From the Dark Side of the Moon; 
Raiding by Ground Forces in the Southwest Pacific 
during the Second World War

by

John Hilton Bradley
Major, United States Army

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A long and deep interest in the military history of the Second World War, especially the actions which liberated hundreds of prisoners of war and internees in the Philippines led me to the subject of raiding in the Southwest Pacific Area. While initially interested in writing a history of three rescue operations in the Philippines I found that the raiding in the Southwest Pacific was so unique and interesting that more actions had to be covered to gain a broader perspective of raiding in the theater. As a result I began to investigate guerrilla raids; raids by Australians in the Markham Valley of New Guinea and on Timor; a magnificent espionage raid in Singapore Harbor; then raid patrols by American forces; actions by American units in New Guinea, New Britain, the Solomons, the Admiralties, and the Philippines; the many small raids by members of the Allied Intelligence Bureau; and finally, and briefly, raids by the Japanese.

What started out as a rather limited history and study grew rapidly until many subjects had to be trimmed to fit into a manageable thesis. This is the result of my interest and research: a broad narrative of many raids, primarily those which were made by American forces, which struck the Japanese during the war; and an evaluation of the raids, their side effects, and their impact on war in the Southwest Pacific.

JOHN HILTON BRADLEY
For Len Hanawald, Ray Celeste, Bill Johnson, Frank Thompson, Phil Tabb, Henry Cannon, William Scott, and Noble Bradley whose deaths diminish us all.
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CHAPTER I: PARADISE, WAR, AND THE RAIDERS

They are lush green outcroppings surrounded by brilliant white surfaces in the deep blue oceans and seas of the Southwest Pacific. These thousands of islands, large and small, populated and unpopulated, are incredibly beautiful during peacetime. From the air and from the sea they are all the fabled Bali Hai, but once ashore they lose their aura of beauty and become desolate and dangerous places where nature and disease exact a terrible price from unlearned and unsuspecting soldiers. In the Second World War these islands of primeval beauty with their precipitous mountains, damp green jungles, mysterious swamps, pounding surf lines, and unknown diseases were a difficult battleground for the armies, navies, and air forces which fought there.

Geography in the Southwest Pacific changed the nature of warfare: it did not permit land and naval campaigns to be fought in isolation. Since there was no continuous land mass stretching from Australia to the Philippines, the seas and oceans became the routes of advance for the ship-borne armies. Once ashore to seize the land objectives, the armies had to be supported by naval and air forces and, in turn, the armies had to seize and secure bases for their sister services. Geography made the three services interdependent, an indivisible trinity, and it required that campaigns be fought by mutually supporting
forces if decisive results were to be obtained.

Geography also restricted the size of the land forces which were deployed at any given time, and it made the war one of divisions and corps rather than one of massed armies. Terrain made the war a fluid one because no force was capable of occupying all the islands and establishing a solid unbroken defensive line across the theater. The Southwest Pacific was an ideal battleground for small units which could move behind enemy lines and strike without warning at the enemy's troops and installations. It was a raider's paradise.

Raiding started early in the war on Luzon and continued throughout the long and bitter campaigns. Each raid was a remarkable story of brave men fighting by various modes on diverse terrain, and each was an interesting action. In many ways raiding was a microcosm of the larger and more spectacular joint and combined operations conducted by the Allied forces under the command of General Douglas MacArthur.

Ground raids in the Second World War occupy a unique niche in military history because for the first time they became the province of the infantryman rather than the cavalryman. In World War I the infantry had conducted the brutal and grueling trench raids, but in earlier years it was the swift moving cavalryman who was the renowned raider. With the final death of the horse, the cavalryman changed his mount and was unable to do much raiding with
armored and mechanized forces except in favorable terrain. Such terrain was not found often in the Southwest Pacific. The advent of the powerful air raid took the deep raiding task away from the ground raider, and in many ways took the tactic of raiding away from the army. Raids in the Second World War often mean air raids to the majority of people who remember the war.

Nevertheless, there were many raids made by ground forces in all the theaters of the war. Some were made by old horse-mounted cavalrmymen, some by armored and mechanized forces, but most were made by the gravel pounding infantryman. The infantryman probably raided most while patrolling because at such times he was either in no-man's-land or behind enemy lines, and he struck only when he had the advantage of surprise. There were, however, many raids made by units other than patrols, and these actions destroyed enemy units and installations, rescued prisoners, harassed the enemy.

Guerrilla raiders aided the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific, and they like their conventional counterparts struck and harassed the enemy. They were the irregular infantry of the war.

This is a history of the ground raiders who attacked the Japanese during the Second World War in the Southwest Pacific. It is an outgrowth of my investigation which aimed at discovering how much raiding went on during the war and how important and successful the raiding was. It
does not cover every raid because every raid has not been found. Essentially the story of the United States Army raiders who operated in the strategic corridor which the main battle forces took from Australia to the Philippines, the history covers raids by other forces, by other nationals, and by the many guerrillas who fought in the corridor. Brief mention is made of the conventional and unconventional raiders who attacked the Japanese outside the corridor in the Solomons, the Indies, Celebes, Timor, and Borneo. American raid patrols and incomplete raids as well as several Japanese raids are not forgotten even though they are really beyond the scope of this history. Many different, colorful, and valiant actions are included to give the story a broad and representative flavor while presenting as complete a history of raiding as can be compiled in a year.

Because the lessons to be learned from the history of warfare are so crucial to the understanding and the future application of the military art, this story will conclude with an analysis of the raiding which took place in the Southwest Pacific during the Second World War.
War, Japanese style, swept through the Southwest Pacific like a scythe in 1941 and 1942. Everywhere the Japanese were victorious, so much so that they had not planned to invade Australia which in 1942 stood naked and vulnerable to an immediate assault. The centrifugal offensive was stopped momentarily at Singapore, Bataan, and Corregidor, but when these areas fell there was no organized resistance by any large Allied forces north of unoccupied Papua in New Guinea. Guerrilla bands remained in the Philippines and Java, commandos operated on Timor and in the Markham Valley of New Guinea, coastwatchers and other lonely agents remained in isolated areas, but these were the pitiful remnants of a once proud Allied force.

It was clear to the Allies that the way back was going to be difficult, and it would be a long time before Japanese suzerainty over Burma, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific could be destroyed. The way back in the Southwest Pacific Theater was dominated by one man, General Douglas MacArthur, and one idea, "I Shall Return." Victory meant the recovery of the Philippines because the recapture of these islands would cut the Japanese off from the Southern Resources Area which they needed to support their war machine, and the Philippines would provide the bases for an eventual attack against Japan. The Allied road to the
Philippines was to be built upon the many islands and the ships of the navy starting at two points, Papua and Guadalcanal. Also, as it later developed, another route across the Central Pacific would carry the forces of Admiral Chester Nimitz from Hawaii to Palau Islands east of the Philippines.

United States Marines assaulted Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 to begin the campaign in the Solomon Islands. The fight on this jungle island was dirty and desperate, and after six months the Japanese suffered their first ground defeat of the war. Combat in Papua was equally terrible. It started when the Japanese landed at Gona and Buna on 22 July 1942 and immediately attacked over the mountainous Kokoda Trail toward Port Moresby. Moresby had to be defended because it was the last base the Allies held north of Australia. Fighting was exhausting in the high Owen Stanley Mountains and the Australians could not stop the Japanese for many weeks. But finally, with a shorter line of communications and more troops, the Aussies held just thirty miles from Moresby, and the now hungry and tired Japanese began retreating toward Gona and Buna.

American infantrymen entered Papua and they moved toward Buna by land, sea, and air while the Aussies attacked over the Kokoda Trail toward Gona. Allied troops approached the coast and their objectives in November 1942, but Buna and Gona did not fall until January 1943.
Bedeviled by tortuous mountains and swamps, lack of food, malaria and other debilitating diseases, the Allied troops, many of whom were green, suffered unusually high casualties in the campaign to destroy the tenacious Japanese in Papua. Success in Guadalcanal and Papua would have been impossible without the support of the air and naval forces, and especially without the naval battles of Guadalcanal and the Coral Sea.

With the starting points secured, allied forces started northwestward: General MacArthur's land forces along the New Guinea coast and Admiral William Halsey's army and marine divisions through the Solomons to isolate the Japanese bastion at Rabaul. This city on New Britain was the major enemy air and sea base in the area and it was located about midway in the Bismarck Archipelago which bridged the Bismarck Sea between the Huon Peninsula of New Guinea and Bougainville in the Solomons.

Progress was slow in 1943. Australians were airlifted into Wau, New Guinea, to defend the airstrip and reinforce Kanga Force which had been waging guerrilla warfare in the zone. Additional Allied units landed to the north in the Markham Valley in September and at Finschhafen to secure the Huon Peninsula. In the Solomons, Admiral Halsey invaded the New Georgia Group in June and July, then struck Vella Lavella and Choiseul in October, and finally slammed into Bougainville the next month. Marines and cavalrymen ended 1943 by landing on the west coast of New Britain and
attacking east to seize Rabaul.

A regimental combat team hit Saidor on the coast of New Guinea in January 1944 to cut off the Japanese retreating from the Markham Valley and the move was successful. Then in one of the boldest maneuvers of the campaign, American forces leaped into the Admiralty Islands north of Rabaul, and captured them with little difficulty. Seizure of the Admiralties gave the Allies an air and naval base and isolated Rabaul, and at the same time it cleared the horizon for new attacks to the north.

Rapidly General MacArthur sent a series of brilliant amphibious attacks up the coast of New Guinea taking Aitape, Hollandia, Wakde, Biak Island, Noemfoor Island, Sansapor, and then distant Morotai Island. He jumped about 1,500 miles in seven months, cutting off the Japanese Second, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Field Armies, over 200,000 troops, in New Guinea and the Solomons and brought his forces into position to assault Mindanao.

Plans called for an invasion of Mindanao, the southernmost island in the Philippines in November 1944, but Admiral Halsey reported in September 1944 that his air operations showed that Leyte was "wide open" for immediate attack. General MacArthur changed his plans, and on 20 October Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth United States Army landed on Leyte to begin the Philippine Campaign. Shortly afterwards, the Battle for Leyte Gulf, a
expected Australian invasion of Borneo and to handle the air forces which were going to interdict Japanese positions in the East Indies. Eichelberger's "Amphibious Eighth" executed fifty-two landings and cleared island after island in rapid fashion. The enemy adopted a tactic of delaying in the center of most islands in order to tie down as many American forces as possible as they were doing on Luzon. Major battles occurred, most of which were on Mindanao.

While the Americans were fighting in the Philippines, the Australians who had taken over New Guinea, New Britain, and Bougainville in June 1944 were attacking to clear New Guinea and Bougainville. The Australians performed a tiresome and unpleasant task, but without them the Americans would not have had the forces to strike the Philippines.

To make sure that the Australians were not deprived of a major action in the final stages of the war, General MacArthur sent the Australians accompanied by small Dutch forces into Borneo in May, June, and July, 1945. The most important objectives were the many rich oil fields.

Allied forces were still fighting in the theater when Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, but most of the enemy forces were on the border of defeat. Further combat, however, would have been costly to the Allies because the Japanese seldom surrendered but fought tenaciously to the
last man. Several areas, Java, Sumatra, Timor, and the Celebes, had never been invaded, and enemy forces surrendered on them without ever having faced the powerful Allied juggernaut. These areas had not been overlooked. General MacArthur had hoped that forces from Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command would assume the responsibility for the southern areas. By 15 August, much of the western part of the Southwest Pacific Area had passed to the control of Admiral Mountbatten and General MacArthur had turned his attention to the invasion of Japan because he had been assigned to command all the ground forces in the impending attack.

Caught between Admiral Nimitz's drive across the Central Pacific, the Allied attack from India into Burma, and General MacArthur's march from Australia, Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had been squeezed into impotence. War, Allied style, had knifed through the Japanese lines in the Southwest Pacific to recapture the Philippines and destroy several field armies, a magnificent fleet, and their accompanying air forces. It was war at its surgical best.
RAIDING DOCTRINE

Raiding doctrine as outlined in the field manuals of the United States Army and in the infantry and cavalry service manuals did not prepare the ground forces of the United States to conduct the raids they did in the Southwest Pacific. Raiding quite obviously would develop according to the doctrine and the training which the soldiers had been given before they entered combat. The cavalryman going into his first action would have been fully prepared by tradition and attitude to raid, and his major branch publication, The Cavalry Journal, provided him with much information on horse-mounted raids. Unfortunately, if reports are correct these old fashioned raids took place only in Eastern Europe, and the horse soldier who went to war in the United States Army was dismounted long before he ever charged. American infantrymen, however, had little information given to them about raiding, and it was ironic that during the long war the infantrymen would constantly raid. Blessed with new modes of transportation, the infantryman could move aboard motor torpedo boats, destroyers, submarines, gliders, and paratroop dropping aircraft and could move faster and deeper into enemy areas to raid and create havoc.

This study of the field manuals and service magazines illustrates the statements just made about the role of cavalry and infantry soldiers in raids.
Articles in *The Cavalry Journal* emphasized raiding, but these essays described classic, horse-mounted cavalry raids. One article went so far as to show the possibility of cavalry raids in dense woods. After surveying various articles, it is clear that the cavalrymen who wrote the pieces were desperately holding on to the past and were trying in every possible way to justify the retention of the horse in the newly mechanized and armored cavalry forces of the United States Army. The articles were discouraging because of their shortsightedness and because they did not deal with the possibilities of raiding by either dismounted or the armored forces of the army.

At the same time the *Infantry Journal* avoided the subject of raiding, something which was inconceivable because the infantryman had raided so much in the days of trench warfare in World War I. No one apparently recognized the growth of infantry raiding which new boats, ships, and aircraft would stimulate, much less the possibilities for raids which developed with the organization and training of parachute units.

Early infantry field manuals were little better than the *Infantry Journal*. The 1940 edition of the manual for the infantry battalion had no information on raiding. This was the manual which was probably in the hands of the troops when the war started. In the 1942 and 1944 infantry battalion manuals this omission had been corrected,
and detailed sections explained how to organize and conduct raids. The manuals were virtually the same, and both described the purposes of raids as follows:

**Raids are made to capture prisoners; to capture or destroy material; to obtain information of hostile dispositions, strengths, works, intentions, or methods of defense; and to inspire confidence and aggressiveness in the raiding troops and harass the enemy.**

Implied, apparently, but definitely not stated was the fact that raids could be made to destroy troops. The manuals further explained that a raid was "an attack followed by an instant withdrawal [my italics] upon accomplishment of the mission." Surprise was also stressed as a characteristic of a raid, but to confuse the matter, the manual explained that raids could be made in daylight or at night and that they were classified as supported or unsupported. Unsupported raids were normally made at night or during periods of low visibility. Supported raids could be made at any time and were dependent on fires of supporting weapons. The battalion would only engage in supported raids.

Infantry rifle company manuals published in 1942 and 1944 had less details on raids than did the battalion manuals. Both company manuals were essentially identical on the subject of raiding. The 1944 edition, however, added an important point. It stated that a "...raid is conducted as a night attack," thus implying that such an action must be thoroughly planned, properly reconnoitered, well rehearsed, and tightly controlled just
like night attacks are.

Raiding was not mentioned at all in the 1942 manual on the infantry regiment.

Quite clearly the infantry manual writers did not give much thought to raiding doctrine until after the war had started. Information on raids which failed to specify that such actions could be made against enemy troops, which required instant withdrawals, and which talked of classifying raids as supported or unsupported lacked a good deal of substance or practicality.

Semi-official publications which talked of infantry tactics were little better. Colonel P. S. Bond wrote in 1940 of only silent raids by patrols: "...night patrols enter the enemy lines to capture prisoners.... The raid is conducted in silence on a carefully prepared and rehearsed plan...." Shades of World War I! The Military Service Company's tactics manual of 1942 spoke only of "Silent Raids on Enemy Outguards" by night patrols. Neither of these sources overwhelmed a budding tactician with detailed information about raids. Both, however, did associate raiding with patrolling, something the field manuals did not do until 1944.

Obviously profiting from the experience of the soldiers in the Southwest Pacific, the new infantry manual on scouting and patrolling which was published in February 1944 talked of raid patrols:
There are two general types of patrols, as determined by their mission: reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols. Within these general classifications, patrols are named according to the specific mission assigned. For example, a combat patrol given the specific mission of raiding an enemy area or command post may be called a raid patrol.\(^{19}\)

Also:

A combat patrol engaged in raiding accomplishes such missions as gaining information, destroying an enemy outpost, or seizing prisoners from an observation post or small defended area.\(^{20}\)

Practicality finally found its way into the manuals, and raid patrols were doctrinally sound.

In the early days only raids by guerrilla forces were discussed to any great extent in the service journals, but often these were again mounted raiders. By discussing the hit-and-run tactics of irregular warfare, the service journals at least provided some information to the students of dismounted raiding.\(^{21}\)

Included in the articles on guerrilla warfare were many discussions about ambushes, which are similar to raids in many ways. In a raid a moving force generally strikes a stationary target while in an ambush a stationary force attacks a moving target. Therefore, in a simple way, the movement of the target can be used to differentiate between a raid and an ambush. Both actions can be used offensively or defensively, but a raid is primarily an offensive act.

Due to the similarity of actions in raids and
ambushes — surprise, sudden attack, and withdrawal — one must be careful not to mistake a raid for an ambush and vice-versa. This is especially true when studying guerrilla reports because the guerrilla often calls all his strike operations raids regardless of whether they are raids, ambushes, assassinations, or espionage actions.

In determining whether a combat action was a raid or not, the following definition has been used:

A raid is a surprise attack against an enemy force or installation which is normally behind enemy lines. Such an action is followed by a withdrawal.

This may be too restrictive, but if so it will be revised in the conclusion.

To many officers, men, and reporters the definition of a raid was too narrow for the operations which were called raids in the theater. For instance, General MacArthur talked of raiding the towns of Salamaua and Lae on the East Coast of New Guinea in 1942, but he added that if the raids were successful the key airfields at both locations could be seized and held. Such an idea contradicted the assumption that a raiding force would withdraw after attacking its objective. Other operations were mistakenly called raids. A report of Sixth Army said that the American and Australian parachute assault against Nadzab, New Guinea was a raid.

Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, the jungle-wise and thoroughly respected commander of Eighth
Army reported that the Eleventh Airborne Division's
diversionary assault against Nasugbu, Luzon in January
1945 was a raid in force. His comments were important
since he commanded the invasion force and because no one
else said the same thing. General Eichelberger was
emphatic:

The idea of Mike-Six was initiated by the
Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Area,
in November 1944 at a conference on Leyte with
the Eighth Army Commander. The first conception
was that the Eighth Army would land one or two
regimental combat teams in southwestern Luzon
as a raid in force led by the Commanding General,
Eighth Army, in person. The objective was to
disrupt the Japanese lines of communication,
create a diversion to support the main landing
at Lingayen, and, if possible, even occupy
Manila itself. A number of conferences followed,
and although the numbers of troops under dis-
cussion varied from time to time, the original
concept of a raid in force led by the Eighth
Army Commander was never changed.

The large numbers of Japanese indicated in the
target area by American reconnaissance parties
and guerrilla reports finally resulted in a
decision that one regiment of the 11th Airborne
Division land at Nasugbu as a reconnaissance in
force. The landing of the remaining troops and
the drop of the 511th Parachute Infantry on
Tagaytay Ridge were to be made only on the direct
order of the Commanding General, Eighth Army.
These facts alone explain why the advance
detachment of the Eighth Army, led by the Army
Commander in person, accompanied the 11th Air-
borne Division on its rapid advance into South
Manila.24

A young unit historian, Private First Class Richard
Krebs, called many of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division's
subsidiary operations raids. These actions involved
small forces, often battalions and companies, which
invaded isolated islands such as Romblon, Lubang, Verde,
and Simara in the Philippines and destroyed the enemy
garrisons on them quickly. Following those short fights they seldom took more than a week the American units
withdrew and left the final mop-up or security of the
islands to local guerrillas. Krebs, however, was the
only unit historian of his division to call these actions raids.

Other actions were designated raids by different writers. A Filipino historian called the First Cavalry
Division's dash into Manila to free the internees in the
University of Santo Tomas and capture Malacañan Palace a commando raid. One author wrote about the capture of
the Bauang Bridges on Luzon and said that the action was a night raid. Newsweek magazine reported that the Thirty-
Eighth Infantry Division destroyed Fort Drum in Manila Bay in a raid.

Most of these actions had raid like characteristics, but none were truly raids. All except the subsidiary
operations will be discussed later because they are so raid-like.

From this short aside, it is evident that raiding doctrine was not well defined at the start of the Second
World War in infantry manuals and publications, and it was certainly not very practical or realistic in cavalry
publications. Also, military men and the observers of military actions were not unanimous in their use of the term raid. It was applied often to operations which were
not true raids. Because of this, the definition stated will be used as the standard for deciding what actions will be called raids.

THE RAIDERS

There were many raiders: combatants and non-combatants, infantrymen and cavalrymen, rangers and commandos, Alamo Scouts and native scouts, paratroopers, marines, sailors, intelligence and espionage agents, guerrillas, and combinations of all of them. The raiders knew no national limitations. They were Americans, Australians, Britishers, Europeans, Filipinos, fuzzy-wuzzies, and mestizos of many races. Christians, Moslems, Buddhists, and pagans fought side by side as the Allies stalked the enemy. These were the raiders, men and women and some children who were devoted to one cause, the destruction of the common foe, the Japanese.

This is their story!
Notes for Chapter I: Paradise, War, and the Raiders

1. To get a feel for the jungle and the environment see any good account of the war in Papua and the combat around Buna and Gona. Excellent descriptions of the environment are given in: E. J. Kahn, G. I. Jungle (New York, 1943); Raymond Pauli, Retreat from Kokoda (Melbourne, 1958); and Osmar White, Green Armor (New York, 1945).


3. Joint operations involve two or more services of one nation. Combined operations involve forces from two or more nations.

War

This section is based on all the sources read.

Raiding Doctrine


5. In "Downer, "Cavalry Commandos," 39, a photo caption reads "Cavalry commando patrol make their way through dense woods at night by compass bearing." I do not doubt the author's attachment to his cause, but I doubt his common sense.

6. This desire to hold on to the horse and horse mounted cavalry is shown clearly in Hawkins, "The Missions of Cavalry in Modern War." Hawkins stated that "At the very least, a cavalry corps should be a component of every field army," 41. [His own italics]. Colonel Albert E. Phillips, "U.S. Horse Cavalry Girds for War," The Cavalry Journal (May-June 1941), 9, wrote: "Man hasn't yet made the machine
that will replace the foot soldier, the pack artilleryman, and the American Mounted Cavalryman." Major General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., "The Wider Role of Cavalry," The Cavalry Journal (January-February 1941), 2-8, also made some interesting comments. He wrote:

Horse cavalry must be judged today by its perfected organization, by the power of its arms and by its battlefield mobility. If there is one lesson that the actual battle experiences of the present war [in Europe] has clearly shown, it is the rebirth of Cavalry as a powerful combat force.

7. I found no theoretical articles in the Infantry Journal during the period 1941-1945 which covered raids. Toward the end of the war and after its end there were several articles about actual raids.

8. War Department, Infantry Field Manual 7-5, Organization of Infantry, The Rifle Battalion (Washington, 1940). This appears to be the first manual about the rifle or infantry battalion. There was nothing in the manual about raids.

9. War Department, Infantry Field Manual 7-20, Rifle Battalion (Washington, 1942) superseded FM 7-5 (1940) with changes (cited in note 8). The information about raiding found in the 1942 manual is also found virtually unchanged in the succeeding War Department publication, Field Manual 7-20, Infantry Battalion (Washington, 1944), 179-184.

10. FM 7-20 (1944), 179. Same as in FM 7-20 (1942).

11. FM 7-20 (1944), 180. Same as in FM 7-20 (1940).


13. War Department, Infantry Field Manual 7-10, Rifle Company, Rifle Regiment with Change 1 (Washington, 1942) and its successor War Department, Field Manual 7-10, Infantry, Rifle Company, Infantry Regiment (Washington, 1944), 91-93. The last manual is identical to the earlier one in most all references to raiding.

14. FM 7-10 (1944), 92. A similar passage is found in FM 7-10 (1942).


18. The only references to raid patrols occurred in an off-handed manner in FM 7-10 (1942), 249-250, and FM 7-10 (1944), 291-292, in the training notes section of both manuals. Here the careful reader will find the following title: "Night Patrol (Raid)." War Department, Field Manual 72-20, Jungle Warfare (Washington, 1944), 89, speaks of patrols, but does not mention raid patrols.


20. Ibid., 141.

21. Haig, "Organization of Guerrilla or Raider Unit," and "Partisan Warfare," [Editorial Comment]. A more complete article is Fred J. Wilkins, "Guerrilla," The Cavalry Journal (September-October 1941), 22-25, speaks of the need for intelligence about enemy vulnerabilities, sufficient troops, good plans, rehearsals, best use of difficult terrain, and surprise.


23. Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Combat Notes, Number 7 (May 1945), 3.

24. Eighth Army, Commanding General, Report of the Commanding General Eighth Army on the Nasugbu and Bataan Operations, Mike Six and Mike Seven [n.p., 1945]. See the Foreword.


CHAPTER II: A MAJORITY OF THE RAIDERS

Anyone making a quantitative study of raiding in the Southwest Pacific would probably conclude after examining all of the combat records that the majority of the raids conducted were made by small Allied patrols and by the Japanese.

Patrolling was constant in the war that the Allies waged against the Japanese. Because there were so many patrols it is impossible to record all of them, but from the ones that were examined there were many raid patrols. These actions, however, were not always designated raid patrols. It was the goal of this survey to see if such patrols actually were executed because raid patrols have become an important tactic for small units in the United States Army.

No story of raiding would be complete without mentioning the raiding activities of the enemy. In this war, the Japanese gained fame for their suicide, banzai, and infiltration tactics, and these characteristics applied to their raids. Like the Viet Cong who have become renowned for their ambushes, the Japanese were equally renowned for their unique raids, and because they were so different than those of the Allies, the Japanese raids deserve attention.
Most of the American division and regimental histories mention raids which were made by combat patrols everywhere the units fought. Australian histories also mention the many raids made by their patrols. These actions like those of the Americans took place everywhere conventional Australian formations deployed. This section covers only a few of the American raid patrols.

Many of the American actions were not planned raid patrols, but rather they were extemporaneous affairs which took place behind Japanese lines when a patrol found an enemy unit, outpost, or installation, and then without being discovered, attacked it and withdrew. These unplanned raids could be called raids of opportunity.

Seldom are these opportunistic operations called raid patrols. It is, however, clear from analyzing the reports of the actions that the patrols did raid, but that the raids were not planned.

Guerrillas working with the Thirty-Third Infantry Division (The Golden Cross) provided an example of such a raid of opportunity. While bedding down for the night on a mountain top in North Luzon, the Filipinos spotted movement nearby. Their patrol leader, a man named Dulay, took twelve men and went out to investigate just as dusk descended in the mountains. The guerrillas split into pairs and closed in on the hilltop where the movement had
been observed. Finding a small group of Japanese there, Dulay and his men attacked with knives and rifles and killed eleven enemy soldiers who manned what was determined to be an observation post.

Another patrol on New Guinea in July 1943 reported that along the Komiatum Track they had found ten Japanese soldiers sleeping in a hut at dawn. Quickly organizing an attack, the patrol assaulted the outpost, killed all the enemy, and then continued on its way. In a similar action, a patrol from Company F, Thirty-Fourth Infantry Regiment fighting in the Ormoc Valley of Leyte on 18 November 1944 "surprised a group of fourteen Japanese preparing their noon meal and killed the entire group without loss to themselves."

This opportunistic raiding was common in the theater, and it was characteristic of the enemy to set himself up for such actions. The reports of the 302d Reconnaissance Troop, First Cavalry Division after both the Admiralty and Leyte-Samar Campaigns mention this Japanese peculiarity. The 302d's patrol leaders observed that "Patrols had great success in surprising the enemy during meal times. Their security was generally superficial and too close to the main body for maximum protection."

Records of the First Cavalry Division showed that patrols raided when they had the chance to do so, but seldom were they called raid patrols. No other division records were examined in detail, but it is presumed that
similar actions occurred because the First Cavalry Division saw considerable combat in all areas of the theater.

To find out if American units did send out raid patrols, a division and brigade commander and a regimental and battalion commander, both of whom served in two divisions, were interviewed. Also a veteran of a regimental reconnaissance platoon and another veteran non-commissioned officer, both of whom served with the First Cavalry Division in the Admiralties, on Leyte, and on Luzon, were questioned. All the men said that the term raid patrol was not used, and the tactic of raiding was not common. A commentary from Guam also was explicit in excluding any mention of raid patrols. Due to this evidence it may be risky to call many patrol actions raid patrols, but if the definition of a raid is applied carefully to combat patrol actions, many of the patrols which attacked the Japanese were truly raid patrols.

There were planned raid patrols, but again, the Americans seldom called them raid patrols. A First Cavalry Division history spoke of a "raiding patrol to Catbologan, [Samar]," but the original Eighth Cavalry Regiment report called the action a "raiding party." It is probable that the cavalrymen called any planned raid, a raid, and did not differentiate between a raid made by a patrol and one made by another force.

A very non-typical cavalry raid was made by the Seventh Cavalry Regiment (Garry Owen) patrol on the night
of December 1944 in the mountains of Leyte. The troopers of George Custer's immortal regiment "...taught the Japanese a lesson in infiltration. [They] wormed their way through a strong enemy perimeter, knocked out two machine guns, killed four of the enemy, and retired to their own lines without having received a scratch." This is a raid in its purest form, but Major B. C. Wright, the division historian, did not call the action a raid.

Other divisions reported similar actions. The Thirty-First (Dixie) Division spoke of patrols which were given the missions of "destroying enemy supply dumps, and in a specific case of destroying food, ammunition, and large quantities of gasoline at [an airfield]." A 185th Infantry Regiment Patrol from the Fortieth (Sunshine) Infantry Division was told to "...render inoperative the mine control station" reported to be on nearby Inampulagan Island. A similar mission was given to a patrol from the Eighth Cavalry Regiment when it was sent out on Christmas Day 1944 to destroy an enemy observation post on Leyte.

These reports are a sample of the material found on raid patrols in the unit histories. There is a paucity of information in these histories, but if the combat records of the First Cavalry Division are indicative, there were many patrol actions which could be called raids. It is reasonable to assume that other unit journals, operation reports, and patrol reports, would be similar to the
cavalry division's.

This subject was just touched upon to see if raid patrols were actually used in the theater. Because these actions have been stressed in recent army training programs, especially in the United States Army Ranger School, the raid patrols made in the theater provide excellent examples of how the tactic can be used best in jungle war. One fact is interesting: few if any of these actions took place at night.

Patrols raided in the Southwest Pacific; however, many of them were not planned as raid patrols.

All these actions required the highest standard of small unit leadership, initiative, and performance, especially those which could be called raids of opportunity.

JAPANESE RAIDERS

Japanese forces raided continually in the theater. They attacked most often at night to destroy outposts, artillery positions, command posts, and other vital positions. Since the Japanese were fighting on ground which they knew, were masters of infiltration, and were oblivious to the risks incurred in some of their suicidal actions, they seriously threatened many allied units with their fierce and diabolically clever actions.

Practically every unit history, American and
Australian, and every unit report mentions a multitude of enemy raids. One group of raiders struck Brewer Task Force's Headquarters on Los Negros in the Admiralty Islands in a well publicized action. Only the intrepidity of several headquarters officers and soldiers saved the command post. Near Aitape, New Guinea, Eleventh Corps reported that enemy suicide parties tried to destroy American artillery by infiltrating the positions at night and using demolitions to demolish the howitzers. Similarly, the Seventh (Hourglass) Infantry Division history reported a raid by the enemy against Battery B, Forty-Ninth Artillery, on Shoestring Ridge, Leyte. The Forty-Third Infantry Division and others also reported raids on their artillery positions, but the Forty-Third also noted that the Japanese consistently raided bivouac areas to harass and tire the front line troops. As the Thirty-Seventh (Buckeye) Infantry Division so succinctly reported: "The Japanese persist in the use of small infiltration parties, and banzai charges by small groups of suicide troops. Adequate security must be maintained particularly at night."

A raid plan, found in the notebook of a deceased Japanese soldier, outlines a typical enemy raid. The translated extract reads:

A Plan for a Surprise Raid:

1. Personnel and Equip[ment]:

1 rifle with 30 rnds of ammo and 3 handgrenades per man.

2 kg of powder charge with slow-burning 3 sec fuze.

1 bottle of gasoline and matches per man.

Emergency rations for 4 days plus 2 meals of rice.

The unit will work in 3 small groups.

2. Tentative period of operation:

3 Mar/45 to 7 Mar /45/.

3. Objective of this raid:

The suicide penetration party will seek out and destroy enemy troops and supply dumps in vicinity of San Isidro and the University of the Philippines.

From the comments of American units and Sixth Army's intelligence report on combat on Luzon, this was the type of small unit attack which commonly struck Americans during the campaigns in the Southwest Pacific.

When American troops landed on Luzon the Japanese commanders had withdrawn their troops from the low lying areas and had planned to fight the invaders in the mountains. Because of overwhelming Allied air and fire power, as well as superior armor forces, the Japanese felt that they could not meet the attacking units under favorable conditions in the low terrain. It became evident to American commanders that the Japanese could only conduct limited offensive operations, and these actions were mostly raids. A final report states:
It is not surprising, then, that the only planned offensive action by the Japanese on Luzon, was a series of infiltration raids, launched from strongly-held defensive positions.

Infiltration groups were given a variety of names, such as: "Raiding Units", "Suicide Penetration (Kirikomi) Units", "Harassing Units", and "Special Attack Forces". These groups operated mostly at night, with varied objectives, in a effort to destroy our fighting strength. Missions often were very general, but most of the time the enemy concentrated on destroying aircraft, tanks, artillery and mortars, and bridges. Only the alertness of the veteran units prevented the Japanese from being more successful with their raids.

Something interesting developed as the enemy raids were examined. Because of the nature of Japanese operations, suicide attacks, banzai attacks, and night infiltrations, American soldiers often called these actions raids, when in fact, they were just unsuccessful attacks. From the defender's point of view, therefore, small unsuccessful attacks can appear to be raids because the enemy strikes and withdraws.

Perhaps then raids should be analyzed from both the defender's and the attacker's points of view. This would be most important in examining patrol actions, because patrols normally withdraw whenever they make contact with an enemy force they cannot handle. To the defender, the patrol which attacks his position, to probe it or destroy it, may seem to be a raiding force.
Japanese raiders should be remembered as the accounts of Allied raids are presented because it is obvious that the jungles and islands of the Southwest Pacific provided the same opportunities to the enemy to raid as it did to the Allies. Japanese raided often. They raided ferociously. They raided suicidally. Unlike the Americans, they raided mostly at night. During the final battles on Luzon, raiding was the only offensive capability the enemy still had. By then, a minor tactic had become a major one, and this illustrated how desperate the Imperial Japanese Army had become and how close to defeat it was.
Notes for Chapter II: A Majority of the Raiders

Allied Raid Patrols

1. The following division histories were examined: First Cavalry, Sixth Infantry, Seventh Infantry, Eleventh Infantry, Twenty-Fourth Infantry, Twenty-Fifth Infantry, Thirty-First Infantry, Thirty-Second Infantry, Thirty-Third Infantry, Thirty-Seven Infantry, Thirty-Eighth Infantry, Fortieth Infantry, Forty-First Infantry, Forty-Third Infantry, Seventy-Seven Infantry, Eighty-First Infantry, Ninety-Sixth Infantry, and the Americal. Regimental histories examined were: Seventh Cavalry and Twenty-First Infantry. Original reports of the Thirty-Seven and Thirty-Eighth Infantry Divisions and extensive records of the First Cavalry Division were also surveyed. Most of these accounts contained some references to raids, raid patrols, or operations which could be called raids or raid patrols.

2. For Australian raid patrols see: G.avin Long, The Final Campaigns (Canberra, 1963), 119-120, 126-127; and Dudley McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—First Year, Kokoda to Wau (Canberra, 1959), 439.


6. Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "Blocking the Ormoc Road," Combat Notes, Number 6 (20 April 1945), 45.


8. Interviews with Major General William C. Chase, USA, Retired (formerly the Commanding General of the First Cavalry Brigade and the Thirty-Eighth Infantry Division); Colonel William E. Lobit, USA, Retired (formerly a squadron commander in the First Cavalry Division and a regimental commander in the Thirty-Eighth Infantry Division); and former sergeant and later lieutenant B. T. Cwin, Jr., of the Twelfth Cavalry Regiment's Reconnaissance Platoon. Letter from former Staff
Sergeant Jack D. Langley, Fifth Cavalry Regiment to author, 6 August 1969.

9. Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "Patrolling on Guam," Combat Notes, Number 6 (20 April 1945), 17-20.

10. Major Bertram C. Wright, The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II (Tokyo, 1947), 93.


12. Wright, 1st Cavalry Division, 92.

13. Ibid.

14. Thirty-First Infantry Division, History of the 31st Infantry Division in Training and Combat (Baton Rouge, La., 43, 45.

15. Fortieth Infantry Division, U. S. Army 40th Infantry Division; The Years of WW II, 7 Dec 41 - 7 Apr 46 (Baton Rouge, La., 1947), 123.

16. First Cavalry Division, Eighth Cavalry Regiment, Participation in the Leyte-Samar Campaign. See: "Patrol Report, 25 December 1944," 2. Patrol was from Troop A.

17. United States Army Infantry School, Ranger (Fort Benning, Ga., 1947), 1, 11, 13, 17 talks of raids in ranger training.

Ranger-type operations are overt operations conducted mostly at night in enemy held territory.... Such missions as combat raids to include air-landed, air-evacuation or water-borne raids, combat patrols, ambush patrols, and reconnaissance patrols are typical Ranger-type operations. 1.

Japanese Raiders


21. For several enemy raids see: Thirty-First Infantry Division, History, 69, night banzai raids; Thirty-Third Infantry Division, The Golden Cross, 154-155; Fortieth Infantry Division, Years of WW II, 137; Jan Valtin (pseudonym for Richard Krebs), Children of Yesterday (New York, 1946), 13, 68, 73, 75-78, 93, 105, 114-115, 185, 196, 288-289, 348, 391-392, raids and raid like actions; Stanley A. Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington, 1948), 82-83; and for Australian reports see Long, Final Campaigns, 287, 376-378, 300-301, 424, 429-430.


25. Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Enemy on Luzon, An Intelligence Summary (APO 442, 1945), 38-47.

26. Ibid., 21-22.

27. Ibid., 39.

28. Ibid., 40.
Outside the strategic corridor from Australia to the Philippines stand the Solomons on the east, and Borneo, Celebes, the Indies; and many smaller islands to the west. Except for the southern Solomons and the mainland of Asia, all these areas were within the Southwest Pacific. In each area Allied raiders fought the Japanese.

Few conventional forces operated outside the corridor: American marines and soldiers and Australian forces in the Solomons; and Australians and Dutchmen in Borneo. Raiders from these forces began striking the Japanese in the Solomons early in the war and were still harassing the enemy in the islands at the end of the war. Other raiders from conventional units operated in Borneo after May 1945 when Australian and Dutch forces began invading that large island.

Irregular or unconventional soldiers conducted most of the raids which occurred outside the corridor. Guerrillas and partisans organized and fought the Japanese in southern Borneo, Sumatra, Timor, and in the Solomons. Some of their activities will be covered briefly in this chapter, but the guerrilla raids on Timor are presented in the next chapter.

The most active raiding force was the Allied Intelligence Bureau's Special Reconnaissance Department (SRD). The AIB was the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) of the
Southwest Pacific and it was heavily staffed with British, Australian, and Dutch personnel. The bureau was affiliated with Great Britain's clandestine Special Operations Executive (SOE), and on some occasions performed missions for the SOE or other British agencies. The Philippine Regional Section of the AIB was primarily American, and as its name implies it concerned itself with actions in the Philippines.

While primarily interested in strategic intelligence, AIB agents also raided. Espionage or sabotage raids were a forte. They penetrated every nook and cranny of the theater and seldom failed to infiltrate their objectives. Known to the world best for the work of their coastwatchers during the battle for Guadalcanal, for the exploits of such men as Charles "Chick" Parsons and Jesus Villamor who entered the Philippines to assist in organizing and supporting the guerrillas there, and for two daring raids on Singapore, the AIB agents were remarkable unconventional warriors.

In addition to their individual exploits as raiders, spies, and saboteurs, the men of the AIB organized and directed guerrillas throughout the theater and fought their nearly private wars in the Solomons, New Britain, and Borneo.

To form the mosaic of raiding in the theater, in this chapter the raiders who operated outside the main combat areas are described briefly. First, the conventional and
unconventional raiders, both Americans and Australians, who attacked the Japanese in the Solomons will be mentioned. Then their compatriots to the west of New Guinea and the Philippines will share the spotlight. Finally, the two most remarkable raids of the war, attacks against Singapore, will complete the story of raiding by the forces which did not make the main attack to the Philippines.

THE SOLOMONS

Some of the most terrible jungles in the Southwest Pacific were encountered in the central and northern islands of the Solomons. Formerly German, a British Protectorate at the start of the war, the Solomons became the battleground for many bitter and hard fought campaigns. Memorialized in Guadalcanal Diary, the "Ballad of Rodger Young," and the stories of the intrepid coastwatchers, the islands were the scene of many raids.

Admiral William Halsey commanded the American invasion forces which attacked the islands which were in the Southwest Pacific Area, but neither he nor his troops were under the command of General MacArthur. The general gave the admiral only strategic directions for the campaigns; the troops, ships, and supplies came from Halsey's naval commander in Hawaii, Admiral Chester Nimitz. This strange command arrangement worked successfully because MacArthur
and Halsey, both aggressive fighters, developed and maintained an immense respect for each other and were both dedicated to a common goal, the destruction of the Japanese.

United States Marines made the only strategic raid of the Solomons Campaigns when they attacked the island of Choiseul to divert the enemy's attention from the impending American invasion of Bougainville. Recently retired marine lieutenant general, Victor Krulak, led his reinforced Second Parachute Battalion, First Parachute Regiment onto Choiseul on 28 October 1943. Krulak, then a lieutenant colonel, was a small man with a big nickname, "Brute," one which he still uses. Once ashore, Krulak did everything possible to attract the enemy's attention. His marines raided the Japanese position near Sangigai on the south-central coast of the island, but this action and others failed to impress the enemy commander. Judging that the attack on Choiseul was a diversion, the Japanese prepared to meet the expected American assault on Bougainville.

Krulak's raid, tactically successful, was a strategic failure. Unhappily, this irony occurs often, but it should not stop commanders from using raids to attain strategic goals.

Another marine parachute battalion, this time reinforced with a raider company, splashed ashore at 4:00 a.m. 29 November 1943 at Koiari Beach, Bougainville to raid
and disrupt the Japanese line of communications which ran along the coastline of Empress Augusta Bay. The marines, unfortunately, landed in a Japanese supply dump area which was filled with enemy troops, and once the Americans were recognized they were immediately attacked. Recovering from their initial surprise, the Japanese drove the marines into a tight perimeter on the beach and then tried to destroy the raiders with heavy attacks. Major Richard Fagan, the raid commander, faced with possible annihilation asked for immediate withdrawal, but it was many hours before small boats could reach the beach and evacuate the major and his men. Only a stubborn defense, heavy shelling of the enemy by long range 155mm artillery, direct fires from LCI gunboats (landing craft infantry), and fire support from destroyers allowed the marines to survive and withdraw. Inexplicably, the withdrawal was unopposed in the last few minutes. It was completed by 8:40 p.m. Fifteen Americans were killed in the action and ninety-five more were wounded.

Planned without sound intelligence, the Koiari raid was nearly calamitous. Nothing stresses the need for intelligence better than this action.

Marine actions are often highlighted when talking about the Solomons, but many army divisions also fought there. Soldiers from the newly trained infantry divisions raided, and the best accounts of army raids are found in the excellent history of the Americal Division. Organized
from several units on nearby New Caledonia, the Americal began its combat history in the Solomons.

One raid of opportunity made by troopers from the Americal was particularly amazing:

On November 14 [1943] the [164th Infantry Regiment's Intelligence and Reconnaissance] Platoon departed for an intensive search of a series of hills which lay some ten thousand yards east of Mom Hill. On the following day a group of about fifteen Japanese was observed in an unidentified native village in the area. Visual contact was maintained with the Japanese while the village was scouted from all sides.

The small patrol was reinforced by the arrival of men from Company H on November 16 and plans were made for an attack on the unsuspecting enemy. Confident that his attack would go well, the patrol leader brazenly held a "dry run," following which an exacting critique was held.

In the pre-dawn darkness of the following day, the troops stole quietly into assigned positions, completely surrounding the village. On a pre-arranged signal all men opened fire and for a few brief seconds the roar of guns was deafening. Then, as suddenly as the fusillade began, it stopped. Not a single shot was fired in return by the Japanese for none of the twenty-three found dead in the village lived long enough to raise their weapons.

Another company from the 164th Infantry executed a sparkling action near Sisivie, Bougainville. Company B left its trail block position earlier and bivouaced about two thousand yards from Sisivie. The bivouac became a base camp the next day while patrols located and scouted a large enemy camp nearby. Early on 3 August a platoon from the regiment's Antitank Company joined Company B, and after attack plans were published, the Americal soldiers moved out and surrounded the enemy camp by 9:40 a.m.
After a few anxious and quiet moments the raiders opened fire, stunning the enemy momentarily. Once engaged the Americans noticed that the enemy camp was larger than reported and held at least a company. Intensifying enemy fires soon began striking the raiders and they soon were heavy enough to force the Americans to withdraw. In the brief engagement, one American officer was wounded while approximately thirty-seven Japanese were killed and many more were wounded. The raiders could not see inside the huts and could not estimate how many other enemy soldiers they had hit.

Americal raiders were not unique. Many similar actions were conducted by all the army divisions. Each division history reports interesting raids by patrols and other parties.

Many raids were conducted in the islands after the American units withdrew and Australian formations assumed the mission of holding and clearing the Solomons. A patrol led by Lieutenant L. F. Goodwin surprised and killed several Japanese near a small village and a creek deep in the interior of Bougainville. Another patrol under Lieutenant F. A. Reiter raided a ridge, appropriately named Reiter's Ridge, to harass the enemy. The Australians grenaded the Japanese position and left three huts blazing on 28 March 1945. Sixty Indian prisoners had been rescued by a raiding force and on one occasion a raiding party captured a lone Japanese prisoner. In
another pair of actions in gardens on Bougainville, commando sections attacked and destroyed several Japanese in January 1945. Patrolling continued in the Solomons and it was natural that raids were made by these small groups as they traversed the jungled areas looking for small enemy forces to capture or annihilate. Because commando units were part of the Australian command in the Solomons, they could be counted on to raid often since surprise attacks were a specialty of these expert infantrymen.

In addition to the conventional warriors who raided the Japanese there were a number of irregular groups who killed their fair share of the enemy. These guerrillas were organized by coastwatchers and other members of the AIB, many of whom operated constantly behind enemy lines. Some of these irregulars had helped Krulak's marines on Choiseul. By the end of the war there were several irregular units: Kennedy's guerrillas, Ysabel guerrillas, and the Choiseul guerrillas. One of the raids made by these forces was reported by an AIB member:

During the period all field parties increased their guerrilla activities, scoring some sizable "bags" in Bougainville [in June-July 1945]. One particularly good bag was when 195 Japanese were ambushed whilst tending to their wounded from a previous strike, their arms being neatly piled by their huts, the sentries were first dealt with and the exercise was rudely interrupted by the guerrillas opening fire with Brens and automatic weapons whilst those nearest the huts lobbed grenades through the doors and windows, all were exterminated. Our casualties
caused great rejoicing amongst the guerrillas, the news spreading to the surrounding districts had excellent effect on native morale throughout the surrounding areas.

While not a very ethical action, most guerrillas actions during the last months of the war were more reprisals than attacks, the raid was quite successful.

These few raids, made by regular and irregular units, were representative of all the actions which took place in the Solomons and were typical of the similar actions which harassed the Japanese throughout the theater.

BORNEO, CELEBES, THE EAST INDIES, MALAYA AND FRENCH INDOCHINA

West of the main line of attack from Australia to Philippines, Australian and some small Dutch forces struck three areas: Tarakan, Brunei Bay, and Balikpapen, near or on Borneo. The invasions came in May, June, and July 1945, but even though the end of the war was imminent, many bloody actions were fought. Apparently the Australians were intent on utterly destroying the Japanese they found because they were constantly assaulting with seeming disregard for their own casualties. For the first time in the war the Aussies had overwhelming firepower to support them, but they often chose not to use it. Probably because of these constant and vicious attacks and in spite of the many patrols which prowled the hinterland of Borneo,
the official history of the Australian Army provides practically no reports of raids. One was mentioned, but although the raid commander was told to attack a small village as a diversion, the raid was never made.

With commando units, veteran raiders, and many battle tested infantry units among the invading forces, it is most probable that there were many raids in the short Borneo campaign. This must be presumed, however, because the few sources consulted did not mention the usual amount of raids that Australians normally reported in their earlier campaigns.

Dutch and Australian guerrillas operated on Borneo, most of them being members of the Allied AIB's Special Reconnaissance Department. On 20 May 1945 a native party raided a Japanese headquarters, and although they killed no enemy soldiers they seized a safe and many documents. Another AIB guerrilla force under Captain Sutcliffe, found and attacked thirty Japanese near Aling on 8 June 1945, and even though they were met with heavy fire, the raiders killed twelve enemy soldiers.

The other raids which struck the enemy in the Celebes, the East Indies, and the coast of mainland Asia were made for the most part by the operatives of the AIB. There were guerrillas in Java and Sumatra, but their actions

*No known first name or initials.
there are not known. Study of Dutch sources would be helpful, but they are unavailable.

A long record of the various raids is found in the records of the AIB. These show that raiders tried and failed to attack Timor twice in June 1945. Many other planned raids were scheduled to attack such diverse places as Koepang and Dili on Timor; Ambon and Boela in Ceram; and Taberfahe in the Aroe Islands. Due to problems of transportation all of these actions were cancelled.

Several unique AIB actions were consummated. One raid was aimed at the island of Tahoelandang which stands forty miles northeast of Celebes, and it was designed to destroy a crashed American Ventura bomber with secret instruments aboard, rescue some European refugees, "deny to the enemy the use of native luggers by removing them to Morotai," and evacuate native boat builders who were needed to build boats so that other AIB agents could use them to penetrate the same area. Called Giraffe I, the successful operation was commanded by Major A. E. B. Trappes-Lomax who was prominent in other AIB actions. Two American seamen were among the raiders. The follow-up operations, Giraffe II and III, completed the work of the first action by bringing out the native boats.

Another action, a "snatch raid" rescued the Sultan of Ternate under the noses of the Japanese in the islands Southwest of Morotai. Late in the war, AIB parties operating in conjunction with Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's
Southeast Asia Command raided into French Indochina to cut railroad lines and destroy some shipping. Raids were also directed at the critical Malaya-Siam-Burma railroads.

Of all the raiding activities that took place in Borneo, Celebes, the East Indies, surrounding small islands, and along the coast of the Asian mainland, three are most important. They were the actions of the Australian and Dutch guerrillas on Timor and the two amazing raids which were made against the enemy ships in Singapore harbor. The Timor story will be covered in the next chapter and the Singapore raids will be discussed in the next section.

Unfortunately, except for the raiding on Timor and the raids against Singapore, the rest of the comparable actions have not been reported in detail. Therefore, Timor must serve as the vivid example of guerrilla actions in this part of the theater, while the Singapore raids are the epitome of the covert attacks which intelligence agents conducted during the war.

THE DOOMED TIGER OF SINGAPORE

Singapore, the fallen fortress, was a magnet for raiders who aimed at destroying the ships which always were sitting deep in the water at the many docks and anchorages in the great port. Two of these raids,
Jaywick and Rimau, were probably the most ambitious actions of their type in the war.

Both were conceived and executed under the command of an English army officer, the late Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Lyon of the Gordon Highlanders. These actions were waterborne raids, had naval targets, and were made by Australian and British soldiers, sailors, and marines. Jaywick, the heroic and successful action, and Rimau, the tragically unsuccessful operation, serve as excellent case studies for determining when and how to conduct strategic raids.

Ivan Lyon was an obsessed man in 1942. His main desire was to return to Singapore to strike the Japanese who had driven him and his British comrades out of Malaya. An expert yachtsman, Lyon thought that he could infiltrate the defenses of Singapore in small canoes, move unnoticed to enemy ships, attach time-delayed limpet magnetic mines to their superstructures below the waterline, and then withdraw from the harbor. Lyon proposed to reach Singapore's environs by traveling on a captured Japanese coastal vessel, and once the raid was completed he and his party would return to Australia on the same vessel.

His concept was so daring that it was nearly foolhardy, but Lyon was not to be denied, and after lobbying among friends and officials in Australia he was finally given the permission and the means to conduct his surprise attack on Singapore. In the bleak days of 1942 when the Japanese still held most of the Pacific and Asia, Lyon
must have provided a spark of hope and a glimmer of glory to the victory starved Allies in the Southwest Pacific. It was probably the need for some spectacular success, like Doolittle's air raid on Tokyo, that persuaded the high commanders to approve Lyon's Jaywick.

Lyon selected his men carefully and put them, soldiers and sailors, through intensive training for nearly a year. The captured Japanese vessel, renamed the **Krait**, was also refitted with a new engine and other necessities for the long voyage from Australia to Singapore and back. Lyon's personal motives for the attack were intensified because his wife and daughter were prisoners of the enemy. One of his officers, Lieutenant Robert Page, AIF (Australian Imperial Forces), had a similar incentive. His father, a high official in New Guinea, was also a Japanese prisoner. Other men had their own reasons for being on the mission, but most seemed to be the adventurous types who seek and enjoy such dangerous, demanding, and secretive action.

On 2 September 1943 the raiders left Australia aboard the **Krait** and sailed north into the Java Sea flying the rising sun flag of Japan. They had a relatively uneventful voyage, if travelling incognito through enemy seas is uneventful, and penetrated the Rhio Archipelago where the six raiders left the **Krait** on 18 September. Weakened by sixteen days at sea, the men with Lyon spent some days ashore regaining their strength and stamina, and then
Route of the "Krait"

Operations}

7 Sept 1943
16 Sept
21 Sept
4 Oct
12 Oct

 Alessio, Poonchee Gt.
Baker Patrol Base
Attack Singapore
Leave Poo Base
Clear Langape Sea

Sketched from National Geographic Map, Pacific Ocean, 1:6,500,000 (Washington 1939)
paddled their black silk canoes, called folboats, to an attack position in the vicinity of Singapore. The Krait, meanwhile, had returned to the multitude of small islands off of Borneo to cruise aimlessly until it was to rendezvous with the raiders on 1 and 2 October.

Six raiders in three black canoes slipped into Singapore Harbor during the night of 26-27 September and moved to several ships in the different anchorages. The men managed to attach their magnetic limpet mines below the waterlines of several freighters and one tanker without being challenged. One party was seen by a Japanese sailor while they were placing their mines on one ship. Luckily, the Japanese did not sound an alarm. After each party had placed their mines, they withdrew as they had come, and paddled for different rendezvous points outside the harbor. Lyon and the three men with him heard the mines explode around dawn, and they believed that all the charges detonated properly. Exhausted, they fell asleep.

More exhausting and exciting days followed before the six raiders were safely back on the Krait. One crew made the first rendezvous on 1 October, but Lyon's four man group missed the rendezvous and had to wait one more day before they made the second planned link-up. The Krait sailed for Australia on 2 October and arrived home seventeen days later.

Jaywick was an extraordinary raid. It had been based on excellent intelligence, tremendous training and
preparation, and had benefitted from dynamic leadership. One flaw, however, was not detected, and that was Ivan Lyon's insatiable desire to attack Singapore. Jaywick did not satisfy Lyon, and soon he was scheming for a larger attack, one which would hit several harbors simultaneously. The scope of the raid was reduced, however, and Singapore again became the target for Lyon's energies.

The new raid was called Rimau, the Tiger, and coincidentally, Lyon had a large tattoo of a tiger's head on his chest. For this second raid, Lyon had a larger party. He planned this time to enter the Java Sea by submarine and capture a native junk which was to be used like the Krait had been. Once close to Singapore, the raiders were going to enter the harbor and attack the ships there using two-man submersible undersea craft named Sleeping Beauties. These craft moved through the water like porpoises and, according to one commentator, they were unreliable machines. After the raid, Lyon and his men would rendezvous with a submarine several weeks later, and then would return to Australia.

Everything went according to plan until the raiders neared Singapore in their captured junk. There, for some unexplained reason, someone aboard the junk fired at a native police launch which came out to meet the raiders' boat. Lyon aborted the mission immediately because he felt that it was compromised. The raiders withdrew, destroyed their junk and the secret Sleeping Beauties, and moved to
their assembly and rendezvous areas by folboats.

No rendezvous was ever made with the submarine. The raiders evaded the Japanese for some time, but the submarine did not make the first pick-up date. When the submarine did arrive, the raiders were nowhere around, but the rendezvous party knew from an inspection of the area that the raiders had been there once.

Whether it would have helped if the submarine had arrived on time is a moot point because all except eleven of the raiders had been lost or killed in the islands between Singapore and Australia by that time. Eleven men were captured by the Japanese. One died in captivity, and the remainder were executed by the enemy after being convicted by a court-martial for violations of the rules of land warfare. Sadly, the men were killed about a month before the war ended. Ivan Lyon did not die by a samurai sword, however, because he was killed in the early skirmishes with the Japanese search forces.

If Rimau were really necessary, and especially if it had been timed to strike the ships in Singapore just as the American Sixth Army assaulted Leyte in the Philippines, then it might have been worth the effort. No writer and no report said that Rimau had a strategic purpose of this importance. One gets the impression that Rimau was undertaken because of Lyon's drive and initiative and his obsession with Singapore, an obsession which subjugated important considerations like the untrustworthiness of
the Sleeping Beauties, the hairbrained scheme of piracy, and the long delayed time for rendezvous. Most importantly, Lyon overlooked the reluctance of many of the Jaywick veterans to join Rimau. These veterans who went on Rimau did so in loyalty to Lyon, but Lyon let his men down by concocting a poorly conceived mission.

Jaywick succeeded because of a great amount of hard work, gallantry, and luck. Rimau was doomed because it was not as well planned, had too many "ifs" in it, and was staggered by bad luck. The confidence of the raiders, obvious in Jaywick, was lacking in Rimau. Lyon, who surely must have understood the risks he was taking, did not develop the same esprit among his men in Rimau as he had in Jaywick.

Soldiers must know when to raid and when not to raid. Personal desires may have a place in operations when they coincide with necessary missions, but they should not be the driving force for unnecessary actions. Impossible missions like Jaywick and Rimau can be successfully executed, but all possible errors must be eliminated or avoided. Jaywick succeeded because errors were minimized. Rimau failed because too many errors were built into it. Ivan Lyon was responsible for both and deserves the praise for his success and criticism for his failure. So do his subordinates and superiors. Lyon's operations present significant lessons for all raiders. Both should be studied.
Much of the raiding done by the AIB has not been publicized. Only Lyon's activities have been written about extensively. The few examples mentioned give a taste of the type of espionage raid which the AIB sponsored. Unlike most of the other raids in the theater, these actions were conducted by soldiers and sailors who, if captured, were denied the protection of the rules of land warfare and who expected to be executed by their captors.

Ivan Lyon was the epitome of the unconventional soldiers who regardless of the risks involved attacked the Japanese as violently and as often as they could before they were killed. His raids and the others of the Allied Intelligence Bureau were some of the most colorful and heroic in the Southwest Pacific.
Notes for Chapter III: Outside the Corridor


3. Rentz, *Bougainville*, 114, feels that the raid did draw enemy forces to Choiseul and thus forced the Japanese to be off-balance when the main American attack hit Bougainville. T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito (eds.), *A Military History of World War II with Atlas, Volume II, Operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific Theaters* (West Point, N.Y., 1950), 341, agree. On the other hand, Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul*, 204, say that the diversion to Choiseul was clearly seen by the Japanese commander and he was not deceived by it. Miller, *Cartwheel*, 241, agrees with Shaw and Kane. I believe that the official marine historians, Shaw and Kane, and the official army historian, Miller, have sounder judgments because they wrote at a later date and had more sources available to them.


Stanley A. Frankel, *The 37th Infantry Division in World War II* (Washington, 1948), 138, writes about a "raiding party" to Kuraio Mission which was led by Major John E. Frick.

8. These raids are described in Gavin Long, *The Final Campaigns* (Canberra, 1963): 120-121 (raid patrols led by Lieutenants L. F. Goodwin and F. A. Reiter on Bougainville); 126-127 (a raid under Captain R. C. Cambridge and Major R. G. Simpson captured one prisoner); 127-128 (a raid led by Lieutenant K. W. T. Bridge rescued sixty Indian prisoners at Tanimbauban, Bougainville); 145-146 (a raid by Captains C. J. P. Dunshea and R. Watson); and 200-201 (small guerrilla raids which occurred under the supervision/direction of Lieutenants C. W. Seton and P. W. Mason.

Many of the units of the Australian Army which fought in the Solomons were commanded by officers who had raiding experience earlier in the war on Timor and in the Markham Valley area of New Guinea. Lieutenant Colonel Bernard J. Callinan, veteran of Sparrow and Lancer Forces on Timor, commanded the Twenty-Sixth Battalion. Major N. I. Winning, veteran of Kanga Force on New Guinea, led the 2/8th Commando Squadron. Their earlier exploits will be recounted in the next chapter.

9. Information about guerrilla raids and operations came from General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, *The Intelligence Series*, Volume IV, *Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA* (Tokyo, 1943). See the following enclosed reports: Commander J. C. McManus, "North Eastern Area Operations, April 1943 - November 1945," which is Part B of Document XV and Lieutenant Commander H. A. MacKenzie, "Coast-Watching in the South Pacific Area, 1 June 1942 to 21 April 1943," which is Document XVII. [Hereafter the reports of McManus and MacKenzie will be cited without reference to the document in which they were found.]


Seton also talks about guerrilla activities in his area. C. Harmon Gill, *Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945* (Canberra, 1968), 232n, 331, 634, also mentions Seton and his actions. Strangely, Gill lists Seton as a sergeant in the Australian Army in one part of his book and as a captain in the same force in a different reference.
11. MacKenzie, "Coast-Watching in the South Pacific Area," 30 (growth of guerrilla forces), 31 (activities of Kennedy's guerrillas), 32-33 (the Choiseul guerrillas), and 33 (the Ysabel guerrillas).


Borneo, Celebes, the East Indies, Malaya, and French Indochina

13. This is the impression I got from reading Long, Final Campaigns.


15. GHQ, USAFP, MIS, GS, Intelligence Series, Vol. IV, Operations of the AIB. See Document XXV which is a separate report entitled: "The Official History of the Operations and Administration of "Special Operations Australia" (SOA) Conducted under the covername of "Services Reconnaissance Department," (Melbourne, 8 March 1946). [Hereafter cited as "Official History of SOA" without reference to the document in which it was found.] Reference to this Australian report is confined to its own Volume II, Operations, which is the only part of the report appended in Document XXV.

See, 100, for information on the native raid on Trusan.

16. Ibid., 101.

17. Selden Menefee, "Guerrillas of the Indies," The Cavalry Journal (March-April 1945), 54-57. Menefee mentions raids on New Guinea by Dutchmen or their colonials, but speaks briefly about guerrilla actions on Sumatra and in southern Borneo.

18. "Official History of SOA," 50, see the Sundog raid.

19. Ibid., 89-91, see the aborted Falcon raid. Falcon was conceived in August 1943 and envisaged simultaneous attacks on thirteen enemy bases located in an area from Timor to New Ireland by a parachute striking force.

20. Ibid., 190-192, see the Giraffe I operation. Also see Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau (New York, 1958), 262. Ind mentions the requirement to extract several Europeans, but does not speak of the seizing the native luggers. The SOA history mentions the mission of taking the luggers, but not the one of evacuating the Europeans.

22. Ibid., 201-203, covers Opossum. See also: Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, 262-263.

23. "Official History of SOA," see: the 5th, 8th; and 9th patrols of the Politician-Optician operation, 222-224. The 5th patrol which was scheduled to attack the railroad between Tourane and Saigon was aborted. The 8th patrol went ashore and laid charges on the same railroad, and also executed a "demolition raid" against the Honan Maru near Hondo! Island. The 9th patrol also raided the railway near Tourane Bay.

24. Ibid., 230-231. See: the Period operation.

Period was a "coup de main" operation and its objective was to cause the maximum disruption to vital rail traffic between Malaya and Burma/Siam at a time when it would most effectively assist the strategic situation of the theatre. 230.

The raid was never executed.

The Doomed Tiger of Singapore


Connell and Mckie wrote complete books on the two raids. Mckie's seems to be the more thorough account, but Connell has more information about Ivan Lyon and the Sleeping Beauties, the craft used on Rimau. Neither author mentions the other although they used many of the same sources and published in the same year. Mckie, an Australian, emphasizes Australian participation in the raids, and Connell, an Englishman, emphasizes English participation. Mckie is more critical of Lyon than is Connell.

My comments on the two raids are a brief distillation of all the material found in the sources mentioned, but mostly they are based on the two books.
26. Canoes had been used by the British Royal Marine Commandos to raid German shipping in the Gironde River in France in 1942. See: James D. Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines (New York, 1959), 89-113. The story is covered in the chapter entitled "War in a Canoe." Another account is called "Cockles and Muscles: Operation Frankton," and is found in Burke Wilkinson, By Sea and By Stealth (New York, 1956), 71-89.

27. Connell, Return of the Tiger, 183-211 feels that the Sleeping Beauties were satisfactory craft. McKie, The Heroes, 210, disagrees:

Rimau volunteers regarded the training S.B.'s as inefficient and dangerous, but when more modern operational craft, for the raid itself, arrived at Garden Island, these were even more unimpressive and so full of new "bugs" that they were almost unmanageable.

The following description of the Sleeping Beauties is found in the narrative portion of GHQ, USAFP, MIS, CS, Intelligence Series, Vol. IV, Operations of the AIE, 19.

The newest of these [small submarines], the motor submersible canoe (MSC) was a steel canoe, decked in, and driven by a small electric motor. Batteries were housed in a sealed compartment. Ballast and trim tanks enabled the craft to submerge. Under water, the craft was controlled by hydroplanes and rudder, an amazing maneuverability being achieved.

28. McKie, The Heroes, 261-296. The ten raiders were convicted for:

- (1) not wearing regular uniforms
- (2) conducting espionage by sketching naval vessels seen enroute to Singapore
- (3) killing two or three Malays on the police launch while flying the Japanese flag.

The last item (3) was crucial, and it was a correct, legal charge. Article 40 in War Department, Field Manual 27-10, U. S. Rules of Land Warfare (Washington, 1944), 11, states that the use of enemy flags is a legal ruse as long as they are discarded before combat is started. In the Rimau operation, the raiders opened fire while flying the Japanese flag.

The problem of uniforms is an interesting one. Perhaps, raiders who work deep in enemy territory should be provided special uniforms with a minimum of distinctive insignia. For instance, the United States could allow its
raiders to wear any type of clothing without insignia, but would require that a "green beret" or other simple device be worn at all times as a special international badge of identification.

29. McKie, The Heroes, 205, states that the second operation like the first one was conceived by Ivan Lyon. No one states what the strategic requirements were for Rimau. The report on Rimau found in "Official History of SOA," 215, states that the plan for Rimau originated in Great Britain in August 1944. This is unconfirmed in other sources. That late in the war, Rimau would only make sense if it was scheduled to coincide or support a major operation like the invasion of Leyte in the Southwest Pacific Area or a similar attack along the Burma or Malaya coasts by the Southeast Asia Command forces. No such relationships were mentioned. More information is needed on the strategic requirement for Rimau, and also for Jaywick.


31. Someone else had an obsession with attacking Japanese shipping in Singapore beside Ivan Lyon. In July 1945 a toy submarine attack was launched by the British against the port. Two of the submarine raiders won the Victoria Cross, Britain's highest decoration for valor, for their actions on the raid. See: Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, 219-239, and Wilkinson, By Sea and By Stealth, 134-137.
CHAPTER IV: THEY NEVER SURRENDERED

As the victorious Japanese forces swept the Allies from the Southwest Pacific only small isolated groups of angry men and women and unsurrendered soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen remained to fight against the enemy. From this human reservoir, guerrilla bands formed. In some areas small commando units were sent in to begin or sustain guerrilla activities. Other places found small militia units or decimated regular forces carrying on the battle. These forces continued to strike the Japanese in the only ways possible: they raided, ambushed, assassinated, and conducted sabotage.

Initially, the guerrillas were not supplied from Australia, but after radio contact was established with the Allied Forces there, supplies were sent in to the guerrillas as soon as it was possible. In some areas the supplies came in with little difficulty, but in others this activity was nearly impossible during the war. Reinforcements seldom joined the fighters behind enemy lines, but in many areas intelligence operatives were able to aid the guerrillas.

Australian commandos and local militia and home-guard units conducted guerrilla warfare in Timor, New Guinea, New Britain, and toward the end of the war in the Solomons. Dutch guerrillas operated on Timor also and throughout the Indies. Some were active in northern
New Guinea. Guerrillas from the Allied Intelligence Bureau became active on Borneo and New Britain. These movements were all different, but they had one thing in common: generally they were quite small.

In the Philippines the largest and probably the most important guerrilla movement developed as Filipino patriots, opportunists, and bandits joined Americans, Europeans, and Chinese in attacking the Japanese. Valuable in harassing the enemy during the occupation, many of these units became major combat formations after the Americans returned.

The contribution of all these guerrilla units to the final victory was immense, but it has never been evaluated theater-wide. Reports of each guerrilla movement have been published in isolation from all the others, and therefore it is difficult to find one history of the guerrillas in the Southwest Pacific.

This chapter presents a sketch of guerrilla raiding, not complete guerrilla movements, in four different areas within the Southwest Pacific. One section, Sparrow Force's harassment of the Japanese in Portuguese Timor, covers raids which took place outside of the main attack corridor from Australia to the Philippines. It is included because it spotlights a movement that succeeded at first but then failed. The other three sections review Australian actions in New Guinea, and New Britain, and the guerrillas in the Philippines. One peculiarity is notable about Australian guerrilla actions: only on New Britain did native guerrillas
operate under their own leaders in combat. In all other cases, Australians either led all-native units, or their guerrilla formations were entirely Australian or European. This is the drama of the four groups of guerrillas who raided in the theater and never surrendered.

A YEAR OF HARASSMENT ON TIMOR

Shortly after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor the Australian government, worried about future attacks on its nation, deployed small formations to several locations along an arc from Timor on the north to New Caledonia on the northeast to protect vital areas. Timor, a small, dry, mountainous island, stood at the east end of the Melanesian Barrier a scant three hundred miles from Darwin, the nearest large Australian town. Because it had two airfields, one at Koepang in Dutch Timor, and one smaller one at Dili in Portuguese Timor, the island was strategically important. With these airfields in the hands of the enemy, Japanese bombers could easily reach Darwin and other Australian towns.

Deployment of the Australian troops to Timor had been complicated because the island was divided between Holland and Portugal, and London had to negotiate the matter with both governments. Furthermore, Portugal was neutral and weak and could not be relied on to resist Japanese
occupation of her colony. The occupation of Portuguese Timor, no matter how benevolent, threatened the ultimate security of the Dutch colony to the west. The Dutch Government consented to the dispatch of Australian troops, and once they arrived the Dutch and Australians sent troops to occupy Dili, capital of the Portuguese possession.

A battalion group composed of the 2/40th Battalion and the 2/2 Independent Company with smaller detachments, commanded by Colonel W. W. Leggatt, reinforced the two hundred and thirty Dutch troops in Koepang. Just after the Australians arrived, Major A. Spence's 2/2 Independent Company was sent to Dili with some Dutch soldiers. With deployment completed the two thousand man force, called Sparrow Force, commanded by Brigadier W. C. D. Veale, an Australian, prepared to meet the enemy's onslaught. Colonel N. L. W. van Straten commanded the Dutch forces.

Four days after Singapore capitulated, Japanese amphibious and airborne troops struck Koepang and Dili, and within four days had forced the surrender of the major part of Sparrow Force in Dutch Timor and had driven the Allies who had occupied Dili into the nearby mountains. Sometime later the unsurrendered remnants of the Allied units in Dutch Timor reached the mountains of Portuguese Timor where the commandos of the Independent Company had started to wage guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. Brigadier Veale and Colonel van Straten remained with
Sparrow Force until May when they were evacuated to Australia.

For nearly two months the men of Sparrow Force had no contact with the outside world, but finally on 20 April 1942 using a jerry-rigged radio which the signalmen had built, the guerrillas flashed a message to Australia:

FORCE INTACT. STILL FIGHTING. BADLY NEED 6 BOOTS, MONEY, QUININE, TOMMY GUN AMMUNITION.

The radio, dubbed "Winnie the War Winner," brought hope, a firm mission, and supplies. Seven days later the first bombers dropped supplies to the isolated guerrillas, and these were followed by additional supply drops as well as by air raids against vulnerable Japanese targets.

Allied Land Forces in Australia told the Sparrow Force guerrillas to remain on Timor and harass the Japanese. While promising supplies, the headquarters could not promise reinforcements. In June, General MacArthur said that while an invasion was a long way off, he wanted the guerrillas to continue to harass and sabotage the Japanese on Timor. At the same time, he directed his subordinates to plan to evacuate Sparrow Force if the enemy made a concerted drive to destroy the guerrillas.

On Timor the Japanese tried to talk the Aussies and the Dutch into surrendering, but the Allies although in poor health were determined to fight on. They had a special incentive for staying out of the enemy's prison
camps because they knew how poorly the Japanese had treated other prisoners. When the Allies would not surrender, the Japanese labelled them outlaws, called them bandits, and declared that when captured the guerrillas would be executed.

Fighting as best they could from the start, the new guerrillas sniped, ambushed, and raided killing Japanese whenever and wherever they could find them. Given a harassing mission from Allied Land Forces, they made no attempt to hold ground and continued to conduct operations to kill as many Japanese as possible.

Raids played an important part in the guerrilla war and they were generally successful. Raids were small affairs, but they were numerous, and constant. Every week two or three raids were conducted and these killed on the average from five to fifteen Japanese each. Enemy casualties mounted and more importantly enemy morale was depressed.

Major B. J. Callinan, a veteran guerrilla, the original second-in-command of the 2/2 Independent Company, then its commander, and later the commander of Lancer Force, wrote about the effects of the raids.

Japanese soldiers told natives that the Australians were devils who jumped out of the ground, killed some Japanese and then disappeared, whilst their officers complained that though they had been fighting them for months, many had never seen an Australian....

As these pin-pricking raids of ours continued, the Japanese came to blame us for
everything that happened, and this is the pinnacle of success for a harassing force. It is a state of mind induced by numerous fruitless endeavors to deal with an enemy who seems to be able to deal a blow anywhere at any time, but who remains elusive.\textsuperscript{12}

Typical of these small raids was one conducted by Sergeant H. E. James and two men from the Independent Company. The sergeant found a small Japanese outpost and reconnoitered it with his party for two days. The commandos stayed within one hundred yards of the position, examined the exact routine of the enemy, and decided to assault at breakfast on the third morning. When they opened fire on the Japanese the commandos killed twelve of them and then ran off unhurt into the bush.\textsuperscript{13}

There were even smaller actions. In one, an Australian lieutenant disguised as a native entered a Japanese occupied village. He went into a house in which thirty enemy soldiers were sleeping, grenaded it, fired at the Japanese who fled from the billet with his sub-machine gun, and then withdrew. Another one man raid took place when a commando dressed up in a sarong, blackened his face and body, and then with a sub-machine gun concealed under his garment he walked into an enemy controlled village. He moved up to a group of loitering Japanese, whipped out his tommy gun and killed several. The corporal, like the lieutenant, escaped unhurt.\textsuperscript{14}

There were unsuccessful raids. On one occasion a section was planning to attack a Japanese position which
it reconnoitered without being detected. That night, however, the guerrillas were in a nearby village which the Japanese attacked. Caught by surprise the Allied raiders were scattered and the raid was never executed. Another time the guerrillas were planning to capture a Japanese officer because Australia wanted a prisoner. Everything was going well as the raiders crept up to a water hole where the officer was bathing. Unfortunately, the officer had another soldier with him, and when the raiders opened fire and killed the escort they alerted the other Japanese in the area. Enemy fire was hot and heavy and the raiders were forced to retreat quickly carrying a wounded com-
patriot with them.

Sparrow Force guerrillas made their largest raid against the enemy in Dili on the night of 15-16 May 1942. Their purpose was to distract the enemy from the south coast of Timor where the guerrilla bases were and to force the Japanese to focus their attention on the port of Dili. Major Geoffrey Laidlaw, then a platoon leader, led the raiding party of twenty men into Dili from the nearby town of Remexio to attack the three thousand enemy troops in Dili. His force was composed of Lieutenant T. G. Nesbit's section of his platoon and several other men.

Leaving Remexio on the afternoon of the 15th, the raiders were in position at dark and "...with blackened faces and wearing rubber patrol boots, [they] crawled through the barbed wire and the perimeter defences, and,
undetected, reached the main street. At the head of his men, [Major Laidlaw], shot dead a Japanese sentry at a machine-gun post. That was the signal to open fire and the commandos blazed away with Bren and tommy guns from the shelter of buildings and street gutters. In the general confusion, the Japanese, firing wildly, shot some of their own men. The raiders kept up the fire for about ten minutes and then at approximately 1:15 a.m. on the 16th they withdrew under the covering fire from Lieutenant H. J. Garnett's party on the nearby beach. All the raiders escaped and the confused Japanese did not pursue.

By June 1942 the Allied guerrillas had stung the Japanese often and caused them an untold amount of trouble. In September, the 2/4 Independent Company arrived to reinforce its sister unit, and it looked as if guerrilla warfare could be continued for a long time on Timor. The Japanese, however, had decided to eliminate the guerrillas and after building up their combat forces they slowly and steadily converged on the guerrilla base areas. Even with outside assistance, the recent reinforcements, and air strikes, Sparrow Force could not prevent the Japanese from achieving their ultimate goal. After the enemy coaxed or coerced the Timorese to oppose the guerrillas and after they interned most of the Portuguese inhabitants, the Japanese were prepared to finally clear the guerrillas
It was obvious to Sparrow Force that the unequal struggle could not continue for long. On 17 November Lieutenant Colonel Spence, the Commander of Sparrow Force, was evacuated to Australia and Major Callinan took command of the guerrillas on Timor. Callinan's command was renamed Lancer Force. Within four weeks, the exhausted 2/2 Independent Company, Dutch troops, and Portuguese refugees were taken out to Australia, and Lancer Force was seriously weakened. The remaining guerrillas were now nearly ineffective because they could neither penetrate the Japanese positions nor gain much intelligence, and furthermore they could not defend their own areas.

In January 1943 Australia ordered Callinan and his men evacuated by ship, and three days after the order was received the guerrillas were steaming toward Darwin.

A twenty man party commanded by Lieutenant Harry Flood was left on the island to gather intelligence along with another intelligence outfit, "Z" Special Force. Flood's guerrillas, designated "S" Force, (the British seem to have a passion for special names) were soon attacked and scattered by the enemy and during one combat lost their precious radio. Luckily, they were able to join "Z" Special Force which still had a radio, and once together the two parties requested immediate evacuation because they were no longer effective. On the night of 11-12 February 1943 the last of the Allies paddled a single
rubber dinghy out to the USS Gudgeon, boarded the submarine, and left for Australia.

During the year of guerrilla warfare on Timor the Australians and the Dutch killed over one thousand Japanese, lost only forty of their own men killed, and tied down about twenty thousand Japanese on the island. The raids and other small harassing actions so worried the Japanese that they deployed additional troops into nearby islands because they believed that the guerrilla actions on Timor were a forerunner to impending Allied attacks into the East Indies from Darwin. The Allies never invaded Timor or the East Indies so the Japanese deployments were in vain. In 1945 the Australians accepted the surrender of the enemy in Timor aboard a corvette in Dili harbor.

Major Callinan drew two important lessons from his experiences on Timor. First, guerrilla operations can never occur without the support of the population. Second, guerrillas must operate in an area where there is a surplus of food, because only with enough food will people support a guerrilla force.

There is a sequel to the story of Sparrow, Lancer, and "S" Forces. The Allies were never able to penetrate Timor during the remainder of the war. Party after party from the Allied Intelligence Bureau disappeared because the Japanese were in complete control. This was a sad conclusion to the inspiring campaign which the Dutch and Australian guerrillas waged for one year on Timor.
LIMITED OFFENSIVE: KANGA FORCE IN NEW GUINEA

While Sparrow Force guerrillas were harassing the Japanese on Timor the militia-like troops of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR) began guerrilla operations against the Japanese forces which had landed at Lae and Salamaua and were moving into the Markham Valley. In April and May 1942 the activities of the NGVR guerrillas included several small meeting engagements, ambushes against the Japanese and enemy raids against the guerrillas. After being hurt by some of the NGVR actions the Japanese reacted violently and, through terror and reprisals reminiscent of similar acts on Timor, attempted to deprive the Australians of much of their native support. Many of the natives, however, remained loyal to the Australians; and they were invaluable allies in later activities.

Strategically, the Bulolo Valley, a gold mining area, and the Markham Valley provided the Japanese with an important flanking position from which they could move south into Papua and from which they could launch air strikes against the Allies. Major airfields were located at Lae, Salamaua on the coast, Wau, in the center of the Bulolo goldfields, and at Nadzab, fifteen miles west of Lae in the Markham Valley.

In April General Sir Thomas Blamey, the Allied Land Force Commander and the Commander in Chief of the
Australian Army, decided to build up a special force around the NGVR units. The 2/5th Independent Company which was trained and on duty in Port Moresby was chosen to join the NGVR and other small units in the Wau area. The combined guerrilla forces were called Kanga Force and General Blamey hoped to use them to attack the enemy's air bases at Lae and Salamaua. Additional headquarters and support complements were organized from Australian formations at Port Moresby.

On 1 May General MacArthur suggested to General Blamey that "...ground raids be initiated against Lae and Salamaua to destroy enemy installations and if possible, to occupy the airfields." If the airfields were captured, Allied fighters would fly in immediately and begin advanced air operations against the Japanese from them. Because MacArthur's concept of a "limited offensive" coincided with the planning of Blamey and his generals, General Blamey concurred with General MacArthur's suggestion. Realistically, the Australian Commander did not believe that the key airfields could be captured, but raids were definitely possible.

Once the two generals agreed to deploy Kanga Force to raid in New Guinea, the only problem which remained was how to transport the reinforcements into Wau. General MacArthur told his air chief, Lieutenant General George H. Brett, to fly in the Australians, but due to the dangerous Japanese thrust through the Coral Sea to
New Guinea no aircraft could be immediately provided. In addition, the 2/5 Independent Company was needed in Moresby until the Japanese threat was reduced.

Finally on 23 May 1942, after the Battle of the Coral Sea stopped the imminent invasion of Port Moresby, the first Kanga Force troops flew into Wau. Eight days later the Independent Company was deploying into the Bulolo Valley and Kanga's mortar platoon and headquarters were established in Wau. In command of the new force was an inexperienced, twenty-five year old major, N. L. Fleay, and his responsibilities were immense. With a total force of seven hundred, of which only four hundred and fifty were effective, Major Fleay had to fight the two thousand Japanese at Lae and the two hundred and fifty at Salamaua. His mission required that he attack Lae and Salamaua, but at the same time he had to protect his base at Wau because it had the only airfield in the area which was still in friendly hands. Other supplies and equipment besides those that came in by air had to come overland across the difficult and exhausting Owen Stanley Mountains. Major Fleay decided to raid the two main towns, rest some of the NGVR units which had been active since the enemy landed, and deploy the majority of his men to cover the Bulolo Valley north of Wau.

Local NGVR guerrillas had been watching both Lae and Salamaua for some time and they had been told to do nothing to disrupt the mission of Kanga Force. During the next few
weeks the information which the NGVR scouts provided the Australians was to be invaluable for their raids.

In Wau, Major Fleay planned three raids. The first one was to strike Heath's plantation, seven miles west of Lae on the Markham Valley Road, because the Japanese garrison there was a block to any future attack on Lae from the west. Next, a raid was planned against Lae to test its defenses to see if a large attack was possible and also to destroy aircraft and installations at the air-drome. Lastly, an attack was to be sent against Salamaua to demolish airfield installations, dumps, and a radio station. Once the raids were planned, Major Fleay ordered his subordinates to attack Heath's Plantation and Salamaua; Major T. P. Kneen, commanding the Independent Company drew the mission against Heath's while Captain N. I. Winning, his "C" Platoon Commander, and Captain D. H. Umphelby, the NGVR Company Commander; received the other mission.

The raid on Salamaua was skillfully executed but there were some initial problems. Major Fleay, unfortunately, failed to designate a raid commander so both Captain Winning, who commanded the Independent Company troops detailed for the action, and Captain Umphelby, who led the NGVR guerrillas assigned to the raid force, thought that they were the overall commander. Fleay resolved the problem quickly and gave the command to Winning. Also, while the raiders were moving up to the objective, supplies became critical and the operation was halted for a short
time. The additional troops in the area overtaxed the small NGVR supply dumps scattered in the countryside, and the troops had to wait until additional supplies could be man-carried to them from other dumps. Supplies arrived one day before the troops moved to the Salamaua area.

Before the raid was planned Sergeant J. B. McAdam and his NGVR scouts reconnoitered Salamaua and located the enemy strongpoints, weapons positions, important buildings, and trails. The raiding force had marched on 10 June to its first base at Nubo, a town twelve miles to the south of Salamaua. From there Captains Winning and Umphelby reconnoitered the objective and concluded that there were three hundred Japanese troops in the area rather than the two hundred and fifty previously estimated. Two days later on 17 June, Captain Winning and Sergeant McAdam went north again, infiltrated the airdrome and then moved farther north to reconnoiter Kela where the radio station was located. On this trip, the two men found a new area for the raiders' base camp three miles south of Salamaua and then located an assembly area for the attack at an old campsite at Butu which was between the airdrome and the Francisco River.

With excellent knowledge of the enemy and his positions, Captain Winning drew up his plans. A sand table was built, all the enemy positions were plotted on it, and the raiders were briefed. While these activities were
taking place in Mubo, scouts were sent back to Salamaua to watch the area to see if the enemy did anything which might indicate that he knew an attack was imminent. The Japanese took no new actions and apparently were completely unaware of the presence of the Australians, but the wary raiders continued to reconnoiter the area right up until the time the forces moved into position for the attack.

Originally, Captain Winning had planned to use Mubo as his raiding base, but finding himself too far away from the objective, he moved his force to Butu on 27 June. There his supplies finally reached him, and there on the afternoon of the 27th and all day on the 28th he had his troops rehearse the raid plan. Rehearsals were important because the raiders were a composite force, some had not seen combat before, and the attack plan was rather complex.

Six separate parties were to attack different objectives from Kela Point on the north to Salamaua airfield on the south while a mortar party was to support the attack from the coastal village of Logui which was east of the airfield. All groups were to be led into their assault positions by guides who knew their routes thoroughly, and each of these routes approached the objectives from the west. The terrain demanded this peripheral attack because the target area was about two thousand yards wide and five thousand yards long, and between Kela and the airfield there was a large swampy area. It was
A Fifth Air Force photo of the terrain in the Salamaua area. Troops of the 41st Division landed at Nassau Bay, made a junction with the Australians at Bitoi Ridge in the Muba sector, and moved toward Komiatum along the Francisco River.
A Fifth Air Force photo of the terrain in the Salamaua area. Troops of the 41st Division landed at Nassau Bay, made a junction with the Australians at Bitoi Ridge in the Muba sector, and moved toward Komiatum along the Francisco River.
a complex maneuver, but the individual missions were relatively simple.

Starting from the north, Lieutenant C. M. O'Loghlen and eight men were to destroy the Japanese and their houses at Kela Point. Below the point in Kela a ten man party under Corporal W. M. T. Hunter was to assault the bakery and nearby enemy soldiers while Captains Winning and Umphelby led six men against a sentry post. Lieutenant J. C. Leitch with five raiders was to move into Kela with the captains' group and attack a house which stood just west of the radio antennas. These antennas and associated radio equipment were to be demolished by the two engineers and the four other soldiers who were led by Sergeant W. O'Neill. O'Neill's party also had to blow up the coastal bridge which crossed a tidal swamp on the road from Kela to Salamaua.

Lieutenant J. S. Kerr commanded the eighteen raiders, the largest party, who were ordered to destroy several red roofed Japanese billets and the headquarters building at the Salamaua airfield. The last group, a mortar party, was to seal off the Japanese march route out of Salamaua by bombarding the narrow neck of the isthmus where the coastal roads from Kela and the airfield intersected. Lieutenant W. Drysdale, who was killed in action three months later, led the eleven man mortar party. This group was to withdraw when Captain Winning fired a prearranged pyrotechnic signal.
Each raiding force was to begin the attack at 3:15 a.m. 29 June. To make sure that everyone was in position for the assault, Captain Winning planned that starting at 2:00 p.m. 28 June the different parties would depart Butu at staggered times. After the raid was completed the raiders would rendezvous at Butu and then move back in one body to Mubo.

One major change occurred during the planning. At first it was hoped that the raiders could actually enter Salamaua and air raids were scheduled to batter the defenses on the isthmus. The first air raid was poorly executed and a second daylight air attack never was made. Therefore, the ground attack into Salamaua proper was eliminated.

Commandos of the Independent Company made up the majority of the force; three engineers, eleven mortar-men, and two eighteen man sections. Umphelby's NGVR guerrillas formed the remainder of the force. All the raiders were well armed. Each soldier carried two grenades, and a pistol and the riflemen had sixty rounds of ammunition while the sub-machine gunners carried one hundred and fifty rounds. Lieutenant Drysdale had one mortar and limited ammunition and the Independent Company soldiers were also armed with two Bren guns and six sub-machine guns. Make-shift demolitions and flares were carried for some of the demolition tasks, but special charges were prepared for use on the coastal bridge and the radio antennas.
Heavy rain drenched the objective area early on the night of the 29th, but as the weather cleared a bright moon rose and illuminated the targets. Each party slowly moved into position as the attack hour approached. Shortly after 1:40 a.m. one of Corporal Hunter's men shot and killed the alert sentry at the Kela bakery and triggered the attack. Following the first shot, Hunter's soldiers killed the remainder of the Japanese in the building and in the action one Australian was wounded.

Lieutenant O'Loghlen's men were just crawling into position when the attack began. They had been delayed by barking dogs and had had to abandon the planned land approach to Kela Point and instead approached their objective from the sea. Quickly, the raiders grenaded and destroyed two houses in which they thought there were Japanese soldiers, then shot the survivors, and threw flare-bombs into eight or nine other houses. O'Loghlen estimated that three of these last houses were destroyed, but the flare bombs did not ignite in the others. The party withdrew when Japanese machine gun and mortar fire began striking Kela Point. One Australian was wounded, but the party managed to withdraw successfully taking three rifles and one sub-machine gun with them. They left behind an estimated fifteen Japanese dead.

In Kela proper, the captains led their men toward the sentry post, but it was unoccupied. Moving on aggressively, they killed all the Japanese they saw and then turned south
and linked up with Sergeant O'Neill's party. Unfortunately, O'Neill's men had not been able to destroy the radio antennas because the charges failed to detonate. They were more fortunate at the bridge. Just after the demolitions were emplaced, Japanese mortar fire struck and detonated them, destroying the structure. One engineer was wounded as enemy machine gun fire began to sweep the road.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Leitch's force entered Kela between the captains' party and Sergeant O'Neill's and accomplished its mission. After grenading and destroying their assigned house, the sub-machine gunners who had posted themselves at opposite corners of the house killed twenty fleeing Japanese.

At Salamaua Airfield, the premature firing from Hunter's group caught Lieutenant Kerr's force moving into position. The Japanese quickly manned their defensive positions, but this did not deter the raiders who just as planned attacked and detonated their explosives in their assigned buildings. The Australians then opened fire with Bren guns and traversed the guns across the entire airfield area. As the Japanese sent reinforcements to the airfield, Kerr's soldiers were forced to withdraw. Retreating the raiders tried unsuccessfully to burn down the hangers, and then finally at dawn they left the airfield because of intensified enemy pressure. Lieutenant Kerr delayed his movement back to Butu when he found that four of his men
were missing. He sent a detail back to look for the four men, but they were not found. The lieutenant then led his men back to Butu and arrived there at 5:00 p.m. 30 June.

While all these actions were taking place, Lieutenant Drysdale's mortar shelled the southern edge of Salamaua with thirty-six rounds and destroyed one enemy strongpoint and an estimated fifteen enemy soldiers. The mortar fire was stopped prematurely about 4:00 a.m. when Lieutenant Drysdale mistook two red flares which were fired by the Japanese at the airdrome as Captain Winning's signal to withdraw. It was none too soon, however, because enemy mortars began falling near the party. When Drysdale's men approached the deep and dangerous Francisco River they ditched the mortar so that they could cross the river with less difficulty.

All the raiders, except Lieutenant Kerr's were in Butu by 11:00 a.m. on the 29th, and about an hour later Captain Winning marched his force south to Mubo. The retirement was covered by Lieutenant E. P. Hitchcock's NGVR force positioned just south of Butu. No Japanese forces pursued the raiders so Hitchcock's guerrillas saw no action. The following day all of the raiders including the four previously missing had assembled in Mubo, and the Salamaua raid was finally over.

Only three raiders had been wounded, none killed or missing. Captain Winning, soon to be known as the
"Red Steer", became a legend in his unit for his combat exploits. He reported that approximately one hundred enemy soldiers were killed and six houses, three trucks, a bridge, and a bicycle had been destroyed. Some small arms, documents, and miscellaneous equipment, about the first Japanese equipment the Australians had found, were captured. Every mission had been accomplished except that the radio antennas were not destroyed.

When the Japanese finally reacted to the raid they found and destroyed the Butu camp, sent strong patrols to scour the area, shelled the jungle around the objective and had their aircraft strafe the escape routes. They reinforced Salamaua with over two hundred soldiers and fortified Kela Point, but the work was in vain as far as Kanga Force was concerned. The guerrillas never attacked Salamaua again, but the Allied force which finally assaulted the town had a tough and bitter fight.

Several mistakes were made on this raid: scouts did not report the dogs at Kela Point; the home-made flare-bombs and demolition charges were unsatisfactory; and Lieutenant Drysdale mistook an important signal. Two major points are open to criticism also. First, the raiders should have concentrated on the airfield and the radio station with most of their forces. Other points should have been attacked only to divert the Japanese away from the main targets. Second, the two captains should not have been with the same party and, more importantly, the
commander should have been with the major force, presumably at the critical objective. But, for a first effort by a new, composite guerrilla force, the Salamaua raid was remarkably successful.

While Captain Winning and his raiders were attacking Salamaua, Major Kneen was planning his raid on Heath's Plantation. His first troops had moved from Bulolo on 10 June and marched into the Markham Valley and joined the NGVR guerrillas. The remainder of Kneen's company left Bulolo on the 13th and joined the initial force in the valley. Unlike the high and rugged Mubo area, the Markham Valley was low, swampy, and malaria infested, but it did have a major road which ran from Lae past Heath's Plantation to Nadzab and paralleled the Markham River. The valley became the second major operational area for Kanga Force, and it had been the major area of action for the NGVR troops before Kanga Force was formed. Headquarters was established at Bob's Camp, southwest of Nadzab, below the Markham River.

Heath's Plantation, a small group of houses, was located south of the Markham Valley Road about seven miles west of Lae. Along the road, about seven hundred yards to the southeast, stood thirty to forty foot long Lane's Bridge, which crossed Bewapi Creek. Lane's Plantation occupied an area just south of Heath's on the east side of the road. Most of the Japanese garrison was expected
to be garrisoned at Heath's.

About fifteen miles northwest of Heath's the raiding party had established their base position at Camp Diddy. Many patrols had come from Camp Diddy and reconnoitered the area around Heath's. Major Kneen had inspected the target area himself and he had decided that the plantation could be best attacked from the southeast, the side toward Lae, because the ground sloped down toward the objective and would give the raiders the advantage of attacking downhill.

Major Kneen drew up simple plans. The raiders starting at Camp Diddy would move to Narakaper near the river, and then after remaining overnight there, they would continue along an overgrown trail through swamps and bush along the Markham River to a rendezvous point on Bewapi Creek. The creek then would be followed until the force neared the Markham Valley Road near Lane's Bridge, and then the raiders would turn and strike towards Heath's through a line of kapok trees on the plantation.

Three sections, each under a lieutenant, were to surround the main plantation house and once they were in position an assault group would attack in a generally northerly direction to destroy the house. The assault group would dispose of any enemy sentries encountered on the way to the objective and they would begin the attack when a member from the encircling forces threw a grenade under the plantation house. Two other parties had important
tasks: one would dispatch the two sentries at the intersection of the Markham Valley Road and the small road which ran south of the house; and the second would destroy Lane's Bridge to prevent any Japanese reinforcements from rushing into the area along the main road. Arrangements were also made for Allied aircraft to strike Lae to disrupt any countermeasures which might begin from that enemy base. Once the raid was completed, Major Kneen and his men were to withdraw in a body along the road; then after passing through a planned covering position they were to disperse throughout the area to prevent effective pursuit.

Leaving Camp Diddy at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June, the raiders carried twenty-one sub-machine guns, thirty-seven rifles, many revolvers, one hundred and sixteen hand grenades, and several explosive charges. They spent the night in Narakapor, and the following day they marched down the river track to Bewapi Creek and entered their assembly area about 4:00 p.m. Only a seemingly inquisitive Japanese fighter plane gave them some worried moments, but it soon left without attacking the column.

Once in the rendezvous area Major Kneen, Sergeant R. D. Booth, his intelligence sergeant, and two young privates, immediately left to reconnoiter Lane's Bridge and the plantation house which was barely a mile and a half away. The major and the two privates reconnoitered the bridge while Sergeant Booth went over to look at Heath's,
where, unfortunately, he had to remain for a long time because two Japanese guards came and sat on the log behind which he had concealed himself. The bridge inspection was made in proper time and the three raiders returned to the rendezvous area to await the return of Sergeant Booth. Major Kneen had planned to launch his attack on the plantation house at midnight, but when Sergeant Booth returned it was already 10:30 p.m. and the attack had to be delayed. Finally, at 11:30 p.m. the raiders began leaving their assembly area.

Moving toward the highway along the Bewapi Creek in the bright moonlight, the raiders were soon at Lane's Bridge where the two demolition men were dropped off and where Sergeant Booth for some unexplained reason was also deployed to cover the two privates. Turning as planned, the Australians struck out for Heath's. By 2:20 a.m. 1 July the three sections which were assigned to surround the house were nearly in position, but the assault group had been stopped below the drive south of the house by a barking dog. The assault group was stymied, each time the men moved the dog barked, and eventually it awakened the Japanese inside the house. One enemy soldier shouted at the dog as if to tell it to be quiet.

At this critical time, fire erupted unexpectedly. It came from the two soldiers who had been detailed to kill the sentries at the road junction. The Australians found the sentries across the road from where they had expected
to find them, and what was worse the raiders had been unable to get closer than ten yards to the sentries because the moon illuminated the area. Faced with this dilemma, the two Australians waited until they thought that all their comrades were in position, and then they shot the two Japanese.

Caught by surprise by the fire, the assault group was unable to attack and it withdrew to a ditch south of the road in front of the house, where Major Kneen had moved. From here the raiders opened fire on the house and from the groans heard inside their bullets found their marks. Escaping Japanese were cut down. The raiders on the other sides of the house grenaded it and the surrounding area. Confusion reigned. In the darkness a group of Japanese escaped because the Australians who saw the Japanese thought that they were their own assault troops maneuvering into a better position.

Enemy reaction was swift. A field gun suddenly opened fire and it hit Major Kneen in the chest after the first few rounds had gone high and landed near Lane's Bridge. An enemy machine gun was reported to be firing into the area from the other side of the Markham Valley Road. Quickly, the raiders realized that there were probably a larger number of Japanese in the area than anticipated.

Major Kneen's death added to the confusion. No one
had been designated as his successor and therefore some valuable time was lost until Lieutenant M. W. Wylie, a section commander, took command. While all the combat actions were taking place, the two demolition men detonated their charges and the bridge dropped into Bewapi Creek.

Fifteen to twenty minutes after the initial shots, the raiders withdrew carrying their two wounded comrades with them. Major Kneen lay where he fell, the first Kanga Force fatality.

Moving northwestward as planned the raiders escaped easily because the Japanese, probably thoroughly confused, failed to pursue. Between 5:25 a.m. and 6:10 a.m. Allied bombers attacked Lae, but their strikes were hindered by bad weather. Shortly after daylight Japanese fighters strafed the Markham Valley Road and also strafed the raiders as they moved through kunai grass toward Gabmatzung. No Australians were hit, however, during the retirement, and none were hit later when the Japanese bombed their rendezvous area in Nadzab.

Less impressive than the Salamaua raid, the action at Heath's Plantation killed an estimated forty-two Japanese and destroyed the plantation house and the bridge south of the objective. Major Fleay, the Kanga Force commander, claimed that the raid was a success, but the raiders had not been able to eliminate the Japanese garrison and thus the block to movement into Lae was still intact.

Mistakes were evident: reconnaissance was not good
enough; the leaders did not get to see their objectives; and the chain of command was faulty. They cost Major Kneen his life.

Japanese reactions continued after the two major raids. Villages were bombed. No enemy troops moved westward, but the Australians expecting the worst closed Camp Diddy and moved their operating camp to an area south of Nadzab, below the Markham River.

After the raids, Major Fleay ordered his forces to restrict their actions to patrolling and observation. Sickness, tired troops, and a lack of supplies caused the order. But action came often because the Japanese prowled the area looking for the guerrillas, and by the end of August the guerrillas were in a precarious position. Japanese threats caused the Australians to burn the Bulolo Valley, and then they were forced to give up the valley and their main base and airfield at Wau. Finally, Kanga Force was ordered to prepare defensive positions at Kudjeru, the starting point of the Bulldog Trail, a point twelve miles southeast of Wau. Bulldog Trail led south to Lakekamu River which emptied into the sea 150 miles northwest of Port Moresby. It was the only way out for the guerrillas if they had to retreat.

Strangely, the Japanese did not continue to attack and soon a calm settled over the area. On 1 October, a
raid on Mubo, which had been occupied by the Japanese after they drove the Australians out earlier, shattered the peace. Captain Winning led the raiders, and Major Fleay went along as a "rifleman."

Winning's intention was to approach the stronghold by way of an old overgrown trail but he could not find it in the darkness. The raiders therefore followed a track which led into Mubo from the south-west by way of high ground known as Mat Mat Hill. Lieutenant Drysdale, who was leading, was, however, wounded by a booby trap. The defenders were aroused. Another booby trap gave urgency to the initial alarm. Japanese poured out to meet the attack. Winning's men, heavily outnumbered, fell back carrying the dying Drysdale and two other wounded men. In a heroic action, Sergeant O'Neill with two or three other men blocked the enemy pursuit. O'Neill was credited with killing sixteen Japanese in one action with his sub-machine gun. The raiders, once clear of the area, broke up into small groups and evaded and escaped from Japanese reaction forces. It was several days before the men were all together again.

Australians estimated that they had caused fifty casualties, and later reports indicated that they had killed the Japanese commander in Mubo.

Three months later, Kanga Force marauders struck Mubo again in the largest raid of the guerrilla campaign. It involved approximately three hundred troops and four hundred raiders, and aimed at recapturing Mubo.

During the in between months Kanga Force patrolled and began to rebuild. Australian commanders in Papua were
not interested in stirring up the Japanese in the Wau area because they would be unable to help Kanga Force since they were bogged down in the dirty battle to clear Papua.

A newly assigned, twenty-three year old major, T. F. B. MacAdie, only two years out of Duntroon, Australia's West Point, was appointed the raid force commander. MacAdie had two years of experience at the Australian Guerrilla Warfare School, and he had arrived in New Guinea with his 2/7th Independent Company in October 1942. Commandos from his company were deployed quickly and trained in the operational area. Major MacAdie worked his men hard because he did not feel they were prepared to fight efficiently when they arrived at Wau.

Ever present, the aggressive and experienced Captain Winning joined the force as Major MacAdie's second-in-command. He was to draw the most difficult assignment, another march and attack over Mat Mat Hill.

Plans called for the raiders to surround the "echoing gorge at Mubo" with several forces. Placed on the high ground the raiders were to attack at 9:30 a.m. on 11 January 1943.

Major MacAdie with sixty men was to seize and hold Vickers Ridge, east of Mubo, while Captain N. D. Finch with forty men captured the bridge which crossed the Bitoi River and connected Vickers Ridge with Mubo.
This Air Forces photo shows the rugged terrain over which 41st Division troops fought their way to Salamaua. After the capture of Mubo and the Japanese positions on Lobaba Ridge and Green Hill, the attack moved along Bugar Creek to Komiatum, gateway to Salamaua.

**Mubo Raid**
11-12 Jan 1943

**Kanga Force**

**Overlay # 1**

**Tactical Plan**

Positions shown are approximate ones.
This Air Forces photo shows the rugged terrain over which 41st Division troops fought their way to Salamaua. After the capture of Mubo and the Japanese positions on Lababia Ridge and Green Hill, the attack moved along BuiGap Creek to Komiatum, gateway to Salamaua.
Captain Winning was detailed to occupy Mat Mat Ridge with one hundred soldiers who were to be supported by 162 carriers. Observation Hill, standing northwest of Mubo, was the objective of the fifty raiders commanded by Lieutenants W. L. Ridley and J. C. Leitch. Once in position, the Forces were to open fire on Mubo when Captain Winning fired a long burst from a Vickers machine gun.

In the "Saddle" which was about two miles south of Mubo on the Buisaval Track, Captain G. T. Bowen was to deploy his eighty-one soldiers in a covering position. Bowen, before he was killed, saw some of the most vicious action in the raid. He was assisted by Lieutenant Wylie, the officer who had led the raiders out of Heath's in July.

On 8 January 1943 the raiders moved out toward Mubo along different routes. They were allotted only two days to approach and occupy their positions, even though Captain Winning who was so familiar with the area wanted more time. Major MacAdie's party moved onto Vickers Ridge on the evening of 10 January in plenty of time to prepare for the attack the next day. Except for Winning's huge force, all the other parties also arrived in their assigned positions before the scheduled attack time.

After twenty hours of steady, hard climbing Captain Winning and his men were still short of their position. The climb up Mat Mat Hill was just too exhausting. To
make matters worse, the captain's reconnaissance party had been delayed by the flooded Bitoi River and it was unable to provide the vital information about the terrain on Mat Mat. Early on the 11th, a fog blanketed Mubo, but although it delayed the attack, the fog allowed Winning's force to get into position before the attack started.

Once on top of Mat Mat, Captain Winning was shocked to find that he could not see Mubo. Any forward movement down the ridge was thwarted by razorbacks and the exhausted condition of the raiders. There was no alternative but to open fire, so Captain Winning began firing at 1:20 p.m.

All forces joined in immediately and the raid was on. The enemy below was completely surprised when the small arms and the mortars struck Mubo. Twenty to thirty Japanese were killed in the opening minutes, and more fell as the raiders picked them off. Lieutenant Ridley's group assaulted from Observation Hill to Garrison Hill with some success, but the advance was halted by the fire from Major MacAdie's position which fell across Ridley's front.

While in contact, Lieutenant Leitch, a veteran of the Salamaua raid was killed by a Japanese sniper.

During the fire fights, MacAdie and Winning were in radio contact; but when Winning began withdrawing with Ridley's party, he did not tell the major what he was doing. Major MacAdie and Captain Finch kept their men on Vickers Ridge after the other groups had withdrawn because
MacAdie was instructed to retire only if he was in danger. Since the Japanese did not pursue, the raid commander did not feel he should pull back. It was a bold and courageous decision.

Having taken no action against the Australians, the Japanese returned to normal activities in Mubo. No enemy forces moved against the raiders on 12 January either, but late in the morning a column of Japanese troops marched leisurely into town. Their walk in the sun was rudely interrupted at about 11:30 a.m. when Major MacAdie's commandos raked Mubo with more fire. Finally provoked, the Japanese deployed towards the Australian position. MacAdie was uncertain what to do. He remained in position for some time; but after one of the messengers he sent to the "Saddle" for orders was killed and his companion wounded, Major MacAdie withdrew his force. He took his men east, climbed Lababia Ridge, and then executed a steady and successful retirement down the ridge along the Buisaval Track. The Japanese pursued in strength.

On 16 January they struck the raiders' positions in the "Saddle." The Aussies, after some very desperate fighting, made another orderly withdrawal to "House Banana," but left behind the dead Captain Bowen.

At "House Banana," the raiders linked up with Company B of the 2/6th Battalion commanded by Major J. S. Jones. This unit was the van of the Australian Seventeenth Brigade which was being landed at Wau. The raid was over; and,
coincidentally, so were the independent guerrilla activities of Kanga Force. From this time on, Kanga Force grew until it was a division-sized force. As it grew, Kanga Force expanded its operations and became one of the conventional units which were given the mission of seizing Lae, Salamaua, Nadzab, and clearing the Markham Valley and the Huon Peninsula to the north.

Kanga Force was disbanded on 23 April 1943. Major General Stanley Savige took command in the Wau-Salamaua-Lae area when his Third Australian Division entered the fight. The period of limited offensive action by a guerrilla force was officially ended.

No raid had ever struck Lae. The raids on Heath's, Salamaua, and Mubo had harassed and hurt the enemy, but they had not dislodged him. Kanga Force, like Sparrow Force on Timor, had tied down many Japanese units, but more importantly it had put some offensive spark into ground operations while the Allies in the theater were on the strategic defensive.

FERDINAND FORCE; NEW BRITAIN

Australian coastwatchers, members of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, were inserted into New Britain in 1943 to report the movements of Japanese air and naval craft. Many of these men had worked and lived in the
country before the war and were well-known and respected by the natives. Generally they were assisted by loyal native policemen who were valuable in leading the local people.

Japanese forces were large, but their main bastions on New Britain were located at the western end of the island and at the huge base at Rabaul. Enterprising agents were able to work with little interruption in the hinterlands and the mountains of the island. Because of their security, some like Malcolm Wright thought of waging guerrilla warfare once they had firmly established their intelligence organization on New Britain.

Early in 1944 after the Americans landed at Cape Gloucester and Arawe, Wright and his party requested arms to equip a hundred natives as their security force. Coastwatcher headquarters agreed and soon arms and extra rations were dropped into Wright's area, and immediately afterwards the coastwatchers equipped and trained selected men with the new weapons. The leaders for the new forces were natives or the key native non-commissioned officers who assisted the white coastwatchers.

Due to some vicious local reprisals which the Japanese conducted against native villages and selected individuals, the new guerrillas were eager for blood. The local warriors wasted little time. Small parties of Japanese were attacked in the deep jungle or in small towns, and after some initial combats the guerrillas began attacking enemy forces
on the road which ran from the west coast to Rabaul through their domain.

Ambushes were common, and occasionally the guerrillas raided. The following is an account of one raid:

Each party of Japanese was stalked through the bush until they relaxed their guard. Sometimes they halted on a hill to take a breather, or in the shade of a tree to have a snack; as they halted, they bunched together to talk or share a light for a smoke; this was the time when our guerrillas hit. One or two hand grenades, a burst of fire from the rifles and shotguns, and the action was over.

The guerrillas disappeared quickly into the bush and were seldom struck by the fire which the surviving Japanese sprayed at them. After such a raid the guerrillas could not attack further because the enemy, now fully alerted, was prepared to repulse the light attacks.

Along the same road, guerrillas under the command of a New Irelander, Sergeant Makelli, struck a rear guard of a large enemy force just after dawn one morning. Deploying quietly Makelli's natives moved into a position to the west of the town of Silanga after the enemy's main body had left. Fifty Japanese remained and, when the officer in command formed his soldiers up and ordered them to pick up their packs, the guerrillas opened fire. The first burst killed many, but additional Japanese were

*No known first name or initials.*
picked off or grenaded to death. Massed fire killed off others at the end of the fight. No guerrillas were wounded in this episode which killed thirty-seven of the Japanese.

It was a very important victory for the guerrillas because the Japanese officer who was killed had led his troops in the torturing and killing of several native leaders four months earlier. The guerrillas savored their revenge.

On the whole these were not large actions, but they took their toll of the Japanese. Wright's guerrillas, Tiger Force, killed over two hundred enemy soldiers in three months and lost only one guerrilla. In east New Britain, John Stokie with villagers armed with spears, axes, and rifles eliminated sixty-three enemy troops, and Lion Force under Ian Skinner captured a post at Palmalhal and killed twenty-three more Japanese. These were the men of Ferdinand Force.

Later the AIB Guerrillas replaced the Ferdinand guerrillas when the Japanese had been driven from the mountain areas in the central part of New Guinea. The new guerrilla force was uniformed, commanded by Australian officers and non-commissioned officers, and was a full-time unit. Unlike the earlier guerrillas the AIB men worked in conjunction with Australian formations which slowly attacked eastward toward Rabaul and which were trying to clear the island of Japanese. The new force, however,
still raided as it destroyed small enemy outposts and coastwatcher positions.

Guerrilla actions on New Britain were the most successful of the war according to Commander J. C. McManus, RAN (Royal Australian Navy), one of the coastwatcher commanders. They certainly should have been: The Japanese did not occupy the island in force and seldom conducted serious counter-guerrilla operations, and therefore the coastwatchers were free to operate as they wished in most areas. These men were also well-supported: aircraft brought in adequate supplies; air strikes could be requested easily and were conducted often on sighted targets; agents were fit and were replaced regularly; and the coastwatchers were always in contact with their headquarters. The presence of American troops and later Australian troops in the area also helped the guerrillas perform their harassing mission because the Japanese had to keep their eyes on the major units and not on the guerrillas.

Ferdinand Force faced a different situation on New Britain than Sparrow and Lancer Forces faced on Timor and Kanga Force met on New Guinea; it faced a much less difficult situation than most of the guerrillas encountered in the Philippines. But like all guerrillas in the Southwest Pacific, the primitive native warriors and their few white leaders successfully harassed the enemy with small raids. On New Britain, however, the raids were merely a side-light to the more important mission of coastwatching,
until coastwatching became an unnecessary task as Allies swept northwestward along New Guinea to the Philippines.

BEFORE MACARTHUR RETURNED: GUERRILLAS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Guerrilla raids began in the Philippines before the fall of Bataan. Guerrilla groups began to form on Luzon in January 1942; and these groups raided, ambushed, and sabotaged the enemy and his installations.

On 13 January 1942 the First Guerrilla Regiment, the forerunner of the United States Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP, NL), raided the town of Tuguegarao in the Cagayan Valley in conjunction with Troop C of the Twenty-Sixth Cavalry (Philippine Scouts), which was commanded by Captain Ralph Praeger, USA. The raiders also attacked the adjacent airfield and destroyed three aircraft. One hundred Japanese troops were killed in the raid. This operation brought immediate Japanese reactions against the guerrillas, but the guerrillas of the First Regiment kept fighting and soon settled down to ambushing Japanese patrols and raiding enemy installations in North Luzon.

Early raids were also conducted by Walter M. Cushing and his men. An El Paso native, Cushing was the operator and part owner of the Batong Buhay Mine in Kalinga Province. At the start of the war he formed a guerrilla unit from
his miners and started to operate along the Ilocos Coast area of North Luzon. Cushing scored several early victories with ambushes. The first came at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, and the second occurred on 18 January 1942 when his forces killed sixty Japanese and destroyed ten trucks at Candon, Ilocos Sur. After these early successes Cushing was forced to move with part of his force to La Union Province. With several successful operations under their belts, Cushing's men became skillful raiders and they specialized in destroying bridges and small enemy garrisons.

One of Cushing's raids took place on the night of 13-14 February 1942 against an enemy camp in the vicinity of the town Darigayos. The raiders had previously reconnoitered the enemy camp at night and they knew that there were only three sentries on the side of the camp which bordered a small ravine. This ravine provided an excellent avenue of approach for the raiders into their target area, and Cushing and his six men moved into it during their infiltration into the camp. They were further aided during the approach by a three foot drainage ditch which went up from the ravine to the camp fence. The raiders crawled up the ditch to the fence, and they were not discovered even though inevitably they dislodged rocks which roared downhill to shatter the quiet of the night. The raiders also benefitted from the weather because a tropical storm was forming and the night was black and windy as they crawled to the fence. Earlier, the moon had been bright
and had helped their approach march. A few minutes after they entered the camp the storm broke and the area was deluged by rain.

At the camp fence Cushing moved away from his group and silently killed the nearby sentry. After he returned, the men divided up the explosives for their attack. Three men including Cushing took a stick of dynamite for use against three Japanese billets. One security man armed with a tommy-gun went with each demolition man as they moved into the camp. The seventh raider, armed with a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), remained in position to cover the withdrawal of the three assault parties.

Each assault party moved quickly inside the camp as the rainstorm began, and kept close to the walls of the buildings to avoid detection. Cushing began the action when he threw his stick of dynamite into a Japanese billet. The rain hampered his efforts to light the six inch fuze, but once lighted the fuze functioned beautifully and the dynamite exploded and destroyed the barracks. The other demolition men immediately attacked their targets.

Confused Japanese ran everywhere. The Filipino tommy-gunners cut down several who spilled out of the barracks, and the stationary BAR gunner killed many more. In the uproar Cushing and his men escaped without casualties. No exact assessment of Japanese casualties were given, but in those days any enemy kills were significant.

As a result of this small, well planned operation and
others, the Japanese moved many of their units into foxholes and kept them out of garrisons in order to combat the night marauders.

As a result of guerrilla raids, Japanese combat units moved into the countryside to destroy the guerrillas. These forces were often very successful, and they destroyed many small bands and captured several of the prominent early guerrilla chieftains. Reprisals also began against the guerrillas and their supporters. The Japanese did not treat the guerrillas and unsurrendered American officers as soldiers and would not give them the status of prisoners of war. Thus, once captured, the guerrillas and their friends could expect summary execution.

When Bataan fell, Cushing stopped operations because he feared that the Japanese would kill prisoners as reprisals against guerrilla operations. The Bataan Death March and other atrocities, however, soon brought the guerrillas back into action. Cushing's days were numbered because he was soon betrayed by some supposedly loyal Filipinos near Jones, Isabella, in September 1942. Seriously wounded in the Japanese raid on his position, Cushing took his own life to avoid capture. For his short lived campaign, Walter Cushing was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Purple Heart.

While Cushing had organized his band, Marcos V. Agustín, a young Filipino bus driver, organized another
band of guerrillas in the area to the north of Laguna de Bay. Marking, as Agustin called himself, was also to win the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions as a guerrilla chieftain. He was assisted by many Filipinos and Americans, but he did not submit to the authority of other guerrilla leaders. His combativeness brought success in battle, but it complicated the efforts to unify the guerrilla forces in Central Luzon. His stubbornness was ameliorated in some cases and strengthened in others by the noted Filipino-American journalist, Yay Panlilio, who joined his band and became his executive officer and his common-law wife. Yay had been renowned in Manila before the war for her slacks and for her gumption. She stood up to men like Carlos P. Romulo who was her editor at the Philippine Herald. Yay became the historian of Marking's guerrillas, and wrote an interesting story which is naturally enough clouded by her prejudices.

Yay Panlilio reported in detail only one Marking raid, one which took place about two months after the Bataan Death March. At this time Marking decided to raid a prisoner of war camp in his area and release the allied prisoners. His men conducted an initial reconnaissance of the camp, but not satisfied with it, Marking made his own reconnaissance. Marking saw the graves of the dead Americans and saw their privations and their treatment at the hands of the Japanese. His reconnaissance gave him the
fiery motivation to move his men into action immediately.

His raid is best described by Yay Panlilio.

Launches and sailboats brought the [raiders] across [Laguna de Bay] from Tanay. Under cover of night, [Marking] took them up the Lumban River. [Leon Z. ] Cabalhin [a trusted lieutenant] with twenty men crept into position on a rise overlooking the schoolhouse garrison, to fire on possible reinforcements the moment they came out of the garrison. Other men proceeded to a halfway point between the garrison and the prison camp, to string barbed wire across the road. The Lumban mayor, in on the raid heart and soul, had all the lights out and every dog tied and waited himself for the guerrillas to tie him up as an alibi to the Japs.

On through the town to the camp Marking and some forty-five men moved, slow and silent, picking their way over each dry branch and loose stone, feeling with their hands through the blackness, crawling. Inside were the helpless men they would save. It must be a success, it had to go right! They were tensed to life, and death.

Marking shot a sentry, signal for a tensely aimed volley, and the guerrillas sprang into the clearing to shoot and bludgeon the remaining guards and grab their guns.

Guerrillas called for the prisoners to join them and escape, but an American captain in the camp barred the escape route to the other men. One soldier, George Lightman, did join Marking, but he was the only one rescued. The guerrillas withdrew bitterly disappointed. They had made a perfect raid and they had boats in position to carry the prisoners across Laguna de Bay to freedom and safety. Marking had not been prepared for a refusal by the prisoners, but in those days the prisoners could have thought the raid was a trap set by the Japanese or simply
did not feel that escape would mean survival. Anyhow, it was a tragedy that the rescue failed, and that Marking got only one man and some rifles for his efforts.

As a reprisal for the raid, the Japanese executed ten prisoners the next day. Marking never raided for prisoners again as the price he paid for this one was too high. Following the operation the enemy started a strong campaign to destroy Marking's forces. A pattern was developing: successful offensive guerrilla operations brought strong Japanese reaction and reprisals. Raids were dangerous in occupied areas.

Raids continued in other sections of Luzon. The Communist Hukbalahaps operated in the area around Mount Arayat. One of the small Huk raiding parties was seen by Captain Donald Blackburn when he and Major Russell Volckmann were moving north to find a haven in the mountains. The raiders were a scruffy lot who were led by a girl whose father had been executed by the Japanese earlier in the war. Blackburn saw the Huks move out to raid a Japanese garrison at Santa Rosario and he saw them return with several captives and a supply of freshly butchered carabao meat. The captives were informers and collaborators according to the Huks, and they were later executed by bolos. The Huks, unfortunately, often disposed of their political enemies, so the trustworthiness of this claim is doubtful. Later in the war, the Huks attacked all their American and Filipino opponents and often appeared to be
pro-Japanese in their actions.

Other units in the Philippines raided, but their operations are hard to define and properly record. Many so-called raids were often ambushes or local attacks against Japanese soldiers. The word "raid" seemed to be used to define any act which hurt the enemy, his supporters, and his installations. Raids were often made to secure arms and supplies, and occasionally they were made to rescue prisoners.

The most important man rescued in a guerrilla raid was Colonel Ruperto K. Kangleon of the Philippine Army. Kangleon escaped from the Butuan Prison Camp when Ernest McLish's guerrillas raided Butuan, Mindanao in December 1942. Kangleon became a key guerrilla leader and won the Distinguished Service Cross. He was a veteran of twenty-seven years service, a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, and had served as a District and Regimental Commander in the Philippine Army. Immediately after his release, Kangleon left Mindanao, returned to his home on Leyte, and soon took charge of the guerrillas after an internecine war had destroyed his chief competitor. When the Americans returned in October 1944, Kangleon and his forces were ready with information and combat units.

Kangleon's one time Chief of Staff, Ensign I. D. Richardson, USN, expained some of the details of the small raids which he knew had taken place on Leyte and Mindanao. One was conducted by a very small group of American
survivors led by Tom Baxter against a party of twenty Japanese who had billeted themselves in a small schoolhouse in Malamono, Mindanao. The raiders made a homemade bomb by wedging two sticks of dynamite into a piece of iron tubing. A fuze was attached to one end and the other end was plugged. Then the tubing was notched with a file to improve fragmentation.

Moving to the vicinity of the schoolhouse at about 4:00 p.m., the guerrillas hoped to catch the Japanese eating. Two men stayed on the nearby hill to cover Tom Baxter who had the homemade bomb. Baxter moved up to the schoolhouse; and after much difficulty because of a sweat soaked scratch pad for his matches, he lighted the fuze and threw the bomb into the nearby window. Baxter then took off at a dead run as did his comrades. The bomb exploded and presumably killed every man inside the house. The seven or eight Japanese soldiers who were late for the meal appeared and fired at Baxter as he fled into the countryside. No guerrillas were hurt.

This action was the most indicative of this period because it showed what chances were taken and what effort was expended by the unsurrendered guerrillas so that they could strike their enemies and hurt them. The raid was not complicated, but it was successful, and it showed why Tom Baxter was the accepted leader of his group.

Toward the end of 1942, the guerrillas throughout the Philippines began an uncoordinated offensive campaign
against the Japanese. Raids figured prominently in the campaign. One of these took place in North Luzon after Lieutenant Colonels Martin Moses and Arthur Noble of the U. S. Army ordered their USAFIP, NL force to take the offensive. The raid was planned for 1:00 a.m. 15 October 1942 and was to be executed by Captain Rufino Baldwin and his men. The raiders were to attack the enemy garrison at Itogon, destroy portions of the Kennon Road, and capture the notorious Japanese agent Okoda who lived in Itogon.

Okoda was hated by the Filipinos and the Americans because he had supplied the enemy with lists of Filipino guerrillas and their hideouts. The capture of Okoda became a community effort, and it was planned with the loyal citizens of Itogon. Several citizens were to get Okoda drunk on the night of 14 October to facilitate his capture. It was hoped that once captured, Okoda would provide the guerrillas with the names of collaborators and the locations of enemy troops.

Captain Baldwin was a logical leader for the raiders. He was an infantry officer, a veteran of Bataan, and he was an Igorot, a native of Luzon's Mountain Province. Baldwin knew the area and so did his men. Furthermore, Baldwin was multi-lingual. He knew English well enough to

*No known first name or initials.*
please Moses and Noble, and he was fluent in the native dialects of the area so that he could give clear commands to all his raiders.

With everything planned well and success seemingly assured, the raid started badly. Some nervous guerrillas fired prematurely alerting the Japanese, who then immediately manned their defensive positions. The element of surprise was lost; and as soon as the enemy machine guns opened fire, the raid came to an abrupt halt.

The same firing which alerted the soldiers also warned the drunken Okoda of his impending danger. He somehow managed to run for shelter. It was Okoda's last act, though, for he fell into a ditch and broke his back. When the raiders found Okoda, they killed him on the spot.

The next day the Japanese moved more troops and tanks into the Itogon Mine area. This completed the picture of failure. The guerrillas had failed to perform their mission against Itogon and the Kennon Road and now were faced with a formidable force.

Lack of fire discipline was the key failure of the guerrillas. Surprise was lost, and surprise was vital to the execution of the raid. Baldwin blamed two American civilians for the error, but in the confusion it was probably hard to fix the blame on any person. Inexperienced troops tend to fire prematurely, and since most of these early fighters were very inexperienced, thorough training was needed to improve their discipline and performance.
In the Visayas, the central islands of the Philippines, and in Mindanao, the guerrillas were more successful in their offensive operations than they were on Luzon. The Japanese had not occupied the islands so completely and the garrisons had been able to prepare for guerrilla warfare while the main battle for the Philippines raged on Luzon. The islands never were completely occupied and the guerrillas were never under the constant pressure they were on Luzon. This is perfectly evident when the stories of the various leaders are examined. No area was so thoroughly controlled throughout the war as was most of Luzon.

On Panay, Colonel Albert Christie, USA, had stocked supplies, and before he surrendered he had conducted many hit-and-run raids on the Japanese who had occupied the coastal areas but who had remained out of the interior. Colonel Macario Peralta of the Philippine Army, another future winner of the Distinguished Service Cross, organized the Panay guerrillas after Christie surrendered and kept his forces active. Claude Fertig, the brother of Wendell Fertig on Mindanao, reported that Lieutenant Colonel Julian C. Chaves, Philippine Army, a battalion commander who had fought well against the Japanese, "had liquidated several Jap garrisons causing the Japs to withdraw into the three provincial garrisons." The guerrillas remained active on Panay until July 1943 when the Japanese moved against them in force and destroyed much of the guerrilla
organization and forces.

Other islands in the Visayas obviously had their small raids, but they were not mentioned in the sources reviewed. Activity was generally proportional to the size of the occupying force. Some interesting raids took place on Mindanao and they were recorded.

One was conducted by the Syrian mining engineer turned guerrilla, Captail Khalil Khodr, and two of his companions, Captain Vincente Zapanta and Tom Baxter. The raid was planned quickly one afternoon when the guerrillas were told that a Japanese patrol was in the vicinity. The area was rice paddy land and it was too open for an ambush so a hit-and-run attack was decided on. The guerrillas organized immediately, and struck the enemy patrol that afternoon. The raiders held their ground until the Japanese deployed and began using machine guns and mortars against them. Then the guerrillas took off, and as they ran away they threw their weapons in a carabao wallow so that they could escape with greater ease. No guerrillas were injured, but unfortunately no enemy casualties were reported.

This operation was unusual because it was a combination of an ambush and a raid. From the brief account it was a moving attack against a moving column, and it showed how aggressive and experienced leaders could make the best of a fleeting opportunity to destroy an enemy force. Such an operation can only be conducted when the attackers know their enemy, their own capabilities, and their operational
Another raid was executed by the guerrillas commanded by Captain Ernest McLish who had formed his band after he decided not to surrender in 1942. McLish raided a Japanese garrison with his men, but his troops were in open fields and they could not cope with the enemy soldiers who fired machine guns at them from behind stone buildings. McLish's operation failed because like so many young leaders in their first action, he tried to do too much with too little. Guerrillas generally do not have the combat power to meet regular forces face to face, and once a raid like McLish's is stopped the guerrillas cannot continue it as a siege. This lesson was learned time and time again by other guerrillas, but perhaps the most well known example was the attack on Butuan in May 1943 by about nineteen hundred riflemen under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Childress assisted by Khodr, Baxter, and several others. The siege lasted nine days but the guerrillas were finally driven off by Japanese reinforcements.

Raiding had its funny moments as well as its serious ones on Mindanao. A Moro guerrilla leader, Salipada Pendatun, provided some comedy relief. He attacked the normal school in Malaybalay in which several enemy soldiers were billeted. The Japanese were amused by Pendatun's efforts to drive them out of their position with only small arms fire. Pendatun was not to be denied, however, and he breached the wall of the building by placing two one hundred

*Also McClish, MacLish.*
pound bombs on a carabao and which he sent roaring toward
the enemy position. The carabao made his mad dash to the
wall and oblivion because Pendatun had placed a burning
rag under the animal's tail. The guerrillas gained their
victory.

Pendatun's tenacity and improvisation paid off in
victory. His performance as a guerrilla leader remained
excellent, and at the end of the war an official report
mentioned that Pendatun's regiment had "kept the Kigos-
Kabacan Road closed to enemy traffic until early 1944
when shortage of equipment and supplies forced the guerrillas
to yield control."

These small raids and other offensive operations
during the early part of Jap occupation had an unfavorable
result: they brought reprisals and counter-guerrilla
operations by Japanese forces. These first occurred on
Luzon, the most tightly controlled area, where a myriad of
different guerrilla units had stung the Japanese. Later,
the active units in the Visayas felt the hard hand of the
Japanese combat forces, and in the end even Mindanao
guerrillas were subjected to an intensive counter-guerrilla
campaign. The civilian population felt the brunt of the
Japanese reprisals as the people were in guerrilla areas
and were obviously culpable. "Lay low" orders went out to
many guerrilla commanders on Luzon after General MacArthur
ordered the guerrilla units to stop offensive operations
and concentrate on intelligence collection, organization,
and training in March 1943. Peralta, on Panay, had received similar instructions earlier.

Each guerrilla chieftain accepted MacArthur's orders in different ways. Those under the greatest pressure from the enemy, Lieutenant Colonel Volckmann, Major Donald Blackburn, and the other leaders of USAFIP, NL, and Major Bernard Anderson in the Central Luzon followed the orders quickly. They had no choice. Offensive operations were just not sensible in face of fierce reaction. Marking and his men were not so compliant, but their situation east of Manila was so bleak that the orders from MacArthur merely confirmed the actual situation on the ground. Marking had to lay low to survive.

On Leyte, Colonel Kangleon was not pleased with the order because he needed to keep attacking the Japanese to maintain the support of his people. He eventually broke the order in February 1944 to keep the support of the population. By October Kangleon controlled most of inland Leyte.

Wendell Fertig on Mindanao reacted unfavorably because he thought that MacArthur and his headquarters just did not understand the situation on Mindanao. Like Kangleon, he felt that he had to keep fighting to keep the people with him. Fertig, though, was a bit too cocksure of himself and of the capabilities of his forces. Before the U. S. Forces returned to Leyte, Fertig was subjected to a
massive Japanese effort to destroy his organization. The Japanese were nearing success when the landing occurred on Leyte. Fertig learned how ineffective guerrillas can be against determined regular troops who are properly led and deployed.

In retrospect the order to cease offensive operations was wise. It saved civilian lives and it made the disunited guerrillas do what they could do best in the Philippines -- get information. As a result the Philippines did not become a Timor, a place where no allied forces could remain and no allied forces could ever penetrate for the duration of the war.

Offensive operations did continue on a reduced basis in the Philippines. Colonel Volckmann started counter-espionage operations to rid his area of collaborators and traitors.

Volckmann gave his counter-espionage program widespread publicity and then began a relentless campaign to find and destroy those men and women who were hostile to the guerrilla movement. The campaign was successful. The enemy elements were dealt with, the neutrals became supporters of the guerrillas, and the long time supporters of the guerrillas became more dedicated to their cause.

Volckmann's forces raided. One raid was made against the town of Cervantes in Ilocos Sur Province where a number of Filipino agents who worked for the Japanese had taken refuge. A unit from the First District, USAFIP, NL attacked
the town at night, and after the raiders fixed the Japanese soldiers in their defensive positions, they surrounded the building in which the Filipino spies had gathered and then set it afire.

Another raid was made by Blackburn's Eleventh Infantry Regiment against the capital of Apayao. It too was successful and many traitors were eliminated. In the raid the guerrillas captured the records of the puppet provincial governor, and they found out how and why Major Richard Praeger and his assistant Captain Thomas Jones had been captured by the Japanese. The records included the final report of the operation which captured Praeger and Jones and listed the names of all the people who had been involved in it. Since Praeger and Jones were executed, the men of the Eleventh Infantry hunted down and killed all those implicated in the report. The pro-guerrilla elements then became more active in supporting their armed forces and obeying the orders of the Eleventh Infantry.

After the Sixth Army had landed on Leyte, Volckmann became concerned about the fighting qualities of his troops. He decided to rescind his "lay low" order and allow the guerrillas to begin offensive operations to gain combat experience and to test his leaders. The small operations proved valuable. The 121st Infantry Regiment on the Ilocos Coast carried out a number of small operations. One of them was made against the San Fernando Naval Base and in it the guerrillas destroyed sixty thousand liters of
fuel. Another operation had a humorous note, but it caused the Japanese much damage. Volckmann needed an engineer to run his pet power plant, and he decided to kidnap the unsuspecting Swiss engineer who ran the Agno River power plant for the Japanese. The Sixty-Sixth Infantry Regiment conducted the raid and after capturing the engineer unharmed, the guerrillas destroyed vital machinery and flooded the turbine room.

In the Cagayan Valley in Northeastern Luzon, Donald Blackburn planned a raid to test the defenses in the town of Solana before he launched an all out attack to capture the town. Two missions were assigned to the raiders. First, they were to seize a Japanese spy, Avena, and second, they were to seize the warehouses in town which contained an enormous quantity of rice which the guerrillas needed. Avena was the key man in the local spy ring and his capture would improve the security of the guerrillas in the locality.

These missions were assigned to Herbert Swick's battalion, and Swick decided to raid Solana with his "A" Company which was commanded by Lieutenant Arcensio. Plans were developed and Blackburn approved every detail. The night of the attack, however, was not designated in advance.

*No known first name or initials.
because the leaders wanted to strike Solana when the Japanese patrols were away from the town. Swick was told to choose the exact night for the raid.

Blackburn and Swick's operations plan had four parts. The raiders and the cargadores were to assemble outside the town for the attack. Then the guerrillas were to capture Avena and any other available members of his spy ring. With this accomplished, the raiders were to seize the warehouses and protect them until the cargadores could be called into town. The raid would end when the cargadores finished carrying out all the rice they could handle in their carabao carts.

Swick selected a perfect night for the raid. The Japanese were away from Solana and the overcast sky gave the raiders concealment but also allowed them enough light to operate by. The operation started well and the cargadores and their carts were in position at the proper time. Unfortunately, Blackburn was to be disappointed in the results. The raid unfolded as follows:

"A" Company met no obstacles as they entered the town. But the sergeant charged with the capture of Avena bungled the job. He found the right house without any trouble, but when Avena was awakened and called out "What do you want?" the sergeant answered simply and honestly, but stupidly, "We want you, Avena."

That was sufficient identification for Avena, who was prepared for just such a visit. He had rigged up a crude alarm, several loose planks, which, when pulled by a rope inside his house, made a loud clatter in the street. An accomplice heard the racket and ran for the church. Soon the church bell was ringing, and
Avena's accomplices were pouring out into the streets of Solana. They were armed and they started shooting.

The noise and confusion frightened the sergeant. He added haste to honesty, a poor combination for a guerrilla on a hit-and-run raid. His men succeeded in breaking into Avena's house, but as they cornered the master spy his accomplices ran up from the rear shouting and shooting. One of the guerrillas fell, seriously wounded. His comrades' fright turned to anger. A bayonet was thrust at Avena. He warded it off with his hand, and lost three fingers. In the ensuing confusion, Avena escaped.

[Meanwhile] ... the other end of the operation was also falling apart. The noise and confusion frightened the cargadores who were just beginning to carry supplies out of the Gunma and Toyaminka warehouses. The cargadores took to their heels, abandoning their carabao carts.

Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Arcensio decided that "A" Company had better get out of Solana while the going was good. 104

This raid was a dismal failure, and its failure was reinforced when the Japanese moved a garrison back into the area. It was the Itogon raid all over again. Training and discipline had to be tightened to prevent its repetition. Also, the raid was a bit ambitious. The leaders tried to do too much with one company. It would have been better to plan on getting Avena one night and the rice another night, or more forces should have been assembled to do the two jobs simultaneously. The Eleventh Infantry recovered from its mistakes and Lieutenant Tomas Quiocho and his men took Solana at a later date. 105

These operations paid good dividends to USAFIP, NL.
Troops were hardened and leaders tested. When American forces landed on Luzon the guerrillas were prepared to fight alongside them. Seasoned by their small offensive operations and their raids the guerrillas fought courageously and earned the praise of the Sixth Army Commander, General Walter Krueger, who said that Volckmann's men were worth a regular division of troops.

Of the other guerrilla units which continued to operate during the lull, two will be discussed: Colonel Kangleon's on Leyte, and Colonel Fertig's on Mindanao.

Colonel Kangleon's forces on Leyte were quite successful after he started his offensive campaign against the enemy on 1 February 1944. Most of the Japanese were forced out of the hills into the coastal towns by the offensive.

Raids continued and a small one was made against the town of Anahawan on Leyte where there were twelve enemy soldiers who never went out on patrols. A plan was hatched with the local mayor to destroy the groups in the mayor's house with a single grenade.

On 1 February the mayor invited the soldiers to breakfast in his house and the Japanese came as planned. They, however, left one man outside the door to guard the others. This eventuality had been considered; and after the mayor left the house on the pretext of getting the soldiers something from the yard, a guerrilla approached
the guard. The guerrilla was dressed in a long shirt which covered the pistol he carried in his belt. He was also carrying a chicken in both hands and the chicken had a peg attached to one leg with a string. When the guerrilla came in front of the guard, the other guerrillas moved up to the house with their precious grenade. After a few attempts to communicate with the guard, the guerrilla at the door dropped the chicken as a diversion because he wanted the guard to bend over to catch the bird. The Japanese guard did just that and the guerrilla drew his pistol and killed him. Immediately thereafter the other guerrillas threw the grenade into the midst of the assembled Japanese and killed them all. Three Japanese were out back of the house and they managed to escape in the confusion. The guerrillas then stripped the enemy dead of their clothes, gas masks, wristwatches, shoes, rifles, and ammunition and absconded with a Nii mortar, a case of mortar 108 ammunition and three grenades.

Lieutenant Joseph St. John, another guerrilla who served on Leyte under Colonel Kangleon, reported a similar guerrilla raid where chickens were used as decoys. The raid, led by Lieutenant Capile, was made against a group of thirty-three Japanese in a small outpost. Fifty

*No known first name or initials.
guerrillas assembled in the nearby jungle, and two others went down to entice the enemy guard with chickens while the other Japanese were eating breakfast at some distance from their stacked weapons. The guerrillas distracted the guard with the chickens and managed, despite his warnings, to get right up to him. Once close to the Japanese guard, the guerrillas drew their bolos from the feathers of the birds as they dropped them, and killed the enemy soldier. The other guerrillas then entered the outpost quickly and attacked and killed the other Japanese soldiers with bolos. No bullets were expended, no guerrillas were injured; and the victors captured valuable rifles and ammunition. Lietenant Capile used the same type of ruse about a month later and killed seventeen more Japanese soldiers with bolos.

After the first American aircraft appeared over the Visayas on 12 September 1944, the guerrillas on Leyte took heart and began to press their operations against the smaller Japanese outposts. Such operations were a part of Colonel Kangleon's plan to aid the impending American invasion. One hundred and ten guerrillas under the command of Captain Landia* raided the Japanese garrison in Abuyog at this time. The guerrillas entered the town quickly, swarmed all over the Japanese position before the enemy knew what happened,

*No known first name or initials.
and killed about thirty enemy soldiers while only five of their men were slightly wounded.

On Mindanao the pattern of raiding was quite similar. Jack Hawkins, a United States Marine lieutenant who escaped from the prison camp at Davao and joined Major Molish's guerrilla force, wrote about harassing raids in Anakan. These raids aimed at driving the Japanese out of Anakan in order to prevent them from exploiting the Anakan sawmill, the uncut hardwood reserves in the area, and from discovering the guerrilla radio station and headquarters in the vicinity. One raid was organized under the command of Lieutenant Dongallo. Forty selected men were chosen for the action, and they were issued ammunition and some homemade hand grenades. These grenades were made by implanting "a stick of dynamite with a short fuze in a tin can [filling] the remaining space with nails, pieces of chain, nuts and bolts, [and] then sealing the top with pitch." If the grenades were not fatal, they at least probably gave a victim a good case of tetanus.

Dongallo's men rehearsed the plan and then, after a pig roast was held in their honor, the raiders moved off towards the sawmill. Once in an attack position in the woods near Anakan the raid began.

*No known first name or initials.
...In the predawn darkness, Dongallo's men crept stealthily into the small settlement, lobbed their homemade grenades through the windows of the Japanese-occupied houses, sprayed the buildings with rifle and automatic rifle fire and set fire to the lumber which had been cut and stacked at the sawmill. By the time the Japanese survivors had recovered their senses, the lumber was ablaze, and Dongallo had withdrawn without suffering a single casualty.

The guerrillas estimated that thirty or more Japanese were killed and more were wounded. To keep pressure on the enemy several more smaller raids followed and finally the Japanese withdrew the garrison in Anakan.

McLish's men had learned their combat lessons well. Their operations were well planned and executed and finally they had the power to accomplish their intended objectives.

In another exemplary operation on Mindanao, Wendell Fertig raided a small party of Japanese soldiers who had billeted themselves in a small schoolhouse. The situation developed one evening when Fertig was told that a Japanese patrol had reached the small building about three miles from his headquarters in the vicinity of Sulug. Fertig decided to check out the patrol since he had had Major McLish scouting for it all day in the area around Bonifacio. Fertig left his camp with his bodyguard and driver and started for the schoolhouse. The three men carried two BAR's.

At the head of the valley in which the schoolhouse was located, Fertig and his men met nine guerrillas from the company which was in charge of the local area. These men
reported that their company had been living in the schoolhouse but that the unit had left when the Japanese approached it. The guerrillas had overestimated the size of the enemy force and had left in such haste that they forgot to take their company records with them. The nine guerrillas told Fertig that they did not know where their unit officer or their compatriots were.

Fertig had the guerrillas lead him to the schoolhouse. The unpainted wooden building stood on short pillars in a cornfield, and its galvanized iron roof gleamed in the moonlight. Once near the schoolhouse, Fertig decided to attack it. His plan was simple. He and his two men would move into position and cover the front door while the nine guerrillas moved into position to cover the other three sides. Once the guerrillas were in place they were to fire one shot to attract the attention of the Japanese and then Fertig would send one of his men under the porch of the building to ignite it. The planned fire would force the enemy soldiers outside where the guerrillas could kill them. Fertig dispatched his forces and told them if they met any enemy outposts to send a runner to him for further instructions.

Once in position Fertig knelt at the base of the dripping cornstalks and saw a Japanese soldier come outside and relieve himself. After the soldier went back inside the building Fertig put his BAR in position and aimed it at the front door. When the rifle broke the silence, the
reported that their company had been living in the schoolhouse but that the unit had left when the Japanese approached it. The guerrillas had overestimated the size of the enemy force and had left in such haste that they forgot to take their company records with them. The nine guerrillas told Fertig that they did not know where their unit officer or their compatriots were.

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Japanese immediately ran out the front door. Fertig killed two of them before the survivors bolted back inside. With the plan foiled Fertig stopped his man from running to the porch. The guerrillas behind the house began shouting loudly as they aimed a heavy volume of fire at the building. After they stopped firing and Fertig finally got the Filipinos to stop shouting, he sent one of his men over to them to see what had happened. The runner returned and reported that four Japanese had been killed at the back of the house. Fertig then sent the runner to check on the situation inside the house. The Filipino soon reappeared and reported that all the Japanese were dead.

This hasty raid annihilated the eight Japanese who had scared away a guerrilla company, recaptured the company's records, saved the guerrillas and their families from disclosure to the enemy, and added to the guerrillas' stocks of rifles and ammunition. A security outpost was left behind to harass any enemy reaction force. No Japanese forces followed that night, but the next day a large enemy unit found the dead soldiers, and soon Fertig was forced to move his headquarters to another isolated hill.

So far only the story of consummated raids has been told. One raid which should have been made by Fertig's men was not made, and it had tragic results. GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, sent an agent into Mindanao with the information that the Allied prisoners near Davao were soon to be moved.
Fertig did not know of the impending move. The agent, Major Harold Rosenquist, was planning to raid the camp to rescue the prisoners, but Fertig did not consider that the mission was feasible and he refused to allow Rosenquist to operate as an independent commander on Mindanao. Irked that a higher headquarters had ordered someone into his area without consulting him, Fertig obstructed Rosenquist, and when he finally found out about the plight of the prisoners it was too late to act. The prisoners were evacuated from Davao in several ships; and, as luck would have it, the alert guerrilla coastwatchers reported the enemy ship movement. Two or more of the vessels were sunk or went aground as a result of the ensuing American submarine attack. The Japanese with characteristic savagery grenaded and machine-gunned the survivors. About eight hundred allied prisoners died in these sinkings of the unmarked Japanese prison ships. This repetition of earlier sinkings of other prison ships was a cruel tragedy so near the end of the war.

These two situations show the contrast of decisions. In the first situation Fertig made a series of excellent decisions, took quick action, and gained superb results. He adjusted his simple plan to meet the situation and his guerrillas acted well under pressure. The raid was just about perfect in all details. The second situation showed how stubbornness and inflexibility can be aggravated by the supposed interference of higher headquarters and how a
man can make a serious error by worrying too much about his prerogatives. Sometimes the mission must be executed without worrying about privileges, chains of command, and regulations. Fertig knew this, he was a guerrilla, and he had to act this way to survive. However, he made a human error, and it was not the only one of the war.

Colonel Fertig's successful guerrilla movement was highlighted in Lieutenant General Eichelberger's report on the Mindanao operation. The report stated that the guerrillas under Fertig's command controlled about ninety-five percent of the land area of Mindanao when the forces of Eighth Army landed to clear the island.

Guerrilla raids did not stop when the American units returned to the Philippines; however, it is difficult to record them in any detail. Many were just mentioned in passing. Many of the guerrilla leaders and guerrilla writers were evacuated immediately and their narratives stopped. Even the official report of the guerrilla resistance movement in the islands stopped with the return of the American forces. Many guerrillas were attached to the invading American units and they were used in all sorts of missions. Volckmann's USAFIP, NL, Marking's Guerrillas, Anderson's Guerrillas, Terry's Hunters, and Fertig's men went on to bigger and better things. Guerrilla raids harassed the enemy throughout the Philippines, and most of the time they were aimed at small isolated outposts and
fixed installations. Guerrillas played significant roles in the liberation of the prison camps on Luzon.

It is evident from this survey of guerrilla raiding in the three major areas of the Philippines, Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao, that raids had significant tactical and strategic results. Enemy forces were tied down to protect their installations. The guerrillas also managed to kill and wound many hundreds of Japanese. Raids were most successful in the lightly held areas against small installations and garrisons, and they were best employed when supported heart and soul by the local inhabitants. The raids which succeeded employed proven procedures and emphasized knowledge of the enemy, their area, and the need for surprise. Plans were simple and violently executed. Failure proved the value of these points.

Importantly, guerrilla raids showed that offensive operations in a well occupied nation can be dangerous to a guerrilla movement and that the civilian population can be badly hurt. Without the help of the civilian population overt guerrilla operations are difficult if not impossible to sustain. The conclusion must be drawn then that raiding should be employed selectively during a successful occupation. Once the guerrillas' enemy is distracted from his occupation duties by an invading conventional force, however, guerrillas can begin raiding with virtual impunity because the enemy will normally face the invading forces and turn his back to the guerrillas behind his lines. Then
guerrilla raids can devastate an enemy.

It happened this way in the Philippines.
Notes for Chapter IV: They Never Surrendered

1. There are many references to guerrilla operations in the Indies, Borneo, northern New Guinea, and the Solomon; however, detailed sources have not been found.

Selden Menefee, "Guerrillas of the Indies," The Cavalry Journal (March-April 1945), 54-57, speaks of Dutch guerrillas in the Manokwari area of the Vogelkop Peninsula of New Guinea, in southern Borneo, Sumatra, and of course Timor. Of the Manokwari group, Menefee wrote:

"The little troop, though ravaged by illness, waged an aggressive guerrilla campaign throughout 1943. They killed about 40 Japanese and blew up installations on a number of Japanese bases. The biggest raids were on the big Japanese base at Sorong, in March 1943, and on the ship Daiti Maru, which was anchored off Manokwari at the time."

He commented further about southern Borneo:

"In November 1943 [Japanese radio] told how defenses were being erected against guerrillas in southern Borneo."

Menefee also reported that the Japanese captured 1800 Dutch and Indonesian guerrillas in Sumatra in February 1944.

Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns (Canberra, 1963), mentions many actions of Australian guerrillas in Borneo, New Britain, and the Solomons. Allied Intelligence Bureau operatives, including coastwatchers, were often the instigators of such movements. See Chapter III of this thesis, notes 8 through 12, for previous detailed references about Australian guerrillas.

No attempt has been made to find detailed information about all these diverse and important guerrilla movements, but it is obvious that many existed and they have not been widely publicized. Guerrillas raided in each area to harass the Japanese, defend themselves, and in the last days of the war they often raided to clear the enemy from their native lands and home areas.

A Year of Harassment on Timor

1a. Material for this section came from the following sources: Hugh Buggy, Pacific Victory, A Short History of Australia's Part in the War Against Japan (North Melbourne, 1945), 50-59; Bernard J. Callinan, Independent Company,

2. See the introductory chapter by Nevil Shute in Callinan, Independent Company, xvii-xxix, for a summary of operations on Timor.

3. Independent companies were commando units. They were originally organized by the British to raid occupied France. After being developed in Australia they were deployed early in 1942. The First Company was spread from the New Hebrides to the Admiralty Islands, the Second was on Timor, and the Third was on New Caledonia. The Fourth Company was in Northern Territory, Australia before it was sent into the Markham Valley of New Guinea. The peculiar designation "2/2" of the Australian units indicates that the unit is part of the Second Australian Imperial Force (A.I.F.), i.e., the one which served outside of the mainland of Australia during the Second World War. The unit is called the Second Second Independent Company, the Second Fortieth Battalion, etc.


5. Australia evacuated the two officers by Catalina flying boat on 24 May 1942 because army officials wanted to know more about operations on Timor. Lieutenant Colonel A. Spence, the commander of the 2/2 Independent Company, assumed command of Sparrow Force.


7. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 605.

8. Ibid., 602-606.


10. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 603.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

Limited Offensive: Kanga Force in New Guinea

24a. Most of the material for this section comes from Jack Boxall, A Story of the 2/5 Australian Commando, A.I.F. (Lakemba, Australia, n.d.), and McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau. I have reworked the information presented by McCarthy for most of the narrative on Kanga Force raids. Other secondary sources cover Kanga operations, but they do so briefly. Additional strategic information and colorful details were taken from other books, reports, and press releases, and these are noted where used.

25. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 84-87.


28. Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 3-7, and McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 84-86, discuss the initial plans and deployment of Kanga Force. Buggy, Pacific Victory, 62-63, provided some information about the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles as does McCarthy, 45-47.

29. For data on the Salamaua raid see: Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 6-7, 12-13; McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 90-96; Pat Robinson, The Fight for New Guinea (New York, 1943), 88-89; Osmar White, Green Armor (New York, 1945), 141; and The New York Times (1 July 1942), 1 and 8.

30. Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 12, states that the raid was to start at 3:00 a.m.

31. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 93.

32. Ibid., 92-93, reports that the raiders totalled seventy-five commandos, NGVR personnel, and natives. Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 12, reports that there were sixty-four of all ranks, meaning commandos.

33. The official communique to the New York Times (1 July 1942), 1 and 8, states that sixty Japanese were killed on the Salamaua raid. Milner, Victory in Papua; 43, and Robinson, The Fight for New Guinea, 88, agree. White, Green Armor, 141, states that over one hundred enemy soldiers were killed. Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 13, reports 123 Japanese dead. The figure stated in the text is from McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau.

34. For data on the Heath Plantation raid see: Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 6-9; McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 96-99; and White, Green Armor, 141-142. McCarthy provides most of the details.

35. Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 7.

36. McCarthy's account is not very clear and his maps do not help clarify the raid plans or the attack. Boxall's report is brief. The intricate details of the raid may be inaccurate, but based upon the sources they are the best that can be developed.

37. Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 8, states that Major Kneen was killed at point blank range by a "field gun." Immediately thereafter the raiders destroyed the gun. Boxall gives no other information about the piece. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 99, mentions only a "gun," and says nothing about the weapon being destroyed. In addition, he never says where the gun was, where it came from, or why it was not mentioned in previous intelligence reports.
38. Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 8, says forty-three Japanese were killed. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 99, records forty-two. Milner, Victory in Papua, 43, and White, Green Armor, 141-142, both report forty enemy were killed.


40. Ibid., 537, and Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 17-18, cover the first raid on Mubo.

41. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 537.

42. Ibid., 540-544, and Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 20-21, cover the second raid on Mubo.

43. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 538.

44. White, Green Armor, 154.

45. McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 544-586, describes the operations in the Wau-Salamaua-Bulolo Valley area after Major Fleay's force was reinforced and the command passed to Brigadier M. J. Moten of the Seventeenth Brigade.

46. Each student can determine for himself whether Kanga Force had an offensive or defensive mission while it was a guerrilla force in New Guinea. Boxall, 2/5 Commando, 4, lists the missions given to Kanga Force: (1) destroy a naval gun, (2) destroy two wireless stations, (3) destroy as many grounded aircraft and hangars as possible, (4) destroy dumps of supplies, and (5) destroy buildings and as many enemy as possible. Reports of MacArthur, Vol. I, Campaigns, 49, says that Kanga Force was formed to "harass and interrupt the development of the Japanese bases at Lae and Salamaua." McCarthy, Kokoda to Wau, 56, stresses that Kanga was formed by General Blamey "to develop a minor and local but profitable offensive." Milner, Victory in Papua, 42, comments that Kanga attacks were strictly defensive and were planned to delay and disrupt the enemy.

Ferdinand Force: New Britain

47. Malcolm Wright, If I Die, Coastwatching and Guerrilla Warfare Behind Japanese Lines (Melbourne, 1966) provides the material for the raids reported in this section. The story of the guerrilla raids on New Britain is included to illustrate a special type of guerrilla force: native led, native manned, but directed by the intelligence operatives of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. No attempt is made to be comprehensive about the guerrilla raids on New Britain because sources are scarce. For information from official reports see GHQ, USAPP, MIS, GS, Intelligence
Series, Vol. IV, Allied Intelligence Bureau, in particular Appendix XV, "North Eastern Area Operations" and Appendix XVIII, "Report, Lt. M. H. Wright "Coast Watching, Cape Hoskins," Mar 43." Appendix XV contains two reports, one by Commander Eric Feldt, and the second by Commander J. C. McManus. McManus' report is entitled "North Eastern Area of Operations, April 1943-November 1945," and will be cited again without mentioning the larger source in which it is found.

Other sources include: Long, Final Campaigns, 241-270, and Eric Feldt, The Coastwatchers (New York, 1946). Feldt reports similar information to Wright about the guerrilla raids on New Britain.

48. Wright, If I Die, 161.
49. Ibid., 173.
50. Ibid., 182-183.
51. Ibid., 190.
52. Long, Final Campaigns, 241-242, 250.

Before MacArthur Returned: Guerrillas in the Philippines

54. This section is based primarily upon the autobiographies of several American officers (William E. Dyess, Claude E. Fertig, Jack Hawkins, Al Hernandez, Steve Mellnik, Joseph St. John, and Russell Volckmann), an American Roman Catholic priest (Edward Haggerty), and several women who were involved in the guerrilla movement (Yay Panlilio -- "Colonel Yay" --, Doris Rubens, Louise R. Spencer, and Margaret Utinsky -- "Miss "U"); biographical accounts of other Americans (Donald Blackburn, Wendell W. Fertig, Charles Parsons, and I. David Richardson); and the narratives of two Filipino patriots who wrote about their guerrilla units (Uldarico S. Baclagon and Proculo L. Mojica).

Two histories of the guerrilla movement were also used: one written by the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (Volckmann's unit) which is entitled Guerrilla Days in North Luzon, The Story of USAFIP, North Luzon (La Union, Philippines, 1946), and the other by General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, entitled The Intelligence Series, Volume I, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines (Tokyo, 1948).
55. For a brief but detailed account of the guerrilla operations in the Philippines see Uldarico S. Baclagon, *Philippine Campaigns* (Manila, 1952), 229-304.


57. The raid on Tuguegarao is described in Baclagon, *Philippine Campaigns*, 231; USAFIP, NL, *Guerrilla Days*, 31; Harkins, *Blackburn's Headhunters*, 98; Newsweek (2 February 1942); *Time* (2 February 1942), 23; and the New York Times (22 January 1942), 1-2, 9.


60. USAFIP, NL, *Guerrilla Days*, 9.


62. Lieutenant Colonels Guillermo Nakar, PA (Philippine Army), Martin Moses, USA, Arthur Noble, USA, and later Major Ralph Praeger, USA, and his assistant were captured and killed by the Japanese.

63. The Japanese consistently referred to the guerrillas and the unsurrendered Americans as bandits. All reports of guerrilla operations in the Philippines mention summary executions of captured leaders and their men. Guerrillas knew that they probably would be executed when captured. The Japanese followed similar policies on Timor.

64. Cushing's suicide was mentioned in Sanderson, *Behind Enemy Lines*, 218, and USAFIP, NL, *Guerrilla Days*, 16. Other sources mention that Cushing was captured and was presumed dead or had died.

65. A long, detailed, highly favorable account of Marking's guerrillas is Yay Panlilio's, *The Crucible* (New York, 1950). The author was the executive officer of the unit, a sort of mother-confessor, and Marking's common-law wife.


68. Interview with Amelia M. Bradley, 9 August 1969, San Diego, California. "Millie" Bradley worked with Yay Panlilio on the *Philippine Herald* before the Second World War, and both worked for Carlos P. Romulo.


70. Ibid., 15-16.


72. Baclagon, *Philippine Campaigns*, 244.


76. Several prison escapes are mentioned. See: Panlilio, *The Crucible*, 244, for the brief explanation of how Roger Moskara, a guerrilla, was freed from prison in a raid. Volckmann, *We Remaining*, 148, tells of a prison break engineered by the guerrillas which released Herbert Swick and Richard R. Green. How it happened is not discussed. Edward Haggerty, *Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao* (New York, 1946), 147, mentions that Salipada Pendatum "captured the concentration camp." Colonel Kangleon, a key guerrilla leader, was also released from a prison camp in a guerrilla raid. See notes 77-78, which follow.


78. Haggerty, *Guerrilla Padre*, 118-119, mentions an operation by Ernest McLish against Butuan, Mindanao which may have been the one which allowed Kangleon to escape. Travis Ingham, *Rendezvous by Submarine, The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla-Soldiers in the Philippines* (Garden City, New York, 1945), 73, states that McLish led the raid which freed Kangleon.

80. Ibid.

81. This account comes from Harkins, Blackburn's Headhunters, 102-105. It differs somewhat from the information found in USAFIP, NL, Guerrilla Days, 26-27. The last source reported that Baldwin was told to:

...attack the city of Baguio, to block the Kennon Road, to destroy all the enemy garrisons in sector, and to take over all the mines in the Itogon Area. Baldwin and his men accomplished their mission. The Balatog, Atok, Itocon, and other mines in the vicinity of Baguio were recaptured... Captain Baldwin hoisted the American and Filipino flags in the Itogon mining area during the October 1942 offensive. It was only when reinforcements with tanks arrived that his men were dislodged from their newly won positions.

Donald Blackburn was an eye-witness to the raid so his account was used.

82. Ibid., 104.


84. Ibid., 579.

85. Fortieth Infantry Division, U. S. Army 40th Infantry; The Years of WW II, 7 Dec 41 - 7 Apr 45 (Baton Rouge, La., 1947), 124, photo.


87. Ibid., 368, and GHQ, USAPP, MIS, GS, Intelligence Series, Vol. I, Guerrilla Movement in the Philippines, 47.

88. Wolfert, American Guerrilla, 179-181.

89. John Keats, They Fought Alone (New York, 1963), 123.


91. Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, 173. Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine, 82-86, gives a more complete description of the operation.

93. Volckmann, We Remained, 120-121.


96. Panlilio, The Crucible, 249.


98. Keats, They Fought Alone, 196-197 and 299-408 (Book Six: "War").

99. Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, 292. See also Note 24, this chapter.

100. Volckmann, We Remained, 126.

101. Ibid., 151-152, and Harkins, Blackburn's Headhunters, 235.

102. Volckmann, We Remained, 176.

103. Ibid.

104. Harkins, Blackburn's Headhunters, 249-250. For complete details of the Solana raid see also, 238-240 and 251.

105. Ibid., 275-277. Company E, Eleventh Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Tomas Quiocio attacked and took Solana even though the Japanese had been warned of the attack and met it head on. The guerrillas captured 20,000 pounds of rice as well as the spy Avena.

106. Whitney, MacArthur, 184, wrote:

The guerrillas of northern Luzon had already been hard at work at supporting the invasion. They had prepared maps detailing towns and even specific buildings where enemy arms and fuel were stored. Using these maps, U.S. pilots were able to avoid needlessly destroying other towns and buildings. The guerrillas also cut enemy supply and communication lines, ambushed patrols, and destroyed supply dumps themselves. General Krueger said later that the northern Luzon guerrillas, led by Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann, were worth at least one division of troops to the U.S.


116. *Ibid.*, 387-389 and 394-398 explains the problem between Fertig and Rosenquist. Brigadier General Steve Mellnik, *philippine diary/1939-1945* (New York, 1969) explains the background of the raid. Mellnik argued for the project after he arrived in Australia after escaping from the Davao Penal Colony and spending some time with the guerrillas on Mindanao. When he was in Washington, Mellnik recruited a willing Harold Rosenquist to lead the raid on the prison camp, and later Rosenquist was sent to Australia to perform the mission. After much haggling among the staff at GHQ, SWPA Rosenquist was sent into Mindanao. When Rosenquist reported that the Davao camp was empty, Mellnik was most upset. Mellnik mentioned nothing about the squabble Rosenquist had with Fertig.

The following comment by Mellnik, however, shows that Fertig was not above petty squabbles, 263:

We critiqued Fertig’s strange behavior for hours [about being reluctant to evacuate Mellnik and some of his escaped compatriots]. “I don’t understand why he had that chip on his shoulder,” McCoy said. “I didn’t expect him to fall over us, but he was downright hostile! Is he afraid we’ll debunk his phony rank? Why the brush-off on our request to wire MacArthur? ... He didn’t sound convincing when he said he’d tell GHQ about us; we’d be wise to check on him.”

and later:

We described the wait for GHQ's answer, the suspicion that Fertig had not sent the wire, and our
determination to force the issue. "Hell's bells!" exclaimed Ed [Dyess], "Let's light a fire under this guy. We've been through too goddamned much to be stymied now by jealousy or protocol!"

117. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, 238-241, outlines the story of Lieutenant Joseph Coe who survived the sinking of his prison ship off Mindanao. Coe eventually joined the guerrillas after his escape. Keats, They Fought Alone, 394-398, covers the sinkings in less detail. Mellnik, philippine diary, 290-292, also presents some interesting material on the sinkings. For a brief summary of the many sinkings of Japanese prison ships, see 1969 Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 27.

All of the sinkings occurred because the Japanese did not mark or identify the various ships as prison ships. Attacking American submarines and aircraft unknowing sunk the various vessels and caused a great loss of life among the hundreds of Allied prisoners of war.

CHAPTER V: INSIDE THE CORRIDOR

Several patterns of raiding developed inside the strategic corridor from Australia to the Philippines. Three have been discussed: the raids by guerrillas in New Guinea, New Britain, and the Philippines; the Allied patrols which constantly raided; and the Japanese raiders who harassed the Allies everywhere. Planned raids by forces other than patrols, however, have not been discussed, and they form the core of this chapter.

Australians raided often in New Guinea but while they were defending along the Kokoda Trail in early 1942 and later when they attacked to clear enemy forces from Papua, they made only a few raid patrols. When the Aussie "diggers" moved north toward Salamaua, Mubo, and Lae, they did not emulate the actions of their comrades in Kanga Force.

Farther north, the Australians planned to raid Alexishafen to capture a Japanese officer and destroy the army headquarters there, but the attacking forces captured the town before the raid could be executed. Later, two raids, one by a two platoon force and another by a two company group, successfully attacked an enemy force in the mountains and a Japanese command post. These last actions took place after American forces had been withdrawn for deployment in the Philippines, and they were part of an Australian offensive to clear the area inland from Aitape.
Similarly, on New Britain, Australian units and Australian led guerrillas continued to raid there after the American forces were withdrawn.

Smaller actions were planned by the Australians in the Allied Intelligence Bureau. One AIB raid struck Muschu Island off Wewak, but it proved to be a disaster in which most of the raiders were killed. Another operation was designed to support the Allied invasion of Hollandia: parachute parties were to jump in, destroy enemy aircraft at nearby air fields and perform other desired missions. The raids were cancelled at the last minute.

Americans, initially much less experienced than their Australian comrades, raided very little in New Guinea. No raids were made in Papua; some small raid patrols attacked the enemy near the American beachheads; and near Moari, Dutch New Guinea, Alamo Scouts executed a rescue raid which freed many Dutch and Javanese.

There were several raid like actions, however, which were very successful. One was the airborne assault which was made at Nadzab in the Markham Valley, and the other major one was the reconnaissance in force which began the invasion of the Admiralty Islands. Small reconnaissances in force, subsidiary attacks like the one at Mapia Island, and United States Marine actions on New Britain had raid like characteristics.

A most unusual "commando raid" was launched by the
crews of two American PT boats against the village of Loniu in the Admiralties. After bombarding the objective which had been a Japanese naval headquarters, the sailors landed and destroyed the remainder of the town.

American raiders came into their own in the Philippines. Two ranger raids hit the enemy on Suluan Island in Leyte Gulf; the first of them was the initial act of the invasion.

Leyte was the scene of many actions. Cavalrymen, toughened in the Admiralties, not only raided at night, but often penetrated deep into enemy lines to destroy Japanese materiel. Their activity made the enemy deploy his troops to guard his rear installations. Veteran reconnaissance soldiers working from a patrol base in the Ormoc Valley in western Leyte constantly harassed the Japanese in the area and destroyed many key bridges which the enemy needed while other infantrymen, veterans of Guam, landed near Ormoc and made a damaging reconnaissance in force against the enemy in the south. Even a company from a newly committed division raided successfully; they found a complement of Japanese in the mountains, deployed at night, and destroyed fifty of the enemy in a dawn assault.

Soldiers of the 776th Amphibious Tank Battalion, ex-cavalrymen for the most part, added some color to the raids on Leyte. These men took their vehicles out to sea and then assaulted enemy coastal positions with cannons blazing
in what could only be described as unique tank raids.  

On Mindoro a battalion of infantry raided an enemy radio station successfully in the interior of the island. Men from the same division also assaulted Verde Island, just off Mindoro to the northeast, and in a one day raid killed several Japanese and destroyed three cannons and then turned the island over to Filipion guerrillas.

There were many raid like seizures of bridges in the Philippines, but the most impressive of these actions occurred on Negros Island and on Luzon.

Reminiscent of the clearance of Leyte Gulf by the rangers, a company of infantry swept the areas which controlled the entrance to Davao Gulf on Mindanao. In these actions, the foot soldiers aimed at destroying Japanese coastwatcher stations. Further north in Davao Gulf, another infantry company raided Samal Island to destroy the Japanese artillery which was harassing the American units on the mainland near the city of Davao. It was not very successful.

American raiders had a field day on Luzon: rangers and guerrillas freed prisoners at Cabanatuan Prison Camp; parachutists, gliderists, guerrillas, and the men of an amphibious tractor battalion rescued internees in the Los Baños Camp; and elements of a regimental combat team raided Cabu, but hit thin air because the Japanese had bolted.

In the northern mountains, in addition to some raid patrols, one battalion of infantrymen kept raiding Japanese positions
at night to annoy the enemy and prepare for ensuing daylight assaults.

Paratroopers fighting in southern Luzon performed an ingenious raid of opportunity. Low on ammunition after beating off four Japanese banzai attacks, the troopers sallied forth from their position to capture enemy weapons and ammunition. They did this successfully, and returned just in time to defeat the fifth and final banzai assault of the day.

Several other actions were notable: the seizure of the Santo Tomas Internment camp by cavalrymen; the capture of three major bridges near Bauang; and the destruction of the enemy force holding Port Drum in Manila Bay. These were not true raids, but had the characteristics of raids.

All of these Philippine operations were a far cry from the desperate raids which were launched against the Japanese on Bataan in 1942. They showed how the inexperienced American soldiers who had not raided much in their first campaigns on New Guinea had developed into confident, aggressive, and competent raiders. The experience of the Americans illustrated that exhausted and inexperienced soldiers seldom raided. Furthermore, the Allied units raided most when they were conducting normal offensive operations in large areas, rather than when they were seizing beachheads and then defending the coastal enclaves without trying to clear the entire area inland from the lodgments.

Many of the actions were not true raids, but because
they had so many characteristics of raids, several of these
different actions will be covered in the next chapter. Of
the raids mentioned, five sparkling operations dominate the
story of raiding in the strategic corridor: the Alamo
Scouts at Moari; the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion at
Suluan Island and Cabanatuan; and the Eleventh Airborne
Division at Los Baños. These operations, each of which was
nearly perfect, show American raiders at their best.

INTO THE RISING SUN

Little did a former Dutch governor, his family, and
his servants, know how important a date the 28th of Sep-
tember 1944 was in their lives. On that day an escaped
prisoner of the Japanese reported to a Dutch interpreter on
Roemberpon Island that the governor and his entourage were
being held captive by the Japanese in a small settlement
three miles west of the coastal town of Moari, Netherlands
New Guinea. A report was immediately flashed back to
higher Allied headquarters, and within a few days a small
raiding force was dispatched to rescue the sixty-six
people.

Alamo Scouts from Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's
Sixth Army (Alamo Force) drew the raid mission and they
were assisted by Dutch and native soldiers and guides.
These Alamo Scouts established a remarkable record: seventy
missions behind enemy lines without losing a man! Organized by General Krueger on 28 November 1943, the first scout team was deployed on a strategic reconnaissance mission into the Admiralty Islands in February 1944 prior to the start of the reconnaissance in force by the First Cavalry Division's Brewer Task Force the same month. Roaming far and wide throughout the theater these American reconnaissance specialists performed various types of missions. Advanced reconnaissance tasks were completed before invading troops attacked Noemfoor Island off the coast of northern New Guinea and landed at Cape Sansapor further up the New Guinea coast to the northwest. Nine missions on Leyte and nearby islands and thirty-two missions on Luzon included the establishment of coast and road-watcher stations; the organization and control of guerrilla activities; an attempt to capture General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the Japanese commander; and the usual reconnaissance missions.

Although trained in "...reconnaissance and raider work" at the Alamo Scout Training Center, the scouts seldom raided because they avoided combat to gain information. The mission to rescue the governor and his companions was different, a singular exception to most of the scouts' work. Only one other mission was a raid, and in that one, the Alamo Scouts worked as the reconnaissance party for the attacking force. In both actions, three scout first lieutenants, Tom Rounsaville, William Nellist, and John Dove,
played important parts.

As luck would have it, Lieutenant Rounsaville and his five man team, just graduated from the scout training course, were on Roemberpon Island when the prisoner made his report about the captive Dutch and Javanese. The scouts had been sent there on 17 September to help the Dutch authorities evacuate friendly people who after escaping from the enemy had made their way from the New Guinea mainland to the island, which was a spit about five miles off the coast near Moari. While on the island, Rounsaville and his group occasionally went onto New Guinea on reconnaissance missions. Planned as a shake-down operation, it became much more.

Immediately after hearing about the sixty-six captives, the Alamo Scouts, assisted by the prisoner who had supplied the information, began a reconnaissance of the area where the people were held. Once in the immediate vicinity of the unnamed village where the prisoners were held, the scouts checked all the buildings in the area, spotted the enemy outposts, found where the Dutch and Javanese were quartered, and confirmed that the Dutch governor was indeed a prisoner.

Eighteen Japanese soldiers occupied a large hut on the west side of the settlement across a small stream from where the prisoners were held in several huts. Below the prisoners' area there was a small hut in which two Kempetai officials, members of the hated Japanese secret police, held the local chief hostage to prevent any local uprisings. A
radio was located either in the main enemy billet or in the Kempetai hut, and other supplies and equipment were scattered throughout the area.

Lieutenant Rounsaville years later described the area as a plantation, and well it could have been. It is clear, however, that heavy jungle, small streams, and swamps surrounded the settlement, and that the terrain was dominated by the Moari River which ran north of the buildings. A trail ran along the south bank of the river to Moari village at the river's mouth, and then turned south along the coast. At Moari, there was a small Japanese outpost, and the four enemy soldiers there were reported to have two machine guns. It was possible also that the enemy had a barge station at Moari.

North of the Moari River a large mangrove swamp covered the ground and impeded movement except along trails. One small trail ran from the settlement northeast through the swamp to the mouth of the Wanoesser River. This river emptied into Geelvinck Bay about three miles north of the southern tip of Cape Oransbari and six miles from the prison area.

After completing the reconnaissance the Alamo Scouts returned to Roemberpon Island where they found orders instructing them to return to Biak Island immediately. On the night of 2 October, Rounsaville and his team; Lieutenant Louie Rapmund, a Dutch interpreter with whom the Americans had worked; native guides who knew the Moari
River area; and the last of the prisoners who had already escaped to the island boarded PT boats and sped toward Biak. Biak, a coral ridged island honeycombed with caves, became the staging ground for the rescue operation. Once there, Lieutenant Rounsaville was assigned the raid mission. His team, a second scout team under William Nellist, Lieutenant Rapmund and three NEI (Netherlands East Indies Section of the Allied Intelligence Bureau) guides, and a special "contact team" led by Lieutenant Dove, and PT boats formed the raiding force.

Lieutenant Rounsaville planned to land north of the objective, near the mouth of the Wanoesser River, and then march southwestward with the two scout teams, his interpreter Rapmund, and the NEI guides. After striking the camp and rescuing the prisoners, the raiders were to move along the river to Moari and reembark on the PT boats. Before reembarkation occurred the enemy outpost at the mouth of the river was to be destroyed.

Landing and evacuation was to be coordinated by Lieutenant Dove's contact team. During landing the team was to accompany the scouts ashore, remain until the raiders departed, recover the rubber assault boats, and then return to the PT boats. Dove's group, which included a senior American naval rating, was to remain on the boats to coordinate the pick-up which was planned to be completed within twelve hours. The contact team was to have an army
Moos and Vicinity

Sketched from Lt. Colonel Frank J. Sackett, "Southwest Pacific Alamo Scouts," Number One Army Journal (June-Sept 1943), GC.
radio with them so that they could talk with the raiders ashore. This was wise because army and naval radios generally cannot net because of differing frequencies and modulations.

Except for the enemy troops whom the scouts had located, no other enemy positions were known to exist near the objective area. Pockets of Japanese, however, could be expected anywhere since thousands of enemy troops had been cut off and left to wither on the vine in New Guinea. Most of these remained near the coast. Major operations had never hit the Moari area: American units struck Hollandia to the southeast, Biak to the east, Noemfoor to the northeast, and then had jumped all the way to the top of New Guinea where they attacked Sansapor. In September, American units invaded Morotai Island preparatory to driving into the Philippines, and this assault ended the main campaign in New Guinea. From that time forward, Allies held their bases along the New Guinea coast, conducted some actions to clear out and destroy Japanese forces, and executed other small actions. With such a vague situation the Alamo Scout raiders began their operation.

On 4 October the raiders and their accompanying personnel boarded PT boats and left Biak. Crossing one hundred mile wide Geelvink Bay south of Noemfoor Island, the PT boats struck out for the mouth of Wanoesser River. At 7:00 p.m. the scouts began landing, and once ashore,
Lieutenant Rounsaville sent his NEI guides to his front and flanks to check for any enemy activity. The natives returned within twenty minutes and reported that there were no enemy soldiers in the area. Quickly the raiders moved out behind the native guide who had been a prisoner at the settlement. After the force departed, the contact party returned to the PT boats with the rubber boats; and then the navy craft with their army compatriots withdrew into the vast expanse of Geelvink Bay.

Moving southwest steadily through dense and hilly terrain, and then along the faint trail through the mangrove swamp, Lieutenant Rounsaville's force finally arrived at 2:00 a.m. 5 October on the north bank of the Moari River across from the objective. Deploying carefully, the scouts dispersed and secured their position while the native guide, who was acquainted with the area, went forward for a last minute reconnaissance. He was asked to see if the enemy dispositions and the locations of the prisoners had changed. The scout returned in about forty-five minutes and reported that everything was just as it was when Lieutenant Rounsaville and his scouts had seen the area a few days before: the eighteen Japanese soldiers were in the large hut; the Kempetai officials held the local chief; and the sixty-six Dutch and Javanese were billeted where they had been.

Lieutenant Rounsaville had made a tentative plan; and after the native reported his information, the lieutenant drew up his final plan. He decided to lead a five man
assault party of scouts against the main Japanese force; send two scouts to kill the Kempetai men and rescue the native chief; deploy Lieutenant Nellist and four scouts to Moari to destroy the Japanese outpost, capture the machine guns, establish a road block on the trail from the south, and secure a pick-up point on the beach; and have Lieutenant Rapmund and two guides move into the prisoners' huts after the fighting was over to assemble and prepare the rescued people for immediate evacuation.

Attacks were to start at approximately 4:00 a.m. because about that time the Japanese cook began breakfast near the large hut and first light was expected. Lieutenant Rounsaville's group was to open fire and all other groups were to respond similarly. In case Lieutenant Nellist and his men could not hear the firing to the west, the lieutenant was told to begin his attack as soon as possible after 4:00 a.m. Nellist had the only radio so communication with Rounsaville was impossible.

Well armed with Thompson sub-machine guns, carbines, and hunting knives as well as phosphorus and fragmentary grenades the raiders began deploying into their assault positions. Crossing the Moari River at 3:30 a.m., Rounsaville's party and the Kempetai elimination group moved up to their objectives within thirty minutes. Near the large enemy billet, Rounsaville and the five scouts got within fifteen feet of their target and then spread out to be able to fire better on the Japanese. In the early light
the raiders spied the enemy cook beginning his morning chores. Four o'clock came and passed, but the Americans did not open fire. Rounsaville waited ten more minutes to insure that his other groups were in place and then opened fire. After a few initial rounds the raiders threw white phosphorous grenades into the enemy hut. With the light from the burning phosphorous the scouts poured fire into the billet. In three violent minutes fourteen Japanese died. Only four escaped out the back of the hut. When the scouts rushed the objective they found these men, wounded and wearing only shorts, in a trench. Seeing the Americans, the Japanese soldiers bolted. Two were shot and killed, but the other two managed to escape into a nearby swamp where the Americans were content to leave them moaning and groaning in the half light of early morning.

At the Kempetai hut the two scouts knifed and killed one of the Japanese; but as they tried to capture the second enemy official, one American hit the Japanese so hard that he died. The native chief was rescued unharmed.

After these actions were over Lieutenant Rapmund and his men entered the prisoners' area and began to prepare the Dutch and Javanese there for the march to the coast. By 5:30 a.m. the actions at the unnamed village were over: the scouts had burned the enemy supplies; searched for enemy documents and other intelligence material; and demolished with a thermite grenade the Japanese radio found in the village. As planned, Lieutenant Rounsaville had dispatched
a runner to the beach to contact Lieutenant Nellist to ask him to call in the PT boats for the pick-up of the raiders and the rescued prisoners. With everything completed the large group started for Moari with Alamo Scouts in the van and guarding the rear of the makeshift column.

While all the action was taking place inland the scouts under Lieutenant Nellist were preparing to attack their target. They crossed the Moari River at 3:00 a.m. and were near the enemy outpost by 4:00 a.m. Unfortunately, the second group of raiders did not hear the firing from the inland group. The dense jungle dampened sound even in the quiet of early morning.

Nellist used the extra time to reconnoiter the enemy outpost. Finally, he deployed his team. One man covered three sides of the building which served as the outpost, and left the fourth to the Japanese guard who stood at the door. Just after the Americans were in place, at about 5:30 a.m., three other Japanese soldiers joined their comrade near the door of the outpost. Once the enemy soldiers were close together and formed a compact target, the raiders opened fire. After a short fight and following a brief pursuit, the four Japanese were killed. Scouring the immediate area, the scouts found two British machine guns and a considerable cache of ammunition.

After the attack, Lieutenant Nellist moved his party and the captured guns to the beach where the scouts formed a road block to cover the trail along which enemy
reinforcements could march from the south, and secured a pick-up point for evacuation. At 6:15 a.m. Lieutenant Rounsaville's messenger arrived, and Lieutenant Nellist immediately called the contact party on the PT boats and asked that the boats rendezvous at the beach for the evacuation of the raiders and the rescued prisoners.

Within a few minutes Lieutenant Rounsaville's column and the PT boats approached the rendezvous point. At 7:00 a.m. 5 October, everyone was aboard the boats; and soon the deep throated marine engines were driving the trim, wooden hulled PT's through Geelvink Bay into the rising sun toward Biak.

It was a tidy action, this rescue raid, and it was the precursor of a larger and more dramatic operation which later freed Allied prisoners of war in the Philippines. Lieutenants Rounsaville, Nellist, and Dove, and their men were destined to play crucial roles in that raid.

THE LIGHTHOUSE ON SULUAN

Suluan Island, a tiny, coconut and cogon covered triangle in the Philippine Sea stands as the loneliest outpost to the east of Leyte Gulf. Surrounded in part by coral reefs which are often visible at low tide, the island was chosen as the first objective of the American forces returning to the Philippines in October 1944. Radar, radio,
and sensor installations were thought to be on the island or on the nearby islands, but more importantly it was believed that valuable mine charts were located in the lighthouse which stood on a 280 foot hilltop near the southern tip of Suluan. A small enemy garrison, called coastwatchers by one source, marines by another, but believed to be naval troops by the attacking troops, occupied the island.

West of Suluan a line of islands extends south from Samar and forms an outpost line across Leyte Gulf. Elongated Calicoan points southwest from Samar; peanut shaped Homonhon is directly west of Suluan; and the largest of the islands, Dinagat, forms the southwestern anchor of the outpost line. Homonhon was first reported to be unoccupied, although the invaders were told just before they landed that there were forty Japanese on the island. Five hundred soldiers from the enemy's Thirtieth Division were believed to be on Dinagat.

In the first phase of the invasion of Leyte, Sixth Army planned to destroy the enemy on these islands and set up navigational aids for the naval forces to assist the movement of the invasion fleet into Leyte Gulf. Orders assigned the mission to the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion. At 6:30 a.m., 17 October 1944, three days before A Day, the start of the invasion, the rangers were told to "seize and occupy" Homonhon Island and the northern tip of
Dinagat Island, and "...destroy hostile forces and installation [on Suluan Island], recover enemy material of value [mine charts?], and evacuate [the island] upon accomplishment of these missions."

Before the Americans assaulted Leyte, I. D. Richardson, the American assistant to Leyte's guerrilla leader, Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, spent some time on Homonhon reporting Japanese naval activities and locating enemy minefields. On 10 October, Charles "Chick" Parsons and Colonel Frank Rouelle, USA, landed south of Tacloban, Leyte by navy amphibian PBY aircraft to join Colonel Kangleon and prepare for the coming attack. Parsons; Jesus Villamor, and other intelligence agents had had the thrill of entering the Philippines covertly during the occupation, but no combat troops had set foot in the islands since the fall of Corregidor.

First Lieutenant Leslie M. Gray's Company D, Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion was given the mission of leading General MacArthur's return to the Philippines by landing at 6:00 a.m. on Black Beach Three on Suluan Island. Gray's company order stated:

Co. "D", 6th Ranger Inf. En will raid Suluan Island in order to destroy enemy forces and installations at the lighthouse area and to recover any enemy material of value.

It was the first raid of the Philippine Campaign.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Mucci, a stocky, mustachioed 1936 graduate of West Point, commanded the
reinforced ranger battalion. His battalion staged at Finschafen, New Guinea; rehearsed the Dinagat assault on 10 October at Tanahmerah Bay, New Guinea; and held its last commanders' briefing with the Task Force Commander and his captains just prior to leaving Hollandia, New Guinea. Original plans had not included an attack on Suluan, so last minute changes were made at this conference, and new orders were issued at sea.

Five hundred rangers embarked on the eight destroyer transports, APD's, of Task Group 78.4 (Dinagat Attack Group) which was commanded by Rear Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN. Struble, an Annapolis graduate of 1915, was supported by Rear Admiral R. W. Hayler, Annapolis, 1914, who commanded the fire support force which included the United States light cruisers Denver and Columbia and six destroyers. With these forces came Task Group 77.5, a minesweeping and hydrographic unit, which included two Australian vessels and was led by Commander Wayne R. Loud, USN. These vessels and the rangers were in the vanguard of the huge armada which was bringing nearly two hundred thousand American soldiers to Leyte to smash the Japanese in the Philippines.

Early on 17 October the amphibious force arrived off of Suluan when the area was being lashed by high winds which resulted from the typhoon raging north of Leyte. The difficult weather conditions prevented the rangers from landing on Suluan as planned. At 6:30 a.m., Commander Loud's
minesweepers began their dangerous mission near the island. This action was discovered by the Japanese on Suluan between 6:50 a.m. and 7:19 a.m. and a message was flashed to naval headquarters in Manila reporting the appearance of two Allied battleships, two converted aircraft carriers, and six destroyers. The message, sent in the clear, exaggerated the size of the American force, which at this time only consisted of three minesweepers, eight APD's, and a half dozen cruisers and destroyers.

After the minesweepers cleared the sea lanes to Suluan, the ten thousand ton cruiser, Denver, moved to within 6500 yards of the shore and at 8:00 a.m. began shelling Black Beach Three, the proposed landing site, with her five and six inch guns. The bombardment lasted twenty minutes. Under the cover of the protective fires, the Company D rangers who had clambered over the side of their transport, the Crosby, into four LCRP landing craft, moved toward the beach. Around 8:20 a.m., in a driving rain, Lieutenant Gray's troops hit Black Beach Three and fulfilled MacArthur's promise. American troops had returned to the Philippines.

They stirred up a hornet's nest. A second enemy message informed the Commander of the Combined Japanese Fleet in Formosa that American forces had landed on Suluan, and the Japanese commander alerted his key subordinates to prepare to execute Sho Operation 1 for the defense of the Philippines. The enemy naval forces which began
steaming toward the Philippines were eventually to strike the United States Seventh Fleet off Leyte Gulf, near Suluan, after the American ground forces were safely ashore, and were to be defeated in the greatest surface engagement between naval forces in the Second World War. The Japanese Second Air Division was ordered into immediate action also, but the ghastly weather obscured visibility and prevented any enemy air attacks near Suluan. Later on the 17th, Japanese naval reconnaissance planes spotted the Dinagat Attack Force; but before enemy aircraft could strike, the weather closed in and prevented any attacks. The weather also prevented Allied air action in the area.

Once ashore the rangers reorganized quickly and moved south along the trail which passed through the barrio of Granadas. No enemy resistance was met initially. Lieutenant Gray moved southward as planned in a column of platoons: the first platoon led and provided the point and flank guards; the second platoon followed and also provided flank guards; and Gray's command group was sandwiched between the point section and the Second Section of the leading platoon. About five hundred yards south of Granadas, the trail turned eastward toward the lighthouse, and at this point the rangers found four buildings which had recently been occupied by the Japanese. One radio was discovered in the buildings, which were determined to be billets and storage houses; and after a reconnaissance of
SULUAN ISLAND
PHILIPPINES

GIRANADA

Scale: 1:50,000

Legend:

- Soft elevation and higher to soft elevations
- Woodland
- Coconut Palm
- Sand
- Trail
- Reef
- Fathom Curve, Feet

Drawn from Army Map Service S131, Sheet 4892-II, Suluon Island, 1944.
the area, the rangers burned and completely destroyed the buildings.

Continuing east the rangers ran into their first hostile fire which killed PFC Darwin C. Zufell and wounded PFC Donald J. Cannon. As the company deployed and attacked, the Japanese retreated into the dense jungle which bordered the trail. After reforming, the Americans drove forward and reached the base of the hill below the lighthouse without further combat.

Rising above them, the lighthouse stood at the top of sheer rock pinnacle, and one hundred and fifty concrete steps climbed the hill from where the rangers stood. Deploying most of his company at the base of the hill, Lieutenant Gray led one assault section up the steps to the lighthouse. No enemy fire erupted. The Japanese had fled. In the deserted lighthouse and surrounding buildings Lieutenant Gray and his soldiers found and destroyed a pair of binoculars, two power units, and a radar antenna. The lighthouse was left as it was, partially destroyed by fire from the supporting American cruiser. Completing their mission at the lighthouse by 10:40 a.m., the raiders withdrew to the beach at 11:25 a.m. There, the company commander found that the landing craft had been broached by the severe weather and the radio link with the Crosby had been broken. The weather was horrible, typhoon winds were lashing the islands, and rain squalls blew in constantly. The rangers and the boat crews, now isolated on Suluan, had
no choice but to remain in place overnight and wait for boats to evacuate them when the weather calmed. Lieutenant Gray formed his men into a defensive perimeter and the men settled down for a wet and windy wait. PFC Cannon, suffering from a groin wound, was cared for as well as possible.

Early on the 18th the Filipinos reported that there were Japanese about eight hundred yards away in a garden. Lieutenant Gray dispatched a fifteen man patrol to check out the report; and after reconnoitering the central part of the island, the patrol was suddenly fired upon from a small hut which was nearly invisible in the tall cogon grass. One ranger was shot in the head. Seeing no Japanese, the Americans opened fire on the position. Driving in on the hut, the rangers found two dead Japanese. Apparently, three more enemy soldiers were killed in the fire fight, but this information was reported to the rangers by the Filipinos at a later date. Carrying seriously wounded PFC Roscoe Dick, the patrol returned to the perimeter without further incident. Dick, an American Indian, died aboard ship the next morning and was buried later on nearby Dinagat.

Before leaving Suluan, the rangers buried the first casualty of the invasion, PFC Zufall, in the little park in the center of Granadas. Loyal Filipinos promised to care for the American's grave. Zufall, Dick, and the wounded Dallas were the price which the rangers paid for their attack which netted only five known enemy dead according to
Lieutenant Gray's report. More optimistic American reports said that thirty-two Japanese had been killed.

Immediately after noon on the 18th, boats from the Sands began evacuating the raiders to the Crosby, and by 3:00 p.m. all of Lieutenant Gray's rangers had returned to the Crosby. The first raid on Suluan was over.

On Dinagat the other rangers found important sea charts which were later used during the invasion of Okinawa. No immediate resistance was met on the island, and none was met when rangers landed on Homonhon Island. Dinagat was assaulted on the 17th, but troops did not land on Homonhon until the next day because of rough seas and the failure of minesweeping equipment. By noon on 18 October the Americans on the two islands were prepared to install navigational lights for the armada which was due to arrive within thirty-six hours.

Suluan was destined to be raided again because the Japanese on the island began molesting the Filipinos there. The following entry in the Company B's operations journal sets the stage for the second raid:

[Message from Captain Arthur D. Simons, Commanding Company B to Colonel Mucci, signed 4:04 p.m., 19 October 1944]

Authenticated Report received that two seven Japs still at large on Suluan. Japs are Running wild. Massacering civilians. Request permission to wipe out garrison. Need three LCPR's. Life is getting dull. Request immediate reply. Colonel Mucci denied the request later that afternoon, but the rangers did not give up trying to get to Suluan. They
asked permission to go again on the 23d, and finally on
the 25th, Colonel Mucci gave the company permission after
Sixth Army had approved the adventure.

Approval of the mission did not end the rangers' problems. Neither the army nor navy could provide any boats
to carry the Americans from Homonhon to Suluan. Not to be
denied, the rangers rounded up five sailboats and eleven
bancas, Filipino outrigger canoes, and planned to cross the
fifteen mile passage between the islands. Captain Simons,
now claiming to be an "admiral [of a] fleet [of] thirteen
vessels," planned to leave Homonhon at 6:00 p.m. on 27
October, but tides caused a delay until the next day. The
rangers moved out into the channel at 2:00 a.m. on the 28th
and four hours later seven bancas capsized. It was an
inauspicious start.

Simons and his men did not give up, and by early
afternoon on the 29th, the first rangers landed on Suluan.
Filipino guerrillas had preceded them on the 21st, and
they secured the beachhead for the Americans. The crossing
had been a hazardous one for two reasons. First, the craft
were not the most reliable for an amphibious assault, and
second the Japanese controlled the air above. To avoid
detection the raiders placed their equipment under cover,
wore no helmets, and stripped to the waist.

Early the next morning a patrol reconnoitered probable
routes of attack, but did not make contact with any
Japanese even though the enemy was visible around the
lighthouse. Naval gunfire was requested on the lighthouse, but it never was delivered.

It was the 31st before the rest of the rangers arrived to join the leading section on Suluan. They landed at 3:30 a.m. after an eleven hour struggle against the winds and tides.

When the entire force assembled, plans for the attack on the lighthouse were firm. In addition patrols had reconnoitered the western side of the island and had poisoned the enemy's water supply.

A patrol on the night of 31 October-1 November reconnoitered the difficult terrain on the east side of the island to find a route to the lighthouse. It found that the ground nearly formed a vertical cliff which was covered by all sorts of jungle vines and scrub rose bushes. To get to the lighthouse, the rangers would have to climb up the cliff at night, a formidable task.

Captain Simons decided that the main attack would go up the cliff because it would be suicidal to try to assault the objective up the steps which was the only route of approach from the west. The captain also decided to attack at night, something that had not been done very often by American troops in the jungle. To aid in the cliff attack the rangers planned to carry ropes.

Two forces were organized for the raid. Captain Simons was to lead two assault squads and a light machine gun squad across the island and down the east coast to take
the lighthouse in reverse. The remainder of his unit was
formed into a blocking force which was to move down the
west coast of Suluan, turn east, deploy along the trail to
the lighthouse, and then at dawn attack and destroy the
Japanese security guards at the foot of the steps and isolate
the enemy on top of the ridge. After Simon's men destroyed
the Japanese at the lighthouse they were to sweep across
the top of the ridge and move down the steps to join the
blocking force. Once linked up, both parties were to
attack southward and push the remainder of the Japanese
toward the sea to destroy them.

At 9:15 p.m. 1 November, the men under Captain Simons
were to begin their approach march, and at 3:00 a.m. the
next morning the blocking force was to move out. Flares
were to be used to control future actions: a red one from
the top of the cliff would signify that the assault group
had cleared the lighthouse area; a subsequent yellow one
would indicate that the same group had control of the stair-
way; and an orange flare would tell the blocking force to
begin its attack to the south immediately. In case anything
went wrong and the Americans were discovered, all forces
were to press their attacks to the end regardless of enemy
reaction and resistance.

Each ranger was thoroughly briefed and all details of
the raid were covered: plan of attack, routes to the
objective, each man's part in the action, and the key sig-
nals. The need for surprise was stressed because without
it. the small cliff assault group could be annihilated easily if discovered prematurely. No lights were carried and leggings were removed to prevent them from snagging in the brush. Watches were kept in pockets, and only one item was allowed in each pocket. Faces, hands, and even the thirty foot ropes were blackened.

With plans made, equipment prepared, and the rangers briefed and camouflaged, the final attack began. Captain Simons reported:

At 2115 the attack group that was to scale the cliff left the bivouac area and crossed the island to the [east] side. A very bright moon made the traveling easy but rather dangerous since the landscape was lit up like a Christmas tree and the ground was as open as an Iowa prairie. The men moved along in single file about ten yards apart. The point moved out until it was thirty yards ahead of the rest of the group and picked the softest ground and the most shadow to go through. The terrain became extremely rocky and jagged but the trail was still clear and the going good.

By 2400 the assault group was on a very indistinct trail over solid coral. Footing was insecure and the men were feeling their way along with their feet and hands and breathing silent prayers that the coral wouldn't crumble and give them away. At this point orders were issued for all men to take off their socks and put them on over their shoes to decrease the possibility of noise and slipping. The men pulled off the trail, such as it was, and followed the order. In ten minutes hand signs indicated that they were ready to travel again. In the dead stillness they knew the rough part was about to start.

At 0100 the group was directly under the lighthouse that stood out like a spectre overhead. The point turned ninety degrees to the right and started up. The going was slow, painfully slow since there was no trail and the coral was chopping the meat off fingers and palms. At points the men pulled themselves up hand over hand on the
vines where there was no footing at all. Up to this time there had been no noise of any kind and everybody was breathing a little easier when a rifle stock hit a coral cone and it rang like the voice of doom in the stillness. Everyone stopped moving and breathing at the same time. The silence screamed at the men as they waited for a rifle shot from above that would indicate the guard had heard us. For ten minutes the men waited and hoped and waited. The point moved out again and the slow procession crawled on up the cliff.

0200 and the guides and the Company Commander were on top of the cliff. The rest of the men started moving into position on the narrow platform. The Jap latrine is five feet ahead. The farthest building is twenty yards away and the nearest eight yards to the front. The full moon light[s] up the four white buildings and the Japs are talking in the nearest one, still no alarm. The first men feel naked in the bright light as they keep their guns trained on the 60 foot cement tower. Still no sound but the unintelligible grunts of the enemy in the nearest building. Then suddenly it breaks. A sleepy Jap is coming to the latrine. As he puts his feet on the first of two wooden steps leading to the board platform the lead men know he's getting too close for comfort and one of the guides raises his sub-machine gun and crashes three slugs through his chest.

The body is five or six feet from the Company Commander and the fight has started whether it was planned that way or not. White phosphorus grenades shower into the buildings and the machine gun comes crawling up the cliff as fast as it can be moved. In a remarkably short time it's in position. The gunner is holding one leg down and firing the gun. The Company Commander is holding the other leg and the ammunition box. The third leg is free. The Squad Leader of the LMG [light machine gun] squad is keeping the gun clear of crawling men going by to the rear and tracers are lacing the sky in a grotesque pattern under the moon.

The Japs are taken completely by surprise and they run into the fire, back up and go over the cliff where grenades and rifles pick them off as they fall. The machine gun fire lifts
and the two assault squads go through the buildings and clear them out with grenades and rifle fire. Everything has been secured but the tower itself. The first shot was fired at 0210. At 0230 the firing has dwindled to an occasional shot from the tower. The men wait and watch. Another shot from the tower and a fusillade answers it. The firing stops completely and the red flare is sent up. A check shows two of the men badly shot. Three dead Japs in a heap and the rest scattered over the side and bottom of the cliff. The men on top relay[x] and look at the eight holes in the tin roof on the shack where the Battalion Surgeon is working over the wounded with quick sure hands. Guards are posted and the men watch the moon travel across the clear sky.69

The individual bravery of the rangers was rewarded: Captain Simons and his machine gunner received Silver Stars for gallantry in action; Bronze Stars went to several other soldiers.

In the bivouac area, the blocking force saw the red flare streak into the sky at 2:45 a.m., fifteen minutes before the party was to depart. Moving rapidly the remaining rangers arrived at the bottom of the cliff by 4:15 a.m. and at 6:05 a.m. they opened fire against the Japanese positions near the foot of the stairs. Falling into the American trap, the Japanese troops slowly retreated toward the southern tip of Suluan, but as they retired they fired automatic weapons at the lighthouse and wounded three more Americans.

Sporadic fighting continued until approximately 10:00 a.m. when the rangers figured that they had killed all but five or six of the enemy garrison. Soon, the wounded were carried back to the beach to be evacuated
while a party remained to demolish the lighthouse.

Four more Japanese were killed by the rangers on 4 and 5 November as patrols scoured the island. In all the actions on Suluan, Company B lost two soldiers killed and two others wounded. Forty Japanese had been killed and the remainder, if any, were left for the guerrillas. On 13 November, nearly two weeks after they first landed, Captain Simons and his men were taken off Suluan and rejoined the remainder of the ranger battalion.

Neither Captain Simons’ company nor Lieutenant Gray’s company were destined to make major raids again in the Philippines. The rangers’ most spectacular raid was to be made by troops from two other companies under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mucci, but the attacks on the lighthouse which stood on the top of the coral cliffs of Suluan prepared the way for the intrepid action which with the help of the Alamo Scouts who had raided at Moari rescued the five hundred Allied prisoners who still lived at the Cabanatuan Prison Camp on Luzon.

FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE PIT

Camp O’Donnell was the terminus of the Bataan Death March, a camp of atrocities in which hundreds of Americans and thousands of Filipinos died from disease, starvation, and Japanese brutalities. After it was abandoned in the
late summer of 1942, most of the Americans were transferred to the new camp at Pangatian in Nueva Ecija Province, a compound called Cabanatuan for the nearby town to the southwest. At Cabanatuan, the survivors of the Death March joined the men from Corregidor. In 1944, some veterans of Singapore were imprisoned there also after their rescue by the Japanese from a prison ship sunk by Admiral Halsey's aircraft off Luzon.

Like those who rotted at Camp O'Donnell and were rotting at the ancient and condemned Bilibid Prison in Manila "...the men [of Cabanatuan] who survived the long march from Bataan and the bloody ramparts of Corregidor found at last, the bottom of the pit." Prisoners of the victorious Japanese army, they were not accorded the proper status of prisoners of war, but were treated as captives and often used as slaves or coolies. Desolate and dying, the allied prisoners dreamed of rescue or evacuation.

Few escaped from Cabanatuan: the men were too weak and emaciated and the enemy too vigilant. Swift, brutal, and often fatal reprisals were the consequences of the attempted escape or violations of camp regulations. Rescue was the great dream; and even when it failed to come in 1942, 1943, or 1944, it remained the hope which kept people alive.

Liberation became a possibility when the Americans

*The name of the camp is italicized for clarity.*
finally landed on Leyte in October 1944, but it was not really practical until General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army drove ashore at Lingayen Gulf on 9 January 1945. Once secure in the beachhead, Sixth Army fought south through the Central Plain to Fort Stotsenberg and Manila with its Fourteenth Corps while its First Corps turned north and east to protect the army's left flank and to drive into the Sierra Madre and Caraballo Mountains where the enemy was establishing new defensive positions. Farther south, General Robert Eichelberger's newly formed Eighth Army landed on the west coast of Luzon at San Antonio on 29 January to seal off the Bataan Peninsula and at Nasugbu on 31 January to attack Manila from the south.

In a series of spectacular actions, troops from Sixth Army freed prisoners of war and civilian internees at Cabanatuan, the University of Santo Tomas in Manila, and the Agricultural College near Los Baños, south of Laguna de Bay. Bilibid was seized as an after-thought because the first units to reach the prison failed to capture it since they did not know allied prisoners were being held there.

Planning for the rescue at Cabanatuan began on Saturday, 27 January when a guerrilla officer reported to Colonel Horton V. White, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), Sixth Army, that there were between three hundred and five hundred prisoners in a stockade at Pangatian. When General Krueger heard the news he decided
that the prisoners must be rescued as soon as possible before they were moved, were harmed by the Japanese, or, obviously, perished from their weakened state of health.

This release of the prisoners of war and the internees was one of the goals of General MacArthur. He had convinced President Franklin D. Roosevelt to attack the Philippines rather than Formosa, an objective preferred by the United States Navy, for several reasons, one of which was the psychological necessity of rescuing the people, military and civilian, men and women, adults and children, who were imprisoned throughout the Philippines. The men at Cabanatuan were the first to be freed on Luzon and the largest group to be rescued to date in the campaign.

Colonel White and his section planned the overall operation which aimed at seizing the camp, releasing the prisoners, and bringing them back to American lines. The plans were drawn up using available maps and aerial photographs, but these sources were inadequate for the detailed plans which the men who were to conduct the action would need to develop. Therefore, the colonel selected two Alamo Scout teams, composed of Tom Rounsaville, William Nellist, and John Dove, the three lieutenants who led the Moari Raid, and ten other scouts, to gain the detailed facts about the enemy and the objective area for the raiding force. Lieutenant Rounsaville, the appointed leader, was told to move to Guimba, a town located about fifty
miles from Lingayen Gulf and about twenty-five miles from Cabanatuan. Guimba, held by the advance elements of the Sixth Infantry Division, was the closest friendly town to the prison camp. Lieutenant Rounsaville was to obtain Filipino guides in the town from the guerrillas there, and then he was to depart Guimba as quickly as possible on the 27th, the same day the information had been received about the prisoners.

The planned route of march for the scouts and for the raiders who followed them ran east from Guimba to the small barrio of Mataas na Kahoy and then turned south to the barrio of Plateros which was five thousand yards north of Pangatian. At Plateros or along the route, Lieutenant Rounsaville was to contact the local guerrillas for assistance, aid which proved invaluable. Once at Cabanatuan, the scouts were told to reconnoiter the camp thoroughly, contact the prisoners, and find out how many men would have to be evacuated from the prison on stretchers.

It was known that there was a small Japanese garrison at Pangatian and that, because of the American advance south from Lingayen Gulf, many enemy units were moving north to the town of San Jose, a key road and railway center several miles to the northeast of the target area. Japanese forces were moving at night to avoid being attacked by American aircraft, and they were using the main all weather roads which reached San Jose from Cabanatuan through Baloc and Munoz and from Cabu and Rizal. During the day the enemy
remained in concealed assembly areas or in established camps along the main routes. *Cabanatuan* was one of the stopover points, and it was clear to the planners that a large number of transient Japanese could be near the stockade area at any given time. Other enemy forces were known to be in the town of Cabanatuan and in the three smaller towns to the north on Highway 5: Pinagpanaan, Talaver, and Baloc.

The route to the prison camp was planned to avoid the enemy concentrations. It was drawn south of the road from Guimba to Baloc where it passed by the barrio of Lobang (also Lobong), crossed Licab River, went through a forest, crossed a large grassy area which was broken by some trees and bordered by a swamp on the north and rice paddies on the south, and finally reached Bibayan Creek. Woods were encountered again just west of Highway 5 and they continued onward to the east, cut only by one patch of grassland and the Talvera and Casili Rivers until, about a mile from the barrio of General Luna, a small patch of grasslands again broke the expanse of forest. There were trees around General Luna which was on the hard surfaced road running from Pinagpanaan to Rizal, and the forest stretched farther east to Mataas na Kahoy located on the steep banked Murcon River. The route turned south then into flatter and more open grasslands and paralleled the trail to the barrio of Plainfield, swung east into more woods, and then turned south past the barrio of Balincarin to
Plateros. Both of these last barrios were to be used as bivouac areas by the raiders. From Plateros on the Kaman-dug River it was only a mile to the wide and sandy Pam-panga River, and the route turned southwest past the western tip of a small island which was formed by the double channel of the river. Crossing the Pampanga River at a spot where the trees were closest to both banks, the route went directly south until a small creek was encountered. It then followed the creek southeastward to the main highway which ran from Cabanatuan to Cabu, just to the east of the prison camp at Pangatian.

It was a long route, an indirect but logical one which avoided known enemy positions and large towns. Although many rivers and creeks had to be crossed, the area was very dry at this time; the rice paddies were baked hard, and the waterways were shallower than usual. The forests concealed daylight movements and the expansive grasslands allowed swift night marches. Danger points on the route were the two highways which had to be crossed quickly and carefully to prevent detection by enemy outposts or patrols. Some heavy vegetation along the stream near the prison camp gave the raiders and the scouts a well concealed approach to the vicinity of the camp, but a stretch of open ground north of the camp made the direct approach from the north hazardous.

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be followed the next day by the main raiding force.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci's Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, veterans of the landings on Suluan, Dinagat, and Homonhon Islands in Leyte Gulf, provided the men for the raid. These soldiers had landed at Lingayen Gulf as part of General Krueger's army reserve. Colonel Mucci chose Company C and the Second Platoon of Company F of his battalion, four officers and one hundred and fifteen men, to accompany him on the operation. All the rangers were volunteers, men who "...swore to die before allowing harm to come to a single one of the prisoners." It was essentially a three platoon force led by the battalion commander and supplemented by a company headquarters group and a small medical team which included Captain James A. Fisher of Philadelphia and four medics.

Each thirty-one man ranger platoon had a six man special weapons section built around a single bazooka, the 2.36 inch rocket launcher, two five man light machine gun squads, and two five man assault squads. An assault squad and a machine gun squad formed an assault section.

Platoons were equipped with a mix of rifles, sub-machine guns, sniper rifles, and pistols, in addition to the bazookas and light machine guns. For this mission, the rangers left their six machine guns behind and carried eleven Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR's) instead. These lighter weapons could be handled by one man instead of a crew, and were excellent assault weapons. Long range
radios were also carried, but one had to be left in Guimba to establish a radio relay station for the raiding force.

Colonel White briefed the selected rangers on the enemy situation and the general plans on the 27th using his available maps and aerial photographs. By far the most difficult phase of the operation, the actual raid on the prison camp, had to be planned by Colonel Mucci in the field because it had to be based upon information which was not available to the army staff or the rangers at the briefing. Evacuation of the prisoners, the next most difficult action, required the full support of the army headquarters as well as the help of the Filipino guerrillas and civilians in the operational area. Plans for the evacuation of the weakened prisoners were also critical. All of these plans had to be properly developed and coordinated by the rangers and the Alamo Scouts before the attack on Cabanatuan could begin. Sixth Army had to be prepared to support the raid, especially medically, because the prisoners would be exhausted by any prolonged marching and there was always the chance that the raiders would suffer heavy casualties requiring evacuation. Extraction plans had to be flexible because the American lines could change before the raiders and the prisoners returned to friendly positions. The burden of coordinating the return of the prisoners from Cabanatuan rested equally on the raiders and Sixth Army headquarters.
Unknown to the American leaders, a strange situation had occurred at the prison camp earlier in the month. Just after the invasion of Lingayen Gulf, the Japanese commandant informed the prisoners that they were free but that they would be shot if they left the compound. After the Japanese left, the hungry prisoners moved through Cabanatuan and found and devoured the rations which were left behind. Most of the starved men fell ill as the long denied food hit their unprepared stomachs. After this frustrating lesson, the men learned to eat smaller portions to prevent the unpleasant effects. According to several reports the prisoners gained some weight although none regained his pre-war physique in the few days before liberation. Without the extra food, many more of the rescued men probably would have been unable to walk out of the camp and would have placed a greater burden on the raiding forces during the withdrawal from the prison to Guimba. Unfortunately, the enemy garrison returned after three days, before the Americans could seize the camp, but still the men did profit by the short evacuation because they got some necessary food.

Well armed with automatic rifles and bazookas, lightly equipped and carrying only two days of unpalatable K rations, the 121 rangers arrived on trucks in Guimba from their base camp at Calasiao at five in the morning on 28 January. There the leaders visited the various command posts of the First Infantry and Twentieth Infantry Regiments,
the Sixth Infantry Division, the parent unit of the regiments, and the headquarters of the local guerrilla leader, Major Robert S. Lapham. Major Lapham was one of the major guerrilla leaders on Luzon and he controlled the guerrillas on the area of Guimba and Cabanatuan. Considered a subordinate by Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann whose headquarters were farther to the north, Major Lapham had never really come under Volckmann's control.

At these command posts Colonel Mucci and his party picked up the latest information about the enemy and coordinated the signals to be used when the rangers returned from the raid and were prepared to reenter friendly lines. It was decided that the rangers would fire two green flares when they were ready to enter Sixth Division lines. The nearest divisional unit would fire two green flares in reply to signal that the rangers were recognized and that they were clear to pass through the American forward positions. While in town the rangers established their radio relay station, and before leaving they "borrowed" several extra bazookas and anti-tank rifle grenades from the infantrymen so that they would be better prepared to engage the Japanese tanks which were reported to be in the objective area.

Colonel Mucci moved his men out of Guimba at 2:00 p.m. and soon passed through friendly lines into enemy territory. A few miles southwest, near Lobang, the rangers were joined
by eighty armed guerrillas led by a Captain Joson.
Continuing eastward, the 201 Americans and Filipinos
marched at an average rate of one thousand yards an hour,
straight line distance, through forests and grasslands.
South of Baloc, the raiders crossed the dangerous Highway
5, and by midnight they had forded the Talavera River
enroute to General Luna. Crossing the road near General
Luna at 4:00 a.m. 29 January, the force marched on to
Mataas na Kahoy and then turned south into the more open
and less populated country. A quick two hour hike across
the grasslands, past Plainfield, and then eastward into the
forest ended in Balincarin, the site of the first bivouac.

Several important developments took place in the
bivouac. The rangers met a Captain Pajota, the guerrilla
area commander from nearby Cabu, and they were joined by
the captain and his 250 guerrillas, ninety of whom were
armed. Plans were made to keep all the people who lived in
the area north of the prison from leaving the vicinity and
to apprehend and hold any outsiders who entered the opera-
tional area prior to the raid. As a further aid to the
security of the raiders, the guerrillas were asked to make
the local citizens tie and muzzle their dogs and pen up
their chickens.

Captain Pajota also assumed the task of providing food,

*No known first names or initials.
transportation, and stretcher bearers for the prisoners. This was a large assignment because food was needed for an estimated 650 men, and carabao carts for two hundred sick, feeble, or wounded. Food and carts had to be procured and then distributed along the withdrawal route. Captain Pajota could provide most of the stretcher bearers from among his unarmed men, but all the litters would have to be improvised.

Lieutenant Rounsaville and his Alamo Scouts reported to Colonel Mucci in Balincarin, but their report was not encouraging. They did not have the detailed information needed about the stockade, but they had left several Filipino scouts and civilians watching the prison camp. Lacking information, Colonel Mucci had to wait until the Filipinos returned with the required intelligence before he could really start the raid.

While developing his plans, Colonel Mucci asked Sixth Army to send air corps fighters to cover his force starting at seven that evening so that the raiders and the rescued prisoners could be protected against any pursuit by Japanese armored or motorized forces. The air corps was requested to attack only tanks and trucks, because these vehicles would spearhead any rapid pursuit against the slow moving column withdrawing from Cabanatuan. The air cover was approved.

At six, just an hour before the aircraft were to come on station, the 464 man raiding force left Balincarin and
marched two thousand yards southwest to Plateros. Here, the guerrilla scouts who had been watching the prison camp reported that five hundred Japanese soldiers had moved into Cabanatuan where they were expected to spend the night, and that a large enemy force, possibly a division, was marching on the road to Cabu, which was already occupied by many enemy soldiers. Based on this discouraging news and on the realization that his troops were tired from their long forced march from Guimba, Colonel Mucci decided not to attack that night. The delay was inevitable: the rangers could not afford to tangle with so many Japanese even if they were well supported by the guerrillas. Air cover had to be cancelled, but the delay gave the raiders more time to devise their attack plans and to reconnoiter their objective.

Colonel Mucci dispatched a small reconnaissance party at 9:00 a.m. on the 30th to gain the vital information about the prison camp lay-out: the size and distribution of the enemy forces within the camp, the location of the allied prisoners, and the camp routine. The party, an Alamo Scout lieutenant and an enlisted scout, accompanied by guerrilla Lieutenant Tombo, moved very close to the prison camp and, using the aerial photographs supplied by Sixth Army, made a thorough and exemplary reconnaissance.

*No known first name or initials.*
The experience of the Alamo Scouts as well as the knowledge of the local guerrillas paid off handsomely at Cabanatuan as their report demonstrated.

At three that afternoon in Plateros, Colonel Mucci, Captain Joson, Captain Pajota and their key subordinates were told that the stockade was approximately a six hundred by eight hundred yard rectangle, with the short side paralleling the highway. Three separate barbed wire fences, each six to eight feet tall and four to six feet apart, formed the perimeter of the compound while interior fences, some double and some single, divided the camp up into three narrow, eight hundred yard long rectangles. The eastern rectangle was divided further into two smaller sections. There were two entrances: the main one was on the highway, and its gate was secured with a heavy lock; and the rear entrance was near the southeast corner of the camp. A watchtower stood at the main gate, under which there was a reveted guard position; another tower was on the east fence about three hundred yards south of the northeastern corner; and a third was built at the southeast corner of the camp. These towers, twelve feet high, provided the enemy guards with excellent surveillance of the road, the open area north and east of the prison, and the compound itself. Two pill-boxes had been constructed at the northern corners of the stockade.

A small Japanese garrison of seventy-three soldiers held the camp and manned the two gates and three towers;
and a heavily armed group of four were stationed in the open-topped pillbox at the northeastern corner. Soldiers occupied the guard houses just to the rear of the watchtower at the main gate and just west of the rear gate along the back fence. Officer and enlisted quarters were located in the north central part of the camp next to the road which ran south from the main gate; and about a hundred yards southwest of these quarters four Japanese tanks and two trucks were garaged in several small sheds. In a large group of buildings south of the tank sheds in the south central portion of the stockade, all the transient Japanese were housed. The scouts reported that 150 transients had arrived at 11:00 a.m. and occupied the barracks and that the five hundred soldiers who were there on the 29th had left.

These were not the only enemy forces with whom the raiders had to contend. The scouts and guerrillas also reported that there were eight hundred Japanese with trucks and tanks in Cabu, only a mile away. More importantly, seven thousand similarly equipped enemy troops were in the town of Cabanatuan, about five miles southwest, and they were scheduled to move toward Cabu that night.

In the northeast section of the prison camp, the section bounded by the main gate, the northeastern pillbox, and the eastern watchtower, the reconnaissance party found the allied prisoners of war housed in five barracks. No Japanese positions were inside the prisoners' section.
While reconnoitering Cabanatuan the scouts noted that the movement inside the camp and along the highway seemed normal. They also found out what time the Japanese guards were changed; and, although not mentioned, the reliefs probably were made every two hours on the even hours, in the orthodox manner.

Two problems faced Colonel Mucci: he had to strike the camp before the seven thousand Japanese moved northwest out of Cabanatuan town; and he had to achieve surprise in his attack if he expected to be successful. He decided to attack quickly, around 7:00 p.m., to avoid any disruption of the raid by the seven thousand enemy, and by using dusk and the ensuing darkness to conceal movement up to the perimeter of the prison. Since few people knew of the raid, except for the many Filipinos who had seen the raiding force, idle radio chatter and loose talk by Americans could not tip off the operation to the enemy. Guerrilla restrictions on local travel would also help prevent any disloyal Filipino from reporting the concentration of rangers and guerrillas to the Japanese. Lastly, the thorough briefings on the raid plans and individual assignments given to each raider stressed the necessity of achieving complete surprise.

While the stockade was being reconnoitered the remainder of the Alamo Scouts helped organize the carabao cart train and located vital escape routes from the prison north to the Pampanga River and Plateros. The withdrawal
route to Guimba would be similar to the one used to get to Plateros, unless the American front lines changed.

Having completed all of the preliminary actions, Colonel Mucci devised the final plan of attack with his subordinates. By necessity it was a complicated one, because 134 Alamo Scouts and rangers, 170 armed guerrillas, 160 unarmed guerrillas and other Filipino helpers were involved in the raid. Colonel Mucci had to accomplish four primary tasks: isolate the objective; seize Cabanatuan; release, assemble, and evacuate the prisoners; and finally, withdraw quickly across the Pampanga River and then return to Guimba or friendly lines.

Captain Joson was told to block the highway eight hundred yards southwest of the stockade with his eighty men to prevent enemy forces from Cabanatuan town from surprising and hindering the assaulting forces. To assist the captain, Colonel Mucci assigned him a six man bazooka team led by Staff Sergeant White which could provide the necessary anti-tank fires against attacking enemy armor. Three hundred yards from the other side of the camp, near a small bridge, Captain Pajota and his ninety armed guerrillas were to establish a similar roadblock to prevent any Japanese reinforcements from Cabu from striking the raiders. One ranger was assigned as a liaison representative

*No known first name or initials.
to Captain Pajota. Both blocking forces were given the additional mission of covering the withdrawal of the rangers and the prisoners from the stockade. In light of the enemy threat from Cabu it seems that Captain Pajota should have been given a bazooka team also, because the armored forces in Cabu could reach him much more quickly than any similar force could reach him from Cabanatuan town.

All the assault missions were assigned to the ranger platoons. Lieutenant John F. Murphy, commanding the attached platoon from Company F, drew seven diverse and difficult tasks. He assigned the first one, the reduction of the pillbox at the northeast corner, to Staff Sergeant Millican and his six man squad, and the second one, the elimination of the sentry in the eastern watchtower, to three other men in his platoon. Lieutenant Murphy then had to move his reduced strength platoon to the southeast corner of the camp where, after killing the sentry in the watchtower, he was to attack through the rear gate to annihilate the Japanese in the billets adjacent to the entrance. His final tasks required Lieutenant Murphy to attack northwestward with his platoon to destroy the 150 enemy soldiers in the transient area and, after completing

*No known first name or initials.*
CARRANATAN PRISON CAMP

PAINTAY, NUEVA ECJZA PROVINCE

LUZON, PHILIPPINES

30 JANUARY 1945

DRAWN FROM PLATE IN SMITH U.S. ARMY
CONSENT NOTES, NUMBER 5
(24 MARCH 1945), 17.
this attack, to deploy his platoon to seal off the prisoners' section from any enemy force.

Company C's commander, Captain Robert W. Prince, a "wonderful captain" according to Colonel Mucci, was told to attack southward into the stockade with his company. He gave the initial break-in mission to his First Platoon which was commanded by Lieutenant William J. O'Connell. Once the platoon was inside the camp, Lieutenant O'Connell was to direct its attacks against the Japanese positions in the central part of the camp and move to secure the west side of the stockade. Lieutenant Melville D. Schmidt was ordered to follow the First Platoon with his Second Platoon; and once through the main gate, he was to swing his platoon left and enter the prisoners' section to release, secure, and evacuate the prisoners. Schmidt's weapons section was designated the reserve for the entire force.

Lieutenant O'Connell's scheme of maneuver was quite involved and its success depended on excellent coordination and leadership. The lieutenant ordered his First Section Leader, Staff Sergeant Preston N. Jensen, to attack across the highway, kill the gate guard, break into the camp, and destroy the Japanese in the nearby guardhouses. Simultaneously, Staff Sergeant Homer E. Britzius was to move his Second Section to the right of the main gate and begin firing from outside the fence to cover Jensen's rangers and to attack key enemy positions inside the camp. Staff Sergeant Manton P. Stewart was instructed to follow the
First Section into the camp with his Weapons Section. As the First Section under Jensen entered the compound and turned to attack the guardhouses on the right, Stewart was to drive forward farther and turn right past Jensen until he could gain the maneuver room necessary to attack the tanks and trucks in the central part of the camp. Stewart's maneuver would mask the fires of the section under Britzius, thus forcing Britzius to redeploy through the main gate to the west side of the prison camp where his men were to prevent any Japanese from escaping.

Once Lieutenant O'Connell's First Platoon cleared the gate, Lieutenant Schmidt instructed his First Section, leader, Staff Sergeant Harris, to lead his platoon into the stockade, enter the prisoners' section, and move swiftly to a position at the southwest corner of the area where the rangers could fire at the transient barracks to aid the attack on the billets by Lieutenant Murphy's platoon. Close on Harris' heels, the Second Section led by Staff Sergeant William R. Butler was also to enter the prisoners' domain and deploy along the west fence to fire into the central part of the stockade at targets under fire by the First Platoon and stop any enemy forces from moving into the prisoners' area.

Alamo Scouts; along with the force reserve,

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*No known first name or initials.
Staff Sergeant Stern's Weapons Section from the Second Platoon, were to gather the prisoners together and direct the able bodied survivors to assembly areas north of the highway. Other raiders were given special jobs to support the main attacks. Lieutenant Tombo, the valuable and hard working guerrilla, and Staff Sergeant White, a ranger, were assigned to cut the enemy telephone lines: Lieutenant Tombo on the north side, and Sergeant White on the south side of the prison camp. Individual rangers had to search for and destroy all the Japanese radios in the stockade. These missions helped to isolate the enemy garrison and prevent any calls for assistance to nearby enemy units.

Complex and thorough, the raid plan called for simultaneous attacks on all enemy positions, a difficult task. When Lieutenant Murphy's men opened fire at the rear of the camp all the rangers were to spring into action from their concealed positions near their objectives. The signal for the attack had to come from Murphy because he had to move the longest distance into position and was expected to be the last platoon deployed for the raid. After Cabanatuan was seized, the enemy garrison and transient forces killed or neutralized, and the prisoners evacuated, the rangers were to withdraw when Captain Prince fired a

*No known first name or initials.*
red flare. Once across the highway the raiders would help carry any of the weak and sick evacuees while they provided an advanced and a rear guard for the withdrawing column. When the whole party was at least a mile north of the prison camp, deep into the woods, Captain Prince was instructed to fire a second red flare to signal the guerrillas and any other remaining raiders to withdraw. These last men would form flanks guards and an additional rear guard. American night fighters had been requested to cover the withdrawal just as they had been asked to do the previous day.

Briefings ended the preparations for the raid. At 5:30 p.m. on the 30th, Colonel Mucci ordered his raiders forward to a new assembly area just seven hundred yards north of the stockade, next to the creek which ran eastward and then south to meet the road east of the camp. Final deployments began immediately after 6:00 p.m. from this assembly area.

Lieutenant Murphy moved his unit into the woods and down the creek to the highway where the rangers crawled across the road and continued south. Enroute to his final position south of the back fence, the lieutenant dropped off Sergeant Millican's squad near the northeast pillbox and three rangers close to the eastern watchtower. Undetected, the platoon continued south and Lieutenant Murphy deployed it near the rear entrance and the southeastern watchtower for the initial assault.
Meanwhile, Colonel Mucci, Captain Prince, Company C, and the Alamo Scouts crawled slowly and carefully to avoid detection from the woodline about three hundred yards north of the camp to a small ditch twenty yards away from the front gate. They were in their assault positions by seven twenty-five, and awaited the signal to attack.

To the east, Captain Pajota deployed his ninety men near the planned roadblock, and to the west Captain Joson led his eighty guerrillas near their assigned position.

Nothing interrupted the deployment and the raiders were all prepared to attack when Lieutenant Murphy's rangers opened fire at 7:45 p.m. Clearly heard, the signal triggered all actions.

Two shots by two rangers killed the sentry in the southeastern watchtower. Succeeding ones by the three man party to the north dispatched the sentry in the eastern tower, while Sergeant Millican and his men successfully grenaded and killed the seven occupants of the northeast pillbox. The remainder of the platoon, led by Lieutenant Murphy, charged the rear gate, killed the guards there, and then broke into the main camp and destroyed the enemy soldiers in the billets to the left of the gate. Attacking northwest as planned, Lieutenant Murphy's platoon disposed of the Japanese in the transient barracks.

At the front gate, gaunt Sergeant Theodore R. Richardson, of Dallas, carrying a Thompson sub-machine gun led the assault with his platoon leader, Lieutenant O'Connell.
Sergeant Richardson shot away the lock on the gate and then raced inside the camp and killed the enemy sentry who had only been able to fire one shot at the rangers. Throwing grenades, the remainder of the First Platoon dashed through the gate to annihilate the Japanese in the nearby guardhouses, and destroy the enemy tanks and trucks. The weapons section accomplished their mission in the central part of the camp, and gained a bonus when the trucks which they destroyed were loaded with Japanese soldiers. Sergeant Britzius' supporting section followed the lead sections of the platoon, once its fires were masked by Sergeant Stewart's rangers as they raced southward in the attack, and established itself on the west side of the camp to prevent any Japanese from escaping.

Once the leading platoon cleared the front gate, Lieutenant Schmidt led his men into the attack and, with the help of several of his men, cut through the interior fence and smashed into the prisoners' compound. Shouting "This is a prison break, make for the main gate," Schmidt's rangers raced through the area to positions along the south and western fences. There, Sergeant Harris and his men fired at the enemy in the transient billets while Sergeant Butler's section fired at the adjacent officer and enlisted quarters and launched rockets at the four enemy tanks.

Surprise was complete. The Japanese offered no effective resistance and were destroyed in their positions.
within five minutes. Colonel Nucci said that the "plan worked out OK." It was an understatement.

Most of the prisoners could not believe that they were being rescued. Some were frightened to leave their barracks because they feared that the Japanese, many of whom spoke excellent English, might be preparing to kill them. Finally the sound of the distinctly American voices and the sight of the green clad rangers with their crushed fatigue caps, set as jauntily as such sloppy caps can be, convinced the prisoners that this was indeed liberation. Rounded up by the rangers and the Alamo Scouts, the able bodied prisoners were soon on their way north to an assembly area. Several rangers ran from barracks to barracks to find the invalids who could not walk and, having found about one hundred of them, had them carried out by the Filipino bearers or carried them out themselves.

There was much excitement within the camp once the men realized what was happening. Unfortunately, Colonel James Duckworth, the senior allied officer, fell and broke his right arm running out of the camp, and one prisoner died of heart failure or over-exertion near the front gate. During the long trek back to friendly lines another prisoner expired for similar reasons.

Thirty minutes after the first two shots were fired, Captain Prince, assured that all of the prisoners had been evacuated, fired a red flare and the withdrawal began. While some rangers remained behind to demolish buildings
in the camp, the majority withdrew and escorted the prisoners north to the planned assembly area. To the east and west, the guerrillas remained in position to cover the movement of the column which, with 512 evacuees, now numbered over six hundred men. Slowly, the column moved north, passed through the assembly area, and arrived at the south bank of the Pampanga River where the Filipinos had assembled the first group of grass-filled carabao carts to carry the sick and wounded. After the rangers, guerrillas, and the other Filipino helpers had guided or carried their new wards across the waist deep river, the first and most dangerous part of the withdrawal was over. Captain Prince then fired the second red flare, signalling the guerrillas and the rangers who were demolishing the buildings in the prison camp to withdraw.

The captain and his rangers were able to retire as was Captain Joson who had not been engaged at all at his western roadblock. Joson's guerrillas formed a left flank guard and an additional rear guard for the main body once they moved out of their position. At the eastern block an immediate withdrawal was out of the question because Captain Pajota and his men were under heavy attack by eight hundred Japanese supported by eight tanks. Having heard the firing at Pangatian, the enemy had moved rapidly out of Cabu toward the camp. Double timing and chanting in a close formation, the Japanese approached the narrow, "V" shaped roadblock which Captain Pajota had emplaced just to the west of the
small bridge. The open end of the "V" pointed toward Cabu and the enemy soldiers ran blindly into it until the lead men were about fifteen yards from the vertex of the formation. Then the guerrillas sprang the ambush with withering fire from their BAR's, rifles, and sub-machine guns, annihilating the soldiers in the "V" and on the bridge, driving others back in utter confusion, and throwing the entire force into complete disorder. Japanese tanks moved up from the rear of the column and the battle grew more and more violent as the tanks cannonaded and machine-gunned the guerrillas, but the tanks did not cross the bridge and spared the guerrillas from facing an armored assault. After standing firm for an hour, Captain Pajota broke contact and dispersed his force into small groups so that they could evade the enemy and rejoin the withdrawing column.

Twenty-four hours later Captain Pajota's guerrillas, minus twenty-five comrades, were back with the main body and reported that they had killed or wounded nearly three hundred Japanese.

In addition to these casualties, the rangers killed the 223 Japanese whom they caught inside Cabanatuan while they suffered only four wounded. One Alamo Scout was also wounded near the camp. Two rangers died of wounds.

Although the raid and the bitter fighting were over, the long withdrawal still had to be made. When the column reached Plateros early in the evening, the Filipinos gave
the prisoners food and water and provided additional carabao carts for the infirm. Doctor Layug, the local guerrilla doctor, treated the sick and wounded as best he could in a local schoolhouse, and the ranger medics administered morphine to those who needed it. At this point, Colonel Mucci radioed Sixth Army that he had "Accomplished mission and returned."

In Plateros, the evacuees who could walk were formed into small parties, and under ranger escorts they set out immediately for Balincarin. The first of these groups left at nine o'clock, and some time later the carabao cart train started northward with the invalids who could not walk. These groups left behind the two wounded rangers who were attended by Dr. Merle M. (Jim) Musselman and one aid man, both rescued prisoners, and were guarded by several Alamo Scouts, eight rangers, and numerous guerrillas. In addition to protecting the wounded and the medics, the stay-behind force was to build a small airstrip for a cub aircraft in case the wounded had to be evacuated by air. They never had to build the field because at eleven in the morning on 31 January, Captain Fisher, the ranger doctor who had been severely wounded in the stomach in the prison camp, died of his wounds. So did Corporal Roy F. Sweezey who had been seriously wounded by a stray round from the

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*No known first name or middle initials.*
fight at Captain Pajota's roadblock.

Marching on in the moonlight, the main body reached Balincarin at midnight on the 30th. There fifteen additional carts were secured for the men who could march no farther. Two hours later the column entered Mataas na Kahoy where Filipinos again supplied food and water and sent eleven more carts to join the growing train. At two thirty the men resumed their trek as the fifty-one cart caravan turned westward toward Guimba.

Near General Luna, Captain Prince sent Lieutenant O'Connell's First Platoon ahead with several Filipino scouts to secure crossing sites across the Japanese held highway for the mile and a half long column. Lieutenant O'Connell ordered Sergeant Jensen's section to the north to form a roadblock four hundred yards above the point where the column would reach the road and Sergeant Britzius' section to the south to establish a similar position four hundred yards below the point where the column would leave the road. Both sections were equipped with bazookas and anti-tank rifle grenades. Once the blocks were in position, the column approached the road, turned left on it, traveled about one mile southwest, and then left the highway. At 4:30 a.m. 31 January, the crossing was completed.

One hour later everyone was thoroughly tired so Colonel Mucci stopped the column for a short rest in a small barrio. Soon he had everyone marching west again toward American
During the stop Colonel Mucci had tried to contact his radio station in Guimba, but he was unsuccessful until he reached the town of Sibul which was about halfway between General Luna and Baloc. At eight o'clock the tired raiders and their exhausted wards entered Sibul where they soon were given food and water by the local citizens. When radio contact was made with the Guimba station, Colonel Mucci was told that the Sixth Infantry Division had seized the town of Talavera on Highway 5. Baloc also had been taken.

The American advance secured the column's south flank and practically placed the weary men within American lines since Talavera was only two or three thousand yards southwest of Sibul. There was always the danger that the retreating enemy might appear east of Highway 5, but since they never had garrisoned the area, the probability was small. A messenger was soon dispatched to Talavera to request that trucks and ambulances be sent to Sibul to evacuate the released prisoners.

In anticipating the return of the rangers, Colonel White, the Army G-2, had sent trucks and ambulances to an assembly area north of Talavera, and they arrived there before 9:00 a.m. After Colonel Mucci's runner arrived with the colonel's message, the vehicles were sent forward to Sibul where they arrived at 11:00 a.m. Soon the rescued men were on their way to Guimba, and their long trek was over. The 92d Evacuation Hospital had been opened in the town on the 29th, and on the 31st, the prisoners of
Cabanatuan were moved there. Some were immediately admitted, all were showered with Red Cross packages, and soon were resting or asleep in beds with clean white sheets.

Later in the day, the rangers were picked up by trucks and were taken back to their base camp near Calasiao. The guerrillas and the other valiant Filipinos who had helped so much in the raid returned to their homes.

Five hundred and eleven liberated veterans of Bataan, Corregidor, and Singapore owed much to the Sixth Rangers, the Alamo Scouts, and the Filipinos who made the raid on Cabanatuan such a success. The raiders themselves earned a niche in American military history, especially in the lore of the ranger units of the United States Army. At Cabanatuan, the rangers under their thirty-three year old West Point commander showed that they had learned their lessons well from their comrades raids on Suluan Island and from their similar actions on Dinagat and Homonhon Islands in Leyte Gulf. Lieutenant Rounsaville with his two officer compatriots and his enlisted scouts again proved how important good reconnaissance troops are to the combat commander, and they too displayed the sharpened skills which had been honed on the Moari Raid and the several special reconnaissance missions which they had conducted prior to landing on Luzon. More unheralded were the guerrillas under Captain Pajota who saved the day for the raiders and the rescued prisoners with their defense of the eastern roadblock, and even more indispensable were
the guerrillas and other Filipinos who arranged for and transported the evacuees from Cabanatuan to Sibul. It is not known who controlled all the guerrillas, or even if there was any over all command, but each guerrilla leader deserves high commendation for the performances of his men. Possibly the command of the guerrillas was exercised by Major Lapham; and if it was, it shows what can be done with an organized and well controlled guerrilla organization when it operates behind enemy lines in support of actions by conventional forces.

While a tremendous amount of credit must be given to the men who made the raid, the efficient staff work of Colonel White and his G-2 Section must also be praised. Colonel White died in retirement in 1963, aged 62, but his pride in his part in the Cabanatuan raid is recorded in the terse entry which he placed in the Register of Graduates, United States Military Academy: "Planned & effected liberation over 500 POW. Cabanatuan, PI 45." General Krueger decorated the colonel with the Legion of Merit for his contribution to the raid.

General MacArthur, impressed by the rangers' operation, immediately ordered General Krueger to present the following awards to the raiders: Lieutenant Colonel Mucci received the Distinguished Service Cross; all the other officers were awarded the Silver Star; and every enlisted man received the Bronze Star. Unfortunately, the guerrillas were not decorated.
On 30 January 1945 the long death march which had consumed thousands of veterans of Bataan, Corregidor, and Singapore ended at Cabanatuan where many had marked time for endless months until they died. The last march started just before eight in the evening of the 30th and it became a march to freedom for the five hundred and eleven who had survived so long at the bottom of the pit.

NO BLOOD UPON THEIR RISERS

Alamo Scouts at Moari, rangers at Cabanatuan, cavalry-men at Santo Tomas, and infantrymen at Bilibid Prison in Manila rescued prisoners of war and internees in remarkable operations. More incredible than any of those actions, however, was the combined paratroop, amphibious, ground, and guerrilla raid which rescued 2147 men, women, and children from the Los Baños Internment Camp south of Laguna de Bay, Luzon in February 1945.

General MacArthur on 3 February, still fearful that the Japanese might harm their Allied captives, ordered Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, commanding Eighth Army, to liberate Los Baños. The next day General Eichelberger assigned the mission to Major General Joseph M. Swing's Eleventh Airborne Division which after fighting

*The name of the camp is italicized for clarity.
a grueling campaign on Leyte had landed on the southwestern coast of Luzon near the town of Nasugbu just five days earlier. The airborne soldiers were the closest Americans to the prison camp, but at the time they were too fully committed to handle the rescue mission.

After landing with two regiments at Nasugbu, the division drove inland toward Tagaytay Ridge some thirty miles away. On 3 February the parachute regiment dropped on the ridge, the beautiful north rim of the blue lake which surrounds the Taal volcano; and when all the regiments of the airborne division had linked up, the division turned north to form a "spearhead tipped with brass" which soon was fighting at Parañaque on the southern outskirts of Manila. After a tough fight at Parañaque, the airborne troopers advanced toward Nichols Field where they hit the "Genko Line" and had their most brutal combat. Facing tough Japanese marines who fought from huge mounds and other semi-subterranean positions, the Americans had to attack across flat open ground into the mouths of antiaircraft and six inch naval guns depressed to engage them. Following the fight at Nichols Field the division moved northwest to help the First Cavalrymen reduce the enemy defenses around Fort McKinley. By the 19th, the division had completed most of these actions and was able to turn attention to the operation to free the internees in Los Baños.

General Swing had asked for and received permission to
delay the rescue action, but while the division attacked northward intelligence was being collected for the future operation. The general decided that his staff would prepare the detailed plans for the rescue, and, once prepared, the plans would be given to chosen units for execution. This would free the subordinate commanders from planning responsibilities and would allow the division to implement the plan quickly once an attack date was decided upon.

Anxious internees waited at Los Baños for liberation. Most were former inmates of the Santo Tomas Internment Camp in Manila and had been sent to the new camp against their will. Step-child of the Manila stockade, Los Baños did not have permanent buildings, latrines with plumbing, kitchens, or other facilities that the old university did, but the camp was in the country where the internees did get more food than they had had in Manila. Los Bañosites knew that liberation was near after they heard that Santo Tomas had been seized on 3 February. They had a brief spell of freedom as the inmates of Cabanatuan had when, just after the Americans landed at Lingayen Gulf, the Japanese withdrew from the camp. During the week-long interlude the internees remained in camp although one man escaped.

After the guards returned, life in Los Baños deteriorated as food got worse and discipline became more severe. When liberating troops did arrive, however, the Los Bañosites were spared the terrible shelling that struck Santo Tomas and killed so many internees.
The internment camp was located on the grounds of the Los Baños Agricultural College and experimental station southeast of the barrio of Los Baños which stands on the southern shore of the three fingered inland lake called Laguna de Bay. Los Baños camp stood on the eastern slope of the forested Maquiling mountain complex bordered by a small creek and grasslands to the south, small open fields to the east, and another stream and the main college area to the north. A major highway and paralleling railroad ran between the camp and the lake. Both went west through the barrio of Los Baños and then turned northwest along Laguna de Bay past the Lecheria Hills, across the San Juan River, and past New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa, into the southern environs of Manila. In peacetime Los Baños is about a two hour drive from Manila in a truck, and the area around the old camp is an ideal place for energetic boy scouts to play capture-the-flag. The forested hills, small ravines, rattan thickets, and small streams and jungle enclosed rice fields form as good a playground as they formed a battleground for guerrillas in 1945 when the forty miles from Manila was a dangerous no-man's land, full of unknowns and enemy troops, which the Americans would have to penetrate to seize Los Baños.

Troops from the Japanese Eighth Division occupied southern Luzon, but there were no large enemy concentrations near the camp. Just before the Americans began their rescue operation they knew that about eighty Japanese
garrisoned the internment camp and that there were other forces nearby. At Mayondon Point, where the road running north out of the stockade terminated, twenty Japanese manned a single machine gun. Several enemy soldiers were stationed in the barrio of Los Baños with two three inch guns, and just below town near a large rock quarry intelligence sources had located a Japanese company with four machine guns and two 105mm guns. This force was the main threat to any rescue unit because it could launch a rapid counterattack against the internment camp. Farther to the west along Highway 1 eighty enemy soldiers manned a roadblock just two hundred yards below the destroyed bridge over the San Juan River, and these men were believed to be supported by two 75mm guns sited on the northern slopes of the Lecheria Hills to the east of the roadblock. Most dangerous to any American attacking force, however, were the Japanese units concentrated near the barrio of Alaminos on Highway 1 south of the Maquiling mountain complex. Enemy reinforcements from Alaminos could reach Los Baños in ninety minutes in trucks or in nine hours by marching.  

Like the rangers at Cabanatuan, the airborne troopers were blessed with the assistance of many excellent guerrilla units. There were a number of different irregular bands in the area: Marking's men operated north and east of Laguna de Bay; Terry's ROTC Hunters were active on both sides of the lake; communist Hukbalahaps lurked near the Marking's; President Quezon's Own Guerrillas and a Chinese
band were also in the vicinity. Japanese sympathizers,
Filipinos known as Makapili, balanced the guerrilla
strength somewhat because they were reported to be strong
in the area around the barrio of Los Baños. The exact
role which the guerrillas played in the final drama is not
clear. According to some sources, the Filipinos had actually
planned to rescue the internees by themselves. Even
when they were integrated into a combined American and
Filipino action, it was reported that the raid was primarily
a guerrilla action and that it was called off as it was
starting on 19 February. Unfortunately, United States
Army reports do not cover guerrilla actions in any detail.
No mention is made about guerrilla planning; comments on
guerrilla reconnaissance activities are too general to be
really valuable; and the summaries of guerrilla combat
actions are vague at best.

Guerrillas did participate in the raid and they served
well. They were especially valuable to the intelligence
officer who was collecting information about the internment
camp. The ROTC Hunters brought Peter Miles, an escaped
internee who had joined the Filipino band, to the Eleventh
Airborne Division Headquarters at Parañaque where he was
turned over to Lieutenant Colonel Henry "Butch" Mueller,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence). Having
gathered his information from trusted guerrilla spies, from
Filipinos who worked under the supervision of Major Jay
Vanderpool, the division's guerrilla liaison officer,
from informed Filipinos, and from new aerial photographs, Colonel Mueller still needed detailed information about the internment camp. Peter Miles provided missing data: camp routine, location of the sick, and location of the prisoners inside the camp.

While enemy information was being collected, reconnaissance parties roamed the area in search of terrain data. Lieutenant George E. Skau from the Division's Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon and his companion Lieutenant Haggerty joined the guerrillas on the east shore of Laguna de Bay looking for suitable beaches. They found that the beach at Mayondon Point was the only one which could be used by amphibious craft; other areas were too muddy or restricted by fish traps and other impedimenta.

Engineer parties also inspected Highway 1 from Muntinlupa south to Calamba to see if the road could support tank destroyers and trucks towing artillery pieces. Fords were also located across the San Juan River.

Reconnaissance showed that the raid should not be made by just one force moving down Highway 1 in a "flying column" reminiscent of the one which seized Santo Tomas. Other means had to be used, ones which used the large lake and took advantage of the division's parachute capability. Once Colonel Mueller had completed his intelligence mosaic

*No known first name or initials.*
around 19 February, the final rescue plan was developed by the division staff. Four independent forces were demanded in this unusual and complex plan: one to isolate the camp; a second to assault and destroy the enemy garrison; a third to drive into the stockade to extract the internees; and the last to attack south along Highway 1 to divert enemy attention from the camp and to stop any enemy troops from reinforcing the stockade from the south. Aircraft would destroy Japanese boats on the lake before the raid and would strike the various enemy positions, especially the quarry, during the raid to minimize Japanese reactions.

Each attacking force was different. Thirty-two men from the division's Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon under Lieutenant Skau along with approximately three hundred guerrillas were to surround the camp, kill the sentries on signal, and in addition were to mark and secure a small drop zone eight hundred yards east of camp and the landing beach at Mayondon Point. The assault force, all Americans, would jump onto the improvised drop zone, assemble, and then attack rapidly to the west to break into the camp and annihilate the garrison. As the troopers hit the silk, the rest of their battalion reinforced with engineers and two assault guns was to land aboard amphibious tractors (amtracs) at Mayondon Point, establish roadblocks on the main highway with one company near Los Baños barrio on the
west and the barrio of Bay on the east, and then drive south into the internment camp. The amtracs were to be guided by guerrillas and preceded by engineers with mine detectors. Once inside the camp the amtracs were to move to pre-designated buildings to pick up the weak and the sick internees and then they were to return to the beach, reenter Laguna de Bay, and swim back to Mamatid with their passengers. The remainder of the internees, the guerrillas, and the paratroopers were to march north to the beachhead and wait for the diversionary force to reach them from the west. After the link-up was made, trucks were to evacuate the internees and the two airborne forces would withdraw back to Calamba.

One battalion of glider infantry, supported by two artillery battalions and engineers and reinforced with a company of tank destroyers, was to launch the diversionary attack across the San Juan River into the Lecheria Hills and then drive southeastward to contact the assault forces near Los Baños. If link-up could not be made with the forces behind enemy lines, then the paratroopers and guerrillas with the internees would have to fight their way out to meet the glidermen.

Timing was critical! Each attack was to start when the first parachute opened at 7:00 a.m. The four force commanders, Lieutenant Skau with the reconnaissance platoon and the guerrillas, Lieutenant John M. Ringler with the
jump force, Major Henry A. Burgess with the amphibious body, and Lieutenant Colonel Ernest LaFlamme with the diversionary attack, were to act independently of each other. Once the paratroopers under Burgess and Ringler linked-up in the camp, the reformed battalion would come under the major's command. The overall command of the raid in force was given to Colonel Robert "Shorty" Soule, the commander of the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, and the raiders were designated the Los Baños Force.

This detailed scenario was based upon the normal routine of camp life which found the internees forming up daily at 7:00 a.m. for roll call while the off-duty Japanese guards took calisthenics north of the commandant's headquarters. While exercising, the enemy guards habitually left their weapons in racks at the east end of their barracks facing the fenceline. This weakened the defense of the camp and if the Americans and Filipinos raiders could prevent the Japanese from reclaiming their weapons, and this was part of the plan, then chances were excellent that the attackers could seize Los Baños without much opposition after they killed the sentries on duty.

While the planning was going on other important actions took place. On 10 February the Eleventh Airborne Division was detached from General Eichelberger's command and assigned to General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army where it was attached to the Fourteenth Corps commanded by Major Oscar Griswold. This change did not affect the mission to
Los Baños. Preparations continued after the rescue task was officially given to the division by its higher headquarters, and General Griswold soon approved the raid plan without making any changes in it. The 23rd of February was finally selected as the date of the attack.

Meanwhile fighting raged in and around Manila. Infantrymen and cavalrymen slowly drove the enemy out of the city and into the medieval "Walled City" while the airborne troops and cavalrymen manhandled the Japanese around Wack Wack Golf Course and Fort McKinley. Coincidentally, the final assault into the "Walled City" was to occur when the raid struck Los Baños. In Manila Bay the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment under Colonel George Jones and units from Major General William Chase's Thirty-Eighth Division assaulted the fortress Corregidor in a coordinated parachute and amphibious assault. After 19 February the main interest of the Eleventh Airborne Division was focused east of Laguna de Bay where it would make its first attacks in force into southern Luzon. The Los Baños raid was a sideshow, but one which involved much of the division.

Reconnaissance continued as the attack data approached. Engineers were particularly busy checking Highway 1, finding fords over the San Juan River, taking soundings in Laguna de Bay, and finding departure beaches for the amtracs. On 22 February, commanders of attacking units were allowed to go forward to reconnoiter their attack positions. A guerrilla spy provided last minute
intelligence.

Troops assigned to Los Baños Force began assembling at staging areas at Parañaque and Nuntinlupe. Tank destroyers drove in on the eve of Washington's birthday as did Colonel LaFlamme's First Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry. The 472d Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm Howitzer) and the 675th Para-glider Field Artillery Battalion moved in. Major Burgess' First Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment joined up with the fifty-three amtracs from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Gibbs' 672d Amphibious Tractor Battalion which had come from north of rubble-strewn Manila. Trucks and ambulances to evacuate the internees and the military policemen who were to guide and control them joined the growing task force. At New Bilibid Prison troops prepared the buildings to receive the internees.

Thirty-six hours before the raid started, Lieutenant Ringler's company was withdrawn from the battle line near Fort McKinley and brought to Parañaque to prepare for the impending parachute assault. Nine C-47 transports from the Sixty-Fifth Troop Carrier Squadron landed on Nichols Field at noon on the 22d, and that afternoon the paratroopers moved to the field. After drawing their parachutes which had been flown in from Leyte, the troopers settled down at the airfield and spent the night sleeping under the wings of their transports.
On the evening of the 21st while other forces were assembling, the first raiders moved out in native bancas toward the barrio of San Antonio on the far side of Laguna de Bay. Lieutenant Skau and his men arrived at the barrio at dawn after a rough trip across storm swept lake, and soon rendezvoused with the three hundred guerrillas who were to form the bulk of the force which would infiltrate around the camp, the drop zone, and the landing beach.

Skau assigned eighty of the Filipinos and the bulk of his men to the group which would surround the camp and attack the sentries. Of the remainder, eighty were sent to the drop zone and the rest to the beach. Some Americans accompanied each of the security forces.

Final deployments began at night on the 22d. Skau's men and the guerrillas spent seven hours tramping through flooded rice paddies, bamboo, and thickets in the dark night until they reached the camp and the drop zone. The beach force moved by boat to Mayondon Point. All were in position by the planned attack time, and at the stockade two men were positioned to kill each sentry while a squad moved in close to the rifle racks.

Deployment in the west was not so quiet. Amtracs, tank destroyers, and trucks broke the stillness of the night as they moved to Namatid and Calamba. Artillery went into position; the infantry closed in on attack positions along the San Juan river; and just east of Namatid on the shores of the lake the amphibious force was preparing for its
first "swim" in the muddy lake. Twenty-five trucks and eighteen ambulances were at the beach as were the division military police.

At midnight on the 22d the pilot of a P-61 night fighter, the spooky "Black Widow" with the high pitched engine whine, reported trucks moving in and out of the internment camp. Guerrillas said that the enemy was reinforcing the camp garrison. General Swing was notified of the developments and he decided that the raid would continue as planned. The general was, however, concerned about the reports and because of them he moved with his staff to Mamatid, arriving there at 1:00 a.m. and establishing an advanced command post in the vicinity. Furthermore, he alerted the Second Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment to standby as a possible raid force reserve.

Colonel Gibbs' first amtracs churned into Laguna de Bay near Mamatid at 5:15 a.m. and drove eastward in column on the first leg of their night compass course. Unsure of the worthiness of his craft, Colonel Gibbs was not confident that his vehicles would perform properly. North of Mayandon Point, the amtracs turned sharply to the right, formed nine vehicle waves, and began moving toward the shore in the grey dawn. As they came in, eyes scanned the horizon for the smoke which was to mark the limits of the beachhead.

Ringler's paratroopers at Nichols Field reinforced by a light machine gun platoon probably spent the most restful night of all the raiders, but they too were up early for a
dawn take-off. At 6:30 a.m. the flat C-47's began rolling down the cratered runway, lifted their tails ever so slowly, and then pulled up their noses and climbed into the brightening Philippine sky. Forming up, the nine transports turned south, picked up their fighter escorts, and headed for the drop zone. Jumpmasters looked for the white smoke as they approached the target area.

At Calamba, Colonel LaFlamme's troopers waited for 7:00 a.m. to cross the San Juan River and attack into the Lecheria Hills and down Highway 1 where they knew eighty Japanese manned a roadblock and were supported by two field guns in the hills. The fords which the engineers had marked provided the means for a quick crossing for infantrymen and tank destroyers. Nearby, artillerymen prepared for their first targets.

Japanese and Allied internees awoke on 23 February with no knowledge of the impending attack and the camp routine began as it had for so many interminable months. Guards manned the watchtowers and pillboxes and their comrades assembled for calisthenics under the hated camp commandant, Lieutenant Konoshi. Internees, hoping always for liberation which had still not come, slowly gathered for roll call knowing that they faced still another hungry

*No known first name or initials.
day in captivity.

The routine was suddenly broken just before 7:00 a.m. when the inhabitants of Los Peños looked up and saw C-47's approaching from the bay at a low altitude. Little suspecting the imminent action because aircraft had flown by before and the open jump doors of the transports were to the east and could not be seen from the camp, the internees gazed at the planes which had stars on their fuselages rather than the red ball "fried egg" they had hated so long. No one in the camp saw the column of white smoke which was rising now from the adjacent drop zone.

Something caught peoples' eyes: an object fell below the lead airplane, blew back behind it, and then a parachute opened. Immediately all hell broke loose as Lieutenant Ringler's parachute popped open. Guerrillas and the reconnaissance troopers opened fire all around the camp and killed the sentries in the watchtowers, in the pillboxes, and also wounded and killed most of the Japanese in the physical training area. To the delight of the stunned internees who were scrambling back into their barracks for protection, one of the first Japanese killed was Lieutenant Konishi, the commandant.

Lieutenant Skau led a small party through the fence toward the guard billet and the arms racks and set that building on fire. Guerrillas swarmed through the fence and within a few minutes the majority of the enemy garrison
was killed. The final annihilation, however, was delayed until the jumpers arrived in the camp.

One hundred and fifty-five paratroopers followed their company commander out of the jump aircraft and in a few seconds they had descended the five hundred feet to the ground. With the area secured, the Americans assembled quickly and within fifteen minutes they were crashing through the east gate of Los Baños. Having destroyed a pillbox enroute to the camp, and having found that the guerrillas and reconnaissance troops had nearly annihilated the Japanese garrison, Lieutenant Ringler and his men had to be content with reducing three remaining pillboxes on the east and mopping up the remainder of the enemy who were hiding throughout the camp. By 7:30, all the Japanese were dead and the fight was over. Paratroopers began moving into positions to secure the camp and defend it against any enemy attacks while others started organizing the internees for evacuation.

All had gone well at Hayondon Point. The two smoke signals appeared on time at the flanks of the landing area, and at 7:00 a.m. the amtracs surged onto the beach without difficulty. An enemy machine gun opened up from the high ground to the west so Company C turned right and attacked that position, and after overrunning it continued on towards the barrio of Los Baños and established its assigned roadblock. Company A swung left simultaneously to block the highway toward Bay, and the artillery went into position
to support the attack by Company C. The empty amtracs
with their Filipino guides and engineer mine detection
parties crawled out of the beachhead along the dusty trail,
crossed the highway, and then lumbered through the college
grounds and joined the assault troops inside the camp a
few minutes after the fire fights subsided.

Delighted observers back on Namatid Beach saw the
smoke rise on the beach and the paratroopers drop near
Los Baños. Then the infantry and tank destroyers rushed
through the prepared fords toward their objectives in the
Lecheria Hills and on Highway 1. In the initial melee,
the commander of the tank destroyers was shot and killed.
Forty-five minutes later the Americans had secured the
hills and the one company which had dropped off and attacked
toward the road junction just below the river had seized
its objective also. With the company blocking the road to
the south, the rest of Colonel LaFlamme's force continued
to attack southeastward toward Los Baños against scattered,
but slowly increasing resistance. The Americans reached
the Dalampit River west of the barrio of Los Baños by
noon.

While the attacks were proceeding, the artillery
shelled various enemy positions especially the Dalampit
River quarry where the largest enemy force in the area was
located. Fighters swept low and bombed and strafed the
quarry.

Having successfully completed all their assigned tasks,
the paratroopers at the camp turned their attention to evacuating the internees. Amtracs picked up about fifteen hundred of the weakest and began the slow trip by land and water back to Mamatid. Burning the camp behind them, the paratroopers and the guerrillas escorted the remainder of the internees north to the beachhead after the amtracs left.

Major Burgess, at the beach, was pleased with the operation and the lack of strong enemy countermeasures. He felt that his battalion could hold its beachhead until the amtracs returned for a second lift of internees because there was little enemy action in the area, and then he and his men could fight their way west to join Colonel LaFlamme's battalion. Burgess called his headquarters and asked that his new plan be approved. It was.

Then, after the internees arrived at the beach, Major Burgess recalled Companies A and C and formed a tight perimeter around the beachhead. When the amtracs returned from Mamatid at 11:45 a.m., the major discovered that the vehicles could evacuate not only the remaining internees but all of the paratroopers. He immediately requested permission to change his plan again, and a delighted General Swing overheard the request and told the battalion commander to withdraw his troops with the internees. Everyone at Mamatid was relieved; the link-up of Colonel LaFlamme's force and the troops and internees with Burgess was a difficult
operation, one which could be easily disrupted by any Japanese counterattacks.

Enemy shells began falling around the Mayondon Beach as the paratroopers and internees started their final withdrawal. Two amtracs were sunk. One internee and a soldier were wounded in one, and when they had been transferred to another vehicle, the Americans sank the disabled amtrac to prevent its capture by the enemy. Japanese artillery continued to pepper the beach as the water convoy pulled out into the lake. The guerrillas who had stayed with the force retired to their home area. By 3:00 p.m. Major Burgess and his group were back at Mamatid.

As soon as General Swing approved Major Burgess' last withdrawal plan and the link-up became unnecessary, he ordered Colonel LaFlamme to withdraw his battalion slowly, avoid casualties, and return to Calamba. Then realizing that his division had gained much ground easily, the general told LaFlamme to defend on the north side of the San Juan River. About 5:00 p.m. the colonel and his men completed the recrossing of the river and deployed into new positions where they repulsed an enemy attack that night.

Military policemen had been busy since mid-morning at Mamatid Beach loading the internees and dispatching them in ambulances and trucks to New Bilibid Prison. By late afternoon all the internees were in their new "prison" enjoying hot coffee, sandwiches and other items which they
had been denied for so long.

General Swing reported to General Griswold at 5:00 p.m. that the raid was completed and that the 2147 internees had been recovered. All 243 or 253 Japanese in Los Baños had been killed. Two American soldiers were killed, both of them were in Colonel LaFlamme's force, and three or four were wounded. Four internees also had been wounded, and in addition the guerrillas had lost two killed and five wounded.

With the war going successfully, the raid received little attention in the press. The dramatic rescues at Cabanatuan and Santo Tomas, the paratroop assault of Corregidor, and the bloody battle raging on Iwo Jima pushed the Los Baños action into the background.

It does not deserve to be there. It was a magnificent raid, one that fully deserves the plaudits given it by Major General Louis A. Walsh who was an observer with the Eleventh Airborne Division during the operation:

...it must have been easy and so, no headlines! Don't you believe it! All the ingredients for success.... and tragedy.... were present. On the plus side, we had tactical surprise, and imaginative use of available means, and adequate force at the critical points in time and on terrain, and most important, we had the "hand of the Good Lord" in ours. Since this latter asset couldn't be assured, an ample helping of plain old guts, moral and physical had to serve in the sound conviction that God helps those who help themselves. As it turned out, He was with us. On the minus side, we had an extraordinarily complex plan of operation that required effective coordination of two services, two nationalities, four independently mounted forces and something
over two thousand multi-national civilian prisoners of all ages, male and female. Further, the whole plan was predicated on the incredibly detailed intelligence provided by one foreign (neutral) national which couldn't be confirmed or correlated with either prior experience or any other source. The fact is, it was fundamentally in conflict with all prior experience (Santo Tomas for example). I'm so convinced that no search of the records will show any other operation so completely dependent on timing and progressive, incremental success by each of four forces: the prior positioned recon element; the parachute assault force; the amphibious Main Body; and the diversionary feint that was to be the back-up security and Covering Force if required. All orders were oral; the "Maps" were a Standard Oil road map and a good aerial photo (1 copy); and the component commanders were issued their orders independently. I think it rather obvious that the "Hand of God" factor played a rather important role.

Regardless of whether the "Hand of God" played a major part in the action or not, the paratroopers like the Alamo Scouts at Moari and the rangers at Suluan and Cabanatuan showed their mettle as bold and aggressive raiders. They made no mistakes; nothing went wrong; there were no malfunctions. On 23 February 1945 the paratroopers assisted by their comrades in the glider regiment, amtrac troops, and Filipino guerrillas executed the most outstanding of the raids in the Southwest Pacific. There was no blood upon their risers that day.
Notes for Chapter V: Inside the Corridor

1. The official Australian histories do not mention raids in the Markham Valley after Kanga Force became a regular rather than a guerrilla force. Nor do they speak of raids after the Allied forces landed at Nadzab and Lae. For descriptions of early Australian raid patrols in Papua see Dudley McCarthy, *South-West Pacific Area -- First Year, Kokoda to Wau* (Canberra, 1959), 439.

2. Operation Socrates was planned for 17 March 1944. General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, *The Intelligence Series, Volume IV, Operation of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA* (Tokyo, 1948), see Document XXV, "The Official History of the Operations and Administration of "Special Operations Australia" (SOA) Conducted under the cover-name of "Special Reconnaissance Department." The history contains only Volume II, "Operations." Socrates is discussed on page 93. This report will be cited hereafter as "Official History of SOA," without reference to the source in which it is found.

3. Gavin Long, *The Final Campaigns* (Canberra, 1963), 295-299 (the two company raid) and 325 (the command post raid).

4. For information about guerrilla raids on New Britain see the section entitled "Ferdinand Force; New Britain," in Chapter IV of this thesis.

5. The Muschu raid is mentioned in Long, *Final Campaigns*, 342-342. It is also reported as Operation Copper (originally Operation Ash) in "Official History of SOA," 86-87.

6. "Official History of SOA," 91-92. These were the Phoenix Operations, I, II, and III.


Division, 96. A raid like action by elements of the First United States Marine Division on New Britain is mentioned in Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T. Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul* (Washington, 1963), 397. See the action against the Japanese outpost near a trail junction which took place on 19 January 1944.

9. First Cavalry Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, *Summary of Information from 1600/L 20 Mar 44 to 1600/L 21 Mar 44* (APO 324), 2.


11. Blakeley, *32d Infantry Division*, 198-200, see the raid by the 32d Cavalry Troop; Lieutenant Colonel Max Myers (ed.), *Ours to Hold It High, The History of the 77th Infantry Division in World War II* (Washington, 1947), 170; and Sixth Army, "Blocking the Ormoc Road," *Combat Notes*, Number 6 (20 April 1945), 40, mentions a raid of opportunity. The raid of opportunity is not mentioned in the text.


15. Ibid., 69, mentions the seizures of the Ismus and Las Buras river bridges. The seizures of the Bago River Bridge on Negros Island and the Aringay and Bauang bridges on Luzon are covered in the section entitled "Bridges" in Chapter VI of this thesis.


18. Colonel Joseph E. Zimmer, *The History of the 43d Infantry Division, 1941-1945* (Baton Rouge, La., [1946]), 61. The raid on Caba was made by elements of the 158th


Into the Rising Sun

21. This section is based primarily on a monograph by Captain Tom J. Rounseville, the leader of the raiders, which is entitled The Operations of the Alamo Scouts (Sixth US Army Special Reconnaissance Unit) on the following mission: Rescue of Sixty-six Dutch and Javanese from the Japanese at Cape Oransbari, Dutch New Guinea, 4-5 October 1944 (New Guinea Campaign) (Fort Benning, Ga., 1949-1950). It is the most complete account of the raid and the only one which mentions the initial reconnaissance of the objective area. Rounseville cites two mission reports in his bibliography, one of which was in the possession of Lieutenant Colonel Gibson Niles. Unfortunately, Rounseville follows Niles' monograph's format too closely and uses many similar ideas and phrases. I have written to the former Alamo Scout who is now an army colonel on active duty at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth to get more details. At this time I have received no answer from the colonel.

Lieutenant Colonel Niles' monograph was written a year earlier and it covers this operation. It is entitled The Operations of the Alamo Scouts (Sixth U.S. Army Special Reconnaissance Unit) on the Following Missions: Advanced Reconnaissance of Los Negros Island, 27-28 February 1944; Rescue of Sixty-Six Dutch and Javanese from the Japanese at Cape Oransbari, Dutch New Guinea, 4-5 October 1944; and Reconnaissance of Enemy Dispositions and Contact with Guerrilla Elements, Legaspi--Sorsogon Peninsula, 19 February 1945 (Fort Benning, Ga., 1947-1948). Niles' account is based on several team reports which he had in his possession. Colonel Niles was one of the several officers who commanded the Alamo Scout Training Center.

A third source is an article by Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Sackton entitled "Southwest Pacific Alamo Scouts," Armored Cavalry Journal (January-February 1947), 55-56. Colonel Sackton was a member of the Sixth Army's G-2 (Intelligence) Section during the war, and surely had knowledge of scout activities. He cited no sources for his
article. Sackton's article has numerous errors in it when compared to Rounsaville's and Niles' more detailed accounts.


23. Ibid., 7; Niles, *Operations of the Alamo Scouts*, 6; and, Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, *Enemy on Luzon, An Intelligence Summary* (APO 442, 1945), 117.


28. Although twenty-six Japanese troops were reported in the area all the authors agree that there were eighteen in the large hut, two Kempeitai officials in the small hut, and four sentries at the outpost near Moari.


30. The raiders were: First Lieutenants Tom J. Rounsaville (Team Leader) and William E. Nellist (Assistant Team Leader), Second Lieutenant Louie Rapmund of the Netherlands Indies Colonial Administration (Interpreter), Technical Sergeant Alfred Alfonso, Staff Sergeant Thomas Season, Sergeant Harold Hard, Corporal Andy E. Smith, Technician Fifth Grade Wilbert Wismer, Privates First Class Francis Laquier, Gilbert Cox, Galen Kittleson, Franklin Fox, Rufo Vaquilas, and Bob Asis, and three native guides from the Netherlands East Indies Section of the Allied Intelligence Bureau.

The contact team included First Lieutenant John M. Dove,
Technician Fourth Grade William Watson, Private Charles Hill, and Motor Machinist Mate First Class (USN) K. W. Sanders.

31. Rounsaville and Niles agree on the mission of the contact team. Sackton, "Southwest Pacific Alamo Scouts," 55, says that Lieutenant Dove's team remained on the PT boats while the raiders landed and that the rubber boats were buried ashore.


33. Sources vary on the number and missions of the native and NEI scouts. Rounsaville, Operations of the Alamo Scouts, 14-15, mentions that one guide went forward into the objective area to make a last minute reconnaissance, and when he returned he stayed with Rounsaville for the attack. The two other guides went with Lieutenant Rapmund to help assemble the prisoners. Niles, Operations of the Alamo Scouts, 13-14, says that the "natives" were sent into the village for a reconnaissance and returned with extra guides. Three guides then went with Rounsaville's party, two each went with Nellist and Rapmund, and one went with the Kempetai elimination party. Sackton, "Southwest Pacific Alamo Scouts," 55, says a small detachment with native guides reconnoitered the objective and then one guide each went with Rounsaville, Nellist, and the Kempetai group.

The number of guides who assisted the scouts is anyone's guess. Probably one NEI guide went with each assault group and then two joined Lieutenant Rapmund before he went into the prisoners' area.

34. Niles, Operations of the Alamo Scouts, 14, states that the raiding party carried two SCR 300 radios. Rounsaville, Operations of the Alamo Scouts, 17, states:

It was believed later that two SCR 300 radios should have been carried whereby the delay in hitting ... the machine gun outpost, and the organization of the evacuation point would have been simultaneous with the other action.

Obviously only one radio was carried on the raid.

35. Rounsaville, Operations of the Alamo Scouts, 17, reports that twenty-two enemy soldiers were killed but he does not account for them. The two other authors say only eighteen were killed: twelve near the large hut, two at the Kempetai hut, and four at the machine gun outpost. Rounsaville must have assumed that the four Japanese wounded in the swamp died. Niles and Sackton just say that the four wounded escaped into the swamp and remained there.

Only Sackton, "Southwest Pacific Alamo Scouts," 56, mentions any details about this action.

Ibid. Sackton's times, events, and departure point differ from those of Niles' and Rounsaville's. This appears to be the most incorrect part of Sackton's article.

The Lighthouse on Suluan

This section is based primarily on: Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, *Combat Reports, World War II, 6th Ranger Battalion* (Washington, 1963) which include after action reports, journals, and short narratives of actions on Suluan, Dinagat, and Homonhon Islands.


Cannon, *Leyte*, 54-55, mentions the mine charts. No one else does. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, *Field Order 1*, issued at sea, 12001 14 October 1944, states the battalion's missions:

The ... Battalion reinforced will, on A-3, land and seize HOMONHON ISLAND and the northern tip of DINAGAT ISLAND to assist in clearing the entrances to LEYTE GULF and will further land on SULUAN ISLAND to destroy radar installations and secure documents for military intelligence.

The nature of the documents is never disclosed.
41. Field, Japanese at Leyte Gulf, 28, called the enemy forces on Suluan "coastwatchers", and Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New York, 1945), 249, said the garrison on the island was composed of marines. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Company D, Field Order 1 (APO 72, n.d.), 1, stated:

Reliable reports indicate a garrison varying from 30 to 100. Post is believed manned principally by Navy personnel.

42. Sixth Army, Report of Leyte Campaign, 93, and G-2 Estimate of the Situation, King Two Operation, dated 20 September, paragraph 3, "Homonhon and Dinagat Islands," 192. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Field Order 1, 26 September 1944 (APO 322-1) agrees. Field Order 1, 12001 14 October 1944, the battalion's revised order which replaced the September edition, raised the enemy count on Homonhon to forty.

43. Sixth Army, Report of Leyte Campaign, 94; Falk, Decision at Leyte, 81; and Morison, Leyte, 118-119. All the authors present different aspects of the mission. The ranger battalion orders do not include the mission of erecting navigational aids.


45. Ibid., 94. This change directed the rangers to attack Suluan and it is reflected in the corrected orders issued by the ranger units in October.

46. Wolfert, American Guerrilla, 249-259.

47. Morison, Leyte, 65.

48. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Field Order 1 12001 14 October 1944.

49. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Company D, Field Order 1.

50. This was the only ranger unit organized in the Southwest Pacific. It had a headquarters and headquarters company and six rifle companies (A through F) and was formed from the 98th Field Artillery Battalion on 20 August 1944. The battalion was designated the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion in September 1944. Its first mission was the attack on the islands in Leyte Gulf. The battalion received intensive ranger training before it was committed.
51. Morison, Leyte, 114 (rehearsal) and 117-123 (operations). See Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, History of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion in King II Operation (no data), 1-3, for the initial plans and briefing.


53. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume Five, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago, 1953), 357, make the only specific reference to such a typhoon. Ranger reports speak only of gale winds and typhoon-type winds.

54. Times for different actions at Suluan vary. I have used Morison's times because they are the most complete and I feel that the naval reports are probably the most accurate in this amphibious operation. The rangers landed at 8:05 a.m. according to Falk, Cannon, and one ranger battalion report; at 8:17 a.m. according to another ranger report; 8:19 a.m. according to General MacArthur's report; and 8:20 a.m. according to Morison, Krueger, and the Sixth Army's report.

55. Falk, Decision at Leyte, 79.

56. Morison, Leyte, 117-123. LCRP's were the original ramped landing craft used in the war.

57. Reports differ about the place of the landing. Company D's report says that the rangers landed on Black Beach Three and at the same time said that the troops landed south of Granadas. This is impossible. The beach was north of Granadas. Morison wrongly places the landing beach on Suluan way south of the town of Granadas. I have assumed that the rangers landed on the beach, the natural area, and that they started from an initial position north of Granadas.


59. Action on Suluan is based primarily on Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Company D, Operational Report, 20 December 1944 (APO 24) and the same unit's Field Order 1 (APO 72, n.d.). See also: Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, S-2 Journal, Leyte, 17 October 1944-11 November 1944 (APO 72); Falk, Decision at Leyte, 79-82, and Cannon, Leyte, 54-55.
Based on Company D's original plan and announced deployment.

Broached means that the craft were turned sideways to the surf and thus could not be used while storm surf kept smashing onto the beach. The boats evidently were damaged also because they were not used to evacuate the rangers on 18 October.

Except in the original ranger reports the larger number of enemy casualties are mentioned. Cannon, *Leyte*, does not mention any casualties. Only the ranger reports mention that Roscoe Dick became the second American fatality.


The second Suluan raid is based primarily on Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, *Journal*, Leyte, 17 October to 14 November 1944, S-2 Journal, Leyte, 17 October 1944 to 11 November 1944, and Report of Night Activities, 19 March 1945 (APO 74); and the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Company B, Historical Data (APO 70, 1945) and Journal, Leyte, 18 October 1944 to 12 November 1944. See also: Morison, *Leyte*, fn., 121, and Sixth Army, *Combat Notes*, Number 6, 6-8.


Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Company B, Historical Data, 3-4. Report is signed by Captain Arthur D. Simons, Infantry, the commander of Company B and the raiding force.

From the Bottom of the Pit

The main sources for this section are the following documents of the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion:

Narrative of the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion from January 2, 1945 to July 1, 1945.
Ranger Mission at the Pangatian Prison Camp (A Report to G-3, Sixth Army APO 442, no date)
Journal, 10 January 1945 to 13 March 1945.
S-2 Intelligence Reports, 17 January 1945--5 July 1945,
Numbers 30-104, Luzon.
S-2 Journal, 10 January 1945 to 20 June 1945.
S-3 Journal, 4 January 1945 to 9 July 1945
G-3 Operations Reports, 14 January 1945 to 26 March 1945.

All these documents are found in Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Combat Reports, World War II, 6th Ranger Battalion.

Additional sources include: George E. Jones, "Luzon Prison Camp Rescue Made in Region Thick with Japanese," New York Times (3 February 1945), 1,5; Krueger, Down Under to Nippon, 237-239; Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," Infantry Journal (March-April 1945), 15-19; "Rangers Pierce Foe's Lines, Rescue 513, Many of Bataan," New York Times (2 February 1945), 1, 10; Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "Rescue by the Rangers," Combat Notes, Number 5 (21 March 1945), 1-10; Sixth Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, I, 30-31, II, diagram 11; and III, 16, 157; Captain Ray M. Stroupe, "Rescue by the Rangers," Military Review (December 1945), 63-66. Colonel Mucci's article is the most useful of these accounts. Combat Notes are also helpful and the information in them is similar to that found in the Sixth Ranger Battalion reports. Krueger and Sixth Army's report are similar. Stroupe's article seems to be a condensation of Combat Notes with several unneeded errors.


71. For vivid accounts of the conditions at Camp O'Donnell and Cabanatuan (camp name is italicized for clarity) and stories of Japanese brutalities at the camps and on the Bataan Death March see: Charles Brown, Bars from Bilibid Prison (San Antonio, Texas, 1947), 33-34;


73. Brown, *Bars from Bilibid Prison*, 34.

74. This is not an overstatement. The official Japanese Prisoner of War Regulations (See: Falk, Bataan, Appendix A, 241-246) were humane and in line with the intent of the Geneva Conventions. They were not enforced according to either the spirit or the letter of the regulations, and the brutalities, starvation, and ill health suffered by the Allied prisoners in the Philippines are recorded in practically every memoir or history of prisoners of war in the islands. Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 97-136, is the most explicit on the subject of how the Japanese looked at the status of the imprisoned Allies. He recorded the following introductory address by a Japanese prison official, 99:

[Translator]: Captain, he say you are not prisoners of war. You are sworn enemies of Japan. Therefore, you will not be treated like prisoners of honorable war. Captain, he say you will be treated like captives.

Later, 111-115, Dyess wrote poignantly about the prisoners' constant hope of rescue or release.

Other accounts of Japanese ill treatment of prisoners appear in the New York Times (2-4 February 1945). Falk, Bataan, 221-237, explains why the Japanese acted like they did on the Bataan Death March and were so brutal in their prison camps.

75. For an account of a brutal reprisal for escaping from a camp see: Utinsky, "Miss U," 80-81. Three unsuccessful escapees, Lieutenant Colonels Breitung and Briggs, USA, and Lieutenant Gilbert, USN, were beaten for three days and then buried alive. Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 132-136, reports that the same men were beaten severely for some time and then one lieutenant colonel was beheaded and the other two officers were shot. Neither source gave complete names for the officers.

76. For example, a service nurse dying of cancer in Santo Tomas Internment Camp kept saying that she would live until American marines liberated the camp. She died before liberation, but her courage was an inspiration to all. Personal knowledge.
77. Colonel White was a 1923 graduate of the United States Military Academy. He served as General Krueger's G-2 Officer throughout the war. The colonel retired in 1954 and died in 1963.


79. Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 1-2.


81. Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 1.

82. Ibid.

83. General routes to and from the prison camp are shown in several sketches; Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Mission at Pangatian, enclosure 1; Reports of MacArthur, Vol. I, Campaigns, 323 (color); Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 18; Stroupe, "Rescue by the Rangers," 65.

This description of the terrain is based on the 1944 editions of 1:50,000 scale maps produced by the Army Map Service, USA. See sheets 3357I, Santo Domingo, and 3457I, Bongabon, Philippine Islands.

84. Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 2.

85. Jones, "Luzon Prison Rescue," 5. Captain Fisher was the son of the author, Dorothy Canfield.

86. Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 10, explains the organization and equipment of a ranger company and the equipment of the rangers on this raid.

87. Ibid., 2, 10; Also, Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Narrative, January-July 1945, 5.

88. Assumed. Although according to the main reports Colonel White did most of the initial planning he was not in a position to do the detailed planning for Colonel Mucci. Neither officer would have had the necessary information to make up a final tactical plan on 27 January. Colonel Mucci's decision to delay the raid shows that he had the latitude to make decisions and plans in the field.

Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Mission at Pangatian, 1, and Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 19.

Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 2.

Major Lapham is not mentioned by Colonel Mucci in his article or in his conversation with Jones in that reporter's article in the New York Times, Lapham was not mentioned in any ranger report or in Combat Notes.

Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann appointed Major Lapham as his subordinate and leader of the Sixth District of USAFIP, North Luzon which covered the province of Nueva Ecija where Cabanatuan was located. Major Lapham did not accept his subordinate role and he remained independent and founded his own guerrilla organization, Luzon Guerrilla Army Force (LGAF), which operated in Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, and Tarlac Provinces. Lapham's radio station and headquarters were located in the northern part of the operational area for this raid, probably in the foothills of the mountains. Hukbalahap (Communist) guerrillas were also reported to be strong in the town of Cabanatuan. I do not believe that Lapham had complete control of the guerrillas in the operational area. For much of this information see: Uldarico Baelagon, Philippine Campaigns (Manila, 1952), 236, 242-243, and General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, The Intelligence Series, Volume I, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines (Tokyo, 1948), 9-10, 43-45.

95. This estimate is based upon a study of the 1:50,000 scale maps of the area and the known arrival times at specific locations.

96. These developments are described in detail in Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Mission at Pangatian, 1-2, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 2. Stroupe, "Rescue by the Rangers," reports similar data. Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 15-17, does not discuss these developments.

97. The time of the request for supporting aircraft and the time the mission was cancelled and then rescheduled is not clear in the various journals of the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion.

The battalion's Journal for 29 January reports:

1022: To: BN. C.O.: Plan Changed due to late information. Will attack 301600 and 1700 air support over camp during that time imperative. Planes attack tanks and trucks only.

The same message is found in the S-2 Journal. The time signed is the same as above, 1022, but the time received is 0830 30 January. The message came from Captain Prince.

Again, in the S-3 Journal the same message is recorded, but it is listed as coming from Colonel Mucci. The time in is 0835 30 January.

If the 1022 time on 29 January is correct, Colonel Mucci decided to delay his operation before the rangers received the guerrilla reports late in the afternoon on the 29th. Narrative sources indicate that the mission was cancelled late in the afternoon on the 29th so it might have been possible that the message from the raiders was sent at 10:22 p.m. and was recorded improperly as 1022 instead of 2222.

98. The first request for air coverage on 29 January is recorded in the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion's S-2 Journal on that date. The message from Captain Prince to the Battalion S-3, signed at 291700, was received at 291800 January 1945 and it read in part: "Request continual air coverage commencing 291900 with mission only to attack tank."

A similar message from Colonel Mucci was logged in the battalion's S-3 Journal at 1800 29 January 1945. These messages would indicate that the mission still was "on" late in the afternoon and would contradict the time of 1022 mentioned in footnote 97.
Krueger, Down Under to Nippon, 238, mentions that air cover was provided for the raid.

99. The party included 121 rangers, 13 Alamo Scouts, Captain J oson's 80 guerrillas, and Captain Pajota's 250 guerrillas -- a total of 464 men.

100. Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 17, and Shaplen, "At Cabanatuan," 40, speak of a division of enemy troops. Other sources mention a "large enemy force."

101. According to Jones, "Luzon Prison Rescue," 5, Colonel Mucci said that his troops were "dog-tired." Also Mucci reportedly said that there were possibly seventy Japanese tanks inside the prison camp. Jones' facts at this point in his article are a bit confused. He does such things as place the town of Cabu one mile southwest of the camp instead of one mile northeast of it.

102. Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 17, states that the reconnaissance party left at 9:00 a.m. while Jones, "Luzon Prison Rescue," 5, says that Mucci said that the party left at dawn. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Narrative, January--July 1945, 6, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 3, say that the party departed at 9:00 a.m.

103. The intelligence report is best recorded in Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Mission at Pangatian, 2, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 3 and 5 (sketch).

Comments on the sentry routine and the times of changing the guard came from Sixth Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, I, 30 and III, 16. The deduction of the orthodox guard hours and change is mine.

104. This time of attack would support the comment that the even hours were the times for changing guards. Colonel Mucci probably would not have attacked at a time when there were two guard forces standing ready; the one on guard, and the one preparing to go on duty.


106. Assumed because the actual return route followed the route to Plateros until the rangers learned that the Sixth Infantry Division had seized Talavera. Then the route was changed because the prisoners and the rangers were picked up by trucks and ambulances and evacuated to Guimba and Calasiao.

107. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Mission at Pangatian, 2-4, and Narrative, January--July 1945, 6-7; Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 3-6; and Mucci, "Rescue at
Cabanatuan,"17-18, give excellent details of the raid plans.

108. Three sources say that 286 guerrillas made the raid. See: "Heroes," 13; Reports of MacArthur, Vol. I, Campaigns, 321; and the editors remarks appended to Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 19. None of these mention how the total was determined.

Other sources speak of Captain Pajota's 80 guerrillas, Captain Pajota's 250 guerrillas (90 of whom were armed) -- therefore the logical total would be at least 340.

The number 286 may represent the total number of armed guerrillas, 170, plus Lieutenant Tombo, and the 115 litter bearers who were supposedly used to help the invalid prisoners withdraw from the compound.

109. The number of guerrillas at Captain Pajota's roadblock varies according to source. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Narrative, January—July 1945, 6, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 3, say that Pajota had eighty men. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Mission at Pangatian, 1,3, and Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 15-17, imply that all ninety of Pajota's men were on the block. Krueger, Down Under to Nippon, 238, and Jones,"Luzon Prison Rescue," 5, say that Pajota had sixty men.

According to the New York Times (4 February 1945), 15 (photo caption), Major Lapham commanded the roadblock. No other source mentions this.


111. Not clear in the sources examined. Presumed to be the same positions as the final assembly area for the raid which was near the creek seven hundred yards north of the prison. Jones, "Luzon Prison Rescue," 5, mentions a pre-arranged rendezvous area seven hundred yards north of the camp which would confirm the presumption.

Alamo Scout actions are barely mentioned in most sources. See Sixth Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, III, 16, for a short summary of their actions.

112. Not mentioned in sources, but an advanced guard or at least a guide force had to be provided or the prisoners would have walked blindly northward.

113. Krueger, Down Under to Nippon, 238, says that a night reconnaissance plane was used during the raid. The ranger battalion's S-2 Journal records that the request for air support was approved on the spot by Colonel H. V. White when the message was first received in the ranger command post. See the message from Ranger 2 to Captain Prince, 0824 30 January 1945 in the S-2 Journal.
This was the only practical route for the platoon to advance to its position according to the 1944 map of the area and the aerial photograph of the camp. See Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, for the aerial photograph.

Mucci said that his party crept forward to Cabu Creek, the probable assembly area, and then crawled eight hundred yards to the road. The passage is not clear.

Jones, "Luzon Prison Rescue," 5. The creek Mucci spoke of was not Cabu Creek, but rather an unnamed one which passed east of the camp and then turned north between the main highway and the Pampanga River.


Ibid.

Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 18.


Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 18.


Two persons died according to the four newspapermen who wrote about the rescue.

According to Jones, "Luzon Prison Rescue," 5, Colonel Mucci reported that "Captain Prince stayed behind to set up demolitions in buildings,..." and also the colonel said that "Fortunately Prince had nearly completed his job of blowing up buildings and he fired shots signaling the guerrillas to retire."

For details about the withdrawal see Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 18-19.

For additional reports of the guerrilla action see Jones, "Luzon Prison Rescue," 5, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 6. Jones mentions that twelve enemy tanks were destroyed, presumably eight in this action and four in the stockade. Neither Mucci or Combat Notes or any of the ranger reports confirm these results.

Casualties differ according to source. Captain Fisher and Corporal Sweezey, both rangers died of wounds. Private First Class Jack A. Peters is listed as dead in a ranger casualty report, body recovered. No other mention is made of Peters' death. Technical Sergeant Alfonso, an Alamo Scout, and a Corporal Estesen, a ranger, were wounded. Filipino losses are difficult to determine. If approximately twenty-seven Allies were killed in the raid then twenty-four Filipinos may have died.
Enemy casualties were heavy. In all likelihood the 223 Japanese inside the camp were killed. Possibly as many as 300 were killed or wounded at the roadblock. Enemy and Filipino losses must be considered to be estimates only.


128. This figure varies from 100 to 115 according to source.

129. Interview with Colonel John R. Hall, USA, Retired, the Division Surgeon of the First Cavalry Division at the time. Hall and Dr. Musselman were classmates. According to the colonel Dr. Musselman remained in Plateros to take care of the American wounded, and then after Dr. Fisher died Musselman arranged for Fisher's burial.

130. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Narrative, January--July 1945, 8, and Casualty Report, 1 February 1945, 1.


132. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Mission at Pangatian, 4, and Narrative, January--July 1945, 8; Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 18-19; and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 8, describe the withdrawal best. Also see Jones, "Luzon Prison Rescue," 5, and Mydans, "The Rescue at Cabanatuan," 37-38.

133. Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Mission at Pangatian, 5, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 5, 8.


135. Actions of the Filipinos assumed.

136. According to most sources 513 prisoners were rescued. Two died before reaching Guimba.


138. Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Campaign, 159. Lieutenant Nellist led a beach and area reconnaissance party onto the Surigao Peninsula of Mindanao, 22-26 October 1944. Lieutenant Rounsaville and his party operated on Masbate Island from 12 November to 2 December 1944. The scouts established a coastwatcher station and organized the local
guerrillas.

139. Most likely since Major Lapham's reported area of operation during the occupation was centered in the mountains just north of General Luna. See Reports of MacArthur, Vol. I, Campaigns, 299, 319. One other point supports this premise; the guerrillas cooperated so well with the rangers that some sort of overall control is suspected.


141. Krueger, Down Under to Nippon, 239.

142. Editor's comment appended to Mucci, "Rescue at Cabanatuan," 19. See also Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion, Narrative, January—July 1945, 9, for General MacArthur's message to General Krueger which announced the awards.

No Blood Upon Their Risers

143. This section is based for the most part on the following sources: Fourteenth Corps, After Action Report, XIV Corps, M—1 Operation (APO 453, 1945), 159-166; Flanagan, The Angels, 93-98; H. W. Lombard, "A Military Epic," (source unknown), 371-374 (Article provided by Major General Louis A. Walsh, Jr., USA, Retired); Doris Rubens, Bread and Rice (New York, 1947), 227-233; Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G—3, "By Land, By Air, By Water," Combat Notes, Number 7 (May 1945), 31-39; and Lieutenant Colonel Louis A. Walsh, "The Raid on Los Baños," Infantry Journal (October 1945), 26-29.

A history of the guerrilla actions in the raid -- one which seems to be exaggerated if not erroneous in great part -- is found in Proculo L. Mojica, Terry's Hunters (The True Story of Hunters ROTC Guerrillas) (Manila, 1965), 570-607. Mojica has presented either entirely new and accurate material or he has written a glamorous "war story" to glorify friends and the guerrillas in general. His sources are poor. While appearing credible in parts, the narrative of the guerrilla actions at Los Baños Internment Camp (italicized for clarity) is wrong. Mojica says that the guerrillas attacked the camp before the American paratroopers dropped because the Japanese had spotted the Filipino fighters. Internee accounts, U.S. Army reports, and all the other sources do not sustain Mojica's contention. Such a major error makes me suspicious of the other new information which he presents.


The chapter title comes from an American paratrooper ditty entitled "Blood on the Risers." It is perhaps the most famous of the airborne songs and it tells in detail the story of a young jumper who fell to his death because he forgot to "hook up" properly. It is sung to the tune of "The Battle Hymn of the Republic."

144. Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 197-198, says that he received the mission on 3 February 1945. Flanagan, The Angels, 93, says the mission was received by the Eleventh Airborne Division on 3 February. Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 31, and Fourteenth Corps, Report, M-1 Operation, 159, say that the mission was received in the division on 4 February.

145. The division's regiments were: 187th Glider Infantry Regiment, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, and the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

146. Flanagan, The Angels, 76, comments:

...because a three-star [Eichelberger] and a two-star [Swing] general were generally with the infantry point it was said that [our division] was a "spearhead tipped with brass." Some of the brass got nicked off our spearhead before we got into Manila.
147. Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 31.

148. See Hartendorp, Santo Tomas Story, 147-161, for details about the organization and establishment of Los Baños, and 425-427, for a summary of the later activities. Rubens, Bread and Rice, 227-231, discusses the last days of the camp. Her information differs from Hartendorp's concerning the dates the Japanese left the camp. Rubens says the Japanese left in early February; Hartendorp reports their departure on 7 January 1945. Also see Walsh, Report of Airborne Operations, Luzon, 13.

149. Described from maps and personal experience in the hills around the camp.


151. Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 32-33, provides the best intelligence summary.

Particularly important were the eighty Japanese reported as the garrison of the camp. Mojica, Terry's Hunters, 593, says there were eighty-four Japanese in the camp. Most articles, however, report in their casualty summaries that between 243 and 253 enemy soldiers were killed inside the camp. Intelligence reports were either grossly inaccurate or the final casualties were inflated. I have been unable to resolve the different figures satisfactorily.

An excellent, brief account appraising the strategical importance of the Los Baños area is found in Eleventh Airborne Division, Report, Mike VI, 3.


154. Hartendorp, Santo Tomas Story, 425; Mojica, Terry's Hunters, 577-584; and Rubens, Bread and Rice, 227. Hartendorp mentions the proposed guerrilla raid in passing; Rubens says that it was called off once the internees heard about the rescue of Santo Tomas because they felt that their liberation was just a matter of time. Mojica makes more out of the planned raid, tells how it was conceived, coordinated, and then why at the last minute it was cancelled.

155. Mojica, Terry's Hunters, 583-584. No other author confirms the "cancelled" guerrilla raid.

156. Ibid., 576-577, and Flanagan, The Angels, 93.
157. Major Vanderpool is mentioned in Fourteenth Corps, Report, M-1 Operation, 161, throughout Mojica, Terry's Hunters; and Flanagan, The Angels, 106. Flanagan reports:

When the Division landed at Nasugbu, [Vanderpool] reported to General Swing for duty on his staff, and the General gave him the mission of gathering, organizing, and coordinating all the guerrillas in the Southern Provinces. ...he organized supporting attacks, flank protection, reconnaissance missions, and intelligence spy systems.

158. For brief accounts of reconnaissance and intelligence activities see: Flanagan, The Angels, 93; Fourteenth Corps, Report, M-1 Operation, 161; Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 32-33; and Walsh, "Raid on Los Baños," 26-27.

159. Flanagan, The Angels, 96-97; Mojica, Terry's Hunters, 586-587; and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 32.

160. Flanagan, The Angels, 98, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 32.

161. Fourteenth Corps, Report, M-1 Operation, 161, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 31.

162. Raid plans are described best in Flanagan, The Angels, 93, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 34-35.

163. The Los Baños Force commanded by Colonel Robert H. Soule included:

a. Infiltration Force (Lieutenant George Skau):
   Division Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon
   Three hundred (?) Filipino guerrillas

b. Parachute Assault Force (Lieutenant John M. Ringler):
   Company B, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment
   Light Machine Gun Section from Headquarters Company, First Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment

c. Amphibious Force (Major Henry A. Burgess):
   First Battalion (minus Company B), 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment
   Company C, 127th Engineers
   Two 75mm guns from Battery D, 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion
   Fifty-three tractors and crews from the 672d Amphibious Tractor Battalion
   Two hundred (?) Filipino guerrillas
d. Diversionary Attack Force (Lieutenant Colonel Ernest LaFlamme):

First Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment
472d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm M-2)
675th Glider Field Artillery Battalion
Company B (minus one platoon), 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion

The number of guerrillas involved in the raid is not clear. According to Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 34 and 36, three hundred guerrillas were assembled to isolate the camp and secure the drop zone and the beach, and two hundred more accompanied the amphibious force. Forty of these actually surrounded the camp with the American reconnaissance troopers. Flanagan, The Angels, 95, says eighty guerrillas went to the camp and Walsh, "Raid on Los Baños," 27, and Report of Airborne Operations, Luzon, 26, says fifty guerrillas joined the American paratroopers. Neither Flanagan or Walsh mention the number of guerrillas who were with the other forces or at other places.

Mojica, Terry's Hunters, 592-593, says 326 guerrillas raided the camp and they were divided into nine parties. He mentions that other guerrillas helped out, but does not say how many were at the various positions on 23 February. Guerrillas, according to Mojica, included: Hukbalahaps at the drop zone; Markings and Fil-Americans at the beach; Captain Roman Mawis' company with the amphibious force; and other units such as the Chinese Forty-Eighth Squadron, President Quezon's Own Guerrillas, and the USAFFE Guerrilla Intelligence Unit.


168. Fifty-three amtracs are mentioned in most sources and seem to be the correct number. Other totals listed are fifty-four, fifty-nine, and sixty-four.


170. All authors except Walsh, in both his article and report, and Craven and Cate (eds.), Air Forces in World War II, Vol. V, Matterhorn to Nagasaki, 347, mention nine aircraft. Walsh and Craven and Cate report that ten C-47's carried the jump force.

172. Ibid.; Fourteenth Corps, *Report, M-1 Operation*, 164; and Sixth Army, *Combat Notes, Number 7*, 34. *Combat Notes* say that the Americans met the guerrilla force at the barrio of San Antonio. This is not too useful because there are three such barrios within six thousand yards of the internment camp. The San Antonio referred to is probably the barrio on the coast of Laguna de Bay north of the town of Bay.

173. The final actions of the reconnaissance platoon and the guerrillas cannot be accurately reported. Eleventh Airborne Division, *Luzon, Philippine Islands Campaign*, 10; Fourteenth Corps, *Report, M-1 Operation*, 164; and Sixth Army, *Combat Notes, Number 7*, 34-35, are too general. Flanagan, *The Angels*, 95-96, is not much more helpful. Walsh, *"Raid on Los Baños, )* 28, adds unconfirmed information that the force was in position around the camp fifteen hours before the attack started. (ie. 4:00 p.m. 22 February).

Mojica, *Terry's Hunters*, 592-597, gives the most complete and plausible explanation until he begins to report the attack on the camp. His narrative on this portion of the raid is wrong. See footnote 143, this chapter.

174. Mamatid and Calamba are mentioned most often as the jump-off areas. They appear to be the correct spots. Walsh disagrees in both his article and report. He says that the amtracs deployed from Muntinlupa about 1:30 a.m. 23 February, swam slowly down the west coast of the lake to Linga Point, turned left across the water, and then drove south onto the beach. He reports that the prisoners were taken by the amtracs to Santa Roas Beach.

Because of the slow speed of the amtracs Mamatid Beach was the only one close enough for the four hour round trip (the one actually made) from Mayondon Point. The other beaches were too far away. If they had been used only one group of internees could have been evacuated by the amtracs in the time that the raid took place.

175. Flanagan, *The Angels*, 95, and Sixth Army, *Combat Notes, Number 7*, 34.

176. Fourteenth Corps, *Report, M-1 Operation*, 164-165; Flanagan, *The Angels*, 96; and Sixth Army, *Combat Notes, Number 7*, 34. The exact formation of the amtracs during their movement from Mamatid to Mayondon Point is not explained clearly in any source.

177. Lombard, *"A Military Epic,"* 371, and Rubens, *Bread and Rice*, 231. Both authors were internees.
Ibid. C-47 aircraft have only one jump door and it is on the left side of the aircraft.

The parachute troops jumped at approximately 7:00 a.m. American reports vary by only two minutes.

American reports are not detailed. Mojica's narrative is too full of errors to be taken seriously. Guerrillas did provide the majority of the force. There were either forty (Combat Notes), fifty (Walsh), eighty (Flanagan), or 326 (Mojica) guerrillas compared to not more than thirty-two American paratroopers.

Eighty guerrillas are reported because with about thirty Americans the combined force surrounding the camp would then have been large enough to hold either the eighty or so Japanese reported to be there in intelligence reports or the larger 243-253 man force which was reported to have been destroyed within the camp. The choice of eighty guerrillas is an educated guess.


Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 38.

Ibid., 34, says that 155 paratroopers were in the jump force. Craven and Cate (eds.), Air Forces in World War II, Vol. V, Matterhorn to Nagasaki, 437, give the total as 125, and Lombard, "A Military Epic," 372, says there were 139 jumpers.

Flanagan, The Angels, 96; Fourteenth Corps, Report, M-1 Operation, 165; Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 38; and Walsh, "Raid on Los Baños," 28.

Flanagan, The Angels, 97; Fourteenth Corps, Report, M-1 Operation, 165; Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 38.

The diversionary attack is described best in Flanagan, The Angels, 98. See also: Fourteenth Corps, Report, M-1 Operation, 165, and Sixth Army, Combat Notes, Number 7, 39.

Eleventh Airborne Division, Luzon, Philippine Islands Campaign, 10.

Flanagan says that two amtracs were sunk. Walsh, "Raid on Los Baños," 29, reports only one.

Mojica, *Terry's Hunters*, 604, says that the guerrillas returned to Nanghaya (possibly Nanhaya) after the Americans and the internees withdrew from Mayondon beach.

188. Flanagan, *The Angels*, 98. The number of internees varies: 2146 and 2147 are the most common totals given.

189. The generally accepted number of enemy casualties is between 243 and 253 — supposedly the entire garrison of the camp. The figure is accepted because Lombard, "A Military Epic," 372, reports that the camp garrison numbered over 250. Lombard was an internee and I feel that his report must be given more weight. Mojica, *Terry's Hunters*, 604, reports only eighty-four Japanese were killed in the camp. His total coincides with the previous intelligence report in Sixth Army, *Combat Notes*, Number 7, 32. If the garrison was in fact only eighty-four, then the figures 243-253 probably represent the total number of Japanese killed by all the raiding forces. Enemy losses for areas other than the camp are not given in any source.

190. American casualties vary. Two soldiers from Colonel LaFlamme's force were killed. There is no doubt about that. American wounded vary from two to four. No internees were killed but between one and four were reported to have been wounded. Mojica's report of American casualties differs from American sources. No casualty reports were examined so these figures cannot be fully substantiated. I have used the largest figures reported.


192. Letter from Major General Louis A. Walsh, Jr., USA, Retired, to author, 4 August 1969.

193. As previous notes indicate there are still many questions to be answered about the planning and execution of this action, especially those concerning the Filipino guerrillas and the actions around the internment camp when the raid began.
CHAPTER VI: THE DEMI-RAIDERS

Several spectacular operations in the Southwest Pacific resembled raids, although they were not in the strictest sense raids like Salamaua, Moari, Suluan, Cabanatuan, and Los Baños. They were, however, so similar that they need to be explained to point out how the techniques of raiding—surprise, swift attack, deep penetration—were combined in unique operations which were neither raids nor normal, orthodox attacks.

Similar but not the same as raids, these operations were essentially incomplete or partial raids—demi-raids. These demi-raids included surprise attacks against limited objectives behind enemy lines, involved a wide variety of units of different size, and were both strategic and tactical actions. Sometimes withdrawals were contemplated, but on most occasions the attackers planned to seize and hold their objectives if possible. Because of this desire to retain what had been seized, these actions cannot be labelled raids; most doctrine requires that a withdrawal be executed or at least contemplated before an action can be called a raid.

Five extraordinary operations stand out as model demi-raids: the parachute assault to seize the airfield at Nadzab in the Markham Valley of New Guinea; the dramatic reconnaissance in force into the Admiralty Islands; the cavalry's version of a prison rescue operation—the dash of the "flying columns" into Manila; the seizure of the
Bauang Bridge in Luzon; and the piratical boarding of the concrete battleship, Fort Drum, in Manila Bay.

Subsidiary operations which involved the attack or seizure of tiny islands throughout the theater by small Allied forces and which aimed at the destruction or neutralization of the enemy garrisons on each island also had raid like characteristics. There are so many of the special operations, and they differ so much in scope that they cannot be included as a group in the category of demi-raids. Many might be; however, only the attack on Fort Drum is in my judgment both a demi-raid and a subsidiary operation.

No attempt is made to be comprehensive in recording the model demi-raids: these capsule narratives are included to give an insight into the wide range of combat actions which fell within the raiders' domain in the Southwest Pacific.

THE FIRST JUMP: NADZAB

American paratroopers made the first of the demi-raids in the Markham Valley of New Guinea where Australia's Kanga Force had operated in 1942. Kanga Force had been unable to clear the valley of Japanese even though they had harassed the enemy in the area. The brigade which reinforced Kanga Force and the Australian Third Division had also been unsuccessful in the valley.
South of the Markham Valley the Australians had been able to hold the airfield at Wau, the main town in the Bulolo Valley. Following the defense of that key position the Australians began their drive north to seize Salamaua on the Huon Gulf. These actions were the first moves of the campaign which ultimately seized Salamaua, Lae, the Markham Valley and the Huon Peninsula. The key objectives were the two towns and their airfields as well as the airfield at Nadzab in the Markham Valley. These airfields were needed to control the straits between New Guinea and New Britain to the east.

After final plans were made to dislodge the ten thousand Japanese from the area, Australian and American infantry drove north from Wau over the mountains to Salamaua to divert the enemy's attention from Lae. The fight for Salamaua was bitter and costly but it was successful in drawing the majority of the enemy south from Lae to defend the town.

On 4 September, eight days before the Allies captured Salamaua, the Australian Ninth Division supported by the American Second Engineer Special Brigade began landing on beaches near Lae. The Aussies moved inland immediately. There was no Japanese ground reaction, although enemy aircraft attacked the beachhead.

To seal off the enemy force in Lae and to block the
Markham Valley, a third Allied attack was scheduled to strike Nadzab, twenty-five miles to the west of Lae. This mission was given to the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, an American unit commanded by Colonel Kenneth H. Kinsler, and the one destined to make the first airborne assault of the Pacific War. The paratroopers staged at Port Moresby and at 8:25 a.m. on 5 September they took off in eighty-one C-47 transports and headed across the Owen Stanley Mountains for a rendezvous with the escorting fighters and bombers. About fifty miles from the drop zone the jumpers stood up, hooked up to the static lines inside the aircraft, checked their equipment and waited for the command to "GO."

Approaching the Markham Valley from the southwest, the 302 aircraft turned right and headed for Nadzab. Jump aircraft descended from 3000 feet to about 500 feet; and as they lined up on three different drop zones, the B-25 bombers and A-20 attack planes strafed and bombed the target areas. Fighters remained with the troop carriers to protect them. High above the air armada, General MacArthur and his air chief, Lieutenant General George Kenney, flying in separate B-17's, watched the drama unfold.

At 10:20 a.m. the number one men in the lead aircraft blasted up and out of the left doors of the C-47's and braced for their opening shocks. Shuffling quickly into the doors, the remaining paratroopers cleared their ships in four and one half minutes. Falling about two hundred feet before their chutes opened, the troopers soon descended
the remaining two hundred or so feet to the ground. Getting out of their harnesses quickly the Americans moved quickly through the kunai grass to their assembly areas where the units reformed. Once reorganized, the First Battalion captured Nadzab airstrip, and the two remaining battalions blocked possible approach routes to the north and east.

Paratroopers immediately began preparing the airstrip for immediate use by C-47's. Others were busy throughout the day recovering the supplies which were being dropped into the area by B-17 bombers. Late in the afternoon Australian reinforcements arrived. First, artillerymen were parachuted into the airhead with their twenty-five pounders. Then, pioneers and engineers joined the Americans after they had marched into the area from the Watut River Valley to the south.

Work continued on the airstrip during the night, and the following day an American airborne engineer company landed to aid the construction effort. On the 7th, command elements and reinforcements landed, and by the 10th enough Australians had arrived so that they could relieve the American paratroopers of their defensive mission around Nadzab.

Three jumpers were killed and thirty-three others were injured on the assault; but since no Japanese were found, the 503d Infantry had no battle casualties. A few days later, the regiment saw its only action near Yalu, just to
the east of Nadzab. Eight paratroopers were killed and
twelve were wounded in the engagement. These jump and battle
casualties were exceedingly light; a small price to pay
for a major air base. In the two weeks since the assault,
Nadzab had two six thousand foot airstrips and there were
six others under construction.

One report called the Nadzab operation a raid, but
the others do not. Parachute assaults have many raid-like
characteristics especially in their first phases when the
paratroopers are concerned about seizing their drop zones.
When only initial objectives like drop zones, or in this
operation, airfields need to be captured, airborne actions
resemble raids quite closely. Nadzab was the first of many
striking demi-raids.

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE: LOS NEGRAS

Strategically the most important of the demi-raids
was the reconnaissance in force which the First Cavalry
Division, "The First Team," made into Los Negros Island in
the Admiralties in February 1944. The Admiralty Islands
controlled the sea north of the Bismarck Archipelago which
was the bridge between New Guinea and the Solomons. The
capture of the Admiralties would isolate the huge Japanese
base at Rabaul, New Britain, and the important base at
Kavieng, New Ireland, both of which were in the Bismarck
Archipelago, while cutting off the lines of communication to the bases. Additionally, two airfields, one on Manus and the other on Los Negros, and the large, deep-water harbor formed by the two islands would give the Allies a necessary base for future operations against New Guinea and Japanese positions in the Central Pacific Theater. In General MacArthur's view, the Admiralties formed a cork which he planned to put into the bottle formed by the eastern New Guinea coastline and the Solomons and therein trap the Japanese defenders.

In November 1943 the general ordered General Krueger to seize the Admiralties the following April, and the mission was assigned to the First Cavalry Division. As a result of a ninety minute aerial reconnaissance in February which erroneously reported that the enemy appeared to have abandoned Los Negros, General MacArthur was urged by his air chief, Lieutenant General George Kenney, to invade the islands immediately. General Kenney was convinced that few Japanese were left in the Admiralties while Brigadier General Charles Willoughby, the theater G-2 Officer, reported that the islands were held by about four thousand Japanese. Persuaded by Kenney's aggressiveness, General MacArthur decided to send a reconnaissance force into Los Negros.

It was a gamble, but one worth taking because success would speed up the Allied offensive. If the enemy did meet the reconnaissance with overwhelming force, the operation would be aborted and the reconnaissance unit withdrawn.
Since the First Cavalry Division had been planning to attack the islands, General Krueger ordered the division to make a reconnaissance in force. Brigadier General William Chase was given command of the one thousand man invasion force which was organized around the Second Squadron, Fifth Cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lobit. Supporting pioneers, artillerymen, and other troops were included in this task force which was named the Brewer Reconnaissance Force.

General Chase's men loaded aboard three APD's, old four stack destroyers which were used as fast attack transports, and started for Los Negros on 27 February. General MacArthur and his naval chief, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, joined the force aboard the cruiser, Phoenix.

Due to idle chatter on the radio the Japanese expected an imminent American attack, but the commander prepared to meet the invading force along the shore of Seadler Harbor which was on the north side of Manus and Los Negros. At 8:17 a.m. 29 February, Second Lieutenant Marvin Henshaw led Troop G, Fifth Cavalry ashore through the narrow channel of Hyane Harbor where there were no effective enemy positions. Moving swiftly the cavalrymen established a beachhead, and when the rest of Colonel Lobit's men came ashore they soon were closing in on nearby Momote airstrip. At 9:00 a.m. General Chase reported that his force was successfully ashore, and by 9:50 a.m. the troopers had secured Momote airstrip. Japanese resistance was light and scattered, and
supporting destroyers and cruisers swiftly destroyed those enemy positions which impeded the landing of the cavalrymen. At 4:00 p.m. General MacArthur came ashore. He decorated Lieutenant Henshaw with the Distinguished Service Cross, inspected friendly lines, heard the reports of his commanders, and decided that the cavalrymen would stay. After telling General Chase to hold what he had at all costs, the commander in chief returned with Admiral Kinkaid to the *Phoenix* and immediately ordered the rest of the First Cavalry Division to deploy to the Admiralties.

A bitter fight ensued on Los Negros as General Chase's force was assaulted by the large numbers of Japanese who garrisoned the islands. American reinforcements began arriving on 2 March and finally the entire cavalry division was committed. By the middle of May the Admiralties were secured. The reconnaissance in force achieved its major goals: Rabaul was isolated, the Japanese sea lanes were cut, and the Allies got their needed base. Also, Admiral Halsey's impending attack on Kavieng became unnecessary and was cancelled.

General Kenney's estimate of enemy strength had been wrong, but his insistence on trying to take the islands immediately paid great dividends. The gamble became a *coup de maitre*. 
Cavalrymen in the Second World War seldom had an opportunity to show the dash and speed which had been so characteristic of their branch in years past. Without horses, but equipped with tanks, trucks, and jeeps, the men of the First Cavalry Division, veterans of the Admiralties and Leyte, performed according to their "yellowleg" heritage when they dashed one hundred miles through enemy lines to Manila to rescue nearly four thousand internees and seize Malacañan Palace, the Philippines' White House.

General MacArthur ordered the cavalrymen forward on this mission on 30 January 1945, the day Colonel Mucci's Rangers returned to Guimba with the survivors of Cabanatuan. The general went to the division's command post in Guimba and issued his dramatic instructions to Major General Verne Mudge: "Go to Manila. Go around the Nips, bounce off the Nips, but go to Manila. Free the internees in Santo Tomas. Take Malacañan Palace and the Legislative Building." This was an unusual order, given directly to the division commander perhaps because General MacArthur was upset over the very slow movement of the Sixth Army to Manila.

General Mudge decided to attack on a broad front with three mobile tank led columns because the enemy situation was vague and the cavalrymen had the wide Pampanga River to cross south of Guimba. The first serial was organized
around the Second Squadron, Fifth Cavalry; the second serial was organized similarly about the Second Squadron, Eighth Cavalry; and the third serial was made up of a Provisional Reconnaissance Battalion composed of the 302d Reconnaissance Troop and the two light tank companies and the headquarters of the Forty-Fourth Tank Battalion. The first two serials had a medium tank company, artillery battery, and other supporting troops. All the troopers were to be mounted on organic division vehicles some of which had to be borrowed from the remaining units, and they carried only four days' rations and necessary water, arms, and ammunition. Aircraft from Marine Air Groups 24 and 32 (MAG 24, 32) were to provide flank and advance cover for the cavalry columns during daylight.

Just at midnight on 31 January the three serials moved out of Guimba toward Cabanatuan where early the next morning the Fifth Cavalrymen crossed the Pampanga River and hit enemy resistance. General Mudge, already noted for his valor, ran out on the Valdefuente Bridge to grab the demolitions which the enemy was trying to detonate with mortar fire, and threw them into the river. By 1:00 p.m. that afternoon the cavalry force was locked in a bitter fight with the enemy in the town. Cabanatuan was isolated, however, when Eighth Cavalrymen crossed the river south of the town and turned north to catch the enemy in a pincers. Fighting continued until dusk when the Seventh and Twelfth Cavalry Regiments came up to take over the fight from the
Lieutenant Colonel Tom A. Ross's Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron had swung farther south early on 1 February and approached the town of Gapan at 1:30 p.m. where it came upon another Japanese force. As the cavalrymen attacked to seize the bridge across the Peñaranda River, Colonel Ross was killed, but Captain Don H. Walton, commanding the 302d Reconnaissance Troop, took command immediately and drove the attack home. Walton secured the bridge and later, with the arrival of Troop G, Eighth Cavalry, defended it so that the advancing columns could continue to march. During the night Lieutenant Colonel Haskett L. Conner, Jr. led his Eighth Cavalry Serial through Gapan and by 8:00 a.m. on the 2d his force was thirty-five miles south at Sabang.

During the evening of the 1st, General Mudge assigned the command of the flying columns to Brigadier General William Chase and relieved Chase of any further responsibility for his First Brigade. Originally, only the first serial, led by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lobit, came from Chase's brigade. As General Chase moved south he was accompanied by a Marine Air Control Group commanded by Captain Samuel H. McAloney. This group provided yeoman service controlling the marine fighters during the drive.

As the columns pushed south on the 2d, Colonel Conner's serial led. His forces reached Plaridel early in the morning and contacted patrols from the Thirty-Seventh Infantry
Division. Flaridel was in the infantry division's zone as was the area to the south, so the cavalrymen backtracked and crossed the wide Angat River at Baliuag. Driving on, the Eighth Cavalrymen soon hit a Japanese battalion which was dug in on high ground. Grinding out tough yardage the cavalrymen broke through and continued on along the second class roads.

Colonel Lobit's serial which had had so tough a day at Cabanatuan entered Sabang the same day; but rather than following the lead serial, it crossed the Angat River at Sabang and then turned eastward on Highway 65 toward Norzagaray. Since the Japanese held defensive positions in the nearby mountains to the east, the troopers were to check and see if the enemy had any intention of striking the cavalry columns in the flank. Such an enemy attack would stop the American advance and would require that additional forces be brought up before the flying columns could continue toward Manila.

By dusk on the 2d the twenty-eight year old Conner had his patrols near Santa Maria. Lobit's men were held up near Angat where they spent several hours in a bitter fight with a small enemy force.

About this time the Corps Commander changed the boundary between the First Cavalry and the Thirty-Seventh Infantry Division and in doing so denied the cavalry the main roads into Manila. It appeared that the infantrymen would now be the first into Manila, but the cavalrymen were determined
to win the race with the "Buckeyes" to the west.

Wasting no time at all, Colonel Lobit's troops moved out at 4:30 a.m. on the 3d just as soon as the moon gave them enough light to see the shoulders of the roads. Driving on, the serial reached Norzagaray at dawn and found that the town was held by Filipino guerrillas. Not stopping, the column turned southwest toward Santa Maria. No major enemy attacks struck the column and after fording many streams the Fifth Cavalrymen reached Santa Maria about three in the afternoon to find that Colonel Conner's serial had crossed the Santa Maria River at noon.

Southeast of Santa Maria, Conner's troopers were delayed by small enemy forces and several fords as they moved along Highway 64 to the junction of Highway 52. This "Hot Corner" was outposted by Japanese so the serial had to fight its way through. One troop was left behind to hold the intersection for the following units. At 4:30 p.m. the force rolled up to the town of Novaliches where it found the enemy attempting to demolish the bridge across the Tuliaham River which the Marine flyers had reported was still intact. A navy lieutenant (j.g.), James P. Sutton, a bomb disposal expert, dashed onto the bridge, cut the burning fuze to the mines, threw them into the gorge below, and won the Distinguished Service Cross for his efforts. Sutton's bravery saved the bridge and at least a twenty-four hour delay for the cavalrmen. The advance continued against light resistance and by 6:00 p.m. the leading troops were
in Talipapa.

Like a coyote trying to catch a roadrunner, the Fifth Cavalry's serial tried desperately to catch up with Colonel Conner's men. Once through Santa Maria they drove at reckless speeds along the same gravel roads used by the leading cavalrymen. Often going fifty miles an hour, (one historian said that this was only possible with a complete faith in the now discredited Saint Christopher, ) Colonel Lobit and his men closed to within an hour's march of the lead elements. At Talipapa the troopers became naval tacticians.

It happened that four enemy trucks approached the small intersection in the town from the east as the American vehicles reached it from the north. Enterprising troopers in the lead vehicles waved the Japanese column to a stop and then the Americans roared by firing all their weapons into the Japanese trucks as they crossed the road junction. "Crossing the T" in the classic naval manner, the cavalrymen destroyed the four trucks and killed twenty-five of the dumbfounded Japanese.

A few minutes later the trailing column caught up with General Chase's command group which was only thirty minutes behind Colonel Conner's force. Shortly thereafter, at 7:00 p.m., Colonel Conner's column reached Grace Park, a Manila suburb, which was the southern boundary of the division's zone.

On the right the Thirty-Seventh Infantry Division, although given the better routes, had been slowed down by
demolished bridges and enemy reaction and was twelve hours behind. Realizing that the infantrymen could not reach Manila first, the Corps Commander shifted the divisional boundary; and, when the cavalry reached Grace Park, he gave permission for the cavalry division to enter Manila. The division boundaries were changed and the First Cavalry got the major portion of the city while the Thirty-Seventh Infantry Division was restricted to the narrow corridor through the industrial part of Manila.

Tanks led the way through scattered resistance and sniper fire in Manila toward the University of Santo Tomas. Two Filipino guides, one of whom was reported to be guerrilla Captain Manuel Colayco, joined Colonel Conner's serial and led them through the city, down España Boulevard to Santo Tomas. There the lead tank, Battling Basic, crashed through the concrete and iron grilled fence, killed the Japanese sentries, and moved to the back of the Main Building. Several minutes later the camp was alive with 3700 delirious internees who could not believe their good fortune.

Earlier that day nine American fighters had flown low over the camp, their pilots clearly visible in their open cockpits, and one had dropped his goggles into the camp. A message tied to the goggles read: "Roll out the barrel. Santa Claus is coming Sunday or Monday." News of the message spread like wildfire throughout the camp. Just before dark the loud shouting, "Americanos, Americanos, Jesus Maria, Americanos!" north of the compound electrified
everyone. It was evident to all that liberation was imminent, but it was not until the internees saw the American tanks that everyone knew they were free again. Many internees, however, were not rescued because the Japanese garrison managed to hold them in the Education Building as hostages. These internees were not released until 5 February.

Action continued in other parts of the city. Colonel Conner sent his Troop G to secure Malacañan. The troop commanded by Captain Emery M. Hickman captured the palace, beat off an enemy night attack, and soon were enjoying the premium beer brought to them from the nearby San Miguel Brewery.

General Chase led the remainder of his force down Quezon Boulevard toward the Pasig River. As his force came to the intersection with España Boulevard, the general met part of Troop G, Eighth Cavalry which was under withering fire from Japanese entrenched in the Far Eastern University. It was a difficult situation and since it was clear that the flying column could not reach the Pasig River and the Legislative Buildings, General Chase decided to turn around and move into Santo Tomas. The cavalrymen did this with the help of Filipinos, but unfortunately they left the area without rescuing the Allied prisoners who, unknown to them, were still incarcerated in old Bilibid Prison across from Far Eastern. These men were freed the next day by the
Thirty-Seventh Infantry Division.

All of General Chase's men closed into Santo Tomas around 11:00 p.m. and deployed to defend the camp until the rest of the division broke into Manila. The flying columns had driven one hundred miles in record time through enemy territory to win the race into Manila from the Thirty-Seventh Infantry Division on the west and the Eleventh Airborne Division which was attacking the city from the south. "First in Manila" would become one of the division's proudest claims, as would the traditions of bravery and leadership shown by the cavalry leaders, Mudge, Chase, Conner, Lobit, and Walton. The finest accolade that the First Cavalry Division will ever get was the gratitude of every internee who would always honor the men who wore that large yellow patch with the black horse's head.

Bridges

During the First Cavalry Division's drive to Manila the quick seizure of major bridges saved the cavalrymen time and effort in their attack. Rivers did not have to be forded and more importantly engineers did not have to be employed to rebuild damaged structures or construct new bridges. For these reasons the capture of bridges intact became important military actions. In the Southwest
Moving inland it observed nine Japs driving carabao carts north along the highway from the town toward the bridge. To avoid disclosing their presence by firing at the Jap party, the platoon raced silently parallel to the highway and reached the bridge first. Had the platoon opened fire before reaching the objective, the bridge guards would have been forewarned, the element of surprise lost, and the mission a failure. Upon reaching the bank of the river, the platoon opened fire on the nine, as well as the startled bridge guard, while the demolition squad cut the control wires. All Japs were killed in the brief fight. The bridge was secured at the cost of one American life.

Twenty electrically controlled aerial bombs, ranging in size from ten 110-pounders to two 1000 pounds were found lashed to the bridge trusses or buried in abutments.

Earlier in March similar operations by the Thirty-Third Infantry Division, "The Golden Cross," captured two highway bridges on Luzon. The division had been slugging its way up the Kennon Road to Baguio for some time; and because of the difficulties encountered the tacticians looked for alternate routes to the Philippine's summer capital. Highway 3 runs north from Lingayen Gulf to the town of Bauang where it joins Highway 9, the old route which traverses the mountains to Baguio. This route was selected by the division commander for an "end run" to the mile high city, but it could not be immediately used because only two battalions of the division's 130th Infantry Regiment were free to be committed to the new attack.

There were two key points on the road to Bauang, one at the Aringay River and the other at Bauang. Here large bridges cross the rivers and in March 1945 they were still
intact, but they were mined or prepared for destruction. The coastal plain through which Highway 3 and the paralleling railroad run is fairly low and open, but on the north side of each river the high ground gave the Japanese clear observation and good fields of fire into the bridge sites.

"Golden Cross" planners remembered the success of the First Cavalry Division's "Flying Column" to Manila in February, and they had learned that the enemy was more easily defeated in lower ground than he was in his mountainous positions. Therefore, the first attack, the one to seize the Aringay Bridge, was planned as a rapid motorized operation. Major Charlie Y. Talbott, the Executive Officer of the First Battalion, 130th Infantry, was given command of the troops who were to secure the bridge. Gay Force as it was named was composed of a rifle company and several separate platoons: heavy weapons, 81mm mortar, Intelligence and Reconnaissance, engineers; and it also included M7 carriers mounting 105mm howitzers.

Gay Force was to conduct a reconnaissance in force at night. This was the first major night attack for the division, so plans were carefully made. On 6 March the men assigned to the force assembled at Damortis, ate hot meals, and received clean clothes. At 3:00 a.m. the next morning the motorized advanced guard moved out slowly along the gravel road and reached the de-trucking area a thousand yards short of the 938 foot, twenty-three span, steel and
concrete bridge without meeting any enemy forces.

When the infantrymen and engineers were prepared to move on they called Major Talbott in Damortis and were given permission to move on. Talbott departed with the rest of Gay Force at that time.

Captain James L. Brown, the commander of the advanced guard, deployed his men and weapons on both sides of the bridge when he reached it, and once in position he sent his engineers onto the bridge. When Major Talbott arrived with the main body he found the bridge cleared of all destruction devices; therefore he ordered an immediate advance into the barrio on the north side of the river. Gay Force entered Aringay without opposition and found that the enemy had left the town.

It was inconceivable that the Japanese had left the bridge undefended, but they did, and as a result the Thirty-Third Division picked a ripe plum in their advance to Bauang. Later that morning one American platoon was caught in an ambush on the one thousand foot Mount Nagabong which overlooked the bridge site, but the Americans secured the entire area the following day.

Ten miles to the north the highway bridge at Bauang was the next objective. Corps Headquarters was concerned that the Thirty-Third Division was overextended; therefore, it prevented any immediate moves to seize the bridge. This delay gave the division plenty of time to reconnoiter the objective on the ground and in the air as well as to receive
reports from the guerrillas about the area and prepare attack plans. A liaison officer also managed to sail along the coast and join the guerrillas who were attacking San Fernando, some miles above Bauang. Lieutenant Colonel Volckmann commanded the guerrillas, and his activities drew enemy attention away from Bauang.

On 16 March, Corps finally gave the division permission to advance to Bauang, and the plans to seize the bridge there with a motorized force were immediately implemented. The First Battalion, 130th Infantry again drew the assignment, and a new task force, Boy Force, organized to make the attack. In addition to these infantrymen, tankers, artillerymen, cavalrymen, and the engineers who had helped to capture the Aringay Bridge were assigned to the force. One destroyer and two P-51, "Mustang," fighter planes were detailed to support Boy Force.

Bauang Bridge was a larger and more difficult objective to attack than was Aringay Bridge. The bridge was composed of two spans which were joined by a 975 foot cement causeway which ran across a high spit on land between the two channels of the Bauang River. The 680 foot south span was wired for demolitions and the wires from the munitions ran into a cave located just south of the 570 foot northern span of the bridge. Two one hundred kilogram bombs were known to be on the northern structure and Japanese guards stayed in the toll house on the Bauang side of the
OPERATIONAL AREA

Sketched from Kenneth J. DeCenzo, "Seize of the Philippine Bases, The Military Experiment (June-August 1944), 292.

DEPLOYMENT AT BAUANG (Approximate)

Sketched from Samoy, Combat Notes, Number 7, 50.
bridge. Seventy enemy soldiers were reported to be in Bauang, while seven thousand others were estimated to be in the vicinity of the objective.

Once again a surprise night attack was planned. Darkness would limit Japanese observation of the bridge site and would aid in gaining surprise. Early on the 19th, Boy Force jumped off and moved quickly into an assembly area about fifteen hundred yards south of the bridge by 2:30 a.m. From there the infantry companies marched to a crossing site near the mouth of the Bauang River while the engineers and their supporting forces quietly moved up on the bridge. Four-thirty found the engineers at the bridge; and they moved on to the southern span, cut the wires, and then crossed the causeway without being discovered. About 6:00 a.m., two engineers, veterans of the earlier mission at Aringay, moved onto the northern span with a small infantry escort. They found the two aerial bombs, cut the fuze lighters, then threw them into the river. As the troops ran back toward the causeway, the enemy opened fire killing an engineer sergeant and wounding two other men. The Japanese attacked south from the toll house immediately but were unable to cross the causeway because the fires from the supporting American sections drove them back.

Just at this critical time the maneuvering companies reported that they were in position to assault Bauang,
and Lieutenant Colonel Jessup, the task force commander, told them to attack. The infantry smashed into Bauang as the remainder of Boy Force attacked across the bridge. By dawn the town was in American hands. A bitter fight east of Bauang was next on the agenda, and there in several caves the Japanese fought to the last man. The task force also captured the undamaged railroad bridge just to the east to complete its coup.

Using the two bridges the Thirty-Third Division was soon driving southeast on Highway 9 toward Baguio to execute its "end run" successfully.

THE "TROJAN HORSE" AT FORT DRUM

Engineers and infantrymen combined to make a demi-raid against Fort Drum in Manila Bay in April 1945. These men came from the Thirty-Eighth Infantry Division which was commanded at the time by Major General William Chase, the former commander of the First Cavalry Brigade. Selected by General MacArthur to lead the infantry division just after he led the dash into Manila, General Chase commanded his division in their bitter operations in Bataan and against Corregidor. At his request, Colonel Edward Lobit, his

*No known first name or initials.
paladin from earlier days, joined him and became the commander of the 151st Infantry Regiment. Both cavalrymen were involved in the attack on Fort Drum.

After helping the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment to secure Corregidor, the Thirty-Eighth Infantry Division, "Avengers of Bataan," received instructions to clear several of the small islands which the Japanese still occupied in Manila Bay. These were essentially subsidiary operations, ones which had no real bearing on the outcome of the campaign. The Japanese could not hinder the passage of American ships since their heavy guns were destroyed, but since they were in the area they had to be cleared out. American commanders were not interested in taking any heavy casualties among their veteran troops in these actions because they were such minor affairs.

Caballo Island was the first objective that Colonel Lobit's regiment attacked in March. During the fight on the island the Japanese survivors holed up in some large mortar pits which were impervious to ground weapons and which the Americans could not assault without taking heavy losses because of dominating enemy weapons. To reduce the enemy positions Colonel Lobit devised a plan to pump diesel fuel into the pits and then ignite it to burn out the defenders. Engineers, with the help of the navy which provided oil storage cubes, and the air corps which provided a gasoline engine, modified a boat to pump oil across the island into the mortar positions. On 5 April the boat
approached Caballo, beached, then a hose was positioned to flood the pits, and oil was pumped into the objective. Then the Americans fired white phosphorus mortar shells into the pits and ignited the fuel oil. They repeated the process on the next two days. The Japanese were just about annihilated by the oil treatment and Caballo was soon cleared of all enemy troops. American losses were not low.

These tactics were next used against Fort Drum which was a more formidable objective. It was a concrete battleship which had been built from 1912 to 1922 on the El Fraile reef. Fort Drum was virtually impregnable as the Japanese found out in 1942. Its sides rose forty feet above the water and were over fifteen feet thick. Five feet from the top of the fort, the side walls sloped inward so that scaling ladders could not be used to board the bastion. The top of the fort was at least twenty feet thick and was impervious to the heaviest bombardment. At the rear of the battleship there was a sallyport which was the main entrance to the position, but the seventy man garrison could easily drive off any boarders. Luckily, the fort's guns were inoperable.

A small naval party had tried to seize the fort in February, but had been driven off after the Japanese had allowed the group to actually land and walk through some of the interior corridors of the installation. Since air and naval gunfire attacks could not seize Fort Drum, a direct assault was considered necessary, but it was delayed
Colonel Lobit recommended that Fort Drum's garrison be burned out as the Caballo garrison had been. The special pumper boat, "Rube Goldberg," was still available, but some means was needed to help an assault party board the concrete battleship. A collapsible ramp was built on the conning tower of a LSM so that the attackers could land on top of the fort. Nicknamed the "Trojan Horse," it was built at Subic Bay and then brought to Corregidor.

American planners had the complete details of the fort's construction and they were further aided by Colonel J. R. Burns of Sixth Army who before the war had designed the proposed airconditioning and anti-gas system for Fort Drum. It was decided to pump fuel oil into one of the main ventilators on the top of the fort from which air ducts entered all areas inside. To ignite the oil a six hundred pound demolition charge was to be emplaced and detonated in the ventilator. A thirty minute time fuze was to be used so that the assault party could withdraw to a safe distance away from Fort Drum.

Back on Corregidor the 151st Infantry rehearsed the attack plan. American aircraft bombed the fort before the first assault to clear the top of any Japanese. All was ready on 13 April and the "Trojan Horse" with the "Rube Goldberg" approached the fort. At 9:34 the security forces boarded the battleship, swept the top of it, and covered all openings and then the engineers followed with
the oil line. There was no enemy resistance; the main
difficulty was caused by the rough sea which made it diffi-
cult for the boats to tie up to the fort. Pumping started
at 10:00 a.m. and after the charge had been emplaced the
troops withdrew so that the fuze could be ignited. Unfortu-
nately, the oil line broke after only four hundred gallons
of fuel had been pumped into Fort Drum. Colonel Lobit,
the Engineer, and several infantrymen ran back aboard
immediately, stopped the time fuze, repaired the hose, and
then reemplaced it in another ventilator. After resetting
the fuze the men withdrew onto the "Trojan Horse," and the
boats pulled away from Fort Drum.

White and yellow smoke followed by a disappointingly
small explosion were the first results of the attack. Ten
minutes later, at about 10:45 a.m. when officers were
boarding a flagship to discuss what had gone wrong, a
thunderous explosion rocked Fort Drum and sent pieces of
concrete and steel high into the air. Burning oil had
seeped into the magazine where old American ammunition was
still stored from 1942 and it was this material which blew
the battleship asunder. Overhead, General Chase, who was
flying with the Corps Commander, saw chunks of debris whir
by his aircraft. The hot oil treatment had accomplished
what Japanese and American bombardments had failed to do:
it had destroyed the garrison inside Fort Drum.

For four days the fort was so hot that the Americans
could not land on it, but on the fifth day a landing party
boarded and found that the entire enemy garrison was dead. In all the operations against the concrete bastion only two men had been casualties: one was a member of the first reconnaissance party, and the other was a seaman who was wounded aboard his ship by a Japanese sniper on 13 April.

Colonel Lobit's soldiers cleared Carabao Island a few days later, but did it without using burning oil. It was an anti-climactic action.

Like many other subsidiary actions, the attack on Port Drum resembled a raid. Colonel Lobit's force assaulted with the purpose of emplacing an oil line and demolitions, and then withdrew. They returned only to assess the damage and to make sure that the enemy force was completely destroyed. Of all the demi-raids, Nadzab, Los Negros, Santo Tomas and Malacañan, and the bridge seizures, this action was the closest to being a pure raid.

CHASE AND LOBIT

It is interesting that two cavalrymen, General Chase and Colonel Lobit, were the leaders of three of the model demi-raids. Both officers seemed to bring the traditional audacity of their branch into all of their combat exploits. Whether it was deliberate on their part or just coincidental, their reconnaissance on Los Negros, drive into Santo Tomas, and attack of Port Drum had many raid like
characteristics and differed from pure raids only because each objective was held.

General Chase and Colonel Lobit in their own eyes were not raiders because they felt that raids required withdrawals, and they never attacked to withdraw. Even at Los Negros where a withdrawal was written into the plan they took no steps to prepare for it. When the two cavalry officers sent their troopers forward they expected them to continue in that direction. Both the general and the colonel agree, however, that their actions at Los Negros, Manila, and Fort Drum had many raid like characteristics.

For this reason and because occasional commentators call the Nadzab, Santo Tomas, Bauang, and Fort Drum operations raids, these intriguing actions are called demi-raids. Hopefully, the term is a useful one: one which can describe these activities in the Southwest Pacific Area which have so many characteristics of raids without being complete or pure raids; and one which can add new dimensions to the concept of ground raiding.
Notes for Chapter VI: The Demi-Raiders

1. The term "demi-raid" is my own.

2. Subsidiary operations were numerous but detailed reports of them are limited in the material surveyed. Like raids these actions could be studied in isolation profitably.

Subsidiary operations included the clearance and/or seizure of the following islands: Asia and Mapia Islands off Sansapor, New Guinea by the Thirty-First Infantry Division in November 1944; Dinagat, Homonhon, and Suluan (although this latter action was also a raid) Islands in Leyte Gulf by the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion in October 1944; Lubang, Simara, Tablas, and Verde Islands off Mindoro, Philippines in February and March 1945 by the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division; Burias, Buri, Capul, and Ticao Islands near Samar, Philippines by the Americal Division in February and March 1945; Busuanga, Culion, Balabac, and Pandanan Islands, north of Palawan, Philippines in April 1945; Bongo Island in Moro Gulf, Mindanao, Philippines by the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division in April 1945; and Basilian and Malamani Islands southwest of Mindanao in March 1945.

Reports of these various actions are found in the individual unit histories. Jan Valtin (pseudonym for Richard Krebs), Children of Yesterday (New York, 1946) and Colonel William J. Verbeck, The Story of A Regiment in Action (Washington, 1948) cover the actions of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division in some detail. The Reports of the Commanding General, Eighth Army [n.p., 1945] contain useful information as does the commanding general's own memoir -- Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York, 1950), 200-215. For the ranger operations see the sources referred to in Chapter V, "The Lighthouse on Suluan." Divisions serving under General Eichelberger in the Visayas and Mindanao all report on these special actions, especially the Americal Division.

The First Jump: Nadzab


4. Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, *Combat Notes*, Number 7 (May 1945), 31, states: "The assault on Lae by combined American and Australian forces was the first [instance] during the war against Japan of a raid involving the coordinated use of paratroops, a ground thrust, and an amphibious landing." This is the only comment I found that referred to the Nadzab assault as a raid.

Reconnaissance in Force: Los Negros


Additional information came from interviews with Major General William C. Chase, USA, Retired (Houston, Texas, 24 June 1969); Colonel William E. Lobit, USA, Retired (Dickinson, Texas, 23 July 1969); Colonel John R. Hall, USA (MC), Retired (Clear Creek, Texas, 14 January 1970); and former lieutenant B. T. Owin, Jr. (Houston, Texas, 23 June 1969). In addition a letter from former Staff Sergeant Jack D. Langley (Akron, Ohio, 6 August 1969) to the author proved helpful.

The following historical reports contain narratives of the operation, unit journals, operations summaries, intelligence summaries, and orders: First Cavalry Division, *Historical Report of the Brewer Task Force (1st Cavalry...*
Division Reinforced) in the Admiralty Campaign, 24 January--
18 May 1944 (APO 324, 1944); First Cavalry Division, First
Cavalry Brigade, Historical Report, 27 Feb--18 May 1944, 4
volumes (APO 324, 1944); First Cavalry Division, Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Summary of Information File: From 14
Mar 44 to 18 May 44 (APO 324, 1944); First Cavalry Division,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, G-3 Historical Report Narrative,
Admiralty Islands Campaign (APO 324, 1944); First
Cavalry Division, Eighth Cavalry Regiment, Historical Re-
port, Eighth Cavalry, Admiralty Campaign, 6 March to 20 May
1944 (APO 324, 1944); and First Cavalry Division, Brewer
Combat Team, Field Order Number 1, 29 February 1944.

6. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 362, and Willoughby
and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 171.

7. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 358-360, shows how
emphatic the general was in urging General MacArthur to
make the reconnaissance in force. Even when reports from
Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2,
and the First Cavalry Division estimated that there were
four thousand or more Japanese in the Admiralties and the
Alamo Scout Team which reconnoitered Los Negros on 27 Febr-
uary 1944 reported that the place was "lousy with Japs," the
operation was not cancelled or affected. General Mac-
Arthur obviously respected Kenney's judgment and was in-
fluenced by his air chief's aggressiveness.

8. Colonel Lobit uses Edward rather than William
as his Christian name. The colonel believes that this
action was close to being a raid because the task force
would have withdrawn if the reconnaissance was unsuccess-
ful. Interview.

9. The task force included the following units:
Second Squadron, Fifth Cavalry; Detachments from the Head-
quarters and Headquarters Troop, First Cavalry Brigade;
Battery B (-), Ninety-Ninth Artillery ( two 75mm pack
howitzers); 673d Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery, Auto-
matic Weapons (50 caliber machine guns); ANGAU Detach-
ment; Naval Fire Support Party; Air Fire Support Party; First
Platoon, Troop B, First Medical Squadron; Thirtieth Portable
Hospital; and a detachment of nine correspondents, eight
photographers, and other personnel. The Pioneer Platoon,
Headquarters Troop was designated as the Task Force reserve.
See Field Order Number 1, Brewer Reconnaissance Force, 27
February 1944.

10. Miller, Cartwheel, 319, briefly explains the Japan-
ese defensive preparations and, 330, explains that the
Japanese were prepared for an imminent invasion because they
had overheard long operational messages being transmitted
by American submarines just south of the Admiralties in late February 1944.

11. See Ibid, for all times.

"Go to Manila...."

12. This section is based on a detailed examination of secondary sources, interviews with participants, and a general inspection of the records of the First Cavalry Division. See: Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines (Washington, 1953), 211-221; Wright, 1st Cavalry Division, 125-132, for tactical details.

Combat actions are covered in great detail in: First Cavalry Division, Historical Report of 1st Cavalry Division, Luzon Campaign, 27 January 1945 to 30 June 1945 (APO 201, 1945); First Cavalry Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, G-2 Journal, Luzon Operation, 1st Cavalry Division, 29 January 1945 to 23 February 1945 (APO 201, 1945); First Cavalry Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Luzon Operation, G-2 Periodic Reports, 1 Feb 45--1 Apr 45 (APO 201, 1945); First Cavalry Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, G-3 Operations [Periodic] Reports, 31 January--13 April 1945; Numbers 85-101 (APO 201, 1945); First Cavalry Division, Language Section and Language Detachment 168, PW Interrogation Reports, Luzon Operation, Feb--June 1945 (APO 201, 1945); First Cavalry Division, First Cavalry Brigade, Historical Report, Luzon Island Campaign (APO 201, 1945); First Cavalry Division, Fifth Cavalry Regiment, Historical Record, Fifth Cavalry, Luzon Campaign, Philippine Islands, 27 January--30 June 1945 (APO 201, 1945); First Cavalry Division, Eighth Cavalry Regiment, History of the Luzon Campaign (APO 201, 1945); and First Cavalry Division, 302d Reconnaissance Troop, History, 302 Cav Ron Tr, Luzon (APO 201, 1945).


Short articles include: "Cavalry Re-enter Manila," The Cavalry Journal (March-April 1945), 44; Technician 5 Ralph C. McGraw and Corporal Frank R. Bent, "We Were First


Interviews were with General Chase, Colonels Lobit and Hall, and former lieutenant B. T. 'Owin, Jr. Langley letter was also used.

There are several other accounts which covered the operation and which were briefly consulted. These were the books written by Kenney, Krueger, MacArthur, Whitney, Willoughby, and those authors who wrote about MacArthur. They are too numerous to cite except in special cases.

13. Wright, 1st Cavalry Division, 126.


Colonel Vincent J. Esposito (Ch. Ed.), The West Point Atlas of American Wars, Volume II, 1900-1953 (New York, 1960), Map 155, states that General Krueger was "prodded" by General MacArthur. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 212, says that General MacArthur thought that the advance was "too leisurely."

15. Interview with Major General Chase.

16. General Mudge was often told by General Krueger to avoid such actions. Later during the Luzon Campaign Mudge was hit in the chest by a Japanese grenade when inspecting an enemy cave which had not been completely cleared. The resulting wound was so serious that it ended Mudge's active service in the war. General MacArthur was so concerned that he sent his personal aide and physician, Dr. Roger Egebert, down to see Mudge daily. Interview with Colonel (Dr.) Hall, Mudge's Division Surgeon.

17. Colonel Ross' body and vehicle were searched by the Japanese after he was killed, and the enemy apparently took the colonel's notebook in which he had notes about the operation, artillery check points, and copies of recent
messages. See First Cavalry Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, G-2 Journal, 31 January--1 February 1945 (APO 201, 1945), Items 47 (2307 hours) and 49 (2355 hours).

18. Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation, 300.
22. Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation, 302.
23. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, see fn. 23, 218.

25. Morison, Liberation of the Philippines, 195, and Wright, 1st Cavalry Division, 125.
27. Interview with Major General Chase.
28. Ibid.
29. One historian calls this action a raid. See Alip, Philippine History, 486: "Then in the evening of February 3, the First Cavalry Division made a commando raid and took the Internment Camp of Santo Tomas and the Malacañan Palace in Manila," Colonel Lobit and General Chase, however, do not feel that the operation was a raid because the objectives were to be seized and held.

Bridges

30. This section is based on Kenneth J. Deacon, "Seizure of the Bauang Bridges," The Military Engineer (July-August 1960), 292-294; Karl C. Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan (Washington, 1966), 630; Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 209-211; Fortieth Infantry Division, U.S. Army 40th Infantry Division; The Years of WW II, 7 Dec 41--7 Apr 46 (Baton Rouge, La., 1947), 126-128; General Headquarters Army Forces, Pacific, Office of the Chief Engineer, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945, Volume VIII, Critique (Washington, 1951), 297-303; Colonel Frank J. Sackton, "Night Attacks in the

31. Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 209-211, gives details about the Bago River Bridge as does Fortieth Infantry Division, Years of WW II, 126-128.

32. Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 210.

33. Fortieth Infantry Division, Years of WW II, 126-127.

34. Thirty-Third Infantry Division, The Golden Cross, 163-165.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 169-170.

37. Ibid.

38. The engineers were from the Third Platoon, 108th Engineers. The engineer officer was Lieutenant Edward J. Hughes and the engineer who was killed was Sergeant Charles Howard. See: General Headquarters Army Forces, Pacific, Office of the Chief Engineer, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. VIII, Critique, 297, and Deacon, "Seizure of the Bauang Bridges," 294.

39. This action was called a raid by Deacon, "Seizure of the Bauang Bridges," 292.

The "Trojan Horse" at Fort Drum

Also useful were interviews with General Chase and Colonel Lobit.

41. Interview with Major General Chase.

42. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 352-353.

43. Colonel Lobit suggested the idea to Lieutenant Colonel Fred C. Dyer, Division G-4 (Supply Officer), and it was implemented.

Hoge, 38th Infantry Division, no page number, says that Colonel Dyer and Captain Emory Williams, 113th Engineer Battalion came up with the idea to use oil. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 353, says that the commanding officer of the 113th Engineer Battalion suggested the idea.

44. The fuel was a mixture of approximately seventy-five percent diesel fuel and twenty-five percent gasoline. See: Heavey, "How We Boarded Fort Drum," 15.

45. Hoge, 38th Infantry Division, no page number.

46. Thirty-Eighth Infantry Division, Report of the M-7 Operation, 55, says the walls were eighteen to thirty feet thick and the deck was fifteen to eighteen feet thick. The two fourteen inch and four six inch guns had been destroyed by the Americans in 1942. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 355, says the walls were twenty-five to thirty-six feet thick and the deck was twenty feet thick. Other reports vary also.

47. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 355


50. Interview with Major General Chase.
Chase and Lobit

51. This section is based on my interviews with General Chase, Colonels Hall and Lobit, former lieutenant B.T. Owin, Jr., and the letter from former staff sergeant Jack D. Langley.

For previous comments Nadzab, Bauang, and Manila -- ones which called these operations raids -- see notes number 4, 29, and 39, this chapter.
CHAPTER VII: BETWEEN PEARL HARBOR AND NAGASAKI

Sandwiched between the stunning, surprise air raid at Pearl Harbor in 1941 which brought war and the two air raids which struck Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic weapons in 1945 and ended the war, ground raiders in the Southwest Pacific executed their daring and hard fought raids against the Japanese. This has been the history of some of the raids, and while it is incomplete because all of the small actions could only be covered in an immense work, it should be representative of the different kinds of raids which occurred in the theater.

IN REVIEW

A review of raiding doctrine of the United States Army in 1942 makes it evident that it was adequate in concept but limited in its application to modern war. Seemingly developed out of World War I experiences with trench raids and older ideas about cavalry raids, the doctrine did not foresee the use of new landing craft, folboats, amphibious tractors and tanks, and parachute dropping aircraft in raid operations. Nor did it conceive of extensive warfare in a theater full of islands, jungles, and swamps. The field manuals did not perceive that infantry forces would execute more varied and ambitious actions than
trench raids or raids against front line positions.

Raids against outguards, reconnaissance actions, seizures of prisoners, supported and unsupported raids, night raids, and raid patrols: all were made in the theater. Interestingly enough, the unsupported raid was common, and the raiders used modern aircraft to support their attack in lieu of the artillery prescribed in the early field manuals. Deep raids had to be supported by fighters and bombers while the shallower raid patrols could rely on artillery support because they normally stayed close to friendly front lines.

After the war the distinguished commander of the famous British commandos, Major General Robert L. Laycock, lectured on raids and said that his men normally performed four types of actions: harassing, espionage, supporting, and reconnaissance raids. This was an extension of doctrine by an experienced raider, but it fell short of the experience in the Southwest Pacific. While guerrillas performed harassing raids, Allied Intelligence Bureau agents concentrated on espionage attacks, rangers supported the invasion of Leyte by raiding Suluan Island, and several reconnaissances in force were raid-like actions; the Southwest Pacific soldiers executed three more distinct types of raids. Colonel Volckmann initiated "training raids" to prepare his guerrillas for more conventional offensive combat; rangers performed a "killer" raid against Suluan Island on their second trip there; then "rescue raids," released prisoners and internees in New Guinea and on Luzon.
Each of these actions added new dimensions to raiding in modern ground war.

Mentioning that raids implied a withdrawal, General Laycock said that forces did not have to be extracted in many instances but could continue to attack if the situation warranted it. This idea is consistent with the concept of a "demi-raid", one which is planned and conducted as a normal raid, but in which a withdrawal is only contemplated in an emergency and is rarely conducted. Demi-raids are an important adjunct to raiding, and they should be discussed in doctrine.

Furthermore, the idea of "raids of opportunity," so prevalent among the small patrol actions in the theater, should also have a place in doctrine. Raids generally conjure up the pictures of deliberate, well reconnoitered, thoroughly planned, and rehearsed actions which are one-shot affairs. They need not be that. Front-line infantrymen should always be prepared to raid when an opportunity presents itself, especially when they are involved in fluid warfare in areas where they can often surprise unsuspecting enemy forces.

Present raiding doctrine found in the current infantry manuals is little different from older doctrine, but at least the information is more complete and soldiers are given better instructions on how to conduct raids.

It would be wise in future years to stress a less doctrinaire approach to raiding and to explain to
commanders that raiding is highly imaginative; that the techniques of a limited surprise attack at an enemy position, normally behind enemy lines, can be applied to any desired objective; and that while deliberate preparations and standard raiding techniques are outlined, more opportunistic actions which do not necessarily include all the normal activities of a classic raid can achieve impressive results. The rapidly executed Los Negros attack, the bold drive into Santo Tomas and Malacañan Palace, the impressive raid made by soldiers from the American Division's 164th Infantry on 19 November 1943 on Bougainville, all serve as excellent examples of opportunistic operations. For devotees of purer, classic raids, the attacks against Salamaua and Los Baños are inspirations for other similar actions.

Successful raids need little comment. They achieved their desired results because of intelligently thought-out missions, necessary preparations, sound execution, and flexible and competent leadership. Raids that failed in part or completely were full of errors which violated the principles just mentioned. Like any good athletic team, a raid force, a team in every sense of the word, must avoid errors. Mistakes behind enemy lines, no matter how small, probably will cost lives and could lead to the eventual defeat of any raiding force.

The first error which inexperienced raiders made, and one which more experienced soldiers who were too confident
of their own capabilities also made, was choosing missions which were neither necessary or important nor in some cases accomplishable, or finally which caused a devastating enemy reaction. When poor missions are prescribed, the resultant raid even if well executed can seldom be considered to be worthwhile.

Compare for a minute the differences between Ivan Lyon's Jaywick and Rimau operations. In the first raid, Lyon selected a nearly impossible task for his party, but in the grim days of 1942 when the Allies had no victories to crow about, the raid was practical even though it was dangerous. In many ways the thinking about Jaywick was similar to that which triggered the daring Doolittle air raid on Japan, but unlike the air raid, Jaywick did not bring about a Battle of Midway. Well conceived, thoroughly prepared for, Jaywick destroyed or damaged thousands of tons of valuable Japanese merchant shipping; tonnage which the enemy could not afford to lose at any time during the war. On the other hand, Rimau was planned when the war was turning in favor of the Allies, and it was executed when there was no real need to repeat a suicidal mission into a more alert Singapore Harbor. The Japanese had been shocked by the first raid, and as shown by their relentless pursuit and destruction of the Rimau party, they were prepared for a similar attack. Two errors, Lyon's fixation about attacking Singapore and the high command's approval of a
strategic attack which did not fit into the operations in the theater, doomed the raid from its inception.

Contrast also the rather reasonable missions assigned to Allied raiders with those given to Japanese raiders. Enemy losses in ill-conceived suicidal actions, which seemed to be ordered in routine fashion, destroyed some of the finest Japanese units. Such losses and such missions eventually destroyed the morale of even the most fanatical enemy troops.

Japanese commanders never learned that an army cannot afford to squander its men. Being somewhat more difficult actions than most and ones in which entire parties can be destroyed because of the smallest errors, raids have to be carefully thought out before they are ordered to be conducted. Good troops are hard to find and train, and they are never expendable. Suicide missions should never be conceived as normal raiding tasks, and they should never be accepted unless there is no other recourse available.

Raids should never be conducted when they invite severe enemy reactions which hurt friendly forces more than the raids hurt the enemy. Guerrilla raids on Timor stung the Japanese, and the enemy retaliated against the Timorese and then eventually drove the Allies from that critical island. On Luzon when the guerrillas opened a so-called "offensive" in 1942, the Japanese soon moved against them and captured and killed many of the key American and Filipino leaders. The enemy was so successful that the guerrillas had to
"lay low" on Luzon until late in 1944 and early 1945. The decision to attack in 1942 was a poor one, and the tactical results did not justify the strategic loss of the island to tight Japanese control. Similar guerrilla actions elsewhere in the Philippines finally triggered Japanese counterattacks and eventual contraction of overt guerrilla operations. In all cases where the Japanese moved against the guerrillas, the civilians suffered most from enemy brutalities.

Generally, Allied raiders prepared well for their attacks. Sometimes reconnaissance was inadequate as at Heath's and Mubo, but at Nasugbu, Luzon, the staff of Eighth Army reported that advance reconnaissance alerted the enemy to coming actions. Lack of reconnaissance hurt the first raids; and the experience at Nasugbu, while not affecting the Eleventh Airborne Division's amphibious assault, did cause the commander to restrict other advance reconnaissance missions. For the most part, however, just the right amount of reconnaissance was conducted to insure that the raiders knew enough about the enemy and his area to attack while not alerting the enemy to the impending assault by snooping too much.

The same balance existed in planning and rehearsing for raids. In some cases, Salamaua for instance, time was available for detailed planning and rehearsals. In the Americal Division's opportunistic raid on Bougainville, the raid leader rehearsed his men at the actual objective one day and attacked the next morning; but for the actions
at Cabanatuan, the second Suluan raid, and the dash into Manila, there was little time for planning and none for rehearsals.

Each commander has to base his plans and rehearsals on the enemy situation, but he should make sure that his plans are thoroughly understood and that his men know their exact assignments. At the same time plans should never be made so rigid that they cannot be changed once action starts. Rehearsals can be used to test equipment, techniques, timing, and tactics, but they too should not become so rote-like that if the plan is changed the troops cannot adjust quickly. Plans and rehearsals should stress contingencies so that the mission can be accomplished even when the enemy situation changes drastically from what the reconnaissance and intelligence reports said that it was, and in addition they should prepare raiders to act without making mistakes.

Leadership is the critical factor in mission selection and raid preparation. If it is competent, then the actual operation can proceed with a reasonable certainty of success. During any raid, the leaders supervise the performance of all tasks, make changes to fit the actual situation, and provide a fitting example to their troops. If raid leaders can always do this, then with the advantage of surprise they should always succeed.

In the Southwest Pacific the leaders of the raids were most often outstanding men. Kanga Force commandos admired and respected their Captain Winning, who was baptized the
"Red Steer." Intrepid, and competent, Winning became one of the ace soldiers in New Guinea and the Solomons. General Chase and Colonel Lobit led fresh, untried troops into Los Negros and were tremendously successful. Their later actions at Santo Tomas and Fort Drum placed them in the forefront of the combat leaders of their divisions. General Chase's confidence in Lobit was mirrored by one of the colonel's noncommissioned officers who remarked in 1969 that:

In those days they selected the squad or troop or whatever number they needed [which] they felt had the best Commanding Officer and were the best trained. The 2nd Squadron of the 5th Cavalry was usually the number one Squadron of our Division ... and we had a smart leader. It has been so long ago and I never thought I would ever forget, but now I'm not entirely certain, his name was Maj. Edward Lobaw [Lobit].

Chase himself won the admiration of his contemporaries and of General MacArthur who called the brigade commander "an unsurpassed front-line fighter." The drive, initiative, and coolness under fire of these two cavalrymen won them both high awards for bravery in combat, and they were only two among many.

Colonel Nucci and his company commanders, Gray, Simons, and Prince added to the luster of good leadership among raid commanders as did the Alamo Scout lieutenants, Rounsville, Nellist, and Dove and the airborne officers who led the attack on Los Baños. Marine paratrooper "Brute" Krulak showed the abilities in the Choiseul raid which helped him rise to the high command as a lieutenant general.
Not to be forgotten among the raiders were the excellent non-commissioned officers who aided their commanders. Their performances during the Salamaua and Cabanatuan raids were especially noteworthy.

Most resourceful of all the leaders, however, were the men who organized, trained, and fought the many guerrilla bands in the theater. Australian commandos, Major Callinan and Captain Laidlaw, coastwatchers Wright and Seton, American guerrillas Volckmann and Fertig, the veteran Filipino officer Kangleon, young Peralta, and the difficult Marking provided exemplary leadership for many raids. Blackburn and his "headhunters," Captain Pajota and his steadfast guerrillas, Salipada Pendatun and his Moros, joined the long list of clever and cunning guerrilla officers.

High commanders reflected the same type of superior leadership as their more junior commanders did. General Eichelberger, after a magnificent performance at Buna, led the attack into Nasugbu, Luzon, and then the "spearhead tipped with brass" of the Eleventh Airborne Division into Manila. Dashing and imaginative, Eichelberger was sensitive, fearless, skilled in the arts of war, and not easily dominated by higher commanders. Leading the action at Nasugbu which he called a raid in force, General Eichelberger, wearing the three stars of an army commander, would have dumbfounded any Japanese soldier who saw him exhibiting his brand of personal, front-line leadership.

Eichelberger was not the only aggressive commander who
was involved in raids. General Kenney's insistence on attacking Los Negros immediately and his position in a lead aircraft flying over the drop aircraft that went into Nadzab added to his reputation as a driving leader. General Krueger and his staff planned and supported the several actions from Moari to Suluan to Cabanatuan and Manila. The Eleventh Airborne Division's commander, General Swing, and his staff were similarly efficient in planning and then supervising the raid which rescued all the internees at Los Baños. All these American officers, none of whom were actual raid leaders, aided their raiders by selecting proper missions and the troops who could execute the tasks, and then they made sure that the operations were adequately supported.

General Blamey, the Australian Chief, was an equally good raid director. He proposed the Salamaua and Lae raids and made sure that Kanga Force operated in conjunction with the Allied units fighting in Papua. Other Australian officers made good judgments and were instrumental in withdrawing the Timor guerrillas when they were no longer able to operate effectively and in directing the activities of the coastwatchers and ordering those gallant gentlemen not to raid in order to remain undiscovered.

General MacArthur was intimately involved in three of the demi-raids and ordered the Los Baños rescue. Like General Kenney, MacArthur led the 503d Parachute Infantry
into Nadzab because he wanted to give his untested paratroopers confidence. Just a few hours after General Chase had established his first beachhead on Los Negros, the Commander in Chief landed, ordered Chase to hold in place, and on the spot changed the reconnaissance in force from a raid to an invasion. Later, on Luzon, the general was stopped from following Chase's column into Manila the day after the cavalymen had broken through, only because Chase had failed to secure one of the bridges which he had used.

A recent criticism of General MacArthur chided that the general lacked resilience and fibre in adversity and did not visit his troops enough, but his actions contradict the criticism.

Similar plaudits cannot be given to the enemy commanders. While lower unit leaders were often brave, in fact sometimes they were too fanatically brave, the higher commanders did not show their troops the stuff to breed respect. Without the blind loyalty of their troops, the Japanese field officers would have had more trouble because of their total disregard for life and their direction of futile and rather unproductive raids. Brilliant in the early offensive which swept the Allies from the Pacific, the Japanese commanders could not handle the rejuvenated Allies, and their abominable leadership in defeat, with few exceptions, should not be emulated.

Allied raiders were aided by the poor Japanese leadership which was not restricted only to raiding but was
common to all their tactical endeavors. Most Allied raids succeeded easily because the enemy was not security conscious, especially when they were in areas where contact was not imminent. Generally not alert, lacking rudimentary security measures, and not prepared to fight, the Japanese who were unlucky enough to be the targets of Allied raiders were nearly always annihilated. Such casualties were even more damming of Japanese leadership than the poor decisions which sent so many enemy raiders to their deaths.

Geography also aided Allied raiders. The enemy had no linear land line of defense and as a result the Allies used their superior air, naval, motorized, and armored forces to move over, by, and through enemy defensive areas to strike any desired targets. After Australians and Americans mastered the arts of jungle warfare they were also able to outmaneuver the Japanese in the heavy terrain and raid where they pleased. Australian jungle raiders were superior performers. Americans, it was said, did not really fight in the jungle because they destroyed it before they attacked an enemy position, but the reports from the Admiralties, Moari, the Solomons, and Leyte belie the fact. Improved Allied mobility in the jungle and throughout the theater was a distinct advantage because in the broken terrain of the Southwest Pacific the Allied raiders were nearly impossible to stop. In a theater where soldiers stand bayonet to bayonet across a long, solid battle line, raids like Moari, Cabanatuan, Santo Tomas, and Los Baños
would have been much more difficult if not impossible.

Raids in the Southwest Pacific were a blend of strategic and tactical actions, and the Allied commanders gained greater dividends by having both types of operations. Strategic raids against Lae and Salamaua hoped to capture the nearby airfields so that Allied fighters could be advanced rapidly to the north while the Los Negros reconnaissance gambled on seizing a vital harbor and airfield in lieu of capturing heavily defended Rabaul. Guerrilla raids, tactical actions in every respect, while killing many Japanese and destroying equipment, supplies, and installations, had the strategic effect of tying down valuable enemy troops to guard key areas. Even the rescue operations fulfilled a strategic goal: General MacArthur had argued for a return to the Philippines because he felt that it would be a psychological error to by-pass the islands where so many prisoners and internees were held by the Japanese.

These strategic actions provided major dividends for the Allies, and no commander should ignore their value. Such raids, however, are the most difficult to conduct, and they must be well supported to succeed. Rather than trying for spectacular single-shot strategic raids, commanders might better be advised to use a large number of tactical raids, like those the guerrillas executed, to gain their strategic goals. Numerous small actions can carry the battle to the enemy without having to depend on the larger, more deliberate raids which cost so much in time, men, and effort.
Tactical leaders can raid often if they care to. When, however, officers like General Chase and Colonel Lobit are in command, raids may seldom occur because such combative officers do not attack to withdraw, but still tactical raids are worthwhile, especially for patrols, when a situation presents itself.

Selective raiding is necessary. Too much raiding can be self-defeating because a constant raider once identified can be stopped. The Japanese raided too much, especially at night, and as a result most American units countered such attacks by buttoning up at night, stopping all movement, and shooting anything that stirred near their perimeters. A few animals were shocked as fire broke out in the dark jungles, but more Japanese soldiers died as they tried to penetrate the areas where alert soldiers were prepared to destroy all night intruders. Raiding if used indiscriminately, like any other special tactic or technique, cannot be successful forever.

Two important observations are visible in the history of raiding in the Southwest Pacific: specially trained troops made most of the strategic raids and demi-raids while front-line troops conducted the majority of the raids of opportunity and the smaller actions. It seems reasonable that the raids close to the main battle positions would be made by the troops on line who have the opportunity to raid more, especially when they are on patrol.

For larger raids, for operations deep behind enemy
lines, and for actions away from the major battle areas, higher commanders in the theater normally used their uncommitted or reserve troops or units which are organized for special missions and which remain under their control. Alamo Scouts and the Sixth Rangers were used this way by General Krueger. Specialists in raiding, the rangers were the ideal choice for raids against Suluan and Cabanatuan. Alamo Scouts, though reconnaissance experts, were the logical men to make the Moari raid. For raids which involved parachute drops, the jumpers from the 503d Parachute Infantry and the Eleventh Airborne Division had to be selected, but if the missions had not required parachute operations, regular infantry units could have been employed. While it may have seemed to be a special unit because of its unique name, the First Cavalry Division was picked for the Los Negros and Manila operations because it was readily available and because it had been working on the planned invasion of the Admiralties in the first instance and was the only motorized unit available in the second instance. In addition, the cavalrymen were probably selected for the Manila operation because General MacArthur was fond of the division commander, General Mudge, and had a great deal of confidence in General Chase.

What was common to all these units except for the Eleventh Airborne Division at Los Baños, however, was that the troops were fresh and uncommitted. This was a distinct advantage and always will be one when a deliberate raid is
to be made. The availability of healthy, fresh troops should be deemed as important to raid operations as the need for special training and excellent leadership.

Australian special units abounded: Independent Companies, Commando Squadrons, Coastwatchers, and NGVR units. All raided. Unlike similar American organizations, these units were generally in the line or actively engaged in guerrilla warfare.

Arguments still rage about the need for special troops, but it seems clear from the experiences in the Southwest Pacific that most of the time front-line soldiers can carry the ball for tactical raids, but that special troops are advisable for the more deliberate strategic raids. Any sound combat unit, however, can be made into a "special" formation by giving it additional training and modifying its equipment, and it must be remembered that the Sixth Rangers were organized from a field artillery battalion.

One kind of special soldier was needed in all the combat areas in the theatre: he was the native guide or the American or European who knew a particular area intimately. Most areas of the theater were poorly mapped even though they had been in the hands of the major colonial powers for several years. Raid leaders and planners could not rely on maps or even aerial photographs for that matter, and the raiders once on the ground could not rely on these items alone either. Experts had to provide the information that only they knew: village locations, trails, beach data,
and then, and perhaps even more important, the attitude of the natives in each zone. Guides and local colonial administrators helped raiders also by acting as interpreters especially in New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomons where the majority of the inhabitants did not speak English.

Competent guides, interpreters, and leaders of the local inhabitants are great assets to all soldiers, but they are particularly useful to the raider. Without the assistance of such men most of the successful strategic raids would have failed, and actions at Salamaua, on New Britain, Moari, and Suluan would have been much more difficult. Unfortunately, the value of such people is overlooked in raid training, and young soldiers are trained to travel in enemy territory by map and compass without someone telling them that such instruments are not much help when maps are inaccurate or incomplete in the areas where they will fight. One also feels that trainers assume that raiders will be operating in English speaking countries, or that if they are not, then they can accomplish their missions without any contact with the civilian population.

While the use of special troops is a problem which can be solved with some command decision, a graver problem, endemic to all raiding, is fraught with more difficulties because it involves ethics, international law, and the survival of a raiding force. The dilemma develops because raiders normally try to annihilate their enemy in each
objective, but often they find that many of their adversaries surrender and they are faced with a large number of enemy wounded. Obviously, the raider cannot kill his captives, the prisoners and the wounded, but at the same time he cannot take the time to evacuate them or bind, gag, and leave them in place. Killing the captives merely invites similar reprisals against the raiders when they are captured by the enemy while a more humane course would probably slow down the attackers' withdrawal, disclose the presence of the raiders, or give the enemy an easy chance to destroy the infiltrating force. In a "him or me" situation, each raid commander is faced with the thorniest of problems: abide by the rules of land warfare and the accepted ways of dealing with prisoners or wounded or violate them in some manner in order to insure that his men can survive to fight another day. Standard operating procedures, inflexible rules, rule-of-thumb measures, or personal prejudices cannot be substituted for the specific situation on which each raid commander must base his decisions. On the spot decisions, guided by the highest ideals, ethics, and law, will be demanded often.

Luckily in the Southwest Pacific this problem did not arise in the raids except in the one guerrilla raid which struck about 195 Japanese who were tending their wounded on Bougainville in 1945. Everyone was killed. In most cases, however, the Japanese troops when surrounded or caught in impossible situations committed hari-kari rather
than surrender. In some actions they just kept fighting until killed.

Espionage raiders, scouts who probed deep within the enemy's lines, and guerrillas were faced with the other side of the dilemma: Japanese treatment of them when they were captured. In the great majority of instances, these Allies were executed for their acts. Since few of these raiders wore uniforms, it might have been wise to insist that some minimum uniform be worn so that the captured men could have been treated as prisoners of war rather than as bandits and spies. Perhaps, a "green beret" or similar small device could serve as an international uniform or badge for American raiders instead of a complete uniform. Possibly such a device might have saved the survivors of Rimau or the guerrillas captured in the Philippines.

With the growing importance of limited and guerrilla wars where soldiers serve in all capacities from the covert to the more conventional assignments, current military regulations, government policies, and international laws should re-define the status of "uniformed" espionage raiders, guerrilla units, and special reconnaissance forces. Possibly this is unrealistic, but it would prevent the unnecessary brutality which struck the men who were captured by the enemy while behind Japanese lines during the Second World War.

Allied raiders attacked everywhere in the Southwest Pacific from 1942 to 1945. Their actions were a mirror of the larger operations. Landing from the sea, dropping from
the sky, attacking mounted and dismounted, they were methodical and opportunistic, calculated and imaginative, pedestrian and heroic. Above all they were well led and successful.

In the early months following the swift Japanese victories, the Allies raided sparingly. Only the guerrillas on Timor, in the Markham Valley, and in the Philippines raided to any extent before the Allies began their strategic offensive.

Once on the attack, Americans, in particular, raided more often with fresh, healthy, battle-tested troops who were normally well supported by air, naval, and other ground forces against the demoralized and less efficient Japanese forces. Taking advantage of the enemy's poor security and his isolated forces, the Allied raiders struck with more impunity and performed some remarkably heroic actions. No longer bedeviled by the myriad of islands, the jungle, and the tropical weather, the Americans and the Australians adjusted to the perils of the theater and used their superior equipment and improved skills to attack the Japanese more decisively. The long list of raids show how much the Allies improved as raiders from their first actions in Papua and the Solomons to the exemplary operations in the Philippines. Among the islands of the American colony, United States soldiers with their guerrilla compatriots became expert raiders and demi-raiders.

Japanese raiders were more successful too when they
were part of a major offensive campaign. Working skillfully and brutally, they were effective on Timor, on Luzon, and in Mindanao against the guerrilla forces. Japanese counter-guerrilla campaigns were well conducted and their raids surprised and destroyed many an unsuspecting, unprepared, or outmanned irregular band. Once on the defensive, however, the caliber of Japanese raids diminished rapidly until their last banzai raids were truly pathetic affairs. Near the final days, raids were the only offensive actions the Imperial Japanese Army could conduct. The tactic was hardly useful or decisive.

IN PERSPECTIVE

Looking back over the broad panorama of warfare in the Southwest Pacific it is hard to ignore the importance of raiding in the many campaigns. On the surface it may appear that the many individual and unconnected raids which have been covered in this history are merely a series of interesting stories which had little to do with the great movements of armies, navies, and air forces to final victory in the Philippines. Realistically, the raids did not bring the Japanese army to its knees and they were not decisive in the way that the battles for Leyte and Luzon were. The war could have been won without them.

They did, however, contribute much to the Allied
victory. Guerrilla raids in Timor, the Markham Valley, and the Philippines drew the enemy's attention and tied down large numbers of Japanese troops who could have been used better elsewhere. Raiding in the Markham Valley relieved some pressure on troops in Papua. These were important strategic contributions although the raids for the most part were small tactical affairs. If the guerrilla raiders had not performed so well other forces would have had to execute similar missions, and during most of the war other forces were not available.

In one sense the raiders were indispensable. They rescued so many Allied prisoners and internees that they were invaluable for these actions alone. If the camps had been captured during normal offensive operations the incarcerated men, women and children would have suffered many more casualties either as a result of mistreatment, prolonged starvation and sickness, or the crunching battles which probably would have occurred at or around each camp. It is doubtful that the Japanese would have surrendered the camps without a fight after they had been heavily engaged near them by attacking Allied forces. These rescue actions in the Philippines fulfilled one of the strategic goals of General MacArthur and one of the goals which President Roosevelt accepted when he decided to attack the Philippines instead of Formosa.

The many raid patrols, raids of opportunity, and the actions at Heath's Plantation, Mubo, Tuguegarao, Solana,
Itogon Mine, Anakan, Butuan, and Suluan — the names are legion — also managed to kill and wound hundreds of Japanese soldiers, capture or destroy vital equipment and supplies, and lower the morale of the enemy's troops. The tactical implications of these raids are immense. In many areas they forced the Japanese to defend in two or more directions, a terribly uncomfortable posture, and at the same time required them to defend most of their installations and key positions on the lines of communications to prevent Allied raiders from striking them and gaining quick victories. In a sense the Allied raiders prevented the Japanese from having a truly safe haven in the lands which they captured in the theater.

Espionage and intelligence raiders must have been terribly unnerving to the enemy. To awake early one morning to unexpected explosions and see several freighters and a tanker sinking in Singapore Harbor must have terrorized the port defense officer. The ability to destroy such shipping tonnages with clandestine attacks was strategically valuable to the Allies.

As important as the actual raids were the demi-raids which struck the Japanese with such success. The seizure of the Admiralties, a coup de maitre, was a brilliant move. Nadzab closed an escape route and helped the main battle in the Markham Valley; the bridge seizures assisted the Americans in the Philippines; and the attack on Fort Drum eliminated a tough objective with a minimum loss of life.
Raids were an economical means of accomplishing tactical and strategic goals; only a few men, lightly armed and supplied, were able to achieve immense results. Particularly valuable as an economy of force attack on the defensive, raids were also valuable in similar situations when the Allies were on the sustained attack. Delaying, harassing, disrupting, and destroying, the raiders aided the main battle forces continually. Allied raiders did not carry the ball repeatedly, did not score many touchdowns, but they hit hard and often, destroyed many defenders, and scored when it was necessary. They punished the Japanese without being punished too hard in return.

The opposite was not true of the Japanese raiders. They were, it is true, immensely successful in the early stages of the war, but in the final count the senseless suicide raids which the Japanese commanders assigned to their soldiers needlessly annihilated many a brave and hard fighting Japanese unit. Only when raids achieved their goals cheaply were they really valuable actions. When casualties mounted they lost their true value. The Americans, Australians, and the other Allied raiders learned this, but the Japanese did not.

For the Allies in the Southwest Pacific raids and demi-raids were sensible and productive operations which accomplished an important and diverse assortment of missions.
Strategically and tactically they aided the main battle forces which finally set the Rising Sun.

ECLIPSE

To the Japanese soldier who had known only success in his campaigns against the Allies, the Australian, Dutch, Filipino, Melanesian, and American raids which struck him must have come as a terrifying and explosive shock. Trained to believe in his own superiority as a soldier of the Emperor, the Japanese was not prepared to meet defeat and death at the hands of the many Allied raiders who, led by commandos Winning and Callinan, guerrillas Pendatun and Blackburn, rangers Mucci and Simons, demi-raiders Chase and Lobit, and directed by generals Blamey, Eichelberger, Krueger, and MacArthur, seemed to strike from the dark side of the moon and who then withdrew into the vastness of the Southwest Pacific Area from which they came.
Notes for Chapter VII: Between Pearl Harbor and Nagasaki

In Review


2. Ibid., 528-529.


The most interesting new point is the use of raids to destroy remaining enemy forces following a nuclear attack. In a contaminated area where troops cannot stay raiding is a particularly useful tactic.

4. Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Enemy on Luzon, An Intelligence Summary (APO 442, 1945), 46-47. This source gives an account of a Japanese soldier who deserted after being berated by his general following an unsuccessful suicide penetration mission.


9. Interview with Colonel John R. Hall, USA (MC), Retired, former Surgeon, First Cavalry Division, 14 January 1970. Colonel Hall reported that General MacArthur arrived at the destroyed bridge and was peeved because he could not go into Manila. The general "climbed on" General Mudge and Mudge immediately called General Chase in Manila to see why the bridge had been left unguarded. Chase replied that he had just failed to leave a guard and accepted full responsibility for the error. General MacArthur was mollified, said that it was not a major catastrophe, and that he would try and go into Manila later.


11. Interview with Colonel Hall. General MacArthur visited the First Cavalry Division's command post in Australia shortly after General Chase broke his heel training with his troops. The commander-in-chief chided the division commander, Major General I. P. Swift, and told him that his officers were paid to think rather than act impetuously.

Interview with Major General William Chase, USA, Retired, 24 June 1969. General Chase mentioned that General MacArthur had a great deal of respect for General Mudge. He also stressed that General Krueger had tried to stop Mudge from getting up too close to the action. Chase said that Mudge was extremely brave and that he could not stay away from action. In the battle in the baseball park of Rizal Stadium General Mudge personally led the soldiers against enemy positions in the outfield.

At least one division commander and one assistant division commander were killed on Luzon while inspecting front line positions.
From the Far East I send you one single thought, one sole idea—written in red on every beachhead from Australia to Tokyo—"There is no substitute for victory."

Douglas MacArthur
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