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Austro-American Relations,
1861-1866

by

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ABSTRACT

The period between 1851-1866 was the era of the American Civil War and the European intervention in Mexico, when Napoleon III of France attempted to force the Mexican people to accept Austrian Archduke Maximilian as their ruler. This thesis deals with official Austrian policy in regard to both of the above crises in the history of the western hemisphere. The writer has come to the conclusion that Austria's attitude towards political developments in the United States and Mexico in the 1860's merely reflected the general policy of friendship which the Habsburg government then followed in dealing with the government in Washington. Before the late 1850's the Austrians were anything but cordial to the United States. Then the policy suddenly changed. An evaluation of the reasons for this fundamental policy change is one of the subjects taken up in this thesis.

During the period under discussion a series of important diplomatic exchanges took place between Austria and the United States. Under consideration were such questions as maritime neutral rights during time of war, the sale of arms to the Confederacy, the attempt by a United States consul in Vienna to grant a general's commission in the Union army to the Italian patriot, Giuseppe Garibaldi, and the policy which Austria adopted towards Mexico. Using the records of the Austrian Foreign Office, the United States Department of State, numerous manuscript collections, and other pertinent
primary and secondary sources, the author discusses these questions and relates them to the general problem of the relations between Austria and the United States during the years 1861 to 1866.

_Austro-American Relations, 1861-1866_ is primarily a diplomatic study. However, the author also devotes some attention to the political, social, and economic conditions of both countries. Especial emphasis is placed on the effects of the Civil War on the Austrian economy. The author also discusses the policies followed by the Austrian and American diplomats who played a vital role in determining policy between Austria and the United States. Particularly important were Johann Georg Hülsemann, the Austrian minister to the United States during the first three years considered in the study, and John Motley, the American minister to Austria for the entire period 1861-1866.

Finally, attention is paid to several previous interpretations of Austro-American relations during the Civil War and Mexican intervention. These analyses stated that Austria pursued a hostile policy towards the government in Washington during the 1850's, and the author of this thesis explains, by way of summary, why he rejects these interpretations.
The period between 1851 and 1865 was one of the most crucial eras in the history of the western hemisphere. Compressed into these few years were the American Civil War, an intervention in Mexico, and an attempt by a foreign power to establish a monarchical form of government in the new world. The war, the intervention, and the attempt to establish a monarchy were all related events. Of paramount importance to all three occurrences were the policies of the European nations towards them. Significantly one of these nations, France, let her policy toward the Civil War be determined largely by her ambitions in Mexico. It is no coincidence that the French emperor, Napoleon III, who was one of the most important advocates of intervention in behalf of the Confederacy, was also the leader of the interventionist movement in Mexico.

Austria was another country whose position toward the Civil War, the intervention, and the attempt to establish a monarchy in Mexico was all part of the same policy. It might seem strange that the Habsburg monarchy should be mentioned in context with the Civil War. After all, the impact of Austria on American history had been relatively slight before the war, and Austria never significantly influenced the outcome of the struggle. Certainly neither the Union nor the Confederacy ever feared Austrian intervention in behalf of the other side. It might also seem unusual to mention Austria in connection with the intervention in Mexico.
France, England, and Spain—not Austria—were the countries which originated the idea of the intervention, and France was the one who carried it to completion, and attempted to establish a monarchy in Mexico. Yet the ruler selected by the French to head the new Mexican empire was an Austrian archduke and brother of the Austrian emperor. As a result, Mexico attracted the serious attention of the officials in the Austrian foreign office. Many months of debate were spent deciding what policy the government in Vienna should follow towards Mexico. Several important questions were raised. Should Austria consider the archduke's acceptance of the Mexican throne as an Austrian commitment to support monarchical institutions in the western hemisphere? Or should she regard the archduke's acceptance of the throne as a private act not obligating the government in Vienna to support the empire if the occasion ever arose? Or, finally, should she follow some unclear, undefined, middle course? All these questions had to be, and were, answered by the government in Vienna. As it happened, the final decision reached on these questions proved decisive to the fate of the Mexican empire.

The decision which the Austrian government made on matters involving Mexico was in part influenced by its general policies in regard to Europe, especially in so far as they concerned France. The decision was also based on the policies which the government had formulated towards the
Union and Confederacy during the course of the Civil War. To obtain a complete picture of Austrian diplomacy in regard to the intervention and establishment of a monarchy in Mexico, it is, therefore, necessary to study Austria's policies towards Mexico in connection with its policies towards the American Civil War.

A study of Austria's policies toward the Civil War is also important for other reasons. While it is true that Austrian actions never had any decisive influence on the Civil war, the Austrian attitude toward both participants had a great influence on other European foreign ministries, and the policies of these ministries played a vital role on the final outcome of the struggle. On more than one occasion even tacit Austrian support of the Confederacy would have damaged the Union cause both in Europe and in America. Furthermore, several important exchanges of notes and ideas took place between Austria and the United States during the course of the Civil War. Involved in these communications and discussions were the problems of neutral rights during wartime, the sale of guns and ammunition to the Confederacy, and the attempt of an American consular agent to grant the Italian patriot, Giuseppe Garibaldi, a general's commission in the Union army. All three problems were of significance in the diplomatic history of the United States.

Finally, a study of Austria's relations with the United States during the Civil War is important because it clearly
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shows that Austria's position as a world power had deteriorated to the point where Austria found herself in desperate need of support from both old and new allies. While this fact is not especially revealing by itself, it becomes important when it is shown that in quest of new allies, the Austrian government sought the friendship of the United States. This Austrian policy of friendship for America, so clearly manifested in the attitude of the Austrian government towards the Civil War, bears ample testimony to one of the most often forgotten facts of American history; even before the opening of the Civil War, the United States was already recognized as a world power whose policies could greatly influence the destiny of Europe and whose friendship was valued by important European countries.
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Chapter I
The Basis of Policy

At the opening of the American Civil War Austria and the United States were historically, politically, and socially at opposite poles. While the Austrians traced the history of part of their country as a political unit back a thousand years to the time of Charlemagne, the American people looked back on less than eighty-five years of national existence. While monarchical and autocratic Austria dedicated herself to the maintenance of the existing world order, republican America opposed autocracy and pursued an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. Finally, while predominantly Catholic Austria encouraged missionary work abroad, Protestant America was made up of a fervidly anti-Catholic population.

Because of such fundamental differences between Austria and the United States, the relations between the two countries before the Civil War had been marred by a series of unfortunate incidents. In 1829 a group of Viennese churchmen established the Leopolding Society to "promote greater Catholic missionary work" in America.¹ The missionary scheme was received with scorn by a large number of influential Americans, whose anti-Catholic feeling soon manifested itself in verbal attacks on the whole Austrian political and

¹ Benjamin J. Blled, Austrian Aid to American Catholics, 1830-1860 (Milwaukee: privately published; 1944), p. 23.
social structure. When the inventor of the telegraph, Samuel P. B. Morse, learned of the society, he recalled in a book he wrote entitled *Foreign Conspiracies Against the United States* that Austria was a partitioner of Poland, an oppressor of Italy, a member of the Holy Alliance, and a bastion of aristocracy and Catholicism. He added that Austrians were merely "slaves, slaves in body and mind, whipped and disciplined by priests to have no opinion of their own and taught to consider their emperor their God."^2 His attack on the Habsburg monarchy received the warm endorsement of at least nine newspapers and journals.

As a result of such attacks on Austrian institutions, the first American diplomatic representative to Austria, Henry A. Muhlenberg, received a cool reception when he came to Vienna in 1828. During his three-year stay in the city he frequently encountered strong prejudices against Americans by the diplomatic corps and the advisors to the Austrian Court. Partly because of these prejudices, he was not able to achieve his primary goal of increasing the tobacco trade between his country and Austria. Realizing the futility of his mission, he returned to the United States in 1840, having accomplished little by way of improving relations between the governments in Washington and Vienna.3

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3. Muhlenberg would probably have been unsuccessful even had the United States been on more friendly terms with
The antagonism which existed between Austria and the United States in 1840 continued unabated for almost two decades and reached such proportions after the 1848 revolutions that relations between the two countries were almost broken. Americans unanimously supported the revolutionaries and condemned an Austria which the *North American Review* called a "conglomeration of dissimilar races having no principle in unity but despotism." The secretary of state, John M. Clayton, even instructed A. Dudley Mann to go to Hungary to watch affairs there and to welcome the country into the family of nations as soon as she was able to maintain her independence. The new secretary of state, Daniel Webster, made a public statement of sympathy for Hungarian independence, saying that Hungary "ought to be

Austria, for the Austrian government, already enjoying a large revenue from a monopoly on the tobacco trade, was not prepared to sacrifice part of that income for increased trade with another country. However, the antagonism between America and Austria destroyed any small chance that Muhlenberg might have had in negotiating new trade agreements with the government in Vienna. For a discussion of Muhlenberg's mission to Vienna and of Austro-American relations prior to 1848, see George Barany, "The Interest of the United States in Central Europe," Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, Vol. XLVII (1952) pp. 275-81; Henry Merritt Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929), pp. 633-35; and Mary Anthonita Hess, *American Tobacco and Central European Policy* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1945), passim.

independent of all foreign powers." When Louis Kossuth, the leader of the Hungarian Revolution, came to America after the revolution failed, he met a hero's welcome.

The American reaction to the 1848-49 revolutionary movements naturally disturbed the Austrian government, which, because of Webster's statement in favor of Hungarian independence, even instructed the Austrian chargé d'affairs in America, Chevalier Johann Georg Hülsemann to leave the United States until a proper apology was made for the secretary's statement. As a consequence of the Austrian government's action diplomatic relations between the two countries were interrupted for several months. Although relations were later resumed, further difficulty arose in 1853 over the Austrian seizure of Martin Koszta, a participant in the 1848 revolutions who, at the time of his capture, was visiting Turkey under American protection. His subsequent removal by force from an Austrian ship by an American sloop of war which "happened" to be in the area created an incident which only increased the existing tension between America and Austria.

At the beginning of 1854 Austro-American relations were


6. For the Koszta affair, see William L. Marcy to Hülsemann, Washington, September 26, 1853; National Archives, Records of the Department of State, Notes to the Austrian Legation in the United States, microfilm copy No. 99, Roll 2. Hereafter cited as "U. S. Department of State, Notes to the Austrian Legation."
so strained that it seemed doubtful whether they could ever take a more friendly course. As the United States representative to Vienna, Henry Jackson, wrote to Secretary of State, William Marcy, in January,

The friends of this government link together a series of events connected with the revolution in Hungary, the reception of Hungarian exiles, the speeches and correspondence of Mr. Webster etc. etc.; all of which in their judgement shew that the United States have not entertained for some time past a kindly feeling towards this empire....[The] continuance of this unpleasant feeling between the two governments may tend to restrict a commercial intercourse which might otherwise develop itself between this island and New York.  

More than a year later Jackson still referred to the suspicious attitude of Austria towards the United States.  

Yet in less than another four years J. Glancy Jones, the new American representative at Vienna, wrote to Secretary Cass that the Austrian emperor had given him an audience which he did not even request and that a few days later Count Buol-Schauenstein, the Austrian foreign minister, gave a surprise dinner in his honor. It was clear to Jones that the Austrian government was "sincerely desirous to be on good terms" with America.  

It is obvious that in 1859 the Austrian attitude towards the United States was very different from that in 1854 and 1855. Part of the reason for Austria's change of policy between that brief period was that America, concerned as she was with the growing domestic crisis which eventually led to the Civil War, stopped meddling in Austria's internal affairs during the last half of the 1850's. The cold and unfriendly policy which Austria had previously maintained towards the United States had in the main been due to the fact that Americans had expressed themselves rather critically about Austrian affairs. Although the government in Vienna actually wanted only harmonious relations with the government in Washington, the American attitude had forced it to adopt an unfriendly policy toward the United States. A study of Austro-American diplomacy during the critical years 1848-1853 and of the writings of American travelers to Austria during the 1840's and 1850's indicates that there was surprising cordiality towards the United States on the part of Austrian officials and an earnest desire to stay on friendly terms with America.  

10 Thurlow Weed, who travelled through Austria in the beginning of the 1850's, found that Austria was a "pleasant country." He seemed surprised at the remarkable civility of the Austrian officers despite, as he noted, "the differences existing between our Government and Austria." Thurlow Weed, *Letters from Europe and the West Indies 1843-1862* (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1866), p. 602. Horace Greeley, who had visited Austria a few years earlier, remarked that, despite the ideological differences between American and Austria, he was not "able to dislike the Austrian personally." He even noted that if Austria would abandon Italy, he would be pre-
admitted to Marcy in 1853 that Austria's distrustful attitude toward America "was natural enough" in the light of recent events.11 It is true that the Austrian government had no sympathy for the political and social ideals of America; however, as Glancy Jones later remarked to William Seward, the very fact that Austria was separated from the United States by an ocean and a good part of a continent made it seem foolish to fear America or to pursue a hostile policy towards her as long as incidents did not arise to strain relations.12 And after the settlement of the Koszta affair there was no incident serious enough to cause further discord with America.

As the 1850's progressed the government in Vienna came to realize that closer ties with America might help stabilize Austria's position as a great European power. European politics in the 1850's had largely deteriorated from the relative stability it had enjoyed before 1848, and Austria's position in Europe during the latter part of the 1850's

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11. Jackson to Marcy, Vienna, November 23, 1853, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll. 3.
lapsed into a much more critical state than it had been in during the first five years of the decade. First of all, the Crimean War of 1856 had shattered the Concert of Europe, and, because of Austria's indecisive neutrality in the struggle, it had left her politically isolated. As the 1860's approached, the uprising in Italy placed Austria in direct confrontation with France. When the growing threat of Prussia to Austrian dominance in the German Confederation was added to these difficulties, it became clear that Europe had entered a period of diplomatic turmoil and that Austria was suffering from it.

Despite a perilous financial situation, made worse by heavy military expenditures during the Crimean War, the government in Vienna had to spend large sums of money to maintain her armies. But all the money spent for the army was not sufficient to safeguard Austria's maritime interests, for being a small maritime power, it was obvious that Austria would have a limited navy for some years to come. The government feared that in case of future conflicts between maritime powers, her rights as a neutral on the sea would be violated by England and France. Long aware of America's growing merchant fleet, she hoped that in future European conflicts the United States might serve to guarantee the rights of neutrals against any encroachments from stronger naval powers.13

Austria's hope that the United States might act as a guardian of neutral rights was strengthened by a series of conversations between the Austrian foreign minister, Count Bernhard von Rechberg, and the American representative to Vienna, J. Glancy Jones, in the latter part of 1859. Actually Jones had first sought out Rechberg at the beginning of September 1859 in order to obtain the Austrian minister's views on the Declaration of Paris—the declaration which guaranteed the rights of neutrals during the time of war. Rechberg took full advantage of the opportunity afforded him to note, that not only would Austria stand by the Declaration of Paris—which confirmed America's traditional position though she had not ratified the treaty—but also that she was prepared to go further and "define more clearly what should constitute a blockade, and...what should be strictly considered contraband of war." Then, taking command of the conversation, the Austrian foreign minister asked Jones for his attitude towards the seizure of sailors and unarmed persons travelling on trading vessels. Jones replied that he could not state a definite position, although he thought that the United States would be against such a policy of seizure since it would be foolish to exempt private property (the ships) from capture "and at the same time admit, that such property at sea might be stripped of the men who had it in charge."14

When Secretary of State Lewis Cass later learned of Jones' conversation, he expressed his satisfaction with the Austrian government's desire to define contraband and blockade more clearly. He also approved of Jones' views on the seizure of sailors and unarmed men on trading vessels, and he instructed the American minister to continue his conversations with Rechberg on maritime law.\footnote{Cass to Jones, Washington, November 12, 1859, National Archives, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions to the United States Ministers in Austria 1861-1902, microfilm copy No. 77, Vol. I, Roll 13. Hereafter cited as "U. S. Department of State, Instructions to Vienna."}

In pursuance of his instructions, Jones again met Rechberg in December. During these conversations the Austrian minister reiterated his wish to have contraband of war and blockades more closely defined. He assured the American minister that, his government, like that of the United States, was in favor of abolishing privateering. He pointed out that "Austria had suffered much during the last war and that she was anxious to guard against a repetition of these depredations in the future as she was conscious that she could not expect to contend successfully with the maritime powers on the ocean." Before closing the conversation, Rechberg added that he would personally bring the matter of neutral rights to the attention of the next Congress at Paris, even though it was not on the agenda of topics to be discussed. Jones was so gratified with the Austrian attitude that he wrote Cass that if the
United States desired a stronger maritime law and protection of neutrals it "should begin by opening negotiations with Austria." 16

Although the maritime laws regarding the rights of neutrals remained unchanged at the next Congress at Paris, the talks between Rechberg and Jones left Austria confident that America would protect the rights of neutrals in case of war. The conversations also did much to strengthen the new bonds of friendship between the two countries.

Of course, the closer ties between Austria and America did not mean that relations between the two countries were always harmonious. Americans, still remembering Austria as an oppressor of popular liberties, vexed the Austrians during the Italian war of 1859 by giving their full support to the Italian cause. On their part, the Austrians continued to regard America as a land of anarchists and revolutionaries. As late as 1860 Francis Joseph was reported to have refused permission for the establishment of chairs of American history at Prague and Vienna. 17 However, in spite of the differences that continued to exist between Austria and the United States at the time of the opening of the Civil War, Austro-American relations were, on the whole, on a cordial basis and the prospect for even closer ties between the two countries were bright.

Austrian policy during the Civil War fulfilled this prospect for closer bonds between the governments in Vienna and Washington. Throughout the course of the entire struggle in America, Austria wholeheartedly supported the Union cause. Even when the war began no question existed either in Vienna or Washington about which side Austria would favor, not only because it was known that the government in Vienna was bent on a policy of peace with Washington, but also because it was realized that various political, social, and economic considerations favored a sympathetic Austrian attitude toward the Union cause.

Unlike many of their contemporaries in other European countries, the Austrian ruling classes never regarded the Civil War as a test of democratic institutions. Believing that the very fact that a civil war could take place in the United States indicated that democracy had failed, they were convinced that after the Civil War ended America would become more autocratic in its form of government and would draw closer to Austria. 18 Thus, they were not ideologically opposed to the Union cause. They were, however, opposed to the secessionist movement on ideological grounds. The Civil War began less than thirteen years after the Habsburg emperor had suppressed the revolutions in Vienna and Budapest and, although Francis Joseph had recently

18. This point is brought out well in Jones to Seward, Vienna, August 1861, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
experimented with a somewhat more liberal form of government, Austria remained a conservative, autocratic country. It was against government policy to encourage rebellious movements in the world or to grant diplomatic recognition to any country seized or established in an unlawful or unconstitutional manner. The Austrians regarded rebellions such as that of the Confederacy with disfavor. Lady Harcourt, John Motley's daughter, clearly understood the Austrian attitude when, recalling the days she spent with her father in Vienna, she remarked, "an instinct that we were acting as a constituted government against rebellion rather inclined them to sympathy." And Count Rechberg stated the official Austrian attitude toward the rebellion at a meeting he held with the American minister in Vienna (even before Lincoln had issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 troops) when he said: "Austria hoped to see the United States reunited since she was not inclined to recognize de facto Governments anywhere."20

Other factors also determined Austria's official attitude toward the Civil War. Among them were the relative strength and resources of the Union and the Confederacy. At the opening of the Civil War Austria was typical of most

20. Jones to Seward, Vienna, April 15, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
European countries in that its inhabitants knew very little about America. While it is true that they associated republicanism and radicalism with the United States, they really knew little about America's political structure, history, or geography. It is hardly astonishing that John Motley's daughter, Lillian, was once asked at a party in Vienna if Boston was near the Amazon River.21

Despite their ignorance about American affairs, the Austrians had heard about the immense wealth and material strength of the United States. In fact, one of the reasons why the Austrian representative to the United States was sent back to America during the height of the Kossuth affair was because the Austrian foreign minister felt that, since America's position as a world power was growing so rapidly, Austria had to retain a representative in Washington in order to keep abreast of America's domestic and foreign policy.22 Nothing more clearly indicated Austria's awareness of America's material strength than the government's expectations that America would become the guardian of

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22. When he ordered the Austrian representative to return to Washington, Buol-Schauenstein remarked that "the political and economic importance of the United States was increasing each day, an importance which assured them an influence on the destiny of Europe. It was therefore extremely important for Austria to be accurately informed of the game of politics in the United States." As quoted in Curti, "Austria and the United States 1848-1852," p. 194.
maritime neutral rights.

Since the Austrians were fully aware that most of the industrial power of America lay in the northern regions of the country, they had little doubt that the Confederacy would be overpowered by the vastly superior industrial power of the North. Chevalier Hülsemann, the Austrian minister to the United States during the first two years of the war, noted in his correspondence with Count Rechberg very early in the struggle that the Union had an "immense advantage over the south in power and material." The Confederacy, he continued, "did not have the means to resist for any length of time the vast resources of the North used both on land and sea for their destruction."2 During his first meeting with John Motley in November, 1861, Rechberg in turn, noted how much greater the resources and population of the North were than those of the Confederacy. A few months later Rechberg again alluded to the strength of the North, remarking that "it was impossible for the insurrection to provide men enough to contend for any great length of time against the power of the United States."24 Believing


24. Motley to Seward, Vienna, November 5, 1861 and February 12, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
that the North would win the war, the Austrians regarded it as unwise to support a losing cause, even if other considerations had been equal.

The commercial relations which existed between the United States and Austria further reduced any chance that Austria would recognize the Confederate government. Southern hopes for European recognition rested largely on the famous theory of "Cotton is King." However, even though Austrian industries used considerable amounts of Southern cotton before the Civil War, they were less dependent on American cotton than most European countries. Thus, although the Southern cotton embargo was felt in the manufacturing areas of the Habsburg Empire, it was of such small consequence that it never became a matter of diplomatic discussion or consideration.

In 1861 there were about 200 cotton manufacturers with 1,600,000 spindles in the Austrian Empire. While the size of the cotton industry in Austria was small compared with that of Great Britain in which there were 30,000,000 spindles or even that of France where there were 4,000,000 spindles, it was not much smaller than that of Russia with its 2,000,000 spindles, and it considerably exceeded Belgium's cotton industry. The Austrian industry, furthermore, was highly concentrated and was the principal source of income for several areas of the empire. Reichenberg, in Bohemia,

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25. For a complete discussion of the "Cotton is King" theory, see Frank L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 1-50.
for example, employed 5050 workmen in the cotton spinning
industry and 8500 more in cotton weaving. In Brünn and
Ölmutz, in Moravia, thousands of workmen were also employed
to run the large numbers of handlooms.26

The only port in the Habsburg empire which received
sizeable imports of cotton was Trieste on the Adriatic Sea.
The import figures of Trieste indicate, however, that the
empire was not dependent on the United States for its
source of cotton. In 1857, for example, 77,280 bales of
cotton were imported to Trieste by sea. Of that amount,
American cotton accounted for only 19,890 bales, while
28,340 bales came from the East Indies and 23,700 from Egypt.
While the number of bales from America increased slightly
in 1858, American cotton still totaled less than one third
of the entire amount. Although by 1860 the amount of
American cotton imports had gained slightly again, the United
States still accounted for only approximately forty percent
of the total cotton imports. Cotton from Egypt and especially
from the East Indies accounted for most of the remaining
sixty percent.27 In other words, although the imports of
American cotton to Trieste were increasingly important,

26. Ibid., p. 10; Edward Stiles to Seward, Vienna,
April 1, 1861, National Archives, Records of the Department
of State, Dispatches from United States Consuls in Vienna,
microfilm copy No. T-243, Roll 3. Hereafter cited as "U. S.
Department of State, Consular Reports from Vienna."

27. Of 79,380 bales imported to Trieste in 1858, 26,030
came from America, while 25,040 came from the East Indies
and 23,700 came from Egypt. Of 85,064 bales imported to
Trieste in 1860, 36,248 came from America, 36,036 from the
East Indies, and 10,512 from Egypt. Stephen Remak to John
Appleton,
the total imports of cotton from the East Indies and Egypt considerably exceeded that from the United States.

The figures on cotton imports to Trieste, while significant, actually do not present an accurate picture of Austria's need of American cotton for her manufacturers. In the first place, Austria was a large importer of cotton yarn, practically all of which came from England. Since England relied on the United States for cotton, yarn production was seriously reduced by the Confederate embargo. As a consequence, English manufacturers could not meet the needs of such countries as Austria for yarn, thereby causing great distress among a segment of the Austrian cotton industry.28 Secondly, not all the raw cotton from America was imported to Austria by way of Trieste. Shipping rates from the United States to the Adriatic port were high and the journey long. Furthermore, since it was difficult and expensive to transport supplies from Trieste to the manufacturing areas of Bohemia and Moravia, American cotton was usually shipped to Trieste only for use of the manufacturers in the southern areas of the empire. The more important northern areas relied on the German harbors at Hamburg and Bremen, which also received large quantities of American

Trieste, September 20, 1859, and Remak to F. W. Seward, Trieste, September 14, 1851, National Archives, Records of the Department of State, Dispatches from United States Consuls in Trieste, microfilm copy No. T-242, Roll o. Hereafter cited as "U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports from Trieste."

28. For Austria's reliance on imports of cotton from England, see Remak to F. W. Seward, Trieste, September 14, 1851, Ibid.
cotton. There is no way of telling exactly how much American cotton came into the Habsburg monarchy from these ports outside the empire, since the Austrian reports on total imports into the empire did not include the name of the port from which the merchandise was sent. But it can be assumed that it was a sizeable amount.

Despite these qualifications concerning Austria's reliance on American cotton, it still remains clear that the Habsburg empire depended much less on the United States for its cotton supply than countries like England and France. The United States consul in Vienna, Edward Stiles, who made a clear and detailed survey of the cotton industry in Austria, probably came closest to estimating Austria's need for American cotton when he gave figures which showed that in 1860 America supplied forty-eight percent of the total cotton imported into Austria, while the East Indies supplied forty percent and Egypt about twelve percent. In other words, as Stiles' report indicates, the Confederate cotton embargo adversely affected the Austrian cotton manufacturing industry,

29. Stiles to William Seward, Vienna, April 1, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports from Vienna, Roll 3. Austria was able to use cotton from the East Indies, while other countries relied more heavily on American cotton because the cotton from East India was of an inferior quality when compared to that from America. Since the Austrian manufacturers purposely produced a cheaper and inferior grade cloth than that of countries like England in order not to have to compete in the same markets with them, they found the inferior and less expensive East Indian product more suitable for their needs. William A. Buffom to John Appleton, Vienna, U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports from Trieste, Roll 5.
but its effects on this industry was by no means cata-
strophic. For this reason cotton was not king insofar as
Austro-American relations were concerned.

Even though the struggle in America did not have
catastrophic consequences for the Austrian cotton in-
dustry, the same cannot be said for the Austrian economy
as a whole. Several industries in Austria, especially
those centering around Vienna, were in fact seriously
affected by the Civil War. The manufacturers of luxury
goods like dresses, shawls, glasswares, and wines depended
largely on an American market, which diminished as the war
progressed. Confederate privateers made it dangerous to
ship goods even to the small market which still remained
in America. As a result, many manufacturers who were de-
pendent on the American market had to curtail their opera-
tions or even close their place of business. The situation
became so serious that Theodore Canisius, the American
consul in Vienna, wrote on March 31, 1862:

Vienna suffers very much by our war and several manu-
facturies (sic) which produced shawls and chenille
goods exclusively for the American Market had to stop
working. The total export from here to the United
States during this last quarter amounts to 168,300
florins which is 489,000 florins less than during the
foregoing quarter. This last quarter, ending March 31,
is usually the dullest of the whole year, but doubtless
it would have been much better if peace had been
restored.30

Although the trade between Austria and the United States

30. Canisius to Seward, Vienna, March 31, 1862, U. S.
Department of State, Consular Reports from Vienna, Roll 3.
improved somewhat during the course of the war, many places of business were not able to open until after the American struggle ended. The Austrian government never doubting a Union victory, reasoned that a quick end to the secessionist movement would result in a speedy resumption of normal trade relations with America.

Fear that Europe might become involved in the American war further inclined the government in Vienna to favor a fast end to the secessionist movement in America. Austria's diplomatic position in Europe at the opening of the Civil War was even more critical than it had been at the end of the 1850's. Her humiliating defeat in Italy in 1859 had lowered her prestige throughout Europe, especially in the German Confederation, where the Prussian menace to Austrian hegemony was growing more threatening. Since the Italian war had forced the government to issue large amounts of paper currency, the Austrian florin was further devaluated and international traders lost faith in the soundness of Austrian currency. Furthermore, the government was faced with a serious nationality problem at home. Emperor Francis Joseph's attempts to solve the growing national tensions, first by the October Diploma of 1860, and then by the February Patent of 1861, had ended in failure, and the discontent of various nationalities in the empire remained

31. Canisius to Seward, Vienna, March 30, 1865, Ibid.
In order to stabilize her domestic affairs and straighten out her financial situation, Austria desperately needed a period of relative tranquillity—a period during which the existing tensions in the empire would not be aggravated by outside forces and a period during which she would be able to reduce military expenditures. The government especially feared a European conflict. As John Motley wrote to Secretary Seward in 1864, no country had so much to lose by a European conflict as did Austria. "On the East, West, North and South, open or secret enemies are ever lying in wait to take advantages of any hostilities on a grand scale in which Austria may be involved." While the American Civil War was in no way a European conflict and did not directly involve Austria, it did threaten to involve England and France. Such involvement would place Austria in a difficult position between the belligerents and would disrupt the momentary tranquillity in Europe. Rechberg expressed his government's anxiety over the possibility of a conflict between America


and England when he remarked to Motley that such a war would have "calamitous results" on the world situation. Thus it was greatly to Austria's advantage to see the secessionist movement in America quickly suppressed.

A final factor which influenced Austrian policy was the sale in Europe of numerous American bonds, issued in order to meet the expenditures of maintaining an army. Many of these bonds were sold in Frankfort, where they competed in sales with Austrian railway stocks. When certain irregularities involving the construction of railroads in the Habsburg Empire were discovered, German investors lost their confidence in the Austrian securities; they replaced them with the American bonds, which were paying interest as high as fifteen percent per annum. This loss of faith in Austrian securities added to the growing financial crisis, which, by 1864, had reached such proportions that there was even "a kind of panic in the Vienna Bourse." Austrian financial interests, as well as the government, rightly attributed part of the panic to the sale of American bonds, which were forcing Austrian stocks out of the financial markets. They realized that an end to the Civil War would naturally mean an end to the unusual number of American securities flooding the European market.

34. Motley to Seward, Vienna, January 20, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
35. As Motley wrote to Seward, "The panic is partly ascribed to the large purchases going on in financial centres
and would open the market again to Austrian investments. This provided another reason for Austria to favor a quick Union victory.

Although the Austrian government favored the Union and carefully followed the progress of the struggle, it always remained more interested in European affairs, especially the Prussian challenge to Austrian leadership in the German Confederation, than in the course of the war in the United States. Because the government in Vienna did not concentrate its attention on the American struggle, the Austrian representatives in America were given great latitude in determining Austrian policy toward the war. This fact worked in favor of the North.

The Austrian minister in Washington during the first critical years of the war was Chevalier Johann Georg Hülsemann. Hülsemann had a long career as an Austrian representative to the United States. First coming to America in 1838 as secretary of the Austrian legation, he quickly advanced in 1841 to the post of Austrian charge d'affaires and in 1855 to that of Austrian minister resident.


36. There was a sharp division in the foreign ministry in regard to the policy to adopt toward Prussia. Count Rechberg, the foreign minister, who favored a conciliatory policy toward Austria's rival, was in sharp disagreement with Baron Ludwig von Biegleleben, the ministry's expert on German affairs, and Anton Ritter von Schmerling, the Austrian premier. Biegleben and Schmerling were determined that Austria should retain her "historical preeminence" in the Confederation. See Chester Wells Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 9-12 and 22.
He held this position until 1863, when he retired. His stay in the United States previous to the Civil War had not always been socially or diplomatically pleasant. As an aristocrat he had come to America fearing the republican tendencies of the United States. As early as 1823, while a lecturer at Göttingen, he had denounced America in a book, *Geschichte der Demokratie in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika*, remarking that the administration of justice in America was corrupted, that irreligion was spreading there, and that the prevailing tendencies in the United States appeared "distinctly hostile...and in definitive contradiction to those on which our civilization is based."  

His experiences as an Austrian diplomat in America had strengthened his distaste for American institutions and practices. He was unfavorably impressed by the "levity, inconsequence, and ignorance" with which he felt that the foreign affairs of America were conducted. He also feared the aggressive expansionist tendencies of the United States and was particularly disturbed about the possibility of American meddling in European affairs. As early as 1840, while on a visit to the American Northwest, he had noticed that members of the same nationality, especially the Germans,

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tended to flock together rather than unite in a single heterogeneous population. This "social, national, and religious separatism," he remarked, "seemed to me to be a serious evil." Not only did he feel that such a condition might result in a domestic clash between the nationalities, but also he feared that these people could be stirred up by demagogues to "attempt some reaction against their fatherland." His fear of American demagoguery was increased by the American reaction to the Hungarian revolution.

Hülsemann, however, was a dedicated statesman who believed that the welfare of his government took precedence over his personal dislikes. In the 1850's he was convinced that, with her domestic problems, Austria could ill afford to collide with the United States. He felt that, if his government overlooked American "impertinence" during the Kossuth affair, it "might have a free hand to profit from the turn which relations between Great Britain and the United States might assume in the near future." Consequently

40. Hülsemann to Metternich, Washington, June 8, 1844, as quoted in ibid., p. 511.
41. Actually this was also the conviction of his government. Recognizing the desire of Austria to avoid unnecessary foreign entanglements, Hülsemann was more than willing to follow such a course and even encourage it. See Curti, "Austria and the United States," pp. 173-74.
he recommended that his government follow a policy of patience toward the United States.

The Austrian minister likewise governed his attitude on the Civil War by what he considered to be best for his country. Realizing that his government opposed rebellious movements anywhere in the world, Hülsemann viewed the growing secessionist movement in America—a movement which he considered unlawful and therefore tantamount to rebellion—with great alarm. He criticized the Buchanan Administration for not preventing the dissolution of the country. Despairing of any executive action, he came to hope that the splitting up of the United States into two warring camps might be prevented by some form of conciliation such as the Crittendon compromise. His hope turned to despair when Abraham Lincoln was elected president in 1860. For while he thought that Lincoln's secretary of state, William Seward, for whom he had high regard, would favor compromise measures, he did not believe that Lincoln, whom he considered the leader of the radical elements of the Republican party, would ever accept them. The result would be the secession of a large segment of the United States from the Union. 42

Even though the Austrian minister favored compromise and was critical of what he believed to be Lincoln's lack of moderation, he never equivocated in his support of the

government in Washington once secession became a reality. He used his position with the Austrian government to the full advantage of the North. For example, he often pointed out the economic advantage which the Union had over the Confederacy and frequently reminded his government that the Confederates were "rebels." (He very rarely used the terms "secessionists" or "separatists" which were preferred by other members of the diplomatic corps.) He even compared Jefferson Davis' position to that of Victor Emmanuel, of Sardinia, noting that "both take what belongs to others, the latter without taking account of existing treaties and the former without taking account of the United States Constitution." Finally, he scoffed at the belief of Southerners that "Cotton is King," remarking that the theory "is far less true than they had thought." 

Although at first Hülsemann predicted that the Union would win a quick victory over the South, he altered his views after he learned of the Northern debacle at Bull Run. Instead of speaking in terms of a three or four months' struggle, he now talked of a "long and bloody war ending in the complete ruin of the South and in immense losses in the North." His predictions to Vienna that the struggle would be long and bitter increased his government's anxi-

43. Hülsemann to Rechberg, New York, May 6, 1861, January 28, 1862, February 6, 1862, May 6, 1862, and October 24, 1862, ibid.; Hülsemann to Rechberg, Washington, June 1, 1861, November 25 and 29, 1861, ibid.

44. Hülsemann to Rechberg, New York, June 18, 1861, and September 3, 1861, ibid.
eties over the course of events in the new world. Since it opposed the secessionist movement, the Austrian government, after learning that war had broken out in America, had immediately informed the American minister in Vienna, J. Glancy Jones, that it had not and would not recognize the Confederacy. Nor, the Austrian government told Jones, did it expect the Confederacy even to ask Austria for recognition since the government in Vienna soon intended publicly to state her opposition to the Confederate movement. Still, Austria was concerned over the repercussion that the war in America would have on her foreign policy. Assured by Hülsemann, that the struggle would be of some duration and having depended on America to defend neutral rights, the government in Vienna became alarmed by the prospect that in the heat and urgency of a long struggle America might violate the very rights of neutrals which Austria had expected her to defend. The Austrian government had already permitted at least one American violation of the Declaration of Paris when it recognized the effectiveness of the American blockade as early as July 6, 1861, at a time when it was hardly effective. The government was willing to accept the blockade as binding as long as America promised to adhere to the principle of an effective blockade.

45. Jones to Seward, Vienna, April 15, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
46. The Declaration of Paris stated that in order for a blockade to be legal it had to be binding and effective.
Austria, after all, was more interested in principle and precedent than in the actual effect which the American war would have on her commerce. Her trade with the South was negligible during the war, and it would not be affected very much by American violations of neutral rights. But since America was a powerful maritime nation, her policies respecting neutral rights would carry precedence in case of a future European war.

Fearful of an unfavorable precedent, Count Rechberg decided to ask the "belligerent powers" to abide by the principles of the Declaration of Paris concerning neutral rights. But in order to be certain that America would not construe Austria's concern with neutral rights as an attempt to hamper the Union war effort, Rechberg assured the United States that the government in Vienna, anxious "to cultivate the most friendly relations with [America]... would be the last to aid or abet any movement looking to the disruption of your Confederacy, or weakening its power." Highly pleased by Rechberg's friendly tone, Secretary of State Seward quickly assured the Austrian foreign minister, that the United States would act in accordance with maritime

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47. The implication that the Confederacy was a belligerent power was an acknowledgement by Austria of the same status previously accorded the South by England. It was in keeping with the reality of the existing situation in America, and, unlike England's recognition of belligerency, which of course weighed much more heavily in the war, it did not affect America's friendly attitude toward Austria.
neutral rights.  

The cordial character of the conversations between Austrian and American diplomats indicated the tone that relations between the two nations would assume during the next six years. However, problems of a serious nature still arose between the two countries. Even during the first few months of 1861 the governments in Washington and Vienna were in sharp disagreement over an appointment made by the American President. Soon after taking office, Lincoln had selected Anson Burlingame, congressman from Massachusetts, to represent the United States in Vienna. His choice proved a poor one. Burlingame was unacceptable to Austria, since he had given moral support to Louis Kossuth and the leaders of the 1848 revolutions and had sponsored legislation to recognize Italy as a sovereign country, independent of the Habsburg empire. But even though Austria officially protested, Lincoln refused to change the appointment. He even sent Burlingame to Vienna. Only after the Austrian emperor refused to see the former congressman did the president realize the seriousness of his mistake. He finally corrected it by reassigning Burlingame to the legation in China.

49. Seward to Jones, Washington, August 12, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Instructions to Vienna, Roll 13; Seward to Hülsemann, U. S. Department of State, Notes to the Austrian Legation.

The president made a choice more acceptable to Austria by replacing Burlingame with John Lothrop Motley who was also from Massachusetts. A writer and historian, Motley had previously served a short term as a diplomat in Russia. A former Whig turned Republican, he was anxious to serve his country after the Civil War began. Since he felt he was too old for the army and since he had been a diplomat, he sought a position in the foreign service. In a lengthy correspondence with his friend, Charles Sumner, he first expressed his desire to represent the United States at the Hague, where he felt that he could combine his duties with research on Dutch history. When the position was filled, he sought the post in Vienna. He was bitterly disappointed when he learned that the post had been given to Burlingame, especially since he discovered that Sumner had expressed his preference for the congressman rather than for Motley. His subsequent nomination to the Vienna post was due in large measure to the recommendation of Sumner, on whom Motley exerted increasing pressure after it became

in any case did not have a high regard for Lincoln's abilities as President, was very disturbed by his action. At one time the Austrian minister even suggested his recall from Washington until the appointment was changed. Although Seward tried to reassure Hülsemann by notifying him that Burlingame had been given instructions "to maintain the best relations with the Imperial Government," only the final recall of the former Congressman satisfied the Austrian minister. See Hülsemann to Rechberg, New York, April 5 and 30, 1861, and Washington, June 1, 1861, Austrian State Archives, Records of the Austrian Foreign Office; Hülsemann to Seward, New York, June 4, 1861, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. Hereafter cited as "Seward Papers."
clear that a replacement would be needed for Burlingame.\(^51\)

On the whole, Motley proved to be a fine minister. It is true that he often had difficulty concentrating on European affairs since he was so concerned with the crisis at home. Also he disliked the rigid class rules of Austrian society, often avoiding the social courtesies involved in a diplomatic mission. However, Motley had a strong sense of duty, and he very rarely let his personal beliefs and feelings interfere with his mission. While his interest, for example, lay more in the course of events at home than in the affairs of Europe, his reports on important events concerning Austria and Europe, such as the Schleswig-Holstein question and the Polish Revolution, were long, detailed, and highly informative. And, although he often avoided social affairs, his younger daughter, Lillian made a pleasing substitute.\(^52\)

Motley was certainly well qualified to serve in Vienna. He had studied in Germany. He had close friends in England and the continent, including Otto von Bismarck, with whom he had roomed as a student. He was acquainted with the

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\(^51\) Motley to Sumner, Mayfair, March 5, 1861, June 26, 1861, April 17, 1861, and Boston, June 29, 1861, and August 7, 1861, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University Hereafter cited as "Sumner Papers"; Sumner to Seward, Washington, March 18, 1861, Ibid.  
\(^52\) Motley to his mother, Vienna, March 15, 1862, Curtis, The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley, Vol. II, pp. 251–52; Motley to his daughter, Vienna, January 22, 1862, Ibid., pp. 231–241; Lady Harcourt to Oliver Wendell Holmes, as quoted in Holmes, Two Memoirs, p. 209.
history, people, and mores of the area, and he could speak German as well as three or four other languages fluently. As he wrote to Sumner while he was seeking the Vienna post:

My education has prepared me for it. My studies of years has been of diplomacy, international relations, political history. In Germany I have resided five years. The country is as well known to me as my own. The language is as familiar to my tongue and my pen as my native language. And as you know, I am as familiar with French, Italian, Spanish.53

Motley's friendship with Bismarck proved of especial value to the United States, for it afforded the American minister in Vienna an opportunity to espouse the Union cause. Undoubtedly the correspondence between the two friends was a factor in helping to maintain Prussia's friendly attitude towards the United States.54 Motley's knowledge of German so impressed the Austrian emperor that at first, it actually frightened him. President Lincoln had appointed several former German radicals like Carl Schurz to important diplomatic posts in Europe. Hülsemann was disturbed by these appointments and had reported them to his government. When he found out, for example, that Schurz had been appointed as minister to Spain, he remarked to Rechberg that Schurz was appointed because of Lincoln's

53. Motley to Sumner, Boston, August 7, 1861, Sumner Papers.
54. For Motley's friendship with Bismarck and their correspondence, see James Pemberton Grund, "Bismarck and Motley with Correspondence till now Unpublished," North American Review, CIXVII(September, 1898), pp. 360-76.
promise to the German element of the Northwest "who had been converted or perverted by Carl Schurz...to black republican ideas." When Francis Joseph first heard Motley speak, he was worried that the American minister might be one of these German radicals appointed for political reasons. The emperor asked Motley frankly if he was a German. When Motley replied that he was not a German, the Emperor seemed "relieved."

The new minister came to Vienna with instructions from the Secretary of State identical to those that had originally been issued to Burlingame. They were contained in an important ten-page dispatch in which Seward carefully analyzed the previous relations between the United States and Austria. The secretary remarked that in his opinion the "mission to Austria has not been made as useful hitherto as it ought to have been and that it has generally been undervalued." Much of the failure for not having more profitable relations with Austria, Seward placed on the lack of commercial relations between the two countries. But he also placed blame on the lack of diligence on the part of previous American representatives to Austria and on ideological differences between the two countries. Seward now instructed the American minister to work for increasingly harmonious relations with Austria, trying especially to increase the

55. Hüllsemmann to Kechberg, Washington, June 1, 1861, Austrian State Archives, Records of the Austrian Foreign Office.
56. Motley to Seward, Vienna, November 5 and 11, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Instructions to Vienna.
trade between the two countries.\textsuperscript{57}

The secretary's apparent interest in seeing improved relations with Austria was partly motivated by his concern over possible Confederate movements in Austria, for as he noted, Vienna was "the political centre in Continental Europe."\textsuperscript{58} However his dispatch was a unique document in Austro-American relations. It stood as the most affirmative statement made up to that time by a high American official showing a strong and friendly interest in Austria.

By 1861, therefore, an accord had been reached between the governments of Vienna and Washington. The events of the next five years would test the durability and strength of that accord.

\textsuperscript{57} Seward to Burlingame, Washington, April 13, 1861, U. S. Department of State, \textit{Instructions to Vienna}.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.}
Chapter II
The Policy Applied

With both Austria and the United States determined to remain at peace, relations between the two countries were, on the whole, uneventful during the first few months of Motley's stay in Vienna. The only incident of consequence arose over Austria's decision to maintain her consulates in Richmond and Galveston. Her vice-consul in Richmond, Edward de Voss, had purchased several hundred hogsheads of tobacco before the Civil War had begun. The Austrian government wanted to protect this tobacco and, if possible, ship it to Europe. But Seward had refused to allow the tobacco to pass through the Northern blockade. In conformity with its recognition of the blockade, the Austrian government accepted the secretary's position without protest. Notwithstanding his government's acceptance of Seward's decision regarding the Austrian tobacco, Chevalier Hülseemann insisted on maintaining contact with the Austrian vice-consuls in the Confederacy. When Seward appeared reluctant to consent to his request, the Austrian minister reminded the secretary of state that the vice-consuls stationed in the Confederacy had to receive instructions and news from Vienna. If they could not receive that information indirectly through the legation in Washington, he pointed out, they would be forced to establish their own means of communication with Vienna. Since Seward realized that such
an arrangement would be the equivalent of direct contact between Austria and the Confederacy, the Secretary quickly granted the Austrian minister's request. Seward's action ended the only incident which might have disturbed the existing cordial relations between Austria and the United States during the first eight months of the war.¹

Until the end of November, in fact, support for the Union cause remained so strong among all the people and classes of Austria that it even created a problem for the American representatives in Vienna. John Motley and Theodore Canisius were burdened with a flood of requests for commissions and places in the Union army. Most of the requests had to be reluctantly refused since it was generally against American policy to enlist foreigners in the military service.²

However, the Austrian attitude suddenly changed when Captain Charles Wilkes, commander of the U. S. S. San Jacinto, stopped the European-bound British Mail Steamer Trent on November 8, 1861, and forceably removed two Confederate agents, James Mason and John Slidell. The now famous Trent incident aroused passions on both sides of the Atlantic,

¹ Hülsemann to Seward, New York, September 9, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Notes from the Austrian Legation; Seward to Hülsemann, Washington, September 21, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Notes to the Austrian Legation.
² Motley to Seward, Vienna, August 25, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5; Canisius to Seward, Vienna, September 30, 1861, U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports from Vienna, Roll 3.
almost resulted in a war between England and the United States, and strained the friendly relations between Austria and America. To the English, the seizure of Mason and Slidell represented only one of a continuous number of insults to the British flag by the government in Washington. They had not forgotten a previous threat by William Seward to go to war with England. This latest insult aroused such a fervor that Charles Francis Adams, the United States representative in England, was sure that he would receive his recall or passport by the middle of January.3

The Austrian government was disturbed over the Trent incident for different reasons. Although the seizure of Mason and Slidell was not an insult to the Austrian flag, it was a clear violation of neutral rights. As Charles Francis Adams Jr. later remarked: "the United States did not have and never had had in reality a justifying leg to stand upon and least of all was there any possible justification for the course pursued by Captain Wilkes."4 The Austrians expected the United States to guarantee the rights of neutral maritime powers in case of war. In fact, the Austrian government had even been assured by Seward a few months before the Trent incident that the United

States would abide by the principles of the Declaration of Paris. Rather than guaranteeing the rights of neutrals on the sea, however, the Americans now violated these rights by seizing Mason and Slidell. Furthermore, Hülsemann's first reports indicated that Captain Wilkes had not acted on his own but under the orders of the American President.

Austria, as well as most of the small European sea powers, realized that unless the United States apologized for the incident and denied complicity in Wilkes' actions, a new precedent might be established which would destroy neutral rights and make it possible for impressment and illegal seizure to become the order of the day. Count Bernstorff, the Prussian foreign minister, spoke for all Europe when he said that his country would regard the Trent affair "as a public menace to all existing neutral rights." And one of the leading Austrian newspapers, Die Presse, reported the "hero's welcome" which Wilkes had received by noting sarcastically that "in New York the deed of Captain Wilkes...has inconceivably evoked enthusiasm for reasons which seem incomprehensible. Mr. Wilkes earns no merit. To halt a steam packet on the open seas with cannon fire is no deed of a hero."

7. Die Presse, December 3, 1861.
Besides being disturbed about the violations of neutral maritime rights, the Austrian government was also concerned lest the Trent incident result in a war between England and America. Its fear of such a war was increased as a result of the reports of its minister in America, Hülsemann. After receiving the news of Mason's and Slidell's seizure with great consternation, the Austrian minister immediately went from Washington to New York to see Lord Lyons, the British ambassador to America, in order to urge him to continue to pursue a peaceful policy with the United States. He left New York greatly relieved, for during his interview with Lyons, the British ambassador convinced him that he would do nothing to aggravate the situation until he received official instructions from his government. However, Hülsemann still remained somewhat uneasy; he was not at all sure that the Union government would apologize or return the captured envoys. If it did not, he was convinced that a war would break out between the United States and England. And although the Austrian minister had great respect for the power and resources of America, he shared the belief of his government that such a war would spell "the complete ruin of the United States."

Worried about such a war, the government in Vienna sought out the American minister (after it received Hülsemann's pessimistic reports) in order to learn the

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official American position toward the Trent incident first hand. Unfortunately, communications between the Department of State and the American legation in Vienna were so poor that Motley, who actually knew less about the incident than the Austrian Foreign Office, could say little officially except to reassure the Austrian government that the United States would do all that was honorably possible to avoid war with England. The American minister's reassurances failed to satisfy Rechberg. Soon after talking to Motley, he learned that the British government would consider the Trent incident peacefully settled if the United States would apologize for the affair and release Mason and Slidell. Pleased with the leniency of the British terms and seeing an opportunity to avoid war between England and the United States, Rechberg decided to give strong support to the British by officially protesting the American capture of Mason and Slidell. In a letter of protest to the government in Washington, he pointed out that the seizure of the Confederate envoys was a violation of neutral rights and that England was justified in seeking "reclamation against the affront given to her flag." The lenient British terms,

9. In fact the American minister obtained most of his information about the Trent affair from a lengthy correspondence he had had with the already burdened Charles Francis Adams. See, for example, Motley to Adams, Vienna, November 30, 1861 and December 20, 1861, and Adams to Motley, London, December 4, 26, 1861, Charles Francis Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. Hereafter cited as "Adams Papers."
moreover, "were not offensive to the Cabinet in Washington."
Since the Lincoln administration was morally obligated to
govern its policy toward the Trent incident in the hopes
of obtaining a peaceful solution to the crisis, it should
accept the terms. Such a settlement would be highly
satisfactory to Austria as the government in Vienna was
"equally bound in friendship" with England and the United
States and as a war between the two countries would result
in "grave disturbances...not only upon each one of the
contending parties but upon the affairs of the world
generally."10

As it turned out, Rechberg's protest was unnecessary.
Even before it was received in Washington, the American
government decided to settle the incident by meeting the
British demands. The United States ordered Mason and
Slidell released from their Boston prison and made suitable
apology to the British government. However, Secretary of
State Seward wrote the apology required by the London
government in such a way as to place England in the awk-
ward position of either recognizing the abolition of the
act of impressing sailors of foreign nations—a measure
long sought by Austria—or of refusing a peaceful solution.
London's response was to accept the United States apology,

10. Count Rechberg to Chevalier Hülsemann, Vienna,
December 18, 1861, Senate Executive Document Number 14,
acknowledging in fact the end of impressment by receiving the document without asking for any revision.\textsuperscript{11} Austria was naturally delighted by Seward's maneuver.

The government in Vienna was equally satisfied with the reply which Seward made to its official protest of December 18. In his answer to Austria, as well as to the other countries which had sent protests to Washington, the secretary of state used the same tactful diplomacy which he had used with England. Not only did he make the same apology which he had made to Great Britain, but he went one step further. Assuming the role of defender of neutral rights, he suggested to the European nations that they call an international conference to settle questions involving the maritime rights of neutrals in case of war. To Rechberg Seward wrote that,

\begin{quote}
the United States are not only incapable for a moment of seeking to disturb the peace of the world, but are deliberately just and friendly in their intercourse with all foreign nations; and...they will not be unfaithful to their tradition and policy as an advocate of the broadest liberality in the application of the principles of international law to the conduct of maritime affairs....The United States will sincerely rejoice if the occasion which has given rise to this correspondence shall be improved so as to obtain a revision of the law of nations which would render more definite and certain the rights of states in time of war.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

The secretary of state sent similar letters to the ministers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} For Seward's apology to England over the Trent affair see \textit{Senate Executive Document Number 8, 37th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1862)}, pp. 8-13.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Seward to Motley, Washington, January 9, 1862, \textit{U. S. Department of State, Instructions to Vienna}, Roll 13.
\end{itemize}
of France and Prussia. What Seward did, in other words, was to change the status of the United States almost overnight from a challenger to a protector of neutral rights. This strong position in favor of neutral maritime rights so gratified the Austrian foreign minister that he asked John Motley to convey to Lincoln and Seward "his most sincere congratulations and thanks for the able, temperate, courageous, and statesmanlike manner in which the government has borne itself through these trying circumstances." 13

Throughout the whole crisis Austria's attitude had been conciliatory, patient, and, in some quarters, even sympathetic to the government in Washington. In fact, the Constitutionelle Österreichische Zeitung went so far as to justify Wilkes' action. "Of course the Union war steamer had the right to search the English packet ship," the paper remarked on November 30, "and if there had been Confederate soldiers on the English ship, the war vessel could have confiscated them." 14 While the Constitutionelle Österreichische Zeitung was apparently a strong liberal organ, the official government paper, the Wiener Zeitung, very carefully refused to antagonize the United States by making any comments on the incident. It contented itself with an objective report of the events relating to the

affair.

With the crisis over the Trent affair past, Secretary of State Seward ordered the American representative in Vienna, Motley, to go to London to proselytize the Union cause among his many influential British friends. Motley, however, hesitated to follow out these instructions since he felt that by going to London he would interfere with the work of the American ambassador to England, Charles Francis Adams. After some correspondence with Seward and the secretary's close friend and advisor, Thurlow Weed, who had originated the idea of sending Motley to England, the American minister was able to convince Seward to postpone the mission indefinitely. 15

The temporary cancellation of Motley's journey proved to be a fortunate move, as it was soon discovered, he was needed more in Vienna than he was in London. For at this time, an agent of the Confederacy, A. Dudley Mann, was attempting to create discord between Austria and the United States. 16 Mann had been sent to Hungary in 1849 by the then Secretary of State, John M. Clayton. At that time

15. For details of this proposal to send Motley to London, see Weed to Seward, London, February 18, 1862, Seward Papers; Motley to Weed, Vienna, February 17, 1862, ibid.; Motley to Seward, Vienna, February 18, 1862, ibid.; and Weed to Seward, London, February 18, 1862, ibid.

16. Mann had been sent to Europe in March, 1861, along with Robert Toombs and William Yancey, to seek recognition and treaties of commerce with England, Spain, Belgium, and Russia. It is difficult to see what President Davis could have had in mind in sending him abroad. Mann was vain, verbose, untactful and credulous. See Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 52.
Clayton had given him instructions to recognize the Hungarian government as soon as it was able to maintain its independence and Mann had retained his 1849 orders. Now he threatened to publish them. Because he knew that the friendly American reaction to the Hungarian revolution had been a source of friction between Austria and the United States, he thought that he could thus open an old wound. By creating mass opposition to the Union within the Habsburg Empire he hoped to force the government in Vienna to support the Southern cause. 17

The Austrian foreign minister, Rechberg, was concerned for this very reason that the Clayton dispatch to Mann would be published. Not only did he feel that the publication of the dispatch would give added incentive to the pro-Southern cause in Europe and, in general, would be "very disagreeable" to the United States, but also he believed that Austria would be forced to ask the government in Washington to disavow any intentions of fostering the disintegration of the Austrian empire or of making statements favoring Hungarian independence. 18 Aware that there were large factions in the United States who still favored the dismemberment of the Austrian empire and Hungarian independence and who were influential in the Republican party, he feared that such a disavowment might not readily be given

17. Motley to Seward, Vienna, February 12, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
by the government in Washington. In order to avoid a
diplomatic impasse which could easily arise between
Austria and the United States should the Confederate
envoy publish the document in his possession, Rechberg
decided to discuss the whole problem of Clayton's ins-
tructions to Mann with the American minister in Vienna.

At their first meeting, the Austrian foreign minister
reassured Motley that the Austrian government wished to
discuss the problem of Mann's dispatch with the United
States only because "it had no disposition to throw impedi-
ments in their path or do them any injury since they were
now maintaining the principles of legal authority against
insurrection and rebellion."19 Three subsequent meetings
between Rechberg and Motley were held during February and
March. In these meetings the Austrian foreign minister
was primarily interested in obtaining reassurances from
Motley that the United States would not meddle in Austrian
affairs in any way. He wished to have such an official
American statement on hand to be able to counteract the
anti-American feeling which he felt might arise throughout
Europe after Mann published his dispatch. While Motley
would not state anything officially until after he had
received instructions from home, he indicated to the
Austrian foreign minister that Washington would probably
give such a statement of disavowal in Austrian internal

19. Motley to Seward, Vienna, February 12, 1862,
U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
affairs. He then explained to Rechberg how the situation had arisen. The 1848 revolutions, he said, had taken place at a time when the American government was controlled by Southern slaveholders who, in order to extend the areas of cotton production, favored an expansionist, interventionist policy. American concern with the Hungarian revolution and the statements supporting Hungarian independence, he continued, were only indirect manifestations of this aggressive policy. Actually, the American policy had always been one of non-intervention in the affairs of foreign nations. Now that the slave owners had been "dethroned," the United States "would be in no hurry to intermeddle with foreign nations. [Its] aim would be peace with all the world." Furthermore, he assured the Habsburg foreign minister that although it was proud of its republican principles, the United States realized that these principles could not take root in the Habsburg Empire—an empire which was so politically and socially different from America. 20 Although still concerned over the embarrassment which he felt both countries would suffer when the Clayton instructions to Mann were published, Rechberg appeared quite satisfied with Motley's answer and expressed his confidence in, and friendship for, the United States. 21

While Motley was trying to reassure Rechberg that

21. Ibid.
America would probably not interfere in Austrian domestic affairs, Secretary of State Seward was officially informing the Austrian representative to the United States that the present government could not be held responsible for the Mann mission to Hungary since it occurred during a previous administration. The secretary was actually much less worried about the possible publication of the Mann dispatch than either Rechberg, Motley, or Hülsemann. He always felt that publication would not win any new European support for the Confederate cause and might even serve to increase the pro-Union sentiment among the liberal classes of Europe who sympathized with America's support of the 1848 Hungarian revolution. He also realized that Austria, the one country in which the Confederates might hope to gain support for their cause by the publication of the document in Mann's possession, was determined to remain on friendly terms with the United States no matter what action Mann took.

Perhaps because he also came to realize that the South had little to gain from the publication of the Clayton dispatch of 1849, A. Dudley Mann decided not to publish the document. Instead he went to Vienna to use his personal influence to win support for the Confederate cause. His trip proved to be so utterly fruitless, however, that he was not even able to obtain a conference with the Austrian

The fact that the government in Vienna refused to see Mann and continued to follow a cordial policy toward the Union, however, did not mean that there was no contact between members of the Habsburg and Confederate governments. Since Austria had recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent power, she could, in accord with the established principles of international law, maintain commercial relations with the South. During the course of the war, the Austrian government actually sold large quantities of rifles to the Confederacy. The government in Vienna was in serious financial straits and desperately needed the additional revenues which could be obtained from increased foreign trade. While there were few products which Austria could sell to America during the Civil War, various Austrian concerns manufactured an excellent rifle at a reasonable price and had a large surplus available for purchase. They would gladly have sold them to the North had the government in Washington showed an inclination to buy sizeable quantities of the rifles and sent an agent to Vienna to purchase them. Since it was not contrary to Austrian policy to sell the rifles to the South, the government in Vienna opened negotiations with an agent whom the Confederacy maintained in Vienna after it became clear that the North would not buy the guns. In the fall of

1861 the agent was able to purchase a large quantity of the surplus Austrian rifles.\textsuperscript{24} He began to ship them in November to the Confederate armies.

The American Consul in Vienna, Theore Canisius, had long urged the United States to buy the Austrian rifles. When he learned of the purchases made by the Confederate agent, he asked Seward to authorize the Guetermann brothers, who had offices in Vienna, New York, and Ann Arbor and who had already made several small purchases for the North, to buy whatever rifles were manufactured in Vienna. Canisius expressed the opinion that the Guetermanns could purchase the rifles for the relatively inexpensive price of twelve dollars apiece.\textsuperscript{25} But the government in Washington ignored Canisius' suggestion and continued to display little interest in buying Austrian arms.

\textsuperscript{24.} The exact number of the guns purchased by the South is difficult to determine. Theodore Canisius claims that 70,000 rifles were sold to the Confederate agent. Canisius to Seward, Vienna, September 14, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports from Vienna, Roll 3. However, in an article in the \textit{Journal of Southern History}, William Diamond claims that until February, 1862, only about 15,000 small arms including rifles, muskets, and revolvers, were received in the South from all the countries in Europe. His source is a letter from Judah Benjamin to Jefferson Davis dated February, 1862. See his "Imports of the Confederate Government from Europe and Mexico," \textit{Journal of Southern History}, Vol. VI (November, 1940), p. 476. While Canisius' information was usually accurate, his figure in this case is probably wrong. Most likely the figure should be closer to 7,000 rifles. A sale of 70,000 guns would surely have attracted a great deal of attention, especially in the Confederate government. Yet the Confederate purchasing agent, Caleb Huse, appears never to have even known about the sale. Caleb Huse, \textit{The Supplies for the Confederate Army} (Boston, 1904), pp. 26-27.

\textsuperscript{25.} Canisius to Seward, Vienna, November 18, and November 30, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports from Vienna, Roll 3.
During the summer of 1862, however, the Southern purchasing agent, Caleb Huse, learned that the Austrian government had another supply of rifles for sale. Huse had long been looking for a rifle to match the quality of the Springfield arms used by the Union armies. Having been in Austria in 1859, he was acquainted with the fine craftsmanship of the Austrian weapons. He would like to have gone to Vienna to purchase the rifles but he evidently did not know about the previous Confederate purchase of Austrian weapons. Thus, he believed that the government in Vienna would never allow guns to be sold to the Confederacy. However, he was finally persuaded by one of his associates to make the trip and to his surprise, he was able to buy a large lot of the Austrian rifles with little difficulty. 26 When Motley learned of Huse's purchase, he protested the sale, but his action was in vain. The Austrian government explained to the American minister that the making of arms was an important industry in Austria, that the arms which had been sold to the Confederacy had first been offered to and refused by the United States, and that since the Confederate states were belligerents, they were lawful buyers according the usage of nations. Although Motley then offered to buy the whole consignment of rifles, Austria refused to break its contract with

26. Huse claims that he was able to purchase 100,000 rifles from Austria. Huse, Supplies for the Confederate Army, p. 26. William Diamond does not contest the figure. Diamond, "Imports of the Confederate Government," p. 479.
The government in Vienna continued to sell guns and ammunition to the Confederacy, but its dealings with the South were strictly commercial and indicated no support for the Southern cause. In fact, the Austrian government usually informed the legation in Vienna of any proposed sale to Confederate agents. Austria saw no reason to conceal its dealings with the South and, although Motley had protested the original sales, the government in Washington decided not to press the issue lest it have unfavorable consequences on the relations between the two countries.

Austria also sold Huse other forms of armament. The government sold him ten batteries of six pieces of field artillery which had become obsolescent after the invention by an Austrian army officer of a new type of ammunition called gun cotton. Unlike conventional ammunitions, this new powder was relatively smokeless, produced little recoil, and could hurl a shell farther than had previously been possible. Having watched the experiments with gun cotton with great interest, Theodore Canisius urged his government to purchase and to begin its own experiments with the new ammunition.

29. Canisius to Seward, Vienna, October 4, 1862, ibid.
The Confederate agents also took a keen interest in the Austrian experiments. On December 9, 1862, Mann wrote to the Confederate Secretary of State, Judah Benjamin:

More than once I have had the occasion to advert in my dispatches to the efforts of the Government of Austria to render gun cotton a reliable substitute for gun powder. It now seems that her steady perseverance has been attended with success; and that it has resulted in valuable discoveries by which an improvement in the strength of metal may be accomplished. 30

Canisius was very much concerned over the interest which the Confederate agents took in the new ammunition. On November 18, 1862, he warned Seward that Caleb Huse was negotiating with the Austrian authorities to purchase about thirty batteries using gun cotton, as well as the necessary ammunition. He urged the secretary to instruct Motley to raise protests over the possible sale and to ask the Austrian government to discontinue its negotiations with the South. 31 It is unclear whether or not Seward heeded these admonitions. However, whether in accord with his instructions or on his own initiative, Motley did protest. His action proved successful. The Austrians, who, in any case, did not want the Confederates to gain the formula for the new ammunition, almost immediately cancelled their talks with the Southern agent.

31. Canisius to Seward, Vienna, November 18, 1862, Consular Reports from Vienna, Roll 3.
Even though the government in Vienna was reluctant to give the South the formula for gun cotton, it was more than willing to show the Americans how to produce the powder. The inventor of the new ammunition, Baron Lenck, even offered to come to the United States and to serve in the Union army if he were granted a commission. The government in Washington, however, declined Lenck's offer for no apparent reason other than that it was against the policy of the United States to give commissions in the Union army to foreigners.

Although the United States continued to show as little interest in gun cotton as they had in the Austrian rifles, the American consul in Vienna continued to press the government in Washington to use the new ammunition offered by the Austrian government. This interest in gun cotton is indicative of one of Canisius' flaws as a consular agent. It shows that he was not satisfied to limit his duties strictly to affairs which were supposed to be the primary concern of the three American consuls in the Habsburg Empire. Unlike his two contemporaries, Richard Hildreth in Trieste and William O. Howells in Venice, who generally confined their

32. On October 4, 1862, Canisius notified Seward that, "Baron Lenck proposes now...to offer his services to our government and, if accepted, to introduce his new artillery system and gun cotton into our country, to disclose to our government the secret of manufacturing the new gun cotton and use it at once in this war." Canisius to Seward, Vienna, October 4, 1862, ibid.
duties to commercial matters, Canisius often interfered in strictly diplomatic matters, which were the responsibility of the American minister to Austria, John Motley.

In fact, Canisius' tendency to meddle in diplomatic affairs almost cost him his position as American consul in Vienna. During the summer of 1861 the Lincoln administration struck upon the idea of asking the renowned Italian patriot, Giuseppe Garibaldi, to come to the United States to lead the Union armies against the Confederacy. In July Seward even instructed Henry Sanford to contact the Italian general and to offer him a commission as major general in the Union army. Sanford was instructed to point out to Garibaldi that the Civil War was a "contest for the unity and liberty of the American people" and that the defeat of the Union "would be a disastrous blow to the cause of Human Freedom equally here, in Europe, and throughout the whole world." Sanford was also requested to inform Garibaldi that the secretary of state made the offer "not merely as an organ of the Government, but as an old and sincere and personal friend." Garibaldi refused the offer, after which Seward wrote Sanford that he should inform the secretary of state if Garibaldi ever changed his mind.33

No more official overtures were made to Garibaldi during the following year, for the secretary of state had changed his mind about asking the Italian patriot to serve

33. Seward to Sanford, Washington, July 27 and October 11, 1861, Seward Papers.
in the Union armies. However, Canisius was unaware of Seward's change of attitude and, in an attempt to offset what he considered to be the rapidly increasing pro-Southern sentiment in Europe, he invited Garibaldi in the late summer of 1862 to come to America with a general's commission in the Union army. Recalling that Seward had previously extended a similar invitation to the Italian patriot, he was sure that the secretary would approve his move. He was so certain, in fact, that he did not even inform him of his move until after he sent the invitation to Garibaldi.

Naturally Seward was enraged when he learned of Canisius' action. In a sharply worded letter which he sent the American Consul on October 10, he reprimanded Canisius for inviting Garibaldi to come to America and abruptly dis-

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34. The Secretary came to fear the possibility that welcoming Garibaldi to America might falsely be construed as an indication of official American support for the Italian unification movement while, in fact, the "policy of the United States in regard to Italy [was] absolute abstinence from all intervention in domestic affairs." Moreover, Seward recalled the difficulties he had had with Austria over the appointment of Burlingame as American minister in Vienna. He knew that Austria was very sensitive about America's dealings with persons whom the Austrian government considered to be opposed to the policies of the Habsburg empire and was fully aware of the suspicions which the government had about Garibaldi and his followers. The secretary did not wish to antagonize Austria by granting a commission to Garibaldi, a move which he knew would be considered offensive by the government in Vienna. Seward to Canisius, Washington, October 10, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Instructions to U. S. Ministers in Austria.

35. Canisius to Seward, Vienna, October 4, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports from Vienna, Roll 3.
missed the American consul from the foreign service. In a separate letter to Motley, Seward notified the American minister that, if necessary, he could point out to Rechberg that Canisius' dismissal "illustrates the policy of the United States in regard to foreign and friendly nations."  

The Austrian government was, of course, highly pleased by Seward's dismissal of Canisius. Thus, when Motley officially informed Rechberg of the secretary's action, Rechberg immediately remarked that he was "thankful—very thankful" that Canisius had been relieved of his duties.  

For some unknown reason, however, the secretary of state decided to reinstate Canisius. On December 8 he instructed Motley to notify Canisius of his reinstatement and then to give the news to Rechberg. The American minister, disturbed by Seward's change of heart, wrote to the secretary on December 26 questioning his action. "The restoration of Mr. Canisius," Motley warned, "might be very unpalatable to this government—perhaps create a disagreeable feeling on its part towards the United States, and possibly injure Mr. Canisius himself to the extent of

37. Seward to Motley, Washington, October 9, 1862, ibid.  
38. Motley to Seward, Vienna, November 10, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
a refusal of his exequatur." The Austrian foreign office considered it an act of friendship when Canisius was removed, the American minister continued. He feared what Rechberg would now think when informed of Canisius' reinstatement. Before sending his comments to the secretary of state, Motley decided to have another meeting with Rechberg. In the interview the American minister "incidentally mentioned" to the Austrian minister that the American government had decided to allow Mr. Canisius to remain as consul. Surprisingly, Rechberg made no comment but turned the conversation to other topics.39 The subject never again came up. The Austrian minister was evidently satisfied that Canisius had been properly reprimanded for his action regarding Garibaldi. As a consequence, the affair ended as abruptly as it had begun.

The incident created between Austria and the United States by the American consul's invitation to Garibaldi was the last affair of serious consequence between the two countries which directly related to the events of the Civil War. However, it was not the last incident of importance between the two countries during the era of the struggle in America. In fact, the gravest threat to the cordial relations existing between Austria and the United States lay ahead. As the winter of 1862 approached, the events

leading to that crisis were already taking place in another area of the North American continent.
Chapter III
Mexico

Secretary of State Seward's harsh attitude toward Canisius and his overtures to Garibaldi had been partly due to the events which were taking place in Mexico. One of the reasons why Seward reversed his opinion about inviting Garibaldi to America was his realization that such an invitation would indirectly involve the United States in Italian affairs at a time when non-intervention was one of the most important policies of the Lincoln administration. Involved as the United States was in a Civil War, it was particularly important that America adhere strictly to an isolationist policy.

In spite of the best of intentions, however, the United States was not in a position to follow a strict non-interventionist policy. In the spring of 1862 the French landed troops in Mexico. Rumors were circulating that Napoleon III intended to make the Austrian archduke, Ferdinand Maximilian, emperor of a new Mexican empire.

The news of the French interference in Mexican affairs came at a most unfavorable moment as far as the government in Washington was concerned. Seward had just announced that the United States would not concern itself with European affairs. He had reprimanded Canisius for inviting Garibaldi to the United States because his action made it impossible for the United States "to avoid injurious compli-
In return for a policy of non-interference in old world affairs, Seward hoped that Europe would not become concerned with disputes in the new world. He guessed wrong. For four years France and, indirectly, Austria, involved themselves in Mexico's domestic problems. As a consequence, the Mexican question assumed paramount importance in Austro-American relations.

The beginning of the difficulty in Mexico can actually be traced back to 1857, when a civil war erupted in the country between a conservative clerical party, which wanted to form a monarchical form of government, and a republican party, which was opposed to monarchy. In the summer of 1861 the republican party gained the upper hand, and its leader, Benito Juarez, became president of the strife-torn country. When he assumed the presidency, he faced the problem of making order out of the country's finances. Mexico was on the verge of bankruptcy, and, to make matters worse, Juarez's predecessor had contracted huge loans at exorbitant terms from European financiers. These creditors now demanded payment of the interest and, in some cases, the capital of the loans. Realizing that he would have to declare Mexico bankrupt to meet these demands, Juarez persuaded his government in July, 1861, to approve a two-year moratorium on the repayment of all debts. This action irked the European creditors, who urged their governments to inter-

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1. Seward to Canisius, Washington, October 10, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Instructions to Vienna.
cede on their behalf.

In October, 1861, representatives of the three countries most involved—England, France, and Spain—met in London and decided to use their joint forces in Mexico "to enforce their contractual rights against that country." They explicitly stated that they did not seek to acquire any territory in Mexico or to interfere in any way with the established Mexican government. Despite these protestations of simon-pure intentions, Napoleon III was determined to take advantage of the chaotic situation to establish a French empire in Mexico and to place Ferdinand Maximilian, the brother of the Austrian emperor, on the Mexican throne. Spain also had ambitions in Mexico. Unaware of Napoleon's choice of Maximilian as emperor but knowing of the French ruler's plans to establish a Mexican empire, the Spaniards hoped that Napoleon would name a Bourbon as ruler of Mexico. England was the only one of the three powers which had no interest in Mexico other than that of collecting the debts owed to her citizens.

Several reasons led Napoleon to prefer Archduke Maximilian to a Bourbon prince as ruler of his projected empire in the western hemisphere. The French emperor's main reason, however, was revealed in a letter which he wrote on July 3, 1862, after France had already landed troops in Mexico. In it he stated that he was establishing

an empire in Mexico so that France could prove herself to be a world power and could supply the Latin people with protection against future American expansion. He chose Maximilian as emperor in order to appease Austria and to gain her as a French ally. "As for the prince who would ascend to the throne of Mexico," Napoleon concluded, "he would always be forced to act in the interest of France, not only out of gratitude but because he could maintain himself in power only by our influence." 3

The desire to appease Austria alluded to in Napoleon's letter stemmed from the emperor's wish to draw Austria into a closer accord with the French government. The government in Vienna still remembered that the French emperor had supported Piedmont in its struggle against Austria during the war of 1812 for Italian unification. Although the Austrians never forgave Napoleon for what they considered to be his duplicity, the French emperor, having visions of being the arbiter of Europe's destiny, was determined to come to some kind of cordial arrangement with the Habsburg government. In a conversation with the Austrian minister to France, Prince Richard Metternich, the French emperor suggested that Austria move closer to France. "I believe that you have everything to gain in going with France and England," Napoleon said,

Napoleon hoped to use Maximilian to force Austria into coming to a closer understanding with him.

As early as the summer of 1861 the Austrian government suspected that Napoleon might ask Maximilian to become monarch of Mexico. Although the foreign minister, Rechberg, was apprehensive about the scheme, noting that there was no guarantee that England or France would support a monarchical restoration in the new world, he did not dismiss the idea entirely. He advised his emperor to wait until the situation in Mexico and the French and English plans became more clear before deciding whether to allow Maximilian to become the Mexican emperor. As he noted, Maximilian's ascendancy to the monarchy of a new empire had certain advantages for the Habsburg empire. In the first place, it would afford an easy and gentle way for the Austrian ruler to rid himself of his troublesome brother. Although he was well liked by the populace, Maximilian was a restless, critical, free-thinking young man whose political philosophy caused Francis Joseph much concern. The


Mexican venture appeared to be a golden opportunity to pacify Maximilian, who longed for a throne in the new world, as well as to remove him from the Austrian Empire.6

Aware, furthermore, that Austria's position as a world power had deteriorated since the debacle in Italy, the government in Vienna hoped that the ascendancy of a Habsburg to the Mexican throne would restore some of Austria's former preëminence in the world. Maximilian himself, conscious of the lost luster of his homeland and the possibility of the venture in the new world, remarked,

Owing to the pressure of contemporary conditions, the pristine glory of our house has become dimmed and our family in quite recent times has lost two sovereignties. None sees more clearly than I that it is the destiny of our house to wipe out this stain; and so I cannot fail to see what an impression would be made upon the world and above all upon enfeebled Austria if the proposition in question were carried into effect.7

The attractions of the Mexican venture proved so alluring to the Habsburgs that in October, 1861, when the French officially mentioned Maximilian's name as ruler of the proposed empire in the new world and when Maximilian indicated his desire to go to Mexico, the Austrian government conditionally accepted the French offer. Nevertheless, the government in Vienna was still leery about involving itself in Napoleon's schemes and also retained some doubt about the success of the Mexican venture. Thus, while it temporarily accepted

the French offer, the Austrian government carefully stipulated that before discussions could even be continued, Spain and England, as well as France, would have to assure the government in Vienna that they would maintain troops in the new world to lend military support to the proposed empire. The Austrian government also stipulated that Maximilian could go to Mexico only after an official body representing the Mexican people asked him to be their emperor. The government in Vienna obviously did not need much convincing to dissuade it from becoming involved in Mexico.

Such persuasion, however, was not immediately forthcoming; at first Napoleon's scheme proceeded without difficulty. England, France and Spain agreed to send troops to Mexico. By the end of 1861 these troops had seized the customs house at Vera Cruz. Juarez, who sought a peaceful solution to the intervention in Mexico, even allowed the European soldiers to move farther inland to avoid their falling victim to fever in the coastal areas.

Then suddenly affairs took a turn for the worse. The Spanish, irked by Napoleon's choice of emperor in Mexico, turned their interest toward Santo Domingo and withdrew from the French emperor's project in April, 1862 after arriving at an agreement with Juarez for the future payment of the debt. Suspicious of Napoleon's motives in Mexico, the British also ordered their troops to leave Mexico after reaching an understanding with Juarez. And from America
there came loud protests and warnings against the Mexican intervention.

The United States was naturally disturbed by what was happening in Mexico, for the French intervention there was a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine. As early as December, 1860, Robert McLane, the American minister to Mexico, had emphasized America's determination to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. He warned the other diplomatic representatives in Mexico that while the United States did not object to the right of countries to seek redress and reparations from Mexico for the injuries inflicted on their citizens by the Mexican government, it would object to an attempt by these countries to interfere in any way with the political independence of Mexico. If necessary, he implied, the United States would even use military force to defend Mexico's nationality and independence. In an effort to avoid European intervention, Secretary of State Seward proposed an agreement by which the United States would pay 3% interest on Mexico's debt for five years providing that England, France, and Spain agreed to stay out of Mexico. Deeply concerned about Mexico, President Lincoln "solicited an early action of the senate upon the subject." The senate however rejected Seward's proposal shortly after the Spanish

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fleet captured Vera Cruz. Engaging all its energies on the American Civil War, the United States could do little against the European intervention until after the struggle was over. But it was clear to many of the diplomats in Washington that America intended to concern itself again with Mexico as soon as possible.

Among those who were aware of America's future intentions with regard to Mexico was the Austrian minister in Washington, Chevalier Hülsemann. Hülsemann had always felt that the European countries should not involve themselves in the domestic affairs of the new world, just as he had always believed that the United States should never concern itself with the internal affairs of the various European countries. Knowing that the government in Washington would look unfavorably upon any European intervention in the Civil War, especially since such interference would probably favor the Confederate cause, Hülsemann made it his policy to "avoid as much as possible any appearance of mixing in those disastrous events" of the war. 10

Aware of the Monroe Doctrine, Hülsemann also realized that the United States regarded European interference in any part of the new world in an unfavorable and unfriendly manner. Fully realizing that the government in Washington would try to prevent such European involvement in the internal affairs of the western hemisphere, the Austrian

minister carefully watched the concern of some of the European countries over the collection of the debts in Mexico ripen into the possibility of a large scale invasion of the new world. Such an invasion, he warned in a letter to Rechberg in January, 1862, would be a "much more difficult task" than England, France, or Spain contemplated, since the United States would vigorously oppose the action.\textsuperscript{11}

At the time of his letter, the Austrian minister did not have any idea that the Austrian archduke might become ruler of Mexico. However, when he learned of this possibility a week later he immediately hastened to write a long letter to Rechberg advising against any participation in Napoleon's scheme or in any plan involving intervention in the new world. "The immediate end of this dispatch," Hülsemann first remarked, "is to do all that I can to prevent the Imperial Government from participating in the league which appears to be forming at this moment between France and England against the United States and its efforts to reestablish this Union." Intervention in the new world would be dangerous, he continued, since it would involve fighting a whole continent and since "the premature invasion which is threatened \textsuperscript{11} would be received as a symptom \textsuperscript{11} by America of the most insidious malevolence." Regarding French participation in the proposed league, he remarked that Napoleon acted, not out of considerations for France, but

\textsuperscript{11} Hülsemann to Rechberg, New York, January 31, 1862, \textit{ibid.}
in order "to sustain the Bonapart dynasty." As for England, he said that she acted in the hope that her dominance on the sea would no longer be challenged by a united America. Finally, he advised his government to try, along with Prussia and Russia, to prevent the proposed invasion of the new world. Although he realized these powers were not in a position "to oppose the hostile measures of the two great maritime powers against this country," he concluded that Austria could at least win the gratitude of America "by taking an active part, even morally, against the hostile and destructive measures of the French and the English governments." 12

While Hülsemann was advising his government not to involve itself in the French scheme in the new world, the American minister to Austria, John Motley, was trying to learn as much as he could about the French proposal to make Maximilian the ruler of Mexico. Motley had heard rumors about the possibility of a European invasion of Mexico but, as he reported to Seward, all that he could find out about the scheme was that it was "seriously entertained" by Austria and that the archduke had been offered the throne. Motley did note, however, that the newspapers in Vienna strongly opposed the idea of Maximilian's going to the new world and that "it seems to be understood that it is a purely personal affair of the Archduke and that Austria is to contribute

nothing toward the new empire except the emperor." But he decided that he would see Count Rechberg to learn what he could about the role which Austria was planning in Mexico. In the meantime, he asked Seward to let him know what he should "say officially on the subject."

Motley held a meeting with Rechberg ten days later. During the interview Rechberg intimated that Austria "was simply in a state of expectancy," that France, England, and Spain had made an expedition to Mexico, and that Austria had nothing, and intended to have nothing to do with it. He did not deny that the Habsburg government had thought

13. As John Motley wrote to Seward in October, 1862, the newspapers in Vienna and most everywhere else in Austria were, "on the whole, favorable" to the Northern cause. Motley to Seward, Vienna, October n.d., 1862, U.S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5. The American minister also commented to John Bigelow that the largest newspaper in Vienna, Die Presse, was "very well conducted, very liberal and well disposed in American matters." Motley to Bigelow, Vienna, January 24, 1862, John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, Vol. I (New York: Baker and Taylor Co., 1909), p. 487. Even the military organ, the Gazette, furnished a valuable means to counteract the Southern propaganda spread throughout Europe by the pro-Confederate press of England. Part of the reason for the strong Union sympathy of the Austrian press was the active role which the American diplomats in Austria took in cultivating good relations with the Austrian journalists. Theodore Canisius, for example, wrote to Seward in March, 1862, that he "had the good fortune to make [after his arrival] in Vienna the acquaintance of the leading journalists" and that he had given them "sufficient explanations of the causes" of the war. Canisius to Seward, Vienna, February 21, 1862, U.S. Department of State, Consular Reports from Vienna, Roll 3. Canisius also aided Union propaganda by writing two pro-Northern articles every week for various Austrian journals and newspapers--articles which he believed "controlled to a very great extent public opinion in our favor." Canisius to Seward, Vienna, February 21, 1862, ibid.

of allowing Maximilian to become the ruler of a new Mexican monarchy. He noted, however, that before this eventuality could take place a strong government would have to be established in Mexico and sufficient guarantees of the new government's stability would have to be offered. He then asked Motley if the United States would object to the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. Motley, who had not yet received instructions from Seward, replied in the affirmative, stating that "the idea of European monarchy rests upon an established and historical order of things, which are entirely wanting in North America." In reporting the results of his meeting, Motley remarked to Seward that the scheme of making Maximilian emperor of Mexico was "in nubibus" in Austria and that the government in Vienna would consent to it only if proper securities were offered for Maximilian's safety.  

Even though he told Motley that Austria was only considering allowing Maximilian to go to Mexico, the Austrian foreign minister officially informed Hülsemann of Austria's interest in sending Maximilian to the new world. He asked the Austrian minister in Washington for his views on the probability of success of such an adventure in Mexico. Hülsemann replied to Rechberg's letter on February 18 by trying once more to dissuade his government from participating in any interventionist scheme. "I do not blame the three

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15. Motley to Seward, Vienna, February 12, 1862, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
powers from making an effort during the American Civil War to restore a little order in Mexico," he remarked; "if a monarchy can exist there this moment is without doubt the most propitious to make that attempt. But this is more than an attempt; it is an adventure which probably has as much chance of falling in the water as succeeding."

He referred to the Mexican scheme as a "trap" and warned his government that Napoleon's venture was probably only an attempt "to embarrass Austria either directly or indirectly and that the name of Maximilian would be compromised if the project did not succeed."

The Austrian minister's doubts about the Mexican venture and his concern about Napoleon's motives for involving Austria in it would probably have been enough to dissuade the Austrian government from involving itself in Napoleon's new-world project even if there was no other reason to withdraw. But the announcement by England and Spain in April that they were withdrawing their troops from Mexico shattered any remaining desire of the government to engage in the venture. No longer could Napoleon guarantee the stability of a Mexican empire or Maximilian's safety. Furthermore, the government in Vienna received a letter in February from Baron Richthofeln, a long time student of Mexican affairs, in which the baron insisted that it would be nearly impossible

to establish a European monarchy in the new world.\(^{17}\)

Soon after receiving Baron Richthofen's warning, Count Rechberg advised Maximilian to break off all negotiations concerning the establishment of an empire in Mexico. Aware that Maximilian would be reluctant to give up the Mexican throne, he warned the archduke that if he participated in Napoleon's scheme and went to Mexico, Austria would regard the affair as "extra-official" and would be "entirely a stranger" to it.\(^{18}\)

Rechberg's warnings, however, did not dissuade Maximilian. The archduke was as reluctant to give up the Mexican throne as Austria was to allow him to accept it. He continued to retain friendly communications with Napoleon and in 1863, after the French captured Mexico City and after a trumped-up plebiscite in Mexico declared overwhelmingly in favor of having Maximilian as emperor, the archduke decided to go to Mexico. He sailed from Europe on April 14, 1864.

The archduke's refusal to give up the Mexican throne placed Austria in a difficult position. Although the government in Vienna decided not to involve itself in Mexico, the fact that the brother of the Austrian emperor was to become monarch of the new empire did involve Austria. Since Francis

\(^{18}\) Ibid; Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, May 30, 1862, Ibid.
Joseph was head of the Austrian government, his consent to the archduke's going to Mexico was tantamount to giving official approval for Maximilian's venture. Furthermore, since the archduke was the brother of the Austrian emperor and a Habsburg, the government in Vienna could not easily forsake him should he ever be forced to ask for Austrian assistance. While such aid would clearly involve Austria in the new world, even the realization that such assistance was forthcoming if needed was enough to implicate her in the Mexican scheme.

Although the government in Vienna decided to meet the dilemma presented to it by the archduke's actions by regarding his involvement in the French venture as a private, "extra-official" matter not involving official Austrian policy, it discovered long before Maximilian sailed to Mexico that its policy would be a difficult one to maintain. In June, 1862, for example, when Francis Joseph met his brother at Schönbrunn, he immediately told the archduke that he "would on no account permit...any departure from the reserved and passive role and attitude of the Austrian government towards the whole question" of Mexico. Yet immediately afterwards he launched into a discussion of the conditions under which Maximilian could receive a delegation which had come to offer the archduke the Mexican throne and the stipulations under which he could accept it.

Difficult as its position was, the Austrian government continued throughout the years 1862-1864 to regard Maximilian's
interest in Mexico as a strictly private affair. There simply was no reason why the government should follow another policy. The hostility of the United States towards European intervention in Mexico, for example, remained unabated during these years. Thus, although Austria's trusted minister, Hülsemann, retired in the summer of 1863, he and his successor, Count Nicholas de Giorgi, still sent reports to Austria emphasizing the Washington government's fervid opposition to the events occurring in Mexico. In a letter of September 13, 1863, the former minister even remarked to Rechberg that, should the French desert the Confederates, the South would be ready to join the Union in wiping the French out of Mexico, and he reminded the foreign minister that "the Americans both in the North and South are a vigorous and warlike race." Hülsemann's successor, De Giorgi, noted a few months later that after the American Civil War ended there would be many unemployed soldiers and filibustering in Mexico would "have great attractions for them." Furthermore, 1863 and 1864 were years of growing turmoil in Europe. Difficulty between Prussia, Austria, and Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein and a revolt in Poland threatened to erupt into a serious European conflict.

As it happened, Europe was able to avoid a struggle between the great powers, but in 1863 and 1864 it was difficult to determine what the final outcome of the Schleswig-Holstein question or the Polish rebellion would be. With such problems to occupy its attention at home, the Austrian foreign office could hardly concern itself with Mexico.

As a result, Francis Joseph insisted that Maximilian renounce his rights to the Austrian succession if he intended to go to the new world. At first, the archduke refused his brother's demand, and for a while he even contemplated giving up the Mexican venture rather than his position as heir to the Austrian throne. However, under pressure from his wife Charlotte and the French emperor, Maximilian changed his mind on April 9, 1864, and less than a week before he sailed he gave into his brother's request and renounced his rights to the Austrian throne in order to become the ruler of Mexico. In doing so, he became the dupe of other people's ambitions and sealed his own fate.

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21. Although Francis Joseph forced Maximilian to renounce his rights to the Austrian succession, and hence his connection with the Austrian government, he agreed to let Maximilian retain his appanage of 150,000 gulden and to recruit a small force of 6,000 volunteers in Austria. Francis Joseph considered this concession as merely a face-saving device for Maximilian, who had made a much larger concession. The troops were not meant to involve Austria in any way in the new world, and, as John Motley later reported, the recruiting of the troops was very slow. Few seemed eager to lend their support to the new empire. Motley to Bigelow, Vienna, December 16, 1865, Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, Vol. I, p. 284. Yet the fact that Francis Joseph allowed some of his subjects to go to Mexico did involve Austria and the recruiting of troops in the Habsburg empire later became a matter for diplomatic discussion between the governments in Washington and Vienna.
At the same time that the Austrian government was trying to disassociate itself officially from the Mexican venture, it was attempting to convince the Washington government that it had no ulterior objectives in the new world. As late as September 21, 1863, when it seemed certain that Maximilian would go to Mexico, Rechberg assured Motley, as he had on many previous occasions, that the "Austrian government considered the matter of Maximilian's plan to go to Mexico as a purely personal one regarding the Archduke himself and his imperial brother only."\textsuperscript{22}

The Austrian foreign minister continued to emphasize the private and extra-official nature of Maximilian's venture in the new world right up to the time the archduke sailed to Mexico.

The Confederate government evidently was not aware of what the Austrian position relative to Mexico was. Or, if it was, it still thought that Maximilian's acceptance of the Mexican throne would disturb the relations between the governments in Vienna and Washington to such a degree that the Habsburg government would recognize the Confederacy. This belief marked a change in the South's estimate of its chances for gaining Austrian support for the Confederate cause. As late as the summer of 1863 Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, had turned down a re-

\textsuperscript{22} Motley to Seward, Vienna, September 21, 1863, U. S. Department of State, \textit{Dispatches from Vienna}, Roll 5.
quest by Lucius Q. Lamar, a Confederate commissioner to Europe, who had written Benjamin advising him to send additional commissioners to Austria and Prussia. Lamar had been falsely assured by a gentleman residing in Berlin that the governments and armies of these two countries were "extremely favorable to the cause of the South and that the success of the South was not more sincerely desired at any court than that of Austria." Misled by the opinion of this Berliner, Lamar felt that a commissioner in Austria and Prussia could easily persuade the two governments to throw their support to the Confederate cause. Noting that the Union agents in Austria and Prussia were highly successful in convincing emigrants to go to America, he also expressed the belief that a commissioner might be useful in encouraging Austrian emigration to the Confederacy.

Realizing that Lamar's information was inaccurate, Benjamin ignored his suggestion. Now, however, the Confederate Secretary of State thought it was advisable to send an agent, James Mason, to Vienna in order to attempt to win the Austrian government over to the Confederate side. If Maximilian "shall accept the Mexican throne," Benjamin wrote in his instructions to Mason,

the interest which will naturally be felt by the Emperor of Austria in the fortunes of his brother as

well as the interest of the French Government in the maintenance of their own work suggest a series of contingencies in any one of which it may be all important that this government should have discreet and able assistance at Vienna.  

But the Confederate secretary of state warned Mason not to present himself at any court or "make any formal application as an accredited commissioner unless previously assured unofficially that your reception as such will at once be accorded." In reply to Benjamin's instructions, Mason answered that he would proceed to Vienna only if the Austrian government indicated that he would be cordially received at court. The Austrian government never indicated that it would welcome a visit by Mason, and the Confederate agent never went to Vienna. Furthermore, it was never again suggested that a Southern agent could be of use in Vienna.

The difficulty with the Confederate policy regarding Austria was not so much the reasoning behind it as its timing. Benjamin's conviction that Maximilian's acceptance of the Mexican throne would strain Austro-American relations proved true, but not until almost two years after he wrote his instructions to Mason advising him to go to Vienna. The

25. Ibid.
fact was that Austria always viewed Maximilian's venture in the new world as a private act and that in 1854 the United States accepted this view. What else, after all, could she do?

The government in Washington, in fact, had accepted the Austrian position ever since 1852, when it was first rumored that Maximilian might become the emperor of a new monarchy in Mexico. The American minister in Vienna had first discussed the Mexican question with Count Rechberg in February, 1852, when the Count had assured Motley that Austria had no intentions of ever involving itself in Mexico. Motley was so satisfied with the foreign minister's reply that he never again questioned Austrian intentions in Mexico even after it became apparent that Maximilian was going to sail to the new world. "I should say that this whole matter [of Maximilian and Mexico] is an embarrassment to the Imperial Royal Government," Motley wrote Seward in September, 1853. "Offence might be given to France should her fatal gift be refused, while acceptance can bring no possible good to Austria."27 When Maximilian finally did sail to Mexico Motley wrote Seward summarizing what he had always believed was the official Austrian attitude towards Napoleon's scheme in the new world. "From the beginning to the end," Motley reported to the secretary of state, "the

27. Motley to Seward, Vienna, September 21, 1853, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
conduct of his Austrian Majesty has been consistent, dignified and worthy. The Austrian government has now nothing whatever to do with the Mexican government. That it will recognize the new Emperor when notified of his accession is a matter of course. Beyond that it will do nothing."28

Secretary of State Seward seemed to be satisfied with Motley's analysis of the Austrian policy toward Mexico. He advised him as early as March 10, 1862, that it would not be necessary to explain to Austria America's reaction to the recent intervention in Mexico by France, England, and Spain, since the government in Vienna was not a party to the intervention. However, since he had heard rumors that the Austrian archduke might become emperor of a new monarchy in Mexico, he thought it advisable to supply Motley with the official American position in regard to the intervention as it had been communicated to the three European powers involved in Mexico. In this communication he had warned against the establishment of a foreign government in the new world. Motley was told that he might unofficially submit this view to Count Rechberg if he thought it advisable.29 In other words, Seward did not want to implicate Austria unnecessarily in a scheme in which she was not involved, but he wanted the government in Vienna to know that the American government strongly opposed intervention. The implication was that

28. Motley to Seward, Vienna, April 12, 1864, ibid.
the government in Washington would regard with disfavor any Austrian act—specifically sending Maximilian to Mexico—which would involve Austria in Napoleon's plan to establish a monarchy in the western hemisphere.

However, Motley stressed so strongly his conviction that Austria had no interest in Mexico that Seward never considered Austria a part of the interventionist scheme. This was true even when it seemed possible that Maximilian might become emperor of the new monarchy in Mexico. The secretary of state continually instructed Motley not to discuss the question of Mexico with the government in Vienna unless specifically requested to do so by Austria.

"The Imperial Government of Austria," Seward wrote to Motley on September 11, 1863,

has not explained to the United States that it has an interest in the subject of the war in Mexico or expressed any desire to know their views upon it. The United States have heretofore on proper occasions frankly expressed to every party having an interest in the question the general views and sentiments which they have always entertained and still entertain in regard to the interest of society and government on this continent. Under these circumstances it is not deemed necessary for the representatives of the United States in foreign countries to engage in the political debates which the present unsettled aspect of the war in Mexico has elicited. You will be promptly advised if a necessity for any representations to the government of Austria shall arise.30

In the absence of instructions from Washington, Motley limited his remarks on the intervention to unofficial statements that the United States viewed the "conquest of

Mexico by France with unequivocal resentment and alarm."  

Even though Seward continued to recognize that Austria had no interest in Mexico, he slightly altered his policy of not discussing the intervention with the government in Vienna after it became more certain that Maximilian would go to Mexico and after the archduke stated that before leaving for the new world he would need the consent of his brother. The secretary of state now instructed Motley to open talks with Austria on the question of Mexico; he also ordered him to give Count Rechberg a copy of the American views toward the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico—views which Seward had already sent to the French and in which he, of course, expressed the strong opposition of the United States to the French plan.  

In pursuance of his instructions, Motley presented Rechberg with a copy of Seward's views. Rechberg looked at the paper, and, after reading it, commented that it "seemed to him a very moderate and statesmanlike dispatch." He reassured Motley once more that the Austrian government disassociated itself from the whole affair and would do nothing "to sustain the proposed empire." 

The Austrian foreign minister did not promise that  

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31. Motley to Seward, Vienna, September 1, 1863, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.  
33. Motley to Seward, Vienna, November 24, 1863, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 5.
Francis Joseph would stop his brother from going to Mexico, even though it was apparent that Seward hoped that he would make such a statement. Nevertheless, the Austrian emperor's demand that his brother renounce his rights to the Austrian succession before leaving for the new world satisfied the secretary about Austria's desire to remain aloof from the Mexican intervention. It is significant, therefore, that although he told Motley that the attitude of the United States towards the intervention would remain the same whether or not Maximilian renounced his rights to the Austrian crown, Seward still instructed the American minister to revert to the former policy of not discussing the Mexican question unless it was first mentioned by Austria.34

Even though the government in Washington seemed satisfied that the Austrian government had tried to disassociate itself from the Mexican venture, almost everyone realized that difficulty lay ahead between Austria and the United States. The Lincoln administration could not concern itself with Mexico at the beginning of 1864 because it was involved in its own civil war. It was common knowledge, however, that after the civil war was over—and by the summer of 1864 the end of the civil war seemed more apparent—the United States would try to destroy the Mexican empire. Such an attempt would be bound to involve Austria. Even though Maximilian

might rely solely on the French aid which had been promised him in order to save his empire, Austria would still have to give its tacit support to a Habsburg in his struggle against the United States. And if French aid was not forthcoming or was insufficient Maximilian could be expected to turn to the Austrian emperor for help. Then Francis Joseph would be compelled to assist his brother, and then relations between the United States and Austria would become strained and perhaps even be broken.

For the above reasons, Motley, who had tried so hard and so successfully to maintain friendly relations between Austria and the United States, was pessimistic as he viewed the Mexican situation in the spring of 1864. "Next Sunday," he wrote his mother in April,

the Archduke Maximilian accepts the imperial crown of Mexico and within two or three months he will have arrived in that country. Then our difficulty in this most unfortunate matter will begin. Thus far the Austrian government on the one side, and the United States government on the other, have agreed to wash their hands of it entirely. But when the new 'emperor' shall notify his accession to the Washington government, we shall perhaps be put into an embarrassing position.35

Motley's prophecy that the intervention in Mexico would place Austria and the United States in an "embarrassing position" proved true but not until almost two years later.

In the meanwhile, the government in Washington fought and

won the Civil War. Maximilian's venture in the new world in no way altered Austrian opinion or policy toward the war. The government continued to favor the North even through the Union's darkest days. When it learned in April that Lee had surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse and that the Civil War was almost over, the government was jubilant. When soon afterwards it discovered that President Lincoln had been assassinated, its joy abruptly changed to sorrow. Count Meyenburg, who had replaced Rechberg as Austrian foreign minister, best expressed Austrian feelings when he wrote Motley: "The horrid crime of which Mr. Lincoln was the victim could not but inspire the government of his Majesty the Emperor with the more sincere grief as at no time have the relations between Austria and the United States borne a more friendly character than during the official term of Mr. Lincoln."36

The end of the war, however, meant that the United States would now turn its attention to Mexico and that the friendly character of the relations between the governments in Vienna and Washington would endure its most severe test. Secretary of State Seward wasted little time in dealing with Maximilian's empire. Even before the Civil War ended, he stated publicly that the continued presence of a French army in Mexico would be antagonistic to the policy of the United

States. In January, 1866, he added weight to his warning by stating that the peace with France would be in jeopardy if the French would not withdraw their military force from Mexico. His warning came at a time when Napoleon had already determined to remove French troops from Mexico. The French emperor, who was confronted with serious domestic problems and who was continually receiving letters concerning the ingratitude and incompetence of Maximilian, had reached his decision to abandon Mexico at the end of 1865. Having received definite information about Napoleon's plan to withdraw from the new world, Seward decided to speed the French Emperor's withdrawal by sending him a note on February 12, 1866, demanding the assignment of a definite date for the beginning of the removal of the French troops. In reply, Napoleon officially announced on April 5 that his army would begin to leave Mexico in November.37

When Maximilian heard of Napoleon's decision to abandon Mexico, he realized, of course, that his empire was in peril unless he could find new military support to replace the French. He remembered that in September, 1865, after the French emperor had concluded that he would have to give up Mexico, he had suggested that Austria send a large military force to support Maximilian.38 In a desperate effort to prop

up his crumbling crown, the archduke decided to follow Napoleon's suggestion. He opened negotiations with the Austrian foreign office in an attempt to secure Austrian military aid for his empire.

The start of these negotiations placed Austro-American relations in a precarious position. Before 1866 Austria had shown almost complete disinterest in Maximilian's empire. In fact, relations between the archduke's government and that of his brother were never on the best footing. Maximilian never forgave his brother for forcing him to renounce his right to become emperor of the Habsburg empire before allowing him to go to Mexico. While on the voyage to the new world Maximilian even prepared a memorandum which he later delivered to all the European courts asserting that his brother had coerced him to renounce a right which he held sacred. When Francis Joseph learned about the letter he became enraged and almost broke off diplomatic relations between his government and that of the archduke. Although the passage of time somewhat healed the conflict, the brothers remained on unfriendly terms for the next two years.

Before Maximilian left for Mexico Francis Joseph had agreed to let him recruit a force of 6,000 troops from the Habsburg empire and an additional force of 2,000 men each year for four years to replace those who died, deserted, or completed their enlistment during the year. Even though no more than 2,000 additional troops were supposed to be
sent each year, rumors circulated at the end of 1855 and the beginning of 1866 that Austria intended to let more than this number go in one year. Motley wrote Seward on February 20, 1866, to assure him that the rumor was untrue. The American minister's report was correct. In fact, the recruiting of the contingent for 1865 had lagged far behind the quota of 2,000 volunteers. Few were interested in going to Mexico and, as Motley noted in the above dispatch, not a single person enlisted for 1866. As of February, therefore, the American minister was entirely satisfied that Austria, both its people and government, had little interest in Maximilian or Mexico.39

The withdrawal of French troops and the subsequent opening of negotiations between the archduke's government and the Austrian foreign office drastically changed matters. Unable to desert the emperor's brother without making some attempt to save him, the government in Vienna agreed to send 4,000 volunteers for the year 1866 and 2,000 for the next three years, provided that the Mexican empire "remained a private matter of Maximilian's."40 Private matter or not, Secretary of State Seward, who had just forced the French out of Mexico, had no intention of seeing French troops replaced by Austrian contingents. Seward first learned about the Austrian plan to send additional troops to Mexico

from Motley, who wrote him on February 27—just one week after he had insured him that the rumors about sending more troops to Mexico were false—that he had just learned that efforts were being made "to induce the Austrian government to consent that 4,000 volunteers may be levied here this year for Mexico." Motley stated that consent would probably be given and that the volunteers could be expected to leave Austria for Mexico before the year ended. 41 A few weeks later Seward received another report from the American consul in Paris, John Bigelow, stating that a diplomatic representative of the archduke, Gregorio Berandiran, was in Paris trying to raise funds to make it possible for 10,000 Austrians to leave Trieste for Mexico. Disturbed by the news that 10,000 Austrians might go to Mexico, the secretary instructed Motley to inquire concerning the facts of Bigelow's dispatch and, if they justify the report, to bring it to the knowledge of the Austrian government, seasonably, and say that the United States cannot regard with unconcern a proceeding which would seem to bring Austria into alliance with the invaders of Mexico to subvert the domestic Republic and build up foreign Imperial institutions.42

Then a few weeks later Seward received a second letter from Bigelow stating that he had just learned that Austria had signed a military convention with Maximilian's government by which the government in Vienna agreed "to ensure the en-

41. Motley to Seward, Vienna, February 27, 1866, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 7.
42. Seward to Motley, Washington, April 6, 1866, ibid.
rollment necessary to keep full the Austrian Corps" in Mexico and by which a ship line had been established between Vera Cruz and Trieste. 43

Meanwhile, Motley was informed by the Austrian government that it had signed a military convention with Mexico, but that this convention called for only 1,000 volunteers, which was the number it would send to Mexico. 44 Disturbed by the differences between Bigelow's and Motley's information, Seward instructed Motley to find out immediately the exact relations Austria intended to maintain with Maximilian's government. Seward also told the American minister to warn the Austrian government

that in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with the sanction of the Government of Vienna, the United States will feel themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting a state of war by Austria against the Republic of Mexico; and in regard to such a war waged at this time and under existing circumstances the United States could not engage to remain silent or neutral spectators. 45

Ten days later Seward sent another dispatch to the American minister in Vienna instructing him to leave the country should Austrian volunteers embark for Mexico. 46

Seward's tougher policy towards Austria displeased

43. Seward to Motley, Washington, April 6, 1866, Ibid.
44. Motley to Seward, Vienna, March 27, 1866, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 7.
46. Seward to Motley, Washington, April 16, 1866, Ibid.
Motley. The American minister felt that Austrian policy toward America and in regard to Mexico had always been friendly, sincere, and straightforward, and that it did not merit the harsh and peremptory tone which the secretary of state was using. Alluding to Seward's dispatch of March 19, he noted once more that Bigelow's information about Austria's sending 10,000 volunteers to Mexico was false. He had told the Austrian foreign office about the report and they had denied it, stating that Austria intended to send only 1,000 troops. The Austrian government also remarked that it regarded Maximilian's venture as a private affair. To intimate, therefore, that Austria was in alliance "with the invaders of Mexico," as Seward had suggested in his recent instructions, would, Motley felt, "appear to suggest that the Imperial Royal Government had not been hitherto frank in her dealings on this subject." This implication was not true, Motley said. As to the 1,000 troops which Austria did say it would send to Mexico, the American minister felt that the United States could not object, pointing out that Austria would never complain if the United States decided to send American troops to aid the Mexican republic in its struggle against Maximilian.47

All these opinions Motley presented to Seward in his dispatch of April 6—long before he was instructed to leave

47. Motley to Seward, Vienna, April 6, 1866, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 7.
the country if Austria allowed troops to go to Mexico. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the instructions of April 16th from Seward left the American minister in a quandry. Although he did not approve of the secretary's orders, he had been told by his superior to warn the government in Vienna against allowing troops to go to Mexico. Motley sought some means by which he could obey the instructions of the secretary of state and at the same time show his good faith and trust in Austria. He finally decided on the very undiplomatic and irregular measure of presenting the Austrian foreign office with a copy of his April 6 dispatch to Seward, a move which he felt would serve to inform Austria of Seward's protest while at the same time let the government in Vienna know that the American minister was trying to maintain friendly relations between his country and Austria.  

Accordingly, Motley met with the recently appointed foreign minister, Count Mendsdorff, on April 14 and read to

48. Motley had become so convinced of the righteousness of Austrian policy towards Mexico that he let his convictions guide his diplomacy. This was one of the few times that Motley so acted. But conducting himself in such a way even once was a dangerous course for him to follow. It indicated a lack of appreciation on his part of the exigency with which the United States regarded the immediate removal of all Europeans from Mexico. Even more serious, his pro-Austrian sentiment could have made his role as a representative of the government in Washington ineffective. While it is no justification for his action, it should be pointed out, however, that Motley was not the first diplomat, and would not be the last, who let his sympathy for the government to which he was attached affect his duties as a representative of the United States.
him the April 6 dispatch to Seward. After listening to Motley, Mendsdorff replied that he felt the American minister's remarks represented a "perfectly clear and explicit statement of the position of the Austrian government in regard to Mexico." 49

Satisfied with the Austrian minister's reply, Motley wrote to Seward to try to reassure him that the Austrian government had "no idea of bolstering up the Mexican empire." In order to comply with his recent instructions, however, the American minister noted in the same letter that he had presented America's protest to the Austrian policy regarding Mexico, albeit in an unofficial manner. He asked Seward to send him further instructions if the Secretary wanted the protest made official. 50

When Seward learned of Motley's action in reading the dispatch of April 6 to Mendsdorff, he became angry. "Your assumption [about the right of Austria to send volunteers to Mexico] and the arguments upon which you build it," he immediately wrote Motley,

were submitted by you to Count Mendsdorff; and it is not unlikely that he may have inferred that the assumption is consistent with the views which are entertained by the United States, and would therefore be approved by them. It becomes necessary for this reason for me to say that I do not acquiesce in this position.

The Secretary ordered Motley to seek an assurance from

49. Motley to Seward, Vienna, April 15, 1866, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 7. 50. Ibid.
Austria that it would not allow troops to leave Mexico from anywhere in the empire; he again ordered the American minister to leave Austria if Austrian troops embarked for Mexico. 51

This time Motley followed Seward's instructions to the letter. He drew up a note in which he warned the government in Vienna that the sending of troops to Mexico would "almost inevitably increase the general excitement in the United States and that the United States would regard the sending of such troops with serious concern." 52 Before he delivered the letter to the Austrian officials, however, he met once more with Mendsdorff and showed him the dispatches he had been receiving from Seward so that the Austrian government would know how seriously the United States viewed the sending of troops to Mexico. 53

Mendsdorff read Seward's dispatch to Motley but made no reply except to say that the matter was too serious to discuss before he received Motley's official note of protest. However, Austria was on the verge of war with Prussia and the government in Vienna now realized that if it let troops go to Mexico, the move could result in war with the United

52. Motley to Mendsdorff accompanying Motley to Seward, Vienna, May 8, 1866, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from Vienna, Roll 7.
53. Motley to Seward, Vienna, May 8, 1866, ibid.
54. Ibid.
States. The Austrian government did not want a war with the United States in the first place and it certainly could not afford a struggle with America at the present moment. The government in Vienna needed its troops and supplies at home and not at a place which had never interested Austria. True, Maximilian was a Habsburg and his downfall might cause some embarrassment for the emperor. But the government could not be expected to aid the archduke when it had more pressing problems at home. Therefore, on May 12 Count Mendsdorff notified Motley that the volunteers recruited from Mexico would not be allowed to sail at present. This move, the Austrian minister added, was made "in order to avoid any complications with the United States or any interruption to the friendly relations between the two countries."55

While Mendsdorff said that the troops would not be allowed to sail for the present, he actually meant that they would never sail. Realizing this, Seward was so elated that he now praised the American minister. "I congratulate you upon your success," he wrote Motley. "It would have been pleasant if I could have been allowed to be...less abrupt in my instructions, but the exigency was upon us, and interests of great magnitude were involved."56

A few weeks after sending his dispatch Seward was officially informed by Mendsdorff that Austria would per-

55. Motley to Seward, Vienna, May 22, 1866, ibid.
manently forbid the departure from the Habsburg empire of any troops bound for Mexico. When he learned the news, which by no means surprised him, the secretary of state simply remarked that the Austrian move was "in harmony with the spirit which has governed the proceedings of the whole period in which political disturbances in America have been the subject of discussion between the United States and the Emperor."57 No remark regarding the nature and spirit of Austro-American relations during the period 1860-1866 could have been more true.

57. Seward to Motley, Washington, June 29, 1866, ibid.
Conclusion

In a short volume entitled *Lincoln and the Emperors*, A. R. Tyrner-Tyrnauer recently examined and analyzed the policies which the Austrian, French, and Belgium rulers adopted towards the American Civil War. In his study, Tyrner-Tyrnauer maintained that the emperors, like Francis Joseph of Austria, hated and feared Lincoln and hoped that the Civil War would destroy or at least weaken the United States. He noted that the war occurred at a time when Francis Joseph, as well as the other European emperors, was struggling against the forces of liberalism and republicanism which rose to the surface during the "anti-monarchist revolutions" of 1848. Since the United States personified the very ideals which he was trying to repress, the Austrian emperor favored the South, in Tyrner-Tyrnauer's opinion, while at the same time he worked for the establishment of a monarchical system of government in Mexico.¹

Tyrner-Tyrnauer is not the first writer who has maintained that Austria favored the South during the Civil War. The eminent American diplomatic historian, Samuel Flagg Bemis, has indicated that Austria supported the Confederacy in its struggle against the Union in order that it might be easier to spread Catholicism in Latin America. The spread of Catholicism, Bemis argues, was Austria's principle interest.

in the western hemisphere during the era of the Civil War. 2

While there is little doubt that Austria would have liked to see the spread of Catholicism in the new world and to see Maximilian remain as emperor of Mexico, these considerations were never factors in determining Austrian policy towards the Civil War, and later, towards Maximilian's government. Long before the Civil War began the Austrian government had come to appreciate and respect the material power, strength, and resources of the United States, and had come to realize the important role which America would assume in world politics in the future. These considerations assumed much more importance than the spread of monarchy or Catholicism.

Perhaps the division of the United States into two separate nations would have so weakened the power of the United States that she would be unable to prevent the growth of Catholicism and absolutism in the western hemisphere. Certainly the Austrian government realized that a united America could and probably would resist such movements. But Austria could not afford to base her ambitions in the western hemisphere and her policy towards the United States on her desires in the new world. In the 1860's the problems in the Americas were only of secondary importance to the diplomats in the Austrian foreign office. Of far greater concern to them was Austria's position as a world power. Aware that her prestige in Europe had largely deteriorated

since the 1848 revolutions in the Habsburg empire, the foreign office realized that Austria needed a period of tranquility in order to solve her serious domestic problems and to restore her former preeminence in Europe. To even contemplate ventures in the western hemisphere would be to contemplate turmoil and conflict, a state of affairs entirely contrary to the best interests of Austria during the era of the Civil War.

In accordance with its desire for world stability, the Austrian government hoped for a quick end to the Civil War once it began. The fear that England and France might become involved in the struggle increased Austria's anxieties over the possibility that the war would disrupt the momentary tranquility in Europe. Before the opening of the struggle Austria had supported compromise measures to avert war; the government in Vienna probably would have supported a compromise solution agreeable to both sides at any stage of the struggle. During the course of the war, however, no doubt ever existed in the Austrian foreign office about which side to support. It was obvious to the Austrian officials that the Union was too powerful to lose the war, and it made good sense to support the winning side. The fact that Austria was opposed to rebellious movements in all parts of the world, that she was not as dependent on southern cotton as were other European nations, and that she wished to maintain friendly terms with the United States made it all the easier and wiser for the
government in Vienna to support the Union.

When the European powers decided to intervene in Mexico Austria was already committed to supporting the North. Aware of the resentment which the government in Washington displayed towards the intervening powers, the Austrian government realized that it could not participate in the intervention and at the same time hope to maintain friendly relations with the United States. This consideration, as well as the government's dislike of Napoleon, the fear of war over Mexico, and Austria's concern with her domestic problems, convinced the Austrian government not to participate in the intervention in Mexico.

How much the Austrian government valued the friendship of the United States was made evident when it had to choose between preserving Maximilian's empire (and, possibly his life) and maintaining cordial terms with the government in Washington. While it was a difficult choice for the Austrian government to make, it was a decision which was reached without hesitation once the United States made its position clear on further aid to Maximilian.

The fact that Austria maintained a friendly policy towards the United States did not mean that her attitude had changed in regard to the institutions and ideologies which the United States exemplified. Austria sought the friendship of the United States, supported the Union cause during the Civil War, and withdrew from Mexico because she felt it was expedient to do so, not because of fondness for the United States. The
Austrian attitude was best typified by her longtime representative to Washington, Chevalier Hülsemann. Even though Hülsemann had long been critical of American institutions and the conduct of the government in Washington, he supported all measures which promised to bring a closer accord between Austria and the United States and opposed all plans or schemes—such as the intervention in Mexico—which threatened to strain relations between the two countries. His actions were governed not by his personal attitude towards the United States but by what he considered to be the best interests of his country.

Because Austrian policy towards the United States was governed by expediency, the government in Vienna was occasionally willing to pursue a course of action which was against the interests of the United States. Thus the Austrian government sold guns and ammunition to the Confederacy. Austria desperately needed new sources of revenue and she had a surplus of guns. While she would have preferred to sell the arms to the North she unhesitatingly sold them to the South once they had been refused by the Union. However, had the United States vigorously protested the sale, which it did not, Austria would have most likely cancelled the sale of arms to the Richmond government. In any case, the sale of guns to the Confederacy in no way indicated a change in the Austrian government's determination to maintain cordial relations with the United States. It is indicative of her attitude that she
always informed the American representatives in Austria of her dealings with the Confederate agents, and that she would not give the South the secret to the discovery of a new type of ammunition, gun cotton.

As a result of Austria's firm decision to remain on friendly terms with the United States, both countries emerged from the crisis of the 1860's more determined than ever to maintain cordial and harmonious relations. Not until World War I did relations between the two countries take a turn for the worse, and even then, America's war efforts were directed not so much against Austria as against Germany. Germany was the villain, Austria the dupe.

Great historical eras often produce great ironies. Certainly one of the great ironies of the Civil War era was that Austria, so politically and socially the opposite from America, should emerge from the era of the war as one of her new friends while England, so closely resembling America in its political and social institutions, should emerge more estranged than ever from the United States.
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