RICE UNIVERSITY

THE CAREER OF ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART

by

RICHARD NIEBUHR

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

Thesis Director's signature:

R. John Rath

Houston, Texas

May, 1968
Abstract

THE CAREER OF ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART

Richard Niebuhr

This thesis is a study of Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart, one of the key figures in the Nazi hierarchy who aided in the German takeover of Austria and ruled the Netherlands for the Nazis throughout most of World War II.

The first chapter deals with Seyss-Inquart's early years, his first associations with politics, and the role he played in the Anschluss. During this time, Seyss-Inquart worked to accomplish his life long dream, the union of Austria and Germany. To this end, he began to associate with Austrian Nazis and achieved a position of importance in the cabinet of the Austrian government of Kurt von Schuschnigg. Using this post, he helped to undermine Schuschnigg's government from within. But throughout these early years, Seyss-Inquart thought himself a patriot, working for the glory of his native land. He was not yet a full-fledged member of the Nazi conspiracy.

The second chapter is devoted to Seyss-Inquart's career from the Anschluss to his establishment of the government of occupation in the Netherlands. It was during this time that the first striking changes in his character occurred. No longer was he a patriotic Austrian,
working for what he believed to be the good of his country, but a cog in the Nazi machine. After leaving Austria because of the subordination of his position as governor, he was made a Reich Minister without portfolio and a member of the German Reich cabinet. In the fall of 1939, Seyss-Inquart assumed new duties as Hans Frank's deputy governor of the occupied Polish territories. This post was of minor significance, however, and in May, 1940, Seyss-Inquart was appointed head of the civil government of the Netherlands, a position he held until the end of the war. The government he established in Holland was perhaps the smoothest running of any of the Nazi-occupied countries.

The final chapter of the thesis discusses the last years of Seyss-Inquart's career, from the first repressive measures that he decreed against the Jews to his death at Nuremberg. During this time, his personality came almost full circle. The mild-mannered Viennese lawyer had disappeared, and in its place was a man who brutally put down opposition by the Dutch people and railed against the Jews as the enemies of National Socialism. In spite of his often humane efforts towards the conquered people he governed, the Nuremberg tribunal found him guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Fully accepting the responsibility for what he had done, Seyss-Inquart was executed after being pronounced guilty by the tribunal.
PREFACE

The Second World War is now a generation past, and whole storehouses of information are now available to the scholar interested in pursuing studies in this field. For the first time we are able to reexamine critically the Third Reich and the men who played major roles in the Nazi apparatus. This thesis is an attempt to reevaluate one specific figure in this period, Artur Seyss-Inquart, and it is hoped that it will prove useful to others who wish to do research in this field.

I wish to express my warmest thanks to Dr. R. John Rath, my thesis director, for the perceptive and helpful criticisms and suggestions he has given me. Also, I would like to thank the other members of my committee, Dr. Floyd S. Lear, and Dr. Charles Garside Jr., for their help in my work. I must also convey my gratitude to the members of the Austrian History Seminar for the kind aid they have given me in my research and writing. And lastly, I wish to thank the staff of the Fondren Library, who have patiently offered their assistance to me. It should be noted that I alone am responsible for any errors found in the study.

Rice University
May, 1968

R. W. Niebuhr
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I: VERY MUCH A PATRIOT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II: CAUGHT IN THE WEB</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III: THE FINE LINE COLLAPSES</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I: POSITIONS HELD BY SEYSS-INQUART</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I:
VERY MUCH A PATRIOT

The story of a traitor, a trapped man, a fallen man, always makes interesting reading, especially if the individual has fallen into a web of destruction which he himself has woven. The chronicle of the life of Artur Seyss-Inquart is no exception, for it is the story of a man who at first thought himself wholly a patriot, working for the glory of the German Reich, who gradually shed his principles one by one until he found himself caught in the matrix of horror and destruction that was Nazi Germany.

As is true with a great many of the members of the Nazi hierarchy, there is little in Seyss-Inquart's early years that would indicate the later course of events in his life. He was born in the small city of Iglau, a German-speaking town in Moravia and a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. During his youth his family moved to Olmütz, also a small town in Moravia, where he lived until he was fifteen. At that time, his parents moved to Vienna, where Seyss-Inquart finished high school and, after passing his Abitur, began legal studies at the University of Vienna.¹

When war broke out in 1914, Seyss-Inquart interrupted his educational plans and joined the Austro-Hungarian army, in which he served for the remainder of the war. He was a young man of courage and as a member of the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger he distinguished himself in action in Russia, Roumania and Italy. During the war he was wounded once and decorated three times for bravery in the face of the enemy. In fact, from his wound in the war Seyss-Inquart received a limp with which he was burdened for the rest of his life.

Throughout the war Seyss-Inquart continued studying law, and while on furloughs from the army he passed his final examinations and received his doctor of law degree from the University of Vienna in 1917. Shortly thereafter, in 1918, the war was over, and Seyss-Inquart went back to Vienna.

Like thousands of other young soldiers returning home from the front, Seyss-Inquart faced a future that was difficult for him to comprehend. The polyglot Habsburg monarchy was no more. In its place were a battered

---

2Ibid.


4Kelly, 22 Cells in Nuremberg, p. 185.

5Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 67.
Austria, only a fraction of its former size and with barely a tenth of its former population, and a group of succession states with shattered economies and separated from one another by new tariff barriers.

For Seyss-Inquart, the position of the shrunken Austrian state was hopeless unless it could in some way be reunited with Germany. To this end, the young Viennese lawyer dedicated himself. Even at Nuremberg, he proudly stated that he had been working for the union of Austria with Germany as early as 1918.6 Nor was Seyss-Inquart alone in his feelings about an Anschluss, or union with Germany. After the war the Austrian Provisional National Assembly declared Austria part of the German Republic, and a few months later the Constitutional National Assembly adopted a similar statement. In 1921, when segments of the Austrian populace were allowed to vote on the subject, they overwhelmingly favored the Anschluss. In the Tyrol and Salzburg the affirmative vote was over ninety-eight per cent.7

In 1921 Seyss-Inquart established his own law practice in Vienna, and during the following decade he

6Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 317.
became moderately prosperous through his legal activities. During this time he also became active, in a minor way, in Austrian politics. He joined the German Brotherhood (die deutsche Gemeinschaft), an anti-Semitic, nationalist organization, many of which were springing up throughout Austria during this time, and was a leading member of an organization for union with Germany called the "Austrian-German Volksbund." He also came into contact with National Socialism, and, although he did not become a member of the Nazi party, he strongly sympathized with its views on the Anschluss. In fact, until after the Anschluss was realized, Seyss-Inquart never belonged to a political party as such. He differed strongly with many of the parties' programs and methods, especially in that he wanted the union of Austria and Germany to come about gradually and entirely be legal, as opposed to violent, means.

In 1938, just before the Anschluss took place, Seyss-Inquart felt that three to five years more would

---

8Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 67. See also Davidson, The Trial of the Germans, p. 447. Interestingly enough, many of Seyss-Inquart's clients were Jews.

9Davidson, The Trial of the Germans, p. 447. Future Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss was also a member of this group.


11Ibid.
be needed before the two countries would be ready for union. He felt that the Austrian people and government must be won over to the idea of National Socialism gradually rather than have it forced upon them. And in the Anschluss that Seyss-Inquart envisioned, Austria would maintain her independence to some degree, holding a unique place in the whole German Reich. On February 17, 1938, he stated his views to Hitler himself:

I agree to an autonomous and independent Austria, that I support the Constitution. Further development, including the Anschluss, must be based on this. The formation of public opinion in Austria must proceed independently, and in accordance with present constitutional possibilities. This was Seyss-Inquart's dream, for which he worked from 1918 until 1938. In his own strange way, he was very much a patriot, working for what he thought was the good of the Austrian people and nation. He used the Nazis as a means to an end to attain this goal. Hitler actually seemed to agree with Seyss-Inquart's ideas, and until German troops marched into Austria Seyss-Inquart remained under the delusion that Hitler would go along with this plan. This is only one

---

12 Ibid., pp. 970-976.

13 The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 73.

14 Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, p. 27.

example of how Seyss-Inquart's ideas became thwarted by his relationship with the German warlord.

Nonetheless, from 1931 on the Viennese lawyer collaborated with the Nazis to a considerable degree in his work. At the Nuremberg War Trials the prosecution tried to prove that Seyss-Inquart had been a member of the Nazi party since 1931. Their argument hinged on a flimsy piece of evidence—a letter from Seyss-Inquart to Heinrich Himmler dated August 19, 1939:

As far as my membership in the Party is concerned, I state that I was never asked to join the party but had asked Dr. Kier in December, 1931, to clarify my relationship with the Party, since I regarded the Party as the basis for the solution of the Austrian problem. ... I paid my membership fees, as I believe, directly to the 'Gau' Vienna. These contributions also took place after the period of suppression. Later on I had direct contact with the Ortsgruppe in Dornbach. My wife paid these fees, but the 'Blockwart' was never in doubt, considering that this amount, forty shillings per month, was a difficult accomplishment for my wife and myself, and I was in every respect treated as a Party member. ... In every way, therefore, I felt as a Party member, considered myself a Party member, as stated, as far back as December, 1931. 16

But we must consider that by August, 1939 (the date of the letter), Seyss-Inquart's position within the Nazi organization, that of Reich Governor of Austria, had first been subordinated to that of the Reich Commissioner for the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich17


and then changed to Reich Minister without Portfolio.\textsuperscript{18} Seyss-Inquart no longer had any official position in the governance of Austria or any other state, and his party regularity was being questioned by old-time members of the Austrian Nazi Party. It certainly would not have been bad policy on his part to make it seem to his superiors as though he had in reality been active in the party organization ever since 1931.

In actual fact, Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not become a member of the Nazi Party until March 13, 1938,\textsuperscript{19} the day after the Anschluss had taken place. For a time he did pay dues to the party organization, but after the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss in July, 1934, he discontinued paying them until March, 1938, when he joined the party.\textsuperscript{20}

In considering Seyss-Inquart's position in the Nazi Party, we must remember that the regular German NSDAP and the illegal Austrian branch of the National Socialists, while connected, were not the same organi-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18}Positions Held by Seyss-Inquart, Nuremberg, November 10, 1945 (Doc. No. 2910-PS), \textit{Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression}, Vol. V, p. 579.
  \item \textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{20}Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, \textit{The Trial of German Major War Criminals}, Vol. IV, p. 517. On this point we must accept Seyss-Inquart's word. No evidence has been found to contradict his statement, and all of the secondary sources accept it as fact.
\end{itemize}
zation. Of the fact that Seyss-Inquart worked closely with the German Nazis long before he officially became a member there can be no doubt, but his relationship with the illegal Austrian Nazi Party was quite different. Indeed, many members of the Austrian Nazi group did not even know Seyss-Inquart until after the Anschluss, and they then resented his position in the government. In response to the question of whether or not Seyss-Inquart had had close contact with the illegal Austrian National Socialists before 1938, the former Nazi Party Gauleiter, Siegfried Uiberreither, testified at Nuremberg:

No. I personally did not know Seyss-Inquart until his visit to Graz.\(^{21}\) In Nazi circles he was considered a non-Party member. I think--I do not know with certainty--that he joined the NSDAP only when it was legalized. For this reason, he personally encountered a strong opposition in illegal Nazi circles.\(^{22}\)

But in spite of the fact that his relationship with the Nazi party in Austria was limited, Seyss-Inquart began to be interested in affairs of state. Ever since the end of the First World War he had been a friend of Englebert Dollfuss, who became Chancellor

\(^{21}\)On March 12, 1938.

of Austria in 1932. After the war the two had worked together in an attempt to unify the Austrian Christian Socialists and Nationalists. Seyss-Inquart believed that Dollfuss had intended him to be a part of his ministry in 1933, but this did not take place. In July, 1934, however, the chancellor spoke with Dr. Seyss-Inquart about the problem of mobilizing the middle class nationals to serve as a balance against the National Socialists, who were becoming increasingly active in Austrian political affairs.

More discussions between the two men were planned, but the following week, while Seyss-Inquart was vacationing near Iglau, he received news of the assassination of Dollfuss. Two days later, on July 27th, Seyss-Inquart returned to Vienna, where it at once became apparent to him that the assassination had been a complete catastrophe to the Austrian Nazis. Wholesale arrests were made of the leaders, and what remained of the movement was driven completely underground. Seyss-Inquart joined a small group of Nazi sympathizers in

---

24 Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 69.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
efforts to aid the families of those men who were arrested, but other than that, he participated in little of moment in Austrian politics for over two years.

It was not until May, 1937, that Seyss-Inquart received his first official position in the government of his nation and that was an indirect result of an agreement made between Germany and Austria on July 11, 1936. By that year, relations between Austria and Germany had become somewhat strained. Germany had imposed economic barriers that were proving harmful to Austrian industry and agriculture. Because of this, Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg met with Hitler on July 11, 1936, to see if these restrictions could be relaxed.

On the surface the agreement that was signed that day contained only two main points. Germany reaffirmed its recognition of Austria's sovereignty and promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbor. In return, Austria pledged that in its foreign policy it would always act on the principle that it acknowledged itself to be a "German State."

---

28Ibid., p. 963.

29Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg--Former Chancellor of Austria, Nuremberg, November 19, 1945 (Doc. No. 2994-PS), ibid., p. 704.

30Ibid., pp. 704-705.

31Ibid.
But there were secret clauses in the pact. An amnesty was granted for all Nazi political prisoners in Austria, and Austria agreed to appoint members of the "National Opposition" to positions of political responsibility.\(^{32}\) In May, 1937, although he was not yet a member of the Nazi Party, Seyss-Inquart was called upon to fill one of these positions of political responsibility, and he was appointed State Councillor of Austria.\(^{33}\) This position in itself was relatively unimportant, but through his work as State Councillor, Seyss-Inquart paved the way for his later appointment to positions of greater responsibility in the Austrian government.

The Viennese lawyer quickly familiarized himself with the actual workings of the governmental post to which he had been assigned. He also continued work on his program of gradual and "legal" incorporation of Austria with the German Reich. However, during this time he played no decisive role in governmental affairs. His position was of minor significance and had been given to him mainly as a gesture of the Austrian government to include men with National Socialist leanings in its structure.

In spite of the incorporation of these Nazi men into

\(^{32}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 705.}\)

\(^{33}\text{Positions held by Seyss-Inquart, ibid.}, \text{p. 579.}\)
the Austrian government, however, relations between the two countries improved little, and Hitler again asked Schuschnigg to join him in talks about the problems. This second round of discussions between the leaders of Austria and Germany was to take place on February 12, 1938. It was the background of events leading up to these talks that gave Seyss-Inquart his first chance to undermine the government of Austria and assist the German government in its takeover of his homeland.

The very day before Schuschnigg left for his conference with Hitler at Berchtesgaden he discussed the concessions he was willing to make to the Germans with several officials in the Austrian government. Among them was Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart. Schuschnigg outlined ten points on which he was willing to give in to Hitler the next day. Seyss-Inquart took careful note of them and dispatched them to the Nazi warlord in Berlin. According to the testimony which Seyss-Inquart offered at Nuremberg, he admitted that he sent a courier, Dr. Kajetan Mühlmann, to Hitler with a brief report of his conversations with Chancellor Schuschnigg and Guido Zernatto, the other government member present during the talks. But he explained that he did not send

---

35 Ibid.
Mühlmann until after Schuschnigg's departure for Berchtesgaden, and he insisted that his intention was not to tattle to Hitler about Schuschnigg's plans, but rather to help smooth the way for the negotiations, since Seyss-Inquart was the recognized middle man between the Austrian government and the Reich.

But at Nuremberg Seyss-Inquart was trying to lessen the nature of his treachery, and his report is highly inaccurate. Seyss-Inquart actually called Dr. Mühlmann in about 5:00 in the afternoon of the discussions with Schuschnigg, long before the Austrian Chancellor had gotten on the train for Berchtesgaden. Mühlmann was given an outline of the ten points which were still under discussion in another part of the building and told to leave for Berchtesgaden with the news immediately. Consequently, Hitler knew Schuschnigg's position completely even before the Austrian Chancellor arrived for the discussions. This knowledge enabled him to make far

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid. See also Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, p. 28. On this point Seyss-Inquart's testimony is quite accurate. Except for this one noticeable piece of duplicity, Seyss-Inquart acted openly in his relationships with both Schuschnigg and Hitler, fully reporting his conversations with each to the other. Strangely, Seyss-Inquart saw no contradiction in assuming this position. He recognized Schuschnigg as the Chancellor of Austria and Adolf Hitler as the leader of all the German peoples. One reason for Schuschnigg's great trust in Seyss-Inquart was the honesty and openness with which he conducted these matters.

38 Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, p. 36.
broader demands than he would otherwise have done. Seyss-Inquart had done his work well.

When Prince Starhemberg heard of the pact signed by Schuschnigg and Hitler in 1936 he asked the Italian ambassador to Austria to pass on only two words to Mussolini: "Finis Austriae." Austria's fate had been stayed for two years, but now, at Berchtesgaden, his dire prediction would come true. Of this meeting with Hitler Chancellor Schuschnigg later remarked:

The twelfth of February, 1938, the day of my interview with Adolf Hitler at his mountain retreat, Berghof, near Berchtesgaden, will forever remain one of the darkest and most fateful days in the annals of Austria. It was the beginning of the end, for exactly one month later the German army invaded Austria.

When Dr. Schuschnigg arrived at Berchtesgaden, Hitler was in a very bitter mood. He railed against Austria

---

39 Ibid., p. 54. While Schuschnigg was discussing matters at Berchtesgaden with his foreign secretary, Dr. Guido Schmidt, he learned from him that Dr. Mühlmann was at that very moment at the Berghof conferring with Hitler. Strangely, Schuschnigg still never made the connection between Mühlmann and Seyss-Inquart and did not suspect his state councilor of treachery. See Kurt von Schuschnigg, "Affidavit," Nuremberg, November 19, 1945 (Doc. No. 2995-PS), Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, pp. 710-711.

40 Ernst Rudiger Prince Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini (New York: Harper, 1942), p. 239. Starhemberg was the first secretary of the Austrian Fatherland Front.


and its history and poured forth verbal abuse on the chancellor all day. Finally, at 4:00 p.m. Schuschnigg and his foreign secretary, Dr. Schmidt, were handed a two-page typed list of the Führer's "concessions" to Austria.

Hitler had received Seyss-Inquart's report, and the list of ten points with which Schuschnigg and Schmidt were now confronted were very similar to the very ten that Dr. Schuschnigg had outlined the night before. The typed list contained ten specific demands regarding Austria. Only the following of them, however are important to this narrative: the immediate appointment of Seyss-Inquart as minister of public security, with full authority over the Austrian police; the amnesty of all National Socialist political prisoners; the reinstatement of all Nazis who had been removed from positions in the Austrian government; and the concession that everyone in Austria should be free to profess the Nazi creed, which until this time had been illegal.

The list concluded with a reaffirmation of the agreement of July 11, 1936, which of course was now utterly meaningless.

were taken at the Berchtesgaden meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. The only account of the proceedings available to us is the one provided by the former Austrian chancellor, and all of the secondary reports are based on it.

43Ibid.  
44Ibid., p. 711.  
45Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, pp. 21-22.
Sohuschnigg and Schmidt were naturally shocked by the list of concessions which Hitler handed them. They had been told that the talks would be limited to a discussion of the agreement of 1936 and a reaffirmation of that agreement. But the Nazi leader had tricked them, and had instead used the conference to extract new concessions from the Austrian chancellor. There was little that Schuschnigg could do, and he quickly gave in to the demands that Hitler had presented to him. The door was thus open to the complete destruction of Austria as an independent state.

But this was certainly not entirely the chancellor's fault. Seyss-Inquart's treachery had alerted Hitler to precisely how far the Austrians would go in giving in to his demands. Armed with this knowledge, the Führer pressed his demands still further.

Schuschnigg probably never found out about Seyss-Inquart's duplicity. In fact, he kept a firm faith in his friend, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, even after Austria's independence had been destroyed. Like Schuschnigg, Seyss-Inquart was a devout Roman Catholic. He was also a strong intellectual who had been drawn into politics

---


47 Ibid., pp. 709-710.
from a legal career and an officer of the Austrian Imperial army who had fought on the Isonzo front.

Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg were both shy and cultivated men who had a strong love for classical music. In fact, a long discussion about the Austrian composer, Anton Bruckner, had first brought them together. These many similarities (especially Seyss-Inquart's Catholicism) formed a bond between the two men that lasted through the final gloomy days of the Anschluss.

On February 16, 1938, in accordance with his agreement with Hitler, Dr. Schuschnigg appointed his friend, Artur Seyss-Inquart, minister of interior with full authority over the Austrian police. According to the prosecution at Nuremberg, it was the intention of the German Nazis that Seyss-Inquart use his control of the Austrian police to their political advantage. In fact, the day after Seyss-Inquart was appointed he went to Berlin to discuss his new role with Heinrich Himmler and Hitler. But we know little concerning the nature of the discussions that took place there. Seyss-Inquart maintained that his discussions with Himmler were vague, that the conference lasted only fifteen minutes, and

---

48 Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, p. 27.

49 Positions held by Seyss-Inquart, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, p. 579.

that he could discuss nothing of importance since he
had just been appointed and was still unfamiliar with
his new duties. Martin Fuchs presents a considerably
different version of Seyss-Inquart's visit to Berlin,
saying that the discussions covered in great detail
what Seyss-Inquart should accomplish upon his return
to Vienna. According to Fuchs, the major part of
Seyss-Inquart's mission was as follows:

Disturbances are to be provoked so as to
enable the minister of security to enrol
special police from the National-Socialist
ranks on the grounds of strengthening the
security organization.
All police-stations must be staffed by
officials with National-Socialist tendencies.
National-Socialists are to be appointed to
all executive positions.

Regardless of Seyss-Inquart's instructions, when
he returned to Vienna the problem was further compli-
cated by the fact that Schuschnigg had decided to es-
establish a kind of dual control over the Austrian police
by also appointing his state secretary, Dr. Skubl, to
a position of authority over the force. Schuschnigg
felt that in this way the National Socialists would not
be able to gain control over the police. But instead,

51 Ibid., pp. 974-975.
53 Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, p. 105. Dr. Skubl
was already president of the untrustworthy Vienna po-
lice. Now he was given the additional office of ins-
spector-general of the Austrian gendarmerie.
as a result of his actions, the dual control he established led only to lessened efficiency and effectiveness.

The new minister of interior was quite right when he testified at Nuremberg: "All orders of the executive came from Skubl. I myself never gave a direct order to the Austrian police. Skubl was given instructions by Dr. Schuschnigg, particularly on 10th and 11th March. I myself did not bring a single National Socialist into the Austrian police." But Seyss-Inquart was evading the central point: to control the Austrian police for the Nazis, Seyss-Inquart did not need to lift a finger. Quite to the contrary, his very lack of decision and nonchalant control gave the Nazis the opening they needed. Seyss-Inquart was not by any means the only Nazi in the higher echelons of the Austrian police, and when rigid control from above no longer existed it became easy for the Nazis to infiltrate the ranks of the police in large numbers. By March 11, the day the Anschluss actually took place, the Vienna police could no longer be relied upon.

There was another technical reason why Seyss-Inquart could not use the Austrian police to interfere with

---

Nazi activities. The agreements signed by Schuschnigg and Hitler forbade this type of intervention except in the case of "grave crimes." Chancellor Schuschnigg had, in effect, tied his own hands.

In the meantime, Schuschnigg quickly realized that he had gained absolutely nothing for his government by the Berchtesgaden agreement. His repeated concessions to the Germans having failed, he now decided on one last desperate attempt to retain Austria's independence.

On Tuesday, March 6, the chancellor called into his office the members of the cabinet and told them that he had decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of Austria's independence. At this time, however, he still had not decided on either the wording of the proposition in the plebiscite or the date on which it should be held. The next day the decision was made to hold the plebiscite on the following Sunday, March 12th.

---


57 There is a considerable divergence of opinion as to when this meeting actually took place. See Schuschnigg, "Affidavit," ibid., p. 713; and Fuchs, A Pact With Hitler, p. 305. The most authoritative sources indicate that the meeting was held on March 6.


59 Seyss-Inquart gives the date as Monday, March 13, but all other sources disagree. Seyss-Inquart, "The Austrian Question 1934-1938," ibid., p. 978.
Schuschnigg made his decision in the firm belief that Hitler would not dare do anything to hamper the voting since the whole world would be watching and waiting on its outcome.

The reaction to the announcement of the referendum was both immediate and mixed, partially due to the vagueness of the proposal itself. The plebiscite itself was actually rigged. Only citizens over twenty-four years of age could vote. The plebiscite was announced only four days in advance, making it impossible for proper voting lists to be prepared, and the referendum was under the control of the pro-Schuschnigg Fatherland Front. There was no secret ballot in the plebiscite, making it very difficult to cast a negative vote. Most important, the proposal itself was worded poorly. One had to vote either for or against Austrian independence, which was a serious distortion of the issue at stake.

At his trial Seyss-Inquart said that he had opposed the plebiscite from the outset, but this is difficult for us to believe.\(^{61}\) Chancellor Schuschnigg informed him of the plans for the plebiscite on March 8, and at that time the minister of the interior

---

\(^{60}\)Davidson, *The Trial of the Germans*, p. 452.

pledged to support the plebiscite. He had as yet not received word of Berlin's reaction to the announce-
ment, and before he did, Seyss-Inquart assisted Schuschnigg in preparing propaganda supporting it and went on nation-wide radio urging an affirmative vote.

Soon, however, the inevitable reaction from Berlin arrived in Vienna. Hitler was furious and wanted the plebiscite postponed. He strongly felt that at this time the National Socialists had little chance in a vote "for" or "against" a free and independent Austria. The Nazis simply could not win. The referendum, he thought, must be postponed. When word of the Führer's reaction reached Seyss-Inquart, the latter quickly changed his mind and informed Chancellor Schuschnigg that he did not think the plebiscite advisable.

But for once Schuschnigg appeared resolved. He would not change his decision, and he broadcast a speech

64 Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 75. See also Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, pp. 127-129. Hitler had in fact, first received the news of the plebiscite with utter disbelief. When he was sure that the story was true, however, he immediately went into action to frustrate Schuschnigg's plans.
65 Ibid.
over the nation-wide radio network in favor of the plebiscite. The broadcast was an eloquently dramatic plea for Austrian independence in which he explained that it was the will of Hitler, and not of Austria, that Austria be incorporated into the German Reich.\footnote{Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, pp. 127-132.}

Very few persons connected with the Austrian government foresaw what Hitler's reaction would be. But Prince Starhemberg says that he realized (although probably only in retrospect) that the plebiscite would provide Hitler with exactly the excuse he was looking for to increase diplomatic and military pressure to the very breaking point.\footnote{Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini, pp. 272-273.} This is exactly what happened. By the afternoon of March 10 Hitler had made up his mind to get Schuschnigg's referendum called off. He called in his chief military advisors and had them draw up immediate plans for the invasion of Austria in case his political pressures did not succeed in forcing a capitulation from the Austrian government.\footnote{Operation Otto, Berlin, March 11, 1938 (Doc. No. O-102), Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. VI, pp. 911-912.}

To begin his military pressure Hitler closed the German-Austrian border at Salzburg at 4:30 on the morning of March 11th.\footnote{Schuschnigg, "Affidavit," ibid., Vol. V, p. 713.} An immediate wave of panic swept
through Vienna. The chancellor was got out of bed at 5:30 to hear the news, and he quickly headed for his office in the chancellory.\textsuperscript{70}

Schuschnigg immediately called his cabinet into session. All the members were present except Seyss-Inquart, who at that time was actually at Aspern Airport meeting Glaise-Horstenau, who was arriving from Berlin with an important message from Göring.\textsuperscript{71}

The minister of the interior finally arrived at the cabinet meeting with Glaise-Horstenau, at 9:30 a.m., and they were both quickly ushered into Dr. Schuschnigg’s office.\textsuperscript{72} The sealed message which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him from Berlin was now read to the chancellor.\textsuperscript{73} It stated that Sunday’s plebiscite was to be postponed for two weeks. If Schuschnigg refused to go along, both Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau were to resign. The message also contained military threats against Austria if the chancellor did not capitulate.\textsuperscript{74} Schuschnigg, now desperate, immediately telephoned President Miklas and the chief of police in

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{72}Schuschnigg, "Affidavit," \textit{ibid.}, p. 714.

\textsuperscript{73}Schuschnigg, \textit{Austrian Requiem}, p. 42.

Vienna, Dr. Skubl, who told him that the Viennese police could not be relied upon in case of trouble. Schuschnigg was in a quandary. Dr. Miklas, the Austrian President, was often a rather wishy-washy fellow whom the chancellor did not think he could count on for support. Part of the chancellor's own cabinet was now in open revolt. His own Vienna police could not be relied upon, and he was being threatened with military might by Austria's powerful neighbor. Dr. Schuschnigg decided there was little he could do save capitulate and postpone the plebiscite.

At 11:30 a.m. Schuschnigg called Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau into his office and told them to inform Göring that he would call off the plebiscite as requested. By now, however, it was too late. Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau called Göring in Berlin only to come back with still more demands. Hitler had now decided to force the Austrian government to the wall and cause its complete collapse. He had not the slightest interest whatsoever in merely having his

75 The office of president of Austria carried little authority. While not a ceremonial title, it carried with it little real power, which was largely vested in the hands of the chancellor.


77 Notes Concerning the Telephone Conversations between the Fieldmarshall and the Minister Seyss-Inquart,
demands satisfied. Therefore, whenever the Austrians would accept the terms dictated to them by the Germans, the Germans would raise the ante even higher. This time when Seyss-Inquart and Glaize-Horstenau returned from their phone conversation with Göring, the two messengers told the chancellor that he must resign and appoint Seyss-Inquart as chancellor. 78

Again, Schuschnigg did not know where to turn. Word had been received from Italy (formerly Austria's defender against Hitler's intrigues 79) that no help could be counted on from that quarter. 80 Mussolini would not even speak to the Austrian chancellor over the phone. Schuschnigg was sure that he could not count on either London or Paris, and besides, France was that very day undergoing one of her frequent cabinet crises.

Berlin, March 14, 1938 (Doc. No. 2949-PS), ibid., pp. 629-639. This document contains the complete transcript of the telephone conversations that took place between Seyss-Inquart and Göring on March 11, 1938. Later, Göring liked to take credit for the entire operation on March 11, claiming to have masterminded the collapse of Austria. Actually, this is not so. Göring was in contact with Hitler throughout the day and did little on his own initiative. One of Hitler's primary goals and fondest dreams was the incorporation of Austria, the land of his birth, into the German Reich, and he would not trust the operation of so important a scheme to even his most trusted subordinates.

78 Ibid.

79 In 1934, after the assassination of chancellor Dollfuss, when Austria seemed to be threatened by a German takeover, Mussolini rushed troops to the Brenner Pass to guarantee Austria's independence.

and there was not even a government in Paris. Schuschnigg asked to be received by President Miklas to submit his resignation.

But now Schuschnigg ran into an unexpected obstacle. The usually mild Austrian president was not willing to name Seyss-Inquart as the new chancellor. Miklas did accept Schuschnigg's resignation late in the day, but only after ever-increasing pressure had been applied to him. The old man remained adamant throughout the next day, and did not yield until just before midnight.

Hitler's decision to have Seyss-Inquart appointed chancellor was almost as much of a surprise to the minister of the interior as it was to Miklas and Schuschnigg. Seyss-Inquart was, as we have seen, a mild, soft-spoken man, and at this point in his career he still had not been affected by ruthless, self-seeking ambition. In fact, upon receiving Göring's telephone call, Seyss-Inquart

81 Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 47.


83 Ibid. See also Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, pp. 49-51; and Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, pp. 67 and 157.

84 Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, pp. 53-54; Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, p. 180. Miklas later said that he never did appoint Seyss-Inquart as chancellor but only accepted Schuschnigg's resignation and let power pass into Seyss-Inquart's hands. See The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 77.
seemed "white in the face and agitated." As he later stated, at times on March 11 he felt only like a "girl telephone switchboard operator" between Vienna and Berlin. While this is surely an understatement of the role that he had played in bringing about the fall of the Austrian government, it must be admitted that Seyss-Inquart had not outwardly sought the chancellorship for himself. He had not even discussed the appointment with either Miklas or Schuschnigg until late Saturday evening. And at times that night it seemed as though Seyss-Inquart were actually trying to thwart the Nazi plans for stepping up military pressure on Austria.

On March 10th Göring had composed a telegram for Seyss-Inquart to send to Berlin, requesting German troops to enter Austria to quell "internal disturbances." Göring had told him to send the telegram after he had seized power and thereby provide the Nazis with a pretext to march into Austria. The telegram was never sent. Seyss-Inquart steadfastly refused to

85 Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, p. 151.
87 Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, March 11, 1938 (Doc. No. 2463-PS), ibid., pp. 207-208.
send the message because it was an outright lie. There were no disorders in Austria, and Seyss-Inquart still clung to the hope that Austria's independence could be preserved. He knew that if the German army marched across Austria's borders Austria would be totally assimilated into the German Reich and would be unable to preserve even a trace of independence. Seyss-Inquart favored an Anschluss, but only one in which Austria would maintain a degree of independence, and assume a new position as cultural capital of the German Reich. And the Anschluss, Seyss-Inquart thought, must come about entirely by legal, and not by forceful, means.

But this was not to be, although the new chancellor would think so for several days. Hitler had no intention of letting Austria maintain her independence after he had dreamed so long of incorporating her into his empire. Soon, every shred of Austria's independence would vanish.

Late in the evening of March 11, 1938, as Seyss-Inquart was sworn in as the last chancellor of the First Austrian Republic, his mind was far from politics. His work was finished, or so he thought. He was looking

---

forward to going back to his legal practice in Vienna. He was content. The *Anschluss* of Austria with Germany, for which he had worked so hard and so long, was at hand.
CHAPTER II:
CAUGHT IN THE WEB

The new chancellor was at the apex of his career. His dream of Austria's union with the German Reich had at last been fulfilled. All of his efforts had been rewarded. According to his own strange lights, every act that he had taken was that of a patriot. The Anschluss for which he and so many of his countrymen had waited so long had come into being, and there was little that remained to be done. Seyss-Inquart fully expected that Hitler would now name himself president of Austria and that his service would no longer be required. The only step that remained to be taken was the preparation for Hitler's visit to Austria. To this end he telephoned Hitler the next morning. Seyss-Inquart suggested to the German leader that, as a symbol of the union of the two countries, perhaps it would be good to have Austrian troops march into the Reich as well as German soldiers into Austria. Hitler agreed and told Seyss-Inquart that he would meet him in Linz, in Upper Austria, later that day.¹

When Hitler arrived in Linz, Seyss-Inquart greeted

¹Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 79.
him before a cheering crowd on the balcony of the city hall and proclaimed that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain (which forbade Austria's reunion with the Reich) was now inoperative. For the new Austrian chancellor, this was the peak of his entire life. One must note Seyss-Inquart's own words to grasp the depths of emotion from which he spoke:

The road was difficult, hard and full of sacrifice. It led over the most shocking defeat of the German people, but yet out of it grew the great and brilliant idea of the indivisible common fate, the knowledge of one living nation, the idea of the national socialism.

The goal for which centuries of German history have battled, for which untold millions of the best Germans have bled and died, which has been the final aim of fierce struggle, the last consolation in the bitterest hours—has today been reached. Austria has come home.

This was not mere rhetoric, for Seyss-Inquart rarely indulged in such. He was brief and precise. On the rare occasions when he spoke he was sincere. And well he might be, for Hitler's triumphal entry into Austria

---

2Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 318.

3Address of Bund Chancellor Dr. Seyss-Inquart from the balcony of the city hall at Linz on March 12, 1938, Linz, March 12, 1938 (Doc. No. 2485-PS), Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, p. 234.

4Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 80. Here Seyss-Inquart was speaking from notes which he had at the trial.
more resembled a Mardi Gras than an invasion. Seyss-Inquart felt that he was not alone in his feelings, and that all of Austria stood with him. Speaking of the events surrounding Hitler's visit to Austria he said: "I felt that no Austrian statesman, no man in a position of responsibility, ever had the whole population behind him so much as I."5

But all in Austria was not to be as Seyss-Inquart had thought and planned. The next morning he received his first surprise: Hitler instructed him to draft a law providing for the complete union of Austria with the Reich.6 Previously Seyss-Inquart had believed that Austria, although united with the German Reich, would retain somewhat of an independent status,7 but Hitler had other ideas. Austria was to become merely another province of Germany,8 and Seyss-Inquart, of course, was forced to agree.

Accordingly, on March 13 Seyss-Inquart called together the Council of Ministers and drafted the law providing for Austria's complete incorporation into Germany.9 Later in the day a decree which put the law

---

5 Ibid., p. 81. 6 Ibid., p. 79.
7 Ibid., p. 73. 8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 319.
into effect was signed by the leaders of the German government, and the Anschluss became an accomplished fact. ¹⁰

Hitler was very pleased with the way that the Anschluss had been carried out. When he spoke of it, tears came to his eyes. ¹¹ Correspondingly, the new Austrian chancellor rose high in his estimation, and he began to develop greater plans for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, which would become apparent two days later in Vienna.

Meanwhile, on the evening of March 13, Seyss-Inquart reported to the Führer on the Anschluss law and took advantage of the discussion to press several points home to the German leader. ¹² First, Seyss-Inquart requested that the Austrian Nazi Party maintain some of its independence from the German party and that it be headed by a provincial. On this point Hitler made no decision. Second, he requested that Austria be granted a certain amount of independence. To this request Hitler responded affirmatively. Austria would be given its own governor—

---


¹² The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 80.
a Reichsstatthalter. Lastly, Seyss-Inquart suggested a readjustment of the unfair currency exchange rate, and on this point also Hitler agreed.

Before the new chancellor left Hitler he explained to him that all of his political wishes now had been fulfilled by the Anschluss and that he would now like to return to his private law practice in Vienna and retire from politics. But Hitler was formulating bigger plans for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, and he told him that he would reserve his decision on this matter until later.

Precisely what those plans were Seyss-Inquart found out two days later when standing on a speaking platform with the Führer in Vienna. Hitler introduced Seyss-Inquart as the new "Reichsstatthalter." As the Austrian chancellor testified at Nuremberg, "That to me was actually the first news of my appointment as Reichsstatthalter." Seyss-Inquart, although he had not wished to be, was now the head of the civil administration of Austria. He did not question Hitler's decision, but accepted it willingly. In retrospect, it

---

13 Ibid.


15 Ibid. See also The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 80. For a complete listing of all offices held by Seyss-Inquart from 1937 until the end of his career, see the appendix.
is difficult for us to understand why he did so, for Seyss-Inquart was not a man who gloried in public acclaim and adulation. At this point in his career, he was certainly not power-hungry. Perhaps the new Reichstathalter felt that he could serve his country in the new post. We can only guess at his motives. But he had taken the most fateful step of his life. He was no longer working as a patriotic Austrian, but as a cog in the Nazi machine. Seyss-Inquart had fallen into the web, and from it there would be no escape.

Seyss-Inquart expected a relatively quiet and uneventful tenure in his new office. But Hitler had already, unknowingly, sewed seeds of dissent within the Austrian governmental structure. Immediately after his return to Berlin, he sent Josef Buerckel to Vienna to head the Reich Commission for Austrian Re-Annexation to Germany. Ostensibly, this position would not seem particularly important. Its purpose was to facilitate the complete incorporation of all facets of Austrian life into the German Reich.

Soon serious new problems developed as a result of the division of authority—where Seyss-Inquart's stopped

---

16 Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, ibid.
and where Buerckel's began. Buerckel was in control of the party apparatus, which had always been hostile to Seyss-Inquart. He also effectively controlled propaganda, the press, the youth movement, and the Church. In all matters concerning the ill-defined idea of "re-annexation," Seyss-Inquart was directly responsible to him. The result was that the central departments of the Reich, operating from Berlin, turned to and sought advice from Buerckel's staff rather than from Seyss-Inquart's.¹⁷

This situation angered even the mild-mannered Reichsstatthalter, and he soon protested to Hitler himself. On April 18, 1938, in the presence of Buerckel, Seyss-Inquart explained the situation to the Führer. A long discussion followed, after which Hitler agreed with his Reichsstatthalter and reprimanded the Reich Commissioner by saying, "Buerckel, you must not do that, otherwise the enthusiasm of the Austrians for the Anschluss will change to irritation with the Reich."¹⁸

But even this discussion with Hitler availed Seyss-Inquart little, for there was hardly and change in either Buerckel's attitude or actions. Seyss-Inquart


¹⁸Ibid. See also Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 80.
felt that this was largely due to the influence of Reinhard Heydrich, the chief of the Nazi secret police. 19

At any rate, Seyss-Inquart's position in Austria became a subordinate one. Officially he remained the head of the civil administration in Austria, but he did little save execute orders and decrees that were issued from other sources. For example, at Nuremberg, the prosecution tried to make much of the fact that Seyss-Inquart had persecuted the Jews during his term of office in Vienna. This was almost a complete untruth. The confiscation of Jewish property and the removal of Jews from Austria were the result of orders issued by the German minister of the interior, not by Seyss-Inquart. 20 The Reichsstatthalter never denied that the orders were issued over his name, but they did not originate with him; he merely executed them. Even Jewish families themselves testified for Seyss-Inquart on this point and explained that he had protested the treatment of Jews to Reich Commissioner Buerckel. 21 When Field Marshall Göring held a meeting to discuss the Jewish

19 Ibid.


21 The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 81.
question on November 12, 1938, Seyss-Inquart did not even attend.22

It is true that Seyss-Inquart was anti-Semitic and had been for many years, but his anti-Semitism knew bounds, and he would not yet yield to wanton destruction of their property and lives. His personality had not yet changed to that extent. He was still a quiet, bureaucratic Viennese lawyer at heart.

All of Seyss-Inquart's term of office in Austria followed much the same pattern. He was, in effect, a rubber-stamp for the proposals that were handed him from either Buerckel or higher authorities in Berlin, and, although the Reichsstatthalter performed his duties with his usual impeccable efficiency, his subordination to Buerckel grated on him continually. At one point Seyss-Inquart, by virtue of his honorary rank in the SS, even tried to bring proceedings against the Reich Commissioner, but Buerckel, also an honorary general in the SS, was immune from disciplinary action.23 Because of this situation, Seyss-Inquart was able to originate nothing in the way of policy in the governance of Austria,


23Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 82.
and, rankling over the subordination of his own authority to that of Buerokel, he left his position in Austria in May, 1939.\textsuperscript{24}

The Nazi hierarchy realized that a man of Seyss-Inquart's ability could not be left idle, however, and in May Hitler appointed him Reich Minister without portfolio and a member of the Reich Cabinet, a position which he held until the end of the war.\textsuperscript{25}

Although the two positions to which he had now been appointed placed him in the upper echelon of the National Socialist hierarchy, the posts were largely titular ones and the months between May and September of 1939 were relatively inactive ones for Seyss-Inquart. He had no real official duties and found himself with little to do. He still resented having his position in Austria made a subordinate one, and he knew that he had not yet proved his ability in governing. But shortly thereafter the entire political situation in Europe changed, and Seyss-Inquart received a new post.

In 1939 Hitler's armies crossed the Polish frontier and quickly conquered Germany's weaker neighbor

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 84.

in the East. Immediately it became necessary to set up a government of occupation in the newly acquired territory and the German government named Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart to fill one of the administrative posts in Poland.  

The position to which Dr. Seyss-Inquart was named in early September was that of chief of the civil administration of South Poland. Technically, this position was under the authority of the Armed Forces, but since Hitler reorganized the governmental structure of Poland on October 12, 1939, the administration was never set up, and Seyss-Inquart quickly assumed his new duties as Hans Frank's deputy governor general of the occupied Polish territories.

This new position was actually little more satisfying to Seyss-Inquart than his job in Austria had been. Here again he was a subordinate, with little power to initiate any type of action or policy on his own. His duties were even similar to those in Austria and he was primarily what he had always been—a bureaucrat. Indeed,
Seyss-Inquart's role in Nazi rule in Poland was so inconsequential that the secondary works on this subject hardly even mention his name. Nonetheless, there were certain aspects of his work in the occupied Polish territories that help us to understand the character of this man who was slowly becoming entwined in the National Socialist structure.

We must remember that Seyss-Inquart was, above all, a soft-spoken and quiet man, who, although not averse to, was certainly not strongly in favor of, physical violence. He was not, as he pointed out in a letter to Göring, "of an active fighting nature." This aspect of his personality had already shown itself in Vienna, where he had protested to Buerckel against the cruel treatment to Jews. In Poland it was to become even more clear.

While serving under Frank in Poland, Seyss-Inquart used his influence to do away with arbitrary punishment, and instead, to substitute proper court procedure for the trial of those accused of working against Germany.  

---


31 Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 85. Here it is not clear whether or not Seyss-Inquart is speaking from notes made at the time, which he frequently did during
He also expressed his desire for the reestablishment of Polish administration under "old people of former Polish times" and stated that "compulsory work must be replaced by normal employment as soon as possible." 32

Governor Frank placed Seyss-Inquart at the head of a commission of inquiry over the summary police courts that were established in Poland, and, largely because of the deputy governor's efforts, as many as fifty percent of the imposed sentences were cancelled. 33

During the winter of 1939-1940, when a famine spread across Poland and became most serious in the towns, Seyss-Inquart obtained thousands of tons of grain to help ward off starvation. 34

I do not intend to give the impression that Seyss-Inquart was only a devout and compassionate humanitarian while in office in Poland, but rather I wish to make the point that this side of his personality

---

32 Ibid., Vol. XVI, p. 85.  
33 Ibid., p. 86.  
34 Ibid.
did indeed exist. Seyss-Inquart was first and foremost an extremely efficient administrator—a well-lubricated valve in the Nazi machine—but he was also a human being, capable of strong sensitivity and warmth. He was increasingly becoming involved in the National Socialist bureaucracy, but he had not yet completely sacrificed principle for efficiency.

To demonstrate the other side of the Polish deputy governor's personality, perhaps it will be best to turn to an example of the tremendous efficiency and thoroughness that were so much a part of his legal mind. In late November, 1939, Governor Frank asked Seyss-Inquart to make an official tour of the districts of Warsaw, Lublin, and Radom, and report to him on the results of his findings. The tour lasted only five and one half days, but during that time, with his usual efficiency, the deputy governor completed a huge amount of work. On the tour Seyss-Inquart viewed, discussed, and reported in some detail on at least fifty-eight different topics, varying in scope from problems of unemployment and currency, the resettlement of refugees, the organizational set-up of the governments of small towns, and the difficulties with the Wehrmacht.

35Official tour of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. IV, pp. 953-968.
to friction resulting from inflated gasoline prices, cattle shortages, and the establishment of a sugar refinery. On the tour he also demonstrated the beginnings of his devotion to Nazi Germany. He explained to governmental leaders that the principal aim of Nazi policy in Poland was to further the interests of the Reich and that nothing should be done that would in any way hamper this goal. To carry out this idea, during the tour Seyss-Inquart ordered the seizure of all Polish stocks of such crucial commodities as oil, salt, and manures to be used in the Reich.

But in spite of his many accomplishments in Poland, perhaps his greatest was the establishment of the organization of the new government itself. Hitler had provided only a skeletal outline of how he wished it to be set up. So Seyss-Inquart vigorously applied his great talents in this area, and labored many hours to establish an efficient, well-running governmental structure. Just before he left Poland to assume his next post, governor Frank paid tribute to his assistant's work in the following terms:

In the construction of the General-Government your name will forever take a place of

\[36\text{Ibid.}\]
\[37\text{Ibid.}\]
\[38\text{Ibid.}\]
honor as originator of this organization and State system. I express our thanks, Mr. Reichminister, for your collaboration and for your creative energy.  

The fact that Seyss-Inquart performed well for his masters in Poland was not lost on the Nazi leadership in Berlin. Previously they had admired his talents during the Anschluss, and now they took note of them again. Within a few months they decided to give the deputy governor an even bigger job, of infinitely more importance to the Reich. On May 18, 1940, Hitler appointed Seyss-Inquart Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands territories. And so, just eight months after arriving in Poland, Dr. Seyss-Inquart assumed his new responsibilities—the highest that were to be accorded him in his career.

The actual decree naming Seyss-Inquart Reich Commissioner of the Netherlands was made public on May 20. According to its provisions, the former deputy governor of Poland was made the supreme civil power in the Netherlands, responsible only to Hitler himself. The powers


40 Decree of the Führer of May 18, 1940, on the execution of power by the government in the Lowlands, May 20, 1940, Führer's Headquarters (Doc. No. 1376-PS), ibid., Vol. III, p. 929. The terms Reich Commissioner and Reich Commissar are interchangeable, depending on the translation from the German.
granted to Dr. Seyss-Inquart were extensive. Although Dutch law remained in effect, as long as it did not interfere with the German occupation, the Reich Commissioner was given authority to rule by decree.41

By the time Seyss-Inquart reached the Netherlands the queen and the royal family, as well as the cabinet, had fled to England.42 All power in the country, civil as well as military, was being exercised by the commander in chief of the Dutch army and navy, General Winkelman.43 Seyss-Inquart was, therefore, presented with two alternatives: he could either appoint a new Dutch government or conduct the administration of the country himself.44 He chose a compromise between the two.

Although he himself would rule the country, a large

41Ibid.

42Top secret report about the situation and developments in the occupied territories of the Netherlands, n. p., n. d., (Doc. No. 997-PS), Ibid., Vol. III, p. 642. See also Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 9. There was a clause in the Dutch constitution forbidding the seat of government to be located outside of the Netherlands itself. In spite of this, Queen Juliana removed the government to London to assure the continuance of the government outside of Nazi hands.

43Ibid.

44Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 89.
number of members of the old Dutch government assumed positions of responsibility under him. This, as well as the entire operation of establishing Nazi control in the Netherlands, was made relatively easy by the attitude of the Dutch people toward the Germans. Seyss-Inquart was surprised at the lack of hostility he encountered after his arrival at The Hague.\(^{45}\) The people of the Netherlands felt that the stunning victories of the German armies proved that the war was nearly over and that German dominance on the continent was assured. They quickly became rather resigned to living with their Nazi conquerors. Henry L. Mason cites another convincing reason for this attitude in his book, \textit{The Purge of the Dutch Quislings}:

Thus, the Dutch, some of whom had even killed themselves rather than face the known horrors of Nazi persecution and concentration camps, suddenly found themselves confronted with the spectacle of orderly, disciplined, and extremely well-behaved German troops who molested no one, not even Jews, burned no books, erected no concentration camps, and, in fact, avoided unnecessary interference with the ideology, the administration, and normal day-to-day life of the people. . . . Thousands of Dutchmen were forced to confess to themselves that, after all, the Nazis were not half so bad as they had been painted.\(^{46}\)


Thus it was in an atmosphere of calm and acceptance that Seyss-Inquart began to put into effect the plans that the German leaders in Berlin had developed for the Netherlands.

The reason for the takeover of the Netherlands in the first place had been a military one—a part of the campaign plan for the great spring offensive of 1940. It was widely assumed that Hitler would name a military governor over the newly acquired territory, but instead he chose a civilian government, leading to speculation that Germany had ideas of annexing the Netherlands to Germany politically. Although this may have been the case, throughout the war all public statements denied that such plans were being developed. The Netherlands were to maintain at least a semblance of autonomy. The reasons for this policy are quite apparent. First, it would greatly facilitate the initial establishment of government in Holland, with little objection from the Dutch people. Second, it would make it much easier to develop arrangements of collaboration with many of the Dutch themselves, only a fraction of whom favored outright annexation with Germany. On the other hand, Hitler and his fanatically race-

---

48 Ibid.
conscious advisors of course, admired the Nordic stock
of the Dutch people and even considered transporting
large segments of the populace to the east and using
them as a kind of breeding stock to help purify the
German race. These, then, were the plans which the
Nazi warlords had formulated for their newest acquisi-
tion, and it was up to the Reich Commissioner to im-
plement them to the best of his ability and see to it
that the wealth of the Netherlands was made as produc-
tive as possible for the German Reich.

In setting up the system of government itself,
Seyss-Inquart, at least partly for practical reasons,
decided to make extensive use of many existing Dutch
agencies and offices. Replacing the entire structure
would prove to be practically impossible. And the num-
ber of Dutch Nazis who would be qualified to fill re-
sponsible positions in the government would be far
too small. Outside of the Dutch cabinet the highest
posts were those of the four commissioners general, and
to these positions Seyss-Inquart named highly capable
and talented men. The commissioner-general for finance
and economy was Hans Fischboeck, a former bank president

49 Ibid.

50 Top secret report about the situation in the Neth-
erlands, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. III, p. 646.
from Vienna, who brilliantly managed Dutch resources for the German war effort; Dr. Friedrich Wimmer, another native of Austria, was placed in charge of the departments of internal affairs and justice; Fritz Schmidt, a slightly unbalanced, but highly intelligent man, was given the post of minister without portfolio in the new government.

In the Netherlands, too, as was the case in Austria, the Reich Commissioner was to be irritated by a division of authority, and the main reason for this division was the man who held the fourth commissioner general's post, Hans Albin Rauter. The ever-present SS leader Heinrich Himmler, without Seyss-Inquart's knowledge, had placed a higher SS and police leader in command of all German, and in effect, Dutch, police in the Netherlands, and the man he had chosen was Rauter. Seyss-Inquart was therefore, almost forced to give him a position in the Dutch government as well. Thus he appointed Rauter, also an Austrian, commissioner general of security. The Reich Commissioner took a somewhat different attitude toward the SS in the Netherlands, however. Rather than disputing its authority (although he

---

51 Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 89. See also Davidson, The Trial of the Germans, p. 460.

52 Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation, p. 30.
did do this on a number of occasions), he pretended that all of the SS orders were issued by him. If his authority was not supreme, at least this time he was going to gloss it over and make it seem as if it were. As Seyss-Inquart said over and over again in his speeches, "I will give my instructions. They must be executed by all." This was hardly true, as he knew, but, nonetheless, he kept up the pretense throughout the war.

Rauter's position (as was often the case with members of the SS) was very ill-defined. He received his orders directly from Himmler and was technically supposed to clear them with Seyss-Inquart. But he rarely did so, and when he did, it was usually a matter of little consequence.

There was one other major figure in the Netherlands over whom Seyss-Inquart had no control, the commander of the armed forces in the Netherlands, a post which Hitler had created two days after Seyss-Inquart's. The military commander was supposed to be the military equivalent of the Reich Commissioner, but in reality, was not nearly so powerful. One reason

---

54Ibid., p. 124.
55Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation, p. 33.
for this was that the man appointed to the post, Friedrich Christiansen, an air force general, was a protégé of Göring, who, after the battle of Britain, began to lose influence with the Führer.

The last important group of men included in Seyss-Inquart's new government were the secretaries general. These men were the permanent heads of the civilian agencies. The Reich Commissioner did not have to search for men to fill these posts, however, for the queen had requested each of them to stay on in his post after the Nazi takeover. All eleven of them remained in office. In fact, as late as 1943, three of them were still actively participating in Seyss-Inquart's government. The fact that these men remained in office did much to assure the smooth transition between governments and helped a great deal to assure the populace about the stability of government.

The utilization of Dutch civil servants in his own government was highly pleasing to Seyss-Inquart, and he reported favorably to Hitler on the subject. He also pointed out to the German warlord that the general method he had adopted for governing was to use Dutchmen

57 Ibid.
58 Top secret report about the situation in the Netherlands, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. III, p. 646.
to help accomplish Nazi goals. For example, the seizure of Dutch raw materials that took place directly after the beginning of the German occupation was carried out entirely through ordinances issued by the secretaries general. Soon all orders concerning the seizure of supplies and their distribution, and shipments of materials to Germany were issued over Dutch signatures. In none of these instances was it necessary for the Nazis to apply pressure to accomplish their goals, for the Dutchmen in the government acted voluntarily.

It may seem surprising to the present day observer that so many Dutch citizens were apparently so willing to collaborate with the Nazis who occupied their homeland. But at the time there were many reasons that encouraged Dutchmen to do so, and Seyss-Inquart exploited them all. First of course, was the ready-made base that Seyss-Inquart had to work with—the Dutch Nazi Party, which had been founded in 1931 by Anton Mussert. At one time the Reich Commissioner even considered making Mussert head of a Dutch government under his own supervision, but the Dutch Nazis had only a small popular following and Seyss-Inquart soon dismissed

59 Ibid., p. 647.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Mason, Purge of Dutch Quislings, p. 7.
the idea. Besides, Seyss-Inquart decided that Mussert did not have the ability to become head of state. In the summer of 1940, the Reich Commissioner gave Hitler his opinion of the Dutch politician:

Mussert: A liberal nationalist attempting to use Fascist methods, who is in the end afraid of the greater German Reich. His political qualities are not as great as those of an average Gauleiter in the Reich. In the Netherlands he plays a not inconsiderable role with them. 63

The main role that Mussert played was the building of the Dutch Nazi Party. And from its ranks Dr. Seyss-Inquart took many qualified men who were more than eager to hold government positions under the Nazis. The Reich Commissioner, of course, preferred to have men of National Socialist thinking working under him in his government, although, as we have noted, the Dutch Nazi Party’s membership was so small that this was not always possible.

The second reason why collaboration with the Germans

62 In 1935, the first election in which the Dutch Nazis participated, they received 7.91% of the vote. In 1937 their share dropped to 4.2%. By 1939 the portion received by the Dutch National Socialists had dropped to a low of 3.7%. Although these figures are in a way misleading because strong gains were actually registered in several cities by 1939, the Dutch Nazis’ influence seemed definitely to be waning. Their base of strength was primarily in the lower middle classes. Mason, Purge of Dutch Quislings, p. 7.

was widespread after the invasion was the queen's request to members of the Dutch civil service to stay at their posts. Not only the eleven secretaries general, but also a host of lesser officials remained in office after the conquest of the Netherlands.

But the most important reason for the collaboration was the way in which Seyss-Inquart set up the government. He told the Dutch members of his government and administration that he expected complete loyalty from them, but if anything was ordered which they felt they could not endorse, it would be their privilege to resign without any fear of retribution.\(^6^4\) Most of Seyss-Inquart's requests of the Dutch people seemed quite reasonable, and many of them were issued over the signatures of Dutch government leaders. During the entire first year of the occupation not one Dutchman has harmed or killed in reprisal for anti-Nazi activities.\(^6^5\) Because of this seeming reasonableness on the part of the Nazi ruler, the Dutch people were lulled into going along with his decrees with a minimum of resistance, and were even willing to take an active part in the government with him.

Seyss-Inquart tried to perpetuate this attitude

\(^{6^4}\)Ibid., p. 647.

\(^{6^5}\)Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation*, p. 60.
among the Dutch, for he admired them as a people. He promised them a new golden era, such as the seventeenth century, allowed prisoners of war to return to civilian life, and promised the people that he would not force National Socialist beliefs on any of them. When he assumed office on May 29, he said in a speech at The Hague:

We neither will oppress this land and its people imperialistically nor will we impose on them our political convictions. We will bring this about in no other way—only through our deportment and our example. 67

In another speech, he explained why he felt this way:

I shall always act as a National Socialist. But that does not mean that I shall force National Socialism on one single person. National Socialism is a matter of inner conviction. 68

Seyss-Inquart's method of handling the conquered Dutchmen worked well. Throughout the war his government was the most efficient and productive of any of the subject Nazi domains. Much of this success can be attributed to the first year of the German occupation, in which Seyss-Inquart, through the use of Dutch collaborators, made the transition into his new government of occupation smoothly.

66 Mason, Purge of Dutch Quislings, p. 2.
67 Seyss-Inquart, Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden, p. 10.
68 Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XVI, p. 87.
Once the administrative branches of government had been established on a Nazi footing, Seyss-Inquart turned to modifying some of the other Dutch governmental institutions. He took away the functions of the States General, or Dutch parliament, allowing it to meet only at his request. Since, in the opening months of the occupation, he ruled primarily by decree, they would have had little to do anyway. Seyss-Inquart also established a German judiciary system independent of existing Dutch courts. The German courts were set up for the purposes of trying German nationals living in the Netherlands, as well as non-Germans who were accused of committing crimes against the Reich. The German judiciary created by the Reich Commissioner operated on two levels: a district court, presided over by one judge, called Landesgericht; and a supreme court (Obergericht), made up of a three-judge panel. These courts were usually under the control of judges who were German civilians, but a military jurisdiction was established as well. The civilian courts were generally fair in their judgments and less politically motivated than the military counterparts to them.  

---


70 Ibid., p. 649. See also Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation, pp. 38-39.
After the judicial set-up had been completed, Seyss-Inquart began to reorder the Dutch economy. All supplies of Dutch raw materials were seized and redistributed. The Dutch were allowed to retain enough to maintain the economy for six months and the rest was sent to Germany. Through this plan, the Reich received enormous quantities of materials which were in short supply. The same program was put into effect regarding the supply of food.

During the summer months of 1940 the first property seizures took place. Belongings of persons who acted in ways hostile to the Reich were confiscated. In accordance with this order, the property belonging to the Dutch royal family was taken over by the government.

Seyss-Inquart also acted to change the monetary structure. The moratorium that had been placed on banking directly after the invasion was cancelled, and the stock exchange was reopened on a limited basis. Government funds were used for the transportation of raw materials into the Reich, and the official exchange rate of Dutch guilders and German marks was lowered.

---

71 Ibid., p. 648.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.
Instead of the old rate of one guilder to one and a half Reichsmarks, the new rate was set at one guilder to one and a third Reichsmarks.\(^75\)

The most far reaching of Seyss-Inquart's proposals, however, was put into operation with the consent of the president of the bank of the Netherlands. This plan made both Germany and the Netherlands mutually obligated for each other's currency. In other words, the bank of the Netherlands was required to exchange Dutch guilders for Reichsmarks whenever the demand should be made upon it. The agreement went on to state that the bank of the Netherlands would have no voice in these transactions, it would only be informed of them by officials of the Reich bank.\(^76\) This turned out to be a shrewd plan, indeed, for the Germans could inflate the value of their own currency, and still have unlimited access to the valuable Dutch guilders. Seyss-Inquart succeeded quite rapidly in making the entire Netherlands economy merely a tool of the German government.

In the first year of German occupation, as he restructured the Dutch economy and politics, Seyss-Inquart also began an intense effort to imbue the citizens of the Netherlands with feelings of warmth and loyalty to

\(^{75}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 649.} \quad ^{76}\text{Ibid.}\)
the German Reich. The Reich Commissioner wrote to Berlin that one third of the Dutch people were willing to collaborate with him in his government. His percentage was probably quite accurate, but when it came to actually transferring their loyalty from their native land to Germany, a completely different situation developed which doomed Seyss-Inquart's plans to almost total failure. Initially, the Reich Commissioner organized a group of associations, largely aimed at the professions, whose purpose it was to help members learn to believe in a political and cultural union of the German peoples. Among these associations were a cultural association (Kulturkammer), a medical association (Arztekammer), a chemists' association (Apothekerammer), and a board of agriculture (Landstand). Seyss-Inquart continually emphasized that the organizations were strictly voluntary and that members could quit the associations at any time without fear of political or social consequences. In spite of his efforts, however, none of his associations had any notable success. In order to spread the gospel of National Socialism, Seyss-Inquart

---


78Ibid.

decided to increase the number of Nazis in lesser governmental positions, including even mayors of small towns. In this respect, he was somewhat successful. By July, 1944, fifty-two percent of the Dutch population lived in municipalities governed by a Nazi mayor.\textsuperscript{80} His efforts to subjugate the labor movement to state control, however, met with little success. He was not able to organize the workers under government leadership until April, 1942, and even then the membership of the organization was less than one-fourth the number of organized workers in the Netherlands before the occupation.\textsuperscript{81}

One of the major stumbling blocks in the nazification of public life in the Netherlands proved to be the loyalty of the people to the House of Orange. At first, the Germans thought that this loyalty would be abandoned, but on June 29, 1940, Prince Bernhard's birthday, great demonstrations took place that proved otherwise to Seyss-Inquart. Following this event, he decreed that thenceforth demonstrations for the royal family would be considered acts against Germany and be dealt with accordingly.\textsuperscript{82} But this did not dampen the

\textsuperscript{80}Warmbrunn, \textit{The Dutch under German Occupation}, pp. 37-38.

\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., p. 45.

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., pp. 43-44.
feelings of the Dutch, which only intensified throughout the war.

In accordance with his plans for nazification, Seyss-Inquart gave considerable freedom of action to the Dutch Nazi Party. They had permission to conduct demonstrations in favor of the German Reich and a great deal of freedom in political activity. But the Dutch National Socialists went too far. They began openly to criticize the Jewish community in the Netherlands, and the population strongly resented it. Seyss-Inquart himself began to take actions against the Jewish populace, and this did considerable damage to his image. In 1941 a general strike broke out in Amsterdam, which was largely a show of sympathy against action taken against Jews. The Reich Commissioner was forced to suppress it brutally, and heavy fines were levied on the population. With Seyss-Inquart's authorization, the German Wehrmacht issued a decree requiring all Dutch male citizens between the ages of seventeen and forty to register for forced work programs, and Jews were required to have themselves specially marked to signify their race.\(^83\)

With these decisions and actions, Seyss-Inquart's honeymoon with the Dutch people was over. They had not

been hostile to his government initially, but now re-
sentment was beginning to spread across the country.
No longer would the Reich Commissioner be able to count
on a lack of resistance to his plans in the Netherlands.
And as the situation changed, so did Seyss-Inquart's
response. He alone was really responsible now for what
took place in the Netherlands, and he was determined
that the country would operate smoothly for the Nazi
warlords. For the first time in his career he began to
authorize ruthlessly oppressive measures to keep the
Dutch population in line. His personality had indeed
changed from that of the quiet Viennese lawyer. He was
now the master of a state subjugated by a foreign power
and was concerned with little else save loyally doing
his masters' bidding.
CHAPTER III:
THE FINE LINE COLLAPSES

The first decrees signed by Seyss-Inquart that openly engendered the hostility of the Dutch people towards his regime were those that signalled the beginning of German persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands. The first orders were issued quietly and seemed relatively innocuous. But by the end of his first year as Reich Commissioner a full scale pogrom was actually underway.

On October 22, 1940, Seyss-Inquart signed into law the first of his orders concerning the Jewish community in the Netherlands. ¹ Four days later it was published, as were all his decrees, in the Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Niederländischen Gebiete (Official Gazette for the Occupied Dutch Territories). ² This first order decreed that all businesses and joint stock corporations belonging to or controlled by Jews must be registered with the government of occupation. A business was defined as Jewish-owned or controlled if it had one Jewish partner or one Jewish member on the board of directors. Also included were corporations that had one-fourth of their stock or one-half of their votes under Jewish

² Ibid.
control. The order also contained the catch-all phrase "if it actually is under the controlling influence of Jews," thus allowing the regime to label many businesses as Jewish-controlled whether or not they were. The decree went on to define a Jew as any person descended from two "racially pure" Jewish grandparents; who belonged to the Jewish religious community on or after May 9, 1940; or who married a Jew, or was married to a Jew on or after May 9, 1940. ³

In spite of the ominous warning notes sounded by the new law, the Jewish community was not overly disturbed. After all, Jews had in no way been restricted, rather merely asked to register their business holdings. But only two months later, on December 27, 1940, the first of the restrictive decrees went into effect. Seyss-Inquart ordered the prohibition of German citizens or persons of cognate blood to work in Jewish households. ⁴ Failure to comply with the new law brought stiff fines and possible prison sentences, not for the Germans, of course, but for the Jews.

At first it seems difficult for us to understand why Seyss-Inquart, who had been so lenient to the Jews

³Ibid.

while occupying his previous posts, should now wish to
begin a program of systematic destruction of their role
in Dutch life. At Nuremberg, Seyss-Inquart explained
how he felt at the time:

When I took over the functions of the Reich
Commissar, I of course realized that I had to
take some position and would have to take some
steps in regard to the Jews in the Netherlands.
I will say quite openly that ever since the
First World War and the post-war period, I was
an anti-Semite and went to Holland as such.
I had the impression, which will be confirmed
everywhere, that the Jews, of course, were defi¬
nitely against National Socialist Germany. There
was no discussion of the question of guilt as
far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied
territory, I had only to deal with the facts.
I had to realize that particularly from the
Jewish circles I had to reckon with resistance,
defeatism, and so on.
I told Col. General von Brauchitsch, Commander¬
in-Chief of the Army, that in the Netherlands,
I would remove Jews from leading posts in the
economy, the Press, and the administration. The
measures taken from May, 1940 to May 1941 were
limited to this. The Jewish officials were dis¬
missed, but were given pensions. The Jewish
firms were registered and the heads of the firms
were dismissed.5

Seyss-Inquart was honest in his testimony, and perhaps
he had not until then developed further and more serious
measures to be used against the Jews. Until the spring
of 1941 the new laws seem more intended to put the
Dutch Jews in their place in regard to National Socialism
rather than to start a full scale program of persecution.

5Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, Trial of the German
But in February, 1941, after the first general strike, Seyss-Inquart decided that more needed to be done than just regulate the economic life of the Jews, and sterner measures began flowing from his pen. Again, the Reich Commissioner explains his reasoning:

In the spring of 1941, Heydrich came to me in the Netherlands. He told me that we would have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish circles. He told me that the Jews would at least have to be treated like other enemy aliens. The English for instance, in the Netherlands, were interned and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of Jews—about 140,000—this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did not object to this argument of Heydrich. I also felt that this was necessary in a war which I absolutely considered a life and death struggle for the German people. For that reason, in March, 1941, I ordered that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. And now things went step by step.6

The registration proceeded quickly, and the definition of a Jew was now broadened to be more all-inclusive. A Jew was now defined as a person of full or part Jewish blood, and a person descended from only one grandparent of full Jewish blood or a member of the Jewish religious community was considered as such.7 By forcing them to register, the government could keep track of all Jews in the Netherlands with a minimum of effort. The registration thus established the groundwork for all the programs that would later be undertaken by the German conquerors.

6Ibid.

The first of these proclamations struck deep into the fabric of Jewish life. In February, 1941, Seyss-Inquart decreed that no longer would Jewish youths be allowed to matriculate freely at Netherlands universities. Instead, each applicant would have to be cleared by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Education-Science-and Cultural administration. In effect, this placed a severe limitation on the number of Jews allowed to enroll in the universities. But this was only the beginning and the Reich Commissioner had far greater plans. The decree limiting Jewish students in Dutch universities did not affect the real source of Jewish power—money. Seyss-Inquart quickly set out to destroy this power base.

Six months later, in August, the most far-reaching order yet was published. All real property belonging to Jews, including real estate and mortgages, that had not been previously registered, had to be listed and registered with the occupation government. Power was granted to the Dutch authorities in charge of this law's enforcement to alienate, in whole or in part, any of the property they wished. This was a power Seyss-Inquart would increasingly make use of as Jewish citizens in great numbers were shipped off to the east for liquidation.

---

8 Decree referring to Jewish students, February 11, 1941, The Hague (Doc. No. 3325-PS), Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. VI, pp. 43-44.

But the worst was yet to come. In August, 1941, the government of Seyss-Inquart ruled that no Jew could practice any profession in the Netherlands without the express consent of the occupying power, which also had the right to impose conditions of any sort on such practice. By this decree, any employer was also empowered to break any contract that had been made with a Jew, or to terminate a Jew's employment, merely by notifying him at the beginning of any given month. 10

In November, 1941, Jews were entirely excluded from the Dutch Chamber of Arts, 11 membership in which was essential to anyone active in sculpture, architecture, artisan arts, music, literature, theater, film industry, or the press. Thus, by the beginning of 1942 the Reich Commissioner had not only limited the aspirations of the Jewish people but had ordered the role that they would be allowed to play in Netherlands' economy and society.

Seyss-Inquart had now come almost full circle in his attitudes toward the Jewish community. Initially, he had tolerated them, but now he was bitterly lashing out against them in both word and act. He even began to berate them publicly in his speeches:


11 Decree concerning the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, November 22, 1941, The Hague (Doc. No. 3329-PS), ibid., pp. 48-58.
The Jews are the enemy of national socialism and the national socialist Reich. . . . They are those enemies, with whom we can neither come to an armistice nor to peace. . . . We will beat the Jews wherever we meet them and those who join them must bear the consequences. The Fuehrer declared that the Jews have played their final act in Europe, and therefore they played their final act.\textsuperscript{12}

Seyss-Inquart had worked carefully indeed. He had meticulously cut off every avenue of escape that was open to the Dutch Jews, and now he was ready to annihilate them while they could not resist. To this end, in late 1942 he began deportations to the east on a massive scale.\textsuperscript{13} Seyss-Inquart was later to protest at the war trials that he really had no idea of the fate that was in store for the Jews who left the Netherlands for the concentration camps. But this is one case in which the Reich Commissioner was telling less than the truth in his testimony. He had visited at least one of the concentration camps himself, and it is impossible to believe that a person with Seyss-Inquart's authority and position could fail to know the end result of the work he was carrying out for his masters in Berlin.

In 1940 approximately one hundred and forty thousand Jews were registered under the decrees of

\textsuperscript{12}Seyss-Inquart, \textit{Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{13}Davidson, \textit{The Trial of the Germans}, p. 465.
Seyss-Inquart in the Netherlands. After the war no more than fifteen thousand of them remained alive. One hundred and twenty-five thousand Dutch citizens of the Jewish race had "played their final act."\(^{15}\)

We must remember that in all of the plans and programs for persecution of Jews in the Netherlands Seyss-Inquart played only a secondary role. All of the actions of the Reich Commissioner were but a small part of Hitler's vision of a new order in Europe. The ideas and the directives for the most part came directly from Berlin. But Seyss-Inquart's role was not a passive one. He willingly acquiesced in all of Hitler's mad ideas, and in applying them to the Netherlands, he did so with a vengeance.

Although, the Jews, of course, suffered more than any other segment of the Dutch population, they certainly were not the only ones. The plans that Seyss-Inquart implemented affected nearly every citizen in the Netherlands. After the general strike in Amsterdam was put down in February of 1941 by the use of brute force, heavy fines were levied on the population, and Seyss-Inquart

\(^{15}\)Ibid.
began to increase the use of forced labor. With his authorization, the German *Wehrmacht* issued a decree requiring all Dutch male citizens between the ages of 17 and 40 to register for such forced work programs.\(^\text{16}\) Those who attempted to resist or escape were to be shot.\(^\text{17}\)

By October, 1944, the decree was greatly broadened to include all males through the age of 50,\(^\text{18}\) and in December of that year all those who were registered were placed under labor obligation to the government.\(^\text{19}\)

The general strike was, of course, only a minor reason for this change in economic policy by Seyss-Inquart's government. In 1940, when he set up the government in the Netherlands and planned the general pattern of the Dutch economy, Seyss-Inquart, as well as most observers in Europe, thought that the war was nearly over. As a result, the Reich Commissioner's plans were developed to integrate fully the Dutch economy into "Greater Germany." By 1942, however, it was rapidly becoming apparent that the war was going to last several years. Because of this, all of Seyss-Inquart's carefully formulated plans had to be restructured. It now

\(^{17}\) *Ibid.*.  
\(^{19}\) *Ibid.*
became his primary aim fully to develop the Netherlands economy as the most useful tool possible in Germany's full wartime economy. Little thought was given to the future. Only the present seemed important—how to get as much possible manpower and production out of the Netherlands to be put to use in Germany's war machine. The forced labor decrees followed as a natural extension of this policy.

Just as the decrees concerning forced labor became increasingly comprehensive, so also did the penalties for shirking one's duties to the Reich become more severe. Now it was not merely a matter of being arrested or shot but of having one's home destroyed and his family deprived of ration cards.\(^{20}\) Also, since workers were being rounded up in great haste, there was no time to catalog their skills, and the result was horrible waste of manpower and technical ability. The Wehrmacht soon issued a complaint concerning the horrible disorganization that was rampant in these recruiting procedures.\(^{21}\)

As early as 1942 the Netherlands began forcibly shipping "volunteer" laborers into the Reich to work in factories.\(^{22}\) By May and June the number of workers

\(^{20}\)Ibid., pp. 818-819.


\(^{22}\)The deportation of Netherlands workmen to Germany, n. p., n. d. (Doc. No. 1726-PS), ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 227-228.
shipped monthly amounted to around twenty-three thousand, and by 1944 the Reich had become so desperately short of manpower that it was recruiting on a massive scale. On November 11 and 12, in Rotterdam, fifty thousand men were taken in a single operation.\(^{23}\) By the end of the war, between three hundred thousand and four hundred thousand citizens of the Netherlands had been deported for forced labor in Germany, not including prisoners of war, and of course, the Jews.\(^{24}\) This represented the largest number of deported workers of any of the Nazi-occupied countries during World War II, outside of Belgium, and naturally put severe strains on the Dutch economy.

After 1942 and the disasters at Stalingrad and El Alamein, the German economy was in more serious straits than ever, and, as a result, even more demands were made on the already sick economy of the Netherlands. More than manpower was now needed, and Seyss-Inquart loyally undertook a new policy of uprooting and shipping nearly everything of value from Holland to Germany. By 1944 he was completely stripping Dutch factories and sending machines and tools to Germany. More than

\(^{23}\)Ibid., See also Davidson, *The Trial of the Germans*, p. 473. In 1940 over 92,000 Dutch workers were shipped to Germany; in 1941, over 150,000; in 1942, 260,000; and by 1945, well over 500,000, according to Davidson.

\(^{24}\)Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation*, p. 72. Warmbrunn's figure is slightly lower than Davidson's. I have used it in the text because it approximates the figures used by most secondary sources.
half of the locomotives on the Dutch railroads were also confiscated, not to mention nearly all of the freight and passenger cars.\textsuperscript{25} Besides goods which would be of practical use to the war effort, the Nazis also seized huge amounts of private property, especially that of Jews, and sold it to raise money for the German government.\textsuperscript{26}

A large segment of the economy of the Netherlands was based on agriculture at the outset of the war, but the emergency status of the German economy caused Seyss-Inquart to make drastic changes in farming as well as industry. Before the war the farmers of the Netherlands had concentrated production on high quality dairy products and poultry. But both of these required the importation of large amounts of grain; so the Reich Commissioner effectively transferred Dutch agricultural emphasis to crop production—potatoes, grains, and plant proteins.\textsuperscript{27} One of the results of this policy was a drastic reduction in the number of farm animals in the Netherlands. In 1945 only one-tenth of the poultry and one-third of the hogs that had existed in 1938 remained.\textsuperscript{28} The reduction in livestock, however, was not as serious. But all in all, by 1945 agricultural

\textsuperscript{25}Davidson, \textit{The Trial of the Germans}, p. 476.

\textsuperscript{26}The \textit{Trial of German Major War Criminals}, Vol. VI, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{27}Warmbrunn, \textit{The Dutch under German Occupation}, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid.
production in the Netherlands had dropped to half of what it had been in 1938.\textsuperscript{29}

In spite of all the demands made upon it, however, the Dutch economy performed remarkably well throughout the war. Even after the new policy of stripping the factories was implemented, Seyss-Inquart kept his small country running at the highest possible efficiency. Though there were huge drains made on the Dutch economy, the Netherlands' exports to the Reich doubled between 1938 and 1940, and their value in the four succeeding war years was triple that of the 1938 level.\textsuperscript{30} The Dutch economy itself may not have prospered, but it served its Nazi conquerors admirably.

Throughout the violent social and economic dislocations that accompanied Nazi rule in the Netherlands, the Dutch people reacted differently to their foreign oppressors. During the entire war there existed a substantial number of Dutch citizens who were willing to collaborate openly with the Nazis. On the other hand, an even larger number defiantly resisted the Nazi warlords. The Dutch resistance movement stemmed largely

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 70-72.
from the attitude of Seyss-Inquart toward the Dutch people and his treatment of the Jews in particular. As the Reich Commissioner's tactics became more and more ruthless, the resistance grew in strength and daring. Initially the resistance movement had been small because of the "wait and see" attitude the Dutch people adopted toward the new Nazi regime in the opening months of the occupation. But as the strictures Seyss-Inquart placed on the Dutch people became more stringent, the resistance developed rapidly.

At the outset of Dr. Seyss-Inquart's rule, the resistance consisted largely of small strikes and production delays which did not have much effect on the Dutch economy. But by 1944 the extent of sabotage had grown serious enough that the Reich Commissioner was forced to issue warnings and take reprisals against the saboteurs. Seyss-Inquart, however, with his calculating and efficient bureaucratic mind, always remained in control of the situation, and until the last weeks of the war his government was not seriously handicapped by the work of the resistance. After the strike of February, 1941, only one more general strike occurred in the Netherlands—in the spring of 1943. It, too, was quickly put down by Seyss-Inquart's troops.

---

As the war began to draw to a close and the demands placed on the German economy, as well as those of the nations occupied by the Nazis, grew more rigid day by day, the German government began more seriously than ever to finish a program that they had begun in the early stages of the war: the seizure and shipping of works of art and libraries from the occupied countries to points within the Reich. In this work, Seyss-Inquart gave his tacit, if not whole-hearted, approval. Naturally, all of the possessions of the Jewish families in the Netherlands were appropriated by the Germans, but so also were the collections of various religious groups and masonic lodges, libraries and museums throughout Holland. Thus, in the end, Seyss-Inquart had done much to destroy not only the social and economic fabric of Dutch life, but the cultural as well.

The Reich Commissioner, however, did not think of his work in these terms. All of his acts were motivated, not by a hatred of the peoples he governed, but rather by a deep and fanatical love of "Greater Germany." In fact, Seyss-Inquart felt a great deal of sympathy for and with the Dutch nation. To him, the Netherlands was a German nation, and the Dutch were a German

---

people. Frequently, he tried to make life as easy as possible for them. Of the millions of bicycles in Holland, Seyss-Inquart appropriated but a fraction because he knew the Dutch relied on them as almost their only means of transportation. He tried to increase the food rations the people received from the government, and at the end of the war the population had actually increased nearly half a million. In many instances he reduced the number of citizens killed in reprisal slayings to one-fifth of what he had been ordered to kill, although it is true that this was perhaps just as much an act of political expediency as of humanitarian sympathy. Not during the entire occupation was there a repressive censorship of the Dutch press. In many instances Seyss-Inquart attempted to prevent German forces from pillaging Dutch private property. And after the invasion he expended great efforts in the rebuilding of the bombed out city of Rotterdam. He even allowed the Dutch to pray publicly for their Queen, provided, of course, that they included a prayer for the well-being of the Reich Commissioner.

---


37 The *Trial of German Major War Criminals*, Vol. XVI, pp. 61-62.
As the war drew to a close in the spring months of 1945, Seyss-Inquart received orders from Hitler to carry out a scorched earth policy in the Netherlands, destroying almost everything of value to keep it out of Allied hands. For the first time since he had become trapped in the Nazi web in 1938, the Reich Commissioner now openly defied his superiors. He refused to carry out an insane policy which would accomplish nothing save prolong a war already lost and inflict untold suffering on the already troubled people of the Netherlands. Seyss-Inquart respected the Dutch people, and this last order he simply would not fulfill. Even the Allied prosecutors at Nuremberg admitted his role in preventing the destruction of Dutch property at the end of the war. But it was too late. No gesture in the end, no matter how magnanimous, could undo the work that Seyss-Inquart had so carefully accomplished while working for the Nazi tyrants.

After Allied troops crossed the border and liberated the Netherlands in the spring of 1945, Dr. Artur von Seyss-Inquart was arrested on May 8 and placed in custody to await trial for the crimes he had committed in the name of National Socialism and Germany.

---

38 The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Vol. XXII, pp. 520-521.
After the war was over, the Allies decided to take a step unprecedented in all history—the trial of the "war criminals" in the Nazi hierarchy. It was the idea of the Americans, British, French and Russians that by punishing the wagers of aggressive warfare, such action would be discouraged in the future. Among the twenty-four men indicted by the newly formed court was Artur Seyss-Inquart. 39

The indictment against Seyss-Inquart was the same as that against all of the defendants. It contained four parts: partaking in the common plan or conspiracy; crimes against peace; war crimes; and crimes against humanity. 40 Although by definition of the charges, almost every one of the defendants was guilty, they were, nonetheless, asked to plead guilty or not guilty and prepare a defense against the prosecution, made up of members of the four Allied countries.

Before stating their pleas individually before the court, it was explained to the defendants that they would be given no immediate opportunity to explain their pleas, or to plead differently to different sections of the indictment. Thus forced by the court to plead one way or the other concerning the blanket indictment, Seyss-Inquart and the other defendants one by one professed

40Ibid.
their innocence regarding the charges.\textsuperscript{41}

As the trial got underway, it quickly assumed more the atmosphere of a carnival than a serious court of law. It was obvious before the opening of the first session what the verdict would be, and the court degenerated into a spectacle around the dethroned German tyrants. Because of the mass of evidence collected by the Allies through the captured German documents, the prosecution presented an elaborate, and for the most part well-documented, case against the Germans. In spite of this, the prosecution spent a great deal of time on relatively trivial matters and was frequently caught unprepared for the often brilliant German defense. Many times during the trial Seyss-Inquart embarrassed American prosecutor Thomas Dodd by referring to documents Dodd should have been familiar with, but was not, or by catching him up in his own rhetoric.\textsuperscript{42} Because Seyss-Inquart did not need a translator himself during the trial, he was often ahead of the court dialogue and had to be reproached by the bench.\textsuperscript{43}

In many ways the defense that Seyss-Inquart offered was signally different from that of most of the

\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{42}\textit{Ibid.}, Vol. XVI, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 69.
other defendants. With a few exceptions, Seyss-Inquart's testimony was extremely honest. There was very little that he attempted to hide. Often during the trial he spoke not from memory but from notes he had made at the time and which he had kept throughout the war.\footnote{Ibid., p. 73.} He alone among the defendants accepted full responsibility for policy as a member of the Reich cabinet, even though he had little voice in policy and the cabinet never met after he was appointed.

As was the case with many of the other Nazis on trial at Nuremberg, Seyss-Inquart explained that many times throughout the war he did not initiate policy but merely followed orders given him by Berlin. But he never apologized for the part he played or denied responsibility for actions taken over his name, whether or not he was the instigator of such policy.

He remained loyal to Hitler and to his idea of "Greater Germany" to the end. In his last statement at Nuremberg, Seyss-Inquart proclaimed: "My last words express the principle by which I have always acted and to which I will hold to my last breath—I believe in Germany!"\footnote{Ibid., Vol. XXII, p. 406.} In refusing to deny responsibility for his
collaboration with Hitler and his work in the countries he governed for the Nazis, he courageously explained: "To me he remains the man who made Greater Germany a fact in German history. I served him and remained loyal to him. I cannot today cry 'Crucify him,' when yes¬
terday I cried 'Hosanna.'" Even at the end of his life the former Viennese lawyer clung to his mystic dream of a united German people and a glorious German Reich.

During the trial Seyss-Inquart exhibited the qualities for which he had always been known. He remained calm and quiet throughout and never became upset or shaken. He presented his defense with a quiet efficiency, covering every point, and paying meticulous attention to the smallest of details. Even when the atrocity films from the concentration camps were shown during the trial, which caused many of the defendants to break down, Seyss-Inquart remained passive throughout. The Reich Commissioner's life had been relatively simple, and on the surface at least, unemotional. All of this was reflected in his composure before the court. Even when the verdict was read aloud at the conclusion of the trial, Seyss-Inquart sat quietly, staring straight ahead through his thick glasses.  

46 Ibid.

47 Seyss-Inquart's composure is apparent to anyone who has seen a portion of the Nuremberg trials on film.
In the final statement by the prosecution, the humane and sometimes compassionate treatment that Seyss-Inquart had shown the people he governed was freely admitted. But in the end, no amount of good works could have erased the horrible record that Seyss-Inquart had written. The memory of the concentration camps and deportation of the Jews, the forced labor decrees, and the destruction of the Dutch economy would not soon be forgotten; and his own words, "Annihilate the Jews," could not be changed.

The court found Seyss-Inquart guilty on three of the four counts in the indictment: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. He was found not guilty under the first count: the common plan or conspiracy.\(^4^8\) Seyss-Inquart was sentenced to death by hanging,\(^4^9\) and in the spring of 1946 life ended for the former Viennese lawyer who had become entangled in the Nazi web.

At first it is difficult for us to make a judgment on the life of Seyss-Inquart. So many conflicting pictures of him are offered to us from all sides. On the one hand, the prosecution at Nuremberg portrayed him as little more than a ruthless butcher, sending off

\(^{48}\)Ibid., p. 521.

\(^{49}\)Ibid.
thousands of Jews to be slaughtered in the concentra-
tion camps of the east. They show us a man who heart-
lessly destroyed lives and property as if they were
toys, and who secretly plotted to enslave all the
peoples of Europe and make them vassals of the Nazi
regime.

On the other hand, Seyss-Inquart's eloquent defense
attorney, Gustav Steinbauer, attempted to explain Seyss-
Inquart as a man who, although confused, had only good
intentions at heart; a man who, in following a dream,
became lost and had his vision of life distorted by
those who surrounded him. Steinbauer magnificently
pleaded with the court to "judge not in wrath, but
search for the Edelweiss that blooms under the thorn." 50

The truth about Seyss-Inquart lies somewhere
in between these two views, and, as is the case with
almost all men of note, he is very difficult to cate-
gorize, for his opinions and actions changed so
dramatically from one period to another.

Seyss-Inquart, the patriot, did in fact exist. He
fervently believed in the union of the German peoples
and honestly looked forward to the Anschluss as the
answer to his dreams. He courageously acquitted himself
in action during the first world war, and until the

50 Ibid., Vol. XIV, p. 156.
Anschluss became history his only hope was to see Austria united with Germany. When he asked Hitler to allow himself to retire from politics in 1938 he was sincere. The goal to which he had devoted his life had become a reality.

The figure of Seyss-Inquart, the confused bureaucracy also existed. After the Nazi takeover of his homeland, Seyss-Inquart had no idea of where he was going. In a way, he attempted to transfer his loyalty and patriotism from Austria to Germany, and, in the process, the outer shell of his personality began to disappear. Although no fanatical disciple of National Socialism, he attempted to fit into the Nazi machine, and, as he did so, much of the quiet lawyer from Vienna vanished.

The image of Seyss-Inquart as a Nazi tyrant is a real one, too. He did persecute the Jews in the Netherlands and systematically destroyed the Dutch economy. From the time he left Austria Seyss-Inquart slavishly served his masters in Berlin.

To the casual, yet open-minded, observer, the personality of Seyss-Inquart seems a paradox. It is difficult to understand the interchanging aspects of his personality. How could the same man send over one hundred thousand Jews to their deaths while at the same time
be terribly concerned about the needs of the Dutch people during the war? How can the same man claim to be devoted to his homeland yet wish to see it swallowed up by an aggressive, militaristic neighbor? The pieces to the puzzle fall into place only when we view Seyss-Inquart's entire life in perspective.

Above all, Seyss-Inquart confused the means he was using with the ends he was seeking. He somehow saw in Nazi Germany the only hope for the union of the German people that he wished to come about. After the Anschluss he became so entrapped in the Nazi machinery himself that he was unable to see where it all was headed. Like a moth, which seeking the light, flies into the flame, Seyss-Inquart could not perceive the reality about him. He had believed for so long in the idea of a "Greater Germany," that he refused to believe the events that were taking place around him. Or if he did believe it, he clung with such tenacity to his dreams that he himself became not only the victim, but also the perpetrator of some of the most vile crimes ever conceived by the mind of man.

There is a fine line that runs through history, on which many men have walked. On one side is treachery; on the other, patriotism. The listing winds of circumstance often determine on which side of that line a man
has stepped, and many times only in retrospect can we call a man patriot or traitor. For Seyss-Inquart, the fine line collapsed, and he found himself merely a cog in the evil treachery of the Nazi machine. Seyss-Inquart lost sight of, and control over, the ideas with which he worked. And in his mind, the glory that might have been Germany, and someday yet may be, was somehow forgotten.
APPENDIX

POSITIONS HELD BY SEYSS-INQUART, 1937-1945

1. Member of the NSDAP (Nazi Party) March 13, 1938-May 8, 1945.


6. Reich Governor of Austria, March 15, 1938-May 1, 1939.

7. Member of the Reichstag, April, 1938-May 8, 1945.

8. Member of the Reich Cabinet, May 1, 1939-1945.

9. Reich Minister without Portfolio, May 1, 1939-September, 1939.

10. Chief of the Civil Administration of South Poland, Early September, 1939.

11. Deputy Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territories, October 12, 1939-May 18, 1940.

12. Reich Commissioner for Occupied Netherlands, May 18, 1940-May 8, 1945. (Began May 29, 1940)
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

DOCUMENTS


Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. 15 vols., Nuremberg: Nuremberg Military Tribunals, n. d.


MEMOIRS


SECONDARY SOURCES

GENERAL


**BIOGRAPHIES**


