eve have had numerous advocates and numerous accusers. Bertschinger, reversing the positions of Adam and Eve, makes him her tempter through his excessive preoccupation with the Tree, with the result that Eve first magnifies his thoughts in her dream and then carries out, through love, what she is sure he wants done. This gallant apology for Eve, however, disregards Adam's necessity of warning Eve about the command (as he does without complaining or being unduly preoccupied with it) and the reflection in Eve's dream not of Adam's explanation of starlight and invitation to rest but of Eve's ideas and images, manipulated by Satan. Schultz blames Eve for her vanity and undue curiosity about the stars—the faults to which Satan appeals in his proem in the dream. Although Schultz may be reading too much into Eve's words before the dream, he is nearer right than Bertschinger, who ignores her reasoning about whether or not to share the fruit with Adam. Moreover, even in the exchange of recriminations, Eve does not repeat her falsehood about seeking godhead for him, whereas Adam does reproach her as the object of his self-sacrifice.

Self-sacrifice on Adam's part is a frequent interpretation, although it is doubtful that Adam's action can be called wholly unselfish. He deliberates less than Eve before sinning; he forgets his love and
gratitude towards God almost as readily as Eve does; he fears that to lose her will be to lose himself. Waldock's designation of Adam's motive as "love as human beings know it at its best," Turner refutes by referring to Raphael's warning to Adam not to idolize Eve, and Adam's errors in that direction:

[Adam] allowed himself to be deluded by Eve's physical attractions into a fond belief...that Eve possessed a higher type of Wisdom and Virtue...; that however wrong she seemed to be she was somehow right; that whatever was good enough for her...was good enough for him.

This reasonably accurate if blunt statement requires Stein's qualification that Eve's charm is "not merely literal and external." As Turner rightly observes, the poem derives deeper artistic, ethical, and religious significance from the plausible and sympathetic treatment of Adam that causes the reader to feel "an overwhelming impulse to do what Adam did." Yet he shows somewhat less than a "full-hearted response" in the following degrading paraphrase of Adam's argument: "I am irrevocably attached to you, (like a dog on the end of a leash), and where you go I must go too."47

The rather unusual charge that Adam was guilty of both uxoriousness and "intellectual cocksureness" in his explanation of Eve's dream is a part of Bundy's interpretation of the dream as evidence of evil concupiscence in both Adam and Eve. Having well analyzed the dream in terms of diabolic inspiration, whereby dreams apparently good or indifferent contain hidden inducements to idolatry and other vices, and also in the admittedly modern terminology of "dream compensation" with reference to Eve's potentially evil tendencies, Bundy calls Adam's refusal to admit that evil may enter Eve's mind "uxoriousness," and blames him for not inferring supernatural agency from the similarity
of the dream to his own dream from God. In view of Adam's ignorance of the very existence of evil angels until Raphael's instruction, however, the charge seems unduly severe. Moreover it will be explained below why it is unlikely that Milton meant to suggest evil concupiscence in Adam and Eve before the temptation by the Serpent.

In blaming Adam further, and rightly this time, for letting Eve depart, Turner attempts to exonerate Eve as not wholly responsible, but an unreasoning agent by nature, hence "an incalculable force for evil." The sentence on Eve he explains as an accepted Biblical tradition. Ignoring Raphael's instruction to Adam to warn Eve, Turner also argues that she, unlike Adam, received no final warning. Likewise Green urges lenience toward Eve for acting "in good faith as a Humanist, whose proper business is to search out knowledge," especially in view of the resulting acquisition of knowledge that freed man from "perpetual ignorance of right and wrong." This argument brings us to Fletcher's position, that Adam and Eve were unable to cope with Satan because they lacked the knowledge of good and evil. (His argument, in turn, rests on the evidence that although Adam suspects "som cursed fraud," he and Eve are slow to identify the Serpent as Satan, and on the absence in Raphael's discourse of any subject "that would have involved a knowledge of good and evil"—from which one would infer that Uriel was similarly lacking in moral knowledge and that the problem of evil was irrelevant to Satan's fall.) Since the evidence that man possessed moral knowledge before the Fall has already been supplied (in Chapter V, above), it will be sufficient to note here that to deny such knowledge to man before the Fall is to reverse Milton's treatment of man as a free and responsible agent before the Fall, sufficient in
will and reason to stand.

The interrelations of Adam and Eve and the combination of internal and external motives for the Fall, Stein treats with especial reference to the artistic problems involved. It is difficult to determine the individual responsibility precisely, for even aside from the part played by Satan, Adam is both self-tempted and tempted by Eve, for whom he is also in part responsible. The external agency is effective only because of the inner victory of evil. Although "lovingly and sufficiently created," Eve shows three potential violations of the right order before her sin: her innocent vanity in loving her image in the mirror (for which episode Milton effectively uses the Narcissus myth); the dream; and the separation from Adam. Separated and elevated in the dream, she returns briefly to the mirror state. Milton's "calm and unromantic" praise of the order of nature and the beauties of day is reflected in Adam's praise of rest; Eve's lovely lines about nature, though emphasizing night and revealing innocent wonder about the stars, still center about her love for Adam; but the Tempter celebrates sensuously the "sophisticated beauty of shadow" and the stars that appear "Whom to behold but thee." (V, 45) The climax is the offer of elevation and "knowledge as a means of happy self-love." Tempting inwardly, hence effectively, Satan manipulates a will too pliable, though Eve when awake rejects the dream. When Eve separates herself independently, "however sweetly," she is beginning to approve of self-love and her own set of values, with the result that she is ready to succumb to the temptation of "self-love rationalized as knowledge." Despite Milton's refusal to praise a "fugitive and cloister'd vertue," Eve was wrong to leave her "best prop"; for in
context her admirable sentiments are seen as undue eagerness for the fame (even in Heaven's eyes) to be won by victory, and pride in rejecting help against sin.\(^53\) Desire for a new experience as well doubtless influences her.\(^54\)

Stein regards Adam's first physical response to Eve, whose beauty infuses new sweetness into his heart, as a danger signal because the metaphor of infusion suggests the creation: Eve may be "creating him in turn in her image." Although the "metaphor of inspiration" may suggest Adam's later sin of substituting Eve for God, Stein possibly reads too much into the poem in calling Adam's words "the shell and rinde of matrimony," since Milton expands in the poem those Biblical words that he criticized. Greater evidence of Adam's liability to fall occurs in Adam's own admission that

so absolute she seems
And in herself compleat, so well to know
Her own that what she wills to do or say,
Seems wisest, vertuousest, discreetest, best;
All higher knowledge in her presence falls
Degraded. (VIII, 547)

Although he admits that her superiority is an illusion (for which he blames nature) he is in a state of mind "theologically and symbolically innocent," but one that "could borrow meaning...by anticipating human experience after the Fall," when it would become "the fallen self-righteousness that assumes itself virtuous because it knows what is right."\(^55\)

So far Adam and Eve have not formally approved of their enjoyable illusions; but in Adam's permission of Eve's departure, Stein sees the actual Fall: with his knowledge now degraded in the presence of beauty, Adam displays "all the characteristics of fallen nature" in violating his responsibilities to God and to Eve. "Go, for thy stay, not free,
absents thee more," (IX, 372) though ostensibly an act of love is an unselfish choice that conceals self-love (fear of her being more absent) rather than concern for her true welfare. Later he admits his error here. Whatever the theological demands of innocence, Adam would here be pronounced guilty in "a purely secular drama." Hanford makes a better case for Adam here in view of Adam's unwillingness to coerce Eve, for, as he observes, Milton declares in Areopagitica that childish men must be exhorted to avoid evil influences, not forcibly hindered. Lack of confidence in Eve is justified only by the outcome, then unpredictable, and his giving Eve her freedom might be called a kind of parallel to God's gift of free will to man. Part of the complexity of the problem lies in the difficulty in judging the extent of Adam's authority over Eve and in drawing the line between innocent overestimation (as in Uriel's case) and willful self-deception. Since it is doubtful that Milton meant to show Adam's conduct here above reproach, Stein is right in perceiving some failure of self-knowledge; but the blamable tendencies that foreshadow sin do not prevent Adam's sincere assertion of obedience to God and trust in the rightness of His will. In view of the difference between Paradise Lost and a "purely secular drama," moreover, one of the main reasons for Milton's success in presenting the Fall is his refusal to oversimplify the reconciliation of artistic and theological demands.

The foreshadowing of the Fall, as described above, with its purpose of making the Fall not only plausible but an apparently inevitable result of character, was limited by the requirements both of Milton's theory of causation and his theological tenets that man retain his free
will and his innocence until his yielding to the formal temptation.\textsuperscript{58} The solution that Adam and Eve were not innocent and sufficient to resist, or that they exhibited evil concupiscence before Satan's address to Eve, is therefore misleading. Whereas Stein is fully aware of the theological implications, a more extreme position is that the line between innocence and experience is so blurred that Adam and Eve "are fallen from the very start." What difference, then, does the eating of the apple make? It fulfills what has been "hidden in the mind" so as to give Adam and Eve self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{59} To interpret Adam and Eve as exhibiting evil concupiscence from the beginning is to deny Milton's frequent assertions of their goodness and innocence, their "perfect, but not immutable" nature, \textit{(V, 52h)} and to ignore the tragic change which the Fall effects in their nature and relations with each other and with God. If, as Miss Bell would have it, Adam and Eve first lack "the inner regulator of conscience" and then gain awareness that "virtue can never be instinctive" for them,\textsuperscript{60} then free will to choose between good and evil on the basis of moral knowledge disappears, at least before the Fall. Innocence has already been described as absent from this state, supposedly of instinctive virtue, in which Milton shows the causes of sin as "a backward reflection of the complex results."\textsuperscript{61} It is no wonder that in spite of these bad results and man's ignorance of the right way to progress that the Fall is needed to release man from sin and give him "the moral ability to vanquish evil." (Grace, too, seems to have vanished, by the way.) But is it not more likely that the contradiction between the myth of a perfect, unfallen man in Paradise (a myth accepted in the poem) and the critic's impression of man's original lack of innocence results rather
from a misinterpretation of the poem than from any inconsistency on Milton's part?

Undeniably man's innocence included the potentiality of sin, which could be indicated only by approaching the remote and mythical state of innocence by analogies from the experiences of fallen man; but the presence of evil tendencies, even, "so unapproved," does not indicate sin until the false values are actually chosen. Moreover Milton's system of logic did not demand a chain reaction from an initial impulse, but a series of parallel causes, since God is dissociated from "the more proximate efficient causes." In the Ramean system of logic, as Howard explains, Satan is the instrument of man's Fall; Eve is an external influence that provides the occasion for Adam's sin; Adam is the "principle cause" of his own Fall. In addition, that "unitie defective," which Tillyard calls "lack of self-sufficiency," that caused Adam to need Eve's companionship becomes the "impulsive cause" of his preferring sin with Eve to innocence alone—a cause that co-operates with his innocence, which has been wrongly called "mental levity." The "form" of sin—that which makes it what it is—can be seen only in the effects: the change of "innocent imperfections...into sinful passions." The "form" gives the sin of disobedience its "peculiar essence." (The "end" of the sin, the greater glory of God and man, will be discussed in the next chapter.)

The distinction between Adam's innocent susceptibility to female charm, and lust, an implication of the sin, is valuable, although more information might be desired about that cause illustrated only in its effects. That disobedience implied lust only potentially, exonerates Adam from the charge of lust before the Fall, but not from
the sin of disobedience, or from failure to act according to his moral responsibility, although the reader is in danger of so concluding from Howard's statement that "Adam's unexercised reason was not proof against the demands of his 'unitie defective.'" Allowing Adam moral knowledge and free will before the Fall, Howard nevertheless gives the impression that Adam was powerless to resist the parallel causes. Although a fuller treatment of Eve's sin would have been helpful, the Fall is interpreted primarily to mean the Fall of Adam, and Eve's sin could presumably be described as the result of a similar system of causes.

This logical system was the basis of Milton's attempt to make clear and reasonable the theological implications of the Fall. These implications are best explained by the Christian Doctrine, which defines sin as the violation first of the innate law of conscience and second, of the special command of God. Disobedience of the command resulted from both the Devil's instigation and man's liability to fall. (C.D. XV, 179-181) The loss of righteousness is treated as "the consequence of sin, or if it were sin, ...a sin of ignorance," since man expected no harm, and therefore a punishment. (C.D. XV, p. 199)

Kelley makes the following applications: Satan's words sow in Eve "the seeds of concupiscence, which...flower into...sins. "Conducive to gluttony, ambition, curiosity about hidden things, and distrust of God's truth, his address finds her unduly credulous. In eating she is actually guilty of gluttony and aspiration to knowledge and godhead. Although aware of Eve's sinful "credulity and sacrilege, "Adam is guilty of "excessive uxoriousness," distrust, presumption, and (in his rationalizations) credulity. Thus Kelley and Howard interpret
Milton's treatment of Adam and Eve's innocence just as Hugh treats it: they were innocent before the formal temptation not only of actual sin, but also of evil concupiscence.

Thus Milton treats the violation of the Biblical taboo in such a way that the "primitive scale of values" is transformed to make the experience of Adam and Eve a universal example of the trials and weaknesses of every man and every woman." Although the command itself is an arbitrary law of God, not of nature, the sins comprised in the transgression and the motives behind it indicate that in disobeying, Adam and Eve violate the right order of values and the precepts of right reason, which is "not a dry light, a nonmoral instrument of inquiry," nor merely "the religious conscience," but "a kind of rational and philosophic conscience which distinguishes man from the beasts and which links man with man and with God." Through sin they fall into "infatuated irreligious self-sufficiency." The difference between the sins of Adam and Eve is not altogether that of perverted will and perverted reason respectively, but in Eve, the ambition of "an inferior seeking an impossible secure exaltation in self-love," and in Adam, that of a superior "seeking an impossible secure debasement in self-love." Adam judges wrong in considering Eve too absolute and in substituting love as an absolute value for that "discipline in self-transcendence" through which he was to love her with reference to God. Pleasure is good; but it must not be inordinate, and the grosser must feed the purer. Knowledge is good; but it demands temperance and righteousness in its use, and it must be so ordered as to give supremacy to the inner light of wisdom. Love is good; but it must be directed toward inner rather than outer beauty, and it must
not forget "that its proper object is the possession of the lasting
good [which is] God." 72

Milton's treatment of the Fall, therefore, is in accord with
the Christian tradition. It offers, as this chapter has attempted
to indicate, a number of points for comparison both with Ambrose's
account and with that of Hugh. All three authors treat the Fall as
the product, in Hugh's terminology, of external temptation combined
with internal. Identifying the Serpent with Satan, they agree that
he was motivated by envy that man, an inferior being, should be
exalted, whereas he, formerly among the highest angels, should be
degraded. Ambrose's presentation of the reasoning that leads Satan
to tempt man is sufficiently vivid to be called a faint foreshadow-
ing of the great soliloquies of Milton's Satan. Hugh, on the other
hand, treats more systematically of a greater number of relevant
questions: he is more explicit about the free will of men and angels,
for example, but he also finds space to explain that Eve was not
sufficiently experienced to be unduly alarmed by a talking serpent.
They all agree that Satan wished to find Eve, the weaker, alone;
Ambrose adds two reasons: that since she knew the command indirectly
from God through Adam, her faith would be weaker than his, and that
Adam could best be overcome with female charm. Although Milton does
not accredit Satan with precisely these reasons, he emphasizes Adam's
direct, and Eve's indirect, knowledge of the command; Adam's closer
relationship than Eve's with God; and Adam's Fall through wrong evalua-
tion of Eve.

Milton is close to Hugh in showing Satan abashed in the presence
of Eve's virtue and beauty. He develops consummately the suggestions
of Hugh and Ambrose about Satan's ingratiating speech and his subtle sophistry in disguising illicit pleasure as right and natural (as Ambrose notes) and both denying evil and offering freedom from evil and the wrongs of the "Great Forbidder" (as Hugh observes). All agree in holding Eve responsible for her weak judgment and credulity. Milton's account of the motivation of Adam and Eve is traditional. In depicting Eve's gluttony, he is not inventing a further debasement of Eve; for although Ambrose does not believe that that motive would have been sufficient without illicit ambition, he sometimes speaks of the Fall simply as the result of inabstinence; and Hugh, who treats the three motives as inordinate desire for knowledge, vainglorious desire to be like God, and gluttony, suggests that perhaps the last would in itself have been sufficient. He does not make this gluttony a violation of the precept as Milton does. Hugh makes the valuable distinctions, also found in Milton, that man exhibited evil concupiscence before the actual sin of eating the apple, but after the temptation by Satan, and that reverent imitation of God differs greatly from perverse competition.

Both Hugh and Ambrose treat Eve, the first sinner and the corrupter of her husband, as the more sinful of the two. Ambrose, attributing her persuasion of Adam to sin to selfish love in wanting to have him with her, blames her for not using her new knowledge of evil to warn him. He blames Adam severely, however, for preferring a woman to the grace of the Lord and for exposing his children to sin and death. He condemns both for idolatry in putting their selfish desire ahead of God and for violating the hierarchy according to which the man is the head of the woman. Hugh, blaming Adam's remissness as Eve's guide,
condemns her more because her ignorance resulted from a sinful attitude. Although Milton's treatment of the Fall gives the reader the impression that Adam is nobler than Eve in sinning, he explicitly blames both Adam and Eve for violating the hierarchy. Even the motive of selfish love for the deception of Adam is degraded in Eve to envy and jealousy, but hers is the reasoning of a mind not enlightened to recognize its guilt, but darkened already by sin. Adam is no less guilty of yielding to her persuasions through making Eve his God. Both are to blame for permitting what Stein terms "a willing ignorance in their self-deception."
CHAPTER VII

MERGIE COLLOQUE WITH JUSTICE

I

As Ambrose observes, the promises of Satan were either lies or harmful truths. Adam and Eve had their eyes opened, indeed, but not truly open as before the Fall, when Adam had the insight to name the animals and a deeper inward knowledge. Whereas before the Fall, Adam and Eve were naked in simplicity of morals, though clothed with virtue, they were afterwards despoiled of sincerity and cloaked with fraud. Knowing that they were naked and base they sought to cover themselves with fig leaves. These Ambrose explains as worthless actions or worldly goods and pleasures in contrast with fruit, symbolic of charity and faith. A much better clothing than the worthless leaves would have been such divine words as the Lord's command: "Let your loins be girded about, and your lights burning." (Luke 12:35)

"And they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day..." The passage should not be taken too literally, Ambrose warns, since God is omnipresent; the statement means that man was aware of God's knowledge of his hidden thoughts and emotions. Therefore Adam fled, for he did not want his sin to be brought to light. "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord," (Isaiah 1:18) but the sinner does not want to hear the voice of the Lord, walking at evening. Evening it was indeed for Adam, for in his concupiscence he was slow to feel ashamed, such is the glowing agitation of sin. God, however, penetrated into Adam's soul with the question "Adam, where art thou?" He spoke with "a certain excellent power,"
not with a corporeal voice. In calling Adam He offered a remedy, for the remedy begins with the sinner's sense of shame. In being ashamed, Adam displayed a kind of knowledge; for frequently the sinner recognizes only afterwards that the act which he considered harmless was really sinful. "Where art thou?" referred not to place, of course, but to state of mind. Adam was in a state of sin, fear, and shame; but he was stronger than Eve, and therefore called first, because he was the first to feel ashamed. However she, too, acknowledged her shame.

Much of Ambrose's discussion of the results of the sin is similar to that of Philo, who also treats man's nakedness as spiritual alienation from God, and the summons as a statement of man's guilty refuge in himself. Philo further explains the answers of Adam and Eve as an indication of the order of the steps of sin: the mind yielded to sense perception, which is not altogether subservient to it, and which in turn had been cheated by pleasure, which falsified a harmful object. Hence the order of the sentences: the Serpent was immediately cursed; the woman, neither good nor bad intrinsically, was given a hearing first; and Adam (and indeed the earth also) being neutral, received no curse per se.

Accepting Philo's explanation of the order of the curses, Ambrose treats the judgment scene for the most part more literally. Both Adam and Eve offered excuses. Eve's explanation that the Serpent deceived her, although it did not absolve her from the sin of disobedience, was accepted because of Satan's ability to transform himself into an angel of light and because of his adroit sophistry in assigning false names to actions. Having been nurtured on the fruits of
virtue in Paradise, Eve was not wholly irredeemable, and through her
shame and willing confession, she obtained a remedy with her sentence.
She was placed under her husband's rule so that she could not corrupt
him but might be prevented by him from sinning. Allegorically, as
the Church, she was to serve the Lord, whose service is perfect free-
dom; and through the generation of Christians in faith, chastity,
righteousness, and love, she was to be saved.

The condemnation of the Serpent was not an instigation to injure
man, but a prediction and a warning. Allegorically, bodily pleasure,
especially gluttony, grovels in the dust of the world. By contrast,
Adam was to eat herbs, the ordinary fare of mortals, and afterwards,
in the state of grace, the living bread of Christ. Just as the earth
was not cursed except in the production of thorns, man's evil works,
so Adam was not actually cursed; for sorrow is a blessing when it
leads to repentance, and labor meant the subjection of body to mind
and the cultivation of the spirit.4

Elsewhere Ambrose speaks of the discord between the Serpent's
seed and that of Eve as the natural enmity between mankind and actual
serpents; but he further interprets the curse as a condemnation of the
author of sin, who will persecute man until Judgment Day.5 Other
topics omitted from the main discussion are also discussed in various
other writings of Ambrose. In saying "Behold, the man is become as
one of us," God mocked man's pretensions to divinity, through which,
in combination with the sin of gluttony, man became naked and base;
and He clothed man because man had lost the veil of innocence.6 In
clothing him with skins, as it has been noted elsewhere, God caused
the celestial Adam to assume a body and to take on the image of the
Moreover Adam was now liable to "die the death." That "morte moriemini" is not redundant is evident in Ambrose’s explanation of four kinds of death: one can die by death, die by life, live by death, or live by life. To live by life is to have a blessed life in accord with virtue; to die by death is to undergo both physical dissolution and spiritual loss of life eternal; to die by life is to live bodily but die spiritually, or to descend into Hell alive; and to live by death, the fate of martyrs, is to suffer death in order to win life. Much depends besides on the kind of life one lives by. Even more distinctions are therefore possible: death unto this life, for example, through life in Christ. There is also the intermediate life of the animals. There is the life of the dead. Finally, for the Christian disciples, there is a fellowship in life and death. Death may be punishment or freedom unto life with Christ. Evidently the warning "Ne morte moriemini" referred to physical dissolution and spiritual damnation. Although he was redeemed from the latter by Christ, he did undergo physical dissolution, or separation of body and soul; Ambrose notes Adam’s physical death at Golgotha.

In that first fraud the human race was involved. In describing man’s successive degeneration, Ambrose uses the figure of the lodestone which attracts a series of rings by a gradually diminished magnetic power; just so, the original virtue is lessened in the course of time. This same figure, probably derived from Ion, is found in Philo. Moreover guilt is transmitted to all. Adam is in each of us, with the result that we contract sin by tasting forbidden things. More specifically, Ambrose calls original sin as an inherited taint in the
body. If he had believed the theory of the traduction of souls, he would have explained original sin as a taint of the soul; for Adam's soul sinned and corrupted the body. Although Christ was made in the likeness of the flesh (that is, he assumed a body of man's substance), he avoided the taint of original sin through being born of the Virgin and through having a body like that of Adam before the Fall. 12

In accordance with man's debasement from his original innocence, God had to give man a written law to replace the natural law which he broke. Thus by the Law, the knowledge of sin resulted, that man might realize that he was subject to God and that he could be saved only through grace. 13 Here God reveals His mercy. Nevertheless the Fall of man has given rise to a number of questions about His justice and His goodness.

How, for example, could God have permitted in Paradise the Tree of Knowledge, evidently harmful, and Satan in the guise of the Serpent? Actually that Tree, although bitter in its effect of making man know his nakedness, was part of God's plan for the good of the whole; for the knowledge of good and evil is really beneficial:

For how, if there were no knowledge of good and evil, could we discern the difference between them? For we could not have judged that which is evil to be evil without the knowledge of good. There could be no knowledge of good unless there were also good, and we could not know the good to be good without the knowledge of evil. 14

As for Satan's evil purpose, God converts that in spite of Satan into our good. Temptation gives the righteous the opportunity of demonstrating their virtue; Job, for example, strove against temptation and was crowned with victory. This crown no one can attain except by conquering evil by means of righteousness. Without the temptation by
Potiphar's wife, Joseph could not have fully manifested his chastity. Judas, it is true, was harmed by the temptation of Satan, but he could not have fallen if he had been righteous; for no one can be destroyed except through his own free and erring will. Likewise, having been in Heaven, Satan appeared not unjustly in Paradise, where he could not have corrupted Eve's immortal virtue if that foolish virgin had kept her lamp lighted. 15

In a subsequent chapter, Ambrose meets the objections that if God had foreseen the Fall, He would not have given a superfluous command; and that since He is omniscient, perhaps the Old Testament was not divinely inspired. Since his opponents do accept the New Testament, Ambrose draws a parallel from it to prove that although God's commands are broken, His purpose is still carried out: Christ chose Judas although, and indeed because, He knew that Judas would betray Him. (He chose him in token of the salvation offered to all sinners.) But God [unlike the World Spirit in Emperor and Galilean] did not impose upon Adam or Judas the necessity of sinning. Nevertheless the sins of both were good for mankind; for without the establishment of sin there can be no virtue. Finally, God permits man to choose evil when tempted, that by punishment for faults and consciousness of his own frailty, man may thereafter keep the divine commands and realize God's grace in restoring what he lost. 16 Thus guilt caused man's subjection, but subjection leads to humility, and that brings about obedience, with the result that by sin man is ultimately released from sin. 17 Christ, the Good Shepherd, will not abandon man. "Felix ruina, quae reparatur in melius"—Fortunate Fall, which is restored for better! 18
Therefore Adam and Eve, though exiled from Paradise, retained the memory of it. Paradise remains as a hope for the just. As St. Paul tells us, the soul of man may ascend from the first heaven to the second and finally to the third in the splendor of spiritual grace, for just as man is corporeal, animal, and spiritual, so he must gradually ascend to discern Heaven. Even while living, Paul was transported to hear ineffable words which he might not repeat. Thus whoever has been in Paradise by the ascent of virtue may hear the arcane mysteries of God, concludes Ambrose, with the meaning, apparently, that the good man is "in Paradise" in the sense of living a virtuous life and taking comfort in the hope that the Bible offers of gaining Paradise.19

II

Through disobedience in eating the fruit man gained the experience of evil. Adam and Eve saw nothing that they had not seen before, but they saw things differently in the light of their guilt. In knowing themselves to be naked, they knew through feeling illicit passion that nakedness was shameful and sought to hide their shame.20 In his sermon on Ecclesiastes Hugh gives a remarkable picture of man's flight from truth, which may appropriately be cited. In calling the author of Ecclesiastes "the new Adam," Hugh means that he fell into the errors of the first Adam, although the parallel does not always hold true, since there is considerable psychological distance between Adam, who hid himself in fear and guilt after the first sin, and the "new Adam," who, weary and cynical after a surfeit of pleasure, expressed the hollowness of all delight.
However, Adam could enjoy his Paradise of Pleasure no more than the "new Adam" could enjoy the worldly vanity in which he had taken refuge. The joys of fallacious good were so mixed with bitterness that both knew them to be deceitful. The author of Ecclesiastes argues against joy, reproves mirth, and finally turns his heart to seek wisdom. (Not spiritual joy, of course, is meant, but mental levity and incontinence.) Referring to the guilt of Adam, Hugh addresses him and all others who seek the truth in vain: "O human heart, where art thou,...that thou dost not know what is useful for the sons of men? Adam, where art thou?" God seeks man that man may find God. Lost in the shades of ignorance, man does not realize that only the truth is worth seeking, and that man, who would not stand in truth, cannot stand without truth. "Wandering, instable, and fugitive wilt thou be all thy days,...nor will thy heart find rest." He who is foolish in pleasure will be wretched in affliction. "Vanity of vanities!" God walked about in Paradise; the sinner thinks that truth has withdrawn from his heart; but indeed the truth is constant, but the heart of the sinner withdraws. Gratitude for God's loving kindness should move the sinner. Just as the first Adam hid himself, so the "new Adam," blinded by concupiscence, and lacking inner wisdom, could not see the truth. Who seeks it outwardly, not inwardly, remains in shadows, hidden with leaves, among the appearances of things. "And having found vanity in the fruit, dost thou hope to find truth in the leaves?"

Adam, hiding in the garden, was in the third stage of sin. First the sinner listens to temptation; next he yields to carnal delights; then he makes a bold defense in his elation, when his mind should be
terrified with guilt. Such is the procedure in sin: first it is hidden, next known, and then indulged in defiantly. Even then, no matter how burdened, the sinner can hope for forgiveness, since the Lord calls him to penitence and life. Thus Adam, though bold and unwilling to confess, had not entered the fourth stage of sin, final despair, and therefore could receive God's mercy.22

God's questioning of Adam was merciful. Instead of accusing him immediately, He gave him time to deliberate and repent when He asked, "Adam, where art thou?" The question was a summons, a warning against boldness, and a sign of compassion. In admitting nakedness, Adam was really accusing himself. Neither he nor Eve, however, was willing to take the blame, for Adam implied that God was at fault in giving him the woman, and Eve, in blaming the Serpent, was indirectly criticizing its Creator.

In passing the sentence, God did not hesitate to condemn the Serpent, for Satan was already convicted of sin in his own person and was now indubitably guilty of seducing man. Fittingly the greatest sinner was made an instrument of temptation on earth as he had been in Heaven. The devil, though in his assumed form, was accordingly condemned to tempt all mankind to his own detriment. The enmity between the woman and the Serpent was to arise first when Eve's repentance grieved Satan, and then in the conflict between Satan's demons and God's saints, who would crush Satan's pride. Eve's sorrows in conception and childbirth were to include, in addition to physical pain, the grief of seeing some of her children die and knowing that few would be predestined to salvation. Her subjection to her husband meant submission to his dominance and even violence instead of only to his
direction, as before the Fall. Her hope of salvation through her children Hugh does not explain as a reference to Christ; believing that virginity or marital continence would have given her greater hope, Hugh explains that she would be saved by steadfast love and faith, and that mystically the flesh is saved by co-operation with the spirit to produce good works. Adam's sentence, that he should labor instead of simply receiving the abundance of nature, was the lightest. Further mercy is seen in God's clothing them with skins, although it is uncertain whether He taught them to skin the animals or sent angels to minister to man.

Further punishment, however, was the expulsion of Adam and Eve, who were no longer fit to remain in Paradise or to eat of the Tree of Life. In saying "Behold, the man is become as one of us," God spoke ironically (appropriately, not sarcastically) about Eve's credulity and (by implication) Adam's remissness in guiding her. Lest man might be immortal in the sense of being preserved in temporal life, he was prevented from eating of the Tree of Life by God's Cherubim and the turning sword of flame. Actually the Cherubim were to prevent Satan from returning to Paradise, whence he, too, was cast out, and the fire (which could create the sensation of burning without consuming the matter) was to deter man. Allegorically the fiery sword represents the passions of this life, and the angelic guard, the fulness of wisdom and charity, through both of which man must pass to taste of the Tree of Life.

Man became mortal, infirm in body as in mind, through sin. Instead of being immediately punished with death, Adam and Eve were condemned to miseries which death would have ended, though not eternally condemned.
as Satan was. Whereas they had been potentially mortal and immortal, they were now necessarily both mortal and immortal. In preferring the convenient to the right, man lost both the right and the convenient and also his original moderation in desiring convenience. Labor was no longer moderate, and appetite was so extended that man has an inordinate desire for inordinate quantities. Of the punishments that changed man's nature, mortality, ignorance, and concupiscence, the last two are both guilt and punishment, which the body incurs with the soul for the soul's guilty desire.

Through the body, moreover, original sin is transmitted. Whereas the original sin was actual sin in Adam and Eve, in their descendants it is that corruption acquired at birth through generation. The statement that the substance of all his posterity was in the first man has been opposed since "there were not so many atoms in the particle which was propagated in Cain as there have been descendants from him."

In opposition Hugh argues that the particle was able to increase without the addition of other substances and (departing from science) adds that a baby who dies will be resurrected with what would have been his adult nature. Although original sin results from the concupiscence that inevitably accompanies propagation, it is transmitted not in that act but in the seed. The fleshly taint contaminates the soul, an indivisible essence, which is not propagated and cannot transmit guilt.

How does it become tainted? If it erred in inclining too much to the body, it would be guilty of actual sin. If it were tainted, though sinless, as a punishment for Adam and Eve's sin, St. Paul would not have said that all were made sinners by one man's disobedience. If the taint were disobedience, the term could not be applied to children
too young to reason. Original sin, however, is that ignorance and
desire of sin that exist potentially in a child, not voluntarily,
but by necessity. The ignorance of children is not blamable voluntary
failure to know but an incapacity of the senses to provide accurate
data to judge the truth; for man lost by sin that original knowledge
which was both a share in the angels' knowledge and accurate perception
of temporal things.

Through baptism man is released from damnation for original sin.
Concupiscence remains, just as mortality remains, for only the guilt
is removed. Parents who have been baptized have children who are
held guilty of original sin until they, too, are baptized. Hugh's
explanation (in somewhat modernized terms) is that baptism is an ac¬
quired characteristic and therefore not transmissible. In spite of
the equal bodily corruption and equal redemption by baptism, men's
souls are nevertheless not equal, for there are observable differences
of mental ability in men; apparently men's souls vary in excellence
just as the angels' did. Why there should be these differences, and
why the originally innocent soul should be confined in a body that will
taint it with guilt, Hugh finds it necessary to leave among the in-
comprehensible hidden judgments of a just God. 28

It may indeed be questioned why God permitted the temptation and
Fall of man in the first place. Hugh replies that although evil is
the antithesis of good, it was good that evil should exist because
it makes the good appear more valuable by contrast and because it will
ultimately be converted to greater good. That nothing can be done
against God's will does not excuse the sinner, who is judged according
to his will and his opposition to God. Even though his act is a part
of God's total plan, he does not intend to direct his action to God's end. That God's commands may be broken is no contradiction of His power, since He gives commands according to the good of the individual, even though the good of the individual may be inconsistent with the greater good to the whole that would result from his disobedience. This disobedience is neither commanded nor approved, but permitted because of the greater good of the whole that results from evil.29 God does not predestine evil, however; He predestines only His eternal plans and the grace which He is disposed to give the elect. He only foreknows and permits evil.30

Man's Fall, then, was not predestined, but permitted. Man had a good will and sufficient righteousness to stand. It would have been unjust to condemn either man or the angels for their fall if they had been imperfect. Man had sufficient grace to refuse to listen to temptation.31 Through the sacrifice of the Saviour, moreover, God brought forth good from the Fall. Adam and Eve themselves were given grace. Even though they lacked the taint which their descendants inherited, their sin cannot be called the worst ever committed, for the sin against the Holy Spirit is worse. Besides, it is the opinion of many Fathers that Adam and Eve lived so justly through grace that although they were never readmitted to Paradise, they obtained remission of their sins, nevertheless, and were exempted from eternal punishment.32

God's justice is further brought out by Hugh's statement of man's case in legal terms. God is not only Judge of the criminal, man, but also Counsel for the Defense. Justly man is punished for transgressing God's law, for since he knew that law, his plea that he was deceived by
Satan's lies must be rejected. In holding and punishing man, however, Satan is unjust, for far from being the faithful minister of God, he first turned criminal and then corrupted God's servant. Who but God could have been man's Advocate? Whereas Hugh speaks of God as man's Advocate, it is more usual to regard Christ as our "Advocate with the Father." Thus Milton presents Christ as the only "Patron or Intercessor "for man. (III, 219) Later he has Christ say:

1et mee  
Interpret for him, mee his Advocate  
And propitiation. (XI, 32 ff.)

Even so man had to compensate God for the loss of a faithful servant. Since no sinful man was a worthy compensation, God Himself gave man a more perfect man than the first Adam to offer Himself for mankind by willingly and obediently accepting undeserved punishment to absolve man for disobeying God's law. Whereas the legal case between God and Satan took place at the beginning of the world, and that between man and Satan was tried at the time of Christ's crucifixion, God's judgment of man for the crime against Him is deferred until the Day of Judgment.33

By another extended comparison, Hugh describes Christ as the true King, who leads His followers into battle against the tyrant Satan. From the beginning there have been true Christians through His grace who have fought Satan, and until the end of the world there will be Christians who can crush Satan by conquering inwardly through patience.34

Man's hope of salvation lies in grace. By grace man is freed from the imputation of the guilt of original sin. Although man is not sinless and is held accountable for whatever actual sins the concupiscence he has inherited leads him to commit, he is given operative grace to help
combat concupiscence, which will be finally crushed at the Resurrection. God restored the freedom of man's will, which was corrupted in man's loss of his original grace, so that man is still free from necessity. By grace man can love the good truly, will it, and attain it. He should profit from the example of Adam and Eve and avoid immoderation and unrighteousness. Just as they had the opportunity to prove their merit, so subsequent man through grace may prove his merit by accepting God's offer of help and inspiration. Just as Paradise, which had only good before the Fall, but not the greatest good, was an intermediary place, so earth is now intermediary between Heaven and Hell, since it has both good and evil, but neither the greatest good nor the greatest evil. God gave man such a place and an interval for his trial and correction in order to save him justly as well as mercifully. By his just use of good things on earth and his obedience to God's will and by persevering in faith and good works, man may prove himself worthy of the greatest good in Heaven.

III

Milton shows in Adam and Eve, immediately after they have eaten the fruit together, the blind and audacious intoxication of sin.

As with new Wine intoxicated both
They swim in mirth, and fancy what they feel
Divinitie within them breeding wings
Wherewith to scorn the Earth. (IX, 1008 ff.)

Their pure love is degraded then to carnal lust. Afterwards, as a result of passion, seeing the signs of concupiscence, they recognize their nakedness. In contrast with their former "naked Majesty," when they were clothed with "native Honour," (IV, 289 f.) and not encumbered with the "troublesom disguises which wee wear," (IV, 740)
their nakedness now appears shameful to their darkened minds:

innocence, that as a veile
Had shadow'd them from knowing ill was gon ... 
And honour from about them, naked left
To guiltie shame hee cover'd, but his Robe 
Uncover'd more. (IX, 1054 ff.)

Despoiled of good, they seek to cover their shame with leaves, and
they spend the "fruitless hours" before their judgment in quarreling.
Their disillusionment about the promised godhead and enlightenment
provokes the irony of God:

O Sons, like one of us Man is become
To know both good and evil, since his taste
Of that defended Fruit; but let him boast
His knowledge of good lost and evil got. (XI, 64 ff.)

The scene of man's condemnation Milton enlarges from the Biblical
account dramatically and spiritually. In sending His Vicegerent Son
to judge man, God reveals both His justice and His mercy. Although
the summons "Adam, where art thou?" is spoken compassionately, Adam
and Eve reluctantly come forth, "discount'nanct both," (X, 110) and
devoid alike of repentance and of love for each other or for God.
Although the "Evening coole" symbolizes God's lessened wrath, to Adam,
who would prefer to hide as a savage in the impenetrable woods, the
ethereal light of His face is still too bright. Whereas Adam is later
overwhelmed with the realization of his own ingratitude, his only sorrow
now is that he has lost innocence for a fallacious advantage. Eve,
abashed, confesses soon and simply blames the Serpent, but Adam somewhat
reluctantly accuses Eve because he must tell the strict truth and be-
cause he fears otherwise to bear the whole punishment. By contrast,
after their hearts have turned to repentance, Eve, in her beautiful
plea for forgiveness, offers to bear the whole blame, whereas he de-
clares that if prayer could change the decree, he would take it all
upon himself. At the judgment, however, his words are in accord with Hugh's description of the confession as an attempt to shift the blame. Rejecting Waldock's description of Adam's explanation as "a hang-dog performance and a flat lie," Turner calls it a true if disillusioned admission.38 Without revile the Son explicitly blames him for it:

Was she thy God, that her thou didst obey
Before his voice, or was shee made thy guide,
Superior, or but equal, that to her
Thou did'st resign thy Manhood? (X, 145 ff.)

The Son does not hesitate to sentence Satan in the "mysterious terms" of the curse on the Serpent. Although it was Satan who was "Convict by flight, and Rebel to all Law," (X, 83) and although the Serpent, his instrument, was not properly guilty, it was nevertheless "justly then accurst" because "vitiated in Nature." (X, 168-169) The mysterious curse on Satan was then verified

When Jesus son of Mary second Eve,
Saw Satan fall like Lightning down from Heav'n. (X, 182 ff.)

Before that distant event, however, Milton includes a magnificent passage further on in Book X in which Satan is punished "in the shape he sin'd." (X, 516) As a logical consequence of his imbruting and embodying himself in the Serpent, he and his followers are transformed to serpents and deluded with a multitude of forbidden trees whose ashy taste mocks their hunger and thirst. As for Adam and Eve, the full import of their sentences is yet to be realized. Later Adam reassures Eve that her suffering in childbirth will be recompensed by her joy in her children, and that "Idleness had bin worse" than his sentence of labor. (X, 1051 ff.) Even then neither knows of the impending loss of Paradise.

Adam and Eve are not immediately cast out of Paradise. First the
angels laboriously set the sun and earth at cross purposes, so that all nature may reflect the discord in man's soul, and "fierce antipathie" begins among the animals, who now glare at Adam. In his great despairing soliloquy, Adam recognizes the justice of his punishment and explores the terrible meaning of death. Finally, when Eve has reconciled him to her, they are able through God's grace to offer prayers of true contrition. Consequently God is willing to be reconciled with man, but He cannot permit him to dwell in Paradise, for, according to the law of nature,

Those pure immortal Elements that know
No gross, no unharmonious mixture foule
Eject him tainted now. (XI, 50)

Therefore, since prolonged existence in this life would be but misery, He prevents man from eternizing woe by preserving temporal life or obtaining the illusion of immortality by means of the Tree of Life, which is now unsuitable food.

Directed to comfort Adam with a revelation of God's plans for the race, Michael is sent with a band of Cherubim to drive man forth. Perhaps some reflection of the statement of Hugh to the effect that the fire was to prevent man's re-entry and the angelic guard was to deter Satan is found in the order that Michael take his

choice of flaming Warriours, least the Fiend
Or in behalf of Man, or to invade
Vacant possession som new trouble raise. (XI, 101 ff.)

The "flame Wide waving" of the sword, too, however, is also to protect the passage to the Tree of Life,

Least Paradise a receptacle prove
To Spirits foule, and all my Trees thir prey,
With whose stol'n Fruit Man once more to delude. (XI, 120 ff.)

On learning that they must leave Paradise, Adam and Eve sorrow greatly,
she that she must leave her native land and the flowers that she has
tended, and he that he must never see again God's "blessed count'nance."
After the angelic comfort, Adam and Eve, "with wand'ring steps and
slow," take from Paradise "thir solitarie way." (XII, 648 f.)

Among the types of death that Hilton distinguishes in the Christian
Doctrine (XV, pp. 203-209) is the liability to those evils that lead
to death, together with the concomitants of sin, such as guilt and
terror. The second kind of death comprises loss of innate righteousness
and obscuring of right reason, and the death of the spiritual
life. So in Paradise Lost the implications of the sin become evident,

For Understanding rul'd not, and the Will
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now
To sensual Appetite, who from beneath
Usurping over sovran Reason claimed
Superior sway. (IX, 1126 ff.)

Thus liberty is lost when

upstart Passions catch the Government
From Reason. (XI, 88 f.)

The perversion or loss of the image of God in the service of ungoverned
appetite results in the deformities which Michael permits Adam to wit-
ness. Nevertheless the image of God, reason, and true freedom may
more properly said to be obscured rather than lost, and to be capable
of being restored by God's grace.

The other two types of death are physical death, which arose
through sin, not through nature, and the eternal damnation of sinners.
The definition of death as a separation of body and soul Milton rejects
in favor of the belief that the whole man dies since the body never
had life "of itself." The mind, moreover, is the principal offender.
Therefore after a period of sleep, the whole man will arise without
preliminary recompense of good or bad, to be judged. (C.D., XV,
"What could be more absurd," he asks, "than that the mind... should escape the threatened death, and that the body alone, to which immortality was equally allotted, before death came into the world by sin, should pay the penalty of sin by undergoing death?" (XV, p. 219)

The complex meanings of death are also explored in Paradise Lost. Allegorically Death is the offspring of Sin, conceived by Satan, and admitted into the world through God's permission as the result of man's sin, "to lick up the draf and filth." (X, 630) This allegory Erskine finds inconsistent with the theological presentation of the Fall. The difficulty really lies in the number of abstract ideas which death must combine; it is no wonder that he is such a shadowy shape, "If shape it might be call'd that shape had none." (II, 667)

The conflict occurs, Miss Darbishire points out, when the figures of Sin and Death are brought into relation with the abstractions which they represent. "Sin became a part of [Adam and Eve's] consciousness the moment they ate the apple; Death as a further state of being entered their minds after the sin was completed." Furthermore Eve urges that they seek Death or do his office: "That is, let us seek Death, or if we can't find Death, let's die." Nevertheless Milton's allegory of the origin of Death is vivid, and his terrible Shape that shook a dreadful dart is a splendid personification. The victory of Christ, whereby "Death his deaths wound shall then receive," (III, 252) is a traditional Christian paradox.

Speculations on the possibility of death occur in the Council in Hell, where the fallen angels debate whether God could or would annihilate "this essential," or whether He would reserve them for eternal
torment. To man before the Fall death is but an unspecified terror. A further possibility is suggested by the Serpent (and it is rather reminiscent of one of Ambrose's distinctions); Eve may die to human life in putting on godhead. Unconvinced, she believes that she may be bound with the bonds of death or annihilated. She knows enough about life and death to judge that the Serpent lives.

The most extended discussion of death occurs in Adam's moving soliloquy. Having been sentenced to return to the dust, he is brought to an agonized examination of his fate. Longing to end the wretched sense of endless woes (the misery that Hugh pronounces worse than death), and fearing that he can multiply nothing but curses, Adam welcomes death:

Why am I mockt with death, and length'nd out
To deathless pain? (X, 773 f.)

Here he regards death as loss of intellectual being, but almost immediately the doubt assails him that his soul cannot perish but will linger around the grave in a living death. This terrible supposition is logical:

it was but breath
Of Life that sinn'd; what dies but what had life
And sin? the Bodie properly hath neither.
All of me then shall die. (X, 789 f.)

The contradiction between death as extinction and death as endless suffering raises the problem of whether God can "make deathless Death" (X, 798) and extend "finite to infinite" in man. It would violate the principle of causation in proportion to the capacity of matter to prolong the sentence "beyond dust and Natures Law." (X, 804 ff.)

If death is prolonged misery instead of "one stroak," (his imagery recalls the dart) then
both Death and I
Am found Eternal, and incorporate both. (X, 815 f.)

After he is reconciled with Eve and his pessimistic conjectures are mitigated, he rejects her suggestion of suicide, "Destruction with destruction to destroy," (X, 1006) partly in fear of a living death, and partly in the hope of God's mercy. Later Adam receives his deepest shock in the vision when he beholds the death of Cain, and he weeps at the wretched state of those who suffer from sickness and deformity. Nevertheless he is released from his original doom, for justice demanded that he die since either his nature or the unalterable decree would have had to be changed had it not been for Christ's charity in paying "The rigid satisfaction, death for death." (III, 212) Adam learns that he is to suffer temporal death, but that through Christ the faithful may hope for life eternal.

Original sin Milton defines as the depravity or evil concupiscence engendered in us by our first parents and transmitted by propagation to all except Christ, who avoided this contagion through His supernatural generation. Thus the purpose of the immaculate conception was "to obviate the contamination consequent upon the sin of Adam." (C.D., XV, pp. 195, 281) He recognizes the distinction often made between original sin in Adam's posterity and the original sin which was actual in Adam and Eve. Since "original sin" is a too narrow term to be applied properly to Adam, Milton prefers to designate it as "the sin which is common to all men...which our first parents and in them all posterity committed when...they tasted the fruit of the forbidden tree." (C.D., XV, p. 181) Adam as the "common parent or head...stood or fell for the whole race." (p. 183) Like...
Hugh, Milton explains that original sin is transmitted to the children of regenerate parents because by faith the imputation of guilt is removed, but not the inherent sin. "It is not, therefore, man as a regenerate being, but man in his animal capacity that propagates his kind, as seed, though cleared from the chaff and stubble, produces not only the ear or grain, but also the stalk and husk." (p. 197)

Unlike the Fathers who, rejecting the theory of the traduction of souls, had to explain original sin as a bodily taint that corrupts the soul, however, Milton preferred traduction to the belief that God created separate and tainted souls: "If sin be communicated by generation and transmitted from father to son, it follows that... the rational soul must be propagated in the same manner; for...from the soul all sin in the first instance proceeds...[Now] can sin be imputed through Adam to that soul which was never in Adam or derived from Adam?" (C.D., XV, p. 187) The difficulty of attributing original sin to children, who have committed no actual sins, he meets with the assertion that God foresaw that they, being the offspring of sinful parents, would grow up to sin. (p. 187)

Like Hugh, who declared that men differ in the excellence of their souls, Milton explains that although all men have sufficient grace to know the truth, there are nevertheless different degrees of grace. "That an equal portion of grace should not be extended to all is attributable to the supreme will of God alone." (C.D., XIV, pp. 147-149) Finally, Milton explains that original sin is not just physical deterioration, as some have argued, but moral; physical imperfection would have been no juster than moral, for "the former has so much influence on the latter." (C.D., XV, 185) God's justice in punishing
the race with original sin may be evidenced by a number of Biblical
texts in which God visits the fathers' sins upon the sons. Except
for the attribution of original sin to children (the justification
for which has already been cited), God's justice is apparent in that
"no one perishes except he himself sin." (C.D., XV, p. 185)

In Paradise Lost, both God's justice and His mercy are satisfied
by the Son's sacrifice to redeem the race, lest Satan be permitted to
draw after him the whole Race of mankind
By him corrupted. (III, 161 f.)

Original sin may therefore be removed by grace:

Man shall not quite be lost, but say'd who will,
Yet not of will in him, but grace in me...
Some I have chosen of peculiar grace
Elect above the rest. (III, 173 ff.)

Only those who reject the mercy offered to all are excluded from
grace, yet by himself man could never have expiated his own crime,
for which Adam "with his whole posteritie" was to die. (III, 209)
Reference has been made previously to the warning to Adam that the
welfare of himself and his sons depends on him, (VII, 637 f.) and
his bitter realization after his sin that his guiltless descendants
will be condemned for his fault, and then that they cannot be called
guiltless even:

But from me what can proceed,
But all corrupt, both Mind and Will deprav'd. (X, 821 f.)

It is only later that he realizes the implicit promise in the curse
on the Serpent.

Some problems concerning God's justice in permitting the Fall,
however, remain. In order that man might be a morally responsible
agent, he had to be free to choose between good and evil. In the
Christian Doctrine Milton declares that the fall of man was not
Neither election nor reprobation is predetermined for any man, but just as Adam was free and sufficient to stand, so by grace man is now free to be saved, according to his individual merit. God's foreknowledge does not imply predestination, for as Milton has Him declare in *Paradise Lost*:

> Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault, Which had no less prov'd certain unforeknown. (III, 118 f.)

This freedom is the result of God's withdrawal of the power of His goodness that man and the angels may not be compelled to serve necessity.

The choice demands that evil be offered as an alternative to good. Unlike Satan, who was "self-tempted," man had the choice presented by an external evil agent whom he was free to resist. God permitted Satan to tempt man as part of His plan for good. But what of Satan's own fall? Originally he, too, was created good and sufficient to remain good; through a sin of the will (pride and envy), willful self-deception, and rejection of right reason, he fell. Therefore he has a two-fold role in the poem, for he typifies the evil principle, but not being evil originally, he is also a dynamic character, progressively degraded. He is closely related to the allegorical figures, Sin and Death, who owe their shadowy but pernicious existence to the perversion in his nature when he willed to sin. As an allegory, he has been described as "the evil of the world in its alluring and its hideous aspects...self-destructive [whereas] good is ever-living." Although his epic stature is so great that the allegory is frequently ignored, it is not inconsistent with his gradual deterioration, since Milton hereby presents both the hardened sinner and the course of evil as it appears in this world.
As an epic character (not the principle of evil) he elects evil for his good. Was there an existing or potential evil that an angelic intelligence might be perverted by choosing? The traditional Christian definition of evil, as formulated by St. Augustine, is that it is the absence of good, and that it results from turning from the higher to the lower; the evil lies in the choice, not in the value chosen. Accordingly Milton rejects dualism; the one original matter is intrinsically good; ultimately the good will triumph and prevail upon Satan.

"Treble confusion, wrath and vengeance" will be poured (I, 220), whereas the just will inhabit the new Heaven and earth, which will be "all Paradise." (XII, 464) Thus will God create good out of evil.

That even, however, belongs to the future. Meanwhile there is a kind of dualism in Satan's activity. Although he is not wholly unrestrained, to deprecate the extent of his power would be to minimize the real misery and evident evil in the world.

In the realm of moral values (as opposed to the metaphysical problem of evil) is found another kind of dualism; for good and evil derive their meaning from their relationship. Mr. R. A. Tsanoff clarifies the positive and negative scale of values as follows:

This is a world of good and evil...unqualified condemnation of the world and likewise suave dismissal of evil as unreal are at variance with the facts of life, are indeed self-refuting views...[As] Dean Inge writes, "...dualism cannot be transcended without transcending the standpoint of morality." Good and evil...are what they are always in relation...This cosmic concourse is a scale or hierarchy [in which] evil is literally degradation, the surrender of the higher to the lower...Evil is not "somehow good" any more than sinking is somehow rising.

In contrast with Mr. Tsanoff's conclusion that God, as "the apogee of value," has not static perfection, "the terminus of perfection," but dynamic perfection, Milton follows Augustine in affirming His
perfection, rather than His perfectibility, and treats history as a teleological process toward that eternity of golden days for the just when "God shall be All in All." (III, 341) Nevertheless, as Gilbert explains, Milton makes the higher nobility of the just the result of mortal suffering, and ultimate happiness in the future state of perfection "dependent on and conditioned by the evil in this world."

Although the punishment of man seems overwhelming and disproportionate, many critics have accepted the paradox of the "Fortunate Fall." Few would go so far as to view the exile as a cheerful departure "to travel and see life—in short, to have a Renaissance career." Some have taken the Fall as a release from obedience to God's arbitrary will, which meant "perpetual ignorance of the difference between right and wrong," through man's following his mind, "fully informed with the issues of human life," although "really mistaken" to the extent of believing his choice to be wrong. In view of the favorable results, God's justice in permitting the Fall is saved, Green concludes, only through making Adam a mere mechanical Adam; the good consequences of what Milton calls a sin but what is essential to man's welfare obviate the "injustice, or at least the appearance of injustice" in the official sentence upon man. Since Adam sinned in ignorance of how God would bring forth good from his sin, however, he cannot be exonerated according to the consequences. (Enough has already been said in Chapter V, moreover, to indicate that contrary to Green's somewhat contradictory statements about Adam's acquisition of moral knowledge through the Fall, Adam and Eve did possess moral knowledge originally.) As a morally responsible agent, Adam had to be judged
according to his intention; for according to Milton, "The end which a sinner has in view is generally something evil and unjust, from which God uniformly educes a good and just result." (C.D., XV, p. 75)

The best statement of the "Fortunate Fall" is Lovejoy's account of man's sin as the necessary condition both of "the greater glory of God" and of greater benefits for man than he could otherwise have obtained. Citing Ambrose as saying that the sin brought more benefit than harm and as formulating "the more generalized and hazardous apothegm that 'sin is more fruitful than innocence,'" he summarizes the Christian tradition to the effect that man's "Fortunate Fall" was permitted that he might be redeemed by Christ, although none of the writers could wholly escape the pitfalls behind the felix culpa. 50

In spite of the justice that makes sin its own punishment and the mercy shown to fallen man, the evil and misery in the world are still overwhelming; and the Fall itself, in spite of the official warning lest man "pretend Surprisal," and in spite of the insistence on free will, does not wholly avoid the appearance of necessity. Part of the difficulty results, as Miss Darbishire points out, from taking the anthropomorphism of the poem too literally. Not God as Omnipotence and Goodness but the epic Monarch appears to demand rigid justice in contrast to His Son's mercy. We object "that he does predestination as well as foreknow. He created Satan; He made Adam and Eve what they were; He knew they would fall." 51 Similarly Henry Adams offers some cynical reflections on the God of St. Thomas Aquinas: "At best the vision of God, sitting forever at His worktable, willing the existence of mankind exactly as it is, while conscious that...hardly one in a million could escape temporary misery or eternal damnation, was not the best possible
background for a church."

Nor is there a solution of the problem of Job's tragic affliction. Ambrose, as we have seen, explains his trial as an opportunity for his virtue to be proved and perfected. Milton likewise declares that just men are tried "for the purposes of exercising or manifesting their faith or patience, as in the cases of Abraham or Job." (C.D. XV, 190)

Yet although Job does attain to a knowledge of himself and his relation to God, he was already perfect and upright, and we are overwhelmed at the disproportion of his suffering in comparison with his increase of knowledge and virtue. (Since the hedonistic system of values is obviously irrelevant, it is beside the point to ask whether the thousand she-asses and fourteen thousand sheep and so on were adequate compensation; the justification for his moral anguish remains unconvincing.) It is greatly to be regretted that Milton did not write the tragedy based on the Book of Job that he once contemplated, but some likeness to Job may be found both in Samson, when he laments the sufferings of God's elect, and in the fallen Adam.

In Paradise Lost the sense of man's tragic fate is poignantly conveyed. Even after rendering Adam inexcusable, Milton longs for that warning voice to cry out, "Wo to the inhabitants on Earth!" (IV, 5) Not the divine command, nor the angelic warning, nor man's admission of the need to be on guard can prevent our feeling that frail, helpless man is abandoned to an adversary too great for him and punished disproportionately. It is true that Adam admits that if he found it hard to keep one command in return for innumerable blessings, he should have rejected the terms earlier; but even if his punishment was just, it seems exorbitant to exact the penalty from all his race, as yet
guiltless. Even the offer of grace for the elect who can appease "Th'incensed Deitie" (III, 187) leaves far too great a majority devote to death. Taking Adam as a kind of Everyman, the "perfect, cursed, blessed man," we may term his Fall fortunate, but when we behold the individual Adam's tears for the dark fate of his children and perceive his concern, even after the revelation of Christ, for the persecution of the Christians, we may well protest that the enrollment in the Book of Life is too limited, that the good man must combat overpowering odds, and that it is an uneven battle in which the evil forces are unchecked and the good free only to suffer for truth's sake. Thus Gilbert's evaluation: "To produce a few consummate men is worth all the world's evil" may be questioned. Nevertheless it is one measure of Milton's greatness that in his justification he did not become an advocate for the Lord in the manner of Job's comforters.

Although Milton may well have felt that the sufferings of Adam and Eve "are typical of humanity: and they never should have happened," he blamed man for his misuse of free will and rejection of God's freely offered grace. For clearly he accepts that Christian belief in the ultimate good. Just as he speaks in the Christian Doctrine of the "more excellent state of grace and glory" for redeemed man, (XV, p. 251) so in Paradise Lost he shows Adam in doubt whether to repent more of his sin or to rejoice more in the greater glory for God and grace for man. At the revelation of the ultimate victory of Christ and the happier Paradise for the just, Adam is overcome with joy at God's goodness

O goodness infinite, goodness immense!
That all this good of evil shall produce,
And evil turn to good; more wonderful
Then that by which creation first brought forth
Light out of darkness. (XII, 469 ff.)
Nevertheless it was Bentley, not Milton, who ended the poem:

Then hand in hand with social steps their way
Through Eden took, with Heav’nly comfort cheer’d,

thereby riding over, with what Santayana calls in another context
"the Juggernaut car of optimism," Milton’s beautiful concluding lines.
Miss Darbishire points out that although Milton accepted the dogma
of man’s lost innocence, he presents Adam as morally educated through
sorrow, and Eve as capable of greater spiritual depth and love.55
Moore likewise praises the consummate skill of the conclusion, in which
Milton combines the sorrow of the departure with the newly revealed
hope.56

Something remains to be said of the final hope of Paradise. Re-
turn to the earthly Paradise was impossible, nor could man so easily
prepare himself by degrees for life in Heaven. Only long after the
Law had evinced sin, could man by the new covenant of grace aspire by
due steps to gain entrance to the "Palace of Eternity." (Comus, 12 ff.)57
Meanwhile there remained the Paradise within. Miss Samuel, unconvinced
about the "Fortunate Fall," believes that this Paradise is happier
only than the external Paradise which Adam lost when sin disjoined
the inner and outer states. Since happiness is now to be won only
by labor more than heroic, the inner Paradise of innocence that he also
lost may be only regained at best, not surpassed.58 Without making
Milton’s distinction in favor of the regained Paradise, she identifies
the Paradise that Adam lost with that which Christ regained. Of this
she gives an excellent description:

the happiness of love, founded in trust, expressing
itself in obedience to the moral law, and fulfilled in the
perfect harmony of the soul within itself and with the
divinely ordered universe which is its home.59
Thus the Christian code is given explicit formulation in the words of Adam and Michael. Having learned of the Paradise that he may gain, Adam declares that he now realizes fully the value of temperance in knowledge, service of God in love and fear, humility, and fortitude. Confirming this code as the sum of wisdom, Michael enjoins Adam to add Faith,
Add Vertue, Patience, Temperance, add Love,
By name to come call'd Charitie, the soul
Of all the rest. (XII, 581 ff.)
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

That Majesty which through thy Work doth Reign
Draws the Devout, deterring the Profane.
And things divine thou treatest of in such state
As them preserves, and thee, inviolate.

So Andrew Marvell wrote in On Paradise Lost. Having at first feared that the "sacred Truths" might be turned to "Fable and old Song," he discovered that Milton had included nothing improper and omitted nothing "that could be fit."¹ Nor does Addison's praise of Milton's "happy invention" exclude his use of the whole Christian tradition and his "judicious imitation" of the classics. He speaks, it is true, of the brevity of the account in Genesis: "From these few particulars Milton has formed one of the most entertaining fables that invention ever produced." Milton's poem is "a comment upon Sacred Writ," an expansion of it by "many beautiful and natural fictions of his own." Who would gainsay such a criticism? For it should not be concluded that Addison conceived of Milton as simply expanding a portion of Genesis on the model of Homer and Vergil since he expressly defends Milton's interpretation of Adam's motive for falling as his excessive love for Eve: "I need not add that the author is justified in this particular by many of the Fathers and the most orthodox writers."² If Milton has conditioned our approach to Genesis so that we can scarcely read of the unspecified fruit without picturing the fair apples "Ruddie and Gold," or of the subtlest beast without recalling the great "Arch Angel rownd," he drew the suggestions for his beautiful fictions from a vast cultural heritage; and that myth which Saurat acknowledges
that poets require was for him no less than what Santayana terms the Christian epic, the picture of human destiny and the "moral autobiography of man." 5

As an illustration of the essential orthodoxy of *Paradise Lost* certain passages by Ambrose and Hugh about Adam and Eve have been compared and contrasted with Milton. It has been noted that Milton's concrete Paradise is closer to Hugh's interpretation of the literal meaning in Genesis than to Ambrose's allegorical account (and enlarged with details from classical and Renaissance writers), but that the tradition of Paradise as an allegory of the virtuous soul in the midst of pleasure, the explanation of the fountain and rising sun and Tree of Life as Christ, and the allegory of the Church underlie some of Milton's imagery and his emphasis on the spiritual meaning of "Man Pleased in a Paradise." In treating the fruit as not magically efficacious except in the false story that Satan tells Eve, but the pledge of obedience and the object providing the means for experience, Milton interprets the facts of the Biblical narrative as Hugh does. With both Hugh's description of life in Paradise as the shadow of future life and Ambrose's treatment of it as an allegory of the soul, Milton's creation (in Stein's words) of "an image of the archetype," his reference to earth as the shadow of Heaven, and his later emphasis on the Paradise within, agree.

Milton's account of the creation of man is similar to that of Hugh in a number of ways and to that of Ambrose chiefly in the making of man by God and His Son. In pointing out the consultation before the creation of man, Hugh anticipates Milton's account of the Deity's speaking "like to a man deliberating"; the eternal plans for the Creation
that Hugh mentions suggest the "great Idea"; and Hugh's explanation of the position of man in the scale of being and his importance as the cause of the Creation is similar to Milton's description of man as the "Master work" and the "end of all yet done." Although he minimizes the patristic and mediaeval emphasis on the contrast between man's excellent soul and vile body, Milton keeps the distinction between man's creation in God's image and the nature of the Son, who is that image. Chiefly (Ambrose and Hugh would have said entirely) with respect to the soul, man manifested the divine image in "natural wisdom, holiness, and righteousness."

In treating of the creation of Eve, Milton is closer to Ambrose than to Hugh, although his discussions of love and companionship in marriage and his treatment of the "rib of Mariage" as "a relation much rather than a bone" agree with Hugh. Although obliged to use the literal story of the rib, Milton is less concerned with the physical implications than with the spiritual. Similar to Ambrose's description of Adam's sleep as an abstraction from this world into divine matters is his passage about Adam's dream. Ambrose's distinction between man's creation outside and woman's creation inside Paradise is emphatically kept but later emphasized at Adam and Eve's departure from Paradise. Eve's subordination to Adam is traditional. In prose Milton refers without elaboration to the allegory of Adam and Eve as Christ and the Church, but he omits it from the poem, where it would certainly be unessential if not inappropriate. He makes some use of the traditional parallel between Adam and Christ and twice refers to Mary as the "second Eve."

In his account of man's nature before the Fall, Milton is closer
to Hugh than to Ambrose in his interpretation of man's free will and his analysis of his knowledge. Adam had a comprehensive understanding of his world, himself, and God, both through reason and through revelation. The freedom of his will, essential for him to manifest virtue, was closely related to reason, appraisal of what is to be chosen. He was virtuous as long as he ordered his life according to reason and directed his will in accordance with God's will. Enjoying abundant good, he had the opportunity of winning eternal good by obedience to an arbitrary command which dealt with something indifferent in itself (in Hugh's terms, a precept of discipline) as distinguished from the natural law of reason, and was therefore a test of pure obedience. On his choice of obedience or disobedience depended his advancement or degradation from the state of conditional immortality (freedom from pain and external violence in addition to the inner fortification of reason) and such perfection as suited the first state. From the Tree of Knowledge (named from the event) man acquired not knowledge but the experience of evil, whereas he was originally endowed with moral knowledge: both direct and abstract knowledge of good and abstract knowledge of evil. Milton's position here is practically identical with Hugh's, which is only imperfectly indicated by some of Ambrose's arguments, although Milton's Satan commits some of the same fallacies as Ambrose's opponents. With both Ambrose and Hugh, Milton agreed that knowledge must be judged according to the motives for which it is sought and its use in attaining a sound faith.

In his account of the Fall, Milton was likewise not exorcising his own personal devil, whatever that may have been (Faustian pursuit of knowledge, rebellion, pride, susceptibility to feminine charm, or any
of the charges against him), but following the tradition, Ambrose offers several explanations for the Fall. Philo's allegory, in which pleasure (the Serpent) tempts the senses (Eve), by which the mind (Adam) is corrupted, with the distinction between illicit pleasure and the true pleasure of virtue; the inducements to pride and the desire for exaltation, fraudulently offered by Satan, who, having fallen, envies many; violation of the proper hierarchy when Eve takes the lead and Adam submits. Eve's motives for her first sin—Ambrose treats as gluttony, levity, credulity, and illicit ambition, for all of which, Adam is also blamed, though less than Eve, since Adam was innocent until tempted by her. Eve's second sin, corrupting Adam, he explains as the result of selfish love and wish that Adam share her exile from Paradise. In Hugh's account, external temptation by Satan first incites evil concupiscence, but internal temptation co-operates to produce sin. Satan seeks the weaker and inexperienced Eve, whom nevertheless he fears, and induces her to doubt God's word. She falls through gluttony, vainglory, sinful ignorance, perverse imitation of God, and undue curiosity, seeking the wrong means to carry out her wrong ambition, and putting utility ahead of righteousness. Adam falls through love of Eve, not pride, and through failure of responsibility.

All these ideas of both Ambrose and Hugh contribute something to Milton's interpretation. Sensuality (as gluttony or passion) is more the result than the cause of the Fall. Violation of the hierarchy characterizes the sin, which results from external and internal temptation combined. At first disarmed by Eve's beauty, Satan subtly flatters Eve and leads her to rationalize her desires for knowledge for the sake of superiority and godhead as the disinterested wish for
knowledge and longing for happiness. Once she is corrupted by sin, her motives in seducing Adam show results of which she is too elated to be aware: her unselfish love is transformed to jealousy and desire that he share her penalty, which she can rationalize as love. Adam, his reason undeceived by Satan's promises, falls through overevaluation of Eve and undue susceptibility to her charm. In both, the Fall includes a formidable catalogue of sins. If Milton depicts the characteristic weaknesses of men and women (as probably he intended to a great extent), and if Eve's sin appears more degraded than Adam's, he nowhere explicitly pronounces her more to blame than Adam, whom the Son rebukes for accusing her rather than himself. It is equally erroneous, moreover, to read into the poem exoneration of Adam's noble love or Eve's glorified humanism on the one hand, or on the other, a state of concupiscence or fallen human nature before the formal temptation by Satan, in spite of Milton's artistic, logical, and theological preparation for the Fall.

Milton follows the Biblical account of the results of the sin. In his treatment of the transition from honorable nakedness, veiled with innocence and virtue, to shameful nakedness, cloaked with shame and fraud, and known as such through the illicit passions that resulted, and in his distinction between the original way in which Adam and Eve's eyes were open and the change through which their eyes were opened to see differently in the new state of spiritual blindness, he has given the account the same emphasis found in Ambrose and Hugh. All three picture man's spiritual alienation from God, with particular reference on the part of Hugh and Milton to Adam and Eve's accusation of each other and indirectly of God instead of genuine repentance and
confession. (Seen in context as part of the fruitless "mutual accusation" of Adam and Eve in their lowest spiritual state, Adam's derogatory predictions about women are in considerably less danger of being read as a personal outburst of Milton's opinions.) The Biblical sentence is pronounced, but the emphasis is on mercy, and the curse on the Serpent is referred, according to tradition, to Satan. All agree that "Behold, the man is become as one of us" is ironical, and that Adam and Eve must be expelled as unfit to live in Paradise. Like Hugh, Milton notes that the devils were also prevented from entering Paradise. Although he uses the literal Cherubim and sword, not the allegorical explanations as in Ambrose and Hugh, he possibly increased the flames of the sword as "a preview of that universal conflagration which will finally purge the sinful world." Ambrose explains the change in man's nature as liability to temporal death (with the possibility through the sacrifice of Christ of avoiding eternal damnation), subjection of reason to passion, and original sin, sometimes explained as a bodily taint and sometimes as the result of sin on the part of generic man.

Hugh treats the results as ignorance and concupiscence, loss of convenience and righteousness, and original sin, a bodily taint which affects the soul, and which remains even after baptism although the imputation of guilt is thereby removed. Milton includes in man's punishment subjection of reason to the passions, obscurcation of the image of God, physical ills and temporal death of body and soul (through Christ, not eternal death and damnation), and transmission of concupiscence, the guilt of which, but not the inherent sin, may be removed by baptism.
All three emphasize the mercy as well as the justice of God. To Ambrose the Fall appears good for the race as a whole, temptation is a chance for righteousness to manifest itself, and the establishment of sin, which is necessary for the existence of virtue, leads to more obedience and gratitude for God's grace, whereby man has the hope of Heaven and the inner Paradise. For Hugh, good is fairer by contrast, and the good brought forth from evil is greater than good by itself and better for the whole of mankind, although the sinner, judged by his motives, is not thereby exonerated for disobeying a command given for his individual good. Evil is only permitted, not predestined; man was originally free, perfect, and sufficient to stand, and through the mercy of Christ, he was subsequently restored through grace to freedom and given the hope of Heaven. Milton likewise kept the paradox of the "Fortunate Fall." Man was free to fall because he could not otherwise have been good by moral choice, but by necessity without value. Evil lay in the choice, not the value chosen; there is one matter, ultimately good; and God brings forth good out of evil. Adam was justly blamed since his motives were wrong and he knew nothing of this greater good to come; but by the mercy of the Saviour, grace prevented the whole race from paying the rigid satisfaction, with the result that whoever will can be saved. The poignant sense of tragedy at the end of the poem is mitigated by the hope of grace and hard-won greater glory, and the sorrow of departing from Paradise is combined with the gentler note of renewed love between Adam and Eve and between God and man, through which, by a life in accordance with the Christian code, man may endeavor to gain the Paradise within and the ultimate Heaven.
NOTES

All quotations from Milton's poetry are taken from the Oxford Standard Edition by H.C. Beechng (New York, 1935). With one exception the references to Milton's prose are to volume and page of the Columbia Edition of The Works of John Milton, ed. Frank Allen Patterson (New York, 1938). Milton's Christian Doctrine (De Doctrina Christiana) is quoted from Charles Sumner's English translation in the Columbia Edition. One reference is made to the index of A Commonplace Book of John Milton, ed. Alfred J. Horwood (London, 1877). Quotations (which I have generally translated) from the works of Ambrose and Hugh are taken from Migne's Patrologia Latina, Volumes XIV-XVII and CLXXV-GLXXVII respectively. The following abbreviations are used:

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tr>
<td>Adnot. Eluc.</td>
<td>Adnotationes Elucidatoriae in Pentateuchon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allegoriae</td>
<td>Allegoriae in Vetus Testamentum</td>
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<td>Alleg. Inter.</td>
<td>Allegorical Interpretations of Genesis II, III</td>
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<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Christian Doctrine</td>
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<td>C.J.</td>
<td>Classical Journal</td>
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<td>Comment. in Rom.</td>
<td>Commentaria in Epistolam ad Romanos</td>
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<td>De Para.</td>
<td>De Paradiso</td>
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<td>De Sacr.</td>
<td>De Sacramentis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dial.</td>
<td>De Sacramentis Legis Naturalis et Scriptae Dialogus</td>
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<td>ELH</td>
<td>A Journal of English Literary History</td>
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<td>ES</td>
<td>English Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expos. Evang. s. Luc.</td>
<td>Expositio Evangelii Secundum Lucam</td>
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<td>Hexam.</td>
<td>Hexameron</td>
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<td>HLB</td>
<td>Huntington Library Bulletin</td>
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<td>HLO</td>
<td>Huntington Library Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Epist. I ad Tim.</td>
<td>In Epistolam I ad Timotheum</td>
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Chapter I

1 In Cowley's translation (given in Milton's Poetical Works, ed. Beeching, pp. 569-571):

Cool from the crystal spring, their sober wine;
Their youth should pass, in innocence, secure
From stain licentious, and in manners pure.
For these are sacred bards, and, from above,
Drink large infusions from the mind of Jove.


5 Ibid., pp. 101-102.

6 Ibid., pp. 110-113, 124-126.

7 Ibid., p. 172.


9 Clark, op. cit., pp. 212, 189, 198, 163.


11 Hanford suggests that although Milton probably turned against the ministry when party politics prevented his receiving a fellowship, he had possibly recognized earlier that his ambition went beyond the "most spacious Puritan conception of the preacher's function." (Op. cit., p. 50)
Milton's defense of poetry and his belief that the poet may serve God acceptably are illustrated not only by *Elegy VI* but also by *Ad Patrem* and the *Letter to a Friend*.


15 Ibid., p. 199.


Puritans believed in the direct revelation of the divine will and purpose to the individual and in man's voluntary collaboration with God. Having a keen sense of responsibility, the believer was supported in his faith that nothing in the world is due to chance or blind fate. With fear and trembling each individual should work out his own salvation in obedience to the divine will.


G.N. Conklin, op. cit., note 9 to Chapter I, pp. 88-89.


Ibid., pp. 25, 35-37.

Ibid., pp. 67-74. Here Conklin argues convincingly that Milton based his doctrine on a philological interpretation of the text but admits that at times Milton is "more polemic than expository." (p. 81)

Maurice Kelley, This Great Argument (Princeton, 1941), p. 98.


George Coffin Taylor, Milton's Use of Du Bartas (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1934); Grant McColley, Paradise Lost (Chicago, 1940); Sister Mary Irma Corcoran, Milton's Paradise with Reference to the Hexameral Background (Washington, D.C., 1945), p. xvi.
John Paul Pritchard, op. cit. (see note 18) and also "The Influence of the Fathers upon Milton, with Especial Reference to Augustine (Unpublished Thesis, Ph.D., Cornell University, 1925); Kathleen Ellen Hartwell, op. cit. (see note 17); C.S. Lewis, "Milton and St. Augustine," A Preface to Paradise Lost (London, 1942). Hume and Peck, according to Ants Oras, are noteworthy among early editors who cite the Fathers (Milton's Editors and Commentators from Patrick Hume to John Henry Todd [1695-1801] [London, 1939]).

The anonymous editor of Milton's Paradise Lost, Book I (Glasgow, 1750) mentions Augustine, Origen, Philo, and Justin Martyr, although the connection between text and citation is sometimes tenuous. Walter Raleigh makes frequent brief references to the Fathers (Milton [London, 1915]), and Denis Saurat devotes a brief section to St. Augustine and other patristic writers (Milton: Man and Thinker [New York, 1925]). Especially valuable is the reference to Ambrose, among others, by A.O. Lovejoy, "Milton and the Paradise of the Fortunate Fall," ELH, IV (1937), pp. 161-179.

In the writings of Tertullian, whom the Church regarded as a doubtful guide, it may be added, Carver sought justification for Milton's unorthodoxy. "The difficulty," he finds, "is to reconcile Tertullian with St. Augustine." (P.L. Carver, "The Angels in Paradise Lost," RES XVI [1940], p. 420) C.W. Whiting consults Ambrose, Augustine, Basil, Bede, Bruno, Gregory, Origen, and Rupertus to show that in omitting the Holy Spirit from his account of the creation of man, Milton was probably indebted to the Greek theologians, who subordinated the Son and Holy Spirit to the Father, and possibly indebted to Ambrose ("The Father to the Son," MLN LXV [1950] pp. 191-193). A passage from Ambrose is his starting point for a discussion of color symbolism, a medieval heritage of Milton's (in a paper not yet published on "Satan's Color") and Augustine, Isidore, Bede, and later medieval sources are cited for the seven periods of time in Michael's revelation— one of the "marked traditional and...mediaeval elements in Milton's culture which form part of the framework of his religious and ethical thought." ("Seven Ages, or the Pattern of Time in Paradise Lost," another paper of his, not yet published) I am indebted to Mr. Whiting for his kindness in allowing me to read and quote from these two papers.

Alfred Henry Deutsch, see note 25 above.


In tracing the High Ancestry of Puritanism, G. G. Coulton points out that no Puritan denounced pomp and ritual more vehemently than St. Bernard, or hated ecclesiastical pride more wholeheartedly than St. Francis. (*Ten Mediaeval Studies [Cambridge, England, 1930], pp. 58-71*) In describing Puritan pride and penitence, Macaulay notes that the Puritans, for all their hatred of Popery, fell into its worst vices, "intolerance and extravagant austerity." (*Milton, ed. C. W. French, 2nd ed. [New York?], 1930, p. 77*) Bunyan's persecutions by Satan and almost overwhelming despair have a counterpart in the spiritual struggles of Otloh, who was tempted to despair of God's mercy to so great a sinner. (For Otloh, see H. O. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind, I*, 318-324). No further instances of mediaeval gloom and uniformity (to use Rand's expression for the common charge against mediaeval men and Puritans) need be given since Milton was far removed from the Philistines and fanatics, "In Regions milde of calm and serene Ayr."

52 Bush, *op. cit.*, p. 35.


57 H. O. Taylor, *op. cit.* (see note 54), p. 425. Creemeans summarizes Calvin's contributions: he discarded the "many bases of the scholastic law" and made way for new legislation; he kept the mediaeval belief in the natural law given Adam, but emphasized the corruption of fallen man, nature, and social relations; in removing authority from the Church, he opposed even St. Augustine. (*The Reception of Calvinist Thought in England* [Urbana, 1949], p. 12).

60 William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism (New York, 1938), pp. 23, 85. "Impertinent citations drew forth the protest, "That saying was much more observable that men have beards, and women none; because quoted from Beza, and that other Pax res bona est; because brought in with e, said Austin." (From Joseph Glanvill, Vanity of Dogmatizing, 1651, p. 162 ff., cited in note 20 by Richard Foster Jones, "Science and English Prose Style," The Seventeenth Century, p. 84. For Calvin's broad culture, use of Seneca, Cicero, and Plato, and inclusion of Renaissance humanism in his spiritual frame of reference, see Joseph McDill, Milton and the Pattern of Calvinism (Nashville, 1942), pp. 116-124.


62 George Wesley Whiting, Milton's Literary Milieu (Chapel Hill, 1939), Part I, Poetry.

63 George Coffin Taylor, Milton's Use of Du Bartas, pp. 15-21.

64 Allan H. Gilbert, "Milton and the Mysterians," SE, XVII (1920), pp. 147, 168-169. Mr. Gilbert summarizes the conclusions of Robert L. Ramsay's "Morality Themes in Milton's Poetry," SE, XV (1918). In discussing Milton's synthesizing ability, Basil Willey calls him the last great writer who could ignore the demarkation between truth and fiction; Milton could accept the Fall as historical although he was more interested in its "typical" truths. (The Seventeenth Century Background, p. 226-227)


Dudden, op. cit., II, 459; Smalley, op. cit., p. 15.


Smalley, op. cit., p. 3.


Christopher Dawson, Mediaeval Essays (London, 1953), p. 29, 47.


Rand, op. cit., p. 82.
Martin A. Larson finds Milton's "repudiation of Puritanism and absorption of essential Stoicism...most significant." (The Modernity of Milton [Chicago, 1927], p. 108)

A juster estimate is given by Hanford (Handbook, pp. 237-238): "Temperamentally, he felt a strong affinity for Stoic doctrine," but his real philosophy was Christian idealism. Christ condemns Stoicism in Paradise Regained, although he dwells on it longer, "as if it were better worth the pains of a refutation."

Corcoran, op. cit., p. 134.


A. Williams, op. cit., p. 15.


Harnack, op. cit., VI, 44.


Prolegomena by the Benedictines of St. Maur, published with Hugh's Works (MPL, LXXV), cxxxvii.

Smailley, op. cit., p. 104, mentions his relations with Hebrew exegetes; his studies are also described in the Prolegomena; B. Hauréau, Histoire de la Philosophie Scholastique (Paris, 1872), Vol. I, 426, quotes him as saying in De Sapientia Christi that he does not know where dialectic obtains its "diverse, adverse—I will not say perverse—opinions."

Taylor, Mediaeval Mind, II, 386-387.

Smailley, op. cit., p. 85.

Ibid., pp. 169-170.

Ibid., pp. 87-89, 93, 94-95.


Chapter II

1 F.K. Rand, Founders of the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), p. 87. The *sensus literalis* was the obvious historical meaning; *sensus moralis*, the application to conduct; *sensus allegoricus* (mysticus), the prophecy in the Old Testament of an event in the New Testament; *sensus anagogicus*, the revelation about the life to come. (p. 85) Frequently Ambrose took the literal exposition of Basil and added moral commentaries from Philo and allegories from Origen and others. (Smalley, *op. cit.*, p. 97, note 1.)

2 Ambrose, *De Paradiso* (MPL XIV), col. 276; *In Apocalypsin Expositio* (MPL XVII), col. 778; Letter XXXI (Epistola Sacrae Virgini Demetriad) in Opera Ambrosii ([Paris], 1661), IV, col. 257, a letter omitted from Migne’s edition because of its doubtful authenticity; *De Para*., col. 300.

3 *De Para*., cols. 276, 277.

4 Letter 45 (MPL XVI), col. 1142. *Paradisus*, Ambrose explains, is equivalent to hortus (garden).

5 *In Psalm I Ener.* (MPL XIV), col. 921; *In Psalm XXXIX Ener.*, col. 1065: "...in Paradiso semper matutinus erat dies."


7 *De Para*., cols. 282-283.

8 *In Apocalypsin Expositio*, col. 778.
9 In Psalm XXXV Enar. (MPL XIV), col. 954.
11 Letter 45, col. 1143.
12 In Apocalypsin Expositio, cols. 778-779.
13 De Para., cols. 286-287.
14 Ibid., col. 290.
15 Ibid., col. 291.
16 The mist or flood (according to which translation is used) is said to have a "mythological or supernatural connotation." (The Interpreter's Bible, ed. G. A. Buttrick and N. B. Harmon [New York, 1952], Vol. I, 493)
17 Hugh, Adnot. Fluc. (MPL CLXXV), cols. 638-440.
18 Summa Sent. (MPL CLXXVI), col. 94.
19 Allegoricae (MPL CLXXV), cols. 638-639.
20 Miscellanea (MPL CLXXVII), col. 807.
21 De Sacr. (MPL CLXXVI), col. 283.
22 Adnot. Fluc., col. 39.
23 Summa Sent., col. 94: "Non a natura nomen habuit, sed ex occasione quam praestitit"—It did not have its name from its nature, but from the opportunity which it provided. Cf. De Sacr., col. 283. The Tree gave no knowledge but was simply the means for experience. (See Chapter V)
24 Allegoricae, col. 639.
25 Ambrose, De Para., col. 275: "Nunc igitur hylen hunc paradisum aestimare debemus"—Therefore we should not regard that Paradise as material.
27 See ibid., p. 427 for Keightley's note on P. L. V, 17.
28 Milton's Paradise is located in Eden, which extends from Auran to Seleucia. Here Milton is close to Raleigh, who rejects both the allegory and various farfetched locations of Paradise in favor of a terrestrial situation in Eden, which is joined with Canneh, or Seleucia, and Aran, which is identified both as Mesopotamia and a city [Haran] on the Chaboras, a tributary of the Euphrates. (George W. Whiting, Milton's Literary Milieu [Chapel Hill, 1939], p. 45, 48-50)
George M. Whiting, in an article not yet published entitled "Seven Ages, or the Pattern of Time in Paradise Lost."

Further discussion of Ambrose's treatment of the animals and birds as the passions and empty thoughts of the soul (De Para., col. 299) will be given in Chapter IV. Sister Mary Iona Corcoran, "Milton's Paradise with Reference to the Hexameral Background" (Washington, D.C., 1945), p. 38, refers to the coromant as the symbol of the "Law-State-Church Pyr¬
ret," but she makes no other reference to Milton's possible use of the bestiaries.

H. C. Rosedale, "Milton: His Religion and Polemics, Ecclesi¬


Arnold Stein, An answerable Style (Minneapolis, 1953), pp. 53-54, 64, 73. For a treatment of Milton's Paradise as the dream of the Golden Age, see Paul Elmer More, "The Theme of Para¬
dise Lost," Shelburne Essays (Boston, 1908), Ser. IV, pp. 239-253. S. R. W. Tillyard also takes Book IV as an expression of Mil¬

The Interpreter's Bible, I, 502-505.


Among Ambrose's parallels between Adam and Christ, and Eve and Mary, is the statement that as Eve damned us through an apple on a tree, so Mary absolved us through the gift of a Tree, for Christ also hung on the Tree of the Cross like a fruit: "Eva nos damnari fecit per arboris pomum, Maria absolvit per arboris donum;quia et Christus in lig¬
o pepondit, ut fructus." (Sermones [LFL XVII], col. 692) Milton uses no such naive and startling imagery, which is closer to Herbert's "You stole the fruit, and I must climb the tree."

B. Rajan, Paradise Lost and the Seventeenth Century Reader (New York, 1948), p. 155, note 6, calls the description of the fruit as an intoxicant a figure of speech.

C. S. Lewis, op. cit., p. 69: "What is the Apple? It is an apple. It is not an allegory." Irene Samuel, Plato and Milton (Ithaca, 1947), pp. 118-120, expands this statement: only Satan, "who—be it remembered—did not taste the apple," claims it has magical power; it is not "a condensed
encyclopedia, "however; its sole virtue was as a pledge."


Chapter III

1 Ambrose, De Para. (MPL XIV), col. 276.


3 Idem, Alleg. Inter., Works, Vol. I, 175, 181. Ambrose explains man in Paradise as the soul amid the virtues and adds that man was placed there as the sun in the sky, awaiting the rule of the heavens, just as Creation awaited the Son of God. (Loc. cit.)

4 Ambrose, Letter 45 (MPL XVI), col. 1144.

5 Hexam., col. 257-258. Opposing the Greek definitions of the soul as blood or air or a harmony, he defines it as the life-giving principle. (De Isaac et Anima [MPL XIV], col. 504)

6 Hexam., col. 266.

7 Ibid., col. 259.

8 Taking a reference to God's painting the walls of Jerusalem as an allegory of the soul, Ambrose keeps the figure of the well-painted soul and the description of the face as the reflection of the soul. Following Paul ("Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them the members of a harlot?" [I Cor. 6:15]), he warns women not to delete the image by making their faces glow with rouge instead of truth. (Ibid., cols. 258, 260-261) This patristic commonplace, especially vivid in the satirical sermons of Tertullian, is reminiscent of Hamlet's accusation of Ophelia, "God has given you one face, and you make yourselves another." Philo speaks of the deterioration of the race with an analogy from art: "The copies are inferior to the originals, and what is painted or moulded from the copies still more so." (On the Creation, pp. 111-112)

9 Hexam., col. 258. Although he accepts the parallel between Adam and Christ, Ambrose explains the earthly and the heavenly Adams as follows: man in Paradise was celestial, but after the Fall he became earthly and assumed a body (i.e. he was clothed with skin). Ambrose urges man to assume the heavenly image that Christ may recognize Himself. (In Psalm. CXVIII Expos. [MPL XV], col. 374)

10 Hugh, Adnot. Eluc. (MPL CLXXV), col. 37.
Hugh, De Sacr. (MPL CLXXVI), cols. 211, 212, 214, passim. God's knowledge, power, and wisdom are eternally His attributes, which, although manifested in the act of creation, existed in Him independent of it; His foreknowledge only required the creation that it might be manifest, for that quality is attributed to Him with reference to the created universe, which requires the measurement of time.

Adnot. Eluc. (MPL CLXXV), col. 37. Ambrose makes the analogy between the virgin soil and the Blessed Virgin, Adam's dominion over the animals and Christ's over the universe, Adam's creation in the image of God and Christ as the image of the Father, the Tree of Knowledge and the Cross, and other parallels. (Expos. Evang. S. Luc. [MPL XV], col. 1614) Elsewhere he says that both Adams were of earth and spirit (i.e. God and Mary with reference to Christ); that a virgin persuaded the first to sin, whereas the Blessed Virgin gave birth to the second; that the first brought death, whereas the second brought life and grace. (Sermones [MPL XVII], cols. 691-692)

Hugh, De Sacr. (MPL CLXXVI), cols. 205-206, 263-265; Dial. (MPL CLXXVI), col. 22.

Dial., col. 20.


De Sacr., col. 265.


Dial., col. 22.

Adnot. Eluc., col. 37.

Summa Sent., col. 91.

De Sacr., col. 264.


Summa Sent. (MPL CLXXVI), col. 91.

De Sacr., cols. 219-225. Man's recognition of the Trinity by reason seems to contradict Hugh's assertion that the attribution of Power, Wisdom, and Love to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost respectively is a mere convention since all three share these attributes equally; perhaps Hugh means that reason naturally conceives of the Trinity. (See Summa Sent., cols. 56-57.) St. Thomas was content to prove the Father by reason as the basis for a body of dogma requiring faith. The other Persons are deduced as follows: God's thought is "His own reflection in the Verb, the so-called Son... God loves Himself... in the Holy Ghost." The number of Persons was limited to include only essential attributes. (Henry Adams, "Saint Thomas Aquinas," Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres [Boston, 1905], pp. 351-352)
See note 11, above. One might expect Hugh to explain the creation as instantaneous although revealed to man in process, but he states that no entire day of rest intervened, but that God did not work continuously during the six days. (De Saer., col. 199)

"Certainly there is no sufficient foundation for the common opinion that motion and time (which is the measure of motion) could not, according to the ratio of priority and subsequence, have existed before this world was made, since Aristotle, who teaches that no ideas of motion and time can be formed except in reference to this world, nevertheless pronounces the world itself to be eternal." (C.P., XV, 35)


Sister Mary Irma Corcoran, Milton's Paradise with Reference to the Hexameral Background, p. 45, suggests a physical resemblance between Adam and Christ, who was traditionally pictured with "a massive, serene brow, brown or auburn hair reaching to the shoulders, and... gray or blue eyes." I have not attempted anything so extensive as her chapter, "The Image of God." From the first mention of "one greater Man," (P.L., I, 4) Milton uses St. Paul's parallel between Adam and Christ, who becomes "in Adam's room The Head of all mankind." (P.L., III, 284 f.) Milton never makes the detailed antitheses of Ambrose and Hugh, however.

Chapter IV

1 Ambrose probably followed Philo, who identifies the animals with the passions, but does not explain the naming as the evaluation of them, as Philo does. They agree that sensory perception should be subordinate to mind so that both may be mind, not the reverse. Made of body and soul, man is partly irrational, and his senses are deceived by delusory pleasure. Philo further explains that the man made in God's image yearns after the image, whereas the man of clay is linked to the passions. Ambrose rejects the idea of two Adams. (Philo, Alleg., Inter., Works, Vol. I, pp. 225-257, passim.)

2 Ambrose, De Para. (MPL XIV), cols. 299-300.

3 Ibid., cols. 297-298.

4 Ibid., col. 284.

5 Ibid. Elsewhere Ambrose calls Adam and Eve types of the soul and body respectively as well as of Christ and His Church. (Expos. Evang. S. Luc., MPL XV, col. 1632)

6 Sermones (MPL XVII), col. 692.
Alienorla(\textit{MPL CLXXV}), col.639. Elsewhere Hugh states that everyone has within himself Adam, Eve, and the Serpent, i.e. spirit, pleasure, and Satan, and also the earth (flesh) and Paradise (unity), and thorns after sin (punishments of mind and body). (\textit{Misc. [MPL CLXXVII]}, cols.700-701) Another time he explains that Eve daily offers the fruit to the first man when the flesh suggests emotions of the will to the mind. The fruit (pleasures of the flesh) savors of worldly approbation and is colored with the honor of secular power. The devil tempts the flesh to take pleasure, and the flesh urges the spirit to consent. Therefore a man must take card lest sensuality dominate reason and lest bodily dullness deprive the soul of its power to reason. (\textit{De Nuptiis [MPL CLXXVI]}, cols.1214-1215)

\textit{Sacr.}, cols.315-316.

\textit{Quaest.} (\textit{MPL CLXXV}), col.598.

\textit{De Sacr.}, cols.315-316.

\textbf{22} \textit{William B. Hunter, "Prophet Dreams and Visions in Paradise Lost,"
\textit{MLQ}, IX (1948), 282-285. On the basis of the words "Bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh," in Genesis, many writers, including St. Jerome, have called Adam a prophet.}

\textbf{23} \textit{Arnold Stein, \textit{Answerable Style}, p.61.}

\textbf{24} These are Milton's only references to the number of Adam's ribs or the location of the one removed--questions that perplexed and amused the commentators. (See Arnold Williams, \textit{The Common Expositor}, p.90) Milton's brief and elevated treatment suggests that he was aware of such discussions.


Sister Mary Irma Corcoran, *Milton's Paradise with Reference to the Hexameral Background*, pp. 66-67. She says that Milton is closer to Ambrose in calling Eve Adam's image than to the main tradition, which held that Eve was created primarily in God's image. Ambrose states that Adam was made in God's image, but that Eve received her virtue from her husband. *(Expos. Evang. 2. Luc. [N. T. XV], col. 1632)*

Stein, op. cit., p. 115. He also suggests that it is as if God said, "Let us now make woman in your image." *(P. 81)* Perhaps the distinction between the image and creation in the image applies here: Eve is Adam's image, but presumably she, too, was made (in a lesser degree) in God's image.


*Tetrachordon*, IV, 99; *The Judgment of Martin Bucer*, IV, 47.

Stein, op. cit., p. 106.

*Tetrachordon*, IV, 83-85. Milton states that God could have made "out of the same mould a thousand friends and brother Adam" instead of Eve, and that "Austin contests that manly friendship in all other regards [than propagation] had bin a more becomming solace for Adam, then to spend so many secret years an an empty world with one woman," but he adds that our writers "deservedly reject this crabbed opinion."

*Tetrachordon*, IV, 84; *The Judgment of Martin Bucer*, IV, 46-47.

*Tetrachordon*, IV, 97.

*Colasterion*, IV, 247.

*Tetrachordon*, IV, 93.

Chapter V

1. Philo states that the naming of the animals marks the beginning of language, with each name as a symbol expressing the nature of the object. *(Alleg. Inter. Works, I, 235)* He also calls it the "business of wisdom and royalty," for Adam, "taught by Wisdom's own lips," bestowed titles on his subordinates as a ruler does. God's "own viceroy" must indeed
have been powerful since even his descendants have sovereignty over the animals. God knew Adam's abilities but called on him "as a teacher does a pupil" to elicit his reasoning power. (On the Creation, Works, I, pp. 117-119) This last sentence recalls Adam's debate with God in Paradise Lost. Some writers have believed that Adam will regain sovereignty only when he can call the animals by their true names again (Francis Bacon, e.g. See A. Williams, The Common Expositor, p. 81)

2 Ambrose, De Para. (MPL XIV), cols. 298-299.

3 Philo says that Adam's being taken to the garden signifies his comprehension, and his work of dressing and keeping it, the practice of noble deeds and the remembrance of holy precept. (Alleg. Inter., Works, I, 181, 205) This is not the passage that Ambrose cites, which I have been unable to locate.


5 Ibid., cols. 294-295.

6 Ibid., cols. 285-286. "Unitas enim praevericari non potest... plurium discreta sententia est." Philo makes a similar distinction: God said, "Thou shalt eat," in the singular, but "Ye shall not eat." In the plural, for it is hard to find a single wise man to practice virtue, but the many are ordered to abate from evil. (Alleg. Inter., p. 215)

7 Ambrose, op. cit., cols. 286-287.

8 Ibid., cols. 287-288.

9 Ibid., cols. 289-290.

10 Ibid., col. 291.

11 Ibid., cols. 293-294. God's command, which did not give man knowledge of evil, simply defined what to avoid for Adam in order to define virtue.

12 Ibid., cols. 305-306.

13 Ibid., col. 304.


15 Ibid., pp. 61-81.


17 Ibid., p. 97.

18 E.K. Rand, Founders of the Middle Ages, p. 93.

19 Hugh, De Sacr. (MPL CLXXVI), cols. 269-270.
Sister Mary Irma Corcoran, Milton's Paradise with Reference to the Hexameral Background, pp. 104-105. She cites the reference to the loss of grace quoted in this chapter. Comparing man's virtues in Paradise Lost with the discussion of virtue in the Christian Doctrine, she observes that Adam and Eve practiced such duties toward God with regard to self and neighbor as were compatible with their nature before the Fall. (pp. 109, 112) C.S. Lewis emphasizes the majesty of the first couple: Adam really was "what Solomon and Charle-
magne and Haroun-al-Raschid and Louis XIV lamely and unsuccessfully strove to imitate. (Lewis, op. cit., p. 114) So evident are Adam and Eve's virtues that it has seemed unnecessary to illustrate them further from the poem. Deutsch interprets "perfection" as "having the supernatural gift of grace" as distinguished from "preternatural gifts, such as bodily immortality, which, being nonessential to nature, though compatible with it, were added by sanctifying grace." (A.H. Deutsch, Scholastic Elements in Paradise Lost, p. 172) There is no indication, however, that Milton used this distinction.

43 Clarence C. Green, "The Paradox of the Fall in Paradise Lost," LII, LIII (1938), 553-564. Green also notes that free may mean "without constraint," or "free to obey the reasoning faculty," whether reason is deceived or not, or "free to disobey the reason." This last meaning, an evidence of voluntarism, he differentiates from the intellectualistic Platonic concept of sin as the result of the obscuring of the mind by passions so that it dictates sin to the will. Reason may mean "the rational faculty," or "right reason, the moral law of the universe." (pp. 565-567) Green's solution that Adam erred as a voluntarist results from his interpretation of Adam's words before his sin as evidence of a mind clearly aware of its best interests, but subordinated to the will, rather than obscured by passions—a difficult distinction to make. The several meanings of free and reason are expanded from Basil Willey's distinctions and his description of Adam's freedom as "freedom-to-lose-freedom," i.e., "to abandon God," whose service is perfect freedom." Willey treats Adam before the Fall as "God-constrained" and denies his true freedom to make a moral choice before he had experienced sin. (Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background, pp. 254-255) Both Green and Willey disregard Milton's intention and statement and treat the Fall as man's liberation from "beneficent determinism."


45 Marjorie Nicholson, "Milton and Hobbes," SE, XXIII (1925), 417, points out that although Adam is essentially good, his nature (i.e., his passions and instincts) is inadequate without the direction of reason. Natural pleasure is good if temperance is observed. Since "the natural order of man's faculties is all-important," the reversal results in sin:

For understanding ruled not, and the will
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now
To sensual appetite. (I.P., IX, 1127 ff.)

Irene Samuel, Plato and Milton (Ithaca, 1947), p. 164, likewise treats the Fall as a violation of the right order which begins when Adam severs love from reason and subordinates wisdom to beauty. For an excellent discussion of "right Reason," see Douglas Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time (Ithaca, 1945), p. 37.

Adam first addresses God as follows:

O by what Name, for thou above all these

Surpassest far my naming.  
(VIII, 357, 359)

The point about Adam's inability to name God is made by Corcoran, *op. cit.*, p. 93, and others.


*Areopagitica*, IV, 312-313, 315.


*Of Education*, IV, 277.

*Areopagitica*, IV, 311. From the point of view of postlapsarian man, the knowledge of good and evil is highly desirable:

As therefore the state of man now is; what wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear without the knowledge of evil? He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true wayfaring Christian.

As Irene Samuel observes, "knowing good by evil" is the doom of man, whose situation is now reversed. Adam, who had the knowledge of evil, not the experience, was subjected to trial according to the premise of the prose passage quoted. (*op. cit.*, p. 119)

"The keystone of all happiness" in Milton's system, as described by Miss Samuel, is "the trustful acceptance of God's will and its attendant virtue of love [upon which] every other good depends." (*op. cit.*, p. 117)
The question of whether pious acts are pious by God's definition, or acceptable to Him because in accord with the absolute standards of right and wrong, is at least as old as Plato's Euthyphro. St. Thomas affirmed the superiority of intellect over will and admitted restraints on God's free will, whereas Scotus and Occam, by asserting the supremacy of the will, started the doctrine that God could have established a moral system the reverse of Christianity had He so chosen. Miss Nicholson seems justified in declaring that in Milton's God reason is superior to will; for according to the Christian Doctrine, nothing happens of necessity because of God's foreknowledge, which is the result of His knowledge of the natural causes of things. God does not contradict Himself because "a being infinitely wise and good would neither wish to change an infinitely good state for another, nor would He be able...without contradicting his own attributes." He established the creation according to natural reason, not impulsive command, that duty should arise from reason, "not the reason be swallowed up in a reasonless duty," according to Tetrachordon. Miss Nicholson therefore concludes that "Milton's God is not an arbitrary Creator...His Will is guided by His reason." (On. cit., pp. 429-430)

Irene Samuel, op. cit., p. 120.

Mr. Fulton's comment on the modern experimenter is equally applicable to Eve: Whereas Socrates affirmed that virtue is knowledge, the assumption that knowledge is virtue takes no account of the experimenter's motives, which may be interested or disinterested; knowledge, therefore, should be regarded as insight on the one hand, but on the other, power or temptation. (On. cit., pp. 17, 19)

Chapter VI

1 Ambrose, De Para. (MPL XIV), col. 301.
2 In Psalm. I Enarr. (MPL XIV), col. 921.
3 De Para., cols. 301-304.
4 In Psalm. CXVIII Expos. (MPL XV), col. 1416. Here Ambrose says: "...serpens ille callidus et astutus ad construendas nec sitiis suas artes, quo incorruptae ac rudis naturae dote fundatum primogeniti Adam labefactaret affectum, femineis magis ille cibris quam suis comisit venenis"—That serpent, clever and crafty in constructing the devices of his wickedness, by which quality he might impair the established disposition of the uncorrupted and inexperienced nature of the original Adam, trusted more to feminine charms than to his own venom.
5 De Para., cols. 302-304.
Adam sinned in contemning God and serving the devil in His place; therefore his sin was not far from idolatry. The striking statement that Adam made the steps whereby the robber might go up to his children occurs in col. 114. The three motives, "oblectatio carnis, species gloriarum, et aviditas potentiae"—the pleasure of the flesh, the glitter of glory, and the lust for power, are listed in Expos. Evang. S. Luc., col. 1622. Ambrose says in In Psalm. I Enar., col. 928: "Nam Evae prae timmisit ordinem naturae"—Eve wrongly disregarded the order of nature.

Hugh, Summa Sent. (MPL CLXXVI), col. 94.

As soon as he had been created, Satan rebelled because he thought his own mental powers should give him supremacy over God. Therefore he was cast into outer darkness.

The good angels continue to stand not by necessity but by their own goodness, confirmed by grace so that it cannot fail. (Ibid.) Hugh also attributes to God as much free will as is consistent with His goodness.

Hugh's discussion about Eve's substitution of "ne forte" for "ne morte" (probably a difference resulting from a textual error in the Vulgate) occurs in Adnot. Fluc., col. 41.
Allan H. Gilbert, "The Problem of Evil in Paradise Lost," *JE&F,* XXII (1923), p. 177, says that Satan personifies evil in its alluring, then hideous, and ultimately self-destructive aspects. Stein observes how Satan evolves as a dramatic character, moving inevitably toward his ruin, and calls Satan's soliloquies "a masterly presentation of Satan's psychology in Satan's terms," for his pity easily slides into self-pity, and his reasoning about God's motivation is a projection of his own motivation. (Stein, op. cit., pp. 9-11)

Arnold Williams, *The Common Expositor,* pp. 116-117, states that "by implication at least," the Serpent is interpreted as Satan by the New Testament writers, and explained by the commentators as a real snake "into which the devil had insinuated himself." Edward Chauncey Baldwin, "A Note on Paradise Lost, IX," *MLN,* XXXII (1917), 119-121, offers the evidence that since Augustine says, "That proud and envious angel...chose the serpent because being slippery and moving in tortuous windings, it was suitable for his purpose," and since Aristotle declares that the serpent "draws itself up till it stands erect upon its tail...because its oesophagus is long and thin," neither the identification of the Serpent with Satan nor the difference in its locomotion can be termed unprecedented. It may be added that Milton's Serpent, although of course he does not go bounding along on the tip of his tail like the Beaver, moves not with indented wave,

Prone on the ground, as since, but on his rear,
Circular base of rising foulds, that tour'd Fould above fould a surging Maze. (IX, 496 ff.)


Eve's ritual adoration of the Tree—a manifestation of self-love—is a sacrilegious corruption of the morning worship service, as Stein notes (op. cit., p. 96). It is also a debasement of Eve, who rebelled against God and Adam, to the status of a primitive "worshipper of a vegetable," according to C.S. Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost, p. 122. The personification of the Tree is traditional, for Philo speaks allegorically of a "tree cognizant of good and evil," (On The Creation, Works, I, p. 123) Ambrose calls the trees of Paradise "spirantia et rationabilia"—breathing and endowed with reason. (Letter 45, col. 1142)

C.S. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 121-122. He praises Milton's skill in delineating subtly Eve's transition from innocence to evil; for no one about to sin describes his act as sinful: "If you or I, reader, ever commit a great crime, be sure we shall feel very much more like Eve than like Iago."

Stein, op. cit., p. 108. He wonders whether Eve would have been redeemed by grace for not offering Adam the fruit. In view of her selfish calculation of the alternatives, it seems unlikely.

Irene Samuel, Plato and Milton, p. 166.

Stein, op. cit., p. 100.

Douglas Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time, p. 84.

James Holly Hanford, "The Dramatic Element in Paradise Lost," SP, XIV (1917), p. 185, finds Adam's Fall and the "sense of tremendous waste" greater and more tragic than Eve's because his nature is "nobler and more steadfast." The quotation from Hanford in this chapter is taken from his Handbook, p. 213.


Schultz, op. cit., pp. 20-21. To find a "pleasing pout" and a love of earth "admittedly injudicious" in the beautiful speech in which Eve says, "With thee conversing I forgot all time," (IV, 639) is a rather extreme interpretation in an otherwise judicious estimate of Milton's foreshadowing of the temptation scene.

Stein, op. cit., p. 97.


Murray W. Bundy, "Eve's Dream and the Temptation in Paradise Lost," Research Studies of the State College of Washington, X (1942), pp. 282-284, 287-291. Adam's admission that evil may enter the mind of God or man is inexplicably dismissed as a "comforting generalization" that approaches nonsense. Adam does, of course, err in thinking Eve perfect in herself.

50 Green, "The Paradox of the Fall in *Paradise Lost*," *MLN*, LIII (1938), pp.568-569.


53 John Diekhoff, "Eve, the Devil, and the *Aretopraxica*," *MLQ*, V (1944), pp.430-432, finds Eve's denunciation of "Vertue unassayed" less applicable to Paradise than to Milton's England. If Adam mistrusts Eve (and he admits that he, too, needs help) he is justified by the outcome. Unlike the Lady in *Comus*, Eve does not resent, but rather seeks her trial.


58 Cleanth Brooks, "Milton and Critical Re-estimates," *p.1048*, is well satisfied with Milton's handling of the "tension" between theological free will and artistic inevitability.

59 Millicent Bell, "The Fallacy of the Fall in *Paradise Lost*," *PMLA*, LXVIII (1953), pp.863, 876.


62 Leon Howard, "The Invention' of Milton's 'Great Argument': A Study in the Logic of 'God's Ways to Men','" *HLO*, IX, 158.


65 Although Howard warns that the attempt to find motives for Adam's disobedience ignores the causal system, his treatment of Adam as imperfect, lacking direct knowledge of good and evil ("when truth is sought, testimony has little force for proof"), is close to the position that he criticizes in Tillyard, that the "sin" is failure to possess thorough moral knowledge, in which case eating the apple should have been the means to avoid sin. This position he rightly opposes because if carried to its logical conclusion, it would reverse Milton's theme and make the result of sin the acquisition, not the loss, or rather obscuration, of free will. (*Ibid.*, pp.162,164)
Howard observes that the poem does not reflect the theology of the Christian Doctrine in every respect since the logical system may not require a full theological treatment, and since "dogma, aims, and arguments are not the same." Many theological controversies he dismisses as "a Laocoonian struggle" with irrelevant matters. (Ibid., pp. 167, 176) The warning is well advised, but the logical requirements do not, of course, exclude artistic and theological considerations.

Maurice Kelley, This Great Argument, pp. 148-150.

Douglas Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Times, p. 47.

Ibid., pp. 37, 82.

Stein, op. cit., p. 100.

Ibid., p. 115.

Samuel, op. cit., p. 164.

Chapter VII

1 Ambrose, De Para. (MPL XIV), cols. 307-308.
2 Ibid., cols. 308-310.
3 Philo, Alleg. Inter., Works, I, 303, 335, 341, 345, 347.
4 In Psalm. CXXVIII Expos. (MPL XV), col. 1205.
5 De Fuga Saeculi (MPL XIV), col. 701.
6 De Elia et Jejunio (MPL XIV), col. 581.
7 In Psalm. CXXVIII, col. 1354.
8 De Para., cols. 295-296.
9 Letter 71 (MPL XVI), col. 1243.
11 Apologia David Altera (MPL XIV), col. 903.
12 Comment. in Rom. (MPL XVII), cols. 114-118; Letter 76, col. 1261.
13 Letter 73, col. 1252.
14 De Para., col. 277. This argument appears to contradict Ambrose's assertions (see Chapter V above) that the knowledge of good and evil was harmful because conducive to sin, and that man was better off in the state of innocence when he knew evil (what to avoid) by the natural law in his heart.
The argument quoted in this chapter is not inconsistent with Ambrose's belief that knowledge of evil leads to sin, however, for he proceeds to the "paradox of the Fortunate Fall," that the results of sin were ultimately good. The contradiction lies in the implication that without the knowledge of evil derived from the Tree of Knowledge man could not know the good or distinguish it from evil. The solution given by Milton (but not by Ambrose) is that man, who had moral knowledge before the Fall, knew evil only by good, and that only after the Fall was he doomed to know good only by evil, and evil, by experience.

17 *Letter*, 72, col. 1252.
19 *De Para.* , col. 300.
20 Hugh, *Adnot. Fluc.* (MPL CLXXV), cols. 41-42. Here Hugh notes without further comment that Adam and Eve's use of fig leaves has caused some commentators to identify the forbidden fruit as a fig.
21 *In Ecclesiasten. Homilia VIII (MPL CLXXV)*, cols. 165-168.
22 Misc. (MPL CLXXVII), cols. 848-849.
23 *Adnot. Fluc.*, cols. 42-43.
24 *Quaest. In Enist. I ad Tim. (MPL CLXXV)*, col. 598.
25 *Adnot. Fluc.*, cols. 43-44.
26 *Summa Sent.* (MPL CLXXVI), cols. 100-101; *Dial.* (MPL CLXXVI), col. 24.
28 *Summa Sent.* , cols. 105-109; *De Sacr.* (MPL CLXXVI), cols. 304-305. On the transmission of the parents' actual sins, Hugh cites Ezekiel to the effect that the son will not bear the father's iniquity. Each individual should be responsible only for his own sins; the accumulated inheritance of actual sins would result in a hopelessly depraved race. It is true that the Bible speaks of the visitation of the fathers' sins upon the children unto the fourth generation—a limit, at least; but Hugh mitigates this statement by applying it only to sins committed before the birth of the children and by explaining the visitation as the sons' voluntary imitation of the fathers' sins. (*Summa Sent.* , col. 110)
De Sacr., cols. 236-240-241.

Ibid., cols. 213-214.

Summa Sent., cols. 101, 84-85, 99. Reference has been made in Chapter V to Hugh's belief in man's free will and the angels', and his assertion that the evil angels remained evil through obstinacy, not necessity, and that the good were confirmed through grace. Hugh admits one restriction on God's free will: His goodness would not permit Him to do evil. Hugh rejects Jerome's assertion that God, being incapable of sin, lacks free will, and agrees with Ambrose that God refrains from sin not by necessity but by His free will and goodness. (Ibid., cols. 104-105; De Sacr., cols. 304-305)

Summa Sent., col. 105.

Dial., cols. 28-31.

Ibid., cols. 31-32.

Summa Sent., cols. 105, 99-100, 102-103.

Dial., cols. 27-28.

De Sacr., cols. 293, 305-306.


John Erskine, "The Theme of Death in Milton's Paradise Lost," PHLA, XXXII (1917), 581-582.


The doctrine in this passage suggests Plato's Phaedo, and is similar to this description in Comus:

The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite loose
The divine property of her first being.
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp
Oft seen in Charmed vaults, and Sepulchers,
Linger, and sitting by a new made grave,
As loath to leave the body that it lov'd,
And link't it self by carnal sensuality
To a degenerate and degraded state. (467 ff.)

The use of this principle (probably derived from Aristotle) whereby a cause operates in proportion to the capacity of the matter may be compared with Philo's use of it in his discussion of God's bounties, which are not given in proportion to God's capacity to do good, but to the capacity of the recipient. (On the Creation, p. 19).
Milton vindicates God's justice through man's free will. God's permission of evil is the absence of His interference with "natural causes and free agents." Predestination he defines as "the principal special decree of God...whereby God in pity to mankind, though foreseeing that they would fall of their own accord, predestinated to eternal salvation... those who should believe and continue in the faith." (G.D., XV, 213, 67; XIV, 91)

See Chapter VI, Note 33, above. Advocates for the devil have ranged from the sentimental critic who exclaimed, "Poor fellow! He couldn't help himself!" (H. Rawlings, "The Tranfigured Theology of Milton's Paradise Lost," Westminster Review, CLIII, [1900], p. 39) to Shelley, who declares that Satan in his courageous perseverance is morally superior to God, who tortures him "with the alleged design of exasperating him to deserve new torments." (A Defense of Poetry, Prose Works, ed. H. Buxton Forman [London, 1880; Vol. III, 127-128] Obviously the former fails to understand Satan's free will, whereas the latter disregards Satan's soliloquy (IV, 32 ff.) in which he both denies the excellence of his chosen course and admits his own fault in failing to repent.


Gilbert, op. cit., p. 188.

Trask, op. cit., p. 581.

C. Green, "The Paradox of the Fall in Paradise Lost," MLN, LIII (1938), pp. 569-571.


Helen Darbishire, op. cit., p. 35.


Gilbert, op. cit., p. 192.


Much could be added about the steps to Heaven. In discussing Augustine's treatment of how the soul may rise by stepping stones, E. K. Rand refers to other examples. It is true, he says,
that the Neo-Platonists had a kind of mysticism "with ladders... Their ecstasy was a linked metaphysical sweetness long drawn out." Not necessarily mystic, the Neo-Platonic ladders may exhibit wooden formalism. "But the mind of a poet, of an Ambrose or an Augustine, helped both by Neo-Platonism and by the new [Christian] vision of allegory [culminating in Dante], finds the gate of Heaven by the stones that served as Jacob's pillow, and sees the Angels of God ascending and descending on the ladder of his dream." (Op. cit., pp. 264-265)

58 Irene Samuel, Plato and Milton, p. 121.
59 Ibid., p. 171.

Chapter VIII

2 Addison's Criticisms on Paradise Lost, ed. Albert S. Cook (Boston, 1892), pp. 119-120, 131.
3 George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion (New York, 1900), p. 89. Denis Saurat's statement, "Poets in particular need myths," is further applied in his comment, "Milton looked upon dogma as a sort of myth, chiefly useful for poetical purposes"—a rather extreme statement. (Milton: Man and Thinker [New York, 1925], pp. 207, 203)
4 Saurat, op. cit., p. 220.
5 Milton's "personal intrusiveness" is read into Adam's words by F. R. Leavis, "Mr. Eliot and Milton," SR, LVII (1949), pp. 20-21.
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1. Moreover there was a Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil in Paradise... Afterwards we shall see whether this tree was beautiful to behold and good to eat like the rest... Meanwhile we have nothing to blame even if we cannot know the reason. For in this creation of the world we must not condemn by any rash judgment whatever seems difficult for us to understand and incomprehensible to our judgment, such as the creation of serpents and of any other poisonous living thing; forsooth, we men cannot understand and know why every separate thing was done... For there are many things which are not to be measured by our intellect, but rather to be considered from the height of the divine disposition and word. For suppose, without the prejudice of later assertions, nevertheless, that this Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil displeases you because after men had tasted of it, they knew themselves to be naked: still I say unto you that for the consummation of the divine work, even this Tree [of Knowledge] arose in Paradise and was therefore allowed by God, that we may know the pre-eminence of good. For how, if there were no knowledge of good and evil, could we discern the difference between good and evil? For we could not judge that which is evil to be evil if there were no knowledge of the good; there could be no knowledge of the good unless there were also good; nor, again, could we know that which is good.

APPENDIX A

SELECTED PASSAGES FROM AMBROSE'S DE PARADISO

1. Erat autem lignum scientiae boni et mali in paradiso... Postea videbimus utrum et hoc lignum speciosum ad aspectum et bonum ad escam fuerit sicut alia et alia... Interim nihil habemus, quod nunc reprehendere debemus, et sin rationem scire non possimus. Neque enim in hac creatura mundi, si qua nobis difficilia intellectu videntur, et incomprehensibilia ingenio nostro, temperario quodam debemus condemnare judicio, ut creaturam serpentium, venenatique aliquius animantis; quippe homines qua ratione singula quaecumque sint facta intelligere adhuc et scire non possimus... Sunt enim plurima quae non nostro ingenio metienda sunt, sed ex altitudine divinae dispositionis et verbi sunt aestimanda. Ponente sine praeadiculo tamen assertionibus futuris, ideò tibi hoc lignum de scientiae boni et mali displicere, quia postea quum gustaverunt ex eo homines, intellexerunt se esse nudes; attamen ad consummationem divinae operationis dicam tibi et hoc lignum [de scientia boni et mali] in paradiso exortum, et ideò a Deo esse permittum ut possimus supereminem quam boni scire. Quamodo enim si non esset scientia boni et mali, inter bonum et malum discretionem aliqua non esse posset nisi esset scientia boni: scientia autem boni esse non posset nisi esset et bonum: neque rursus quod bonum erat, sciremus bonum esse, nisi esset scientia mali... Ergo et quod malum putamus, plurumque non per omnia malum est sed in commune utilit. Nam scift fel in parte est corporis, et tamen ad totius utilitatem corporis prodest: ita utilitati omnium profuturam scien Deus scientiam boni et mali, in parte constituit, ut in commune prodest...
to be good unless there were a knowledge of evil... Therefore that which we think bad, many times is not bad in all respects, but useful in general. For just as gall is in part of the body, yet is of benefit for the use of the whole body, so God, knowing that the knowledge of good and evil would be advantageous for the use of all, established it in a part, that it might benefit the whole.

2. Adverte quia extra paradisum vir factus est, et mulier intra paradisum, ut advertas quod non loci, non generis nobilitate, sed virtute unusuque gratiam sibi comparat. Denique extra paradisum factus, hoc est, in inferiore loco, vir melior inventur; et illa quae in meliore loco, hoc est in paradiso, facta est, inferior repertur. Mulier enim prior decepta est, et virum ipsa decept. Unde apostolus Petrus subjectas fortiori vasi mulieres sanctas viris suis velit dominis obedire memoravit... Et inde contuendum quia nemo debet sibi facile praesumere. Nam ecce illa quae in adjunctum facta est viro, praesidio virili indiget; quia vir caput est mulieris: ille autem qui adjunctum uxoris habitur se esse credebat, lapaus per uxorem. Unde nemo debet facile alteri se credere, nisi cujus virtutem probabit, nec arrogare sibi qui se pro auxilio putatur: adeo enim magis si inve- rit fortiori cui se putabat esse praesidio, ab ipso gratiam mutatur, sicut et viros mulieribus honorum impertire apostolus Petrus praecepit... Sed etiam tunc priusquam a serpente mulier decipetur habuit viri gratiam, quoniam de viro sumpta est licet hoc sacramentum magnum sit. (Col. 2:84)

2. Note that man was made outside Paradise, and woman, inside Paradise, that you may observe that everyone may procure grace for himself by virtue, not by nobility of birth or place. The man, then, made outside Paradise, that is, in a lower place, was found better, and she who was made in a better place, that is, Paradise, was found inferior. For the woman was deceived first, and she herself deceived the man. Whence the Apostle Peter said that virtuous women, subject to the stronger vessel, should obey their husbands as masters... And from this it should be considered that no one should be presumptuous too easily, for behold, she who was made as a help for the man lacked the protection of a man, for the man is the head of the woman; but he, who thought that he would have the help of a wife, fell through his wife. Wherefore no one should readily trust another unless he has tried his virtue, nor should anyone who should think himself accepted as a help be arrogant; but rather, if he should find that the one to whom he thought he was a defense is stronger than himself, he should borrow grace from him, as the Apostle Peter orders men to honor women... But even then, before she was deceived by the Serpent, the woman had grace from the man, for she was taken from the man, although this is a great sacrament.

3. Qui nescit, inquiunt, bonum et malum, ne ipsum quidem novit, quod est obedire mandato. Et ideo quia non noverat, venia, inquiunt, dignus fuit qui non obedivit, non condemnatione. Quae quidem quaestio de his absolutionem habet, quae ante memoravimus. Considerare enim potuit homo ex iis quae Deus ei contulerat, quod insufflationem Dei
accepit, quod erat in paradiso voluptatis locatus, summam au-
tori obedientiam deferendam. Et ideo si vim nesciebat boni et
mali, tamen qua tantoriam audtor dixerat de ligno scientiae boni
et mali non esse gustandum, fide premceptorii servare debuerat.
Non enim ab eo peritia, sed fides exigebatur. Intelligebat
utique Deum omnibus praeminere, ideoque personam jubentis
spectare debuerat. Et si non intelligebat vim qualitatemque
jussorum, sciebat tamen premceptorii deferendam esse reverentiam.
Habebat in natura haec opinionem; et si non habebat judicium
boni et mali. (Col. 289)

3. Who does not know good and evil, they say, does not
even know this: what it is to obey a command. And so, since
he did not know, they say that he who disobeyed was deserving
of pardon, not of condemnation. This question has a solution,
indeed, with reference to the things that we have said before.
For man could have considered, from those things that God had
bestowed on him—the fact that he was placed in a Paradise of
Pleasure, the fact that he had received the Divine Affluxus—
that he should offer the highest obedience to his Author. And
so if he did not know the force of good and evil, yet, because
the Author of such great things had said that he must not taste
of the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil, he ought to
have kept faith with his Instructor. For faith, not empirical
knowledge, was exacted of him. And certainly he knew that God
is pre-eminent over all things and therefore he should have
borne in mind the nature of his Instructor. Even if he did not
understand the force and nature of the commands, nevertheless
he knew that he ought to revere his Commander. By nature he
had this belief, although he did not have the understanding
of good and evil.

4. Iterum accipe: Scire bonum melius est quam nescire;
et ei qui bonum sciat, pulchrum est scire quod malum est, ut
sciat cavere quod malum est, et ut prudens subeat custodiae
cautionem. Rursus autem non satis est hoc solum scire quod
malum est; ne cum malum scias, scientia boni incipias defrau-
dari. Pulchrior est igitur ut utrumque norimus, ut et quia
scimus bonum, fugiamus quod malum est; et ex eo quod cognos-
cimus malum, boni gratiam praefaramus. Sed ita debes utrumque
scire, ut et profunde noverias, et quod noveris exsequaris,
actusque scientiae congruat. Alioquin tolerabiliorem Scriptura
indicat eum qui utrumque nesciat quam qui perfectorie utrum-
que cognovit. Gratam enim scire, cuod vel exsequi vel vitare
non possis: gratam scire sine usu atque opere cognitionis pro-
fundae. Denique osten ad existimationem medico scire cuid pro-
sit, et quid noceat aegro; nisi cognitioea quamadmodum oportet,
utatur: et ideo non est cognitio bona, nisi ea utaris ut
oportet. (Cols. 289-290)

4. Again, consider this: To know good is better than not
to know it, and for him who knows good it is a fine thing to
know what is evil, that he may know how to avoid what is evil,
and that, as a prudent man, he may take the precaution of being
on guard. But, again, it is not enough to know only this, what
evil is, lest when you know evil, you begin to be defrauded of
the knowledge of good. For it is a finer thing to know both, therefore, so that because we know the good, we may flee what is evil, and so that because we know evil, we may prefer the grace of good. But you should know both in such a way that you know them profoundly and carry out what you know, and that the acts are in keeping with the knowledge. Moreover the Scripture says that he who is ignorant of both is rather to be endured than he who knows both perfunctorily. For it is a serious matter to know that which you cannot carry out or avoid; it is seriously bad to know without use and practice of profound knowledge. Finally, it is prejudicial to the reputation of a doctor to know what is beneficial and what is injurious to a sick man unless he uses that knowledge to whatever extent is necessary; and so there is no knowledge that is good unless you use it fittingly.

5. Quid est enim peccatum, nisi praevergiant legis divinae, et coelestium inobedientia praeceptorum? Non enim auribus corporis de mandatis coelestibus judicamus; sed cum esset Dei verbum, opiniones quaeda nobis boni et mali pullularunt; dum id quod malum est naturaliter intelligimus esse vitandum, et id quod bonum est naturaliter nobis intelligimus esse praeceptum. In eo igitur vocem Domini videmur audire, quod alia interdicit, alia praecipit. Et ideo si quia non obediens illis quae semel a Deo praecepta credimus, poenae aestimatur. Dei autem praeceptum non quasi in tabulis lapideis atramento legimus inscriptum, sed cordibus nostris tenemus impressum spiritu Dei Vivi. Ergo opinio nostra ipsa sibi legem facit. Si enim gentes quae legem non habent naturaliter ea quae legis sunt, faciunt ejusmodi legem non habentes ipsi sibi sunt lex qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis. Opinio igitur humana sibi tamquam Dei lex est. (Cols 292-293)

5. For what is sin but transgression of the divine law and disobedience of the heavenly precepts? For we do not judge of heavenly commands with bodily ears; but when there was the word of God, there came forth certain opinions for us of good and evil, when we understand that what is evil should be avoided and that what is good is commanded us by nature. In that, then, we seem to hear the voice of God, that forbids some things and commands others. And so if anyone does not obey those things which we believe were ordained by God once and for all, he is held liable to punishment. But we do not read the precept of God as though it were inscribed on stone tables with ink, but we have it impressed on our hearts by the Spirit of the Living God. And so our judgment itself makes the law for itself. For if the peoples who have not the Law do naturally those things which are the work of the Law, not having Law of this kind, they themselves are a law unto themselves who show the work of the Law written in their hearts; thus our human judgment is as God's law for itself.

6. Invidiae autem causa beatitudo hominis in paradiso positi, et ideo quoniam ipse diabolus acceptam gratiam tenere non potuit, invidit homini, eo quo figuratus e limo, ut incola paradisi esset, electus est. Considerabat enim diabolus quod ipsi qui fuisset superioris naturae, in haec saecularia et mundana deciderat; homo, autem, inferioris naturae sperabat aeterna. Hoc est ergo quod invidet dicens: Iste inferior adipiscitur quod ego servare non potui? Iste de terris migrabit.
6. The cause of his envy, moreover, was the happiness of man, placed in Paradise, and so since the devil himself could not keep the grace he had received, he envied man because he, made of mud, was chosen to be an inhabitant of Paradise. For the devil considered that he, who was of a superior nature, had fallen down into those secular and worldly places, but man, of an inferior nature, had the hope of eternity. Then this is what he envied, saying, "Does that inferior receive what I could not keep? Will he move from earth to Heaven, when I have fallen from Heaven to earth? I have many ways whereby I can deceive man. He was made of mud; the earth is his mother; he is involved in corruptible things. Although his soul is of a superior nature, yet even that can be liable to fall, placed in the prison of the body, since I could not avoid falling. There is the first way he may be deceived, then, when he desires greater things than his condition. For here is a certain endeavor for industry. Next, it is in the nature of the flesh to desire what one does not have. Finally, in what respect do I seem wiser than all others if I do not deceive man and contend by fraud and subtlety?" And so he plotted that he would not first attack Adam, but would try to deceive Adam through the woman. For he did not attempt him who had received the divine command in person, but he began his attempt upon her who had learned from her husband, not God, what she should comply with. For you do not have it that God spoke to the woman, but that He spoke to Adam; therefore the woman should be thought to have learned [the command] through Adam.
APPENDIX B

SELECTED PASSAGES FROM HUGH'S DE SACRAMENTIS

1. De ligno scientiae boni et mali: Lignum etiam scientiae boni et mali ibi fuisset narratur, quod non similiter quidem ex natura sua scientiam boni et mali homini dare potuit, quemadmodum lignum vitae vitam in homine corporalem ex natura sua et virtute sibi indita a Deo potuit conservere, sed idcirco tantum lignum scientiae boni et mali dicitur; quia ad probandum obedientiam hominis, sive disobedientiam experiendam parabatur. Erant enim quaedam bona quae neccum homo per experimentiam cognoverat; et quidem quaedam mala quae per experimentiam adhuc nascierat. Et positum est quasi in medio lignum scientiae boni et mali ut per illud homo vel obediendo ad bona gustanda et cognosceda transiret, vel non obediendo ad mala sentienda et percipienda pertingaret. Sic igitur in loco isto sive mali sive boni cognoscendi occasionem acciperet debuit; non tamen ex natura ligni quas hoc homini ex se dare non potuit, sed quia in eo vel obediendo boni vel non obediendo mali pro debita remuneratione accepta occasionem. Si vero aliter vim hujus nominis interpretari voluerimus, dicere poterimus quod Adam ante peccatum bonum et malum scivit; bonum quidem per scientiam et per experimentiam, malum vero per solam scientiam. Postquam autem lignum vetitum tetigit, malum jam etiam per experimentiam cognoscere coepit, atque per experimentiam ipsius mali bonum quoque quam stricte fuerat tenendum agnovit... Quantum autem spectabat ad naturam ipsius, tale fuisset creditur ut sive ederet sive non ederet homo fructum ejus non laedere tur. Convenienter autem lignum vitae ex sua natura virtutem tribuit; lignum vero scientiae boni et mali virtutistantum occasionem praestitit, quia bona inferioris vitae ex natura sunt; bona vero superioris vitae ex gratia. (cxxxv. col. 283)

1. Concerning the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil: The Tree of Knowledge of good and evil is also said to have been there, which was not able to give man the knowledge of good and evil by its own nature in such a way as the Tree of Life was able, by its own nature and the power given it by God, to preserve bodily life in man; but on this account only is it called the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil, that it was prepared to test man's obedience or to prove his disobedience. For indeed there were certain good things which man did not yet know from experience; and likewise there were certain bad things which he still did not know by experience. And the Tree of Knowledge was placed in the middle, as it were, that man should either pass, by obeying, to taste and know good things, or arrive through disobeying at the perception and experience of evil. Thus, in that place, there he was supposed to receive the occasion of knowing good or evil, not, however, from the nature of the Tree, which could not give it to man by itself, but because in it he received the opportunity of either good, by obeying, or evil, by disobeying, as a due recompense. But if we wish to interpret the force of this name otherwise, we can say that Adam knew good
and evil before sin: good, to be sure, through knowledge and experience, but evil only through abstract knowledge. But after he touched the forbidden tree, he began to know evil also by experience now, and through the experience of that evil, he knew how carefully the good ought to have been kept...

But as regards its nature, it is thought to have been such that man would not have been injured whether or not he ate the fruit. Fittingly, moreover, the Tree of Life bestowed power through its own nature, but the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil furnished only the occasion for the knowledge of the power of good and evil; for the good things of the lower life are from nature, but the good things of the higher life are from grace.

2. Concerning the knowledge of man before his sin: If, therefore, it is asked about the first man of what nature he was before his sin, he was rational, indeed, as to his soul, having the ability to distinguish between good and evil, also a perfect knowledge of things as far as it pertained to his first status. For just as (so far as it pertained to the perfection in stature and age of the human body) we believe that the first man was made perfect, so also (as to the soul) we believe that he received knowledge of the truth and perfect knowledge of things then created (that knowledge so far as was appropriate to the first perfection) and that he did not attain to that by study or by any discipline over an interval of time, but that at one and the same time, from the beginning of his creation, by the one simple illumination of the Divine Afflatus, he perceived it. Moreover it is certain that the first man was instructed with three-fold knowledge, namely, knowledge of his Creator, so that he knew by whom he had been made; knowledge of himself, so that he knew what he had been made and what he was supposed to do; and then the knowledge also of that which had been made with him i.e. the world and what he should do concerning it and in it.
3. De duobus praeceptis naturae et discipline: Bonum hominii: Deo vel datum vel promissum nihil profuisset nisi et ad illud quod datum fuerat apponere tur custodia ne immigreretur et ad illud quod promissum fuerat aperire tur via ut quaereretur et inventiretur. Prophece ad bonum datum posita est custodia praeceptum naturae; et ad bonum promissum aperta est via, praeceptum disciplinae. Quo ista praecepta data sunt homini: praeceptum naturae et praeceptum disciplinae. Praeceptum naturae fuit quod intus aspiratum est per naturam; praeceptum vero disciplinae quod foris apposita est ad disciplinam: intus per sensum, foris per verbum... In praecepto naturae tria sunt: praeceptio, prohibition, concessio. Praeceptum autem naturae nos nihil aliud intelligimus, quam ipsam discretionem naturalen qua intrinsicus inspirata est ut per eum homo erudiretur de his quae sibi vel apetenda vel fugienda fuerunt. Quasi enim quoddam praeceptum dare erat discretionem et intelligentiam agenti, cor di hominis asire. Quid ergo cognitio faciendorum fuit, nisi quaedam ad horam hominis facta praeceptio? et quid rursus cognitio vitandorum fuit nisi quaedam prohibita? Quid vero cognitio coerum quaee media fuerunt existimanda est, nisi quaedam concessio? ut ille homo suo libero arbitrio relinquaret ubi quacunque partem eligeret non laedere tur. Deo igitur praecipere erat docere hominem quae sibi necessaria fuerant. Prohibere autem demonstrare noxiam. Concedere vero insinuare ad utrimum et se habentia.

... Mandatum autem disciplinae neque de praeceptione neque de prohibitione naturali sunt poterat; ne si vel eadem praeciperet Deus aut prohiberet quae praeceptum et prohibuerat, meri tum, ut dictum est, ad vitam obediendi non esset. Si vero in utrimum mutaret mandatum, ut vel necessaria prohiberet vel noxiam praeciperet naturam a se factam injuste laedere. Sopertur ergo ut de concessione naturali praeceptum disciplinae numeretur, quia secundum modo meri tum esse potuit ut liberum arbitrium fuit et ubi homo ad utrimum et se pro voto inclinare potuit... Si enim dixisset Deus homini ut de ligno scientiae brani et mali manducaret, haberet diabolus adversus hominem aliquum diocere posset, quod videlicet in executione mandati commodum suum magis quam praeceptum creatoris sui respectivet, et ad periculum id quod praeceptum fuerat non amore Dei, sed delectatione obi adducere fuisse (Cobb, 268, 269-270)

3. Of the two commands of nature and discipline: The good either given or promised man by God would have been of no advantage had no guard been placed also on what was given so that it would not be lost, and had not the way to what had been promised been opened, that it might be sought and found. Therefore a guard was placed on the good given: the precept of nature; and the way was opened to the promised good: the precept of discipline. Those two commands were given man, the command of nature and the command of discipline. The command of nature was what was infused within by nature: the command of discipline, indeed, what was set up from without for discipline: the inner by the senses, the outer, by word... In the command of nature there are three [divisions]: [positive] precept, prohibition, and concession. Moreover we understand the command of nature to be nothing other than that natural discrimination which was inspired within, that through it man might be instructed concerning those things which were to be sought or avoided. For to in-
fuse into the heart of man discrimination and knowledge of what to do was as though to give a certain command. What knowledge was there, then, of things to be done, except a certain command, made to the heart of man? And again, what knowledge was there of things to be avoided, except a certain prohibition? What knowledge, indeed, should be supposed concerning those things which were intermediate, except a certain concession, that in that case man should be left at his own free will when he would not be injured, whichever alternative he chose? Therefore for God to give a positive command was to teach man what things would be necessary for him. To prohibit, moreover, was to point out harmful things. To grant, indeed, was to introduce things [capable of] being regarded whichever way one pleased. The command of discipline could have been taken neither from a positive precept nor from a natural prohibition, lest if God had either ordered or forbidden the same thing that He had formerly ordered or forbidden, the person obeying would have had no merit of [eternal] life. But if He had changed the command in either of the two cases, so that He forbade necessary things or ordered harmful things, He would unjustly have injured nature, made by Him. Therefore it was appropriate that the precept of discipline be taken from the natural concession, for there could be merit only where there was free will and where man could turn at will to whichever he pleased. For if God had told man to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil, the devil would have had something to say against man, namely, that in carrying out the command, he had regarded convenience for himself more than the command of his Creator, and that in fulfilling that which was commanded, he had been influenced not by love of God, but by the pleasant quality of the food.