RICE UNIVERSITY

The United States Army General Staff Corps, 1910-1917: Its Relationship to the Field Forces

by

John A. Hixson

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

Thesis Director's Signature:

Houston, Texas

May 1971
ABSTRACT

The United States Army General Staff Corps, 1910-1917:
Its Relationship to the Field Forces

John Arthur Hixson

In the period prior to the passage of the General Staff Act in 1903, congressional debate focused primarily upon the relationship the General Staff would have to the other bureaus of the War Department. An issue of equal importance, but one which received much less attention, was the relationship the General Staff would have to field commanders in time of war. The General Staff by legislative act was to be only the planning, supervising and coordinating agency for the Army.

In 1910, after a rather aimless first seven years, General Leonard Wood became the Chief of Staff. Both visionary and reactionary, Wood launched programs for reorganizing the General Staff, the Mobile Army and for establishing the supremacy of the General Staff. The continuous turmoil in the border area between the United States and Mexico provided the opportunity for Wood to test the General Staff's war plans and a "Maneuver Division" in 1911 and a new tactical division in 1913.

The General Staff's role in the conduct of field operations began with the precedent established by the Army of Cuban Pacification in 1906. The operations at Vera Cruz in 1914
were conducted under rigid General Staff control. The control of the border operations in 1914-1917 under Chiefs of Staff Wotherspoon and Scott, was much more decentralized and allowed subordinate field commanders to exercise their own initiative.

This study, based largely on War Department publications and the records of the War Department General Staff and the Office of the Adjutant General, is essentially an examination of early attempts to determine the proper relationship between the General Staff and the field commands. Wood saw the role of the General Staff as one which required its active supervision to ensure compliance with the approved war plans. Wotherspoon and Scott visualized the role of this agency to be one of distant supervision, the provision of strategic direction to field commanders and the provision of materiel to these commanders to assist in the accomplishment of objectives outlined in the national war plans.
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 1.
CHAPTER II, THE FIGHTING ELEMENTS............................................................ 27.
CHAPTER III, PLANS AND OPERATIONS – ATTEMPTS AT LINKAGE................. 45.
CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................. 74.
APPENDICES:
   A. The War Department General Staff, 1910-1916..... 81.
   B. The War College Division................................................................. 83.
   C. The War Department General Staff, 1916-1917..... 84.
NOTES............................................................................................................ 85.
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................. 108.
INTRODUCTION

Defeat upon the field of battle has often been the reason for change, as indeed it was the Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806, which hastened the formation of the "Great General Staff." ¹ The French were quick to follow the German lead after the humiliation of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 and form their own version of the General Staff in 1874. It was, however, success in war, rather than failure, which prompted both the British and Americans to pause and consider the shortcomings of their own mechanisms for the planning and conduct of wars. The British had experienced great difficulty in subduing the loosely organized Boers of South Africa, a task which required four years to complete. The Americans, enjoying victory over the Spanish in 1898, had also labored mightily, not against the Spanish, but primarily to unsnarl the chaos created by their not having a military body responsible for planning and direction. The student of today's Army has difficulty in grasping the thought that any military organization could even have existed without an adequate staff and educational system. The United States Army, however, had developed for nearly 125 years, fought five major wars, explored, pacified and helped to settle western territories, mapped the rivers and shore lines of the nation, and withstood countless reorganizations without the benefit of a General Staff and only a rudimentary system of military education.² The phenomenal successes of the Prussian armies of 1864, 1866, and 1871 gave ample evidence that it was now possible to strike harder and faster than ever before; and that it had now become necessary for nations to give thorough attention to planning for war during time of peace. For this
purpose, a General Staff system, in one form or another, was instituted by most of the major powers following the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871.3

Americans were equally impressed by the record of Teutonic success in war. In addition, the United States had become a world power as a result of the Spanish American War; and the possibility of having to fight future wars in defense of the nation and the new possessions was very real. Therefore, the German Great General Staff was seized upon as the model to be emulated in creating our own military organ for planning and direction. However, the Germans, French, and British had long had large military formations, which required more sophisticated staff organizations than did the small American formations. While it is true that the American Armies in the Mexican and Civil War had utilized staff officers to a great extent, these officers had been concerned with the administrative and special departments and were not "General Staff" officers in the German sense of the term. The Germans had had a Truppengeneralstab (General Staff with Troops) for over fifty years before Gerhard Scharnhorst organized the Great General Staff in Berlin.4 The Americans on the other hand were to have a "Great General Staff" (War Department General Staff) before they had a General Staff Serving with Troops; because at the time the American General Staff Corps was organized the United States did not have permanently organized bodies of troops large enough to utilize them. The United States, therefore, had the somewhat dubious distinction of having built its General Staff system from the top down, rather than the other way around like everyone else. This phenomenon was to have important repercussions from 1903 up through 1917.5
In the American rush to adopt this military institution two serious misconceptions were made in the understanding of the term "general staff." The concept of this term throughout the American service was that the General Staff officer had a sort of general relationship to all military activities. Actually, in France and Germany this individual was a specialist of the most restricted type, and his duties were definitely specified rather than being general in nature. The second misconception concerned what was actually meant by the German term "Generalstab." Contrary to the English translation of "Generalstab" it translates literally into the "General's Staff" i.e., the Military Operations Staff. It is quite possible that had the United States possessed large permanently organized bodies of troops (brigades, divisions, corps, and armies) instead of, as was our custom, organizing them and their staffs ad hoc as soon as hostilities were imminent, we might have avoided these errors in understanding and the resulting confusion that was to follow.

In short, the United States was confronted with the problem of establishing a General Staff in a country with no trained General Staff officers, an unclear concept of what a General Staff was and how it operated and no mechanism for developing the required number of trained officers.

In 1903 legislative measures created in the United States Army an embryonic General Staff, a chief of staff of limited tenure to replace the old post of commanding general and established an Army War College. For the first time in its history the American Army was on an organizational level equal to the large Armies of Europe.

However, during the debate over the General Staff Bill of 1903, primary attention was focused upon what relationship the General Staff
would have to the other bureaus of the War Department. An issue of equal importance, but one much less closely investigated, was that of what relationship the General Staff would have to field commanders in time of war. The Senate Military Affairs Committee was unable to persuade the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, to compose a more succinct role beyond that it was to be the planning, supervising and coordinating agency for the Army's activities. Unwittingly or with full knowledge, Root and his Army advisors were making a radical departure from the German model they so much admired by charging the General Staff with administrative duties during peacetime and failing to define its responsibilities concerning military operations during time of war.

This study examines a period in the evolution of that relationship between the War Department General Staff and field commanders. I have elected the period, 1910-1917 for examination for several reasons: first, with the accession of General Leonard Wood to the position of Chief of Staff of the Army on April 22, 1910, the emphasis on the General Staff began to shift from attention to matters primarily of administration toward those of national military policy. The "in house" quarrels of the General Staff were by no means over, but it is not my intent to deal with them here. My second reason is that during this period the Army began reorganizing along more permanent and specified lines of tactical, command and staff organization. The permanent combined arms division makes its first peacetime appearance during this period, thus permitting the training of officers for General Staff duty with troops, a capability not available prior to this time, when the regiment was the largest permanently organized unit. This period spanning a time of intense concern and
involvement with Mexico and our overseas possessions, allows opportunity
to investigate the relationships between the War Department General Staff
and field and territorial commanders as to planning and the conduct of
operations. Finally, by having delayed the beginning of our examination
until 1910, time has been allowed for some development at the Army War
College and the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. In short, we now have
an embryonic General Staff Corps, serving both the War Department General
Staff and with field commands.

There are several difficulties involved in attempting to examine
General Staff and field command relationships during this period. The
operations which will be examined here, both planned and actually con¬
ducted, are concerned with the armed intervention of the United States in
Mexico, and therefore, are of a highly political nature. Because of this,
there is naturally a very large degree of presidential and cabinet officer
involvement in the decision making process. This involvement naturally
influences the actions of all echelons of military command. This study,
however, will concentrate on the military aspects of command and opera¬
tional planning and touch only upon political decisions when they
significantly affect the chain of command or the planning/operations
process. Actual field operations, with the exception of the border con¬
centration in 1916, are of a very small nature, short in duration and
provide little opportunity for changes in initial plans and command
relationships to develop. War, which would allow for a full display and
test of the forces and organization, does not occur. Finally, we have
what all historians must face from time to time, a gap in the sources of
information. The files of the War College Division, which served as the
planning element of the War Department General Staff until 1920, were screened and partially destroyed in the late 1920's. These files, of course, contained a great deal of information concerning the nation's war plans and the organization of the command and staff structure for the implementation of those plans. Fortunately the file of index cards for many of these destroyed documents still exists at the National Archives, and much of the information contained in this study was taken from the many fine abstracts on these cards.

All in all, this six year period, just prior to the entry of the United States in the First World War, provides an adequate arena in which to view the organizational and functional progress of the neophyte American General Staff Corps, and the attempt to define more clearly its role in peace and war.
In 1932 General Douglas Macarthur, then Chief of Staff of the Army, pointed out the fact that, "the War Department had never been linked to the fighting elements by that network of command and staff necessary to permit the unified tactical functioning of the American Army...." He felt that a system should be developed and adopted which would allow the "Chief of Staff, in war, to center his attention upon the vital functions of operating and commanding field forces and which would serve to link the military activities in the Zone of the Interior to the Theater of Operation." In any attempt to trace the evolution of this "missing link", it is necessary to examine first in some detail what elements are to be linked together. Therefore, this chapter will deal with highest element in the chain, the War Department General Staff.

Historically, the organizational development of the War Department is in striking contrast to the development of other senior governmental departments such as the State Department. The Congress, up through the Spanish American War, had frequently exercised its authority, often against the wishes of the President and the Secretary of War, to provide the War Department with additional staff officers in anticipation of armed conflict. Upon the passing of the crisis, however, the provisions providing for this additional group of assistants to the Secretary of War were normally superseded or repealed. Brigadier General John MacAuley Palmer stated the situation accurately in 1902, when he declared "that in all our wars, it
had been the actual military policy of the United States to extemporize its war organization after war has begun or has become imminent...."3

By means of the Congressional Act of March 3, 1813, which was an act for the better organization of the Army of the United States, the Secretary of War was provided with the assistance of a "General Staff." What Congress had established, rather than a general staff in the present sense of the word, were administrative offices that dealt with the day to day routine administrative matters of the Army. They had no planning capability and were charged under the law with no responsibility for planning.4 This organization of the War Department was to remain until the near catastrophe of the Spanish American War, when the United States government found itself incapable of putting a single army corps into the field.5 In addition to the lack of mobilization planning, there was the anarchic situation caused by the split command of the Army between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General. Furthermore, there had been demonstrated a glaring lack of ability, by officers at higher levels, to handle the manifold problems of sudden mobilization, training, and deployment of large military forces.6 The solution to these problems was, of course, to be the adoption of a General Staff system, but before discussing the particular case of the American General Staff, let us investigate briefly what a "general staff" is and what distinguishes it as a singular institution.

An Army's life naturally divides itself into two periods, peace and war, although in light of contemporary experience these periods might be better termed as times of passive and active military operations. Nonetheless, any nation must devise a system for passing from a peace standing
to a war establishment. It is necessary, therefore, in times of peace to organize and train the army, and at the same time to collect information upon which to develop plans for the use of this army in the event of war. These peacetime duties have long been recognized as the proper responsibility of a "general staff." What is not so clear is, what are the duties of the "general staff" during the period of hostilities? Bronsart von Schellendorf tells us that "in some armies all the staff belongs to the General Staff. But that the necessity has universally been felt of having a distinct portion of the staff entrusted with carrying out operations. In the German Army these duties are specially allotted to the General Staff (Generalstab)." Dallas Irvine, however, stated in his excellent article "The Origin of Capital Staffs", that the term "general staff" may describe seven different groups, all of which have been termed "general staffs." He feels that whether or not a staff is a "general staff" depends upon what its functional characteristics are. Irvine had determined these functions to be:

1. The systematic and extensive collection in time of peace of specific information which may be important to the future conduct of operations or to proper preparation for future operations.

2. Intellectual preparation for the future conduct of operations either through systemic development of skill for the handling of contingently anticipated situations or through elaboration of specific plans for war or both.

While this identification of functions at first glance would seem complete in that it covers the collection of intelligence, planning, and the intellectual preparation and training of personnel, it does not include functions to be performed after the commencement of hostilities.
The German concept of the term would seem to be the more complete in that the Great General Staff had responsibility for strategic planning, training of the Army, gathering of intelligence and the coordination and direction of combat operations. This German concept of the General Staff was a natural extension from the development of the headquarter's staff officer of large military formations. This type staff officer began to develop in the 18th century as war became more complex. It had become an act to be pursued on the map with a greater number of possibilities than the individual commander could now handle adequately alone. Intelligence collection became vital to overcome the limitations now placed on the commander's visual control of the battlefield. Written orders and directives replaced visual signals, oral commands and the personal leadership of large formations. Military commands had reached the point in size and organization where a commander needed assistants, beyond his personal staff, for the control of his forces. In other words, these assistants performed duties not previously performed by other staff agencies, but those which had been performed by the commander himself. These staff officers were intended to relieve the commander of the burdensome details connected with the coordination of the several elements of his command. This, then, was the original "Generalstab" or the General's Staff which the Prussians and Germans continued to expand and develop into a General Staff Corps extending from the highest level of government down to the combined arms division.

This General Staff Corps consisted of two parts: the Great General Staff in Berlin and the General Staff Serving with Troops, which had representatives at all levels of command down through division. 10 Most
military staff systems have adopted these two general staff groupings: the first responsible for the general direction of a nation's army, and the second for the conduct of smaller unit operations. Therefore, in the modern sense the term "general staff" had come to include those immediate advisors to the commander, at national level and below, who provided him with information, recommendations and supervisory services.

Elihu Root was named Secretary of War following the resignation of the unfortunate Russell A. Alger. He grasped early the need for radical reform of the War Department. Root and his young Army advisors concluded that this reform called for the creation of a General Staff within the War Department and the Army if possible future military disasters were to be avoided. There was great opposition, however, to this proposal primarily from the deeply entrenched and independent staff bureau chiefs and that august personage, the Commanding General of the Army, Nelson A. Miles. While continuing his campaign for a General Staff, Root proposed, in his Annual Report for 1899, that an Army War College be established, which would have General Staff powers, although its educational role was to be emphasized.11

With the approval of his War College recommendation by the President, the Secretary of War appointed on February 19, 1900, a board of officers to consider regulations for its establishment.12 The Army War College was officially established on November 27, 1901, for the announced purpose of conducting an advanced course of study for Army officers. The character of the institution was to be of an educational nature. Its role as an interim General Staff or as part of such a staff was not emphasized. The objective of the school was to train officers to command in war and,
therefore, theory was not to take precedence over practical application. In addition, the Army War College was charged with supervising the other Army service schools. The supervision of the Army War College and its attendant responsibilities were placed under a governing body designated the War College Board. The membership of this board is interesting in light of Root's future intentions concerning the establishment of a General Staff. The president, Major General Samuel B. M. Young, became the first Chief of Staff of the Army; member Brigadier General William H. Carter was one of the two first Assistant Chiefs of Staff; member Brigadier Tasker H. Bliss became President of the Army War College in 1903 and member Major William D. Beach was designated first Chief of the Second Division (Military Information) of the new General Staff. Thus, over three years prior to its formal establishment the personnel picked to organize and operate the General Staff of the War Department were already in training for their future roles.

Abolition of the position of Commanding General of the Army and the establishment of a General Staff Corps headed by the Chief of Staff of the Army was not done by caprice. On the contrary, it was the military experiences of three-quarters of a century which pointed out its necessity. There was no central authority, other than the Secretary of War, which then had the authority to coordinate and direct the manifold activities of the Army, from War Department to field unit. Past experience showed that this could not be done effectively by one man, or by a division of responsibility between the Secretary and a Commanding General. Root felt that it was impossible, particularly in time of peace, for anyone to exercise the alleged and assumed powers of the Commanding General of the
The idea of independent command would have to be abandoned, Root felt, and that the interests of the nation and the Army would be best served by "the principal and most trusted general of the Army" exercising his influence from the position of a Chief of Staff. While he felt that neither our political nor military systems made it suitable for the adoption in entirety of the German or French model General Staff, he did believe that it was necessary to have such a group of trained men assigned to perform these same staff duties. The best way to describe this group, Root stated, was to call it a General Staff, "...because its duties are staff duties and are general in their character."

In regard to these duties, Root and his Army advisors believed that there were two essential ones to be performed by the General Staff:

1. To acquire information, arrange and fit it into all possible plans of operation, so that an order can be intelligently made.

2. When the order had been made, to exercise constant supervision, that does not mean command, but to inform and advise all the different persons who must conspire to the execution of the order of how every other one is going on with his work.

By adopting a General Staff system and assigning it these duties Root hoped to accomplish the following:

1. Creation of an organization in the War Department especially charged with the preparation of plans for the national defense.

2. Provide for the coordination of the administration and supply services by making them subject to the supervision of the Chief of Staff.

3. Elimination of divided control which had previously nullified unity of action in the War Department.

4. Establishment of a system of higher education for the officer corps.
The General Staff Act of February 14, 1903 essentially accomplished these objectives. The Corps that was created was to be a select and highly trained body of experts to plan for war, rather than perform routine administrative duties, except those required in the coordination of war planning. What role this staff was to play in time of war, however, was not specified.

It was generally conceded by all military authorities that the reason for Germany's military success during the latter half of the nineteenth century was due to a corps of highly trained General Staff Officers. This success and the role of the German General Staff in it were highly praised in Emory Upton's report on the organization of the armies of Asia and Europe and also by Spencer Wilkinson in his book, The Brain of an Army. Elihu Root had selected the German system for his model primarily as a result of his study of these very pointedly German-oriented works. His study of these works and the reports of officers sent to Europe to observe the German Army system revealed that the German General Staff system in the years following the Franco-Prussian War rested on three main supports.

1. Stringent officer selection and rigorous training.
2. Training to ensure not only technical competence, but to provide for intelligent cooperation in the conduct of large scale operations.
3. Instillation of a wholly unbureaucratic spirit and procedure.

While these three areas of emphasis gave the moving impetus and operating level of excellence to the General Staff Corps itself, there were two other unique features of the German military system which allowed the
General Staff to assume its special position as regards planning and the
conduct of operations. These were:

1) Freedom of the military command from legislative
interference.

2) Separation of the General Staff from administrative
functions.

The General Staff was immediately responsible to the German Emperor and,
thus, had an independent position directly under the Commander in Chief.
The Ministry of War was responsible only for provision of material for
war and the handling of routine administrative powers. The Haupt-Etat
or main branch of the Great General Staff under the immediate direction
of the Chief of the General Staff was charged with the peacetime prepara-
tion of large military operations, study of prospective theaters of war
and the training of young officers for General Staff duties. The duties
of the Great General Staff during time of war were primarily concerned
with all matters relating to the disposition of the Army and the leading
of all large bodies of troops.

Mental training in the German General Staff was based on the works
written by Carl von Clausewitz. It was Moltke who brought Clausewitz’s
writings to full bloom and gave them their place in military history.
It is no exaggeration when these principles of Clausewitz are referred to
as the basic concepts of the General Staff. After a time, however,
these principles began to degenerate into dogma which had an adverse effect
on the General Staff Corps. There were no teachers specifically appointed
to the War Academy; therefore, officers from the Great General Staff were
given this chore in addition to their own duties. They drew primarily
upon their own daily work for inspiration with the result that in practice
the Academy training tended to focus on pure staff technique and finally on the conduct of large scale operations, oriented in whatever direction the current Chief of the General Staff directed. Thus, the special preserve of the German General Staff became the conduct of these large operations.\textsuperscript{27}

This, then, was the model for the development of the General Staff Corps of the United States Army and the organization of our General Staff system. The American General Staff Corps was given an initial strength of 45 officers; responsibility for preparing plans for the national defense, rendering professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and coordinating actions with all the other officers who were subject to the supervision of the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff under the direction of the President and/or the Secretary of War was responsible for: the supervision of all troops of the line, the War Department bureaus and any other duties not otherwise assigned which the President might assign him.\textsuperscript{28}

Like the German model, the General Staff Corps was organized into two divisions, with the senior division being designated the War Department General Staff and the other the General Staff Serving with Troops. Paragraph 10 of the General Order prescribing the duties and organization of the General Staff Corps deals with the duties and relationships concerning the position of Chief of Staff. As regards command, it states that:\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27}The President will place parts of the Army, and separate Armies whenever constituted, under commanders subordinate to his general command;...he may place the whole Army under a single commander subordinate to him....
The Chief of Staff reports to the Secretary of War, acts as his military advisor, receives from him the directions and orders given in behalf of the President, and gives effect thereto in the manner hereinafter provided.

The wartime duties, responsibilities and relationships for the General Staff with the remainder of the Army were as vague as those assigned the Chief of Staff.

Now that the General Staff was a reality, what was to be the role of that interim staff body, which Root had created, the Army War College? True to his German model, he placed it under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army. It was assigned the special duty, however, of assisting the General Staff in the preparation of plans for the national defense. Although the organization of the General Staff did relieve the War College Board of a wide range of General Staff duties which it had been originally assigned, it now became, in effect, the defense planning section of the General Staff. It also was incorporated into the First Section, of the Third Division of the War Department General Staff and charged with the preparation of studies of possible theaters of war and plans of campaign to include combined operations of Army and Navy.

Practical application, not the imparting of theory, was to be the standard practice of the War College. In other words, officers were to seek professional improvement by applying knowledge already acquired to the solution of national military problems rather than the sterile study of theory on the "art of war."

By 1910 the Army War College was playing an even more expanded role in the functioning of the War Department General Staff. General Leonard Wood, after assuming the position of Chief of Staff in April 1910, re-organized the War Department General Staff the following September. The
staff branches were no longer numbered, but given titles corresponding to their functions. The War College Division was given the responsibility for preparing plans for the national defense, running the Army War College and collecting and distributing military information.33 (See Appendix A).

Military Information or intelligence has always been a vital necessity for adequate planning. It has, however, not always received the consideration it deserves. When there has been no agency responsible for planning as in the War Department prior to 1903, the need for accurate and timely information is not so apparent. The Division of Military Information was established in 1885 as part of the Adjutant General's Office.34 It remained there until August 15, 1903, when it was transferred to the Office of the Chief of Staff and became the Second Division of the War Department General Staff.35 The Army War College and the Division and the Division of Military Information were first placed together in the same staff section in 1908. The reorganization of 1910 retained them together as the Military Information Section and the Army War College Section of the War College Division.36 (See Appendix B). The primary reason for this reorganization was to give the War College easy access to the files, maps, photographic equipment and graphic arts specialists of the old Military Information Division. In addition, the personnel of the Military Information Section could be utilized as instructors at the War College. The War College Division was now charged with: the collection of information, preparation of plans and training of selected officers. In short, those identifying functions for a general staff, as set forth by Irvine, were all contained in this one division of the staff, and from fifteen to twenty officers of the thirty assigned to the War Department General Staff
were assigned to this one division. While this was in accord proportionally with the strength of the Great General Staff in Berlin in relationship to the total strength of the General Staff Corps, it had little else to recommend it. Proportionally speaking, these thirty officers equalled 128 in Berlin who were operating a "going concern" while our new General Staff was just beginning to attempt to solve problems which had been accumulating for decades.

Viewed in this light, the use of the Army War College to assist in planning is not hard to comprehend, because there were just not enough personnel, trained or authorized. A side benefit to this system was that if an officer helped to develop the nation's war plans, he would, as a result, be quite familiar with them in the event that they had to be implemented, a concept to have interesting consequences later in the conduct of operations.

By 1910 the War College Division had become the center of General Staff activity in the War Department. The nation's war plans were developed here by an interworking of the two sections of that division. Within the Army War College itself was located the War Plans Committee. This committee was composed of the Director, Assistant Directors and the Assistant Instructors. It was responsible for collecting and discussing all data relating to the strategical, logistical and tactical facets of any future military operation. In other words, they were responsible for preparation of the complete plans for passing from peace to war at any location, where it was thought probable that the United States could be involved both in North America and elsewhere.
Student officers were assigned to committees organized within the War College. Each committee was concerned with a particular geographic area of the world or some particular military problem requiring study. The original course organized by Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss had five committees operating under the direction of a Strategy Board, which assigned problems and reviewed progress. Brigadier General William W. Worthingpoon, when President of the Army War College in 1910, added an additional three committees and redesignated the coordinating organ, the Strategy Board, as the General Board. The areas of primary concern became the western hemisphere and the island possessions of the United States in the Pacific. The students assigned to these committees were expected to work out details in general plans and thereby assist the permanent personnel in completing a working plan or the solution of some large military problem.

A War Plan as developed by a particular committee contained four parts: the military monograph, strategic study, logistical study and the tactical study. The foundation of a plan was the military monograph, which was prepared by the Military Information Section of the War College Division. This monograph consisted of two parts: the first dealing with the general military resources of the country, military geography, cities, and communications. The second part was devoted to more localized studies dealing with important cities, towns and strategic areas where military operations of importance were likely to occur. These localized studies were developed with the intention of providing them to military commanders operating in the areas considered.
The second part of the plan was the strategic study which took into consideration the intelligence provided in the monograph, enemy forces, objectives, both enemy and friendly, and the political relationships between the two countries. Finally, conclusions were stated briefly, inferences drawn as to whether our probable course of action would be defensive or offensive, and indications made as to the probable theater of war and the forces necessary for success. The strategic study was for the use of the President and Cabinet.42

This study outlined a policy, either offensive or defensive, the theater of war and the forces to be utilized. Therefore, it was now possible to develop the third portion of the plan, the logistical study, which outlined how to get the troops, equipment and supplies to the theater of war.43

The fourth and final portion, the tactical study, considered the probable locations of engagement and the objectives of each engagement. This study arose primarily from the conclusions and indications arrived at in the strategic study. The tactical studies were developed to be utilized by commanders actually conducting operations on the particular terrain to which the tactical problems pertained. The use of these tactical studies will be made clearer during the discussion of plans and operations.44

Once the plan was complete in all four parts, a study of the whole would usually reveal that several possibilities existed in certain parts of the plan, normally in the logistical and tactical portions. Once these were identified, they were studied further and the conclusions tested on a map maneuver or in a war game. It was here that General Wortherspoon's
change in location of the strategic and tactical map exercises was of
great value. By his insistence that all map maneuvers and war games
use the Western Hemisphere and the country's Pacific possessions, the
students were able to become familiar with potential combat areas and
with the nation's war plans, in addition to testing the completeness,
feasibility and effectiveness of these plans. 45

Having seen how the German General Staff system was used as the
model for the American system and how this model was modified by Elihu
Root and his advisors to provide for the collection of information and
the preparation of plans, we must now investigate how this staff was to
go about accomplishing the second great duty assigned it: that of "supervising" the execution of operational orders issued in connection with the
plans developed under its first responsibility. 46 In this area of staff
responsibilities the atmosphere becomes foggy indeed, because we now be¬
come concerned with types of operational authority. Alvin Brown in his
work Organization states that, "authority as the power of performance of
responsibility includes all means necessary and proper therefor." 47
Command and supervision are both types of authority. Neither is mutually
exclusive, but command in the military sense is considered the most direct
means of exacting performance. The General Staff, however, was not a
command agency, nor did the Chief of Staff of the Army have command authority.
Both were advisory agents only and had to act through others. The crux of
the problem then was to make clear the relationship of the War Department
General Staff to the field forces once the situation arose calling for the
implementation of the war plans. In short, how and by what means was the
General Staff to "supervise" the execution of those plans and ensure compliance by field commanders?

This situation arose because of the failure of the designers of our General Staff system to consider two great differences between the German governmental and military organization and our own. First of all, the German War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff were coordinate. They both reported to the Emperor as Commander in Chief, one for administration and the other for war plans. The second difference was in the positions occupied by the respective Chiefs of Staff. The German was designated as just the Chief of the General Staff. He was responsible to the Emperor only for war planning and the conduct of military operations, and upon the opening of hostilities became in effect, the Army Commander, directly under the Emperor. His American counterpart was designated the Chief of Staff of the Army which made him, not only Chief of the American General Staff Corps, but also Chief of the entire War Department Staff, and responsible for Army administration as well as war planning. In the advent of war, he was still just the advisor to the Secretary of War, and his office only constituted a supervisory bureau of the War Department.

In other words, the War Department was not to function as a General Headquarters of the Army like the German General Staff; it was, in fact, another civilian controlled department of the government responsible for Insular Possessions, the Panama Canal, rivers and harbors, Records and Pension Office, national cemeteries and the Old Soldier's Home, in addition to being responsible for the Army.

Who, then, was to command the Army and insure that objectives outlined in the nation's war plans were achieved? The answer at first glance
is obvious. The President, under the provision of Art. 2, Section 2, of the Constitution, is the Commander in Chief of the nation's armed forces and, as such, can place the entire Army or parts of it under a single commander or several commanders of his own choosing, subordinate to his general command. However, the General Staff was charged with supervising the accomplishment of war plan objectives, that is to say, insuring unity of effort in the chain of command.

The Germans insured this unity of effort among field forces and compliance with national war plans by establishing a General Headquarters in the theater of operations. This headquarters was a microcosm of the Great General Staff in Berlin, in fact, the chief personnel, at least down through the level of staff division chiefs, were the same as in Berlin. A reconstituted Great General Staff was built up in Berlin to handle those functions requiring attention of the General Staff, but which could not be handled by the General Headquarters controlling field combat operations. This General Headquarters under the Chief of the Great General Staff had full command and, in fact, frequently issued operational orders. It was well understood that directives from this headquarters would be general in nature and allow the subordinate commander adequate leeway to accomplish his assigned mission. It was equally understood that a subordinate commander would depart from these directives only when the situation was totally different than anticipated, but even then his efforts must preserve the unity of action specified by the higher headquarters.

American Army regulations stated that, "the supervising power vested in the Chief of Staff of the Army covered primarily duties pertaining to
the Command, discipline, training, and recruitment of the Army, military operations and distribution of troops..." 55 The reference to supervision of command and military operations in these regulations raises an interesting question. What is it supposed to mean? The administrative organization of the United States Army, following the creation of the General Staff, consisted of five geographical commands called Divisions, which were created to serve as the intermediate link between the War Department and the twelve smaller geographical subdivisions called military departments. The term division is misleading, as it refers to a territorial and not a tactical organization. Tactically speaking, the military department of the period corresponded roughly to a tactical division and the territorial division to an army corps. 56 The commander of a territorial division or department had command of all military forces within its geographical limits, which were not exempted from his control by the War Department. In reality, these division/departmental commanders, with the exception of the commander of the Philippine Division, were merely administrative supervisors. 57 Their commands were not tactical in organization nor composition, and all their troops were incorporated into the national war plans, which would be implemented by a commander to be designated at the appropriate time.

The ultimate question remains. How is the command of forces in the field to be organized? The General Staff has the responsibility for the supervision of the implementation of the war plans and the President, as Commander in Chief, could appoint commanders subordinate to his overall command. Therefore, why not emulate completely the pattern of the German
model, and place the Chief of Staff of the Army in command? Would it be better to utilize those who had made the plans and been uniformly trained in the Staff College and the Army War College in the positions of command and staff of the field forces, than those who were untrained and had no knowledge of these plans? It is possible that Elihu Root had this very idea in mind when stated that:

The officer who accepts the position (Chief of Staff) assumes the highest obligation to be perfectly loyal to his commander... In proportion as he merits confidence, the Chief of Staff gradually comes to find his advice usually accepted, and to really exercise the authority of his command... just as Von Moltke exercised the authority of King William of Prussia as his Chief of Staff.

Viewed in this light, the American General Staff Corps and its Chief assume a position much more powerful than that of their German model. From 1910 begins a trend toward a very highly centralized control of field operations. After all, there was nothing to prevent the President from naming his "first soldier" the Chief of Staff, to a field command position. The Commanding General of the Army might be dead, but he certainly had not been buried.
The Spring of 1910 found the line of the Army in wild disarray and scattered broadcast over the landscape of the Continental United States in 49 separate garrisons. The average size of one of these garrisons was smaller than a battalion; i.e., less than 700 men. Regimental commanders were responsible for the training and discipline of their commands but had no way to meet effectively these responsibilities because of the fragmentation of their regiments into widely separated posts. The country had been divided, as previously mentioned, into territorial commands following the Spanish American War in an attempt to delegate some authority from the War Department to lower command levels. While the territory of the United States was more or less evenly divided among these territorial commands, the strength of the Army was by no means as evenly distributed. The majority of the troops were located in the western and southwestern parts of the nation in "hitching post" forts which were relics of the Indian Wars. In short, the nation's Army was not organized or concentrated so that it could be properly commanded, staffed, trained or utilized. This then, was the second great problem facing the new Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood. He had to create a mobile army that was properly organized tactically and concentrated geographically, so that it could be utilized with a minimum of confusion and loss of time in the plans being prepared by the War College Division of the War Department General Staff.

European Armies had long utilized the combined arms division as the
basic tactical unit for their armies. The United States, on the other hand, had chosen to remain with the regiment as the largest permanent unit and to improvise the necessary divisions, corps, and armies out of these regiments when needed. By 1910, however, a more progressive attitude toward our national military policy was developing. The division, not the regiment, for the first time was recognized as the basic building block for large tactical formations. While the Army's Field Service Regulations might prescribe the tactical division as the Army's basic tactical organization, the regiment, in fact, had continued as the basic unit. The territorial divisions, which performed purely administrative functions remained the only "division" in sight. In February of 1910 an attempt was made by the War Department General Staff to give the Mobile Army, or at least a part of it, some tactical organization. A plan was devised for combining the Regular Army and Militia troops in the northeastern United States into a Field Army of three divisions. This was, however, little more than a paper exercise, primarily because there were no funds for implementation of a test of the organization. Furthermore, the organization formed did not fit any of the nation's defense plans; regulars and militia were so badly mixed that no homogeneous organization could be effected and the Commanding General of the First Field Army was not able to coordinate effectively the organizational and supply requirements of the state militias concerned.

An additional, but very important, defect in the organization of the Mobile Army forces was staff organization and functioning. General Orders Number 120, Headquarters of the Army, dated August 14, 1903, had provided
for the General Staff Corps of the United States Army to be divided into two parts; the War Department General Staff and the General Staff Serving with Troops. The War Department General Staff had by this time at least achieved some notion of its proper peacetime functions, and the General Staff Serving with Troops was still in a rather aimless muddle. The reason for this confusion can be attributed to two factors. The first being that there were no tactical units in the United States Army during time of peace which required a General Staff, and second, that the Army's total General Staff experience, by 1910, encompassed only seven years.

During this seven-year period there had been much discussion not only as to what the General Staff Serving with Troops was supposed to do, but also how many officers should be with each level of command. The German General Staff had officers on duty at all levels down through the division, and it was decided to continue to follow the German model. Thus, by 1910 the term General Staff Serving with Troops had come to mean those General Staff officers assigned to duty with armies, corps, divisions, separate brigades, territorial divisions and departments. The senior General Staff officer at each command was to be the Chief of Staff of that command. The fact that he was not the senior staff officer by grade and time of service was not to influence his eligibility to act as the Chief of Staff, and his duties and powers were in no way to be affected by the rank he carried. Needless to say, this situation caused embarrassment on several occasions when the General Staff Officer assigned proved to be junior to the Special Staff Officers on duty at the Divisional or Departmental Headquarters. Generally speaking, there was a universal tendency to use these General Staff Officers in a purely administrative role, when in fact,
regulations specified that their duties were to be the same as those of
the War Department General Staff. At a division or department headquarters,
these duties concerned mobilization, organization, equipment and field
maneuver planning for the Regular Army and the Militia. Due to the small
number of General Staff Officers available for duty with troops, approxi-
mately twelve at any one time; and the lack of large tactical units; there
was little benefit to be derived in the way of General Staff training.
While it was true that the German General Staff Corps had only one of its
number assigned to each division, and two to each army corps headquarters,
the American attempt to copy this pattern overlooked a very important fact.
Although these few officers were the only official representatives of the
German General Staff Corps, a great many of the other officers within the
staffs of these corps and divisions had also received their training at
the German War Academy. In fact, the War Academy annually graduated
approximately 140 officer students, of which only twenty were ultimately
retained for use within the General Staff Corps. The remainder were re-
turned to their units and utilized there. In order to overcome this lack
of highly trained officers in the United States Army efforts were being
made, at this time, to upgrade the level of training of the more senior
field officers within the Army. The classes at the Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth had, up to this time, been composed of senior captains and
junior majors. Selected graduates of these classes went on to the War
College and the General Staff. This situation naturally caused very
junior officers to be sent to fill the General Staff positions within
the territorial commands. In an attempt to resolve this problem, it was
determined that qualified field grade officers would be selected, sent to
a special three months preparatory course at the Staff College and then on to the Army War College. It was also decided that in the future no officer below the rank of major would be detailed to take the course at the War College, unless he had first successfully completed the course at the Fort Leavenworth Staff College. This change was a large step toward insuring the uniformity of officer training and toward closing the professional gap beginning to develop between the younger junior officers and their seniors. The creation of the General Staff Corps had not been met with wild enthusiasm on all sides from the more senior officers within the Army. It is probable that they viewed this rising group of selected and highly trained younger men with mistrust and not a little hostility. It was, therefore, to the advantage of the Army to attempt to train those older qualified officers, who had either not requested to be sent to the course at the Staff College, or who through no fault of their own, had not been available to be sent. Uniformity of command and staff training coupled with the ever wider exposure of the officer corps of the Army to the products of this training would assist the Chief of Staff immeasurably in his attempt to fashion the Mobile Army of the nation into an effective instrument from the unwieldy state in which he found it.

General Wood, while pressing forward reforms in the military educational system, continued to search for a solution to the tactical organization of the Mobile Army. Throughout the latter part of the year 1910 there were a considerable number of studies conducted by the War College Division concerning how best to bring this reorganization
about. The War College Division felt that the creation of four major subdivisions (departments) with several districts located in each department was the optimum solution. The districts were to be solely tactical commands, either brigade or division. This command was to include both the organized militia and Regular Army Troops within the district, and thus insure the practical training and utilization of the militia in connection with regular forces. While this plan seemed at first workable in that the War Department was looking forward to the creation of tactical divisions, the fact of the matter was that for it to be successful, large troop relocations would have to be accomplished. The geographical subdivisions proposed in this plan, like the subdivisions of the First Field Army District, held great imbalances of forces both in number and type. In December of 1910, William E. Wotherspoon, President of the Army War College, pointed to the real problem when he stated that:

Local civilian leaders will...be quick to recognize that the change would involve the movement from their region of the representatives of the staff departments...as well as the probability that there would be decreased expenditures of money in the community and a consequent decrease of local income.

General Wood and the General Staff had only considered the factors of economy and military strategy as bearing on the problem. Political expediency was without doubt the governing determinant, and it was being ignored. This failure to consider the realities of the political atmosphere was important not only because it hindered the reorganization of the Mobile Army, but also because of the adverse effect it had on Congress. The Chief of Staff and his General Staff had been guilty of
following their German model too closely. They were behaving and think-
ing like mere 'military technicians', and disregarding political con-
siderations. They were, however, operating within a system which
allowed legislative interference, whereas, the German General Staff
was not. The failure or refusal of the General Staff to appreciate
the need for political preparation for their proposals was to dog
their efforts to create a more effective fighting force, even after the
absurdity of maintaining these small garrisons in their old Indian
fighting posts was given actual demonstration the following year.

In the years prior to 1911, rebellion and near revolution had
succeeded each other in Mexico with the result that the border area be-
tween the United States and Mexico was periodically in turmoil. Border
patrols had become necessary, then reinforcement of garrisons in the
area and finally a strong concentration of troops.

On March 6, 1911, President Taft ordered a concentration of troops
in the border area. When General Wood and Secretary of War Jacob M.
Dickinson had conferred with the President regarding this concentration,
they had assured him that, "16,000 troops could be assembled without great
effort and that the season was excellent for maneuvers in Texas." 16
Here was a chance to test a portion of those meticulously prepared war
plans that the War College Division had been laboring over concerning
the possibility of war with Mexico. After General Wood had received
President Taft's instructions to send the troops to the San Antonio,
Galveston and San Diego concentration areas, he notified the War College
Division and requested that the President of the War College Division
(General Wotherspoon) report to the War Department with the mobilization
plans. General Wotherspoon was absent, and General Wood was informed that apparently there were no plans. As a result, an improvised plan was drafted and the necessary messages sent out to the units concerned. In actuality Captain Malin Craig of the War College Division, War Plans Committee, had been working on these plans for months and they were complete. It would seem that Elihu Root's vision of being able to pluck the appropriate plan from the "pigeon-hole" and implement it with a minimum of confusion had been somewhat blurred. There was obviously a lack of intrastaff communication as to what plans were being prepared and their present stage of completion.

Troops being assembled at San Antonio were to be organized into a "maneuver division" which was to be not only a show of strength in the border area, but also to be a camp of instruction. General William H. Carter, Chief of the Mobile Army Division, War Department General Staff, who was appointed as the "division" commander was charged by the Chief of Staff of the Army to:

1. Determine the sufficiency and fitness of the present divisional organization.
2. Eliminate unnecessary impediments from divisional equipment.
3. Give thorough instruction in all branches of field training.

The Field Service Regulations for the period called for a divisional strength of 19,850 officers and men. It took from the 6th of March, 1911 until May to bring the division to its greatest strength 12,809 personnel. The delay was caused by the need to concentrate the troops at eleven different points prior to sending them to San Antonio.
Although this was the largest concentration of troops in the United States since the Spanish American War, its real significance was that this one understrength division made up nearly half of the Mobile Army of the United States, which then consisted of 31,850 personnel, and it took nearly three months to get it together.22

If the assembling of the "division" was somewhat eased by the fact that it had been planned previously by the General Staff, the creation of the command and staff structure was jury rigged from the beginning. Carter's Mobile Army Division was charged by the Chief of Staff to work out the necessary plans to perfect a tactical organization for the units within the Continental United States, not with the mobilization planning for the national defense. Colonel Stephen C. Mills was plucked from the Office of the Inspector General in the War Department and designated the division chief of staff. The remainder of the divisional General Staff was composed of Captains Henry G. Learnard and Malin Craig, both from the War Department General Staff. Craig, as previously pointed out, was the plans officer responsible for this mobilization contingency. The Chief Signal Officer, Major George O. Squier was pulled from the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, War Department and the Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Rees from the course in session at the Army War College. The remaining staff officers, e.g., Chief Quartermaster, Chief Commissary, Surgeon, were drawn from the departmental headquarters of the California and Missouri Departments.23 The commander of the division supply base and line of communications located at San Antonio, Texas, was Brigadier General J. W. Duncan, the Commanding General, Department of Texas. This officer could no doubt have delegated a great
deal of the responsibility for the operation of the Maneuver Division's logistics. The very fact, however, that it was the largest peacetime concentration of troops in the United States operating under divisional organization, and that it was operating directly under War Department control demanded his almost constant presence to the neglect of his departmental responsibilities. These responsibilities included the extended patrol operations on the Mexican border in Texas and the New Mexico Territory which made it the most active department in the Continental United States.24

This one attempt to concentrate a full division clearly illustrated that not only was the reconcentration of our Mobile Army badly needed, but also that prior provision must be made for the command and staff of any large formation to be formed in the future. Just to organize the command and staff elements of this one division had required the detail of five officers from the War Department, three being from the undermanned General Staff; one from the course being conducted at the Army War College; and the remainder coming from three territorial department staffs to include one departmental commander already actively involved in field operations in a critical theater. A great deal of the confusion and the resulting disruption of routine business from War Department to territorial command level was no doubt caused by the short reaction time available as a result of the President's sudden decision to concentrate troops on the Mexican border. The plans, however, had been prepared in adequate time. The problem, no doubt, arose from the fact that with the units scattered as they were it had not been possible to coordinate completely the plans with all agencies and personnel concerned it, in
fact, this had been attempted at all. The close control exercised by the War Department General Staff over this operation follows the German concept that the smaller the portion of the Army involved the less there is a requirement for allowing independence of action upon the part of the commander of that portion. It is also necessary to realize that this was a field test of an organization, which may account for the close control of operations by the War Department General Staff, and the reason why it was not placed under the operational control of the Commanding General of the Department of Texas.

If the Maneuver Division maneuvered somewhat less than hoped for, it did serve great educational purposes beyond the training of commanders, staffs and troops. It was discontinued on August 7, 1911, and the results studied by the War Department General Staff. As a result of the early experience with this unit, the War Department reorganized the Army Command within the United States into three Territorial Divisions for strictly administrative purposes. The Divisions were further subdivided into departments; the commanders of which were, henceforth, to be only responsible for the personal inspection, training and supervision of the troops within their departments. Although General Wood had been able to effect this somewhat improved organization and provide for increased attention to training, the Mobile Army was still hopelessly scattered. He continued to urge the organization of proper tactical units and the concentration of commands near lines of communications and population centers in order to ease movement and supply. The year 1911 marked the crossing of the divide between the old Army and the new. The view was now to be increasingly forward looking with the objective of developing
the United States Army into a more progressive and efficient organization. The War Department General Staff continued to study the organizational problems of the Army and in 1912 published the results of their research in a pamphlet entitled the "Report of the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States." This study had been prepared, published and distributed as an educational paper for discussion and comment, with the possible future use of it as part of a national military policy. This pamphlet was widely distributed within the Army, to include the Service Schools, where it received great attention and stimulated much comment. The Joint Maneuvers in Connecticut held in the summer of 1912 again pointed out the necessity for having a permanently assigned General Staff for each division, Militia or Regular.

As a result of the experiences gained by the concentration of the Maneuver Division, Joint Maneuvers in Connecticut and the comments stimulated by the "Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States," a meeting of the general officers of the Army was held in Washington, D.C. in early January, 1913. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the proposed scheme for the organization and distribution of the Mobile Army into five departments, three divisions, four cavalry brigades and three inspectorates for the Coast Artillery. The department and division were to be coordinate. The department was to be an administrative headquarters and the division the tactical. The staff was to be divided into two sections. The first section had duties pertaining to the department and remained in place when the troops took the field. The second section was to serve as the staff of the tactical division. The General Staffs of the Department and the Division were to consist of
a chief of staff and one assistant. Normally, the same individual served on both General Staffs. 34

Objectives to be realized by this proposed reorganization were: 35

(1) Creation of a tactical organization in peace which would continue to exist in war.

(2) To coordinate and give direction to the efforts of all parts of the Army.

(3) To bring about that degree of decentralization which is necessary in any system requiring the cultivation of initiative and the execution of instruction at points distant from the headquarters at which the instructions originate.

The force thus created and which was to be supplemented with volunteers and militia as required would execute the war plans drawn up by the War Department General Staff. These plans encompassed eight contingencies, under which the forces of the Mobile Army might be utilized, but such plans were only to initiate military operations, not control them throughout the entire period of military operations. 36

In addition to giving the Regular Army a permanent tactical organization, this proposed reorganization departed from General Emory Upton's concept of an expansible Regular Army. This reorganization plan contemplated an army composed of the Regular Army, which would be used as an expeditionary force in the initial stages of war, units from the state militias prepared to reinforce the Regulars, and finally, an Army of volunteers to be organized under prearranged plans and used when greater forces were required. 37 In other words, the National Guard and volunteer units would have to be organized into divisions the same as the Regular Army. 38

Serious opposition, in Congress and public opinion, met the proposal
to reconcentrate the 49 small garrisons into eight or nine large ones. General Wotherspoon had been quite accurate in his prophecy that the proposed reorganization, while sound economically and militarily, would fail politically. The only relocation of units which could, therefore, be accomplished must be done by limited Executive authority. What resulted was not the abandonment of posts, but the shifting of units to provide for a better balance of troops within the proposed divisional districts and to maintain closer unit integrity. It was felt by the Chief of Staff that this reorganization would not only "get together those things which belonged together," but also be a great step forward in the decentralization of command responsibility within the Army. General Wood felt that the Philippine Division should be taken as the model, in that the Division Commander was responsible for practically everything within the territorial boundaries of that division. While this attitude toward decentralization of responsibility was intended to develop leaders capable of independent action, it is quite questionable as to whether General Wood intended to allow the department/division commanders a really free hand in all military activities within their commands. His use of the Philippine Division as a model was fine in concept, except that this division was located approximately 10,000 miles from the seat of the War Department and that it a long way from the "shadow of the flag pole" in any soldier's thinking. It is especially remote when given the limited communications available in this period. Therefore, the Philippine Division would have had to be more or less autonomous in any case. The divisions of the Continental Mobile Army were not nearly so remote.
Reorganization of the Mobile Army was made a fact on February 6, 1913. The troops of the Mobile Army stationed within the Continental United States were reorganized tactically into four divisions and several brigades. Administratively the United States and its possessions were reorganized into six geographical commands. The General Order specifying the new configuration designated not only units, but also commanders and staffs. 41

Due to the reduction in strength of the General Staff Corps, sufficient personnel to fill these staff positions were hard to find. The Army Appropriations Act of 1912 had reduced the General Staff Corps from 45 to 36 officers. A section of this Act, to become known as the "Manchu Law" put further curbs on the availability of General Staff Officers, and it was necessary to reduce the strength of the General Staff Corps because of it. 42 While the "Manchu Law" was in the proper spirit, as far as insuring that an officer maintained familiarity with the problems of the line as well as staff work; it caused a shortage of General Staff Officers at a period when they were in great demand. One of the stated reasons for the reorganization had been to provide for the training of General Staff Officers in service with large tactical troop units, and now that suitable units were available the supply of officers was greatly reduced.

In a further attempt to enhance the position of the General Staff Serving with Troops and insure more continuity with the War Department General Staff, the War Department published, in April of 1913, an order specifying the rank of all staff officers within tactical units. The unit Chief of Staff in all cases was to be the senior ranking officer.
This concern over the rank structure of the staffs of the tactical units, divisions, field armies and armies, would seem to indicate that the Chief of Staff of the Army desired to exercise greater influence in the operational formations of the Army, than he did in the administrative organization. This step was a natural extension of General Wood's efforts beginning in 1910 to raise the grade level of officers within the General Staff Corps and to insure that General Staff Officers in field commands were utilized as was intended. By having more senior officers available for assignment and by being in control of their staff assignments, the Chief of Staff could assure himself of a more direct link between the War Department and field commands. It would seem, therefore, that the Chief of Staff possibly intended to establish a second chain of command to link the General Staff at the War Department to the General Staff serving with field commands. This command link would, of course, be a "shadow" one, but could be just as effective in controlling field operations as the formally constituted chain of command. The use of General Staff officers with field commands to form an informal operational command system had long been a facet of the German General Staff system, which, after all, was the model for the American system. The apparent movement by the Chief of Staff toward the greater centralization of control of field operations by the War Department General Staff through the use of staff appointments was in direct contradiction to his stated policy of decentralization. It will be addressed in greater detail later on.

On February 17, 1913, the Chief of Staff directed that the Commanding General, Central Department be alerted to make preliminary arrangements for sending the Fifth Brigade of the Second Division to Galveston, Texas,
for possible future service in Mexico, and to have the remainder of the
division ready to go on order. Rebellion had again broken out in that
country with resultant danger to foreign lives and property. On
February 21, President Taft directed that the Fifth Brigade move to
Galveston and rendezvous with four naval transports there. The remainder
of the division moved to Texas City on the 24th of February. At the same
time that the Commanding General of the Second Division was being notified
to move his division to the Gulf Coast, the remaining department/division
commanders were alerted for movement and issued the necessary maps,
route information and tactical studies pertaining to the contemplated
operations in Mexico, i.e., the movement from Vera Cruz to the City of
Mexico. In marked contrast to the chaotic concentration of the Maneuver
Division in 1911, the movement of the Second Division from its garrisons
to the Gulf Coast was an example of a well planned and executed military
operation. The entire division had been assembled in the Texas City-
Galveston area in only ten days, as opposed to three months required by
the Maneuver Division. No personnel turmoil had been caused in the War
Department Staff or in the staff of any other command in order to create
one for this division. The division came with the command and staff
personnel assigned by the General Order creating the division. Like
the Maneuver Division, the Second Division was not included in the
command of the Southern Department. It remained under the operational
control of the War Department as a part of the First Field Army. This
field army in the General Staff's war plans consisted of the three in-
fantry divisions and the cavalry division of the Regular Army. These four
divisions included the entire Regular Army within the Continental United States. The movement of the Second Division to the Texas City-Galveston concentration area was the first phase of the plan for the movement to Mexico. The transport of the Division's Fifth Brigade from Galveston to Vera Cruz, Mexico, would be the second phase of the plan, but that would come later. In the meantime, the division conducted training exercises, map maneuvers, prepared its equipment, and waited.46
CHAPTER III

PLANS AND OPERATIONS-ATTEMPTS AT LINKAGE

Revolutionary activities in Mexico increased during late 1912 and early 1913. These activities which caused concern as to possible danger to foreign lives and property in Mexico precipitated President Taft's decision to concentrate the Second Division on the Gulf Coast. This decision was made with the view as to the probable necessity for active intervention by American forces in the internal affairs of Mexico. If this were to come about, it would mark the second such intervention in less than ten years (the first being the Cuban Intervention of 1906).

Before discussing the plans for operations in Mexico, it is important that the General Staff's role in the Cuban affair be reviewed briefly, because of the important precedents established in the operations in Cuba from 1906 through 1909.

In the fall of 1905, the Secretary of War directed the Army War College to prepare a study to be used as the basis for organizing an expeditionary force for possible future use in Cuba. This study became the operational plan for organizing, moving, and supplying an expeditionary force of 5,600 officers and men.¹ The General Staff's plan dealt primarily with the organizational and logistical facets of the contemplated operations, however, it also included a recommendation that at least the Chief of Staff of the force be a field grade General Staff officer.² Due to continued unrest and political turmoil in Cuba, this contingency plan was put into effect on September 29, 1906. The General Staff's active participation in this operation, however, was far from over. Lieutenant Colonel William W. Wotherspoon, the acting President of the Army War College, was named
Chief of Staff of the expeditionary force on September 30. He formed a
staff utilizing five other General Staff officers. These five officers
became Wortherspoon's two assistant Chiefs of Staff, the Chief and
Assistant Chief of the Military Information Division and the Provost
Marshal. 3

Increased General Staff control of the expedition took place in
October of 1906, when President Roosevelt removed General Funston from
command and appointed Brigadier General James Franklin Bell, the then
Chief of Staff of the Army in his place. When Bell returned to Washington
in January 1907, he was replaced as the Expeditionary Force Commander by
Brigadier General Thomas H. Barry, former President of the Army War
College and Acting Army Chief of Staff in Bell's absence. Barry re-
mained in command of the Army of Cuban Pacification until it was with-
drawn in 1909. Colonel Wortherspoon was replaced as the Chief of Staff
by Major Millard F. Waltz from the Third Division of the War Department
General Staff. 4 This practice of rotating General Staff officers in key
positions continued throughout the period of occupation. It was even
expanded as those officers with troop units who had had previous service
with the General Staff were selected and appointed to special positions
of responsibility.

Officers serving with the line units of the force expressed a favorable
reaction toward active General Staff participation in the control and
direction of field operations. 5 The execution as well as the planning of
this operation had been carried out by the General Staff in fulfillment
of their assigned duties of planning for national defense and of "supervis-ing" the command and military operations of the Army. In retrospect,
the use of officers who had done the operational planning to oversee the actual implementation of these plans makes only common sense. On the other hand, however, this certainly was not setting any precedent toward the decentralization of control in the conduct of military operations. This was extreme concentration of operational control, particularly with the assignment of the Chief of Staff of the Army as a field commander. This example of early American General Staff functioning is very similar to that of the Grosser Generalstab, the model from which it was created. While conditions in this instance might have necessitated the use of officers from the General Staff in the War Department, it did set a precedent for active General Staff participation in future operations, as has already been pointed out in the instance of the Maneuver Division.

General Staff interest in the possibility of United States intervention in Mexico began in 1910. This increased concern was primarily caused by the steady deterioration of internal affairs in Mexico. In addition, General Wotherspoon's decision in 1910 to change the locale of the map maneuvers conducted by the Army War College from France and Germany to the western hemisphere, tended to focus the attention of Army defense planners on the southern neighbors of the United States. The emphasis in planning, now, was to concentrate on the problems more likely to be encountered on a movement, say from Vera Cruz to Mexico City, rather than in the Hessian Corridor or "rushing a gap" in the defenses of Metz.

Early 1912 revealed the necessity for the United States to maintain a constant force of some 7,000 personnel on the Mexican border. As a result of this requirement, the War Department General Staff began in February of that year, a complete review and rework of the plans concerned
with possible military operations in Mexico. The plans, then in being, required extensive modification because of the necessity for fitting the new tactical division into them. In addition to the four divisions to be organized from the Regular Army, there were twelve divisions to be formed from the militia of the several states. The first revision of the Mexican War Plan envisioned an operation consisting of two separate parts. The main effort was to be an advance upon Mexico City from the east coast seaport of Vera Cruz. A secondary effort was to be an advance upon Monterey from the vicinity of Brownsville or Laredo, coupled with a static defense of the remaining portion of the Mexican border. The estimate of the forces required to accomplish these objectives was approximately 435,500 officers and men. Of this total number, only 35,500 would be Regular troops, but this was almost the entire Mobile Army stationed within the Continental United States. It was decided by the Chief of Staff, General Wood, that the contemplated advance from Vera Cruz to Mexico City had priority over the defense of the southern border. Therefore, immediately upon notification that the United States would intervene in Mexico the entire Mobile Army of the United States, minus two regiments of cavalry and a regiment of mounted field artillery, would move as quickly as possible to Vera Cruz. The above mentioned cavalry and mounted field artillery reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 militia or volunteers would defend the border.

This is an interesting plan when consideration is given to the fact that the border between the United States and Mexico is nearly 1,600 miles in length. In addition, this border is paralleled throughout much of its length by a major transcontinental railroad. The forces allocated
to the defense of United States territorial integrity would be spread rather thin. This plan also bears a striking resemblance to Scott's and Taylor's operations in Mexico in 1846 and 1847. A certain amount of consideration should be given to the vision of being a conqueror of Mexico, like Cortez and Winfield Scott. The position of military governor of Mexico would most likely be bestowed upon the American General commanding the victorious army which entered Mexico City. This General would be the one advancing from Vera Cruz. Who would this commander be? As of February 1912, he had not been designated, but this question should be kept in mind.

This question of command of the field forces raises the more immediate question of where were all the unit commanders and their staff personnel to come from? The War Department General Staff being charged with appointing commanders and staff personnel felt that sufficient officers could be spared from the Regular establishment to command the militia and volunteer brigades and divisions, but the problem of trained staff officers was much more acute. In late October 1912 the General Staff began a survey of the General Staff officer resources available and requested from the other War Department staff departments lists of officers who could be utilized in the Special Staff positions. The resulting survey revealed that the staff officer situation, both General and Special, was critical. A division and Field Army organized under the structure published in the current Field Service Regulations required one General Staff officer each. If even these minimum requirements were met, considering a total force of four Field Armies and 16 divisions, there would be only twenty-five officers left
to conduct the General Staff's business at the War Department and be available for assignment to the staff, of a General Headquarters in the field, if one was to be formed. A survey conducted of War College trained officers who could be utilized revealed that only 71 had been graduated to date. Some of these were serving currently on the General Staff and others would have to be utilized in the command positions of the militia and volunteer brigades and divisions. Not one militia officer had yet taken the course at the Army War College.¹¹

This frantic search for trained officers had been caused by Brigadier General Henry G. Sharpe, the Commissary General of the Army. On March 1, 1912, he had thrown cold water all over the War College Division's proposed Mexican War Plan. He had done this by simply pointing out that there was no provision in these plans for the organization and establishment of a logistical base and Line of Communications. The matter of logistical organization had been completely overlooked. The plans had to be worked out in much greater detail if any kind of an effort was to be mounted against Mexico. General Sharpe felt that there were nowhere near enough officers in his department to operate the logistical apparatus that would be required. He also felt that the brief instructions contained in the Field Service Regulations pertaining to the Line of Communications should be greatly expanded and detailed, so that accurate determinations of the number of personnel required for logistical support of field operations could be made.¹² The War College Division had been caught concentrating on the maneuvering of forces and failing to adequately plan for their prolonged sustenance. The War Department General Staff had concentrated particularly on the logistical aspects for the Army of
Cuban Pacification, but that was a force of only 5,600 personnel. Here the problem was much more complex because of the necessity to provide for two mobile columns; Brownsville-Monterey and Vera Cruz-Mexico City and a 1,600 mile static front. In light of the proposed plan submitted, it would seem that the strategical and tactical studies had received greater attention, than the logistical study. The Chief of Staff was not happy with the proposed plan and the comments on it from the other War Department staff offices. They showed the General Staff in a bad light and hinted at the fact that it was unable to develop adequate and complete war plans. He, therefore, pointed out to the President of the Army War College, General Mills, that the present plan contained a vast number of details which needed to be considered and that the problem would receive his immediate attention.13

The plan was revised and received the approval of the Chief of Staff on March 15, 1912. The plan approved by Wood consisted of six operational phases:14

1. Seizure of Vera Cruz by U.S. naval forces.
2. Arrival of 1st Field Army at Vera Cruz and the advance to the healthy regions of Jalapa or Orizaba.
3. Arrival of 2nd Field Army (Volunteer) at Vera Cruz.
4. Arrival of 3rd Field Army (Volunteer) at Vera Cruz.
5. Defensive measures upon the Southern Border.

The previously mentioned logistical problems had been largely resolved. San Antonio and Galveston were designated as the Base Depots for the two separated contingents of the field forces. The shortage of staff officers,
however, continued as a problem. In fact, it was decided to recall retired officers to perform the duties of the mustering and supply officers at the militia mobilization camps. This would free Regular officers for the staffs of the Base Depots, Lines of Communication and the line units. The plan continued to receive minor revisions throughout the remainder of the year and was approved by the Secretary of War in December. It remained, however, essentially the same in its six operational phases. While the problem of providing commanders and staff personnel for the field armies, divisions, brigades, lines of communication and base depots had been fairly well resolved by December of 1912, the question of who was to be in overall command of the field forces and how this command was to be effected is never addressed in the war plans. The impression is given that this problem is to be resolved by the Commander in Chief upon his decision to implement the plan. The one fact that is painfully clear by the end of 1912, and was just as clear in 1906 and 1911, is that in order for the United States Army to put an effective force of any size into the field it is still necessary to disassemble portions of the planning and administrative organs of the Army and the War Department and build the required command and staff elements of the field forces from the pieces.

In February of 1913, the Army formed tactical divisions, and was alerted for possible deployment to Mexico and the southern border at almost the same instant. The fact that the mobilization followed so closely upon the heels of the order for reorganization caused a great deal of turmoil within the Regular Army. There were the simultaneous necessities for getting the divisions organized, staffed and ready for field operations. The problem of staff officer shortage had become so
acute that a provision had to be included in the order which prescribed the rank of all staff officers within the tactical units. The provision stated that:

Whenever a staff officer of the prescribed rank is not available, an officer of different rank may be detailed.

This attempt, therefore, of the Chief of Staff to strengthen the position of the General Staff Serving with Troops by means of rank within the staff was not progressing very swiftly due primarily to the small number of officers available, particularly the more senior field grades. There were just not sufficient officers qualified to fill these positions. In addition to the problem of having to find adequate personnel to complete the reorganization and fulfill the requirements of the Mexican War Plan, the War Department General Staff was deluged with requests for additional information concerning the proposed operations in Mexico.

Preoccupation with these routine problems did not allow the War College Division an opportunity to resume their primary duties of planning and the collection of information until the Spring of 1913. The incompetency of the Mexican Government, which allowed armed revolution to continue, brigandage to flourish and the economic situation to deteriorate caused the Chief of the War College Division, Brigadier General William Crozier, to direct his planners along a new line of thought. Crozier felt that since the War Plan of December, 1912 was based upon the assumption that there would be a strong central government in control in Mexico and since recent events had shown this assumption to be less than valid, it was time to investigate some alternatives. He, therefore, directed the War Plans Committee to prepare an alternative plan based on the assumption
that there would be a government in Mexico City which would not be able to exercise effective control throughout Mexico.\textsuperscript{18} His concern was natural in that as previously pointed out, the plan of December, 1912 had the majority of the American Army committed deep in Mexico with the border only lightly held. By April of the following year an alternative plan had been developed. This plan called Special Plan A, envisioned using only regular troops in any intervention in Mexico. This force would be the First Field Army. The Organized Militia would only be used for the defense of the border area.\textsuperscript{19} The border was to be defended by the troops of the Regular Army until the militia had been fully mobilized and ready to relieve them for their movement to Mexico.

In early April of 1914, a new figure entered the planning flurry being conducted by the General Staff. Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, the Commanding General of the Southern Department, submitted his own plan for the defense of the southern border and requested that the governors of the states in his department be notified to place their militia immediately under his command when the necessity arose. While he was obviously concerned about the exposed southern flank of the United States, he also suffered from an affliction which caused him to constantly see vast clouds of Mexican cavalry sweeping across the deserts of Chihuahua and Coahuila toward the border. The General Staff felt that there was adequate time available for the successful accomplishment of each phase contained in the plans and his proposals did not fit. Not only that, but Bliss had entered unbidden into the planning domain which was the jealously guarded prerogative of General Wood and his General Staff. He was quickly notified that the plan stood as originally conceived, and that the General
Staff felt itself capable to do all the planning necessary. On April 9, events overtook the planners. At Tampico, Mexico, an American naval paymaster and his boat crew were arrested by Huertista soldiers. Mexican verbal apologies for this event, coupled with two other minor incidents on April 11, were seen by President Wilson as a conspiracy against Americans in Mexico. On April 20, 1914, he went before Congress and requested authority to employ the armed forces of the United States in Mexico. While Congress debated this request, the President acted on the 21st and ordered the Navy to seize the wharfs and customs warehouse in Vera Cruz. He further directed the Chief of Staff to implement Special Plan A. On April 23, Brigadier General Frederick Funston was ordered to move the Fifth Brigade, Second Division from Galveston to Vera Cruz and assume command of all United States troops there, both Marines and Army.

Special Plan A, as mentioned above, called for the use of only one Field Army in Mexico. On April 22, the Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, designated Major General Wood, the Chief of Staff, to command this army, if the President decided to implement the Plan in its entirety. Wood immediately began laying his plans for his field organization and selecting his headquarters staff from the officers in the War Department's General Staff and Special Staff departments. He dispatched Captain Douglas MacArthur, then serving on the General Staff to Vera Cruz along with Funston's command to look the situation over for him personally. MacArthur was to be the operations officer of the First Field Army in the event it was to be deployed. Major General William W. Wotherspoon, then serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff, assumed the position of Chief of
Staff of the Army on the same day. It appeared that this expeditionary force was to be as much a General Staff show as had been the Cuban operation in 1906. At least it looked that way at the top of the chain of command. It also would look that way further down as will be pointed out.22

General Funston had been in command of the Second Division until the movement order for the Fifth Brigade arrived from the War Department on April 23, 1914. Upon receipt of this order he immediately assumed the command of the Fifth Brigade and embarked with it for Vera Cruz. Upon his arrival the marines already there were attached to his command giving it a total strength of 7,236 officers and men.23

During the first week in May, General Funston organized his command, prepared for the arrival of the remainder of the First Field Army, and awaited orders to move on Mexico City. The staff of the expeditionary force was well qualified to assist their commander. The force chief of staff was Colonel William A. Mann. This was the same William Mann who had served as an assistant chief of staff in Cuba in 1906. He had graduated from the Army War College in 1905, and had been detailed to the War Department General Staff in August of 1911. There, he had served as the General Board of the War College Division and just prior to his assignment to Funston's command had been serving as the Chief of Staff of the First Division at Governor's Island, New York.24 In July Colonel Mann was replaced as the force chief of staff by Colonel Benjamin Alyord, who until then had been serving as the headquarters adjutant. Alvord had not graduated from either the Staff College or the Army War College but had been twice detailed to serve on the War Department General Staff.
Alvord's replacement as the force adjutant was Major Frederic D. Evans, Army War College, Class of 1906. While Evans was attending the War College he was a member of Committee No. 4. This committee was one of the five originally established by General Tasker Bliss, and concerned itself with plans and questions pertaining to Mexico and all of Central America, except Panama. He, therefore, was familiar with at least the background information upon which the present operational plans for the Expeditionary Force had been based. Two other officers on Funston's staff were graduates of the Army War College. These were the Inspector, Major Alexander L. Dade and the Engineer Officer, Major William J. Borden. To supplement this collection of experience on the headquarters of staff, General Funston was also fortunate to have as the commander of the Fifth Brigade, Colonel Millard F. Waltz. This was the same Waltz who replaced Colonel William Wotherspoon as Chief of Staff of the Army of Cuban Pacification in March 1907. All in all this was a fine collection of officers and it complimented Funston's own great experience and prestige in guerrilla fighting and pacification operations.

While Funston awaited orders to move on Mexico City, he and his staff began to review the plans prepared by the War Department General Staff and investigate the local military situation in greater depth. Not counting the thousands of anti-Huerta and anti-American guerrillas roaming the area between Vera Cruz and Mexico City, Funston was faced with 11,000 Mexican regulars, of good quality, in a cordon around Vera Cruz. Since no information was forthcoming as to when additional troops would be forwarded to Vera Cruz, the scope of military operations was limited to strengthening the outpost line, stockpiling railroad supplies, and improving the City of Vera Cruz.
After careful review of the war plans and the local situation, General Funston submitted his recommendations to the General Staff as to what he felt should be done with his command pending arrival of additional troops. He felt that it was feasible for his force to move along two separate axes, the Army on the northern route to Jalapa and the Marines along the southern to Orizaba. This would place the American ground forces in control of the mountain passes through which the lines of communication between Mexico City and Vera Cruz ran. It would also get the troops up on the great Mexican Plateau and out of the pestilential lowlands around Vera Cruz. Funston's recommendations were without doubt based upon more accurate and current information than was available to the War Department General Staff. They were also well within the overall scope of the plan. There was to be, however, no delegation of authority to field commanders to vary from the approved plans. On July 21, 1914, the War Department informed General Funston that the approved plans would be followed as laid down, and that he should make no advance, even if attacked, without War Department approval. Since no orders for an advance were forthcoming, the staff of the Expeditionary Force occupied themselves with planning for the defense of Vera Cruz and the use of that port as a base for the First Field Army. The finalized revisions of these plans were then forwarded to the War Department for the use and information of the War College Division.

On November 23, 1914, the American Expeditionary Force was withdrawn from Vera Cruz and returned to Galveston and Texas City without accomplishing much more than cleaning up the City of Vera Cruz. That portion of Special Plan A that had been implemented had proceeded smoothly and
efficiently. The staff of the Expeditionary Force had functioned well, due as much probably to experience in these operations as to training. Nevertheless, the efforts of General Wood to increase the prestige and effectiveness of the General Staff Serving with Troops were beginning to show, even if this was only a small demonstration. The failure of the War Department General Staff to accept the recommendations of General Funston as regards the War Plan was typical of General Wood's tendency to centralize all executive power within the War Department General Staff. General Funston had been saddled with implementing the same plan as had been used by Winfield Scott in 1847, regardless of changed local conditions and his own judgment. This was a movement toward high level centralization of planning and control of operations. The German General Headquarters in the Franco-Prussian War was nowhere nearly as rigid in their restrictions upon field commanders, and they were located near the scene of action, not 1,800 miles away.

While General Funston was attempting to convince the War Department General Staff that the portion of the Mexican War Plan under which he was operating needed revision, they were receiving criticism of the other portion from a familiar source. General Bliss, undeterred by the rebuff his earlier suggestions had evoked from the General Staff, pleaded again in early June of 1914 for a more active defense of the Mexican border area. Bliss felt that offensive action down all lines of communication leading from the border into Mexico was the better method of insuring the security of the area contiguous to that border. The War College Division again stated that.
"It is believed that the present plans of the General Staff are so formed to meet the situation suggested in the letter (General Bliss's) and cope with it successfully. Recommend that the Commanding General, Southern Department be so informed."

The War College Division's reply to General Bliss was typical of the War Department General Staff's attitude toward field commanders, while Leonard Wood was the Chief of Staff. While General Wood had preached the necessity for decentralization of authority to field commanders, he had in fact retained tight control of the reins for planning and control of operations. War planning during Wood's tenure as the Chief of Staff was the special purview of the War College Division and would not be infringed upon. An interesting paradox to Wood's attitude on centralized planning and operational control is his efforts toward building up and enhancing the General Staff Serving with Troops. What was to be their real function? If the planning done by the War Department General Staff was to be so centralized and detailed, it left the other portion of the General Staff Corps with little to do, other than implementation of the very detailed plans prepared by the former. Perhaps, as previously pointed out, this was General Wood's purpose in building up the General Staff in the field commands—assurance that the War College Division's plans would be implemented as outlined and approved.

In any event, a change was in the offing. Major General William W. Wotherspoon became Chief of Staff of the Army on April 22, 1914, when General Wood was designated to command the First Field Army. On this same day, Brigadier General Montgomery M. Macomb became the President of the Army War College and Chief of the War College Division.
General Wotherspoon had early been associated with the American General Staff and shared General Bliss's view that, "all the brains in the American Army did not reside in the General Staff." He had early demonstrated his pragmatic approach to General Staff activities. In 1910, as President of the Army War College, he had insisted that all map maneuvers and planning exercises be conducted with the western hemisphere and our island possessions as the scene of operations and to forget Germany and France. In view of later events this decision may seem to have been erroneous. When it is viewed, however, in the light of the military problems confronting the United States in the early part of the Century, and the size and organization of the Army with which these problems had to be met, there can be little doubt as to the correctness of his decision.

General Macomb had not served on the War Department General Staff under General Wood. His only tour of duty there, prior to his appointment to head the War College, had been as the Chief of the First Section under the reorganization of 1908. This section had dealt with administration and the distribution of the Army, not operational planning. He was now in charge of duties new to him and more likely to approach them more openly and with fewer preconceived ideas.

With the change in the hierarchy of the War Department General Staff, General Bliss's proposals began to fall on more sympathetic ears. While he had been informed in early June 1914 that the Mexican War Plans stood as presently outlined, General Wotherspoon forwarded his proposals to the War College Division for serious consideration. He also informed the planners that further proposals from the Commanding General of the
Southern Department would be shortly forthcoming, and that they also would be referred to the War College Division.\textsuperscript{36} While Wotherspoon informed Bliss that his proposals would receive prompt attention, there were adequate reasons beyond bureaucratic jealousy for not immediately scrapping the present war plan.

First of all, there were already troops in the field operating under provisions of this plan. The United States Expeditionary Forces were in Vera Cruz and the remaining forces of the Regular Army and militia were preparing to proceed with total mobilization, if so ordered by the President. Second, the old bug-a-boo of the lack of sufficiently qualified officers to staff and command the organization outlined in the plan was still not solved. Sufficient progress had been made, however, toward the solution of this problem, and any hasty major change in the plan would completely unhinge the headway made.\textsuperscript{37} Third, the making of major changes to an operational plan on the eve of possible conflict is to court disaster on the battlefield. Finally, but certainly not the least of any counsel against change, were the probable views of General Leonard Wood, the Army's ranking major general. The present plan was the product of his General Staff, and he was presently in command of a major portion of the forces implementing that plan. He could hardly be expected to view major revision of this plan with favor.

With the return of Funston's expeditionary force to the United States on November 26 and 27, 1914, the Second Division was back together again in its original Gulf Coast concentration area. The Sixth Brigade of this division had been sent to Douglas, Arizona because of the occupation of Agua Prieta, Mexico, by some Mexican faction. This brigade had been
transferred to the Southern Department on December 15, 1914, upon War Department orders. The Second Division minus this brigade remained under the operational control of the War Department General Staff. Theoretically, it was still under the control of the First Field Army, but that force had never been formally constituted after President Wilson had let it be known that there would be no war with Mexico. Due to the continued unrest along the border, it was decided by the War Department to dissolve the Second Division and use the troops within the Southern Department to establish new garrisons and reinforce those requiring additional strength.

General Bliss, the Commanding General of the Southern Department, was queried for his suggestions as to the proper distribution of these troops, since they were to become part of his command. This delegation of authority to a field commander was a continuation of the trend which began with General Wotherspoon's assumption of the position of Chief of Staff of the Army and continued by Brigadier General Hugh L. Scott, when he took over that office on November 17, 1914. The foundation for this trend had been laid in March, 1914 with the publication of the new Army Field Service Regulations. These regulations outlined for the first time the functions of the War Department and the commander of the field forces in a theater of operations. The War Department was to determine for the field commander his mission, zone of operations, and provide the means for him to accomplish that mission. The field force commander was to exercise supreme authority over all military and administrative matters within his zone of operations. He was also responsible for the direction and control of all necessary military operations. This provision of
the Army Regulations had received primarily only lip service by the War Department General Staff up to the end of 1914. The field commanders had been little more than puppets with the real control of operations and planning retained by the General Staff. This increasing trend toward the decentralization of operational control greatly enhanced the position of the field commanders and their staffs. At last, the department commander's views were being sought in conjunction with operational planning, instead of his having to try to comply with overly detailed plans conceived in the near vacuum of the War Department. This had particular significance in the Southern Department which had to secure a rather active front of some 1,600 miles.

This front acquired added significance on February 13, 1915, with the designation of General Bliss as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army. In addition to this position, General Bliss was also named as the Chief of the Mobile Army Division. As Chief of this staff division, he was charged by the Chief of Staff, General Scott, with organizing the Mobile Army with emphasis to be kept on the probable use of that Army in Mexico. Bliss had always been able to see vast hords of Mexicans sweeping down on the lightly guarded border when no one else could see them. The events in Mexico during the year 1915, marked by the killing of Americans, both in Mexico and on the border, only added emphasis to General Bliss's dire predictions of danger to the border region. Following the massacre of seventeen Americans by a band of Francisco Villa's supporters on January 10, 1916, near Santa Isabel, Mexico, General Bliss again requested that the Chief of Staff direct the War College Division to review the Mexican War Plans.
In the study conducted by the War College Division as a result of General Bliss's recommendation, the Vera Cruz invasion route was still to remain the main effort, but there were to be several secondary columns moving south from the border area. A new aspect considered by this study was that of the total pacification of Mexico. The War College Division considered the occupation of only Northern Mexico a partial measure which would eventually necessitate the pacification of the entire country.\textsuperscript{44} Winfield Scott's old route still held a fascination for the War College planners, even after developments within that country made it a questionable axis of advance. No fewer than four north-south railroads connected the interior of Mexico with the United States. Although it was 600 miles farther from the border to Mexico City, the possibility of advance along several axes was there. Any advance from Vera Cruz would of necessity be limited primarily to a single axis of advance, and thereby offer the Mexicans an opportunity to concentrate against a main thrust from that direction. Logistical problems could be more easily overcome by basing the advance from the border area along the several rail lines. The Chief of Staff, General Scott, was not ready to accept this study as the last word and directed that further revision of the plans be studied. Events were again to overtake the General Staff planners on March 9, 1916, when Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico, killed eighteen Americans and destroyed considerable property.\textsuperscript{45}

As a result of the Columbus raid, General Funston, the Commanding General, Southern Department, requested on March 9 that American troops be given authority to pursue the bandits into Mexico. Funston also volunteered to command this expeditionary force himself.\textsuperscript{46} This was a contingency
that had not been foreseen by the War College Division. No limited alternative plan such as Special Plan A had been prepared to cover such a contingency. General Bliss, ever the champion of the oppressed, department commanders, commented on General Funston's request, stating that,

"the Commanding General, Southern Department, should be instructed as to the administrative desires and directed to work out all the necessary details, and that the additional forces and supplies that be required would be provided...It is evident that before attempting this expedition, the probable necessity of intervention should be fully appreciated. For intervention, the War College Division plan will apply."

Bliss's recommendation was approved, and General Funston was directed to prepare a plan for capturing Villa, preventing further raids and protecting the border. While Funston was developing his plan of action, the Chief of the Mobile Army Division was alerting the commanders of the Mobile units within the Eastern, Central and Western Departments to be ready to move on short notice to the Mexican border. On March 11, Funston's plan was approved and he was directed to place an adequate force under the command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing and direct him to proceed immediately in pursuit of the Mexican band that had raided Columbus. He was also directed to keep the War Department "fully and frequently advised" as to the situation of Pershing's force.

Pershing was notified by Departmental Headquarters on March 11 that he was to command the expedition into Mexico, what his mission there was to be, and what troops would constitute his force. He immediately set about organizing his command and selecting a staff. Here for the first time, it was not necessary to take personnel from the War Department General Staff or disrupt a departmental headquarters to find qualified
staff officers. The Army War College and the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth had been graduating classes steadily for the past twelve years and the results were beginning to be apparent. General Funston had requested that the War Department send a Captain of the General Staff to Pershing to act as his Chief of Staff, but the detail of even this one officer was not necessary. Pershing found the officers he needed within the units assigned to the expeditionary force or within other units located within the department.\(^{52}\)

Here was a fine example of how a theater of operations was supposed to be organized and operated as outlined in the Army's Field Service Regulations. Funston had been designated as the commander of the field forces in the Southern Department and Pershing's Punitive Expedition operating in Mexico. The War Department General Staff was concerning itself with providing equipment, supplies and additional troops to General Funston. In addition the General Staff was to be kept informed of all developments in the field while they devoted their energies to planning and organizing the ground forces for the possibility of active intervention in Mexico on the scale envisioned in the plans filed in War College Division. While the theater commander, General Funston, would have to operate in a manner more restrictive than the role specified in the regulations because of the very sensitive political nature of the operations along the border and in Mexico, he still had more freedom of action than he had at Vera Cruz two years earlier. The General Staff was open to suggestions and recommendations from the field and the plans were far from being iron clad.

During the period from March to early May 1916, the General Staff provided General Funston with additional personnel, instructions and information.
Steps were taken to improve the intelligence dissemination organization of the General Staff so that both the theater commander and the planners in the War College Division would both have ready access to the same information. On May 9, however, events started to speed up with the possibility of further aggression upon the United States from Mexico. On this day, the Secretary of War informed the governors of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona that the President was calling for the service of the Organized Militia of their respective states, and that the militia would be concentrated as directed by the Commanding General, Southern Department. Funston was also informed at this time that if his forces were attacked by Carranzista troops, he was to immediately occupy such places on the Mexican that he considered consistent with the protection of his forces and the border area. As the situation in northern Mexico continued to deteriorate, the Chief of Staff of the Army continued to discuss the plans for intervention with his Chief planners, General Bliss and General Macomb. On June 16, General Scott decided that the plans for the invasion of Mexico needed a complete overhaul. Mexico City was no longer to be the objective. Instead it was to be the armed forces of Mexico which were then primarily concentrated in the northern part of that country. The main axes of advance were to be along the various railways leading south from the border, and not the Camino Real from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.

By early June, the Mexican leaders apparently felt that if the American troops under Pershing continued southward into Mexico, full United States intervention was soon to follow, and they would prefer to force an open conflict. Due to this attitude and the occurrence of further Mexican raids, it became necessary to again provide additional troops to
the Southern Department. On June 16, the President called the militia of the remaining states into federal service. The concentration of troops on the border would reach a strength of 112,000 by July 21.56 While this mobilization and concentration was underway, an engagement with Carranzista troops took place at Carrizal, Mexico on June 21. The immediate task became to dispose the American troops for war.

By June 23, 1916, the new plan for intervention in Mexico was fairly well solidified. On that date the Chief of Staff informed General Funston that the President had approved of the plan to employ approximately 150,000 troops; 30,000 regulars and 120,000 militia. Funston was to designate the destination of the militia units scheduled for his department by direct coordination with the other department commanders. Pershing's command was to be reinforced up to 20,000 troops. Invasion columns of 30,000 troops were to be concentrated at Brownsville and El Paso, with another column of 10,000 designated to move from Nogales to Guaymas along the Sonora Railway. The remaining forces would be used to screen the border from Brownsville, Texas to Yuma, Arizona. The objective of the proposed movement into Northern Mexico was to force the evacuation by Mexican forces of that portion of the country down to a line running through Guaymas and Monterey, thus creating a buffer zone.57 Throughout the remainder of June, July and August the concentration of forces continued as planned, but the President had already decided that intervention by the United States in the affairs of Mexico would not come to pass.58

Had the invasion taken place, the command structure was to consist of General Hugh L. Scott, the Chief of Staff of the Army in overall
command, with the General Funston commanding the Brownsville column, General Pershing, the central column from El Paso, and General Sage, the movement from Nogales into Sonora. General Scott had suggested to the Secretary of War that General Leonard Wood be placed in overall command, but was informed by the Secretary of War that the President had selected Scott himself. There appears to have been confusion over the matter of supreme command. General Bliss, the man responsible under the Chief of Staff for the Mobile Army and the Mexican Border problem, had taken it for granted that Funston would command. This had been the plan and it fitted in well with Scott's conception of delegation of authority and decentralization of operational control, which he had followed since his assumption of the office of Chief of Staff. Up to this time General Funston had been responsible for the complete organization, deployment, and control of the forces sent to his department. The War Department General Staff had merely supported his requests for troops and equipment, and forwarded additional policy instructions to him. They had taken no active part in the direct control of operations, as they had in Cuba and Vera Cruz. This view of the role of the War Department General Staff and the Chief of Staff was a radical departure from past experiences. It was radical in that it saw that the obvious place for the officers of the War Department General Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Army was at the seat of government where they could perform their advisory and planning functions and be accessible to the commander in chief.

Pershing's Punitive Expedition would remain in Mexico until February 5, 1917, with little activity other than both this force and the units on
the border perfecting their organization and equipment in order to be ready for the advance into Mexico. It was while all this was happening that Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916.

These border problems had demonstrated the meagerness of our forces and the Congress took far reaching steps to remedy this. The size of the Army was to be increased and the mobile troops of the Regular Army were to be permanently organized into divisions and brigades on a tactical basis. The battle for large permanent tactical formations, begun by General Leonard Wood in 1910 had at last been won. The President, rather than the state governors, was now authorized to designate the number of militia units by arm or branch in each state. In addition, he could designate division and brigade commanders and chiefs of staff of these units when called into federal service. The shortage of qualified militia officers had become painfully apparent upon the arrival of these militia units on the border in 1916. Immediate steps were taken to provide qualified Regular Army officers to these positions upon passage of this act on June 3, 1916. The General Staff Corps was to be increased from 36 to 55 officers. This, however, was not the badly needed reinforcement of that body that it appeared.

This increase was to take place over a five year period. Furthermore, only one-half of the officers detailed to the General Staff Corps could, at any one time, be "stationed, assigned to or be employed upon any duty, in or near the District of Columbia." This reduction in the number of officers who could be detailed for duty in the War Department General Staff was made more critical by the fact that the Army War College was no longer to be an agency of the General Staff. The College was to remain under the
supervision of the General Staff, but the instructors could not be active members of the General Staff Corps, and the College would confine its activities to military instruction only. The General Staff had lost its planning agency, the War Plans Committee along with the valuable assistance, which had been provided by the students. The Act of 1916 also eliminated the Coast Artillery Division and the Mobile Army Division from the War Department General Staff. The loss of the Mobile Army Division was particularly felt, because under Generals Scott and Bliss the coordination of plans and operations had become much more complete than ever before. Bliss had insured the necessary coordination between the planning agency, the War College Division, and the forces in the field. A coordination not apparent before in the concentration of the Maneuver Division or the expedition to Vera Cruz. General Bliss had advocated that the field commanders had valid comments and recommendations which had a vital impact on operational planning and were due adequate consideration. He also felt that adequate and realistic plans could only be developed by the War Department planners by taking these recommendations into consideration at the same time that they were forming plans based on guidance provided by the nation's political leaders. The General Staff in Washington was left, following the passage of this Act, with only the War College Division and the Division of Militia Affairs. (See Appendix C).

The War Department had recommended to the Congress that the General Staff Corps be increased to 94 officers, because the border concentration had again highlighted the critical shortage of General Staff officers, which had plagued the Army since the General Staff Corps was created in
1903. The officers which had been available had proven their worth, but were still not available in sufficient numbers to staff fully the new divisions and field army headquarters. If the concept of the division of functions between the War Department General Staff and the forces in the field was to be more fully developed from its first trial in the border concentration of 1916, it was necessary to increase the strength of both branches of the General Staff Corps. Here for the first time since its inception, the Army had left the War Department General Staff in a relatively whole condition, and Congress had torn it apart.
IV

CONCLUSIONS

April 6, 1917, the date the United States entered the First World War, began the first major test of the United States Army's General Staff Corps. The preceding seven years had been a period of active evolution for that body, particularly along the lines of trying to determine what roles the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff were to play in time of war. Although operations had been limited and no extensive campaigns had been conducted against a hostile force, progress toward creating an effective link between the War Department General staff and the field forces had been made.

One area in which little or no progress had been made was that as to who was to command the Army in the field. Although the Office of Chief of Staff of the Army had been created as a replacement for the position of the Commanding General of the Army, the notion that this individual was to be merely the advisor and executive agent of the President, the Secretary of War, and the Chief of the War Department Staff would not take hold. Both the Presidents and the Chiefs of Staff, particularly General Leonard Wood, visualized this office to entail the actual command of the Army forces in the field during time of war, although General Scott tried to side-step it. The Chief of Staff was charged with supervising the command and military operations of the Army, and this was the concept of how it was to be done. After all, this was the way in which the German model operated. There were, however, a few major differences between the two systems that do not seem to have been fully appreciated.
When the German General Headquarters moved into the field with the German Armies, the Chief of the Great General Staff was still the head of that staff. He served as the Chief of Staff to the German Emperor, although he really commanded the forces in the field. A substitute organization to replace that portion of the General Staff now located with the armies was built up in Berlin. The Chief of Staff then became the Chief of both the General Headquarters staff and the provisional General Staff in Berlin. The German General Staff concerned itself only with the various facets of strategic planning during time of peace and the execution of operations during war. Activities concerning the provision and procurement of the materials and resources for war belonged to the Department of Military Economy in the Prussian War Ministry. The German General Staff, then, could be a parallel organization from the Great General Staff in Berlin down to the division, because its functions remained the same at all levels. It was created by a natural process of evolution brought about by the necessity for controlling larger and larger armies. Each evolutionary step created another staff organization with a greater span of control, but one still involved with the same staff functions.

This German model provided the pattern for the American General Staff system, which attempted to operate in a similar fashion, at least up through 1914. The American Chief of Staff, as opposed to his German opposite, was not only the Chief of the General Staff corps, but also the Chief of the entire War Department Staff. His sphere of active interest, therefore, concerned not only planning and operations, but also the activities of the administrative bureaus of the War Department. As
the ranking professional soldier of the United States Army, he had a kind of military authority that no civilian could have. While the German General Staff could concern themselves solely with plans and operations, the American counterpart had the whole spectrum of military activities to concentrate on. There could not, therefore, be a parallel staff structure throughout the American Army as there was in the German. The General Staff Serving with Troops could devote its attention to military plans and operations, but the War Department General Staff could not. It had the additional function of planning for the use and mobilization of the nation's military resources.

General Leonard Wood and his staff appeared to have allowed themselves to concentrate on the coordination of operations and on tight control over the field forces. Wood preached decentralization, but did not practice it. At Vera Cruz he held Funston to a plan so detailed that it left no room for initiative. Wood, furthermore, apparently made no attempt to be relieved from command of the First Field Army. He could not command this army and be Chief of Staff at the same time, so General Wotherspoon was named to replace him. In addition, he selected his staff from out of War Department General Staff, a move which would leave that undermanned body even more depleted, by removing those who had done the planning. These personnel could not be replaced, as they could in the German system. Legislative action determined the strength of the American General Staff Corps, not the whims of the Chief of Staff. If the Chief of Staff and his planners were to be involved in the active control of operations in the field, who was going to take care of things in the War Department? The appointment of a new Chief of Staff would certainly
fill that office, but what of his familiarity with the war plans? The concentration of the Maneuver Division had clearly demonstrated the fact that intrastaff communication, under Leonard Wood, left a great deal to be desired. The concept was that planners should be executors, and this meant active direction of operations in the field. The idea of providing broad strategic direction from the War Department to the field seems to have never occurred to General Wood. He felt that the nation's "number one" soldier had to be in command in the field, just like Generals McClellan and Miles before him. The major differences being that once in the field, he would no longer be the Chief of Staff of the Army or have the authority of the old Commanding General of the Army. The whole hierarchy of the War Department was to be reconfigured at the outset of war. Although General Wood had greatly improved the Mobile Army by the introduction of the tactical division and the expanded post graduate officer training, others would make more effective use of them. His adherence to the German model and the precedent set by the Cuban operations, blinded him to the differences between the German and American systems and caused him to view the relationship between the General Staff and the field forces too narrowly.

With the advent of Generals Wotherspoon and Scott to the office of Chief of Staff of the Army, a broader view began to develop as to what this relationship should be. They felt that the place of the Chief of Staff was at the War Department, not in the field. They believed the commanders in the field had a definite place in the war planning sequence, and that their views should receive close consideration. In order to achieve a closer working harmony between the General Staff planners and
the forces in the field, General Scott effectively utilized his Assistant Chief of Staff to coordinate the work of the Mobile Army Division and the War College Division. These two staff divisions functioned throughout the border concentration of 1914-1916, as a sort of "operations division." They supplied the personnel and equipment to meet General Funston's requests and provided him with additional policy instructions as required. While meeting these current operational requirements, they also continued long range planning to meet the possible contingency of large scale intervention in Mexico. Troop dispositions and operations were left to General Funston, who operated freely within the policy and planning guidance provided by the General Staff.

It was apparent to Scott that with the advent of the division as the basic tactical unit and the increasing size of the American Army in an age of industrialization and increasing technology, the concept of the nation's "first soldier" moving to the field to command the Army would have to be discarded. By 1916 it was apparent that the reforms begun by Leonard Wood toward improving the tactical organization of the Army and the increased attention given to the General Staff Serving with Troops were beginning to pay off. The concept of the division as the Army's tactical keystone had begun in 1910 and had been expanded to include the militia by 1912. The division's success as an organization was demonstrated in the concentration for Vera Cruz and the early concentrations on the border. It was given permanence in the Army's organization by Congress in 1916. The training of General Staff officers to man these units was proceeding well, although on a very narrow basis. The concepts of unit General Staff functions were well developed by 1914 and published in the Field Service Regulations. It
would require the First World War to bring the General Staff Serving with Troops to its full development.

General Scott realized that the evil of destroying the structure of the War Department General Staff and the headquarters of the geographic departments every time the Army assembled a combat force in the field must be stopped. It was necessary for the War Department General Staff to remain intact and in place along with its Chief. Here was the great difference between Wood's and Scott's concepts of what the function of the War Department General Staff was in time of war. Wood tended toward utilizing this staff just like the German model, as military technicians concerned only with the planning and supervision of the conduct of operations. General Scott caught the broader view of the duties of the War Department General Staff. He realized that there was a second sphere of Army interest which was the concern of the General Staff in time of war. This additional area of interest encompassed those activities concerned with the establishment and operation of organizations to provide the personnel and material with which to build an army. In short, Wood saw the General Staff as a coordinating staff designed to execute the policies initiated by the Chief of Staff. This staff concept fostered the tendency to act in an operational, rather than a functional staff role. Whereas, Scott apparently visualized the role of the General Staff and his position in it quite differently. He felt that the War Department General Staff could provide the broad strategic guidance to the field commanders without his taking personal command in the field. He was well on the way to organizing his staff to function along these lines, when Congress all but destroyed the General Staff in 1916. It is true that Scott's method of linking the
War Department with the field forces never underwent the acid test of war, but the basic structure and modus operandi had been developed. A forward looking concept, such as this which would allow for a multi-front war, would not again be brought forward until 1941, when General George C. Marshall would be Chief of Staff of the Army.
APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF 1910-1916

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY OF WAR

CHIEF OF STAFF

MOBILE ARMY DIVISION

WAR COLLEGE DIVISION

COAST ARTILLERY DIVISION

DIVISION OF MILITIA AFFAIRS

Staff Division Responsibilities:

(1). Mobile Army Division: All matters pertaining to Personnel and Material of Mobile Forces, and such other subjects as are not otherwise assigned.

(2). War College Division:
   (a). Collection and Distribution of Military Information; War Department Library; Preparation of Non-Technical Manuals; Direction and Coordination of Military Education; Plans for Field Manuevers; Collection and Discussion of all obtainable data relating to Strategical, Tactical and Logistical Features of future Military Operations and formation of complete working plans for passing from state of Peace to state of War.  
   (b). The Army War College.

(3). Coast Artillery Division: All matters pertaining to the Personnel and material of the Coast Artillery Forces.

(4). Division of Militia Affairs: All matters pertaining to the Organized Militia.

The above staff organization and responsibilities were outlined in Memorandum, Office, Chief of Staff, dated September 26, 1910. A subsequent Memorandum, Office of the Chief of Staff, dated April 1, 1911, added four subsections to the Mobile Army Division.

The Cavalry, Infantry and Field Artillery Sections, Mobile Army Division were responsible for: All matters relating to Stations, Movements, Arms, Equipment and Target Practice and also a general supervision over all matters relating to Personnel, Instruction, Training and Quartering of Troops of their respective arms.
The Miscellaneous Section, Mobile Army Division was responsible for: All matters referred to the Mobile Army Division other than those assigned to the Cavalry, Infantry and Field Artillery Sections, and such other matters as may be referred to it by direction of the Chief of Staff.
APPENDIX B
ORGANIZATION
OF THE
WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Chief of Division
&
President, Army War College
Secretary and Disbursing Officer

Chief Clerk

Correspondence Section
Record Section
Map Section
Library Section
Stenographic Section
Photographic Section
Distribution Section

Military Information Section

Executive Officer

Committees

Military Preparation and Policy
War Plans
Organization, Equipment and Training
Regular Troops:
(a) Infantry
(b) Cavalry
(c) Field Artillery
(d) Coast Artillery
(e) Staff
Militia
Military Education
Military Information and Monographs
History
Library and Map Sections
Legislation

Army War College

Director

Assistant Directors

Assistant Instructors

War Plans Committee

Map Problems
Map Maneuvers
Tactical and Terrain Rides
Historical and Staff Rides
Practice in:
(a) Original Investigation
(b) Preparation of War Plans
(c) Compilation of Military Monographs

Studies In:
(a) Military Geography
(b) Military History

Manual of the War College Division, General Staff United States Army 1915, Page 44.
APPENDIX C

ORGANIZATION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF 1916-1917

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY OF WAR

CHIEF OF STAFF

WAR COLLEGE DIVISION

DIVISION OF MILITIA AFFAIRS

Staff Division Responsibilities:

(1). War College Division:
   (a). Collection and distribution of military information; War
       Department Library; Preparation of Non-Technical Manuals; Direction
       and Coordination of Military Education; Plans for Field Maneuvers;
       Collation and Discussion of all obtainable data relating to Strategical,
       Tactical and Logistical Features of future Military Operations and
       formation of complete working plans for passing from state of Peace to
       state of War.
   (b). The Army War College

(2). Division of Militia Affairs:
    All matters pertaining to the Organized Militia.
NOTES
INTRODUCTION

Pages 1 - 6


5. *Command and Staff Principles* (Fort Leavenworth, 1937), 18.


CHAPTER I

Pages 7 - 26


10. J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff (Harrisburg, 1961), 4-5; Command and Staff Principles (Fort Leavenworth, 1937), 16; Walter C. Sweeney, Military Intelligence (New York, 1924), 42; Irvine, "Origin of Capital Staffs," 162-163, 173.


15. Briant H. Wells, Duties and Responsibilities of the War Department General Staff and Its Relation to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, 1928, located in the MHRC, Appendix A, 4.

16. U. S. War Department, Annual Reports of the Secretary of War 1899-1903, 298-300; U. S. War Department, Establishment of a General Staff Corps in the Army, 11.

17. U. S. War Department, Establishment of a General Staff Corps in the Army, 11-12, 294.

18. Wells, Duties and Responsibilities, Appendix A, 9; U. S. War Department, Establishment of a General Staff Corps in the Army, 14.


25. Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, 5-6; Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York, 1968), 219. This work was originally published in 1878 by D. Appleton and Company.


27. Rosinski, The German Army, 267-268; Natsmer, The Theoretical Foundations, 3. In illustrating his reasons for stating that the General Staff training had become dogmatic and concerned principally with the planning and conduct of large scale operations, Natsmer states, "that a Chief of Staff such as Count Schlieffen took one of Clausewitz's principles, the battle of extermination, and emphasized it with such pointedness and grandiose one-sidedness that this principal assumed the characteristic of a panacea." Schlieffen became a military 'technician' of the extreme type and as a result the General Staff confined its activities, more and more, to strategic planning.

28. U. S. War Department, Annual Reports of the Secretary of War 1899-1903, 328-331; NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 120, Headquarters of the Army, August 14, 1903. This General Order specifies the regulations, providing in detail the duties of the General Staff Corps and the Chief of Staff.

29. NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 120, August 14, 1903; Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton, 1961), 22-23.

30. U. S. War Department, Annual Reports of the Secretary of War 1899-1903, 335-336.
51. U. S. War Department, Annual Reports of the Secretary of War 1899-1903, Appendix D to Report for 1903, 3; Manual for the War College Division, General Staff, United States Army (Washington, 1915), 6. This manual outlines the organization and functions of the War College Division, War Department General Staff in the period 1910-1916. It is located in the MHRC.

32. NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 155, November 27, 1901: Par. 4. A War College for the most advanced instruction at Washington Barracks, D.C. ... It should be kept constantly in mind that the object and ultimate aim of all this preparatory work is to train officers to command men in war. Theory must not, therefore, be allowed to displace practical application. See also Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 35; Hittle, The Military Staff, 198; Arthur L. Wagner, "An American War College," Journal of the Military Service Institute of the United States, X (July 1889), 290.


35. U. S. War Department, General Staff Corps: Laws and Regulations, 23.

36. George B. Ahern, Army War College Chronicle 1899-1917 (Unpublished manuscript located in the MHRC), 160.

37. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 57-58; U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1912 (3 vols., Washington, 1912), I, 236: Manual of the Army War College Division, 7; History of the General Staff, MHRC, 300: This latter reference makes the point that, "the Military Information Committee became so loaded down with "current General Staff work" that it could not conduct proper research for high grade intelligence."; Letter to the author from Colonel W. T. Merry, US Army (Retired), August 17, 1970. Colonel Merry was assigned to the War College Division, War Department General Staff during the period 1913-1916 and states that, "The War College Division was made up of about 20 officers...It had charge of plans and training ..., but had no direct control over any units in the field."
38. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 35-36, 42-43, General Bliss's original organization of the Army War College consisted of a Strategy Board, which acted as a directing and coordinating body for the five committees set up to consider the military aspects of problems concerning Canada, Philippines, and the Orient, Caribbean, Mexico and Joint Army-Navy Maneuvers.

39. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 48, 64-66. In 1910, General William W. Wotherspoon, then President of the Army War College, added three additional committees to the original five, i.e., Military Resources of the United States, Home Defense and South and Latin America. He also changed the locale for the conduct of tactical and strategic map exercises from France and Germany to North America, Hawaii and the Philippines. He felt it was better to locate such exercises "where it was at least possible we might someday serve."

40. U. S. War Department; Annual Reports 1912, I, 236; Ahern, War College Chronicle, 32.


42. Wotherspoon, A General Staff, 20.

43. Wotherspoon, A General Staff, 20-21. For an analysis of the Logistical Plan to support the Mexican Border Concentration of 1916 see: Army War College Document 253-5, February 29, 1924 located in the MHRC. This analysis deals in detail with the plans prepared by the Ordnance Department for the arming and equipping of the field armies in the event of war.

44. Wotherspoon, A General Staff, 21-22; Use of one of these Tactical Studies in the preparation of units for action is given in the War College Division Document File No. 6474-3, 25 March 1911, National Archives, Record Group 165 Records of the War Department General Staff (hereafter cited as NA, RG 165). This document is a resume of tactical situations likely to arise in an invasion of Mexico, along the San Miguel-Herreras-Monterey route, the Vera Cruz-Jalapa-Puebla route. It was prepared by Major Guy Carleton, GS. It consisted of 12 pages and 1 appendix of 2 pages. War College Division Document File No. 6474-203, 18 February 1913, NA, RG 165 (General William Crozier, Chief War College Division to the Commanding General, I Division, Governor's Island, NY) states that, "a copy of this resume of tactical situations likely to arise in an invasion of Mexico has been forwarded to the I Division along with a mounted map showing the routes from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. This copy of the tactical resume accompanied 23 copies of the Mexican War Plan, revised as of December 1912." Ahern, War College
Chronicle, 103, shows that Major Guy Carleton was a member of the Army War College Class of 1909 and upon completion of the course was detailed to the War Department General Staff, War College Division, Army War College as an instructor, and therefore, he was a member of the War Plans Committee.

45. Wotherspoon, A General Staff, 22; Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 55, 64-66.


47. Alvin Brown, Organization (New York, 1945), 104.

48. Hammond, Organizing For Defense, 16-17; Oliver L. Spaulding, The United States Army in War and Peace (New York, 1937), 396; Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, 105.

49. U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1913 (Washington, 1913), Par. 761, Art. LVIII, 164-165.

50. NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 120, Headquarters of the Army, August 14, 1903; Pizer, The United States Army, 48.

51. U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1910, Par. 774, Art. LIX, 139; Carter, The American Army, 199.

52. Schwan, Report on the Organization of the German Army, 62; Schellendorf, Duties of the General Staff, 33.


55. U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1910-1912, Par. 774, Art., 139; U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1915-1918, Par. 763, Art. LVIII, 165.


58. Robert L. Howze, Coordination of Administrative Duties During the Period of Grand Tactical Operations, Unpublished manuscript written at the Army War College during the academic session 1915-1916. MHRC, 5, 37; Schwan, "The Coming General Staff," 17.


CHAPTER II

Pages 27 - 44


6. NA, RG 165, Document No. 6106-3, War College Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, 8 July 1911. Memorandum from the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs to the Chief of Staff, Subject: Revocation of General Orders No. 35, 28 February 1910.

7. U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1910, Par. 766, Art. LIX, 137-138: States that, "The General Staff Corps...is charged with the duty of preparing plans...(including the assignment to armies, corps, divisions and other headquarters of the necessary quota of General Staff and other staff officers)," Par. 781, Art. LIX, 140: States that, "The General Staff of a command consists of general staff officers of such number and grades as may be assigned to it on the recommendation of the Chief of Staff,"; Par. 782, Art. LIX, 140: States that, "The senior General Staff officer on duty with a command shall, unless otherwise directed by the War Department, be the chief of staff of the command. Ordinarily he will be assigned by the War Department."

8. NA, RG 165, Document No. 3287-1, Letter from the Chief of Staff (Lieutenant General S. B. M. Young) to Major General Henry C. Corbin, Governor's Island, New York, Subject: Duties of the General Staff Serving With Troops.

9. Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, 97-98; U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1910, Par. 783, Art. LIX, 140: States that, "The General Staff officers serving with troops are employed...upon the duties prescribed for officers of the General Staff Corps."

10. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 37-63: The Army War College had by June 1910 graduated a total of 71 officers, normally of the grades of Captain and Major; U. S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1910, Par. 17, 17: These regulations are vague as to the duties to be performed by the General Staff officers serving with troops, with the exception of the collection of military information. A Military Information Division office was not established in the headquarters of a military territorial department until 1916. The only exception to this is the Philippine Division where an Office of Military Information was established in 1900.

11. Schwan, Organization of the German Army, 61, 67.


13. NA, RG 165, The basic document is No. 6211, War College Division, General Staff, December 5, 1910, Subject: Reorganization of the Mobile Army. Inclosure 1 to this document is a memorandum prepared by Major Henry T. Allen,
General Staff, which discusses various proposals for reorganization which were prepared by the War College Division, War Department General Staff.


18. U. S. War Department, Establishment of a General Staff Corps in the Army, 22.

19. NA, RG 165, Document No. 6805, Office of the Chief of Staff, 8 March 1911, Subject: Letter of Instructions to Major General William H. Carter, Commanding General, Maneuver Division.

20. U. S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1910, 42.


22. U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1911, I, 12-14, 135-136: States that, "The Army now stationed in the United States consists of 56,753 personnel, deducting the strength of the Coast Artillery Corps...leaves a Mobile Army of 31,850 officers and men."


26. NA, RG 165, The basic document is No. 6805 (previously cited in footnote 19). All the correspondence with the division and from it is contained in this file.


28. NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 94, 19 May 1911. This order directed that the continental United States would be subdivided into three Territorial Divisions and seven Territorial Departments, to be effective 1 July 1911; Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, 170.

29. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports 1911*, I, 142-143; In this report the Chief of Staff of the Army states that he feels, "the continental Mobile Army should be composed of four infantry divisions and one cavalry division." Other advocates of military preparedness urged the formation of a one-division expeditionary force to be located at either Fort Sam Houston, Texas or Fort Riley, Kansas. See: C. H. Mason, *Our Military Needs* (Washington, 1912), 24-25; William H. Carter, *The American Army*, 154-156.


31. NA, RG 165, Indorsement by Brigadier General William Crozier, Chief, War College Division, 8 November 1912, located on the back of the pamphlet's title page in Document File No. 7280.

32. NA, RG 165, Document No. 7280-8. Letter from the Acting Commandant, The Army Service Schools (Lieutenant Colonel N. P. Burnham) to the Chief of Staff, Subject: Comments on "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States."

Subject: Program for Meeting of General Officers Ordered to Report at Washington, D. C. Pursuant to Instructions Issued by the War Department, 19 December 1912.

Plans were being developed to cover the following contingencies:

1. Operations against an invading force on the Atlantic Coast.
2. Operations against an invading force on the Pacific Coast.
3. Operations, offensive or defensive, in the direction of Canada.
4. Operations in Mexico, Central and South America including the problems of embarkation and debarkation.
5. For operations in connection with our outlying possessions.
6. For operations in connection with the Canal Zone.
7. For operations within the territory of the United States in connection with civil disorders.
8. For offensive operations against foreign countries.

Miller, Background, 87-90.

U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1912, I, 267: The continental United States was divided into 12 divisional districts, each district to contain a tactical militia division. The planning in the War College Division, War Department General Staff was done, thereafter, on the basis of having tactical divisions already organized during time of peace.; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 262-263; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948), 39-40.

U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1912, I, 18-19, 164-166, 176; NA, RG 165, Document No. 7545-1, January 31, 1913, Memorandum from the Chief of Staff to the Adjutant General, Subject: Publication of Orders Directing Change of Station for Certain Units of the Mobile Army.


NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 9, February 6, 1913; U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1915, Par. 191 and 193, Art. XXVI, 48-51, Par. 197-199, Art. XXVI, 56-57; U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1915, I, 27.
42. United States Statutes At Large, Vol. 37, Chapter 391: An Act Making Appropriation for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1913 and for other purposes. The so called "Manchu Law" is contained in the first proviso under the heading "Pay of Officers of the Line." The proviso reducing the authorized strength of the General Staff Corps from 45 officers to 36 officers is contained in Section 5, Chapter 391, pg. 381.; U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1913, I, 139; Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, 174; John Dickinson, The Building of An Army (New York, 1922), 265.

43. NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 30, April 23, 1913; U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1913, Par. 755, Art. LVIII, 163-164; Rosinski, The German Army, 281-282.

44. NA, RG 165, War College Division Memorandum No. 6474-223, 17 February 1913 for the Adjutant General. The index file abstract indicates that this was the original alert for the movement of the Fifth Brigade, Second Division to Galveston, Texas.

45. NA, RG 165, Document No. 6474-227, 24 February 1913. Memorandum from the Chief of Staff to the Adjutant General. The index file abstract indicates that the Commanding General, Central Department is to be directed to move the remainder of the Second Division to Texas City, Texas.; NA, RG 165, Document Nos. 6474-228-233, 24 February, 1913. The index file abstract indicates that these were messages from the Chief, War College Division to the Commanding Generals of the Fifth Brigade, East, Central, Western and Southern Departments and the Second Division providing them with maps, information and additional instructions.; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 69.

46. NA, RG 165, Document No. 6474-288, 30 October 1913. From the Secretary, Army War College (Major C. Crawford) to the Chief of Staff, Second Division, Texas City, Texas, Subject: Map Problems, Army War College. The index file abstract indicates that this document outlined what the Second Division's role was to be in the Mexican War Plan prepared by the War Department General Staff. This information was provided to the Second Division so that the division commander could organize and conduct map maneuvers for the training of his subordinate commanders and staffs prior to the movement to Mexico.; U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1913, III, 113-120; NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 9, February 6, 1913.

CHAPTER III

Pages 45 - 73

1. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 50; Millott, "The General Staff and the Cuban
Intervention of 1906," Military Affairs, XXXI (Fall 1967), 114.


3. Ahern, Army War College Chronicle, 57; States that under the provisions of Special Orders No. 230, War Department, September 29, 1906, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Wotherspoon is assigned as chief of staff of the Expedition to Cuba and Majors William A. Mann and David DuB. Gaillard are assigned as assistants to the chief of staff; Millett, The General Staff and the Cuban Intervention of 1906," 117; Major Francis J. Kernan was designated assistant chief of staff, Major David DuB. Gaillard, Chief of the Military Information Division and Captain John W. Furlong as the assistant to the Chief, Military Information Division, Captain Charles T. Menoher was designated as the Provost Marshal.


5. NA, RG 165, Army War College Document Serial No. 11, Appendix 6, "Collation of Reports of the Various Staff Officers with the Army of Cuban Pacification and Conclusions Drawn from Reports of Staff and Regimental Officers on Duty with the Army of Cuban Pacification 1906."


8. U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1912, I, 267: "The planning in the War College Division, War Department General Staff was done ... on the basis of having tactical divisions already organized ...."

9. NA, RG 165, File Index Card No. 6474-25, 13 February 1912, Office of the Chief of Staff, War College Division Memorandum for the Chief of Staff (Confidential) from William W. Wotherspoon, Subject: Assuming Conditions Arise Necessitating Intervention in Mexico; NA, RG 165, File Index Card No. 6474-27, 15 February 1912, Office of the Chief of Staff, War College Division (A. L. Mills, Brigadier General, Chief, War College Division), Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Armed Intervention in Mexico.

10. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-29, 20 February 1912, Office of the
Chief of Staff, War College Division (A. L. Mills, Brigadier General, Chief War College Division), Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Assignment of General Staff Officers for Commands Composing the Armed Forces to be Used in Case of War with Mexico; NA, RG 165, Index File Card Nos. 6474-19, 20, 21, 20 February 1912, Office of the Chief of Staff, War College Division (A. L. Mills, Brigadier General, Chief, War College Division), Memorandum for Staff Department, Subject: Mobilization and War Plans, Mexico.

11. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 37-68; NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-29, 20 February 1912, Office of the Chief of Staff, War College Division (A. L. Mills, Chief, War College Division), Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Assignment of General Staff Officers; U. S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1910, Par. 16, 15-16.


13. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-32, 7 March 1912, Office of the Chief of Staff, Memorandum from the Chief of Staff (Major General Leonard Wood) to the President, Army War College, Subject: Mobilization of Regular and Militia Forces under certain circumstances.

14. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-66, 15 March 1912, War College Division Memorandum (Lieutenant Colonel H. Liggett) for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Armed Intervention in Mexico; The composition of the Second, Third and Fourth Field Armies is outlined on NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-93, 15 April 1912, Part II, Title: The Mobilization, Organization, Concentration, Embarkation and Supply of the Second Field Army of Vera Cruz. It consists of the IV, VI and VII Volunteer Divisions.

Part III
The Third Field Army (Vera Cruz) is composed of the VIII, IX and X Volunteer Divisions.
The Fourth Field Army (Southern Border of the United States) is composed of the XI, XIV and XV Volunteer Divisions; NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-84 (undated), War College Division (A. L. Mills, Brigadier General, General Staff, Chief, War College Division), Memorandum for Major General Thomas H. Barry, Superintendent of the United States Military Academy. This memorandum informs General Barry that he has been assigned to command the First Field Army.

15. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-44, 8 March 1912, Office of the Quartermaster General, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Mobilization and War Plans, Mexico; NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-71,
22 March 1912, Chief, War College Division (A. L. Mills) Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Names of Retired Officers of the Army Competent to Perform Duty. This memorandum states that, "it is necessary to have these officers in order to accomplish the work of muster and supply at the 50 mobilization camps which will be used in the United States."

16.
NA, RG 94, General Orders No. 30, April 23, 1913; NA, RG 165, Document No. 7545-11, 5 April 1913, Memorandum for the Chief, War College Division, from the Chief of Staff, Subject: Proposed General Order No. 30; NA, RG 165, Document No. 7545-11, AGO 2012336, April 14, 1913, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from the Chief, War College Division, Subject: Designation of Staff Officers of Brigades, Divisions, Field Armies and Territorial Departments.

17.
See NA, RG 165, Index File Card Nos. 6474-203-266 for requests from Division/Department Commanders and replies from the War College Division concerning staff officer appointments and information on possible tactical situations, map maneuvers, maps and information on routes and railroads in Mexico.

18.
NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-270, 24 June 1913, Chief, War College Division, Memorandum for the War Plans Committee, Subject: Armed Intervention in Mexico.

19.
NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-309, 16 April 1914, Special Plan "A" for Armed Intervention in Mexico Using Regular Troops for Intervention and Organized Militia for Defensive Purposes. This plan provides for the dispatch of a reinforced brigade of the II Division, of the First Field Army from Galveston and a Provisional Regiment of Coast Artillery from Pensacola. The brigade will go to Vera Cruz and the provisional regiment to Tampico. The remainder of the First Field Army is to be dispatched promptly to Vera Cruz. All mobile militia are to be called out and relieve all regular troops on the Mexican border, except one cavalry brigade. The provisional regiment of Coast Artillery was later dropped from the plan.

20.
NA, RG 165, Index Card No. 6474-326, 22 April 1914, from the Commanding General, Southern Department (T. H. Bliss) to the Adjutant General, Subject: Protection of the Border in Case of Armed Intervention in Mexico; Index Card No. 6474-326, 4 May 1914, War College Division Memorandum (Colonel McMahon) for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Objections to Plan Submitted by Commanding General, Southern Department.

21.
Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 131-132; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964), 40; U. S. War Department, Annual Reports

22. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur (2 vols., Boston, 1970), I, 117; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 40, MacArthur states that General Wood informed him on April 22, 1914 that he (MacArthur) was to be the Field Army Operations Officer. This would seem to indicate that the organization of the General's headquarters and the designation of the officers to fill the positions within that headquarters were not included in the War Plans as were the commanders and staffs of the subordinate units; U. S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1914 (March 1914), Par. 261, 118: These regulations outline for the first time in detail the organization and duties of the General Staff of a division, field army and an army.

23. Spaulding, The United States Army in War and Peace, 405; Adjutant General's Office, Army List and Directory (July 1914), 3. The units comprising the Vera Cruz Expeditionary Force were: The 4th, 7th, 19th and 28th Infantry Regiments, 4th Field Artillery Regiment, Troops I and K, 6th Cavalry Regiment, Company E, Engineers and Field Hospital No. 3 a total of 4,180 personnel.


25. Adjutant General's Office, Army Register 1914, 12, 15, 118; Ahern, Army War College Chronicle, 50, 206, 210-211; Adjutant General's Office, Army List and Directory (July 1914), 3; Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 42-43.


29. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-352, 20 June 1914, from the Commanding General, U. S. Expeditionary Forces (General Funston) to the Adjutant General, Subject: Plan of Operations. Included in this abstract is the 1st Indorsement of the War College Division, 14 July 1914 to the Chief of Staff, Subject: Plan of Operations in Mexico (Comments on Funston's letter of June 20, 1914). Recommends that General Funston be informed by the Chief of Staff that the approved plans will be followed as already outlined. Appended is a notation to the effect that General Funston was so notified by cablegram on 21 July 1914.

30. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-355, 19 August 1914, Captain Douglas MacArthur, General Staff, to the Chief of Staff, Subject: War Plans for the Establishment of a Base at Vera Cruz, Mexico.; NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-356, 21 August 1914, Office of the Chief of Engineers (Dan C. Kingman) to the Chief, War College Division, Subject: Project for the Defense of Vera Cruz by U. S. Troops. Forwards a copy of the project for defense of Vera Cruz prepared by the Chief Engineer Officer of the U. S. Expeditionary Forces (Major W. J. Barden).

31. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-342, 4 June 1914, Memorandum from the Chief of Staff (Major General W. W. Wotherspoon) to the Chief, War College Division (Brigadier General M. M. Macomb), Subject: Letter from Commanding General, Southern Department, Subject: War Plans in Northern Mexico. Also includes a request from the Chief of Staff that the War College Division draft an answer to the Commanding General, Southern Department concerning his proposals.

32. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-342, 6 June 1914, War College Division Memorandum (Major W. D. Connor) for the Chief of Staff, Subject: War Plans in Northern Mexico. Major Connor functioned within the War College Division as the "Action Officer" for War Planning. He was the Assistant Director of the Army War College and accompanied the Chief of Staff to all high level planning conferences at the White House for the Vera Cruz operation.; Army and Navy Journal (April 25, 1914); Ahern, Army War College Chronicle, 218.

33. Ahern, Army War College Chronicle, 234.

34. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 48, 64-66; U. S. War Department, History of the General Staff, Inclosure 1. Brigadier General Wotherspoon served as President, Army War College from December 1, 1909 to January 13, 1912. Upon relief from that position he became the Assistant to the Chief of Staff, a position he held until April 21, 1914 when he relieved General Leonard Wood as Chief of Staff of the Army.
35. U. S. War Department, History of the General Staff, Inclosures 1 and 2; U. S. War Department, Army Regulations 1908, Art. LVIII, Par. 762, 163.

36. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-347, 15 June 1914, Memorandum from the Chief of Staff to the President, Army War College, Subject: Mexican War Plans. Forwards a letter from General Bliss, dated 9 June 1914 which contains proposals for changing the existing war plans.

37. NA, RG 165, Index File Card Nos. 6474-335-351, covering the period May through July, 1914. These entries deal with the problem of finding staff officers for the volunteer field armies. The staff and command personnel for the First Field Army (Regular Army) being fairly well firmed up by this time.

38. U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1915, I, 151.


40. NA, RG 94, Document No. 2229856, November 19, 1914, Letter from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Southern Department, Subject: Mexican Border.

41. U. S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1914, Art. III, Par. 259, 117.

42. Palmer, Bliss, 101-103; U. S. War Department, History of the General Staff, Inclosure 1.

43. Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa (Ithaca, 1961), 225-227; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 187; Ganoe, The History of the United States Army, 453; NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-371, 14 January 1916, Memorandum from the Chief, Mobile Army Division (T. H. Bliss) to the Chief of Staff, Subject: Military Requirements Concerning Intervention in Chihuahua. Recommends that the War College Division be directed to study and report upon the general military requirements for intervention in Mexico based on the following assumptions:

1. Intervention with the consent and cooperation of the Carranza government, to restore order in Chihuahua and protect American life and property there.

2. Intervention against active opposition of Mexicans generally.
(3). Intervention with consent, but no cooperation from the Carranza government.

This recommendation was approved by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. This is the first reference to a possible limited advance into Mexico, rather than the capture of Mexico City as advocated in preceding plans.

44.

NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-372, 4 March 1916, War College Division Memorandum (Major M. W. Rowell) for the Chief of Staff, Subject: The Military Strength for Armed Intervention in Mexico. Operation to be divided into two phases: (1) Military Operations - 387,000 troops, requiring 3 months. (2) Pacification - 557,280 troops, requiring not less than 3 years.

45.

See Herbert Molloy Mason, Jr.'s, *The Great Pursuit* (New York, 1970), 3-21 for a fine account of the raid on Columbus, New Mexico and the resulting Punitive Expedition; also Clendenen, *The United States and Pancho Villa*; Frank Tompkins, *Chasing Villa* (Harrisburg, 1954); and Haley, *Revolution and Intervention*.

46.


47.

NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-374, 10 March 1916, Mobile Army Division (T. H. Bliss) Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Expedition into Mexico. Bliss makes the recommendation that, "...orders be sent to General Funston to organize an expedition for that purpose (destruction of Mexican bands who raided Columbus) from the troops in his department... to proceed according to his best judgment... calling upon the War Department for such additional forces as he may require... to guard the border. The problems on file in the War College Division refer to larger problems, such as intervention in Mexico or some state thereof." This same recommendation is made by the Chief, War College Division in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff on the same date (Index Card File No. 6474-373, 10 March 1916). The War College memorandum further recommends that Major William H. Hay, recently Funston's chief of staff in the Southern Department, who is on leave in Washington, D. C. be placed on temporary duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Hay also served as a member of the War Plans Committee in 1914 and assisted in drawing up the Mexican War Plans. Both these recommendations were approved by the Secretary of War on March 10, 1916.

48.


49.

NA, RG 94, Document No. 2377812, Adjutant General's Office, 10 March 1916, General Staff Memorandum from Major General T. H. Bliss to the
Commanding Officers, Eastern, Central and Western Departments, Subject: Movement to the Mexican Border.


52. NA, RG 94, General Funston's Annual Report 1916, 28; NA, RG 94, General Pershing's Report to June 30, 1916, 4: Troops designated to comprise the Punitive Expedition were: 7th, 10th, 11th, and 13th Cavalry Regiments, 6th and 16th Infantry Regiments, Batteries B and C, 6th Field Artillery Regiment. General Order No. 1, March 14, 1916, Headquarters, Punitive Expedition designated Lieutenant Colonel DeRosey C. Cabell, 10th Cavalry, as the Chief of Staff. Colonel Cabell was a graduate of the Army War College, Class of 1913. He had been detailed as an assistant instructor for the War College Course of 1913-1914 along with Major William H. Hay (See note No. 47). The expedition's assistant chief of staff, Captain Wilson B. Burtt, 20th Infantry, was a 1912 graduate of the Staff College. The other General Staff Officer in the headquarters was Major James A. Ryan, 13th Cavalry. Ryan had had wide experience in guerrilla warfare and pacification operations. He had served as a Provost Marshal and Provost Judge in the Philippines, 1900-1903; Advisor and Trainer of the Cuban Rural Guard 1906-1907; and aide to Charles Edward Magoon, the Governor of the Cuban Provisional Government during 1908. (See Millett, The Politics of Intervention, 151, 181, 224); Letter to the author from Colonel Albert B. Dockery, U. S. Army (Retired), January 13, 1971. Colonel Dockery states that, "Colonel Cabell seems to have attended to many routine details, but most of his time seems to have been devoted to the supply of the troops .... There was practically no staff functioning at the headquarters. General Pershing gave all orders personally...." In the cavalry regiments alone there were five War College graduates, six graduates of the Staff College and four officers who had served details on the General Staff. For a description as to how the General Staff of the Punitive Expedition functioned in the field see General Pershing's Report to June 30, 1916, Appendix D: Comments and Recommendations.

53. NA, RG 94, The collection of documents under the subject heading of War College Memoranda, March - May 1916, contains many documents concerning many of the routine matters of personnel administration and organization in the Southern Department and the Punitive Expedition.

54. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-379, 9 May 1916, Telegram from Secretary of War to Governors of Arizona, New Mexico and Texas; NA, RG 94, Document No. A. G. 2394312, May 9, 1916, General Staff Memorandum,
Subject: Instructions of General Funston as to Action to take if U. S. Troops are attacked by Mexicans; Ray S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters* (6 vols., Garden City, 1940), VI, 73.

55. NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-383, 16 June 1916 Memorandum from the Chief of Staff to the Chief, War College Division, Subject: Mexican War Plans. The plans are to include designation of commanders, staff personnel and the organization of troops; NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-387, 26 June 1916 War College Division Memorandum (Colonels Kennedy Carmeran and Major Palmer) for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Commanders and Staffs, Contains recommendations for division and brigade commanders, chiefs of staff and assistant chiefs of staff without designating the organizations to which they are to be assigned.

56. U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1916, I, 189-194; NA, RG 165, Index File Card No. 6474-397, 18 June 1916, War Department telegram to all states except Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and Nevada directing the mobilization of the Organized Militia for muster into United States service.

57. The Papers of Fitzhugh Lee, Message No. 1547 from the War Department to General Funston, June 23, 1916; Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*, 523; Spaulding, *The United States Army in War and Peace*, 405.


60. Palmer, *Bliss*, 116; Ahern, *Army War College Chronicle*, 124, 147, 186-187, 219; Adjutant General's Office, *Army Register* 1916; Adjutant General's Office, *Army Directory and List* (July 1916), 3-4; U. S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1914, Art. III, Par. 260, 117. The staff of Headquarters, Southern Department had been built up in anticipation of controlling large field forces by the assignment of senior field grade officers. By July, 1916, all of the principal staff positions both of the General Staff group and the Technical—Administrative group were occupied by colonels. Of these officers, the Chief of Staff, Colonel Malvern-Hill Barnum, the Adjutant, Colonel Omar Bundy, the Inspector, Colonel Frederick R. Day and the Officer in Charge of Militia Affairs, Colonel Robert A. Brown were graduates of the Army War College. Colonel Brown had also served as an assistant instructor at the War College during 1910-1911, and thus had been a member of the War Plans Committee of the War College Division.

62. United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 39, Chap. 134, Section 3, 166: Composition of Brigades, Divisions and so Forth.

63. The Papers of Fitzhugh Lee, Organization of National Guard Forces in the Southern Department, January 1, 1917. The majority of the division and brigade commanders and the division chiefs of staff listed in this document were officers of the Regular Army; U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1916, I, 28.

64. United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 39, Chap. 134, Section 5. The General Staff Corps. --, 167.

65. United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 39, Chap. 134, Section 5. The General Staff Corps. --, 167; Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 81-82; U. S. War Department, Annual Reports 1916, I, 53-54. In addition to the loss of the Army War College, this act also eliminated the Mobile Army Division and the Coast Artillery Division from the War Department General Staff.

66. Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 37-80; Ahern, Army War College Chronicle, 30-243. The Army War College had, by June of 1916, graduated a total of 199 officers of which 193 were from the Army. Only one National Guard officer, Major General John F. O'Ryan from New York had attended the course at this school.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS


Merry, William T. Letter to the author, August 17, 1970 located in author's personal files.


Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Records Group 94, National Archives.

Records of the War Department General Staff, Records Group 165, National Archives.


U. S. War Department, Studies on High Commands and General Staffs of Foreign Armies, August 12, 1922. Manuscript in the U. S. Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

Wells, Briant H. Duties and Responsibilities of the War Department General Staff and Its Relation to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1928. Manuscript in the U. S. Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.


PUBLISHED SOURCES

BOOKS

Primary Sources


Funston, Frederick, Memories of Two Wars: Cuban and Philippine Experiences. New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1914.


McClellan, George B. McClellan's Own Story. New York: Charles Webster and Co., 1887.


BOOKS

Secondary Sources


**ARTICLES**


---


---


---


---


---


---


---

Connolly, Donald H. "What and Why is a General Staff?" The Military Engineer, May-June, 1921, 222-229.

---


---


---


---


---


---


---


---


"Organizations of the Army at Vera Cruz," The Army and Navy Journal, May 2, 1914, 1111.


