PREFACE

The following study was undertaken out of personal curiosity. An examination of contemporary reviews of Keats' *Endymion* had revealed that Jeffrey was one of the few reviewers of the time to give any sort of commendation to the work. At the same time, it was difficult to reconcile this with his infamous review of Wordsworth's *Excursion*. Further examination showed that, while Jeffrey did not approve of the Lake School of Poetry, neither did he appear to be an arbitrarily vicious critic: always foremost in his mind was the question of morality.

A perusal of the scholarly material on Jeffrey revealed a failure on the part of most of it to account adequately for the moral basis of his criticism. Moreover, those critics who had discussed Jeffrey had usually done so from Wordsworth's point of view, with the natural result that Jeffrey comes off as a black-hearted villain. On the other hand, the few studies devoted to a vindication of Jeffrey, did so at the expense of Wordsworth. The present study was begun with the conviction that Wordsworth, while not a perfect poet, was a great one; and it was therefore hoped that an examination of
Jeffrey's criticism of the Lake School (for Jeffrey, the Lake School was Wordsworth) from the critic's point of view might contribute to an understanding of his attitude, without having to resort to blackening the reputation of Wordsworth. It is my intention to contribute to the understanding of the quarrel, without condemning either of the participants.

It is Jeffrey, then, who has received the attention here. To attempt to rescue him from the Wordsworthian purgatory is to wage a battle with the traditional view, but I am convinced that Jeffrey is worth the effort.

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R. W. V.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Occasionally, a figure emerges in the course of literary history who, having no claim to fame either as a creative writer or as a critical theorist, was so much a part of the literary milieu of his time, and so articulated a particular segment of contemporary taste, that he acquires importance, if only as a mirror of the literary turmoil of his day. Such a man was Francis Jeffrey. As editor of the Edinburgh Review, one of the most influential and powerful literary organs of the early nineteenth century, and itself a major phenomenon in English literary history, Jeffrey occupies a unique position in that history. He was not a great critic, in the sense that he contributed a great deal to the history of criticism; but he is important in that he read and reviewed works by most of the important writers of the age, and in doing so, reflected a taste which seems to have been not entirely unsympathetic to the new Romanticism, but which was at the same time loth to abandon certain literary standards of a previous era.

Attempts to determine Jeffrey's critical theory have resulted in a bewildering variety of explanations.
Roughly, though, interpretations of Jeffrey's critical position can be classified into five categories: those which treat him as a neo-classic survival; those which represent a moderate position, looking on him as not altogether unsympathetic to the new poetry, but harbouring a reluctance to abandon established literary standards; those which, under the influence of the New Humanism, credit him with the insight to recognize and to warn against the dangerous aesthetic and moral doctrines of the Romantics; those which attribute his critical attitudes to his reason and common sense; and finally, those which maintain that Jeffrey represented a nineteenth-century Platonism. An examination of each of these viewpoints will, I think, reveal at least one basic misemphasis: not enough attention has been paid to the moral aspect of Jeffrey's criticism.

Critics who treat Jeffrey as a neo-classical survival are usually careful to note that his classicism was not that of Dryden and Pope, for his opinion of eighteenth-century classicism in general was pretty low. They do interpret his preference for the works of Crabbe, Rogers, and Campbell, however, as evidence of what Walter Graham refers to as his "degenerate classicism," and what Lewis E. Gates calls "pseudo" classicism and "decorative" romanticism. If Jeffrey did cling to these
critical principles, he could not have exhibited any sympathy for the "romantic" extravagances of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats, or any other of the great romantic writers of the period. But the point remains that Jeffrey, even in his public criticism, often expressed admiration for the poetry and genius of Wordsworth; he made reference to the "tuneful quartos of Southey," and the "rich melodies of Keats and Shelley." Moreover, he wrote in 1828:

The present age, we think, has an hundred times more poetry, and more true taste for poetry, than that which immediately preceded it, -- and of which, reckoning its duration from the extinction of the last of Queen Anne's wits down to about thirty odd years ago, we take leave to say that it was, beyond all dispute, the most unpoetical age in the annals of this or any other considerable nation.

Coincidence or not, "thirty odd years ago" would have been 1798, the year of the publication of *Lyrical Ballads*. Jeffrey considered the new poets -- Scott, Southey, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, etc. -- as having restored the true spirit of poetry, a spirit that had been lost since the time of the great Elizabethans. Admittedly, and as an examination of his criticism of the Lakers will reveal, he appears to have espoused some neoclassical principles; these, however, he did not treat as ends in themselves, but rather he considered them a
means — not necessarily the only means, but a tried and valid one — of best serving the cause of morality. Gates himself perceives Jeffrey's preoccupation with ethical criticism, although he underestimates its importance to his criticism as a whole.

Among the scholars who view Jeffrey as a moderate or transitional figure, J. Raymond Derby sums up the principal viewpoint:

He was . . . more liberal than the Augustans, but too cautious to overlook the crudities when admiring the beauties.

If he was eclectic in his views, he was also transitional, bridging the gap, let us say, between Dr. Johnson and Hazlitt. Among the critics his position was analogous to Crabbe's among the poets; and it was no accident that the latter was his favorite.

Jeffrey, according to this view, was perfectly willing to sympathize with the romantic tendency to break away from formalism in favour of feeling, but he could not stand idiot boys and leechgatherers. Such figures in poetry, in Jeffrey's view, "played havoc with accepted social gradations and with the high seriousness of the emotions and morality of the middle class, which he had made it his task to foster and confirm." Again, the importance of Jeffrey's ethical position is noted, but no detailed analysis of his critical principles is
attempted in the light of this position.

James A. Greig, like Jeffrey, is unable to distinguish between art and reality, and, like Jeffrey, he takes the romantics' assertions that they were moral "teachers" at face value. In Greig's view, a poem as a work of art has no meaning, and to break with "reality" is symptomatic of the dangerous tendency that has led to many of the problems to be faced in this century. Greig believes that Jeffrey saw this danger:

when he found men beginning to break contact with humanity's age old culture and wisdom, ceasing to check their impressions with humility by those of wide common sense, endeavouring to intimidate common sense instead of seeking its help, fashioning out of their morsels of individual experience theatrical dream-worlds in which they were comfortable and supreme, and persuading themselves and others into imagining that these dream-worlds were real -- then his instincts were aroused to a sense of danger as are those of a watch-dog. 11

If this is an unfair and wrong-headed view of the romantic poets, it also represents a gross misconception of Jeffrey and his criticism. As we have seen, he thought very highly of the literary age in which he lived; he was one of the few reviewers to have anything favourable to say of Keats' *Endymion*, and surely,
if ever there was a "dream-world" it is that production of an overly endowed imagination. It is true that Jeffrey's objections to Wordsworth were based ultimately on moral or ethical grounds, but those grounds represented a narrow, prudish, cautious, middle-class, conventional morality, not an inner conviction that what the romantics were doing was indicative of a vast ethical upheaval that would culminate over a century later in fascist tyranny.

Walter Bagehot and D. Nichol Smith both consider Jeffrey as primarily the lawyer in his criticism, exercising common-sense and reason, exhibiting neither great imagination nor great intelligence, but always a "correct" taste. He was unable to comprehend the mysticism of Wordsworth and Coleridge; he could understand or would accept only that which was obvious to any rational Whig lawyer. Such an analysis may be perfectly valid, but it does little to explain precisely Jeffrey's critical theory. Even if this theory be not particularly original, it must be analyzed to be understood.

Merritt Hughes interprets Jeffrey as "the Platonist of nineteenth-century criticism." His originality as a critic lay in his Platonic banishing of the poets from the Republic; he did not succeed, of course, but, according to Hughes, this was his aim. Here again is
the suggestion that it was for moral reasons that Jeffrey objected to the romantic poets, but the idea is not expanded. As far as his criticism of Wordsworth is concerned, Hughes characterizes it as "all honest, clear-eyed criticism; and it all springs from a conviction that Wordsworth was confounding life's plainest distinctions in the mystical mist with which he had surrounded himself for years in the Cumberland hills."\(^{15}\)

None of these scholars have really come to grips with the moral basis for Jeffrey's criticism, particularly as it applies to specific poets, - in this instance, Southey, Coleridge and Wordsworth. I believe that it can be shown that Jeffrey's morality was not a set of profound universal principles in which he saw the answer to every ethical problem; it was rather a not clearly defined code for facing day to day realities and problems. It was suited to a sensible, middle-of-the-road, moderate Whig lawyer. While not a defender of the status quo -- no Whig could be -- Jeffrey was in favour of slow and cautious changes; revolution was not for him.\(^{16}\) I make this point, because, in a very real sense, the social order is intimately involved in any consideration of Jeffrey's moral system. A practical system would allow a man to live happily from day to day, and this would be impossible in an age or country of marked social
unrest; therefore, while conditions were obviously in need of improvement, the improvement had to take place within the established order of society. The "democratic" spirit was the property of radicals, not of respectable Whigs.

It is the moral basis of his criticism, coupled with his peculiar personality traits, which determined Jeffrey's critical attitude. The following chapters will attempt, first, to establish the moral basis of his criticism, and second, to explain his specific comments on the Lake School of Poetry in terms of this morality. A third purpose is to reveal, through his personal relationships with Southey, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, and through the private observations and comments of both Jeffrey and his more sympathetic contemporaries, the quirks of personality which serve, at least in part, to explain the tone of some of the reviews.
AESTHETICS AND MORALITY: THE BASIS FOR CRITICISM

The tendency of some scholars to take nothing at face value, and to underestimate or ignore specific statements of method and purpose on the part of writers, has, in the case of Francis Jeffrey, led to a great deal of unnecessary and unfruitful analysis of his criticism, in an attempt to determine his critical principles. Jeffrey did not have a logical and coherent set of critical criteria on which to base his literary criticism. The most ambitious attempt to prove that he did have a coherent theory, that of Byron Guyer,¹ is unsatisfactory, for although it is pointed out that no one had previously related Jeffrey's criticism to his "Essay on Taste" or to his reviews of the Scottish philosophers, Guyer's attempt to do so produces a theory which fails to explain the very criticism with which he begins. Guyer makes no attempt to check his theory by re-examining the literary criticism in the light of what he considers to be Jeffrey's philosophy. Certainly he is correct in emphasizing the "Essay on Taste" and the reviews of the philosophers as valuable starting points for a consideration of Jeffrey's literary criticism; but again, Jeffrey is

9.
credited with a logical and coherent theory which simply does not manifest itself in his reviews. On this level there are too many contradictions, too many qualifications to be made, too many subtle arguments to be developed. Few of his contemporaries thought Jeffrey a deep thinker, and the obvious inconsistencies in his reviews are more typical of him than any artificial and highly intricate theoretical basis that can be devised to explain them.

In his *Contributions to the Edinburgh Review* (1844), Jeffrey wrote:

If I might be permitted . . . to state, in what particular department, and generally, on account of what, I should most wish to claim a share of . . . merit, I should certainly say, that it was by having constantly endeavoured to combine Ethical precepts with Literary Criticism, and earnestly sought to impress my readers with a sense, both of the close connection between sound Intellectual attainments and the higher elements of Duty and Enjoyment; and of the just and ultimate subordination of the former to the latter. The praise in short to which I aspire, and to merit which I am conscious that my efforts were most constantly directed, is, that I have, more uniformly and earnestly than any preceding critic, made the moral tendencies of the works under consideration a leading subject of discussion; and neglected no opportunity, in reviews of Poems and Novels as well as of graver productions, of eluci-
dating the true constituents of human
happiness and virtue: and combating those
besetting prejudices and errors of opinion
which appear so often to withhold men from
the path of their duty -- or to array them
in foolish and fatal hostility to each other.3

There is nothing particularly new or startling about
attempting to unite morality and literary criticism,
but it is significant that Jeffrey admitted that this
was precisely what he was trying to do. It is with
this point in mind, and from this point of view, that
the discussions in the following chapters were under-
taken. If such an approach can explain Jeffrey's
critical attitudes, there seems to be little need to
isolate specific principles, or to try to fit him into
a particular school of criticism. The critical principles
that can be so isolated, as Derby has pointed out,⁴ are
varied and contradictory. What Jeffrey's criticism was,
and what the subsequent discussions will, I think,
bear out, was an attempt to evaluate literature in the
light of a rather narrow moral standard based on day to
day expediency. Couched as it was to a great extent
in the terminology of neo-classicism and the late
eighteenth-century "School of Sensibility," it sometimes
gives the appearance of being of one of these schools;
but the contradictions inherent in it can be explained
only by the conflict that must be felt when aesthetics
and morality are artificially joined together. The practice of literary criticism from a moral standpoint led to this conflict, and thence to the contradictions, and it is only by arriving at an understanding of Jeffrey's moral viewpoint that his criticism can be understood.

It was noted previously that Jeffrey's "Essay on Taste" and his reviews of the Scottish philosophers might furnish some insight into his aesthetic-moral viewpoint; but before such an examination is undertaken, consideration must be made of the philosophical background against which his remarks were made.

The Scottish "common sense" school, which had such an important influence in the Scotland of Jeffrey's time, was partially the descendant, and partially a movement in reaction to, the eighteenth-century school of British empiricism, which had its beginnings in the writings of John Locke. Locke's "new way of ideas" consisted in making the starting point in any scientific investigation, not a general truth of reason, but a particular psychological event. But this did not lead to a wholesale overturning of the neo-classical ideal of reason; rather, the Lockean school attempted to explain it rather than to dispute its validity: the association of ideas through cause and effect, for example, explained
the "unity of action." At the same time, that which appeared to be a limited empirical function (a sense or a sentiment), was made to include a mathematical law, an abstract idea, or conformity with the dominant moral idea. The notion arose of an aesthetic "inner sense," which was ultimately to become a valid and dependable moral guide.\(^5\)

Although Shaftesbury was opposed to the doctrine of Locke, he was the first to apply the word "sense" to value-experience, to suggest the immediacy and sureness of conscience and taste. A philosophical sympathy with Plotinus and Marcus Aurelius caused him to consider his "inner sense" as "a magic bond which predetermined the well-disposed soul to vibrate in unison with the divine harmony."\(^6\) This inner or moral sense was innate in man, but it required cultivation, and although it acted independently of reason, it never contradicted it. Virtue, for Shaftesbury, consisted in a balance of the "natural" affections, which are social and benevolent, and "self" affections, such as the love of life, the satisfaction of bodily appetites, etc.; and this balance in turn led to happiness.\(^7\) The same "inner sense" which indicated what is good, and therefore led to happiness, also tells us what is beautiful. There is no distinction made between the moral and the aesthetic senses: our feeling
for beauty and goodness is congenital with our entire being.

Joseph Addison differentiated between "primary" and "secondary" pleasures, primary pleasures arising from visible objects which are present, and secondary pleasures arising from visible objects which are not present, but recalled. Pleasure is derived from what is great, from what is new, and from what is beautiful in our own species and in general. The sources of pleasure, however, are within us; there is no objective beauty or deformity. Thus the element of relativity is introduced. In short:

... the pleasures of the imagination for Addison, though sensuous in their origin, are moralistic, reflective, and religious in their bearings. To intuit beauty means that we like to feel big, we like change, we like our relatives and kinsmen, and we like to make comparisons. And we like these things because it is God's will, leading us to admire him and his works.

And thus the idea of the "inner sense," the association of ideas, the linking of the good and the beautiful, and the notion of relativism came through the writings of various philosophers, including Francis Hutcheson, George Berkeley, and ultimately David Hume. Hume maintained that taste, which gives pleasure or pain and therefore constitutes happiness or misery,
rather than reason, which is cool and disengaged, is the motive for action. And it is in the individual taste, not a poem, that beauty lies. Hume was unwilling, however, to admit the relative and the subjective in the realm of taste; the standard of taste was fixed by God; and proper taste can, therefore, be taught. The suggestion here seems to be that the mind, the recipient of the sense impressions, can be taught to select and differentiate those impressions, and so regulate and control the natural flow of suggestions and ideas.

The Lockean influence on these writers gave rise to a tendency, not only to attribute the experience of the beautiful to a sense which could be scientifically analyzed, but to identify the beauty itself to the sensation. In other words, what Locke said of the "secondary" qualities of objects was carried over to the "tertiary" or aesthetic qualities. If sweetness and bitterness are not in the food, it was argued, but rather in our sensing of the food, so may the aesthetic qualities of grandeur and harmony be, not in the objects, but in our sensing. What had appeared was an extreme form of idealism, with the mind the only reality. It was against this idea that the Scottish "common sense" school rebelled. Led by Thomas Reid, they insisted that reason and reflection lead us to distinguish between
what is inwardly felt and the external cause of that feeling. The "common sense" school, then, kept the aesthetic object separate from the aesthetic subject. That beauty is, at least in part, an attribute of the sensation itself, was held by most of the important thinkers of the time, however.¹³

Whether beauty lay in the senses, in the object perceived, or in a relation between the two, really does not concern us here. It was on this point that the "common sense" school rebelled, and a discussion of it has been included to make this clear. Jeffrey, however, was not given to metaphysical speculation, and dismissed many of these questions as immaterial; therefore, perhaps, we are justified, for the purposes of this study, in doing the same.

The empirical philosophy taught by these philosophers, as Walter Jackson Bate indicates, was at least partially responsible for the romantic notion that universal truth can be known only through the particular.¹⁴ Bate also notes that from Locke, British empiricism went in two directions: one tendency was to regard the mind as being totally derived from association; any moral assumptions were utilitarian -- man seeks pleasure and avoids pain. The second tendency resulted in the "common sense" school, which combined the Shaftesburian
"moral sentiment" or "inner sense" with associationism, the implication that "ideas which are similar or which have repeatedly occurred simultaneously or in succession tend automatically to evoke one another."\textsuperscript{15} For a standard for criticism to exist, therefore, there had to be a distinction made between those associations which are common to cultivated men, and those which are individual, unique, arbitrary or accidental.\textsuperscript{16} As we shall see, Jeffrey adopted this viewpoint, and it serves, at least in part, as an explanation for the discrepancies between some of his public and some of his private criticism.

Briefly, then, the Scottish "common sense" school took much of its impetus from Shaftesbury. The "moral sense" was instinctive and internal, and was, for all intents and purposes, identical with the aesthetic "inner sense": there was, therefore, a close connection made between taste and morality.\textsuperscript{17} To know the beautiful was to know the good, and conversely, to perceive the good was to experience the beautiful. Comprising this single intuition were three elements: the instinctive sensibility, imaginative fervour, and a sympathy with human nature. All went to make up the "inner sense."\textsuperscript{18} Shaftesbury had suggested that the proper use of the "inner sense" led to happiness, that to be good was to
be happy; and it is not surprising to find, as we shall see in the case of Jeffrey, that this idea can be reversed so that it becomes the doctrine that to be happy is to be good.

II

The purpose of the preceding discussion of the philosophy and background of the "common sense" school, while admittedly cursory and incomplete, is to show that, in yoking literary criticism and morality, Jeffrey was part of a long tradition in aesthetics, and that given the fact that he was a Scot whose formative years lay between 1785 and 1800 (Jeffrey was born in 1773), there is little wonder that he should have been exposed to such ideas. Indeed, as Martin Kaelich puts the case:

This accretion of thought, to which the literary figures immediately following Locke contributed no small share, produced the associationist climate of opinion that was responsible for the ways in which many writers -- Addison, Hutcheson, Hume, Hartley, Kames, Gerard, Beattie, Priestly, Alison, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Jeffrey, etc. -- habitually resorted to associationalist thinking. 19

If Jeffrey had a theoretical quarrel with Wordworth and Coleridge, then, it lay not in basic principles -- all linked aesthetics and morality -- but in their differing ideas on morals.
Jeffrey's own comments on associationist philosophy, outside the "Essay on Taste," are relatively few, and in general, inconclusive. He argued that neither the idealists nor the materialists had a monopoly on the truth, and that such questions as they debated were entirely a matter of philosophical and abstract speculation, and were consequently of little importance. If the question of the existence or non-existence of external objects had to be considered, Jeffrey was inclined to take a cautious, compromising position:

Upon the whole . . . we are inclined to think, that the conception and belief which we have of material objects (which is what we mean by the perception of them) does not amount to a complete proof of their existence, but renders it sufficiently probable; that the superior and complete assurance we have of the existence of our present sensations, does by no means entitle us positively to deny the reality of every other existence; and that as this speculative scepticism neither renders us independent of the ordinary modes of investigation, nor assists us materially in the use of them, it is inexpedient to dwell long upon it in the course of our philosophical enquiries, and much more advisable to proceed upon the supposition that the real condition of things is conformable to our natural apprehensions.

In other words, Jeffrey favoured a pragmatic approach which would enable a man to deal effectively with the external realities which he encountered in day to day life. Man's conduct had to be affected before abstract speculation assumed any importance. On the other hand,
he denied the doctrines of materialism and its implicit notion of the necessity of human action; he insisted on man's free will, and hence, we might surmise, on his moral responsibility. Jeffrey was convinced that Priestley's materialism was detrimental to morality and religion. "We are a little puzzled . . .," he wrote, "to discover what use, or what room, there can be for a God at all, upon the hypothesis of Materialism . . . .\(^2\)"

Insisting on a philosophy capable of a practical application, Jeffrey also desired a system which would take account of, and support, morality and religion. For these reasons, he could not accept either of the extreme associationist positions -- idealism because it was not practicable, and materialism because it denied free will, and failed to account for morality and religion.

As far as the relationship between practicality and morality was concerned, Jeffrey was not willing to accept the Benthamite view that the basis of good was utility. Arguing that "utility" was as much a feeling as "sympathy" (which Bentham has indicated as insufficient grounds for proper or good action), he maintained that the utilitarian standard was just as variable and just as uncertain as that based on "sympathy," or, in its extended application, the "inner sense." The uncertain element in sympathy or moral feeling, however, is of
a very limited nature, and the common impressions of morality are sufficient to direct the conduct of men, as individuals, or as legislators, "for all useful purposes."\(^25\) Therefore, moral "feelings" are superior to "utility" as a moral determinant.

These feelings, however, Jeffrey did not consider to be private, but to be common to all men: "The existence of such feelings, and the uniformity with which they are excited in all men on the same occasions, are facts, in short, that admit of no dispute . . . ."\(^26\)

We shall see later that these feelings, which constitute man's moral determinants, are excited by literature, and that, in consequence, literature must be such as not to have a detrimental effect on them. Linking this idea with the associationist philosophy, Jeffrey wrote: ". . . moral maxims and impressions arise in the minds of all men, from an instinctive and involuntary valuation of the good and the evil which they have perceived to be connected with certain actions or habits . . . ."\(^27\)

This he considered to be a general rule of morality.

And it was happiness that Jeffrey considered to be man's goal in life — a goal determined, not by reason, but by nature; and therefore, for a man to be happy was to realize himself, and therefore to be good. Good becomes synonymous with happiness.\(^28\) This, then is an
inversion of the Shaftesburian idea that to be good, to realize oneself, is to be happy.

In short, Jeffrey's moral philosophy, if such it may be called, was a strange wedding of Shaftesbury's "inner sense" with Bentham's utilitarian standard. For practical purposes, the "inner sense" was more reliable than "utility," leading ultimately to happiness, the attainment of which constituted the "good." A moral theory, for Jeffrey, had to have a practical application, and this application should be made toward individual happiness. Such action was moral. At the same time, not only did Jeffrey believe that a moral theory was useful only insofar as it was applicable toward individual happiness, but the application itself ought to be such that day to day realities could be competently coped with:

. . . the common impressions of morality, the vulgar distinctions of right and wrong, virtue and vice, are perfectly sufficient to direct the conduct of the individual, and the judgment of the legislator, for all useful purposes, without any reference to the nature or origin of these distinctions. 29

(Italics mine)

III

Jeffrey's "Essay on Taste," 30 as his only compre-
hensive statement of aesthetic principles, is worthy of consideration. Trying first to determine the nature of man's sense of beauty, he rejects the idea that it is a simple sensation (e.g. the color red) on three grounds. In the first place, if it is a simple sensation, it must be referrable to a specific sense or faculty of which it is the object, and this sense cannot be isolated. In the second place, there is a lack of agreement as to the presence of beauty in particular objects; and third, there is an almost infinite variety of things to which the property of beauty can be ascribed -- there is no common element which appears in all beautiful things. Jeffrey concludes that beauty does not lie in the object itself. He summarily rejects the suggestion that beauty can be equated with agreeableness (things other than the "beautiful" can be "agreeable"), and decides that the faculty of taste, if there be such a thing, is unlike any of the other faculties. The key to the problem, according to Jeffrey, lies in psychological associationism: external objects "are felt ... to produce emotions in the mind that have some sort of kindred or affinity." 31

In Jeffrey's view, the sense of beauty depends entirely on the previous experience of simpler pleasures and emotions, and consists of the suggestion of
remembered sensations experienced through the ordinary senses. Objects are called beautiful which possess, for the individual, the power of recalling accompanying sensations. Beauty, then, is not an inherent property of the object, but the result of accidental relations yielding pleasure or emotion. Since an infinite variety of things may arouse pleasurable emotions in someone, all that do can legitimately be termed "beautiful."

"Taste," consequently, Jeffrey defines as "the habit of tracing those associations, by which almost all objects may be connected with interesting emotions." He continues, maintaining that "beautiful" implies the association of ideas; for if it were otherwise, a kind act would have to be called beautiful. The only distinction made between the moral and the beautiful lies in this idea; something moral is good in itself; but a beautiful thing necessarily evokes pleasurable associations and emotions.

Jeffrey maintains that there are three bonds of association: 1) the natural signs and perpetual concomitants of pleasurable sensations; 2) arbitrary or accidental concomitants of such feelings; and 3) analogies or fanciful resemblances to things with which these emotions are necessarily connected. The first of these
is universal: for example, a clear complexion always signifies health. The second is "entirely dependent upon the opportunities which each individual has had to associate ideas of emotion with the object to which it is ascribed." Such relations can occur to whole classes of men, or simply to individual men: the former distinguish national taste; the latter, individual taste, usually determined by class and education. The third bond, that of "analogy," is the principal concomitant of poetry (e.g. spring suggests youth; autumn, age).

Since it is literature, or poetry, that concerns us here, we might stop to consider another comment by Jeffrey: "Poems and other compositions in words, are beautiful in proportion as they are conversant with beautiful objects -- or as they suggest to us, in a more direct way, the moral and social emotions on which the beauty of all objects depends." Beauty in poetry, then, depends on the particular ideas or emotions associated with the objects they describe. It is also noteworthy that these emotions are moral or social. Again the linkage is made between literature and morality, and, as we shall see, Jeffrey's idea of morality had a close connection with his view of the social order.

Thus far, the implication in Jeffrey's theory has
been that taste is something arbitrary, personal, and relative, that no absolute standard exists. Indeed, Jeffrey says as much:

If things are not beautiful in themselves, but only as they serve to suggest interesting conceptions to the mind, then every thing which does in point of fact suggest such a conception to any individual, is beautiful to that individual; and it is not only quite true that there is no room for disputing about tastes, but that all tastes are equally just and correct, in so far as each individual speaks only of his own emotions.\(^35\)

He goes on, however, to insist that this does not mean that all tastes are equally good or desirable, or that there is any doubt as to which taste is best. That taste is best which has "the most numerous and the most powerful perceptions of beauty",\(^36\) in other words, that which can make the most numerous and most powerful associations. And this requires a powerful imagination: "... the best taste must be that which belongs to the best affections, the most active fancy, and the most attentive habits of observation."\(^37\) It all depends on what Bate refers to as the "sympathetic imagination."\(^38\) The more cultivated the taste, the better will be the results of its use -- "innocent delight," and "the cul- tivation of a finer morality."\(^39\) With some specific qualifications, which will be discussed later, this then
is the doctrine that poetry must both delight and instruct.

Jeffrey also points out that there is another distinction of tastes if one is to create beauty for the admiration of others: a person wishing to do so must be cautious to employ only such objects as are the natural signs, or the inseparable concomitants of emotions, of which the greater part of mankind are susceptible . . . Even for those who labour for applause, the wisest course, perhaps, if it were only practical, would be, to have two tastes -- one to enjoy, and one to work by -- one founded upon universal associations, . . . and another guided by all casual and individual associations . . .

Here, then, is the double standard theory of public and private taste which was to cause so much confusion to Jeffrey's contemporaries. 41

IV

We have seen that, for Jeffrey, to be happy was to be good; but there are some qualifications to be made so far as man's condition is concerned, and his capacity for happiness, or good: man is imperfect, and likely to remain so, and the Whig program for social change called for caution, care, and control.

In 1812, Jeffrey reviewed Madame de Staël's *De la Littérature considérée dans ses Rapports avec les*
Institutions Sociales, and it is in this review that he made his most complete statement on the "perfectability" of man. Madame de Staël had argued that literature and social institutions were in a state of constant and universal advancement, and that human nature was slowly approaching a state of perfection. This attitude, said Jeffrey, reveals an unjustifiable optimism. While there is evidence of progress in the accumulation of useful knowledge, he considered Madame de Staël's induction too narrow, since it is based "upon the history of a very small portion of the human race, for a very small number of generations." From a broader point of view, human events and conditions do not bear out the thesis. The areas of advancement, Jeffrey saw in the material and scientific spheres, not in the world of morality and enjoyment -- the world, in other words, inhabited by literature:

All knowledge which admits of demonstration will advance, we have no doubt, and extend itself; and all processes will be improved, that do not interfere with the passions of human nature, or the apparent interests of the ruling classes. But with regard to everything depending on probable reasoning, or susceptible of debate, and especially with regard to everything touching morality and enjoyment, we really are not sanguine enough to reckon on any considerable improvement; and suspect that men will go on blundering in speculation, and transgressing in practice, pretty nearly as they do at present, to the latest period of their history.
There can never be any agreement among men on morals, then, because "there is no truth on which they can agree."\textsuperscript{45} Here is almost a complete relativism: there are no absolute standards of morality, and the roads to happiness are varied and many.

And yet it is obvious from a study of the whole corpus of Jeffrey that he did believe in a definite moral standard, and that, in his view, moral issues had been settled long ago, and were no longer fit for speculation: "In matters of taste... we conceive that there are no discoveries to be made, any more than in matters of morality."\textsuperscript{46} It was suggested previously that Jeffrey's thought was not consistent, and there is no real way that this particular conflict can be reconciled. There are facts, however, which may serve, at least partially, to explain his attitude and his literary criticism in terms of this attitude.

Jeffrey did believe in the progress of taste:

\begin{quote}
Now, we confess we are no believers in the absolute and permanent corruption of national taste; on the contrary, we think that it is, of all faculties, that which is most sure to advance and improve with time and experience; and that, with the exception of those great physical or political disasters which have given a check to civilization itself, there has always been a sensible progress in this particular; and that the general taste of every successive generation is better than that of its predecessors.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}
But he also acknowledged the disparity among national tastes. Although he conceived of human nature as everywhere fundamentally the same, he noted two factors which led to the variety in taste. The first was the stage to which a particular nation had attained in the progress from rudeness to refinement; and the second was the peculiar cultural, climatic, and governmental conditions under which various peoples flourished. In the same article in which these observations were made, he went on to condemn Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* as "eminently absurd, puerile, incongruous, vulgar and affected; — and, though redeemed by considerable powers of invention, and some traits of vivacity, to be so far from perfection, as to be, almost from the beginning to end, one flagrant offence against every principle of taste, and every rule of composition." Granted that Jeffrey explained this by noting the difference in national taste between the English and the Germans, his blatant condemnation of the work, and his reference to "flagrant offence against every principle of taste, and every rule of composition" indicates that he considered British taste (i.e. his own) superior to that of the Germans.

Jeffrey was, in short, first a Scotsman, and second a citizen of Great Britain; for him, British taste
represented the highest state to which that vague faculty had progressed. The duty of a British writer, then, was to write with British taste in mind. Complaining to Thomas Carlyle about his preference for German literature, Jeffrey wrote:

I wish to God I could persuade you to fling away these affectations, and be contented to write like your famous countrymen of all ages, as long as you write to your countrymen and for them. The nationality for which you commend Burns so highly might teach you I think that there are nobler tasks for a man like you than to vamp up the vulgar dramas of these Douster-swivels you are so anxious to cram down our throats, but which I venture to predict no good judge among us will swallow, and the nation at large speedily reject with loathing.

In Jeffrey's mind, as we have seen, taste and morality were nearly indistinguishable, and from his comments on national taste and from his condemnation of works not appealing to what he considered to be British critical taste, we can perhaps venture some deductions. Although taste and morality are variable and relative, and although neither is in a state of perfection or likely to arrive at one, for the purposes of literary criticism, British taste is assumed to be the best, and moral principles established by the ancients are most fully realized in the attitudes of the cultivated classes of Great Britain. Consequently,
any author who places a work before the British public is expected both to please the national taste and to conform to the moral standards of the refined element of the country. Again, it was the practical application of moral principles, not theoretical speculation on them, that motivated Jeffrey's literary criticism.

The moral life for Jeffrey, then, consisted in being as happy as possible in an imperfect world. As a Whig, he believed that social change had to come about gradually, that social unrest was detrimental to happiness, and therefore to morality. The best taste and the best moral standards were those held by the cultivated classes of Great Britain, and it was the duty of British writers to cater to this taste, and to support this morality. That Jeffrey had a prudish and narrow-minded view of morality is all too evident: he praised Bowdler's Family Shakespeare, and in a discussion of John Ford's Tis Pity She's a Whore, he never once mentioned the title. Lord Cockburn, in his biography of Jeffrey, wrote of Jeffrey's letters:

What have been selected are not given on account of any particular opinion or occurrences which they may record, but solely from their tendency to disclose the personal nature of the man. And I am bound to state, that, out of many hundreds of his letters that I have seen, there are scarcely three lines that might not be read
with propriety to any sensitive lady, or to any fastidious clergyman. 54

But at the same time, he had a dislike for didactic poetry:

We have no great predilection . . . for Didactic poetry of any sort, -- at least, where it corresponds with its title, and really aims at teaching; and though there are several pieces that have obtained much merited celebrity under that title, we suspect that it has been earned by the passages to which it was least applicable. 55

A prudish attitude can be added to Jeffrey's practical ideas of morality. At the same time, he considered that the function of poetry was primarily to please rather than to instruct. 56

V

With the preceding discussions in mind, we can now proceed to formulate a theory which will perhaps serve to explain Jeffrey's literary criticism. He considered poetry or literature as one of the means of evoking the passions or emotions, which are the determinants of moral action; therefore the emotions produced must contribute to the general moral good as Jeffrey saw it. Possibly because he valued aesthetic qualities in poetry over moral qualities, the morality took on a negative
character when applied to literary criticism: it was enough that poetry be not immoral; it was not necessary for it to have a positive moral effect. The same reason accounts for his aversion to didactic poetry. It will subsequently be seen that he had no objection to poetry which did not try to depict emotion, or to arouse emotion in the reader; this was poetry completely divorced from reality, and therefore suitable as a means by which a practical man of affairs could escape the sometimes depressing realities of everyday life. Such was what will be referred to a "amoral" poetry.

When poetry did try to depict human emotions, however, it had to be consonant with real life; for otherwise the emotions depicted and aroused (through a sympathetic imagination) would be degraded so as to have an immoral effect. Correct poetry of this type was consonant with the real world, and the emotions which it evoked were consequently morally good. This then is "moral" poetry.

Jeffrey's frequent use of the terms "pathetic" and "sublime" suggests that there were, according to his critical theory, two basic kinds of emotion connected with "moral" poetry: that which was "pathetic" -- usually associated with the "realistic" depiction of sorrow or tragedy (e.g. that in the poetry of Crabbe);
and that which was "sublime" -- usually associated with works whose moral effect was ennobling and uplifting. Jeffrey's use of these words was far from exact. Consider, for example, the following instances:

a) Speaking of Southey's diction in the review of *Roderick*, he wrote that it contained "phrases of affected simplicity and infantine pathos."57

b) Of Byron: "He delights too exclusively in the delineation of a certain morbid exaltation of character and feeling -- a sort of demoniacal sublimity, not without some traits of the ruined Archangel."58

c) Of Dryden: "... he has not written one line that is pathetic, and very few that can be considered as sublime."59

d) Of Elizabethan dramatists: They have a "sublime tone."60

e) He credits Campbell with "pathos."61

f) Of Shakespeare: "... he is more wild, airy, and inventive, and more pathetic and fantastic, than all the poets of all regions and ages of the world."62

g) Of Byron's poetry: "concentrated pathos and homestrukt sentiments."63

h) Crabbe: "one of the most original, nervous, and pathetic poets of the present century."64

i) Of Wordsworth's *Excursion*: "All sorts of commonplace
notions and expressions are sanctified in his eyes, by the sublime ends for which they are employed.

j) "There are thousands of people who can assume a florid description, or be amused with a wonderful story, to whom a pathetic poem is quite unintelligible."

All that can really be said is that these terms were associated with emotions, and that Jeffrey approved of poetry to which such adjectives could be applied. Since both "pathos" and "sublimity" evidently evoke emotions, which form the basis for moral action, we can conclude that the moral effect which they have on the reader is desirable.

*   *   *

The following examination of Jeffrey's literary criticism was undertaken with the ideas discussed above in mind. The theory has been formulated: it must now pass the test of practical application.

As far as the study of Jeffrey's literary relations with the Lakers is concerned, I think it will be found that he exhibits a duality of nature in his public and his private life, and in his public criticism and his private comments, and that this duality was given a
rationale by his associationist aesthetic, which allowed for a dual standard of criticism.
CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL AND MORAL OBJECTIONS

With a supercilious "This will never do!"
Francis Jeffrey assured himself of a prominent place in the Wordsworthian "rogues gallery." Whatever may have been his merits as a critic in his commentaries on other contemporary figures, they are almost completely overshadowed by this unfortunate and dogmatic remark, which opened his review of Wordsworth's *Excursion*. This review marked only one stage in a long literary battle waged between Wordsworth, Southey, and Coleridge on one side, and the irrepressible editor of the *Edinburgh Review* on the other. Most scholars have attempted to interpret the quarrel as the natural outcome of divergent philosophies and literary theories; and yet in doing so, they have underestimated the moral basis for Jeffrey's criticism. On the other hand, while such explanations do, no doubt, account for at least some of the reasons why Jeffrey invariably censured the "Lake School," they do not account for the harshness of the attacks. An insistence that brutal reviewing was the rule rather than the exception in the early nineteenth century, and that in following the normal trend Jeffrey was not alone, provides an insufficient explanation: his reviews changed tone completely between 1802 and
and only a careful consideration of the personal relationships between Jeffrey and the Lakers during this period can adequately explain the tone of a review such as that on The Excursion. Jeffrey himself, while in some ways paradoxical, was, to a certain extent, able to distinguish between his role as a man and his role as a critic, and such a distinction was given theoretical validity by his associationist aesthetic. Wordsworth and Coleridge, however, and perhaps to a lesser degree, Southey, were unable to entertain such an artificial distinction, and consequently they failed to note it in Jeffrey. To them, Jeffrey the critic was simply the most repulsive aspect of Jeffrey the man.

The present chapter will be devoted to an analysis of Jeffrey's theoretical objections to the poetry and the poetic theories of the Lake School, particularly to those of Wordsworth. Subsequent chapters will be concerned with the changing tone of the reviews, and with the personal relationships and attitudes behind the public quarrel.

The moral basis of Jeffrey's criticism is evident in the case which he presented against the Lakers in his 1802 reviews of Thalaba the Destroyer. In the Monthly Review, he made one of his rare utterances of neo-classical doctrine that does not follow from his
version of what is moral: Thalaba, he complains, blends "the Lyric and Dramatic style with the sober strain of the Epic, rather more copiously than the strict rules of harmonious composition will admit." With his comment that the poem is deficient in "probability" and in "connection and consistency of fiction," however, Jeffrey begins his criticism based on morality; for, if the fiction within the poem is inconsistent, the work can bear no valid relation to real life, and this is precisely Jeffrey's next point: since there is no connection between the fictions in the poem and real human life, there can be none of the moral effects of tragic representation produced, and therefore -- the purpose of tragedy being to produce this moral effect -- the disastrous tone of the work serves no moral end. As he says:

As the fictions are by far too extravagant to have any relation to human life in general, the disastrous colour of the incidents can scarcely produce any of the moral effects of tragic representation, and seem to be a gratuitous sacrifice to the author's pre-dilection for sorrow.

The result of Southey's presentation, says Jeffrey, is that the work fails to please: "in works of mere imagination, there should be something to please as well as to effect." Tragic poems which have no relation to real
life, and which therefore serve no moral purpose, are bad because, among other things, "a delineation of fancied affections is apt to fatigue those who have had any experience of reality."\(^3\) In short, such poems "fail to please." Jeffrey's moral criteria, when applied to literature, were of a negative character. For example, he praised Keats' \textit{Endymion}, not because it had any positive moral effect, but because, as a work of pure imagination, it pleased without having any immoral effect.\(^4\) The implication in the review of \textit{Thalaba} then, is that, provided works of imagination have no adverse moral effects, and provided that they do not attempt to present real human affections in an unreal setting, they may provide innocent amusement. Jeffrey discussed such poetry in other reviews. Thomas Moore's \textit{Lalla Rookh}, for instance, he described as tending to excite admiration rather than any warmer sentiment of delight -- to dazzle, more than to enchant, -- and, in the end, more frequently to startle the fancy, and fatigue the attention, by the constant succession of glittering images and high-strained emotions, than to maintain a rising interest, or win a growing sympathy, by a less profuse or more systematic display of attractions.\(^5\)

Such works are of an inferior order to those which present real sentiments in a setting consonant with real life, since the latter do have a positive moral effect on the reader.
Fiction, or poetry, then, must not only be internally coherent, but it must also be in accordance with the facts of everyday experience; if it is not, it can have no moral meaning, and any attempt to give it such a meaning by endowing unreal characters with real emotions, is doomed to failure; the result is boring.

If, on the other hand, literature be presented as a work of "mere imagination," with no attempt made to invest it with a moral significance, it can legitimately be read for the pleasure it affords the reader. The end of poetry is primarily to please, but the best poetry combines pleasure with moral meaning. For Jeffrey, consequently, there were two types of poetry, the "moral" and the "amoral"; and for the purposes of this paper, they will be so designated.

This, briefly, was the essence of Jeffrey's critical theory, and in its application to the Lakers, it did not differ from that applied to other writers of the period. There is a problem involved, however: what seems narrow, though not capricious criticism when applied to other writers assumes, in the opinion of ardent Wordsworthians, an ominous note when applied to Southey, Coleridge and Wordsworth. If Jeffrey is not to be condemned for his criticism of Thomas Moore, for example, why ought he to be damned for his comments on the Lake Poets?
The answer to this question lies perhaps in the brutal tone of some of his reviews, and this answer involves the answer to a question previously posed: why did the tone of the articles change over a period of years? This question must be reserved for later comment, but with reasonable surety we may now assume that Jeffrey did not change the basis for his criticism when reviewing the Lakers.

Jeffrey expanded on his criticism of the Lake School in the first article to appear in the *Edinburgh Review* (1802), where his reluctance to abandon old, established poetical standards, even in the face of a personal inclination to admire poetry that did not follow them, is made disturbingly clear:

Poetry has this much, at least, in common with religion, that its standards were fixed long ago, by certain inspired writers, whose authority it is no longer lawful to call in question; and that many profess to be entirely devoted to it, who have no good works to produce in support of their pretensions.

This passage has often been used as evidence of Jeffrey's reaction and his adherence to neo-classical principles; but no attempt has been made to explain why he would make such a statement. As we have noted, Jeffrey bore no love for eighteenth-century literature. It can be explained, however, by reference to Jeffrey's conception...
of morality; but before such a connection can be made, it will be necessary to consider again his theory of aesthetics.

For Jeffrey, only "universal" elements are capable of eliciting the proper ideas and responses in all readers; if a poetic element is too peculiar to a specific individual, it will fail to arouse universal associations, or it will arouse undesirable associations, and hence its value as an agent of sensation is lost, at least as far as poetry is concerned. Now, Jeffrey felt that the universal elements and devices had been discovered long ago by the great writers of the past, and, since success cannot be challenged, and since he considered much contemporary poetry a failure, he concluded that such poetic principles as those used successfully by older writers were the most valid. This point is expressly stated in his review of Madoc (1805), in which he roundly chastises Southey for seeming "to aim at dethroning the old dynasty of genius, in behalf of an unaccredited generation": the old masters had discovered the universal associations and the methods of presenting them; it was the office of the modern poet to follow their examples:

In matters of taste . . . we conceive that there are no discoveries to be made, any
more than in matters of morality. The end of poetry is to please; and man cannot be mistaken as to what has actually given him pleasure.

Here again is a contradiction in Jeffrey's thought; for it has also been noted that he considered taste to be capable of progress. The only explanation that can be suggested is that underlying his contradictory critical pronouncements was a consistent, if narrow, moral attitude which he felt himself bound to justify and support by any means possible. At any rate, according to the passage just quoted, Jeffrey held that poetical elements were the same in every age and in every country, as well as the topics by which they are suggested.

To return to the review of Thalaba and the passage quoted from it: since both the standards of morality and the standards of poetry were fixed long ago, and since it has been empirically proved that the latter have successfully elicited responses consonant with the former, Jeffrey is here insisting that these established literary standards are right and proper for his contemporaries to follow. The highest kind of poetry being moral in effect, such poetry must adhere to the old standards.

The editor of the Edinburgh Review goes on to term
the Lake School a "deviant, heretical, poetical, sect," whose doctrines are of German origin, an origin which is for Jeffrey equivalent to a "mystical" origin. It has been alleged that Jeffrey was unable to comprehend mysticism and that, indeed, he called everything by that name which he could not understand; and there appears to be some truth in the charge. Certainly, he disliked German literature, and he could not understand Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*, although it must be admitted in this connection that one hundred and fifty years of interpretation have failed to explain completely this *tour de force*. But it is quite likely that, had he understood the mystical viewpoint, he would still have rejected it on moral grounds. The "reality" with which the mystic years to have direct contact is not the reality that must be dealt with in day to day experience, and, in Jeffrey's view, no doubt a preoccupation with striving for the unattainable would necessarily lead to a detrimental treatment of everyday realities. But man's happiness and well-being is dependent on his reaction to everyday experience, and to ignore this "reality" is to sacrifice earthly happiness, and is therefore immoral, since to be good is to be happy.

Jeffrey discerned three sources for the new poetry:

1. The antisocial principles, and dis-
tempered sensibility of Rousseau -- his discontent with the present constitution of society -- his paradoxical morality, and his perpetual hankerings after some unattainable state of voluptuous virtue and perfection. 2. The simplicity and energy . . . of Kotzebue and Schiller. 3. The homeliness and harshness of some of Cowper's language and versification, interchanged occasionally with the innocence of Ambrose Phillips, or the quaintness of Dr. Donne. 

His aversion to what he considered to be the first source is easily explained. We may surmise that Rousseau was for Jeffrey the embodiment of social malcontent -- a trouble maker. The moral life, according to Jeffrey, was a peaceful and happy one; and no man who embraced Rousseau's philosophy could be happy. The social order would be disturbed and wretched if his philosophical principles were put into practice: he represented social discontent, a "paradoxical morality," and an unrealistic yearning for an unattainable ideal. We have seen that Jeffrey felt that the amelioration of human conditions might be possible, but that a perfect state of man was not; and ineffectual railing against the way things are only adds more unhappiness to what is doomed to be an imperfect condition at best. The proper and moral way to live was to make things as pleasant as possible in an imperfect world.
Jeffrey had no objection to "simplicity and energy," provided that the simplicity was not presented in a form that violated established rules of poetics, as it often did when drawing on what appeared to be Cowper's language or Donne's "quaintness." In considering what he thinks to be the unfortunate aspects of poetry written in the light of these sources, Jeffrey again notes the absence of any connection between it and real life, and complains of the affectation of simplicity and familiarity of language: "... their sentiments... shall be indebted, for their effort, to nothing but their intrinsic tenderness or elevation." There is no external point of reference, and the effect is one of degradation: the moral effect that ought to be produced by the delineation of sentiment is lost, and as a result, the poetry degrades human emotions, which constitute the highest good: for the feelings are the instinctive determinants of what is right and wrong.

In a passage which was obviously intended as an answer to the Preface to the second edition of *Lyrical Ballads*, Jeffrey maintains that the "debasing of language leads also to the debasement of the emotions." "It is absurd," he writes, "to suppose that an author should make use of the language of the vulgar to express the sentiments of the refined." Arguing that each
class has its own idiom, and that, in order to be consonant with reality, a poet must take account of these respective idioms, Jeffrey insists that

love, or grief, or indignation of an enlightened and refined character, is not only expressed in different language, but is in itself a different emotion from the love, or grief, or anger of a clown, a tradesman, or a market-wench.¹³

We have seen that, for Jeffrey, the presentation of human sentiments with no way to connect them with real life robs them of their moral effect, and in doing so, debases those emotions which are the basis for moral action. The more refined the sentiments (the moral determinants), the more moral the man who posesses them; consequently, the depiction of refined sentiments, in order to correspond with real life, must be such that they are attributed to people whom Jeffrey, at least, would expect to be so endowed. Their attribution to ruder people would be inconsistent with real life, and thus their moral effect would be lost. On the other hand, to delineate the vulgar sentiments of the vulgar is not poetical, for Jeffrey denies that the lower classes interest the reader by their particular sentiments, or by their language, but only by their situation.¹⁴ He concludes:

... the arts that aim at exciting admiration
and delight, do not take their models from what is ordinary, but from what is excellent; and . . . our interest in the representation of any event does not depend upon our familiarity with the original, but on its intrinsic importance, and the celebrity of the parties it concerns.¹⁵

In other words, Jeffrey demanded representation of things in poetry which would have a universal appeal, not one limited by an individual reader's peculiar experiences. If this appears to be a restatement of the neo-classical position, it must be kept in mind that its basis was associationist psychology and not authority or "reason" and that for Jeffrey it served not as an end but as a means of supporting the moral order of poetry and of life.

As far as the imagery or "style" of the new school of poetry was concerned, Jeffrey notes that there is a perpetual exaggeration of thought:

These authors appear to forget, that a whole poem cannot be made up of striking passages; and that the sensations produced by sublimity, are never so powerful and entire, as when they are allowed to subside and revive, in a slow and spontaneous succession.¹⁶

He further complains that sublime effects are often attempted when they are not called for: in order to give the appearance of unusual force and animation, these poets (the Lakers) "warp it up in a veil
of mysterious and unintelligible language, which flows past with so much solemnity, that it is difficult to believe that it conveys nothing of any value," or else "embody it in a verse of unusual harshness and asperity."17 The "sublime" for Jeffrey appears to be that element in poetry, traditionally associated with "terror," which is produced by the relation of great and usually tragic events, and which has an uplifting or ennobling effect on the reader. The greater force with which sublime passages are presented then, the more pronounced will be the moral effect. His second point voices an objection to what he considered to be dishonest representation, which, in point of fact, corresponds to his denial of the validity of poetry attempting to present and affect human emotions, but failing to be consistent with real life; for lofty sentiments ought not to be expressed in vulgar language, and conversely, ordinary events, if they are to be the subject of poetry at all, ought to be expressed in ordinary language. At the same time, of course, it must be remembered that Jeffrey did not believe ordinary things to be proper material for poetry.

Finally, Jeffrey specifically states what he really believed to be the major fault with the Lakers -- their view of morality. He accuses them of a "splenetic and
idle discontent" with the existing order of society, and of unjustly placing the blame for society's woes on the rich. These poets are, continues Jeffrey, horrified at the condition of the poor, whom they consider to be the victims of upper-class vices; but at the same time, they consider vice in the lower orders as originating in the inherent evil of a society dominated by the powerful. As Jeffrey rather bitterly expresses it:

While the plea of moral necessity is thus artfully brought forward to convert all the excesses of the poor into innocent misfortunes, no sort of indulgence is shown to the offences of the powerful and rich.18

To Jeffrey, this was an insufferable perversion of moral standards.

In his review of Southey's Madoc (1805), Jeffrey emphasizes another point, suggested in his previous reviews, and attacks what he refers to as the "affectation of infantine innocence and simplicity; and affectation of excessive refinement and preternatural enthusiasm; and an affectation of a certain perverse singularity in learning, taste, and opinions."19 In other words, he is objecting to the lack of realism in the poetry, and to its lack of universal poetic elements. Moreover, a child-like innocence is no defence against
the realities of everyday life. Such an attitude he considered silly, and in the detrimental effect it would have on a man's battle with the harsh facts of life, immoral.

In his opening reviews on Southey, Jeffrey established his case against the Lake School, although he later added elaborations and refinements. Basing his criticism on his peculiar morality, he objected primarily to the anti-social tendencies apparent in the poetry, and what he considered to be the contributing factor to this disruptive doctrine, the Lakers' "affected simplicity" of sentiment and language. The style embodied in the latter was a violation of Jeffrey's view of the universality in time and space of poetical standards, and he considered its meaning "mystical" or unintelligible.

II

Among the elaborations was that on the language of poetry, published in the review of Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* (1817). The relatively late date of this discussion does not necessarily indicate a later development of Jeffrey's poetical theory; the same ideas had been expressed in less detailed and coherent forms in most of his reviews of the Lake Poets. The examination of
a more elaborate statement at this time will serve as an aid in the interpretation and understanding of the "poetry as pleasure" idea developed in Jeffrey's review of Wordsworth's *Poems* (1807). Since the statement is a complete one, it is worthy of quotation:

There is, no doubt, a simple and familiar language, common to almost all ranks, and intelligible through many ages, which is the best fitted for the direct expression of strong sense and deep passion, and which, consequently, is the language of the best poetry as well as of the best prose. There is another language peculiar to this manner of writing, which has been called poetic diction, — those flowers of speech, which, whether natural or artificial, fresh or faded, are strewed over the plainer ground which poetry has in common with prose; . . . Such is the style of almost all our modern poets; such is the style of Pope and Gray; such too, very often, is that of Shakespeare and Milton . . . . Now this style is the reverse of one made up of slang phrases; for, as there are words associated only with mean and vulgar ideas, poetic diction is such as is connected only with the most pleasing and elegant associations; and both differ essentially from the middle or natural style, which is a mere transparent medium of the thoughts, neither degrading nor setting them off by any adventitious qualities if its own, but leaving them to make their own impression, by the force of truth and nature. Upon the whole, therefore, we should think this ornamented and coloured style, most proper to descriptive or fanciful poetry, where the writer has to lend a borrowed, and, in some sort, meretricious lustre to outward objects, which he can best do by enshrining them in a language that, by custom and long prescription, reflects the image of a poetical mind, — as we think of the common or natural style as the truly dramatic style, that in which he can best give the empassioned, unborrowed, unaffected thoughts of others.21
Of the three types of language then, only the "natural" and the "poetic" are suitable for poetry. Since vulgar associations lead to vulgar sentiments or emotions, and since the emotions are man's moral determinants, such associations lead to base morality; therefore, language eliciting low associations (slang, or the diction used by Wordsworth) is not proper for poetic usage. "Natural" language is the best, since it is associated with that poetry which is "moral"; there is no language barrier between the expression of passions and the reader, and consequently the desired moral effect is more forceful. "Poetic diction" is suitable for the kind of poetry which is "amoral." As was noted earlier, the use of "slang" tends to degrade the sentiments as well as the language, and is therefore unsuitable for either of the types of poetry which Jeffrey considered legitimate.

Jeffrey concludes the review by expressing a regret that Coleridge had allowed his imagination to overrule his reason and his common-sense, two attributes which, we may surmise, would have enabled him to stay on the straight and narrow path of Jeffreyan morality.

III

Notice was taken previously of Jeffrey's disposition to view pleasure as a primary aim of poetry. This point
is elaborated to some extent in his 1807 review of Wordsworth's Poems:

The end of poetry, we take it, is to please — and the name, we think, is strictly applicable to every metrical composition from which we receive pleasure, without any laborious exercise of the understanding. This pleasure may, in general, be analyzed into three parts — that which we receive from the excitement of Passion or Emotion — that which is derived from the play of Imagination, or the easy exercise of Reason — and that which depends on the character and qualities of the Diction. The first two are the vital and primary springs of poetical delight. . . .

We receive pleasure "from the excitement of Passion or Emotion": and this emotion is expressed in terms of either "sublimity" or "pathos" or some variant of these two, both of which, meeting with Jeffrey's approval, we may conclude have a desirable moral effect on the reader. This pleasure arises then, from Jeffrey's "moral" poetry; for, to the best of my knowledge, he never uses the terms "pathos" or "sublimity" in connection with "amoral" poetry. Another source of pleasure is "the play of the Imagination," and this probably refers to that poetry which, arousing no passions and eliciting no immoral associations, can be regarded as "amoral" poetry. In the discussion of Jeffrey's remarks on language in his review of Coleridge's Biographia Literaria,
I noted that Jeffrey acknowledged two legitimate kinds of diction, the "natural" and the "poetic." Pleasure can be derived from the use of both kinds, but the former is usually used in "moral" poetry, and the latter in "amoral" poetry. In both instances, however, the associations attached to the language must be refined and elegant, not vulgar and infantine; "correctness" and "melody" are indispensable to the desired effect: "no poetry can be long or generally acceptable, the language of which is coarse, inelegant or infantine."\(^{23}\)

In the case of "moral" poetry, the associations fostered by the language must be in accord with refined sentiments aroused by the subject-matter; if they are not, the emotions are degraded, and the moral effect is lost. In the case of "amoral" poetry, on the other hand, it ceases to provide innocent amusement if the associations which the diction gives rise to are vulgar; for vulgar language and sentiments are uninteresting. If, of course, low and uninteresting incidents are depicted in lofty language, the resulting poetry is equally to be shunned: such poetry expresses no aspect of reality, and therefore any moral effect inherent in the refined dictional associations is lost, since those associations are degraded.

Since it might have been objected by Wordsworth,
that refined emotions are legitimately to be connected with trifling incidents, since he himself had experienced them, Jeffrey prepared a defence against such objections by falling back on his associationist theory of aesthetics:

It is possible enough, we allow, that the sight of a friend's garden-spade, or a sparrow's nest, or a man gathering leeches, might really have suggested to such a mind a train of powerful impressions and interesting reflections; but it is certain, that to most minds, such associations will always appear forced, strained, and unnatural; and that the composition in which it is attempted to exhibit them, will always have the air of parody, or ludicrous and affected singularity. 24

This kind of poetry might have had a moral meaning for Wordsworth, but the lack of universal elements of association made it impossible for most readers to be so blessed. In other words, the associations ordinarily inspired by leech-gatherers and wash tubs are at variance with the elevated passions with which Wordsworth wrapped them, and the result is not only ludicrous, but in the degradation of noble sentiments, immoral.

IV

Thus were Jeffrey's theoretical objections to the poetry of the Lakers, most of them presented and elaborated by 1807. With a morality based on day to day ex-
pediency and contentment, he could not fathom what he considered to be the perverseness of a poetical doctrine which, according to his own theory of aesthetics, could do nothing but degrade those sentiments which are man's moral determinants; and neither could he accept a social creed, which he believed to be manifested in the poetry of Southey, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, that attacked established social convention, and could consequently lead to immoral turmoil; for to cause unhappiness is to be immoral.

A consideration that must be kept constantly in mind when attempting to arrive at an understanding of Jeffrey's criticism, is that he did not fully understand the work of either Coleridge or Wordsworth, and therefore, his theoretical objections must be considered in the light of this inability. Whether or not, from the vantage point of one hundred and fifty years after the fact, we are justified in condemning this lack of insight is beside the point; assuming his limited comprehension, and his moral, aesthetic, and social doctrines, Jeffrey's objections to the Lake School of Poetry are coherent and logical. The validity of his position as a basis for literary criticism is another question.

Briefly, and this point is emphasized by Wellek, Jeffrey's theory fails to differentiate between art and
reality: in its terms a poetic description of a scene ought to produce exactly the same associations, and hence the same aesthetic response, as a view of the scene itself; there is no recognition of the role of the poet, or of the poetic imagination and its function in the creation of poetry. This, of course, holds true only when what I have referred to as "moral" poetry is under consideration. Poetry of this type, according to Jeffrey's view, in arousing human emotions, should in all respects be consonant with the real world; otherwise, as I have tried to show, the result is degrading and hence immoral. For Jeffrey, there was no distinction between everyday truth and poetic truth. Whether this view was attributable to his theory or to his inability to perceive and to understand poetic truth is a question that can probably never be answered, although one might suspect that the theory was a function of his lack of insight. Poetry which I have termed "amoral," on the other hand, Jeffrey recognized as unreal; but, being unreal, it was also to be considered at best as a means of temporary escape from reality, an innocent amusement for men of the world, but something not to be taken seriously. Any attempt to invest such poetry with real meaning, in the form of human emotions or passions, Jeffrey condemned as degrading to those passions, and therefore detrimental to morality.
CHAPTER IV

THE TONE OF THE REVIEWS

The tone of Jeffrey's reviews underwent a gradual but marked change over the course of many years. The following examination of his public remarks is made in an attempt to pinpoint these changes, and, incidentally, to serve as illustrations of Jeffrey's inability to comprehend the real significance of Wordsworth's poetry in particular, and the Lakers' in general. (It is doubtful if he really had any difficulty with Southey's epics, but his reviews of Southey usually were mere excuses for a discussion of Wordsworth.)

In his Monthly Review article of 1802, Jeffrey admitted that Thalaba reflected poetical genius, but he deplored what he considered to be the faults. In a conclusion that is typical of his reviewing style, he both praised and damned the poem at the same time:

> On the whole, we conceive that this work contains more ample and decisive proofs of the author's genius and capacity for poetical expressions, than any of his former publications: but at the same time, we are sorry to observe that it affords no indications of his advancement towards a more correct taste or a more manly style of composition.

In the later Edinburgh review of the same poem, Jeffrey labelled it a "wild and extravagant fiction," which set
"nature and probability at defiance." There is no hint of personal animosity in these reviews, nor are they particularly harsh: Jeffrey simply presented his case, and expressed regret that Southey did not appear to be advancing as a poet.

Madoc (reviewed in 1805) came off with only the usual criticisms: it contained many beautiful passages; but there was no character delineation, the story was too long, and there were flaws in the language and style (attributable to "New School" doctrines). In short, Jeffrey reiterated his admiration for Southey's genius and for his capacity, but deplored his "heresies."

There was no particular anger or impatience evident in the two 1802 reviews, or in that of 1805, but with the review of Wordsworth's Poems in 1807, Jeffrey's tone became more irritated, and perhaps with definite rebukes of his criticism in mind, he attempted to vindicate his attitude. Evidently chagrined, he wrote:

It was precisely because the perverseness and bad taste of this new school was combined with a great deal of genius and laudable feeling, that we were afraid of their spreading and gaining ground among us, and that we entered into the discussion with a degree of zeal and animosity which some might think unreasonable towards authors, to whom so much merit had been conceived.

He went on to admit that at times he had suspected himself
of unwarranted severity, but that at other times the magnitude of their errors made him wonder why he had not attacked them with even greater hostility. There is no real reason for doubting Jeffrey's sincerity in this statement; he probably did feel that the repeated poetical "errors" of the Lakers constituted a dangerous perversity which merited any attack which he could launch in defence of what he considered to be the proper style of poetry. On the other hand, the remarks on individual poems, which followed in the review, are suggestive, not only of a stubborn refusal to understand the poetry, but also of a hurt and angry man: "To the Daisy" is described as "flat, feeble, and affected; and in a diction as artificial, and as much encumbered with heavy expletives, as the theme of an unpractised schoolboy." The last three lines of "The Redbreast and the Butterfly" "seem to be downright raving"; "To the Small Celandine" is "babyish absurdity"; the "Ode to Duty" is a poem "in which the lofty vein is very unsuccessfully attempted"; "Yarrow Unvisited" is a "tedious, affected performance"; "My Heart Leaps Up" is a "rapturous mystical ode ... in which the author, striving after force and originality, produces nothing but absurdity." Of "Resolution and Independence" Jeffrey wrote: "We defy the bitterest enemy of Mr. Wordsworth
to produce anything at all parallel to this poem from the collection of English poetry, or even from the specimens of his friend Mr. Southey." In other words, it was so poor that even Wordsworth's worst enemy would be unable to find a poem to match its badness. "Intimations of Immortality" is characterized as "beyond all doubt, the most illegible and unintelligible part of the publication. We can pretend to give no analysis or explanation of it . . . ." The only poems to receive Jeffrey's approval were "Character of the Happy Warrior," "The Horn of Egremont Castle," and the sonnets.

The character of Southey first came in for comment in the review of The Curse of Kehama (1811). Here Jeffrey's patience seems to have come to a definite end. He began the review:

We admire the genius of Mr. Southey; we reverence the lofty principles, and we love the tenderness of heart, that are visible in all his productions. But we are heartily provoked at his conceit and bad taste, and quite wearied out with the perversity of his manifold affectations.

Jeffrey noted that Southey's star was waning, and pointed out that most men of an "improved and delicate taste" not only shunned both him and his colleagues, but considered them in terms of contempt and scorn. In rather a patronizing fashion, he continued:
For our own part, we are a good deal less difficult; and shall continue to testify in favour of Mr. Southey's talents and genius, as resolutely, as against his peculiarities and affectations; — considering it indeed as our chief duty, in this matter, to counteract the neglect into which he seems to be falling, both by endeavouring to correct the faults by which it is provoked, and by pointing out the excellences by which these faults are at once enhanced and redeemed.

As far as the poem itself was concerned, Jeffrey repeated his previous criticisms, and added the charge of "childishness"; he also charged Southey with conceit and arrogance. This appears to have been the first comment made on one of the Lake Poets as a man, and even here, there is a possibility that the charge was an outgrowth of the critical commentary on the poem, and not the result of personal feelings.

In 1814 came the infamous review of Wordsworth's *Excursion*, and in 1815 the equally brutal review of *The White Doe of Rylstone*. The *Excursion* review has been sufficiently reprinted and discussed to allow for a very brief consideration here. Jeffrey began with a devastating "This will never do!" and the tone of the review follows this lead. "The case of Mr. Wordsworth, we perceive, is now manifestly hopeless; and we give him up as altogether incurable, and beyond the power of criticism": so wrote the "prince of critics," who con-
tinued: "We . . . must ascribe the peculiarities of his composition, not to any transient affection, or accidental caprice of imagination, but to a settled perversity of taste or understanding . . . ."8 Again:

The absurdity in this case, we think, is palpable and glaring: but is exactly of the same nature as that which infects the whole substance of the work — a puerile ambition of singularity engrafted on an unlucky predilection for truisms; and an affected passion for simplicity and humble life, most awkwardly combined with a taste for mystical refinements, and all the gorgeousness of obscure phraseology.9

These criticisms were not new, but never before had their tone been so severe. Even at this point, however, after having given Wordsworth up as hopeless, Jeffrey had to be honest: "But . . . Mr. Wordsworth, with all his perversities, is a person of great powers; and has frequently a force in his moral declamations, and a tenderness in his pathetic narratives, which neither his prolixity nor his affectation can altogether deprive of their effect."10

The White Doe came in for even harsher treatment:

This, we think, has the merit of being the very worst poem we ever saw imprinted in a quarto volume; and though it was scarcely to be expected, we confess, that Mr. Wordsworth, with all his ambition, should so soon have attained to that distinction, the wonder may perhaps be diminished when we state, that it seems to us
to consist of a happy union of all the faults, without any of the beauties, which belong to his school of poetry.

Jeffrey had to admit that even *The Excursion* possessed beauties, but *The White Doe* he damned outright. Nor did Wordsworth himself escape the wrathful pen of the little editor: he appears, wrote Jeffrey, "in a state of low and maudlin embicility, which would not have misbecome Master Silence himself, in the close of a social day."

There is little doubt that Jeffrey really felt these poems to be poor, and, according to his critical criteria, even immoral; but there is similarly little doubt that the increase in viciousness from 1805 to 1817 cannot be explained simply as his reaction as a critic to the failure of the Lakers to heed his advice. There must have been other contributing factors.

There is evidence to support the argument that it was Wordsworth alone at this time who was the recipient of Jeffrey's critical wrath. A review of Southey's *Roderick*, published in the same year as that on *The White Doe*, in general follows the same pattern as the reviews of 1802 and 1805. Southey is praised as a genuine poet, though not of the first rank, while his poem is termed monotonous and a little absurd. The diction, as usual, is called "simple" and "infantine." All in all, the
review cannot be called particularly vicious. This review also serves to illustrate the impossibility of the White Doe review being solely the result of Jeffrey's impatience at the slighting by the Lakers of his critical advice. Had this been the case, Southey too, who had been just as perverse as Wordsworth in ignoring Jeffrey's criticisms, would have suffered the same fate with Roderick as Wordsworth had with The White Doe.

The kid gloves began to come off, however, in the next review that Jeffrey wrote on Southey, that of The Lay of the Laureate (1816). He began by pointing out the ridicule attached to the office of Poet Laureate, and by suggesting that a prudent man in that position would "bear his faculties with exceeding meekness, and . . . keep as much as possible in the shade." Southey though, Jeffrey maintained, was not content to play such a role, but rather insisted on writing "rather worse than any Laureate before him," and in doing so, succeeded in making himself appear ridiculous. For the first time, Jeffrey did not praise Southey's genius and then deplore his faults; this time, he had nothing good to say:

The badness of his official productions indeed is something really wonderful, -- though not more so than the amazing self-complacency and self-praise with which they are given to the world. With the finest themes in the world for that sort of writing, they are the dullest,
tamest, and most tedious things ever
poor critic was condemned, or other
people vainly invited, to read.13

And the Lay, according to Jeffrey, was the worst of the
lot: "We have no toleration for this sort of perversity,
or prostitution of great gifts . . . ."14 This review
is closer in tone to that of The Excursion than any
other of Jeffrey's reviews of Southey's work, but, per¬
haps because Jeffrey recognized in Wordsworth a greater
power than that which Southey possessed and therefore
considered him the greater danger and consequently the
principal target of his barbed criticism, Southey was in
general more likely to be the object of a jocular review
than to be the object of Jeffrey's serious censure.

The only time that Jeffrey spoke specifically of
politics in a review of the Lakers occurred after Southey
had been forced to acknowledge authorship of his juvenile
play, Wat Tyler.15 In his review of this work, Jeffrey
was unmerciful, suggesting that Southey's reasoning
powers had completely left him. He attacked Southey,
not necessarily because he had changed his political
creed, but because he was now proceeding to abuse those
who were following his old belief: such a man fully
deserved to be "reproached with the intolerance of a
proselyte, and the malignity of a renegado."16 Con¬
tinuing the review in a humorous vein, Jeffrey suggested
that Southey stick to his Spanish romances and leave politics alone; for in the latter he was an "oracular weathercock."

In the same year (1817) appeared the review of Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*. As far as the tone of this review is concerned, I think that one quotation will serve to illustrate it:

... Mr. Coleridge has ... from the combined forces of poetic levity and metaphysical bathos, been trying to fly, not in the air, but under ground -- playing at hawk and buzzard between sense and nonsense, -- floating and sinking in fine Kantean categories, in a state of suspended animation 'twixt dreaming and awake, -- quitting the plain ground of 'history and particular facts' for the first butterfly theory, fancy-bred from the maggots of his brain, -- going up in an air-balloon filled with fetid gas from the writings of Jakob Behmen [Sic] and the mystics, and coming down in a parachute made of the soiled and fashionable leaves of the Morning Post, -- and promising us an account of the Intellectual System of the Universe, and putting us off with a reference to a promised dissertation on the Logos, introductory to an extended commentary on the entire gospel of St. John.17

The review was hardly a kind one.

In the review of Southey's *Vision of Judgement* (1821), Jeffrey maintained that the poem was a reflection of the "spontaneous decomposition of an artificial poet."

In a discussion of the use of hexameters, he claimed that such a metre was unfit for English, and that Southey's
attempt to revive it was a "piece of solemn foppery, perfectly worthy of the author."18

In his final review of the Lakers, that of Wordsworth's Memorials of a Tour on the Continent, Jeffrey recorded the waning of the "Lake School of Poetry": Coleridge had deserted it, and had damaged its reputation with the publication of "Christabel"; Southey had sunk low since becoming Poet Laureate, "and the flame of his inspiration, after waxing woefully dim in various songs of triumph and loyalty, at last fairly went out in his hexameter Vision of Judgment"; Wordsworth too had fallen:

... since he has openly taken to the office of a publican, and exchanged the company of leech-gatherers for that of tax-gatherers, he has fallen into a way of writing which is equally distasteful to his old friends and his old monitors -- a sort of prosy, solemn, obscure, feeble kind of mouthing, -- sadly garnished wish shreds of phrases from Milton and the Bible -- but without nature and without passion, -- and with a plentiful lack of meaning, compensated only by a large allowance of affectation and egotism.19

The poems in this volume were presented as examples of the depth to which Wordsworth had fallen. The review suggests rather a wistful yearning for the old Lake School, for at least it had been alive. The tone of the remarks is not reminiscent of the 1814-17 period; for, as Jeffrey saw the situation, there was really no
longer any need for attack. The battle had been won, the foe vanquished. The battle-scarred and broken veterans of the foe were to be pitied rather than crushed further; and Jeffrey seems to have had a real admiration for the young Lakers, who, though beaten, had fought the good fight. The real irony lies in the fact that, one hundred years later, the "victor" would be forgotten, and the age in which the battle had been fought would be referred to as the "Age of Wordsworth": such are the vagaries of literary taste.

As far as the tone of Jeffrey's comments on the Lakers is concerned then, the reviews can be divided roughly into four groups: those of 1802 and 1805; those of 1807 and 1811; those of the period from 1814 to 1817; and those which followed this period. In the first group there is no evidence of personal animosity on Jeffrey's part: he acknowledged the merits of the Lake School, while at the same time, he pointed out what he considered to be its faults. His objections, as we have seen, can be attributed to his moralistic critical theory, and they are couched in relatively mild terminology. The reviews of the second group took on a warmer tone, principally, it seems to me, because the Lakers had steadfastly refused to follow Jeffrey's suggestions and to heed his objections to their poetry. He was irritated and angry
because of what he considered to be their perverseness and the prostitution of their talents. On the other hand, his "apology" in the 1807 review of Wordsworth's Poems, and the charge of conceit and arrogance against Southey in 1811, suggest that there were perhaps other reasons for the change in tone. The personal slights and the sledge-hammer-like reviews of the 1814-1817 period have been noted: during this time it is difficult to believe that non-literary factors did not play a part in determining the tone of the reviews. Finally, in the last group, the bitterness disappeared from Jeffrey's comments, and he began to look with a less jaundiced, albeit a contemptuous, eye on the remnants of the Lake School of Poetry. What must now be attempted is to determine what extra-literary considerations contributed to the change in tone in the second, and particularly the third, groups. The answer to the problem is, I believe, to be found in the personal or private comments of Jeffrey and the Lakers between 1802 and 1817.
CHAPTER V

BEHIND THE SCENES

I

Some scholars have interpreted the Jeffrey-Laker controversy in terms of a personal vindictiveness on the part of Jeffrey, and of his desire to promote the sale of the Edinburgh Review. Russell Noyes, for example, maintains that Jeffrey did not like Wordsworth, that he was incapable of understanding him, that there was a fundamental difference in temperament between the critic and the poet, and that Jeffrey was guilty of cupidity, partisanship, and personal vindictiveness.¹

The first three of Noyes¹ charges are probably true, but the last needs some reservations and qualifications. His argument that Jeffrey reviewed Wordsworth in the manner in which he did in order to increase the circulation of the Edinburgh is weak. Even Noyes admits that there was no apparent abuse until 1807, and the review from the beginning had been an unqualified success: by November 7, 1802, a second edition of the first number was in the press, and 2,150 copies of the first issue were sold in Edinburgh alone -- a city of about 100,000 inhabitants.² Its circulation in London was no less remarkable:

74.
from 1806 to the beginning of 1807, the sale rose from 1,000 to 3,500; and after Murray took over as publisher in 1807, the total sale rose to 7,000 -- 5,000 of it in London. Not only, then, did the Edinburgh have an encouraging immediate reception, but its circulation continued to rise steadily until 1807, when a change in publishers, not necessarily a change in the tone of Jeffrey's reviews on Wordsworth, gave a new impetus to the sale. It is therefore highly unlikely that Jeffrey felt obliged to add spice to his reviews in order to increase sales.

As far as political partisanship is concerned, this explanation, suggested long ago by George Saintsbury, has no real validity. It is impossible to explain either Jeffrey's fundamental differences with the Lake School, or the tone of his reviews, by reference to the opposing political opinions of the combatants. Walter Scott, too, was a staunch Tory; and yet he and Jeffrey remained fast friends for as long as Scott lived, and Jeffrey's reviews of Scott's works are, on the whole, honest and fair. René Wellek's suggestion that it was Southey alone who was the object of political malice is a little more feasible; but even in Southey's case, it must be remembered that the only review that actually speaks of politics is that on Wat Tyler, a political piece written
by Southey in his youth. As a play with a political theme, written by a man who contributed political articles to the rival and Tory Quarterly Review, it was fair game for political comment. If that comment was warmer than the circumstances seem to have merited, there are other explanations for it than that of political partisanship. Although the Edinburgh Review did not exhibit a distinctly Whig viewpoint until 1808, when it printed the article on "Don Cevallos of Spain," Jeffrey never denied that politics played a large part in the publication. He reports having written to Scott: "The Review, in short, has but two legs to stand on. Literature no doubt is one of them: but its Right leg is Politics." But, at the same time, there is little or no evidence to support the theory that politics influenced Jeffrey's literary judgments, at least on a conscious level.

The charge of personal vindictiveness carries with it some truth, although Jeffrey has rather unjustly been painted as the villain of the piece. For these reasons, the charge deserves some consideration. Why, for example, if Jeffrey did exact revenge through the Edinburgh, did he feel himself constrained to do so? An examination of the private quarrel between him and the Lakers will perhaps solve this difficulty.
II

Jeffrey had had no contact with any of the Lakers prior to his 1802 reviews of Thalaba, and the review in the Edinburgh was not considered unfavourably by Southey himself. Writing to C. W. W. Wynn in December of that year, he said:

Vidi the Review of Edinburgh. The first part is designed evidently as an answer to Wordsworth's Preface to the second edition of the Lyrical Ballads; and, however relevant to me, quoad Robert Southey, is certainly utterly irrelevant to Thalaba. . . . The review altogether is a good one, and will be better than any London one, because London reviewers always know something of the authors who appear before them, and this inevitably affects their judgment.\footnote{7}

There are two comments that can be made on the basis of this letter: in the first place, it is obvious that Jeffrey was unknown to the Lakers before the publication of the first number of the Edinburgh; and in the second place, Southey's remark on the inappropriateness of many of Jeffrey's comments as far as Thalaba was concerned, shows that he was immediately aware of the reviewer's ordinary practice in reviewing: the work under examination usually was merely a pretext for making comments upon a broader subject. When Jeffrey reviewed one work by one of the Lake School, he used the opportunity to comment
on the School's poetical doctrines in general; and it was against the background of this wider field that he tried to criticize the work before him. Unable to separate the work of art from its author, he was equally unable to separate it from other works by the same author, or from the poetical doctrines held by the author. The general concensus of this particular review seems to have been that, while it was perhaps not so favourable as one would have liked, its influence was not great enough to affect seriously the sale of the poem.

Southey believed that the Edinburgh was doomed to failure, and Coleridge, after the appearance of the second number, wrote to him:

Your prophecy concerning the Edingburgh [sic] Review did credit to your penetration. The second number is altogether despicable -- the hum-drum of pert attorney's Clerks, very pert & yet prolix & dull as a super-annuated Judge.

It is interesting to note that Coleridge, as late as 1804, thought that Walter Scott had written the Thalaba review; so Jeffrey himself, except as editor, was still free of any personal effects. Southey at this time was still proclaiming the ineffectiveness of the Edinburgh and deploring the existence of reviews and reviewers in general. Ironically, the first specific mention of Jeffrey by any of the Lakers involved a mistake: Southey
thought that he had written the review of Charles Lamb's *John Woodvil* or *Pride's Cure*, which contained some comments on Coleridge. Southey wrote to H. H. Southey, asking him to try to discover why Jeffrey hated Coleridge, and in the letter reveals his low opinion of both the *Edinburgh* and its editor:

You may, if you think proper, give him one hint, which may be of service to his Review. In one instance I knew it discontinued, in consequence of the wanton and hard-hearted indecency manifested in the account of a case of extra-uterine gestation, and also of the abominable allusion in the attack upon Young, both in the second number. \(^{12}\)

There can be little doubt that Jeffrey was made aware of Southey's remarks on the *Thalaba* review and on the *Edinburgh*, nor is there any doubt that Jeffrey looked forward to reviewing Southey's next production. In August of 1804, he wrote to Horner: "When will Wordsworth and Southey come forth? I shall try to give you a little pointed criticism then." \(^{13}\) But there is no indication on his part that he felt himself personally affronted by Southey's objections to the *Edinburgh* or to his own role as editor and reviewer. Rather, it appears that he was girding himself to answer these objections, and to present his case in a stronger form -- on theoretical, not personal grounds; and the review of *Madoc* (1805) reflects this attitude.
Jeffrey honestly thought that it was his duty to point out the faults of the Lakers, even, perhaps, a moral obligation. Moreover, it was his natural tendency to reserve praise, even if he felt the work before him to be worthy of it. Regarding Wordsworth, he wrote to Horner:

I am almost as great an admirer [of Wordsworth] as Sharpe. The only difference is, that I have a sort of consciousness that admirers are ridiculous, and therefore I laugh at almost everything I admire, or at least let people laugh at it without contradiction. You must be in earnest when you approve, and have yet to learn that every thing has a respectable, and a deridable aspect. I meant no contempt to Wordsworth by putting him at the head of the poetical firm. I classed him with Southey and Coleridge who were partners once, and have never advertised their secession. . . . There is no help — justice must be done, and I, like the executioner, shall kiss him. I rather think though that he will be acquitted. 14

The point to keep in mind here is that it was the private Jeffrey who was the admirer, and it was the public critic who felt the compulsion to deride what he privately admired. I have hinted previously that Jeffrey's associationist aesthetic provided a rationale for this divided aspect of his personality; and it was the Lakers' understandable inability to comprehend this duality that led to their frequent condemnations of him as a hypocrite. As early as 1799, Jeffrey had written of his admiration
for the *Lyrical Ballads*, and he subsequently repeated his praise in the presence of other witnesses, so that the Lakers were early aware of the discrepancy between his public and his private critical opinions.

The negative aspect of Jeffrey's personality, that aspect which was reflected in his public criticism, was deplored and shrewdly analyzed by his friend, Sydney Smith. Protesting against what he called Jeffrey's "increasing and unprofitable skepticism," he wrote:

> I exhort you to restrain the violent tendency of your nature for analysis, and to cultivate synthetical propensities. The whole effort of your mind is to destroy. Because others build slightly and eagerly, you employ yourself in kicking down their houses, and contract a sort of aversion for the more honorable, useful, and difficult task of building well yourself.

Numerous references to Jeffrey's gregarious and friendly behaviour in private company attest to the vital difference between his positive private role and his negative role as a public critic. Just after the publication of the review of *Madoc*, for example, and before the number in which it appeared was in general circulation, arrangements were made for Jeffrey and Southey to meet. An indication of Jeffrey's honesty and integrity is evidenced by the fact that he thought it improper for him to meet Southey without allowing
Southey to see the review and choose for himself whether or not to go through with the proposed meeting; consequently he sent him a copy in advance. The gesture was not lost on Southey, who referred to it as "gentlemanly conduct." The meeting itself was carried off amicably enough by both parties, with Southey later maintaining that Jeffrey was amusing, but on the subject of taste a "mere child," although he found it impossible to be angry "with any thing so diminutive." So friendly indeed did the two men become, that Jeffrey returned to the Lakes with Southey and took supper with him. Only partially understanding the dichotomy between Jeffrey the man and Jeffrey the critic, Southey later wrote to Danvers:

What I condemn in him is, a habit of speaking of books worse than he thinks of them, — because ill-natured things are said with better effect than good-natured ones, and liked better; and for the sake of selling his Reviews he often abuses books in print which he makes no scruple to praise in conversation.

While Southey's conclusion was that it was Jeffrey's cupidity that caused him to review adversely what he privately liked, as I have pointed out, it is unlikely that Jeffrey was overly concerned with the sale of the Edinburgh. He was prone to be harsher in print than in conversation, but this can be explained by his negative turn of mind (he was a destroyer, not a creator), and by his conviction that the
grounds on which he was attacking the Lake School were moral.

Although Southey's immediate reaction to the Madoc review and to Jeffrey himself was not particularly violent, by January of 1807 his attitude had changed sufficiently for him to write to Grosvenor C. Bedford: "... Judge Jeffrey, of the 'Scotch Review,' alias Gog, abused me for not imitating Pope when I wrote 'Madoc.'" The name calling is something new. The more he considered Jeffrey and his reviews, the more irritated he seems to have become, and the more convinced that Jeffrey knew nothing of poetical excellence and that his reviews were the result of personal capriciousness: Jeffrey "has no feeling of beauty, no sense of excellence, and never praises anything which does not proceed from his own friends ... ." And this after he had written to Mrs. Southey in October, 1805, that the review of Madoc was "mixed up with plenty of compliments."

All in all, however, the Lakers appear not to have taken either Jeffrey or the Edinburgh very seriously between 1802 and 1807. The reviews of Thalaba and Madoc were only two of many, and there was no reason for the poets to become any more upset over the Edinburgh than over any other review in Great Britain. They believed that the sale of the poems would not be seriously affected, and as far
as Southey could determine, Jeffrey as a person was so insignificant in both stature and critical ability that it was not worth while to take issue with him. How wrong they were on both counts remains to be seen.

III

The review of Wordsworth's Poems (1807) was followed by more comments from the "abused" Lakers. The tone of the review was certainly harsher than those on Southey's Thalaba and Madoc but, as I previously suggested, this could have been the result of pure exasperation on Jeffrey's part. On the other hand, he was possibly aware of Southey's contemptuous opinion of him, and deliberately attacked with greater than usual violence as a vindictive gesture. It would be unwise, however, to attach too much importance to the personal revenge theory as far as the 1807 review is concerned. In the first place, so far as I can tell, Wordsworth had made no comments on the Thalaba or Madoc reviews one way or the other, and it seems improbable that Jeffrey would have attacked Wordsworth to get back at the great gossip Southey. (There is the possibility, of course, that Jeffrey felt that one Laker spoke for them all.) In the second place, in November of 1807, Jeffrey, through Scott, broached the suggestion to Southey that he write for the Edinburgh with freedom
to choose his own books and to voice his own opinions. This invitation hardly bespeaks personal animosity; and indeed, in refusing the offer, Southey explained that he did so on the grounds that he had no opinion — literary, moral, or political — in common with the editor, but at the same time that he (Southey) bore "as little ill-will to Jeffrey as he does to me; & attribute whatever civil things he has said of me to especial civility. . . . The reviewals of Thalaba & Madoc do in no degree influence me." He went on to admit that he disliked Jeffrey's seemingly personal bitterness in the reviews, and concluded:

To Jeffrey as an individual I shall ever be ready to show every kind of individual courtesy; but of Judge Jeffrey of the Edinburgh Review I must ever think and speak as of a bad politician, a worse moralist, and a critic, in matters of taste, equally incompetent and unjust.

By Southey's own admission, then, he had no quarrel with Jeffrey the man; and Jeffrey, by his proposal that Southey write for the Edinburgh, showed himself equally amenable to a personal and business association with Southey. Jeffrey the critic was at war with the Lake School, however, and in his reviews, the destructive side of his personality manifested itself. Scott, in his letter to Southey containing Jeffrey's offer, voiced the opinion held by the present writer:
... I always have had to consider his attack as rising from a radical difference in point of taste, or, rather, feeling of poetry, but by no means from any thing approaching either to enmity or a false conception of your talents.

Exasperation and impatience, not personal animosity on Jeffrey's part, caused the increase in severity in the 1807 review.

There is evidence to indicate, however, that whatever little significance Jeffrey attached to the personal aspects of the feud at this time, Southey was determined to counter-attack in order to make the Edinburgh and its editor appear ridiculous. Southey wrote to Coleridge in December of 1807, telling him of Jeffrey's offer and of his own reply to Scott. As we have seen, that reply was polite and gave no indication of any bitterness on Southey's part toward Jeffrey as a man, although as a critic, he held him in the utmost contempt. He concluded the letter to Coleridge:

With you I would challenge all the critics in England & make open war upon them. -- Setting this aside as a thing not to be hoped for, my main object for obtruding a letter upon you was this business of the Edinburgh. If you will attack it in a series of letters, exposing all its falsehood, & ignorance, I will bear a full part in this good work: -- & if you will join with me in my Man of the Moon I will be in earnest about it, & send you the plan for your alteration. The Devil's Thought is some little specimen of what we can do together.
I am sure we should make as much noise as Two Men in the Moon could do, & that we should teach better manners to a set of coxcombs who, because we have hitherto acted as if we were literary Quakers, think they may insult & injure us with impunity.  

As far as Southey was concerned, the war was on.  

By this time, too, it was realized that Jeffrey's reviews did have an effect on the sales of books. Dorothy Wordsworth, referring to the 1807 review, observed that the sale might be for a short time injured, and expressed regret that it should be so. At the same time, she considered the review a personal attack on her brother. Nor was Wordsworth himself able to accept the 1807 review with his usual aplomb. Writing to Scott in January, 1808, he made it clear that he considered Jeffrey a poor specimen of a man and a vindictive reviewer, and that he (Wordsworth) was ready to administer vengeful strokes, if such treatment continued:

To you . . . I must observe that in the first sentence of what he has said upon my Poem he has shown gross want of the common feeling of a British Gentleman. He was cordially received by Southey at his home in this Country, and taken the first opportunity of repaying that civility by a base attempt to hold him up to ridicule for residing in that very country where he had entertained the said Jefferay [sic]. If Mr. J. continues to play tricks of this kind, let him take care to arm his breech well, for assuredly he runs desperate risque of having it soundly kicked.
Indeed, by January of 1809, Wordsworth's intentions in this respect appear to have been fairly well known. Sydney Smith, in a letter to Lady Holland, referred to Wordsworth's vow of "personal vengeance," and if Smith knew, there is little doubt that Jeffrey was no less cognizant. What Wordsworth did not realize, of course, was that Southey had seen the review before he had ever met Jeffrey, and therefore the little editor could not legitimately be accused of unwarranted treachery. It is also interesting to note, that as it was an error that first evoked Southey's attention to Jeffrey personally, it was similarly a misunderstanding which finally roused Wordsworth, who rarely read reviews and who had not previously entered into the fray, to comment on Jeffrey and vow vengeance on him.

Coleridge, during this same period, seems not to have been so opposed to Jeffrey as were Southey and Wordsworth. In a letter to Jeffrey, dated 23 May 1808, he asked for the opportunity of writing a review of Clarkson's History of the Abolition of the Slave Trade for the Edinburgh. In the same letter, he went on to complain rather forlornly to Jeffrey that he could not understand why his name had been brought up so often in connection with Southey and Wordsworth when he had not published anything for thirteen years, and when nothing
of what he had published -- with the exception of a "shilling pamphlet" -- had ever been reviewed in the Edinburgh. "Most assuredly," he wrote, "you have mistaken my sentiments, alike in morality, politics, and -- what is called -- metaphysics -- and I would fain hope that if you knew me, you would not have ascribed Self-opinion & Arrogance, to me --." \(^{31}\)

In July of the same year, not having heard from Jeffrey, Coleridge went ahead and sent the Clarkson review to the Edinburgh, and, as an afterthought, disclaimed any intention of entering the conflict in defence of Wordsworth; that defence, he wrote, he would leave to Wordsworth's own genius and poetry, which were capable of vindicating themselves. \(^{32}\) He wrote to Jeffrey again in November and sent him some prospectuses of his weekly essay, The Friend, "to disperse . . . as favourably, as you can . . . ." \(^{33}\)

Evidently still on good terms with Jeffrey -- he referred to his "very kind letter of 8 Dec." -- Coleridge, after the publication of his review of Clarkson's book, wrote that he felt no chagrin at the changes which Jeffrey had made in his article, and praised the act of publication as "an act of personal kindness and attention." \(^{34}\)

His attitude appears to have undergone a change a year later, however, for in January of 1810, he wrote to Thomas Poole:
For Reviewing, which is more profitable & abundantly more easy than writing The Friend, I cannot engage in, as I hold it utterly immoral -- and was confirmed in it by the changes, Jeffrey [big] made, in my Review of Clarkson's Hist. of Ab. in the Ed. Rev., the only case in which I thought myself warranted to make an exception. 35

This about-face, possibly brought on by conversations and correspondence with Southey and Wordsworth, placed Coleridge in the same position as that held by those two gentlemen. There is some indication, too, if we can trust Coleridge, that Jeffrey had promised to retract some of his censures of Coleridge, 36 of which he had complained in his letter to Jeffrey of 23 May 1808. There is no such retraction in the Edinburgh, and this may possibly have helped turn Coleridge against him.

The establishment of the Quarterly Review in 1808, not only marked a definite rift between Whigs and Tories, between Edinburgh reviewers and Quarterly reviewers, but served as a focal point in the Jeffrey-Laker feud. "In my hatred to the Scotchmen," wrote Southey, "I wish this Quarterly to succeed."37 And Jeffrey, in one of his few private references to the turmoil created by his public criticism, wrote: "Well, what is to become of us? I am for a furious unsparing attack . . . ."38 Although Jeffrey was here speaking of politics, there is no reason for doubting that such an attitude would carry over into
the literary realm as well. Southey, as a firm supporter of the *Quarterly* and a frequent contributor to it, was now fair political as well as literary game. This, then, is one possible explanation for the continued attack in the 1811 review of *Kehama*. Another possible reason, of course, lies in the Lakers' declarations of "open war." Considering the exasperation apparent in the 1807 review, and the outraged complaints and plots between that date and 1811, the wonder is not that Jeffrey continued the attack in a similar tone, but that he did not resort to more brutal tactics.

While the personal references to Southey in the *Kehama* review can be explained as Jeffrey's reaction to the Lakers' bitter comments about him during the 1807-1811 period, the obvious increase in severity of tone in the review of *The Excursion* (1814) offers a more difficult problem. Had this review appeared in 1811, it could have been more easily explained; for Jeffrey had every reason to strike back at the Lakers at that time. The problem is complicated by another factor: Why was the 1811 review not more vicious than it was? The answer lies, perhaps, in the fact that Jeffrey had again visited Southey and Coleridge in 1810. The relations appear to have been friendly, at least on the surface, and Jeffrey felt, no doubt, that the reports of the Lakers' animosity toward
him had been exaggerated. Consequently, he toned down the *Kehama* review. Between that date and 1814, little comment was made by any of the Lakers on either the *Edinburgh* or its editor. Southey evidently was not particularly perturbed by the review of *Kehama*, possibly because he had come to expect such treatment. Other than a reference to it as "matchless impertinence," and a remark to Crabb Robinson explaining the criticism as the result of a predetermined course which Jeffrey was powerless to alter, he was silent.

IV

It is this very silence which makes the *Excursion* review so puzzling. What reasons did Jeffrey have for pressing the attack so viciously? There is a possibility, of course, that the resentment that must have been generated by the Lakers' reactions following the 1807 review, and which had, perhaps, been mollified by his visit to the Lake country in 1810, finally burst forth in 1814. If this is true, it presents an interesting instance of the working of Jeffrey's peculiar psychology. Southey and Wordsworth, as poets, despised Jeffrey the critic, and said so; and Jeffrey probably felt justified in defending himself -- as a critic. As a public critic, he held it a bounden duty to point out the moral errors in the poetry
of the Lakers, and to do so in the strongest possible terms: this was his public obligation, and his public personality was well suited to what he considered to be justifiably harsh tactics. As a private man, however, he felt himself free of any stigma associated with his role as a public critic, and not only enjoyed the company of Southey and his friends, but could even admire their poetry. The obligations of Jeffrey the critic did not fall on Jeffrey the man. At the same time, there is no reason to suppose that he was a complete schizophrenic, that his personal contacts with the Lakers did not have at least a subconscious effect on his public criticism of their works. If we can assume that a pleasant visit with an author would have an ameliorating effect on the tone of subsequent reviews of that author's works, we have an explanation for the relative mildness of the *Kehama* review. On the other hand, Jeffrey did not meet Wordsworth in 1810, and there were, therefore, no mitigating circumstances to soften the tone of his review of *The Excursion.*

This explanation does not, of course, solve completely the problem of the 1814 review. Given the moral basis for Jeffrey's criticism, which necessarily imparted an urgency to his strictures; given the negative and destructive aspect of his personality, which manifested itself in his public criticism; given the increasing exasperation which
he felt as the Lakers obstinately refused to change their political and poetical doctrines; given these elements, combined with the desire, subconscious or not, for revenge, there is little difficulty in allocating reasons for the attack of 1814. In short, Jeffrey, still irritated at Wordsworth's obstinacy, and well aware of the Lakers' opinion of him, evidently tried with one blow to win the war. *The Excursion* was the final proof of the falsehood of Wordsworth's poetical doctrine. Jeffrey had been predicting just such a result since 1802 -- any success on the part of Wordsworth was in spite of his heretical doctrine -- and *The Excursion* was the embodiment of every fault attributable to that doctrine. He had predicted failure unless his advice was followed, and in 1814 he wrote, "This will never do!" predicting the failure of Wordsworth's longest poem; and whether or not it deserves such a fate, *The Excursion* has never done.

Whatever the reasons for Jeffrey's harshness in dealing with *The Excursion*, there is no doubt that it was Jeffrey the critic who wrote the review, and that Jeffrey the man did not feel himself in any way affected by his public attitude. The *Excursion* review appeared in November of 1814, and in October of that year, Crabb Robinson recorded that Jeffrey had asked John Wilson to introduce him to Wordsworth. Wilson refused, but this willingness of Jeffrey to associate socially with the man whose poetry
he was about to damn so thoroughly, and which he privately admitted admiring, presented a puzzle to his contemporaries. Such an attitude can be explained, however, by keeping in mind the dichotomy in Jeffrey's personality.

The review was generally referred to as a "crushing" one, but as Southey put it: "He [Jeffrey] might as well seat himself upon the Skiddaw and fancy that he could crush the mountain. I heartily wish Wordsworth may one day meet with him, and lay him alongside, yard-arm and yard-arm in argument." Wordsworth himself did not consider it a particularly "crushing" review, possibly because he had not read it:

As to the Ed. Review I hold the Author of it in entire contempt. And therefore shall not pollute my fingers with the touch of it. . . . His impertinences, to use the mildest term, if once they had a place in my memory would for a time at least stick there. . . . If the mind were under the power of the will I should read Mr. Jy merely to expose his stupidity to his still more stupid admirers.

He later wrote to R. P. Gillies: "Your opinion of Jeffrey is just -- he is a depraved coxcomb; the greatest Dunce, I believe, in this Island, and assuredly the Man who takes most pains to prove himself so."

It is obvious, that in Wordsworth's mind, there was no differentiation between Jeffrey the critic and Jeffrey the man. Even Jeffrey's friend Sydney Smith was disturbed
at the tone of this latest review: "... Do not," he wrote, "such repeated attacks upon a Man wear in some little degree the shape of persecution?" Smith, whose acute perception had allowed him to analyze correctly the character of Jeffrey as a reviewer, and who recognized the difference between this man and the personal friend whom he loved, evidently feared that the negative destroyer who was the critic was about to sublimate the cheerful and gregarious man who was his friend.

Smith's fears were unfounded, however. Early in 1816, Jeffrey wrote a letter to Wilson, in which he himself noted the duality in his nature:

I assure you I am not in the least hurt or offended at hearing Wordsworth's poetry extolled, or my remarks upon it arraigned as unjust or erroneous; only I hope you will not set them down as sure proof of moral depravity, and utter want of all good affections. I should be sorry that any good man should think this of me as an individual; as to the opinion that may be formed of my critical qualifications, it is impossible for any one to be more indifferent than myself. I am conscious of being quite sincere in all the opinions I express, but I am the furthest in the world from thinking them infallible, or even having any considerable assurance of their appearing right to persons of good judgment. (Italics mine)

Jeffrey the man was able, then, to take a critical attitude toward the productions of Jeffrey the critic; but he also resented the names with which he was being
labelled by Wordsworth and his followers.

Wordsworth intended, in his "Essay Supplementary to the Preface" of his 1815 edition of his poetry, to attack Jeffrey personally, but he was dissuaded from doing so by De Quincey. It was asserted by Dorothy Wordsworth, though, that in the Essay her brother "speaks in a lofty tone which will no doubt surprise the blind adorers of that ignorant Coxcomb Jeffrey." Personal abuse was the order of the day.

As we have seen, Jeffrey continued his attack in the 1815 review of The White Doe, finding nothing in the poem to praise. There was little immediate reaction to the review on the part of the Lakers. Wordsworth, the only one to comment on it, indicated in a letter to Bernard Barton, that reviewers were unable to appreciate so fine a thing as "pure" poetry, and the review of The White Doe was, no doubt, "a splenetic effusion of the conductor of that Review, who has taken a perpetual retainer from his own incapacity to plead against my claims to public approbation."

Jeffrey kept to the attack in his reviews of Southey's Lay of the Laureate (1816) and Wat Tyler (1817), but it was Coleridge's Biographia Literaria (1817) that brought up again the whole question of Jeffrey's sincerity, and aided the Lakers in branding Jeffrey a hypocrite. In
1810, Jeffrey had visited the Lake district, this time as the guest of both Southey and Coleridge. Always a notoriously amiable and gay companion in private company, and noting that Coleridge liked compliments, he flattered him outrageously, and also protested again that he was a great admirer of Wordsworth's poetry, and that he had attacked him simply because the errors of men of genius ought to be exposed. Coleridge, in Biographia Literaria, complained bitterly of Jeffrey's subsequent treatment of himself and his friends, after he and Southey had so graciously entertained him at Keswick. They were, he said, characterized as 'The school of whining and hypochondriacal poets that haunt the Lakes.' In the view of Coleridge, Jeffrey was a hypocritical reprobate, with no sense of honor, and a cruel determination to make the Lake School always the object of his most vicious criticism.

Jeffrey answered Coleridge's charges in a note to his review of Biographia Literaria. He protested that his compliments to Coleridge had been sincere, and that he had been "struck with the eloquence and poetical warmth of his conversation," a fact to which his friends could testify. To Coleridge's allegation that he had subjoined Coleridge to the Wordsworth-Southey School simply because the names "always went together," Jeffrey rejoined a flat denial.
The review itself was not a good-natured one, and some of the events leading up to it are interesting. As early as 1815, Byron had written to Thomas Moore, asking him to write a favorable review of the work in the Edinburgh, in order to help alleviate Coleridge's distress. He asked Moore not to mention his request to Jeffrey, as he "might not like such a project." Jeffrey, however, was loth to give over the reviewing to anyone else, and as a man, he wished to review the book favorably. But, upon reading the work, his destructive public nature, and the earnestness derived from the moral basis for his criticism combined to make the review a harsh one.

We have already noted Jeffrey's aversion to theoretical or philosophical speculation, not because he disliked such exercise, but because it could produce no practical benefits. To quit "the plain ground of 'history and particular facts'" (Jeffrey had a personal predilection for just these things), and to speak of poetry in terms of Kant and German mysticism, was to attempt to justify on theoretical grounds the poetry to which Jeffrey had been opposed in print since 1802, principally on moral grounds. The lack of consonance with reality and the lack of practical application to everyday life in the Lakers' poetry and Coleridge's theory rendered them, by Jeffrey's standards, at best useless, and at worst immoral. Coleridge's discussion of
the fancy and the imagination Jeffrey dismissed as a "long-winding metaphysical march, which resembles a patriarchal journey," and he later made his own position clear:

If we cannot make good an inference upon acknowledged premises, or known methods of reasoning, he [Coleridge] coolly refers the whole to a new class of ideas, and the operation of some unknown faculty, which he has invented for the purpose, and which he assures you must exist, — because there is no other proof of it.

"Acknowledged premises," and "known methods of reasoning" were the criteria by which Jeffrey evaluated philosophy, and any attempt to go outside these guides in order to justify what he had already condemned as immoral, was not only to support immorality with falsity, but to endanger public morality by presenting a theory which might be taken up by other writers.

In short, Jeffrey felt a moral obligation to attack a statement of poetic theory which supported the perversion of "moral" poetry — both because it did support it, and because, as theory, it was abstruse and impractical and could possibly influence other poets, or would-be poets. Three Lakers were enough to deal with; Jeffrey felt it his duty to prevent the spreading of the disease.

The only recorded reaction to this review from the Lake School which we know of was a letter from Wordsworth
to R. P. Gillies, in which he stated that he should "never read a syllable of Mr. Jefferson [sic] Critique," and moreover, that he had not read Biographia Literaria! Sydney Smith, however, still worried over Jeffrey's destructive attitude, wrote to J. A. Murray: "Jeffrey has thrashed Coleridge happily and deservedly; but is it not time now to lay up his cudgel? Heads that are plastered and trepanned all over are no longer fit for breaking." 

Coleridge himself had another reason for hating Jeffrey. In 1815 had appeared a slashing review of his poem, Christabel, and Coleridge assumed that, although Hazlitt had written it, it was Jeffrey who had instigated the attack. He thought seriously of addressing an open letter to Jeffrey, "concerning his proved pre-determined malice"; but evidently nothing came of it. Coleridge felt that the review was a manifestation of Jeffrey's hatred for him personally, that Jeffrey deliberately chose Hazlitt to review the work: "This man Mr. Jeffrey [sic] has sought out, knowing all this [his own and Southey's kindness to Hazlitt], because the wretch is notorious for his avowed hatred to me & affected Contempt for Southey."

Jeffrey's reputation among the Lake poets struck an all-time low during the period from 1814 to 1818; but the attacks which aroused their ire were, in part at least, the
results of the Lakers' own threats from 1807 to 1811. After 1811, Jeffrey the critic considered his task done, and his later reviews were not particularly vicious. Jeffrey the man had borne his adversaries little ill-will, and his seeming hypocrisy was the result partly of his dual nature and partly of his peculiar aesthetic. Because the Lakers could not understand this -- and there is certainly no blame attached to them for this inability -- Jeffrey has emerged as a vicious critic, which to a certain extent he was, and as an equally vicious man, which he was not.

V

There is evidence to show that Jeffrey, later in his life, repented of the severity of his reviews of Wordsworth, but not of their general content. That fount of information, Crabb Robinson, records in his diary for 16 August, 1837, that Empson had recently heard from Jeffrey that he intended to review his criticisms of Wordsworth to see if he had anything to retract. On doing so, he found that, except for "perhaps a contemptuous and flippant phrase or two," he did not. Empson went on to venture the opinion that Jeffrey's distaste for Wordsworth was honest -- and, as we have seen, it probably was.

In the collected edition of his contributions to the Edinburgh Review (1844), Jeffrey did offer a half-hearted apology for his former severity:
I have spoken in many places rather too bitterly and confidently of the faults of Mr. Wordsworth's poetry: And forgetting that, even in my own view of them, they were but faults of taste, or venial self-partiality, I have sometimes visited them, I fear, with an asperity which should be reserved for objects of Moral reprobation. If I were now to deal with the whole question of his poetical merits, though my judgment might not be substantially different, I hope I should repress the greater part of these vivacites of expression . . . .

Considering it in the light of what I have said of the moral basis for Jeffrey's criticism, this statement takes on added significance. By 1843, it was obvious, even to Jeffrey, that the adverse moral effects which he had felt thirty years before to have been the sure result of Wordsworth's poetical doctrine and practice, had not manifested themselves; people of taste enjoyed Wordsworth's poetry. Couple with this the fact that Jeffrey was at this time in his seventies, and the statement not only makes sense, but supports the argument for a moral basis for his criticism. Jeffrey reviewed Wordsworth with such severity, because, at the time, he did consider his poems to be "objects of Moral reprobation." If now he was apologizing for doing so, we are justified in marking it down to his age, and to the fact that his fears had not materialized.

* * *
There is rather a sad epilogue to this unfortunate literary battle, although there are some doubts as to the authenticity of the report. In 1850, the year in which, ironically, both the major antagonists died, James C. Richmond, in a lecture delivered to the Committee of the City of London Institute, reported that Wordsworth, in a fit of passion, had denounced Jeffrey as a coxcomb and a puppy. If he did so refer to Jeffrey, it is a sad and bitter comment, not only on the quarrel, but on Wordsworth.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Explanations for Jeffrey's attitude toward the Lakers and their poetry can be suggested by taking into consideration his associationist background, his narrow idea of morality, and his dual personality. Attempts to evaluate his criticism, and to place him in an historical context, present more difficult problems. It is obvious that Jeffrey did not completely understand the Lakers, particularly Wordsworth and Coleridge; but it seems unfair to judge him on this ground, for 150 years of hindsight gives the modern reader an unwarranted advantage. It seems to me that our only hope of doing justice, either to Jeffrey or to the Lakers, is to consider Jeffrey's criticism in the light of the reception Wordsworth received from other contemporary reviewers.

William S. Ward, in his study of the contemporary reception of Wordsworth's poetry, notes that, although there was a generally favourable reception of the first two editions of Lyrical Ballads, after 1802 there was a growing opposition to Wordsworth and the Lake Poets. Whether or not the appearance of the Edinburgh Review in that year had any particular effect on this change is a debatable point. Ward goes on to point out that only 105.
one-thirteenth of the reviews of the 1817 edition of Wordsworth's Poems were favourable, and that those on The Excursion and The White Doe of Rylstone were predominantly unfavourable (2/13 and 3/13 favourable respectively). After 1815, Wordsworth's stock appears to have begun a slow but sure rise. In general, the Edinburgh followed this pattern -- indeed, it might be argued that it set the pattern; but Ward's conclusion that

... the reviewers seem not to have realized that a new literary sun was on the horizon or that there was anything really new or radical in either the Wordsworthian theory or practice.

is not applicable to Jeffrey. It was precisely because he saw that the Lakers represented a new approach in poetry that he censured them; for, from his standpoint, the new poetry was immoral.

Ward, in another article, sums up the seemingly prudish and conservative attitude of the contemporary reviewers of the Romantic poets in this way:

The survival of the moral emphasis of the Puritans, the continuance of the practical spirit of the Augustans, the natural unrest and threat of revolution all combined to give the critics of poetry the appearance of moral censors and spiritual advisors.

This statement does apply to Jeffrey, and offers at least
some of the reasons for his being the kind of man, and hence the kind of critic that he was. But it is to be noted that Ward’s statement is a blanket covering Wordsworth’s early reviewers in general. Jeffrey, therefore, was not alone in his attitude; but he was alone, as I have indicated, in recognizing the change in poetry, and the poetical powers in it. He noted the beauties as well as the faults, and, like a good lawyer, presented his case. That he considered the moral dangers inherent in the new poetry to outweigh the beauties ought not to be interpreted as a complete lack of comprehension of its significance. Unlike some other reviewers, he did not perpetrate scurrilous attacks for the sake of scurrility; he was genuinely concerned with the state of literature, and the possible consequences of that literature as far as morality was concerned. He attacked because he felt a moral obligation to attack. His fears were subsequently found to be groundless, and we find him rather half-heartedly apologizing for the harshness of his reviews in a note in his Contributions. But when he wrote the reviews, he did so with reference to what appeared to him to be the way things were.

Jeffrey’s recording of what appeared to be is one of the reasons why he is important. He both observed and reflected current taste, and he did so with an awareness of
his public responsibility, and from a point of view broadened by wide reading and contact with most of the important literary figures of the day. A passage which is sometimes cited as proof of his critical inability should, it seems to me, be considered in this light:

The tuneful quartos of Southey are already little better than lumber:— and the rich melodies of Keats and Shelley,— and the fantastical emphasis of Wordsworth,— and the plebian pathos of Crabbe, are melting fast from our field of vision. The novels of Scott have put out his poetry. Even the splendid strains of Moore are fading fast into distance and dimness, except where they have been married to immortal music; and the blazing star of Byron himself is receding from its place of pride. . . . The two who have the longest withstood this rapid withering of the laurel, and with the least marks of decay on their branches, are Rogers and Campbell; neither of them, it may be remarked, voluminous writers, and both distinguished rather for the fine taste and consummate elegance of their writings, than for that fiery passion, and disdainful vehemence, which seemed for a time to be so much more in favour with the public.  

This was written in 1829, and the historian of taste could hardly have asked for a more significant document. For Jeffrey is not here saying what ought to be, but what was. It appeared to Jeffrey that at this time, the public in general had rejected the great Romantics, and that only Campbell and Rogers appeared to be holding their own. There is no doubt that Jeffrey's preference was for the last two, but he also recognized the merits of other and
greater writers, whose popularity was waning.

Jeffrey's greatest weakness as a critic was his narrow view of morality, which paradoxically, was at least partially the result of a virtue -- his sense of responsibility. The general climate of the time -- political and social -- made him reluctant to contribute to a literary movement which, in his view, had the potential to undermine the general welfare. In this respect, he was a conservative; but he was not blind. The poetical merits of the Lakers were evident to him; they were what made the poetry particularly dangerous. Persons less balanced and sane, of a more violent and susceptible temper than he himself, might be adversely affected by such poetry. Jeffrey felt it his duty, therefore, as a man of taste and culture, to act the part of a guardian of public morality. From our own point of view, of course, such a role is considered to be outside the realm of the literary critic; but the periodic furor over obscenity and censorship in our own day illustrates again the close connection still made between literature and morality. It is impossible to separate the two areas in Wordsworth himself, and long after Jeffrey's time the connection continued to be made.

This study has probably raised more questions than it has answered; for, if the essential difference between
Jeffrey and the Lake School of Poetry lay in their respective ideas of morality, we might well ask what precisely was the difference. What was Wordsworth's theory, and how did it differ from that of Jeffrey? The answer to such queries is beyond the scope of this study. My purpose has been to establish the area of disagreement, and to analyze Jeffrey's criticism of the Lakers in the light of his moral viewpoint. In the past, justice has not been done either Jeffrey or the Lakers. Jeffrey's censure of the Lake School was, in point of fact, a censure of Wordsworth, and this thesis has, perhaps, presented Jeffrey's case against Wordsworth without unduly maligning that gentleman; nothing more was intended. Time has vindicated Wordsworth as a poet, and if anything has been accomplished by this examination of Jeffrey's criticism of, and his relationships with Wordsworth, it is that the editor of the Edinburgh Review was not particularly vicious, but that his restricted morality prevented him from according Wordsworth the praise and recognition which he privately felt to be his due.
APPENDIX

List of Reviews and Dates

1802 Southey's Thalaba (Monthly Review and Edinburgh)
1805 Southey's Madoc
1807 Wordsworth's Poems
1811 Southey's Kehama
1814 Wordsworth's Excursion
1815 Southey's Roderick
Wordsworth's White Doe of Rylstone
1816 Southey's Lay of the Laureate
1817 Southey's Wat Tyler
Coleridge's Biographia Literaria
1821 Southey's Vision of Judgment
1822 Wordsworth's Tour on the Continent

lll.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Even other than the fact that it exercised such an influence in the early nineteenth century, the Edinburgh Review is important for at least one other reason: unlike periodicals that had gone before it, it was not subject to the whims of booksellers. Being independent of them, the reviewers were consequently able to judge the works before them by literary criteria rather than according to the publisher's monetary considerations. They were, moreover, paid at the rate of sixteen guineas per sheet, a sum that gave some respectability to a previously vulgar profession.


3. Lewis E. Gates, Selections from the Essays of Francis Jeffrey (Boston, 1894), p. xxI.


5. Ibid., p. 478.


NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Byron Guyer, "The Philosophy of Francis Jeffrey," MLQ, XI (1950), 17-26. Guyer argues that Jeffrey was a positivist, a skeptic, and an adherent of the morality of David Hume and the aesthetics of Archibald Alison. As a critic he was an empiricist, accepting the validity of phenomenal knowledge, and accepting Hume's view of the probability of human knowledge and his empirical view of human ethics. He could accept neither contemporary materialism nor contemporary idealism; instead, he chose a "dualistic realism." As a skeptic, Jeffrey rejected metaphysics as mere introspective speculation, and pessimistically saw man as morally imperfect and destined to remain so.

When Jeffrey's philosophy is understood, it is seen that his associationist aesthetic occurs in the framework of his positivist outlook, and that his positivism prevents his acceptance of any of the philosophical idealisms usually associated with such an aesthetic.

(p. 18)


2. See Thomas Carlyle, Reminiscences, ed. James Anthony Froude (New York, 1881), pp. 301, 290, 320. See also Jesse Raymond Derby, Francis Jeffrey as a Literary Critic (Cambridge: Harvard Doctoral Dissertation, 1929). Derby maintains that Jeffrey had no organized theory, no well defined point of view, that he was a superficially brilliant opportunist, and that the inconsistencies in his reviews are due to the conflict between his aesthetic and his moral aim. Guyer seems not to have read this dissertation, for Derby points out many contradictions to show the lack of any coherent critical theory in Jeffrey's work.


4. See Derby, Francis Jeffrey as a Literary Critic (above).


11. See Ibid., pp. 243-244.

12. See Ibid., pp. 244-247.


15. Ibid., p. 96. See pp. 100-103.

16. Ibid., p. 104.

17. See Walter Jackson Bate, "The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteenth-Century Criticism," ELH, XII (1945), 146.

18. Ibid., p. 150.


22. Ibid., pp. 499-500.

23. Ibid., pp. 502-503.
24. Ibid., p. 496.
25. Ibid., p. 481.
26. Ibid., pp. 481-482.
27. Ibid., p. 482.
29. Jeffrey, Contributions, p. 481.
30. Published in the Edinburgh Review as a review of Archibald Alison's Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (1811); in a revised and enlarged form in the Supplement to the 1824 edition of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica, and subsequently incorporated into the 1841 edition of the same work; and finally, in its revised form, in Jeffrey's Contributions to the Edinburgh Review (1844). All quotations are taken from the one-volume edition of the Contributions.
31. Jeffrey, Contributions, p. 15.
32. Ibid., p. 16.
34. Ibid., p. 37.
35. Ibid., p. 38.
36. Ibid., p. 38.
37. Ibid., p. 38.
38. Bate, ELH, XII (1945).
40. Ibid., p. 39.
41. Jeffrey referred to this idea in a letter to James Grahame, dated 8 April, 1801. Criticizing Grahame's use of "a sort of infantine simplicity" in one of his plays, he wrote:
It is a style indeed that has much beauty in it and very frequently a great deal of tenderness — but it is not fit for the profane ears of the multitude — it is liable to ridicule and will often appear silly to those whose minds are familiarized with grosser interests or have been little accustomed to the unambitious playfulness of affection. — Every man that appears before the public appears before a company to whom he owes respect and on whose sympathies he ought not to reckon too securely and with whom he should not be too familiar. . . . We never think of entertaining a drawing room full of strangers with the prattle of our children, nor think of giving way in their presence to any of those simple emotions which constitute the charm of our domestic society.


42. See Jeffrey, Contributions, pp. 40-60.

43. Ibid., p. 43.

44. Ibid., p. 44.

45. Ibid., p. 44.

46. Edinburgh Review, I (1802), 63.

47. Jeffrey, Contributions, p. 68.

48. Ibid., p. 104.

49. Ibid., p. 106.

50. See Henry Lord Cockburn, Life of Lord Jeffrey with a Selection from his Correspondence (Philadelphia, 1852), II, 258, 213. See also Lady Holland, A Memoir of the Reverend Sydney Smith, ed. Mrs. Austin (New York, 1855), II, 94.


52. Edinburgh Review, XXXVI (1821), 52-54.

53. Jeffrey, Contributions, pp. 299-305.
55. *Edinburgh Review*, XVI (1810), 213.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


7. He predicted, for example, that by 1919 posterity would credit poetic worth to "half of Campbell -- and the fourth part of Byron -- and the sixth of Scott -- and the scattered tythes of Crabbe -- and the three per cent. of Southey . . . ."
   (Contributions, p. 290)


20. See reviews of *Thalaba* (1802), *Madoc* (1805), Wordsworth's
Poems (1807), Kehama (1811), The Excursion (1814),
The White Doe (1815), Roderick (1815).

22. Ibid., XI (1807), 216.
23. Ibid., XI (1807), 217.
24. Ibid., XI (1807), 218.
25. See below, Chapter IV.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


2. Edinburgh Review, I (1802), 75.

3. Ibid., XI (1807), 215.

4. Ibid., XI (1807), 218-223. Jeffrey also referred disparagingly to this "stuff about dancing daffodils." Although we ought not to judge his criticism by his poetic talent, a sonnet evidently written by him, and found in the possession of the descendants of John Hunter, Jeffrey's literary executor, has hailstones dancing:

   28th March, 1837
   The Spring's bright sun shines on thy walls, Craigcrook!
   And violets blue are springing at their feet;
   But wintry blasts their gentle wooing meet
   And unthawed hailstones in each shady nook
   Dance to their music; while the building rook
   Shrieks at her cold tasks, and primroses sweet
   And muffling up their gentle odours cheat
   The season of its incense; yet the sun
   Soars fast and fearless in his summer way.
   The young lambs trusting in their Feeder run,
   The Blackbird cheerly trills his bridal lay;
   And man well knowing whose best will is come,
   Smiles at the threatening which must pass away.

   Quoted by Strang Lawson, "Jeffrey's Dancing Hailstones," Notes and Queries, 196 (1951), 16.


6. Ibid., XVII (1811), 432-433.


8. Ibid., p. 459.

9. Ibid., p. 469.

10. Ibid., p. 464.

11. Ibid., p. 469.
12. Ibid., p. 469.


14. Ibid., XXVI (1816), 449.

15. It had been published without his consent, and his name attached to it in the Morning Chronicle.


17. Ibid., XXVIII (1817), 491.

18. Ibid., XXXV (1821), 433.

19. Ibid., XXXVII (1822), 449-450.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE


3. Samuel Smiles, A Publisher and his Friends: Memoir and Correspondence of the Late John Murray (London, 1891), I, 90.


9. Ibid., II, 936. See also Southey, Life and Correspondence of Robert Southey, p. 159.


11. Southey, Life and Correspondence of Robert Southey, p. 177.


(Edinburgh, 1852), II, 91-92.


17. Lady Holland, A Memoir of the Reverend Sydney Smith, ed. Mrs. Austen (New York, 1855), II, 22. In a letter written in 1806, Smith explained his warnings to Jeffrey:

I like to tell you these things, because you never do so well as when you are humbled and frightened, and if you could be alarmed into the semblance of modesty, you would charm everybody; but remember my joke against you about the moon: 'D—in the solar system! bad light -- planets too distant -- pestered with comets -- feeble contrivance; could make a better with ease. (Holland, A Memoir, II, 33)


21. Ibid., I, 404.

22. Ibid., I, 418.


26. Ibid., p. 229.


32. Ibid., III, 118.

33. Ibid., III, 126.

34. Ibid., III, 148.

35. Ibid., III, 272.


41. Jeffrey's review of Southey's *Roderick*, printed in the same year, exhibits nowhere near the severity of the *Excursion* review.

42. **Robinson on Books and Writers**, I, 151.


53. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, ed. J. Shawcross (London: Oxford, 1907), I, 36. Coleridge's memory appears to have failed him here; the phrase which he quotes is not to be found in any of Jeffrey's reviews.


60. Edinburgh Review, XXVIII (1817), 491, 497.

61. Ibid., XXVIII (1817), 495.

62. Ibid., XXVIII (1817), 497.


64. Sydney Smith, Letters, I, 281.

65. There is still some question as to the identity of the author of this review, but only what Coleridge thought need concern us here.


67. Ibid., IV, 735-736; see also IV, 831-832, 972.

68. Robinson on Books and Writers, II, 535-536; Robinson, Diary, II, 257.


70. Robinson on Books and Writers, II, 695.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX


2. Ibid., p. 87.


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