THE RATIFICATION OF THE FIRST NUCLEAR TREATY: 
THE TEST BAN DEBATE OF 1963

by
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The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was the proudest accomplishment of President Kennedy's one thousand days in the White House. It prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space or under the oceans. The treaty was signed by more than one hundred nations, Red China and France notably excepted. Such a treaty had been a goal of United States policy for five years. In mid-1963 a sudden change of heart by the Soviet Chairman Khrushchev made the treaty possible. Its ratification by the U.S. Senate was preceded by exhaustive hearings, lengthy debate and wide public discussion. The Secretary of Defense stated that the treaty would aid national defense but scientists and military leaders admitted it would involve serious risks. Most opinion on the treaty tended to discount the risks as being overshadowed by political gains which might result from further Russian-American cooperation. The critical question prior to the hearings was the position of the Chiefs of the military services, some of whom were skeptical of the treaty. Massive Russian atmospheric tests had broken the previous moratorium on testing, and they had not been equaled by American tests. Superior testing might have provided the Russians with superior knowledge of heavy and high altitude explosions and made possible the disabling of American weapons and communications in the air and under the ground. Senators who heard all the secret testimony before the Armed Services...
Committee tended to agree. Since the treaty could scarcely be ratified without the support of the military Chiefs, the President worked by various means to gain it. To do so it was necessary for him to accept a compromise worked out by Senator Jackson. He promised to reinstate a vigorous program of underground testing, which he had renounced in June, and to establish a standby facility for use in case the Russians broke the treaty as they had broken the previous moratorium. Conditional approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff deprived opponents of a recognized authority for their stand, except for the notable testimony of Dr. Edward Teller.

After ratification interest in the treaty and in nuclear problems, as well as in disarmament, subsided rapidly.

Further gestures toward Russian-American cooperation resulted in dismal failure some weeks before the assassination of President Kennedy. While the treaty was hailed as a great psychological and symbolic triumph over the dangers of nuclear weapons, subsequent events have cast doubt upon its continuing value. France, and especially China, continued to test, but the treaty may have slowed the accumulation of radioactive fallout.
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The partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was hailed as a great achievement by the governments of almost all nations. In simple terms the treaty renounced all nuclear testing by the signatory nations except underground and under territorial waters. The General Assembly of the United Nations formally approved the treaty and called upon all states to become parties. More than 100 countries had acceded by the end of the year.

The treaty was hailed as the first significant disarmament agreement since the beginning of the cold war. The preliminary agreement between Great Britain, Russia, and the United States to cease nuclear testing in the air, under the oceans and in space, had culminated efforts of five years.

Consent to the treaty on September 24 by the Senate of the United States was called "a significant display of political unity in the international field and a major achievement for the administration." President Kennedy had said he would rather lose the next election than to see the treaty fail in the United States Senate.

President Eisenhower had proposed such a treaty during his second administration, and Chairman Khrushchev's invitation to negotiate the treaty was the acceptance of a further proposal by President Kennedy. After the failure of the first moratorium on all nuclear testing a unilateral moratorium had been declared by President Kennedy and was in effect during the negotiation and the debate.
opinion polls had reported that a preponderant majority of Americans favored such a treaty. Approval for the treaty among non-nuclear nations was even more enthusiastic.

It was assumed from the start that at least 67 Senators, the number required, would vote to ratify. Why was the engineering of consent in the Senate so often called the Kennedy administration's greatest achievement? Why did the debate become bitter? Why, after the debate was over, did 19 Senators vote against a treaty to which the prestige and leadership of the United States government had been so heavily committed?

Many reasons for opposition to the treaty were advanced by those who refused to support it and by those who supported it with reluctance. There were doubts about the origin of the treaty and fears of what might follow. Various motives were imputed to the treaty's critics by its zealous defenders. Some of these charges and accusations were extremely serious, while others were trivial. What were the basic cleavages in American opinion which were revealed or aroused by this debate?

Any attempt to answer these questions is made difficult by the fact that the contest was so one-sided. The opposition never had a chance. It is unnecessary to analyze the reasons for the treaty—they were, and are, obvious. On the other hand, the underlying reasons for opposition to the treaty were complex and subtle, and consequently much more difficult to understand and to explain.

Yet, despite the variety and the occasional obscurity of objections to the treaty, there was one attitude common to all objectors. The common attitude was a lack of confidence in some who were responsible for the treaty and its defense. This lack of
confidence was compounded by the occasionally cocksure manner of some officials who defended the treaty, by their backstage manipulations, and by their concealment of information unfavorable to the treaty. This lack of confidence in some responsible officials, this suspicion of their methods, was concentrated in the capitol city among the governmental and journalistic elite.

The public campaign for the treaty was pitched beyond its best-informed opponents to the nation at large. Less open methods were used to persuade a minority of witnesses and Senators who were inclined to be skeptical. In general, the public proved more pliable than the sophisticated opposition. The public campaign for support gained the most ground.

Despite the near unanimity of official witnesses and the comfortable margin of the approving vote, the push to obtain favorable reactions from the Pentagon, the laboratories, and the Senate was strenuous. President Kennedy, who insisted on comparing his treaty campaign with Wilson's struggle for the League of Nations, was the most apprehensive member of the administration. There was more uncertainty as to the outcome than appears, in retrospect, to have been justified. But the periods of uncertainty, like the tempers of some of the participants in the debate, were short. The entire debate was very brief indeed for a subject of earthshaking importance.

The final vote for ratification appeared in the consciousness of the Nation literally to bury the problem of nuclear explosions. The problem which was buried was worse than unpleasant—it was frightening—and few have chosen to restudy or even to recall the
words, ceremonial but ominous, by which it was consigned to earth. This is a pity, because these words contain a surprising amount of information that will become increasingly significant. They contain much foolishness and also much wisdom. The passage of time has made it less difficult to distinguish between the two.

THE SEMI-SECRET BACKGROUND OF DEBATE

As has been suggested, the dispute over the treaty took place in three major arenas: public (news and commentary), official (White House, Senate), and secret (Pentagon and other closed doors). The activities in the official arena were sometimes directed toward the public, but intermittently obscured by security smoke screens of varying density. From time to time, selected bits of secret information were exposed to view. Enterprising representatives of the press uncovered the most guarded secrets. A fascinating collection of mysteries was alternately guarded and revealed throughout the hearings.

The background of the nuclear test ban controversy extends to Hiroshima—perhaps even to Stagg Field at Chicago University and the first atomic pile. The controversy began to develop after the first Russian atomic test in 1949, which came as a surprise to most scientists. The Secretary of Defense at that time, Louis Johnson, issued a secret order that all Defense Department personnel would say (falsely) the Russian explosion had been accurately predicted and had been included in Defense Department plans. Then came the fight over our development of the H-bomb and the long and tedious disarmament and test ban talks with the Russians which got nowhere.
These involved a series of concessions made by the American negotiators in an effort to reach agreement on inspections against underground testing.

The complicated but sometimes startling story of these negotiations is thoroughly documented in Earl Voss's *Nuclear Ambush* which was published just before the treaty debate of 1963. This book is a monumental record of inspiring American idealism combined with shocking American gullibility. These lengthy discussions involved diplomatic and scientific officials of two administrations and two political parties and a series of Russians. There was good work, there were blunders, but never any real progress. The treaty debate of 1963 took place in the shadow of these repeated failures.

**THE PUBLIC DEBATE BEGINS**

Appropriately, the debate began at mid-year with a revelation by the same Earl Voss, which led to the following from the Associated Press on July 1:

"The Atomic Energy Commission reported today that it had detected suspicious events which it said 'may be nuclear tests of very low yield'... officials said one occurred June 12, which was two days after Mr. Kennedy announced the halt to any further United States atmospheric tests provided other nations also refrained.

"The officials said in view of the inconclusive evidence, there will be no change in:

1. Mr. Kennedy's moratorium.
2. Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman's scheduled trip to Moscow for nuclear test-ban talks starting July 15."
3. The United States offer, made at the Geneva disarmament conference, of a partial test-ban treaty that would outlaw above-ground explosions and permit underground testing.

"The officials said the evidence is that Russia set off small explosions of about one kiloton or so.... They added that the suspected tests were not announced earlier because of the uncertainty. The AEC statement yesterday followed a report in the Washington Star..."6

The United States press tended to shy away from the subject, but a Canadian correspondent in Washington had some interesting comments:

"...experts (said Voss) were worried that the Soviets might have tested a new type of clean weapon which did not emit radioactive debris which could drift outside the Soviet land mass.... Howard Simons, science writer for the Washington Post, said that officials (unidentified) regarded the Voss story as a deliberate leak.

"There was little doubt among officials,' he said, 'that the information had been provided in an attempt to complicate the task of the forthcoming Harriman mission to Moscow.'

"Mr. Voss also wrote: 'Disclosure of the apparent imperfections in the United States atmospheric detection system have strengthened the case of critics of Anglo-American test-ban proposals who have contended weaknesses exist in the verification system.'"7

This news was upsetting to many who suspected the United States was being duped again, and it was unpleasant to learn that the Atomic Energy Commission had kept the secret until prodded by an enterprising reporter at some risk to himself and to his sources. The more definite conclusion promised by the AEC did not appear. The subject was dropped as the campaign for the treaty began.

One week later Representative Chet Holifield (Dem.-Calif.) said he believed his Joint Atomic Energy Committee would approve a treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under
water and indicated that a group of Senators had recently advocated "approximately this same arrangement."  

The fight against the treaty began only one week later. On July 13 the Philadelphia Enquirer reported that U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone on record opposing some of the terms of President Kennedy's proposals for an agreement with Russia to ban nuclear weapons tests. Said the Enquirer: "Their so-called 'concensus' paper was presented more than two weeks ago to the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee...By accident or design the existence of the paper came to light Saturday on the eve of new Moscow test ban talks...."

The Enquirer went on to say that the Pentagon's civilian high command disliked having the Chiefs' views revealed by members of the Subcommittee. According to the Enquirer two Subcommittee members--Senators Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) and Stuart Symington (D-Mo.)--were signers, along with Armed Services Chairman Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), of an earlier letter which had told President Kennedy that further concessions in test ban negotiations would be unacceptable. The text of the letter was not revealed.

Concerning the surpressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Scripps-Howard editorial said, "The disclosures...add new fuel to the charges that civilian authorities have not only disregarded, but have tried to squelch, the advice of the Joint Chiefs." On the other hand the liberal New York Post displayed an opposite and much more emotional reaction to the Chiefs' reported criticism of the treaty: "Who chose exactly this moment to 'leak' this news?...It makes even more imperative the rallying of popular opinion...war and peace in the nuclear age are far too serious to be entrusted to
mechanical military minds. The bombshell hurled by the Joint Chiefs and their press agents will not shatter the Communists. It has landed behind our own lines." The Post went on to quote from The Insiders Newsletter that intrigue and maneuver by hard- and soft-liners in Washington made it increasingly hard for the public to know what was going on: "A Defense Department official let slip at a backgrounder that the AEC's budget for the production of nuclear weapons might be cut by more than half...According to Congressional sources the Administration had planned to propose such a cut in weapons production at next week's Moscow talks." 11 This instance was one of a long series of demonstrations that the official revelation of half a secret often inspired the disclosure of the whole secret.

In Moscow Mr. Khrushchev made it no secret that he really wanted a treaty. For the first time in disarmament negotiations he was seeking more than just a propaganda advantage. He was exuding goodwill and wisecracking to the U. S. and British delegates. One American official said: "Even the pessimists are optimistic." 12 After years of frustration by Russian intransigence few senators could believe anything new was happening, but newsmen began to speculate on how the Senate would react. Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post judged that an all-inclusive ban, including underground tests, would bring on the biggest foreign policy battle since the League of Nations. The senators were not much worried about it yet, because the test ban issue was so old and apparently so futile. 13

THE PRINCIPALS PREPARE

Officials at the Pentagon, however, began to take test ban talk quite seriously, for the first time. An interesting sidelight on
reasons why Defense Secretary McNamara would be anxious for a test ban was provided by Tom Ross of the Chicago Sun-Times Bureau who often produced inside stories from the White House. Such a ban might, theoretically, enable the Defense Secretary to arrive at his announced goal of reducing military expenditures:

"By 1965 more than 1,600 missiles will be on the firing line and the chief expenditures will be for maintenance - much less than the cost of research, development and production.

"That is, unless there is a major nuclear breakthrough which renders the missiles obsolete or drastically reduces their effectiveness.

"Such a breakthrough, say in the development of an antimissile missile, is likely to occur, in the view of most defense atomic experts, only by virtue of atmospheric nuclear tests."14

Whatever Secretary McNamara's purposes, there could be no question about his conception of his role in these large issues. He had risen above personal conflicts and partisan politics. During an interview at this time he was asked what kind of cooperation he was getting from the youthful President, one year his junior. McNamara exclaimed jubilantly: "Magnificent! Simply magnificent! Far more than I could ever have asked for or anticipated."

When asked whether he considered himself a Republican: "A chuckle escaped him and as he smoothed back his sleek dark hair, he said: "...'The Republican National Committee said it had no record that I was one. I asked what they did with all those checks I used to give them and a Committee spokesman said they had no record of any such checks. Maybe I should have them back!'"

Mr. McNamara, though a Presbyterian elder, revealed that he had been studying the application of supreme power in church as well as state. He explained: "I have been reading a couple of fascinating
books lately: Ryan's *The Vatican Council* and Neustadt's *The Powers of the President*... The divergency of the views among Catholic bishops is not unlike those between our own Joint Chiefs of Staff."15 There is no record of comments by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning any supposed resemblance of the Secretary of Defense to the Pope.

It was expected that Mr. McNamara would give the President whatever support he desired, and more, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Senate were not quite so predictable. *Washington Star* Columnist Richard Wilson was concerned lest the Kennedy administration continue what former Secretary of State Dean Acheson called its flirtation with Moscow. He said Mr. Kennedy did not dare enter into a treaty with the Soviet Union by executive action, because members of Congress had been making a strong record against a test-ban agreement on the grounds that the United States was being ambushed again.16 Columnist Lyle Wilson of the *Washington News* wrote: "The average American citizen has been showered with massive propaganda in behalf of a nuclear test ban."17

Most newspapers began running editorials in support of the test ban treaty.18 The greatest boost came from Mr. Khrushchev himself, who said he hoped the conclusion of a test-ban agreement would also be useful from the viewpoint of a general improvement in the international climate.19 On the same day (July 19) the Chinese party newspaper quoted Mr. Rusk as saying the ban would make the U.S. position more secure and Mr. Harriman as hoping to prevent China from getting a nuclear capability, and concluded by hoping that the Soviet Union would not fall into the trap."20
Also on the same day, Senator Jackson, perhaps the best informed and most articulate Senator on military matters, made a noteworthy speech in Seattle in which he warned against thinking the test ban would stop the spread of nuclear weapons. He said if there is a conflict between a test ban agreement and a credible deterrent, the deterrent must come first. Nevertheless, he said, if the treaty is in the national interest the Senate will ratify it. "But a test ban must not be merchandised like cosmetics--with claims that cannot be met," he continued, "Government officials are not salesmen, but stewards." Events were soon to prove that Senator Jackson, on this point, was somewhat optimistic.

Mr. McNamara, on the same date, promised that "all responsible leaders" of his department would support the treaty. According to Lawrence Barrett of the New York Herald-Tribune this statement was generally interpreted to mean that the service chiefs would not be permitted to argue against ratification.

Hanson Baldwin, the august military expert of the New York Times said: "Probably no one in Washington is able today...to say with assurance that a test ban is or is not in the national interest." Nevertheless, many people were saying these things with the greatest assurance. The President told Senators Mansfield and Humphrey he would like to see the treaty ratified by a vote well in excess of the required two-thirds majority and Senator Mansfield predicted early passage. Lights burned late at the Pentagon over the weekend as officials debated. It was reported that two members of the Joint Chiefs had expressed strong doubts about a test ban. The Stennis Preparedness Subcommittee, one of the Senate's most respected investigating committees, according to Washington Columnists Evans and
Novak, continued its closed door search for the answer. On this Committee were Senators Goldwater, Symington, Jackson, Saltonstall, Thurmond, and Margaret Chase Smith. Some very influential members had grave doubts. Evans and Novak predicted this "blue ribbon committee" would issue a report certain to have a major influence in the Senate.25

Even before the treaty was initialed in Moscow, newsmen were being told what would be the strategy for getting it through the Senate. Risks in the treaty would be conceded, but its advantages emphasized. Readiness to resume testing would be maintained.26 The fact that the President had already approved the treaty was expected to create a "natural bias" in favor of ratification.27

Secretary of State Dean Rusk met with the Foreign Affairs (Fulbright) Committee to explain the treaty but cautioned that it was not complete.28 This slight uncertainty gave strong Administration supporters and optimists a chance to declare in favor of the treaty while all others had to remain silent. Senatorial reaction ranged from the exultant to the wary.29

On July 25 it was announced from Moscow that the last obstacle (Russian insistence on a non-aggression pact) had been overcome,30 and on the following day the treaty was initialed. The German government was reassured that recognition of the communist East German government was not involved.31 Japan welcomed the pact with enthusiasm.32

Prime Minister Macmillan was greeted with a roar of approval when he entered the Commons after 11:00 p.m.--with cheers coming even from the Labor Party benches. There was concern in the Commons about the procedure involved in gaining approval from the United
States Senate. The Prime Minister went over the details of the American legislative situation and expressed hope that approval there would be forthcoming.33

Senator Stennis said the Senate would take a long and hard look at the agreement to ensure beyond all doubt that our vital national interests were fully protected.34 To ensure beyond all doubt would prove an impossible goal for Senator Stennis and other members of his committee. To make the decision easier for them and for others, President Kennedy met with the Joint Chiefs at the White House and also discussed the subject with them individually.35 These meetings would cause further comment.

In addition to the President's personally persuasive methods applied to key witnesses, the Administration developed a sound strategy for softening resistance. A persuasive argument had been revealed to friendly commentators. As the astute Max Frankel of the New York Times reported it:

"This is simply the view that a treaty for a partial test ban is primarily symbolic, that it provides only for the kind of moratorium that the President had already proclaimed, that it can be undone if ever the need arises and that in the meantime, as an isolated accord, it may even yield some benefits."36

Frankel then used a word that was to be picked up by the speech writers for three top Administration witnesses simultaneously, and thus pass from academic obscurity into politico-journalalese-cocktail patter:

"The private briefings given to Senators by President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk have persuaded most that the Administration is not rushing blindly into euphoria."
At this point, Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times managed to print more secrets than Defense Department censors would ever allow to reach the light of day from any official hearing. Baldwin had been under high-pressure surveillance during the first year of the Kennedy administration after he opposed Mr. McNamara's troops-to-Europe strategy during the Berlin crisis. President Kennedy had said in a conference, "how can we shut him up?" G-men from Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Justice Department followed Baldwin through the Pentagon demanding reports of conversation from all with whom he had talked. One of his syndicated columns critical of Mr. McNamara was withdrawn by the Times at the request of the White House, after it had been distributed to other papers.

Perhaps it was considered wiser to give Baldwin's test ban revelations the silent treatment, in the hope that the jealousy of other reporters and a general ignorance of the subject would deprive his story of the attention it deserved. Perhaps Mr. McNamara's overworked censors simply missed it. In any event, the silent treatment seems to have worked. The subjects Baldwin discussed were treated throughout the test ban hearings as too highly classified to mention, and this rule was observed even by the Senators most bitterly in opposition to the treaty. Baldwin, a ponderous but extremely thorough writer, omitted very little of first importance. His summary brought the test ban problem up-to-date too jarringly for most level heads to accept:

"There was one 58-megaton explosion in the Arctic test series and it is generally believed
that Moscow now has ready at least 50 weapons in the megaton range - each, that is, equivalent to thousands of tons of TNT.

Moscow's latest four-stage rockets, recently tested in the Pacific, may even be capable of carrying 100-megaton warheads. These tremendous weapons--exploded high in the thin air, or inner space--have great potential importance in the defense against ballistic missiles.

During the latest Soviet tests, one high-altitude explosion destroyed two incoming missiles. In one American high-altitude test in the Pacific, a fairly small nuclear detonation high above the earth caused fission--an atomic chain reaction--in a nose cone 150 miles above the earth and 800 miles from the explosion.

This phenomenon, called neutron flux, travels great distances in a virtual vacuum. Thus it may be able to neutralize fissionable material in incoming warheads. This is a technique about which the Russians are believed to know more than American scientists.

Experts also believe Moscow has accumulated more data than the United States on the effect of the bursts of many megaton-range warheads upon American missile-launching facilities, their electrical connections and their defensive radar and communications.

The so-called "EMP," or electromagnetic pulse, induced by a major explosion has widespread effects. Indeed, the United States has already revised the electrical wiring of its Minuteman missiles as a result of the development of the huge Russian bombs.

Contrary to popular opinion, it is not certain that all atmospheric or space shots can be detected. Some high-altitude tests in the South Atlantic by the United States have gone undetected.

The duration of the treaty may well influence the balance of power. A long cessation would tend to affect the United States more than the Soviet Union.

In the closed Soviet society, secret preparations could be made--as they were before the tests in 1961--for sudden resumption of testing that might not be possible in the United States.
Nuclear technology is far from static, and some experts fear that a secret breakthrough by the Soviet Union might jeopardize the American position.\textsuperscript{37}

Perhaps Baldwin's column escaped suppression or rejoinder because it concluded equivocally: "Whether the political and psychological gains outweigh the military and technological risks, however, only history will tell."

One of the reasons why the treaty was almost sure to be ratified was that conservatives were split on the issue, while liberals supporting the Administration were not. The wedge splitting the conservatives was most often the question of fallout. Columnist John Chamberlin provided an amusing example:

"It is no secret that this columnist is anti-Left, even though he insists that he is more of an old-fashioned liberal or libertarian than he is a conservative. Yet he confesses to one heresy that puts him into strange Leftist company—he is for a nuclear test ban...As a cautious person, I am willing to let the dentist clothe me in a lead-lined apron (for x-rays) and the caution carries over into my feeling that a nuclear test ban is desirable.\textsuperscript{38}

On July 25 President Kennedy began his public campaign for ratification. He delivered a very well-reasoned and well-written speech to the nation on TV in which he said the treaty would reduce world tension, relieve fears and dangers of radioactive fallout, help prevent spread of nuclear weapons to other nations and limit the nuclear arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen the nation's security. The second point, on fallout, was the least debatable of the four. Throughout the remainder of the speech claims were modest and in low key. Only when he said tests under water produce unmistakable signs which our instruments can pick up, and violation involves worldwide consequences for the violator, did he appear to exaggerate.\textsuperscript{39}
On the following day General LeMay's home town paper stated that the General "may be persuaded" not to provide outspoken opposition and that the change in outlook by the Joint Chiefs would materially improve the treaty's chances. 40 The U.S. News and World Report stated:

"The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, before pressure began to be applied, unanimously opposed the test-ban treaty with Russia that now has been initialed. Military view is this: Russia can gain under the proposed treaty; the United States can only lose, which accounts for Russian happiness with the deal." 41

As long as uncertainties remained concerning the testimony of the Joint Chiefs, some Senators remained wary. Dirksen and Hickenlooper refused to join an intended bipartisan delegation (including wives—a rare exception in Russian invitations) to the signing in Moscow. A few other influential Republicans appeared unhappy but the ebullient Senator Humphrey declared that by the time the Senate was through with the treaty the opposition would fade away "like a raindrop in Arizona." 42 Some White House advisors were reported to be worried about ratification but a survey made by Senator Dodd's office indicated at least 70 to 75 would vote favorably. 43

Popular sentiment appeared to be favorable and the White House reported more than 1600 messages on the President's address, mostly commendatory. 44 Even Senator Goldwater thought the President had presented his case well and Senators Aiken and Saltonstall agreed to go to Moscow and make the delegation bipartisan. Under Secretary of State Harriman lost his well-known temper at a closed briefing and threatened a Republican congressman, who had disagreed, with "going to the mothers and children" of their districts but otherwise his briefing on the treaty was effective. 45
President Kennedy, up to this point, was keeping his famous sense of humor. He did let fall one very interesting and somewhat plaintive comment. In an interview on August 1, he said that he had received fewer letters on his TV appearance announcing and explaining the treaty than he had received on a freight rate case.\(^\text{46}\) (It was a few hundred as compared to nearly thirty thousand.) Perhaps the American public was far less excited about fallout and doom than had been represented.

The President may have had another reason for being disturbed by the mild public interest in the treaty. He had gambled in taking the issue directly to the people before applying maximum persuasion and pressure to the Senators who would have the final say. The unexpectedly mild public reaction did not pay off. On August 2 five very respectable Republican Senators—Dirksen, Kuchel, Hickenlooper, Saltonstall and Morton—issued a statement demanding that the Joint Chiefs and other military commanders, nuclear experts in and out of government, and intelligence officers be included among witnesses before Senate committees. They listed some questions about the treaty, but their uneasiness was summed up in the recurrent theme of all complaints directed at top State and Defense officials: they demanded "all the cards face up on the table."\(^\text{47}\)

Senator Dirksen reported that 14 Republican Senators received more mail favorable to the treaty, 12 received more opposed to the treaty, while 6 found their mail evenly divided. Evans and Novak, generally considered Administration insiders, reported in the \textit{Washington Post}: Odds right now are overwhelmingly in favor of ratification, but there is a thorn or two." One thorn was General Eisenhower's refusal to endorse the treaty, another was the
"skeptical, critical and alert" attitude of Senator Hickenlooper, senior Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee. Worse yet, the thorns were not all in the opposition party. Senator Russell had refused to go to Moscow, and his continued opposition would find allies both inside and outside the South. "Nevertheless," concluded Evans and Novak with prophetic insight, "it is difficult to vote against the 'mother and children lobby'...even Senator Goldwater would find it difficult to vote 'no' without serious damage to a Goldwater presidential candidacy."48

There were difficulties within the Administration itself. Harriman had stolen the limelight during the very easy negotiation, thus irritating the State Department and its perpetually obscured Secretary. Mr. Foster's disarmament agency was also disconsolate, and all Administration men were irritated by the busyness of McGeorge Bundy, who was in and out of the Kennedy office more than any other top aide in the entire Government.49

The most important development was the independent attitude of the President's old friend, Senator Jackson. He was the youngest Standing Committee chairman, and the only member of both the McClellan and the Stennis subcommittees. As party chairman for the Presidential Election Campaign, he had found his responsibilities seized and abused by the Kennedys' famous "Irish Mafia." Yet he was versatile, intelligent, and extremely well versed on military matters as well as political ones. Evans and Novak revealed his importance:

"A Jackson vote against the treaty could be pivotal. Though there's a little doubt that the President will get the two-thirds majority needed for ratification, the Administration would like to limit 'no' votes to the handful of neoisolationists
typified by South Carolina's Strom Thurmond. Jackson could make opposition to the treaty more respectable, luring other moderates to vote against it.

"The White House is not yet ready to put Jackson's picture to the wall.

"During the coming days, Jackson probably will be appealed to by White House aides--by the President himself, if need be."50

Walter Lippman's long column on Senator Jackson showed not only how much he appreciated Senator Jackson's importance to the treaty but also how treaty supporters were becoming apprehensive on the eve of the hearings. "Since anyone who knows Senator Jackson would like to respect him, he should try again to make up his mind," said Lippman. These are strong words for a sober columnist to direct toward a Senator. The veteran pundit had no trouble making up his own mind, particularly on his fantastic idea that "the real opposition to the test ban is inspired by the hope that if we keep on testing, we shall invent the absolute weapon,"51 a fantasy which Lippman expressed more than once.52 Dr. Stephan Possony of the Hoover Institute of War and Peace, commented on Lippman's unique view: "No person versed in military matters ever advanced such a childish notion. Absolute weapons cannot exist in periods of rapid technological change...new weapons continually render existing arsenals obsolete."53

THE TREATY'S VALUE DISPUTED

The warm air from the treaty's friends flowing across the cold front maintained by its foes created a fog which only an experienced navigator could traverse. Here and there in the fog distracting cries arose. The Economist of London said of the treaty "its main value is symbolic."54 Peggy Duff, in the Manchester Guardian gave
full credit for the treaty to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament which for years argued and marched and sat in protest and finally "celebrated its triumph" in Trafalgar Square. General de Gaulle said he could share in the joy so eloquently expressed by President Kennedy on what had been concluded between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians but he would not share in the treaty.

There was no joy in Havana or Peking, nor in the excluded government at East Berlin. In New York, at the office of the Atomic Energy Commission, the historic preacher and persistent pacifist A. J. Muste with 800 friends managed to block the doors while women and children released white ballons labeled "no more Hiroshimas" and actors from the Living Theater called for new protests. Drew Pearson, in a column leaking the pro-treaty secrets of a closed conference charged the Joint Chiefs with leaking individual dissent to friends on Capitol Hill. He said Mr. McNamara had secretly claimed that our laboratories have amazing computers that can simulate nuclear explosions.

To add to the embarrassment, though not to the confusion, Aviation Week was impolite enough to recall September 1, 1961:

"On that date, after a three-year voluntary moratorium on testing, USSR surprised the U.S. with a nuclear explosion that launched 15 months of intensive atmospheric testing, during which major strides were made in weapons development. It was Apr. 25, 1962--almost eight months after the first Russian explosion--that the U.S. was in a position to explode the first of the six-month Dominic series, at Christmas Island and Johnston Island in the Pacific."

Into this unhealed wound the Defense Management Report rubbed the abrasive prediction that "History may look back on the nuclear test ban idea as one of the grand delusions of the Twentieth Century." Representative Harsha of Ohio pointed out that it was
treaty negotiator Harriman who had previously agreed to the three-headed government which failed to work in Laos. The Columbus Ohio Dispatch reported, with some exaggeration, that letters and telegrams were pouring into the capitol and that the test ban agreement had set off one of the greatest debates in the nation's history. Veteran Hill correspondent Roscoe Drummond objected that President Kennedy and other Administration spokesmen had tended to rest their case for the treaty on authority alone.

"Yes, they say, the treaty is good; no, they say, it does not involve much risk; no, the Soviets won't gain on us by it; no, we won't be hurt.

"This kind of exposition is not adequate. The Senate deserves to have the facts and the judgments on which these yes-and-no answers rest.

Drummond argued that this was the kind of Senate debate which would give the country confidence.

The suspense was short, but the issues were rapidly inflated. As was characteristic of the Kennedy administration, there was more and more worry about world opinion. Administration stalwarts grew nervous as curtain time for the hearings approached. A Washington Post reporter explained why history offered no consolation:

"The tragic specter of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations already has been raised in Administration and Senate circles when in private discussions the possibility of rejection has arisen...

"Possibly the most damaging aspect of treaty rejection, according to Administration officials, would be the decline which the United States would suffer in world public opinion.

"Some Administration spokesmen conceive of the President making the test ban a major 1964 election issue if it is rejected. Wilson hoped that the League would be the big issue that would keep his party in power in 1920, but the electorate turned its back on his pleas."
In retrospect, such fears about the treaty's chances seem groundless, but they are understandable. Far less understandable is the vague hope of some great gain in East-West relations—worth the loss of an election. Just what the treaty was supposed to accomplish, or to make possible, has never been explained.

It became more apparent that informed opinion retained some doubts about the coordinated views of Administration officials. Journalists were curious about the views of outsiders and about the few remaining insiders known to be resistant to coordination. Senate holdouts and doubters were looking more and more to the wide-open hearings which had been promised.

It was already common knowledge that in the closed door hearings of the Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee, there had been testimony unfavorable to the treaty. Columnists Allen and Scott, who apparently had a pipeline to the subcommittee, reported that the White House was strenuously trying to keep its findings from being published. Allen and Scott predicted, quite accurately as it turned out, that members of this committee would say the Soviets held a commanding lead over the U.S. in the development and testing of giant supermegaton weapons and anti-missile warheads; and that the test ban treaty would block this country from catching up. They would say also that it was utterly unrealistic to believe a test ban agreement signed by the U.S., Britain, and Russia would stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  

THE QUESTIONS AND WITNESSES ARE PREPARED

Fortunately for the President's purposes, the testimony of the objectors was available for analysis and they were available for
consultation. His first task was to influence them as much as possible while avoiding even the appearance of coercion. (Mr. McNamara, who had already boasted to newsmen about cutting off heads of subordinates who disagreed, was useless for this task.) The President had to act alone, and he did not hesitate.

First to be summoned were the Joint Chiefs, and the word was leaked from the White House that only General LeMay remained doubtful after the conferences there. Somewhat less serious, but still troublesome, was the embarrassing problem of Admiral Anderson. The Admiral had been a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff quite recently.

Other retired officers were said to be ignorant of the most recent super-secrets but it was not so easy to discount Anderson in this manner. Here the President demonstrated how a major military obstruction can be changed into a minor political functionary. One report found the procedure dramatic:

"Some Republicans are still talking as though they expect fireworks when the joint chiefs of staff are summoned to give their views on the nuclear test ban treaty.

"Actually, the scene may be as peaceful and anticlimactic as the ceremony at the White House yesterday that capped Adm. George W. Anderson's row with the Kennedy administration.

"The man who ended Anderson's naval career, and then consoled him with the ambassadorship to Portugal, which some Navy officers wish Anderson had refused, was President Kennedy.

"But the President, without so much as batting any eye, pinned a gold medal on the admiral yesterday and praised him in terms generally reserved for conquering heroes. The admiral, who played his part as beautifully as the President, expressed his gratitude in glowing terms.

"There were smiles and handshakes all around. The Marine Band, resplendent in red coats, played. The
White House garden was full of Navy brass and their wives, and cabinet members, all exuding goodwill...

"In previous appearances before Senate committees, all of the chiefs have registered their opposition to a test ban treaty.

"But to judge from the confidence being expressed by authoritative sources these days, the chiefs may well fall in line on this question with their commander-in-chief as gracefully as Admiral Anderson did at the White House yesterday."

It was not quite this simple, but this is an excellent example of how the resources, as well as the power of the Presidency, can be employed.

Another problem for the President was a scientific witness who might prove to be crucial because he was outspoken and stubborn. This was Dr. John S. Foster, director of the famed Livermore Laboratories in California.

President Kennedy had a long conversation with Dr. Foster. They discussed what could result if the Russians, with or without a pretext, broke the treaty and launched an immediate series of tests in the atmosphere. It would develop in the hearings that some pledges were made at this meeting regarding safeguards against being caught napping a second time. Experience had taught Dr. Foster that promises of this sort have a way of being interpreted more and more loosely. The conversation with Dr. Foster would prove to be the least successful of all the President's last-minute efforts at personal persuasion, with the effort on General LeMay a close second.

To talk to Dr. Teller, an even more formidable opponent of the treaty, would, of course, be non-productive and perhaps even negative in its results. Not even President Kennedy would risk his charm against the beetle-browed scientist. The defense against
Dr. Teller's testimony would have to be based on his allegedly limited horizon and his proclaimed ignorance of the latest high-level secrets. Dr. Teller was also handicapped by his early campaign against the treaty. The nature of his testimony was widely predicted and discounted in advance.

Before the hearings opened the President had thoroughly employed both his prestigious office and his persuasive personality. By interceding in the Defense Department he had overcome most of the handicap of Mr. McNamara's reputation for head-cracking. He could rely on Dr. Seaborg's popularity and excellent technical reputation to minimize any scepticism on the part of other scientists in the Atomic Energy Commission.

Once the doubts and questions had been aired, albeit somewhat embarrassingly, they were systematically attacked and discounted by a majority of journalists. Editorial comment favorable to the treaty became more specific and more effective. *Business Week*, for instance, pointed out:

"If risks of Soviet deception are involved, they seem no greater than those the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations were prepared to take in earlier U.S. efforts to contain the atom and improve the chances of peace. Pres. Eisenhower, for example, offered Moscow a limited test ban agreement almost identical with the present one, only to be met with Premier Khrushchev's blunt refusal to discuss it.

"We have now passed the point of no return, and we cannot step back without giving the Communists a tremendous propaganda victory. Unless the debate produces some new argument far more compelling than any advanced so far, the Senate should ratify."[67]

Some scientific journals and associations went much farther, and were more emotional. The Federation of American Scientists in a stirring plea advocated prompt and overwhelming consent to the
treaty. On August 5, three more nations, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and Malaya, announced their adherence to the treaty. This made 36 in all, said Reuters of London. Illustrating the widespread misunderstanding of American constitutional procedures, Reuters included the United States in this number.

As the country looked more and more to the Senate to assume its constitutional responsibility and bolster confidence in the Administration the Senators in turn began to pin their responsibility on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Senator Roman Hruska expressed the increasing worry of those who had not made up their minds:

"I'd like, for example, to listen to what testimony Gen. Curtis LeMay, the Chief of the Air Staff, might have on this. I would feel a lot better if in voting for this treaty we had some assurance from him dispelling some of these things with which we are sorely troubled now."

"What's bothering us is this: Are they in a position to explode in very short order over the entire map of the United States a series of these high-yield bomb loads which would result in knocking out the command and control systems of missiles we would expect to send to Russia if they send some against us? Would they be able to explode enough of these very big bombs so that the electronic circuits in America would be fused and rendered impotent?"

Senator Hruska had managed, in simple language, to ask the classic question. This question would receive complex and evasive answers ranging from Secretary McNamara's brightly positive assertions to the restrained judgments of military men and scientists.

Meanwhile the battle of leaks and counter-leaks continued. An unidentified member of the Foreign Relations Committee divulged that General Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would testify that the treaty involved no danger to national security. The Senator predicted that opposition to the treaty would virtually
collapse with Taylor's assurances. Other reports had indicated that Air Force Chief General LeMay was dubious and Army Chief General Wheeler hesitant, but the Senator who reported Taylor's position expressed belief that all the military chiefs would now back the President. After all, the Senator explained, Admiral Anderson had found out what happens to a Chief of Staff when he fails to go along with the President. The anonymous Senator complained: "How can we afford to vote against the treaty if the Joint Chiefs run out on us? ...If they say there are no real risks involved, how can we oppose their judgment?" The rapid change of heart of the Joint Chiefs was generally assumed to be decisive. Republican Senator Thruston Morton predicted no more than 15 votes would be cast against the treaty.

Nevertheless, the general optimism about the complete rout of the treaty's Senate critics was premature. The Senate had yet to be exposed to Dr. Teller's solemn convictions, Secretary McNamara's computerized salesmanship and General LeMay's stubborn refusal to show the slightest enthusiasm.

The administration's efforts toward complete commitment to the treaty brought results. On August 7, twenty-six countries signed the treaty at the State Department, including six Communist nations and seven allied with the United States. On the same day President Kennedy sent the treaty to the Senate amid expectations of overwhelming approval. The President's 3,000-word message accompanying the treaty was a good one. It explained that the treaty "prohibits only those nuclear tests that we ourselves can police" and permits underground tests "so long as all fallout is contained
within the country." Less felicitous was the statement that tests by other nations "including illegal tests which might escape detection, could not be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland." Mr. Dulles himself, in his most menacing prime, was never so massively retaliatory.

On the day before the hearings began, New York's Governor Rockefeller, the leading Republican candidate for the Presidency, advocated ratification but with clarification of "ambiguous language." The Governor recalled that 15 months previously President Kennedy had minimized the dangers of increased fallout while now, in advocating the treaty, he painted a vivid picture of the dangers of leukemia, bone cancer and deformities. Governor Rockefeller also cited the President's fear of 300 million casualties in the first hour of nuclear war and found this difficult to reconcile with assertions by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara that United States strategy envisages discrimination, control and flexible response in nuclear war. Senator Symington, who had opposed previous test ban schemes, explained to the St. Louis Post Dispatch that he was still against unilateral disarmament or trusting the Russians' good faith-- but he was not against a "cheat-proof agreement" such as the new treaty.
"Moriture te salutamus," said Secretary Rusk as he entered the Senate office building for the hearings. He was simply exercising his Latin, for there was no danger that Secretary Rusk was about to die, in any respect. He was the lead-off man for the Administration, and the entire performance had been well prepared. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Fulbright had invited Senator Russell (Armed Services) and Senator Pastore (Joint Atomic) to bring their committees and join in. Despite the desultory attendance customary for lengthy hearings, this move assured enough questioners on hand to justify the chairman, Senator Fulbright, limiting questions to brief periods so that no witness could be pinned down. Furthermore, Secretary Rusk could defer the most troublesome questions to the military and scientific witnesses, and the latter could so classify their replies as to avoid answering directly. Secrecy would prove a convenient dodge, despite Senator Jackson's demand that the Senate, through its committees, should obtain the same type and range of evidence that was available to President Kennedy when he decided that the treaty was in the national interest.

THE IMPERTURBABLE MR. RUSK

Mr. Rusk was an excellent witness, just as he had proved to be a most fortunate choice for a post which had been the victim of such willful toe-treaders as Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy. Secretary Rusk's alleged lack of charm and style fitted well into the
Administration's star-studded lineup of performers. It was a new
development to find Senators less distrustful of the State Department
witnesses than of junior and more flamboyant witnesses from the Depart-
ment of Defense.

Mr. Rusk simply explained why the treaty was as it was and ad-
mitted its limitations. He expressed hopes for future understandings
with the Russians as though he did not really expect them, which was
all to the good because the Senators did not expect them either. His
answers to questions showed the disillusionment that was normal for
a victim of other agreements and moratoriums. Secretary Rusk ex-
plained that the Soviet Union had objected to placing a withdrawal
clause in the treaty. They had objected on the basis that sover-
eignty permits the denunciation of a treaty in any event (which was
an interesting expression of how seriously the Soviets regarded any
treaty). 79 Mr. Rusk also said that nuclear tests conducted by those
who have not signed the treaty could be a basis for withdrawal. He
predicted "if anyone goes ahead with serious and systematic testing,
this treaty is likely to be terminated by one or more parties," a
prediction which, in view of Chinese nuclear progress, did not indi-
cate hope for long treaty life.

Secretary Rusk refused to participate in the awkward shifting
between balance and superiority as goals which often appeared in
the statements of other officials. Senator Jackson pressed him on
this point: "I am glad to hear you say we should maintain not a
balanced but a superior position in order to maintain peace. Is that
your view?" Secretary Rusk: "That is correct, Sir." 30 The hearings
were held in the Senate caucus room, which was jammed. Twenty-five
Senators had been invited to ask questions and all were present. A dozen others listened. After the crucial witnesses, that number would drop considerably.

MR. McNAMARA'S AGGRESSIVE DEFENSE

On the day following Mr. Rusk's appearance the same crowd was on hand again to hear Mr. McNamara. In contrast to that of the Secretary of State, Mr. McNamara's statement was much more salesmanlike. He announced that his support for the treaty was unequivocal, that U.S. nuclear forces were manifestly superior, and that U.S. underground testing was substantially more advanced. Despite Mr. McNamara's junior Chamber of Commerce manner, his testimony appeared to accomplish his purpose. According to the New York Times report, most of the Senators were obviously impressed by the "candor, precision and forcefulness with which Mr. McNamara dealt with the objections that had been raised against the treaty on military grounds." Mark Watson, the veteran Pentagon reporter of the Baltimore Sun, was able to analyze the Secretary's speech as well as report it. While praising Mr. McNamara's statement as impressive and persuasive, he questioned some of its bald assertions. Watson found it understandable that "McNamara is less worried by the risks than is the military." In trying to explain this, Watson could only say that Mr. McNamara's judgment was based upon conclusions rather than established fact. He said this was the reason why the Senators awaited the answers they would get later in the hearing from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Watson carefully listed the Secretary's most surprising claims: that massive-weapon yields could be improved by extrapolation and without testing; that smaller bombs were better anyway ("this is not a universal view," said Watson); that our Minutemen and their control posts are sure to survive any attack; that while we do not know enough about the effects of airbursts on our electronics systems "we can design around the uncertainties."

Of this last point also Watson was critical: "This, quite candidly, is more optimistic than the wide-prevailing belief at the Pentagon, where there is a sore recollection of the long-enduring blackout of American electronics over a large area following a multimegaton test in space..." Another McNamara argument was that "the prolongation of our superiority will be a principal military effect of the treaty." This, said Watson in a conspicuous understatement, was a conclusion on which there was no complete agreement.

Another claim by the Secretary was a new satellite for detecting even very distant explosions. "This must be the Vela," said Watson, "until today completely on the secret list." Secretary McNamara's revelation from the depths of secrecy to bolster his position was no longer surprising.

An excellent example of Mr. McNamara's persuasive rhetoric was his statement: "I cannot guarantee that we will detect any single clandestine test the Soviets might attempt, but Soviet advisors cannot guarantee that we will not." Another was: "I think we were reasonably prepared for the tests we conducted, but we weren't well prepared for the tests we didn't conduct." More solid was his prediction that at least eight countries may acquire nuclear weapons in
the next ten years and that testing underground would be more expensive for them, which indicated the treaty would make proliferation more expensive for nations choosing to observe it.

In concluding his hurried but well-informed analysis, Watson returned to the question of:

"This 'blackout' potential, of which the Secretary speaks rather breezily...many military technologists still feel they need much more information, available only from tests. ...It is not certain that the United States knows nearly as much on this subject as Russia does.

"There is, therefore, great curiosity on Capitol Hill about what the chiefs will say when they appear before the committee, not only in prepared statements at open hearings, but under sharp and secret interrogation from the more skeptical of the Senate committeemen."§3

The fortunate thing here, for the peace of mind of the general population, was that some of the answers to this sharp and secret interrogation would never be revealed officially. This fact would, in the end, help to explain why so many of those who voted against the treaty were on the Preparedness Subcommittee, which heard almost all the secret testimony; it would also explain Senator Margaret Smith's ominous speech, the last to be made on the treaty. For the public and the world at large, it is perhaps better that criticism of the Secretary's categorical assurances was limited to that which occurred in the open hearings.

Senator Jackson, obviously referring to Mr. McNamara, had stated "The American people do not expect infallibility in their government officials; indeed, they wisely suspect anyone who claims it."§4 This may be true in normal times, but it appears that when survival is at stake people generally want a bedside manner with
plenty of assurance, complicated prescriptions, and plenty of mystical machinery in the back room. The following statement by Mr. McNamara was accepted without much question or comment, and it was often quoted, though seldom in its entirety:

"We have created an enormous military force, powerful and flexible enough to guarantee our ability to deal with aggression under all contingencies. In Cuba, in Vietnam, in Berlin, and elsewhere around the globe we have demonstrated that our will matched our might. Yet--and this is a key point--I cannot allege that the vast increase in our nuclear forces, accompanied as it was by large increases in Soviet nuclear stockpiles, has produced a comparable enhancement in our security." (The secretary also announced plans for a 300 percent increase in nuclear missiles.)

Despite such philosophical asides, Secretary McNamara was consistently more threatening than much-criticized Secretary Dulles.

"...the Soviets will know that we will continue to have the capability to penetrate and destroy the Soviet Union if a retaliatory blow is required." (Mr. Dulles had threatened only to retaliate "at times and places of our own choosing.")

"...a first strike by the Soviets against this country could lead to nothing other than a retaliatory strike by us that would in my words, destroy the Soviet Union. We believe that. They know that we know. And I believe they believe it." (Two threats of supermassive retaliation are better than one. In Mr. McNamara's words, we and they are true and knowing believers.)

Other facts and opinions were more difficult to reconcile:

"The Soviet Union appears to be technologically more advanced than we are in the high yield range...."

"Perhaps the most serious risk of this treaty is the risk of euphoria." 

Perhaps the most persistent and pointed questioner of Mr. McNamara was Senator Hickenlooper. The following discussions indicate some of the puzzlements of both gentlemen:
Secretary McNamara: "I am willing to take out the word 'much' and say that we are more powerful today, vis-a-vis the Soviet, than in 1959."

Senator Hickenlooper: "It is an interesting philosophy or an interesting viewpoint which is really new to me. I hadn't heard it before. That is a pretty categorical answer to a question I have been trying to find the answer to for some time now. I am glad to have you answer it so positively. Others have not been able to give so positive an answer."

Secretary McNamara: "I have certain facts at my disposal, Senator Hickenlooper, I would be happy to expose them to you today right after the hearing."

Later in the questioning the Senator questioned whether the Joint Chiefs could take a line different from the Secretary without danger to themselves.

Secretary McNamara replied: "Our Joint Chiefs have never shied away from danger if there is any, and I do not believe that there is."

Senator Hickenlooper remained skeptical: "There might have been some occasions when it would have been better for the individual to have shied away from it a little bit."

A truly elementary error by Secretary McNamara was his statement: "As an aircraft-carried bomb, the Soviets scaled-up 100 megaton weapon would be suitable only for vulnerable high altitude or suicide low level delivery." The worst feature of this assertion was the indication that no one with even ordinary knowledge of military aviation had helped the Secretary. (When asked about the truth of the statement, Air Force Chief of Staff General LeMay could only express one of his characteristic and unqualified negatives.)
It should be noted, however, that few correspondents could analyze Mr. McNamara's crucial testimony as clearly as did Mark Watson, and few Senators desired to challenge him as did Senator Hickenlooper. It was embarrassing for most journalists and Senators to admit they did not understand the Secretary's special terms, so his testimony was called "clear." Yet the extent to which Mr. McNamara exploited the unfamiliar was revealed in the New York Times by a feature article entitled: "Glossary of Some Terms Used by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in his Statement...." The elaborate glossary attempted to explain his complicated terminology which included "Yield Spectrum," "Weaponized," "Salvo Technique," "Decoy Discrimination," and "Threshold of Evasion."94

One report described some personal clashes between Senators and Mr. McNamara that were not included in the record as it was eventually published. Senator Lausche said Mr. McNamara's position appeared to be throwing overboard the assurance given the people that an anti-missile system will be built. The Secretary raised his voice angrily in denial.

At another point, Senator Goldwater demanded to know why Dr. Teller's statement before the Stennis committee (which contradicted the Secretary's testimony on some points) had been withheld. The Secretary promised to release it as soon as possible. The release was finally made to coincide with General Taylor's testimony supporting the Secretary--"perhaps by chance," said the Washington Post.95

Four Senators assailed Mr. McNamara's testimony as contrary to scientific evidence. Each of the four wrangled with the Secretary.
The exchange became so loud that Chairman Fulbright cautioned them to cease interrupting each other. Mr. McNamara denied reports that anti-missile batteries had already been deployed around Leningrad in Russia. When accused of admitting this fact in secret testimony before the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee, Mr. McNamara demanded that the rest of the questioning be conducted behind closed doors.96

Despite the rough spots and the doubts concerning some overconfident statements, the Secretary's testimony was generally praised as a success. It accomplished what it was expected to accomplish in that it made certain inescapable admissions yet gave reassurance that practically every result of the treaty would be in our favor. The New York Times reporter, who made no attempt to analyze the statement critically, said it seemed to erase many of the doubts and reservations expressed by some Senators on the previous day. The Times military expert, Hanson Baldwin, conceded that the Secretary's review of the military balance of power and of how it might be affected by the treaty was reassuring to most Senators who heard it. Baldwin went on to say that the statement covered, on the whole, familiar ground and that many military men and some scientists would not agree with portions of it. He pointed out the Secretary's reluctance to admit that the Russians may have a missile capable of delivering their 50 to 100 megaton warhead or to concede that the blast, heat, radioactivity and electromagnetic effect of the stupendous explosion might black out radar and communications, and penetrate the missile silos themselves. Baldwin saw the Secretary's strangely worded calculation that large Soviet warheads could destroy an "average
of less than two" of our hardened Minuteman sites as an inadvertent admission of the value of the large weapons. Earlier estimates had been that at least three missiles would be required to destroy only one site. The favorable numerical ratio had now been reversed, according to Mr. McNamara; with the more powerful warheads, the Russians could therefore neutralize our missile bases with fewer missiles.

The Secretary's deprecation of any deployed Russian anti-missile system as no better than Nike-Zeus was qualified heavily, said Baldwin, by the fact that Nike-Zeus had not been deployed and there were no plans to deploy it. Baldwin reported that a missile installation near Leningrad might be the first operational site of an eventual Russian anti-ICBM system which would have considerable international political impact, even if the system were only partially effective technologically.97

At this time, the release of earlier testimony by General Taylor before the Stennis committee revealed that the Joint Chiefs would go along with the treaty although noticeably less positive about it than was their civilian boss, Mr. McNamara. Some of the suspense surrounding the Joint Chiefs' attitude was removed. By signifying their approval, however qualified, the military leaders deprived senators opposed to the treaty of an important debating point.98 There could now be more concentration on the testimony of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the first scientist to testify. This was wise timing by the Administration since Dr. Seaborg was a calm, confident and relaxed pro-treaty witness.
Dr. Seaborg seemed to be sincerely optimistic about the treaty, rather than enthusiastic about it for sales purposes. He thought the treaty would not damage the U. S. nuclear position vis-a-vis Russia, that the weapons laboratories could make satisfactory progress through underground tests, and that the principal work on anti-missile defenses would not suffer for lack of atmospheric testing for some time to come. He believed experimental preparation for peaceful "Plowshare" project explosion could make progress, for a while, under the treaty. He was even optimistic that the treaty might be amended to permit canal-digging and such when the time arrived. 99

Despite his optimism about the treaty and its results, Dr. Seaborg, in his statement and in his answers, used no technical language, no tricky comparisons, and no stacked statistics. There was no I-have-the-facts-at-my-disposal attitude, and no condescension toward non-computerized individuals who dared to disagree. He was free of the security-consciousness and conformity-compulsion that plagued the Pentagon and he was willing to make some interesting admissions. He said the United States had never tested anything larger than 15 megatons and he regretted that complete studies involving blast and fireball as well as radiation effects directed at major weapons delivery systems would be impossible to carry out under the treaty.

Most startling was Dr. Seaborg's comment in reply to Senator Aiken's (Rep.-Vt.) question concerning ban-the-bomb agitators who had, with little respect for truth, exaggerated the dangers of nuclear fallout. When Senator Aiken mentioned the ordinary air
pollution of cities and highways, Dr. Seaborg said blandly: "There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that air pollution is a much greater hazard to the health of the people than is fallout."\textsuperscript{100}

Without hesitation, Dr. Seaborg stated that this country had no means of detecting underwater tests by Russia, although this was contrary to previous official statements, including one by the President. Most refreshing of all was Dr. Seaborg's spirited defense of Dr. Teller and of other space-oriented scientists against the caustic comments of the Committee Chairman, Senator Fulbright. The Senator's ignorance of the most elementary fact of atomic life was revealed in this question: "Why do you measure these matters in half-lives? It seems rather odd that you should call it a half-life rather than its whole life."

In a discussion of the AEC budget, Senator Fulbright tried to induce Dr. Seaborg to comment adversely on the cost of the Apollo, or moon, program, but Dr. Seaborg insisted he gave that program high priority.

Senator Fulbright was shocked: "Over education, urban renewal, mental retardation?...The whole question is where do you put the moonshot in the scale of priorities. Everybody is for going to the moon, I suppose, at sometime. Do you really give it a high priority?"

Dr. Seaborg: "Yes. But I would assume that we can do the projects that you have named at the same time."

Senator Fulbright: "Well, we are not doing them. You know that we are not doing them, don't you?"

Dr. Seaborg: "Well, Senator Fulbright, do you think we would be doing them if we weren't undertaking the moon project?"\textsuperscript{101}
Dr. Seaborg would not be pushed into an adverse comment against Dr. Teller, although he disagreed with him:

**Dr. Seaborg:** "Edward is a good friend of mine and a colleague at the University of California. I have known him essentially all of my adult life. I am fond of him and I have great respect for him and I know that he is very sincere in his views. I personally am not as worried about the particular risks that he points out in his testimony. I believe that the value of the treaty and what it can accomplish far transcends the risks that are pointed out in Edward's testimony." \(^{102}\)

In a final exchange, Senator Fulbright tried to establish that Dr. Teller was moon-struck, or worse, because of his advocacy of an experimental nuclear program on that satellite. The world-famous scholar of liberal renown appeared a crusty sceptic when confronted by modern science in its more venturesome aspects. Dr. Teller had suggested that nuclear power might produce water on the moon.

**Said Senator Fulbright:** "What does he have in mind doing on the moon—even if he got some water? What is the purpose of this is what puzzles me."

**Dr. Seaborg:** "Well, I do not think that I am prepared to answer just what he had in mind. I suppose that it would refer to a time far in the future when there would be sort of a minor colonization of the moon." ...

**Senator Fulbright:** "For what purpose would you colonize the moon?"

**Dr. Seaborg:** "Well, at the beginning, it would be, I suppose—we are getting a little afield here."

**Senator Fulbright:** "I did not get afield. He got afield on it. It seems very far afield."

**Dr. Seaborg:** "First, it would be exploration parties, I suppose, and then it would be—it would depend on the results of that, and the general status of civilization and the degree of adventure of man at that time as to whether
there would be more permanent colonies following that. I could conceive of it as a possibility; yes, sir. But, as I say, decades in the future, and it has very little relevance to the present test ban treaty that we have under discussion."

Senator Fulbright: "Perhaps he was thinking of this if case we did have a nuclear war. This would be one place we could retreat to. Do you think maybe that was it?"

Dr. Seaborg did not think that was it and the Senator dropped the matter. Even his compliment for Dr. Seaborg in conclusion proved awkward: "For a scientist you speak most intelligibly."

Dr. Seaborg: "For a scientist you say?"

Senator Fulbright: "For a scientist you speak most intelligibly to Senators."

Dr. Seaborg: "Thank you." 103

Senator Fulbright maintained his dignity, if not his good humor, until near the end of the treaty debate, which is more than could be said for Senator Morse, the Oregon Republican turned Democrat. The latter gentleman had distinguished himself at the outset by insisting that non-government witnesses also be placed under oath, thus forcing a tedious and unusual swearing of every witness throughout the hearing. His questioning was directed principally against furnishing any nuclear information or assistance to France. He threatened to vote against the treaty if he did not get complete satisfaction in this matter and demanded the recall, for questioning, of Secretary Rusk. His ultimatum was "I am requesting that he be notified that the senior Senator from Oregon representing a sovereign state wishes to examine him in public." 104 Secretary Rusk was not recalled.
The last witness in the coordinated, or "orchestrated" portion of the testimony was General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was the most unruffled witness yet. His statement had been worked over systematically by a military staff. The General himself was a smooth and experienced performer in public, although among his subordinates and colleagues he had been the most unpopular Chief of Staff of the Army since Douglas McArthur. Though less brilliant and personable than McArthur, he was equally ambitious, sometimes more ruthless, and always more anxious to please. He was one of a small group of Army leaders who wisely gambled on a Democratic victory in the election of 1960 and assisted Democratic candidates, particularly Senator Kennedy, in their attacks against the military policies of President Eisenhower. At first privately, then openly, General Taylor himself had challenged President Eisenhower's military program. In a similar manner, he attacked the principles and positions of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while a member of that group, so offensively that he was complimented by another Chief as being "smart as a warehouse rat." His attack on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an institution was cheerfully recanted before a Senate committee when he was confirmed as Chairman. By this time his famous leak of a highly secret paper from the office of Admiral Radford to Tony LeViero of the New York Times had been almost forgotten.

Once General Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, many military men felt that the choice could have been worse. They felt that the politician in uniform had become a uniformed man
in politics. He seemed to speak the language of the new intellectuals in government, and was often called an intellectual because of his systematic self-expression and his study of exotic languages. He drew so close to the Kennedy family that eventually one of Robert's children was named "Maxwell Taylor." The General managed also to get along with Secretary McNamara, which most military men found all but impossible at first, and he came to serve as an excellent buffer between the Secretary and the working Service Chiefs. It was in this capacity that he appeared as a witness, between the Secretary and the Chiefs. He muffled their differences skilfully.

General Taylor's testimony was significant because it confirmed officially the numerous rumors that the Joint Chiefs would support the treaty. He enumerated the reservations which were the price of their support, and stated that they had not been coerced. Their position was reviewed at the end of his prepared statement:

"The most serious reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the treaty are more directly linked with the fear of euphoria in the West which will eventually reduce our vigilance and the willingness of our country and of our allies to expand continued effort on our collective security. If we ratify this treaty, we must conduct a vigorous underground testing program and be ready on short notice to resume atmospheric testing. We should strengthen our detection capabilities and maintain modern nuclear laboratories and programs. Finally, we must not for a moment forget that militant communism remains committed to the destruction of our society."105

This third use of the word "euphoria" caused a critical comment from Senator Russell about the Administration witnesses' "line of statements:"

"I am consumed with curiosity as to just where this word 'euphoria' got into this line of statements."
Secretary Rusk used it, Secretary McNamara used it, and now you used 'euphoria.' That is not an ordinary word in the sense that Senators commonly use it on the floor of the Senate. I do not think you hear it very often around the cocktail circuit, though I do not frequent that. It bids fair to join 'extrapolation' and 'proliferation' when a man wants to pose as an expert in the company of the ignorant. Euphoria would fit right in with them."

General Taylor, with his usual cleverness, suggested that perhaps the military were trying to keep up with the academicians.

Senator Russell concluded sadly: "...It is firmly established now. We will have 'euphoria' around for a long time. I hope we do not succumb to it."

General Taylor agreed with Senator Russell the Russians would not observe the treaty one moment longer than it was in accord with their own selfish national interests, and he supplied an example of his verbal flexibility on another point. The questioners had been trying to get a purely military evaluation of the treaty, since Secretary McNamara had said flatly that the treaty had military advantages. When Senator Lausche asked that the military advantages be identified, the General avoided contradicting his civilian boss by stating that the military advantage was peace.

Another example of General Taylor's artful dodging was his complete inability to recall whether he had supported President Eisenhower's original proposal for such a treaty just four years earlier. The Chairman suggested in vain: "If you could sort of jog your memory, it would be interesting to the committee."

Later Senator Sparkman pressed the point again, but the General had somehow neglected his commitment to look up his previous views. He covered by declaring boldly: "I would feel no embarrassment if
indeed you find that I opposed a limited test ban treaty in 1959 and am for it in 1963." Many associates of General Taylor were completely unsurprised by his frank declaration of flexibility.

(It will be seen that while General Eisenhower had proposed such a treaty in 1959, he was doubtful of its advisability in 1963, for specific reasons.)

General Taylor, as contrasted with Secretary McNamara, was quite candid on one point. "...They (the Russians) can do a certain amount of testing if they want to and if they are prudent enough to hold down the level, thereby they can make some gain..."

Informed analysts such as Mark Watson did not fail to notice that between the Secretary's statement and the General's, there were important differences. General Taylor paid far greater attention to the military disadvantages which the United States would experience and put greater emphasis on the several areas in which the United States had fallen behind Russia in nuclear weaponry or technology. Nevertheless, said Watson, by signifying their approval, however qualified, the military leaders deprived senators opposed to the treaty of an important debating point. New York Herald Tribune commentators observed that the Administration had the upper hand over the treaty's critics, and that the issue might have been all but settled if the Joint Chiefs had not attached reservations to their approval.

At this point, Senator Jackson reentered the debate to establish that the Senate took the Joint Chiefs' stipulations more seriously than he believed the Administration would take them. The New York Times of August 16 reported that the Senate Armed Services Committee
had called on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe the measures required to guard against the risks and disadvantages of the test ban treaty.

Senator Jackson said he had serious reservations about the treaty, and it was for this reason he had instigated the committee's action.

Said the Times: "Senator Jackson is recognized by his colleagues as one of the most informed Senators on questions of national security and nuclear weapons."114

Senator Jackson also said: "What is needed in effect is a 'second treaty' with the Executive Branch that the conditions will be carried out.

"We want to make sure they will in good faith carry out what they say they will do."115

(The Armed Services Committee request was soon to be answered by Undersecretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, who was better trusted than his superior, but was about to resign. Finally the President himself would feel it necessary to give his personal assurance that the Joint Chiefs stipulation would be met.)

Altogether, this first section of the "coordinated" or "euphoria" section of the hearings scored heavily for the Administration. It's recurrent theme was that all we have to fear is the lack of fear itself. One of the most astute political commentators on the scene, Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post, gave the production managers a friendly pat on the back:

"The Administration orchestration in a way has been almost too good. For one thing Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Taylor all turned up with the word "Euphoria" to express their fears that the American public might get rosy eyed about the treaty's meaning."
"There has been a tendency to stress the line that the treaty will seal into permanent advantage what the witnesses have called an American nuclear superiority at the present time. If anything will induce euphoria, it is that kind of talk.

"All in all, nonetheless, the Senate, along with the Administration deserves good marks thus far. Attendance has been good at the hearings, most of the questions have been highly relevant, many have produced quite revealing testimony and have cleared up some fuzzy aspects of the treaty. Maybe things will not continue in such orderly fashion."

Roberts' reservation about the future was justified, for the next witness was General LeMay, a somewhat more solid object than anyone who had appeared as yet.

THE MOBILE PHALANX OF THE MILITARY CHIEFS

General LeMay was one of the greatest combat leaders of World War II. He combined the technical skill of an airman with the unflinching drive of an assault commander. At first, as a colonel leading small formations of bombers over Europe, he drove through to targets without evasive action. His units scored and survived because of disciplined formation flying, tight fire control, and a consistent conviction that the surest way home was always directly over the target. In the Pacific, he boldly shifted to low altitude attacks when high ones were ineffective, and his determination to end the war by the most direct methods helped to end it early. After the war, when the Strategic Air Command was overawed by its own great weapon, he took the command over and drilled it into an elite shock force that for years appeared convinced the next war would begin tomorrow.
So single-minded a man resolves difficulties. He also creates problems. The problems had been absorbed in series by astute Air Force Chiefs Spaatz, Vandenberg, Twining, and White. When General LeMay became Chief himself, the necessity for political compromise and interservice maneuver shocked him more than the cruelties of war. For General Sherman war on wheels was hell. General LeMay believed war should be hell from the sky; the more hellish and frightening the war, or the prospect of war, the more certain the advent of peace and the duration of peace.

In the years of America's atomic monopoly, there were few who differed essentially with these views, and most of those who did were military men, strangely enough, of the other services. As the Russian stockpile grew, and their sputniks orbited the earth, fear and hesitation began to overtake confidence and determination in American nuclear policy. General LeMay was out of step. The idea that we must be overwhelmingly strong in the decisive weapon was abandoned for the postulate that we must balance Communist power everywhere and across the entire warfare spectrum. This, General LeMay could not pretend to believe; so his position became essentially negative. He refused to shift down into low gear. It was predicted he would oppose the treaty.

Fortunately for his opponents, General LeMay was often unadaptable as well as unyielding, and he was capable of gaucheries, such as the time he reportedly advised President Kennedy "not to read too many books; they will only confuse you." His stern and impersonal attitude gained him few unofficial friends, kept most of his admirers at a distance, and left him surrounded by thick-skinned assistants.
and by opportunists who reenforced his strong views. As General Sherman, after the Civil War, moved Army headquarters west of the Mississippi, so would General LeMay have liked to move his Air Force across the Missouri and back to SAC headquarters at Omaha, but he could not. He had to stay in Washington and he had to testify on the treaty.

President Kennedy expected no persuasive support for the treaty from General LeMay, but with men like McNamara and Taylor available he needed no other seconders. The President's problem was how to persuade, and to enable, General LeMay to accept the treaty without obvious evasion. For a man whose bluntness and honesty was proverbial as General LeMay's this was no small task. Neither the President nor the General succeeded completely. (The technique used by the President will be examined later.)

General LeMay's ordeal is evident in his testimony, despite the censorship that was applied to much of it. It was, perhaps, his finest peace-time hour. It is obvious throughout that he was trying to observe a commitment to the President; yet he made no effort to accommodate facts, as he knew them, to the earlier statements of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor.

General LeMay began by saying that he had helped prepare the statement which had been read by General Taylor and that he agreed with it, but from this point on, under questioning, discord became audible:

Senator Goldwater: "As I recall it, he [Secretary McNamara] said he had discussed the language of this treaty with the Joint Chiefs. Has he ever discussed it with you?"
General LeMay:  "No, he hasn't discussed it with me personally, nor do I remember his discussing it with the Joint Chiefs as a body. However, the Chairman is, in fact, with the Secretary daily. I would expect that there might possibly have been some discussion between the Chairman and the Secretary on this particular treaty. However, I don't know."

Senator Goldwater:  "Well, he was specific--I mentioned the Joint Chiefs, not the Chairman. I just wanted to corroborate what I had heard."

(Secretary McNamara's statement said that through the Chairman the other Chiefs had participated fully in all of the discussions. In answer to the specific question: "Have you had meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this specific test ban treaty?" Secretary McNamara had answered: "Yes, sir; I have."

Secretary McNamara had stated, concerning high yield nuclear weapons: "We have chosen, at a time when we were free to test in the atmosphere, not to carry out such tests because we believed that weapons of that type were not militarily important to us," and he further deprecated such a weapon as militarily valueless. This may have led Senator Pastore, an emotional supporter of the treaty, to ask General LeMay: "Do you see any military need for a 50 or 75 megaton bomb?" General LeMay answered: "Yes, sir; I do. The Joint Chiefs have already recommended we go ahead with the development work on a large yield bomb."

Secretary McNamara had said in his prepared statement that the 100 megaton weapon would be suitable only for vulnerable high altitude or suicide low level delivery. This provoked a line of questioning by Senator Aiken, that, despite deletions, appeared to reflect on the Secretary's expertise or candor:
Senator Aiken: "Would the delivery of a 50 megaton, 60 megaton bomb be in the nature of a suicide mission."

General LeMay: "Not at all."

Senator Aiken: "Could it be delivered from such a height that the plane would be out of the range of the concussion or explosion? (Deleted)"

General LeMay: "Yes, sir."

Senator Aiken: "That answers my question (Deleted)."

At this point, Senator Aiken wondered whether defeat for the treaty might bring nuclear war nearer.

General LeMay's reply was unequivocal: "I don't think we are any closer to a nuclear war with or without the test ban treaty."

Senator Aiken hedged: "I don't think anyone can answer that anyway." 123

In one very important respect, General LeMay's painful honesty paid off for the Administration. Anyone who would unhesitatingly invite the well-advertised wrath of the Secretary of Defense by denying three important points which the Secretary had enthusiastically overstated, would hardly be a fit subject for brainwashing.

Senator Kuchel (Rep.-Calif.) wanted further assurance on this point, because, he said, "the American people, and the men and women of the Senate, share a great respect for you and your colleagues in the Joint Chiefs." General LeMay replied categorically that he would resent any pressure to testify for or against the treaty, that he recognized a responsibility to the Congress and to the people as well as to the Administration and that no pressure had been applied.

He then went on to sum up his highly skeptical support for the treaty: "...if we provide the safeguards we mentioned in our paper,
I believe that the military and technical disadvantages that the treaty would bring about could be offset to a point where they would be acceptable and the country should have a chance to make these political gains if, in fact, they could materialize.\textsuperscript{125}

Thus it came about that the official witness who had the strongest doubts about the treaty, or the strongest resistance to repressing his doubts, provided the most effective defense of the treaty. Obviously, no pressure other than the pressure of persuasion influenced him on this matter which he considered fatally important. How the pressure of persuasion was applied, by a master of the art, will be examined after further consideration of General LeMay's unsoftened views. They show how and where the Joint Chiefs were able to apply counter-pressures of their own. General LeMay said "we have failed to do some of the things we should have done in our atomic energy testing program"\textsuperscript{126} and he added that the Russians "are progressing at a faster rate than we are." He then criticized, by implication, the testing performance of both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations and demanded better performance in the future: "We have to get to work and put more of our resources and more of our energy in this field than we have done in the last several years."\textsuperscript{127}

As for the plan of trying to design nuclear parity with the Russians he would oppose it strongly: "Even if your could do it and you arrived at that situation, how do you know it is going to stay there?"\textsuperscript{128} (Deleted.) "Once we have reached it and the people are told, well, now we have parity, they forget it, put it on the shelf, and pretty soon it wouldn't be true anymore, because in a closed
society they can carry on programs without the support of the people, whereas we cannot over here."

Despite heavy censorship of his testimony, the record plainly shows General LeMay's concern:

"We just don't know all the things we would like to know about the vulnerabilities of (deleted) systems (deleted)...they may know a great deal more about it than we do as a result of the last two series of tests they have run (deleted)...This bothers me...they may know something that is vital. They may have been able to pick up a weakness in our defense system that they can exploit."

These comments led Senator Pastore to say: "If you don't mind my saying this, General, now, and I don't mean any impertinency by this because you know my respect for you, then I can't understand why you are supporting this treaty. If all these things are bothering you (deleted) then maybe you hadn't ought to be supporting this treaty."

This seemed not to perturb General LeMay. He went on:

"These are the disadvantages that we see...We know (deleted) that the Russians were planning a test program (deleted) before they broke the moratorium and started testing. (Deleted)...(Deleted) the size of the program and the comprehensiveness of it, this is an area where we could detect the explosions and learn something about it. I can't quite swallow (deleted) that they didn't do equally well in the lower ranges where (deleted) what they were doing. (deleted)."

Senator Pastore: "But Senators have to stand up and vote either aye or nay on this treaty, and...you pick out all the reasons why maybe it is a bad agreement. I mean, where does that leave us?"

General LeMay: "...if you provide the safeguards we consider necessary, then we say you can ratify this treaty, but not without risks, and I have outlined some of the risks. You can attach the importance to each of them in the various weights, as we have all done. There are risks, and no amount of talking is going to make them go away."
Senator Pastore's obvious strain in coming to a decision on the treaty, and feeling right about it, was duplicated in the questions and comments of other Senators throughout the hearing, particularly in the cases of Senators Kuchel, Lausche, Jackson, Russell, Case, and Hickenlooper. Not so with Chairman Fulbright, whose mind seemed to be made up as firmly as that of Senator Thurmond. Usually, he was able to shake witnesses to some extent, but not General LeMay. Could you really trust Britain any more than Russia, Senator Fulbright demanded. General LeMay's experience told him you could. When the Senator asked if there was something special about the Air Force that led it to be more suspicious of such a treaty than any other branch of the service, General LeMay explained that the Air Force had been more involved for a longer period of time in the atomic business than the other services.\footnote{131}

Senator Kuchel remarked that a few Senators had made up their minds from the start but: "I think the rest of us are in the majority. I think we would like to approve the treaty, but we don't want to make a mistake. I don't think there is a scientist in the crowd. God knows there is not a military expert in the crowd." Senator Lausche reminded General LeMay: "You would not be there answering questions if you had listened to me in 1946 when I wanted to make you a Senator."

General LeMay replied that while there might be an advantage being on the other side of the table the responsibility was equal on both sides.\footnote{132}

General LeMay was supported in every instance by the Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Throughout General LeMay's and the
other Chiefs' testimony, the question of confidence arose, as it would arise again and again throughout the debate. When Senator Goldwater suggested that the past record of inadequate testing disturbed the Chiefs more than the new promises General LeMay replied:

"...We are all aware of the statements that the President and the Secretary of Defense have made in regard to maintaining the test program and so forth. We have not, however, discussed with them what they mean by that—whether what we mean by an adequate safeguard coincides with their ideas on the subject."

From this it was apparent that the specific stipulations made by the Joint Chiefs were not discussed with the President. What had been discussed then? According to two commentators with records of accuracy in such matters, the President was primarily concerned with persuading the Chiefs not to oppose the treaty, and he had wisely pitched his argument on grounds other than military. The President had told them that while he expected their support of the pact, he had no objections to their expressing any misgivings. He informed them that careful White House polls showed a safe margin for ratification in the Senate, so military opposition would only cause disunity. Failure to ratify the treaty would be a diplomatic Pearl Harbor, while ratification, he promised, would do no military damage, since there would be no cut in the Defense budget. Representative McMahon had already agreed, the President assured the Chiefs, that one billion which had been cut by the House would be restored. These assurances were said to have been enough for all but General Lemay, whose objections were not primarily budgetary. The President was said to have assured him that convincing evidence of secret nuclear
tests by the Soviets or a threatening breakthrough in testing would result in his invoking the 90-day escape clause to withdraw from the treaty. General LeMay thought it should first be established the Soviets had not already made such a breakthrough in their recent intensive series of tests.\textsuperscript{134}

Another reporter told a similar story with expanded emphasis:

"Secrecy in Washington is never leak-proof, but a reporter must satisfy his conscience that in revealing hush-hush testimony he is not giving information to the enemy. With that restriction in mind, I think it enlightening to report the tenor of General LeMay's dialogue in his closed door session with the Preparedness Subcommittee.

"LeMay and the other Joint Chiefs of Staff were called separately and individually to the White House, a day or so after the Moscow signing of the Nuclear Treaty. They were told that their opinions on the Treaty must be based upon both military and political considerations.

"LeMay was instructed to think politically, but he was then turned over to State Department briefers to be told what to think. He was told that among the major political results expected to flow from the Treaty were (a) widening the Sino-Soviet rift and (b) achieving a world-wide detente, or relaxation of tensions, between the USA and the USSR..."

"LeMay disbelieves, as does Edward Teller, Secretary McNamara's stated optimism that the USA has nuclear superiority and can maintain it under the Treaty. The McNamara opinion is not based on technical knowledge of Russian nuclear power. It is based on intelligence estimates. This means we take the little that is known about Russian discoveries and then extrapolate this material to reach some conclusions. When asked what if these conclusions were faulty in the wrong direction, the burly LeMay, with his expressive voice and manner said: "School's out..."\textsuperscript{135}

This same Preparedness Subcommittee on May 9, 1963, published a document entitled "Investigation of the Preparedness Program."

While directed specifically to the Russian occupation and fortification of Cuba, the Report explained the deficiency in American
intelligence as a disinclination of civilian intelligence agencies to accept the ominous portent of information which had been assembled. This tendency, said the report, was in sharp contrast to military intelligence practice.
On the same day that General LeMay's censored testimony was released, the Russian Defense Minister challenged his American counterpart's claims of advantages gained by a relatively weak series of tests. The Russians, for equally secret reasons, claimed greater triumphs through heavier testing. Because the Chinese had been quoting Mr. McNamara's claims of theoretical American superiority at underground testing, the Russians, who had been remarkably silent up to this point, finally boasted of their demonstrated superiority in atmospheric testing. They did this carefully, according to the Manchester Guardian, for fear American opponents of the treaty might be strengthened by the Russian statement. Just as Mr. McNamara and his scientist aides refused to disclose just how it was that superior Soviet testing had not given them superiority, Malinovsky said he could not divulge how it had given them superiority. Unfortunately, the Russian record of secrecy and surprises was more consistent than the American record of attempted secrecy and of being surprised. Malinovsky's "we cannot divulge" was somehow more ominous than Mr. McNamara's breezy "I have certain facts at my disposal."

General LeMay's and the other Chiefs' open support, however grudging and conditional, of a treaty they had previously questioned, left the treaty's opponents without an official leg to stand on, but they refused to surrender. Their unofficial champion was yet to be heard. The remaining obstacles for the Administration were Senator
Jackson's insistence on guarantees concerning the Joint Chiefs' stipulations and the incalculable influence of Dr. Teller.

DR. TELLER'S STANDOUT PERFORMANCE

Dr. Teller's handicaps were two, and they would prove insurmountable. He was no longer a fully active official. His basic views were well known. Unable to claim knowledge of the very latest secrets, he could only question the omniscience of others. Having no official responsibility, he could only try to convince that he was speaking in the public interest. In both of these efforts he succeeded surprisingly well, but no one, not even Dr. Teller himself, really hoped that his ominous warnings against the treaty would ever be completely justified by events.

Dr. Teller had a consistent theme, which was too philosophical for popular comprehension:

"This test ban has nothing to do with how many missiles either side builds," he said. "This test ban has something to do with knowledge...What Secretary McNamara is telling you is that he is willing to substitute brawn for brain, and to spend more and more money for defense. This is what has been rightly called an arms race. To acquire more knowledge, to acquire more knowledge in order to defend ourselves, this, I would suggest, is not quite properly called an arms race. This treaty will not prevent the arms race. It will stimulate it. This treaty is not directed against the arms race. This treaty is directed against knowledge, our knowledge."136

Dr. Teller had proved his true concern about the fallout problem, despite the fact that the total background radiation had been increased less than 10 percent by all the testing that had been performed. Five years earlier he and Dr. Libby had proposed an agreement with the Russians to limit atmospheric testing to a rate which would not increase the total amount of radiation present at
any one time. (This proposal had been negated by the voluntary moratorium which benefited neither mankind nor the U.S.—only the Russians.)

He was also aware of the secrecy problem and of the uses of secrecy for delusion and deception:

"Arms control limitations are not possible unless there is openness...the real preventive of any arms limitation is secrecy...the enormous weight of Soviet secrecy. This is what we have to fight. We have secrets too. The Russians know all our secrets, I believe, all our important secrets. Sometimes I fear that the Russians know all the secrets we are going to discover for the next two years. But we don't tell it to our people. We don't tell it to our allies, and by having some secrecy we have a hard time to convince the Russian, individual Russian scientists and Russian people, some of whom do not like secrecy either. We should try to convince them that this is the heart of the matter. Abandon as much of secrecy, particularly technological secrecy as possible. Nobody needs to know where our Polaris submarines are, that is proper, that is operations. But technological secrecy leads to confusion, and is not in agreement with the basic institutions of the United States...strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Community, strengthen them to the point where we can feel that we can act as a unit, as a strong unit within which there are no secrets, and which can act in concert. The best deterrent to de Gaulle is if he does not need a nuclear explosive."

In a contest of secrecy, of course, the Russians are sure to win, and Dr. Teller gave them that credit. When Senator Pastore asked whether the Russians had perfected an anti-ballistic missile system the answer was typically dramatic:

"May I please say, first of all, and please believe me, that what I say is true, that I don't know the answer to your question. I furthermore will say that nobody can know the answer to your question except Russia."

Senator Pastore: "I know. But won't you say that what applies to us must, of necessity, apply to them as well?"
Dr. Teller: "No, sir. What applies to people who did not work thoroughly on ballistic missile defense does not necessarily apply to people who did put a lot of work into ballistic missile defense."139

Dr. Teller was more concerned about the possibility of superior Russian knowledge of ballistic missile defense problems and principles than about any other subject, and he was scornful of Mr. McNamara's claim of secret assurances in this regard. He said to pretend to know what the Russians had learned, what they had planned, and how successful they might be was an extrapolation completely beyond reason.140

When Senator Jackson asked Dr. Teller to comment on Mr. McNamara's statement that with unlimited testing the most likely ultimate result would be technical parity between the United States and the U.S.S.R., Dr. Teller replied:

"First, the Russians in my opinion are already ahead. Second, I believe that clandestine testing in Russia in the atmosphere is possible. A small explosion under cloud cover could...not be distinguished from a very shallow ground burst that has thrown off the thin ground cover... the harder worker will win out, and so far the Russians have worked much harder, at least they have caught up with us in knowledge, not yet in deployed systems. I believe they are already ahead of us in knowledge, and they are, as far as I can see, moving faster. I am not worried about parity. I am worried about the United States becoming a second-class power, and next to Russia there won't be a power left if it is a second-class power."

Concerning Mr. McNamara's assurance that deep space testing was not a reasonable proposition for the Soviet Union, and in any event, is one against which we could protect ourselves, Dr. Teller commented simply. "I hope he is right. I fear that he may not be."141

Veterans of Congressional hearings are aware that witnesses on highly controversial questions are confronted by a hatchet man. He
is the member of the committee who is given questions, usually based on research into the witness's past actions and writings, which are likely to embarrass the witness or discredit his testimony. In the case of Dr. Teller the hatchet man was Senator Church. Senator Church did a good job, and managed to sound sympathetic as he quoted Dr. Teller to Dr. Teller. He read excerpts from the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and the *Washington Star* of three years earlier, and from Dr. Teller's book *The Legacy of Hiroshima*, published the previous year. In all of the quotes Dr. Teller had advocated an end to atmospheric testing.

It was characteristic of Dr. Teller that he used Senator Church's request that he reconcile these statements to strengthen his argument against the treaty:

"The simple answer to your question is that I don't reconcile them. They are contradictory...I have changed my mind...Since I have confessed that I have changed my mind I would like to explain to you why."

His reasons were a restatement of his original argument: The new possibility of antiballistic missile defense through further atmospheric testing, recent extensive testing by the Soviets, further barriers erected by the treaty against nuclear sharing with our allies, and the treaty's inhibition of the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful projects.¹⁴²

After this effective defense, Dr. Teller was able to capitalize still further on Senator Church's questions when Senator Anderson sought his support against the super-bomb: "I am not at all sure how important these large bombs would be. They may be important. I may have overlooked their main importance. But I have no case to present to you that we need atmospheric testing in order to construct these more effective large bombs. This is not my case."¹⁴³
Senator Anderson: "You were the director of that laboratory and its guiding spirit for a long time. If this country had had to have a large-scale explosive you would have built one, wouldn't you?"

Dr. Teller: "If I had thought at the time it was necessary I would have built one...But it is entirely possible that four years from now I will appear before this committee and Senator Church will confront me with another situation where on the basis of changed information I will have changed my mind."144

On this Senator Anderson omitted a few quotations which he said might be a little contradictory, because "you are testifying as you now believe, that is what is important." The Senator concluded by saying he hoped Dr. Teller would use his good influence to see to it that the military is prepared and that the underground testing goes on.145

Senator Church had not retired from the scene. Having gotten nowhere with his first list of contradictions, he returned for his second ten minutes with another. Dr. Teller had said that with an effective anti-ballistic system we may not be able to save our cities, but we might be able to save our retaliatory power. When questioned on this by Senator Church he explained that we may save the inhabitants of the cities through missile defense and public shelters.

Senator Church persisted, as had other Senators, in quoting Secretary McNamara's vague assurance that our surviving force will be large enough to destroy the enemy, only to elicit this response:

"...as of the present time, Secretary McNamara is probably right. I have some doubts...When projected into the future these doubts become more than doubts. They become very realistic dangers...on this point discussion in executive session is really necessary because I think that in the evaluation of Mr. McNamara, there are clearly definable optimistic factors which are not very clearly based, and which you should understand."146
Senator Church then shifted to the subject of world government.

Dr. Teller said he had not changed his mind with respect to the need of lawful world cooperation. The possibility of influencing nature even to the extent of controlling weather made such cooperation necessary. Dr. Teller believed that opportunities to agree even with the Russians might occur in the future. "But unless we are strong, and unless we make these rightful steps, I think a premature and insecure agreement with the Russians like this one...is not the right first step."

Senator Church concluded that Dr. Teller's case for greater political union among the free countries of the Western World was more convincing than the case he had made against the treaty. He said there might be votes in the Senate to ratify the treaty, but he did not foresee votes in the Senate to move in the direction of international cooperation that had been advocated so eloquently. Said Dr. Teller: "Perhaps there is one vote." The comment was characteristic. What was wrong with standing alone? 

As the hours of questioning wore on, Dr. Teller was less alone. The questioning moved from Senator to Senator and, like a touring chess champion, he seemed to leave each challenger, in turn, scratching his head as he awaited the next chance to recover his lost argument. Some treaty advocates withdrew; other, such as Senator Dodd, settled for a stalemate. He had not made up his mind, despite the fact that he and his colleague from Minnesota had offered a resolution favoring such a treaty. He thought all should wait until all the testimony had been heard. As was the case with lesser hearings, no one, literally no one—not even the hard working
chairman—would ever hear or read all the testimony. Attendance at the hearings would soon drop to near zero, and some of the record would be deleted.

The colleague from Minnesota was even more shaken by one of the famous scientist's statements. Dr. Teller had accidentally brought about the exposure of the most disturbing secret of all, and Senator Humphrey refused to believe it. It happened in this manner:

Senator Humphrey: "...I believe the main thrust of your argument this morning had been to challenge the judgment, not the integrity, not the patriotism or honor of the Secretary in reference to the Soviet capability..."

Dr. Teller: "I agree with everything you say and I would also add that the Secretary has underestimated the importance of actual operational tests. He is willing to look at the components. He doesn't care, apparently, whether the components are put together and the whole thing is investigated. Its like testing each part of the car and then not give it a road test..."

Senator Humphrey: "Dr. Teller, could you tell me if you have any information that would lead you to an observation as to why we did not have more atmospheric tests in 1961 and 1962?"

Dr. Teller: "Because it was the judgment of the Administration that popular opinion would not tolerate more."

Senator Humphrey: "Now are you sure of that or is that your view?"

Dr. Teller: "Yes, sir. We wanted to test more. We wanted to test more extensively. We had plenty of things we wanted to look at, and we were limited because we were told from the time that the decision is made to the time that the test is finished a minimum period must elapse. It is one of the most serious limitations under which we labored, and I wish you would ask John Foster, who is in charge of the Livermore Laboratory, and who suffered from this limitation. I
wish you would question him on this very explicitly."

Senator Humphrey: "So you are charging here this morning that the reason we did not have more atmospheric tests, following the Soviet test program in 1961, was a political decision made by the Administration?"

Dr. Teller: "Yes, sir."

Senator Humphrey: "I shall examine that very carefully. That is a very serious charge."

Senator Humphrey did examine it carefully, and he returned very late in the afternoon to take much more than his allotted time and to make several lengthy attacks on Dr. Teller's position. He said if the treaty were rejected we would be telling the Soviets there are no restraints and no limits. Dr. Teller suggested we could limit the amount of fallout, as he had proposed five years earlier. Senator Humphrey asked why fallout should be limited if it is not a problem.

Dr. Teller replied that while it was no real problem from the standpoint of health, it was certainly a great problem from the standpoint of psychology and politics.

Senator Humphrey objected: "You think it would be a psychologically effective thing in the tough-minded Russians?"

Said Dr. Teller: "No. But I do not think that the treaty would be psychologically effective on them either."

And so it went, with Senator Humphrey talking more than the witness, but the witness refusing to tire even after several hours and many Senators. Finally, Senator Humphrey came to that most important point concerning the limitations on the tests of 1961 and 1962. On this point, President Kennedy had just intervened to say, at a press conference, that there were more tests than had originally been
planned for the series. Senator Humphrey said that did not indicate that the Administration was limiting the tests. He further understood that the tests that were designed were the ones that we thought were in our national interests.

Dr. Teller was undismayed: "...your inference on this point is mistaken...I am firm in my answer that we could have, and should have, carried out more tests in the atmosphere, and the limitations were not of a technical or military nature but were due to the fact that the Administration did not want more tests."

Said the Senator finally: "I only want the record to be clear on one point, that there is not any unanimity of opinion either in the political or the scientific community, whether about the type of weapons that we ought to have or the number of weapons that we ought to have. Do you disagree with that?"

Dr. Teller: "I am quite sure that in any complicated field you will find some dissenting voices. But when it comes to the desirability of having more tests in the atmosphere for the purpose of the safety of our retaliatory forces, and our missile defense, the unanimity in the technical community was very close to being complete."

Here it was Senator Humphrey who retreated, and so helped establish Dr. Teller's contention. Said the Senator: "But you would not deny that the technical aspects of this problem are not the only aspects of the problem, would you?"

Dr. Teller did not fail to recognize the collapse of the Senator's argument:

"You have asked me about the technical aspects of the problem. You have asked me about the question why did we not make more tests? Were the American scientists not good enough to carry them out? Were we not prepared? I have answered you to the best of my knowledge, and
this answer I maintain, and this answer I hope you will continue thoroughly to investigate."

This left Senator Humphrey, even after help from the President, exactly where he had started. Said he: "I shall. Thank you."

Other than Senator Humphrey, only the Chairman took unlimited time to question the witness, or to speak against him. He was no more successful. Earlier in the testimony, Dr. Teller had said:

"I am sorry to say that we have heard from the very highest quarter, that statement that man now holds in his mortal hands the power to destroy all forms of human life...We are living in a dangerous world. The United States may become the frontline of the battle. The United States, if we are not careful, may cease to exist, but the human race will continue to exist. About that, there is no question in my mind."150

Senator Fulbright thought he saw an opening here: "If we suffer a hundred million casualties, as some testimony had indicated we might in a nuclear exchange, this is of rather important significance, and whether or not someone might survive somewhere does not seem very significant to me. But it seemed to be to you this morning."

Dr. Teller, who had obviously thought a great deal about all these things, did not try to embarrass the Senator, but his answer was necessarily a lecture:

"It is a very terrible thing to talk about the possibility of a war in which 10 million Americans may be killed, which would be the situation if we had, in my opinion, the best missile defense and civil defense that we could construct...It would be much more terrible if half or more than half of our population would be killed, and if America, as a free country and as an idea would cease to exist. But the fact that this is something very horrible, something very enormous, is in my opinion, still different from the survival of humanity itself...the majority of the people of the world will survive, but even if a few people survive, my respect for what we are, for what we humans are, whether Americans or Russians or Germans of Africans or Pitcairn Islanders, is such that in my emotions,
completely unscientific, completely unpolitical, the survival of the human race has an overall importance, yes, sir."

The scholarly Senator, duly humbled, supplied: "overriding purpose, overriding--" but he was still the straight man.

"Overriding, yes, sir; thank you for correcting my English."

"I wasn't correcting your English."

"Yes, you were, because I used the wrong word which in Hungarian would have come out better." (Laughter.)¹⁵¹

The Chairman finally fell back on the surest argument, and the one that would defeat Dr. Teller's purposes in the end, though not to his surprise.

Senator Fulbright: "Well, Doctor, there seems to be a very important difference in your views about what the Russians now have and what testimony we have already had from official witnesses... In the Senate we are accustomed, some of us are, at least, to relying upon the information of our official sources, that is what is called the Intelligence Community, which you are very familiar with. In effect, it seems to me you are asking us to accept your judgment on this point as being superior to that of the Intelligence Community, which is the Department of Defense, the CIA--all of which goes up to make it; is this not correct?"

Dr. Teller: "I am not asking you to accept my opinion as opposed to anybody else's. I am stating my opinion.

The Chairman: "I have been under a misapprehension all day."

Dr. Teller: "I am stating my opinion and furthermore I am stating the reasons for my opinion. I am stating undoubted facts which are on the record, where our intelligence estimates have actually underestimated the Russians in many instances. I am not, I don't dream of the possibility or the propriety of you taking anybody's authority, least of all, my authority. I am appealing to your reason on a basis of facts, and I am asking you to gather more facts concerning the state of the art, concerning our planning--in executive session, so that it should be brought out clearly
and explicitly on what the intelligence estimates are based, what experiments may be needed by our side, how many and what kind of these experiments the Russians might have performed in the past, or could still perform in the future...I am not asking you to believe me. Certainly, I am not asking you to believe me more than to believe these people you have quoted and for whom I have the greatest respect."

The Chairman: "Well, I regret that I am unable to follow that answer... They are far ahead of us, is that correct?"

Dr. Teller: "I said the Russians are far ahead of us in relevant knowledge... I believe the intelligence estimates are more relevant with respect to hard facts, hardware, than they can be with respect to the state of knowledge. It is this point about the state of knowledge that is most disturbing to me, and about the obvious multiple opportunities the Russians had to increase their state of knowledge which we similarly did not give to our own people."

The Chairman: "I confess, of course, no knowledge... I am basing my questions entirely on what I understood the testimony to be from those who are in this field, who have been before this committee... None of them intimated that they thought the Russians were ahead of us in the field of knowledge about either this weapons system, the ABM, or any other one. Perhaps that is their confidence in their own capacity, I don't know."

Here Senator Fulbright, not unlike Senator Humphrey, had begun to see the grey rather than the white and the black, and Dr. Teller's final answer was both patient and effective:

"Senator Fulbright, big nuclear explosions are easily observed. Knowledge is less easily observed. I am disturbed by the fact that in the region which is easily observed, we admit the Russians are ahead. Whereas in those regions where observation is more difficult we still claim superiority or at least equality."

This unanswerable answer marked the end of Senator Fulbright's questioning and virtually the end of Dr. Teller's testimony. It had
been a magnificent performance, covering some 90 pages of the official record, lasting until early evening and dominated by the witness from beginning to end. Even those who disagreed were impressed, and there would be reverberations.

First to show unusual irritation was President Kennedy, at his press conference while Dr. Teller was still testifying:

"I understand Dr. Teller is opposed to it. Every day he is opposed to it...In the last two years, we have conducted 97 tests underground. That is quite vigorous... How many weapons do you need? What we have on hand will kill 300 million people in one hour."

The last comment was beside the point but, of course, the President could not follow the intricate debate in detail. Neither could the public, and his words were addressed to the public rather than to the Senators, as was usual and perhaps inevitable for him. The public had not seen or heard Dr. Teller's testimony, and the Senators would get over it. Even reporters, most of whom disagreed, would get over it. One called it a virtuoso performance. Another said:

"His scientific reputation would be enough to guarantee him a hearing. But Teller is, additionally, a formidable presence. He looks at the world with piercing gray eyes that glint and flash under luxuri-ant overhanging eyebrows. He mesmerized the Senators... with a masterly review of the surprises that have attended our progress in the thermonuclear world. He laid waste to the arguments for the treaty...He put his fingertips together, leaned in his chair issuing admirably formed sentences that seemed destined for tablets of stone...Senator Humphrey...professed himself to have been 'very much moved'--Senator Bennet (R. Utah) told Teller his information was 'more im-portant than any we have heard!' Offstage, Democratic proponents of the treaty were less shaken than they had appeared by Teller's forceful enmity. They have other scientific witnesses who, as President Kennedy pointed out, disagreed with Teller."
The Washington Star continued to support the treaty but defended its critics:

"Only a tightly closed mind could remain indifferent to the views expressed by such as Dr. Teller, General Power, General Schreiver, and now Dr. John S. Foster, head of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory. The adverse testimony of these men cannot be answered by allusions to bushy eyebrows, theatrical tones, vested military interests, etc. There is no doubt in our mind that these critics are just as sincere as are the treaty advocates. And generally, at least, they have access to essentially the same information."  

This was a minority view. Most of the press, in this country and abroad, still favored the treaty.

Foreign opinion was even more in favor of the treaty than was American opinion and more inclined to blame American airmen for the opposition. The London Economist voiced a common view: "President Kennedy slapped down Dr. Teller's uncompromising opposition to the treaty...so far in the hearings the only other experts, nuclear or military, to support Dr. Teller's opposition have been spokesmen for the Air Force."  

Opposition to the treaty increased after the adverse testimony, but only temporarily. Edgar Ansel Mowrer saw a stalemate in military judgments but considered Dr. Teller to be the superior civilian witness:

"Add the approval of the treaty expressed by the Army and Navy leaders and the disapproval of the airmen upon whom our safety has depended for the last fifteen years, and you are likely to know precisely as much as when you started. There is, of course, one great difference between Edward Teller and Robert McNamara. Teller knows all there is to know about nuclear weapons, first hand; McNamara knows only what he is told."  

Mr. McNamara was no longer considered an adequate counter to Dr. Teller. Already the President had stepped into the breach. What was needed now was another scientist rather than a politician.
or a political appointee. Such a man was Dr. Harold Brown, but before he could appear there was another hostile witness—a rather formidable one.

Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, followed Dr. Teller's six and a half hour marathon. It was early evening and few had waited to listen, yet Dr. Strausz-Hupé had some interesting things to say. He considered the treaty a futile gesture, for "In diplomatic history, symbolic acts of this kind which precede an understanding on concrete issues, have proven empty."159

Dr. Strausz-Hupé said Secretary McNamara had presented an incredible picture in which the Soviet leaders, by subscribing to the treaty, voluntarily relegated themselves to a position of prolonged inferiority.160 He said that in actual fact the treaty would preserve Soviet superiority in the very large weapons which Soviet military experts considered important. He believed the treaty would indicate a panicky fear of nuclear war which would encourage attack:

"The Chinese contend that the...United States is already paralyzed by this fear and advocate a more aggressive strategy. The Soviets are not sure whether the United States is as yet psychologically incapable of using nuclear weapons."

Dr. Strausz-Hupé contrasted the United States government's extreme sensitivity to organized vociferousness and to world opinion with Russian success in manipulating or ignoring these influences:

"Khrushchev...restated the value of using pacifists in the West...at the Belgrade Conference of Neutrals (Sept. 1-6, 1961) the participants refused to condemn the Soviet Union for having broken the test moratorium."
"Some were afraid, and some believe that we too acted from fear rather than from more elevated considerations. Perhaps the Soviet 60 megaton bomb has already played its role...There is a widespread concern, particularly in the United States, that any refusal to sign the treaty will incur the wrath of world opinion. We must not allow ourselves to be swayed by unfounded assumptions concerning its importance. The Soviets consistently disregard it when it runs counter to their interests."

At the conclusion of his testimony, Dr. Strausz-Hupe recommended reservations to the treaty which, it appears, would scarcely have been acceptable to the Russians although the reservations were entirely reasonable.

At this point in the hearings principal interest was concentrated on whether the treaty would pass, and by how much; and whether the President or Dr. Teller would succeed in shifting a few Senate votes. Dr. Strausz-Hupe's very interesting comments were scarcely reported at all. The scientist who was sorely needed to support Secretary McNamara was at hand.

TESTIMONY OF THE UNSHAKABLE DR. BROWN

Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, was no man of mystery. The importance of his position in the Department of Defense was well known. His precise views had not been announced, but he was expected to support Mr. McNamara completely, or be forced out of his office. Dr. Brown had accompanied Mr. McNamara on the Secretary's appearance before the committee, but was not called upon significantly, since the Secretary had preferred to answer even the scientific questions in his own individual way. It was now Dr. Brown's task to tone down some of the Secretary's more extravagant claims, without appearing to contradict him, and to substitute
carefully balanced statistics for those which had been used rather loosely. This called for a long statement, somewhat technical, but less studded with special phraseology than that of the Secretary. More restraint and dignity would be needed, but because Dr. Brown was noticeably young, he would need to display self-confidence and assurance. Also required was the assertion, after the manner of the Secretary, of the possession of profound secrets so mysteriously significant that few other mortals had been permitted to gaze upon them, and so complicated that few except scientists and appointed geniuses could possibly comprehend them.

All this was a large order, but Dr. Brown filled it very well. There was no pose except that of relative omniscience, which was necessary, and there was little condescension except for those outside the summit group of secret-sharers who might presume to disagree. One veteran Pentagon reporter had observed of unclear experts that their solid record of achievement in nuclear testing when mishap might mean disaster, had cloaked these scientists in "a mantle of infallibility which has led to arrogance in some of the younger ones." Of this Dr. Brown was far less guilty than most of his colleagues. In Dr. Brown's statement as contrasted with that of Secretary McNamara the subjective optimism was subtle:

"Enough has been learned by the United States to verify the existence, nature, and rough dependence of blackout characteristics on yield and on altitude, although important details still have not been explored. The same is probably true in the Soviet Union on the basis of the tests which they have done."

This key statement was no model of clarity, but it was obviously not designed to mislead anybody. It confessed as much as it claimed and did not presume too much knowledge of the Soviets. Other
statements by Dr. Brown were similar in that they continued admissions which could have been frightening, but were too calmly worded for that. Dr. Brown said it appeared that our ability to retaliate could be preserved even if the Soviets did some cheating.\(^{164}\)

He confessed that

"...detailed knowledge of the vulnerability of the variety of incoming warheads or the various other objects that may be coming in probably will not exist even for the Soviet planners even though they tend to have more information on what we do than vice versa."\(^{165}\)

Dr. Brown's statement about the possibility of detecting Soviet cheating in the lower ranges was doubly conditional:

"...it could be the case that a 5KT shot at 10 km altitude in the Soviet Union would probably be detected, but only a 10KT shot could be clearly identified as such by remote geophysical detectors alone."\(^{166}\)

The frequent use of cautious conditionals such as "it appears," "probably" and "could be the case," was in marked contrast to General LeMay and Secretary McNamara. In this manner and without evasion Dr. Brown described the possibilities of cheating:

"In the parts of the world remote from the USSR or China, such as the South Pacific, the geophysical evasion threshold could be about 20 kilotons and the chance of recovering a debris sample might be rather small."\(^{167}\)

Dr. Brown's most sweeping conclusion had a cautious tone but it managed to sound hopeful:

"The limited effect of the treaty on our strategic superiority means that the benefits to our security in the broader sense...will not be outweighed by the military-technological factors."\(^{168}\)

Dr. Brown's attitude and manner throughout the question period, which was about half as long as Dr. Teller's, was sometimes too candid for comfort, but was generally reassuring in the total effect.
He thought that preventing was more important than any knowledge that might be had from testing in the atmosphere.\textsuperscript{169}

Concerning defenses against missiles he recognized some differences of opinion but felt the Russians were not substantially ahead.\textsuperscript{170} He said he himself found time to look into antiballistic missile problems every few weeks.\textsuperscript{171}

With respect to the high altitude blackout he explained neatly "the Chiefs say the Soviets may have some data that we do not have. I would say yes, and we have some data they may not have."\textsuperscript{172} In conclusion as he had done throughout, Dr. Brown tempered modesty with confidence:

"I do not want to imply that I think I know all the answers to this. I am giving my judgments. They are the judgments that I have reached on the basis of access to all the information that I think there is."\textsuperscript{173}

This final comment resembles Dr. Teller's style, but it was necessary to top Dr. Teller, not merely to match him. This was done through the secrecy gambit which had been employed by Secretary McNamara. Senator Humphrey helped clinch the point: "...you have access to all the information that is available to Dr. Teller and there is no limitation upon your getting that information?"

Dr. Brown: "I have access to intelligence, not only to intelligence information that I believe, that I know, is not available to him... but I also have the benefit...in drawing my conclusions not only on my years as a weapons laboratory member and director, but on my subsequent experience here...."\textsuperscript{174}

With such superiority of both secrets and experience on the part of Mr. McNamara and his immediate aides, it is easy to see why they were impatient of disagreement and confident in challenging all but the equal knowledge and the greater experience of the military
Chiefs of Staff, with whom Mr. McNamara had not bothered to discuss the treaty at all. How did the Chiefs, who, after all, had access to most secrets, manage to differ from authorities such as Mr. McNamara and Dr. Brown? The answer is demonstrated in the following statement by Dr. Brown:

"If there is a surprise abrogation, I think that they may gain some small and temporary military advantage. I think that is the worst that can happen, and in my view that is not a serious argument against the treaty."175

In the long experience of the Chiefs, small military advantages had often been converted into big advantages and sometimes into permanent advantages. It was impossible for them to dismiss this possibility as "not a serious argument."

On one point only was Dr. Brown obviously misleading, and that was perhaps unintentional. Senator Humphrey, because of his previous debate with Dr. Teller on this subject, was determined to make the point that Dr. Brown, as a scientist, did concur in the judgments that were made relating to the number of tests, atmospheric and underground, in the 1962 series. Dr. Brown agreed that he had participated in those judgments and "did concur in them, as did all the other government officials involved."176

Either Dr. Brown was unaware of the opinions of some of the others or he very broadly interpreted the word "concur." Both Los Alamos laboratory director Dr. Bradbury, who supported the treaty, and Livermore laboratory director Dr. Foster, who did not, were shortly to testify that they wanted more and better tests in 1962, but were overruled. Why were they overruled? Here Dr. Brown, perhaps unwittingly, supported Dr. Teller's contention. During the
discussion he eventually admitted that "there was an attempt to get as much in the way of useful tests as we could per megaton of fission products, because there was a desire to keep down the level of fission products."177

Finally, however, despite his cautious statements and careful phraseology, Dr. Brown expressed an optimism about the treaty and its consequences that seemed quite sincere:

"Senator Humphrey, I don't believe we are behind. I am strongly convinced we are not far behind..."178 and again, "I don't think this is a panacea, but having satisfied myself that it is not going substantially to reduce our strategic superiority, if we do everything that also we can and should do. I believe that the treaty should be approved for these broader reasons."179

This was helpful for those who needed reassurance after Dr. Teller's testimony, and there were some who required it.

DR. BRADBURY AND DR. FOSTER: TWO NUCLEAR PHYSICISTS
WITH TWO VIEWS

The two atomic physicists to follow Dr. Brown were, in a sense, subordinate to him as well as to the Secretary of Defense and to Dr. Seaborg. It appeared from their testimony, however, that scientists away from the Pentagon are far less subordinate in their personal views than are most officials who work in the shadows of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. N. E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, began his testimony with a statement which was unique: "The views which I will express are entirely my own personal opinions and any agreement which they may or may not have with those of the Atomic Energy Commission or those of the Administration is fortuitous and coincidental. I have neither
been asked by nor urged by anyone at any level to express any par-

ricular point of view whatever." Obviously, Dr. Seaborg, who was
Dr. Foster's superior as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
was not a typical government boss, else a subordinate's agreement
with him would have been more than fortuitous. The fact that many
scientists can demand such freedom as Dr. Foster expressed distin-
guishes them from other government employees whose specialties are
less spectacular and who may be quietly replaced.

It is notable that on matters involving non-scientific factors
and broad interpretations, the scientists are as much influenced by
their emotions and their basic attitudes as are other people. Dr.
Bradbury was honest enough to make his motivation for support of the
treaty quite clear:

"I, myself, with considerable knowledge of nuclear
things, with some knowledge of their military use, but
with only a plain citizen's feelings about people and
nations and hopes and fears would prefer to try to
follow the path of hope."  

Dr. Bradbury had been making atomic weapons for twenty years,
and his right to hope had certainly been earned. Here was no solitary
and detached theoretician. When questioned by the Chairman, Dr.
Bradbury stated that there were more than 2,000 scientists at Los
Alamos, including 1,000 technicians, 900 with bachelor's or master's
degrees in a technical field, and 450 Ph.D's. 

Dr. Bradbury's optimism was more than just a sales pitch or a
rosy dream. Like the Joint Chiefs, he insisted that underground
testing should be pushed to the limit. He stated that the rate
of testing could be increased and that he had so recommended. 
He admitted no testing of any kind had been performed during the
moratorium period between 1958 and 1961 and that we were unready to resume testing after the Russian surprise simply because it was the policy at that time not to prepare for testing. He said, as Dr. Teller had insisted, that the tests of 1962 "provided the usual mixture of surprises, both good and unwelcome," and he claimed no secret knowledge which was unavailable to Dr. Teller as associate director of the Livermore Laboratory. Dr. Bradbury did not complain about past constraints on testing but inferentially supported Dr. Teller by admitting that in recent testing operations "I have not got everything I suggested."

Perhaps Dr. Bradbury's basic difference with Dr. Teller, and with Dr. Foster and Atomic Energy Commissioner Dr. Libby, was his judgment concerning what the Russians had accomplished in their recent intensive testing. He said our tests were extremely complicated diagnostic operations while the Russians had conducted some experiments of considerable sophistication, but not very many.

For all his deliberate optimism and hope, Dr. Bradbury conceded that the treaty, in effect, meant the Russians had at least caught up with us. He thought that in some general, overall sense, there might be a rough equality in the development of nuclear weapons; but as to why the Russians had become "tractable" he said it would be hard to give a cogent answer.

The last big day of the Test Ban Treaty hearings began with Dr. Brown, continued with Dr. Bradbury, and concluded at near six in the afternoon with Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California. In a reading of the record of the Hearing, Dr. Foster's testimony is the most disturbing
of all. Perhaps this is partly the result of accumulated understanding from other testimony, but the effect is heightened by Dr. Foster's matter-of-fact bluntness with no effort either to hide or to embellish the truth.

It is apparent from the record that the Chairman, who had handled uncompliant witnesses somewhat roughly, made an effort to browbeat Dr. Foster as soon as his opening statement had been read. Dr. Bradbury had said that we had to have larger forces because Soviet secrecy is superior to ours, and we cannot know their exact strength. The Chairman misunderstood his use of the word "assymetry" and demanded Dr. Bradbury "say it so we do not misunderstand it." In answer to a question Dr. Bradbury said he saw nothing in the treaty which would remove distrust. The Chairman wanted to know how he was qualified to judge. None of these sallies seemed to rattle Dr. Foster in the least. Finally, the Chairman demanded:

"You are not advocating that we go to war in order to prove the efficiency of your weapons."

Dr. Foster:  "Obviously not, sir."

The Chairman:  "Well, it is not clear from that page whether or not you would like to try it." 190

At this point, the Chairman permitted other Senators to ask questions. All were more polite and some were highly appreciative of Dr. Foster's willingness to share his knowledge and to state his opinions more pointedly than most other witnesses had done.

Mr. McNamara had spoken of testing as much as one megaton underground. Dr. Foster said very simply that not even tests of a few hundred kilotons could be carried out under the treaty without
risk. Some radioactivity might escape our territorial limits and thus violate the treaty.

Dr. Foster said further:

"Without atmospheric tests, I doubt that we can develop and maintain the requisite skill in the important area of the effects of nuclear weapons. Even our theoretical effort in this area is likely to deteriorate without the incentive of meaningful experiments. An 'intensive' underground program [promised by the Administration] I take to mean a rate of testing determined essentially by the technical-military needs rather than political expediency."191

Just what Dr. Foster meant by "political expediency" he soon made clear:

"For 18 years the United States, aware and concerned for the potential and growth...of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, has developed in a restrained manner. We have every year tried our best to reach an agreement with the Soviets and to limit this constant increase in the development of arms. During that period of 18 years, the Soviets have come from a position of relative hopelessness to one that was described by Dr. Bradbury as rough parity, and I do not want to argue whether they are ahead or behind...the discouraging point is that currently from their recent atmospheric tests and from our recent atmospheric series, I see a very high rate of progress in the Soviet Union, compared to the United States...We have chosen to limit our efforts.192

In answer to further questioning, Dr. Foster agreed that the surrender of leadership in nuclear knowledge had been unnecessary. He confirmed that our lost advantage, or some of it, could have been regained through intensive testing in the higher and lower yields, except for the moratorium and the treaty. Two years of maximum effort would be required to reach the rate of testing operations already demonstrated by the Soviets.193 Dr. Foster said he did not necessarily advocate this but he thought it only
prudent to assume that Soviet knowledge and capability in the high nuclear yields exceeded ours, while we know nothing of their capability in the lower yields.\textsuperscript{194} 

Dr. Foster said flatly that the United States cannot have complete confidence in its vital Minuteman missiles system without atmospheric tests.\textsuperscript{195} 

The Chairman continued to do his best to find ways to counter Dr. Foster's disturbing testimony:

"You do not want to leave the impression that the Russian scientists are more able than ours, do you?"

Dr. Foster: "Sir, I think it is simply the fact that over the years this country has been determined to limit the level of arms. We have never made a race out of the situation."

The Chairman: "Do you think our present and last year's budget for defense indicate a great limitation upon our effort?"

Dr. Foster: "Sir, I think it is not a question of how much the United States spends. It does spend an enormous amount. It is a question of the relative effort exerted by the United States as opposed to the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union performs tests at a greater rate than does the United States, and assuming they have comparatively capable people, then they will progress faster. Whether or not they spend more money I simply do not know."\textsuperscript{196} 

On the question of our disadvantage on going into the treaty with no high yields weapons tests, either for efficiency or for effects, the Chairman asked:

"Why didn't we experiment in this field last year in our last series of tests. Do you know why we didn't?"

Dr. Foster: "We were not ready."
The Chairman: "Why weren't we ready?"

Dr. Foster: "We were not ready because to be ready requires money, authority, and facilities...Since there was no obvious reason why one should stop theoretical studies in design at that particular point and invest a huge sum of money, it was not done...The United States, I feel, did not believe that the Soviets would abrogate, so the money was felt best spent elsewhere."197

All of that had happened months before the hearings. A great lesson in preparedness had been learned--or had it? Assurances had now been given by the Secretary of Defense, and seconded by the President, that nothing of the sort would be allowed to happen again. No one of consequence, apparently, had thought to examine the reliability of these assurances except Senator Jackson. Was his intervention justified? The dialogue between that Senator and Dr. Foster on this subject indicates that it was:

Senator Jackson: "...in the not-too distant past that the laboratory has requested a given number of underground tests only to be cut substantially when the request moved on up to higher authority?"

Dr. Foster: "Yes, ...during the last year we have been under severe non-technical limitations, and I know both Dr. Bradbury and myself hope...that the laboratories will be given an opportunity to do those experiments and carry out a rate of operation that makes good sense....I do not believe we have been conducting an aggressive underground program. As I said, we have had non-technical restrictions."

Senator Jackson: "...have you received assurances that the conditions referred to by the Joint Chiefs will be carried out and that you can submit programs along that line to higher authority?"

Dr. Foster: "No, Senator Jackson."

Senator Jackson: "...have you been questioned about this?"
Dr. Foster: "We have been requested to submit
laboratory estimate..."

Senator Jackson: "When did that request occur?"

Dr. Foster: "This request was generated in the
hearings by the Stennis Committee."

Senator Jackson: "So until that Committee acted to imple¬
ment the language laid down by the Joint
Chiefs as involving the necessary condi¬
tions of their acceptance, you had not
received any request, had you?"198

Dr. Foster: "To the best of my knowledge, that is
correct, sir...To date the laboratory
has not received funds, assurance of funds
or authority to proceed with the purchase
of hardware to achieve a readiness capa¬
bility."199

In other words, although the Secretary of Defense, his aides and
other members of the Administration had made enthusiastic promises
that underground testing would be exploited to the utmost to make
up for the deficiencies resulting from cessation of atmospheric
testing, nothing had been done toward implementing any of these
promises or even to find out from the laboratories what the promises
might cost or what they might require for fulfillment. Only after a
legislative committee insisted an executive function be carried out
was there action on the matter. Senator Jackson had said: "We need
a treaty with the executive branch to ensure that it will carry out
its commitments," and events proved he had a valid point.

Dr. Foster, in agreement with colleagues who had spoken more
favorably of the treaty, dismissed the great fallout scare as almost
entirely synthetic. He explained: "The fallout from all past tests
affecting man for the next 50 to 100 years would be something like
deciding to live a few hundred feet higher above sea level." This
was reassuring to all except the variously motivated agitators of this subject, but Dr. Foster made two comments on another subject that remain profoundly disturbing to any who have the fortitude to face their implications.

First of all, the so called "balance" of terror is a hope rather than a demonstrable reality. It could scarcely be maintained even if it existed, for "we have to reckon with the fact that in an expanding technology, vigorously pursued, there frequently result abrupt increases in scientific knowledge—rapidly reflected in military capabilities—which could upset the balance of power." Second, Dr. Foster made a point that no other expert seems to have noticed:

"The proposed treaty would limit not only our knowledge of the actual state of the Soviet military development, but would also restrict our knowledge of what may even be technically possible. Specifically, this requires that the United States explore vigorously all areas of technology critical to our security. Failure to do this would add to the uncertainties concerning our relative strength, and force us to choose between either an increase in the risk to our security or a further increase in our level of armament."200

This straightforward language contains no technese. No glossary is needed such as that provided by the New York Times for translating Mr. McNamara's presentation. Nevertheless, the philosophical implications of Dr. Foster's few sentences are much more profound than the Defense Chief's confession of the futility of new or improved nuclear weapons while boasting of large increases in such weapons.

Dr. Foster's comment of the motion that gain would result from the curtailment of new knowledge was especially significant. He was the first to emphasize that Russian underground tests would provide no index of Russian nuclear progress such as atmospheric tests had
provided. As long as the Russians tested in the atmosphere, something was known of what they were testing, how often, and how much. Also, no tests had been made, or now would be made, to discover what the Russians could have learned in their series of massive atmospheric tests. Only a very strenuous and expensive underground testing program would provide any indication of what the Russians might be learning underground.

With Soviet secrecy far more complete than ours, mutual agreement to go underground was far from mutual in its consequences. It was like agreeing to a contest in the dark against an opponent with a flashlight. Dr. Foster was warning that nuclear roulette in secret caverns would be just as lethal in its results as anything that might take place in the open air—and a great deal more surprising.

Our minimum insurance against decisive surprise would have to be a vastly increased effort underground, heavy investment in standby facilities for testing above ground, and a considerable increase in all types of armament to hold the line until any such surprises could be overcome. All this the Joint Chiefs had stipulated, and all of it Mr. McNamara, in his strange way, had implied. Dr. Foster simply described the situation, without softening or inverting it.

The explanation of the fallout issue given by Dr. Foster was historical as well as scientific. He said fallout is only a few percent of the natural background of nuclear radiation, which is stronger at higher altitudes and he added: "We know that people have lived at a few thousand-foot altitude, under higher exposure
levels over thousands and thousands of years and we cannot decide whether it has helped them or how it has affected them."

One of the questioners, Senator Byrd of W. Virginia, was most persistent in his pursuit of fact. His questions were designed neither to credit nor discredit the treaty but to discover what should be known. In Dr. Foster he found an understanding witness, and the dialogue between the two was most rewarding for all who were interested in the pursuit of the reality which had proved so elusive. Senator Byrd's questioning elicited from Dr. Foster the information that the Soviets had made three or four times as many tests in the megaton range as had the United States, and that they do about as well in the way of progress per shot as does the United States. Dr. Foster related:

"When the Soviets resumed, it surprised us. It surprised us because they were testing at a great rate, and testing at a great rate implies...that you can handle the flow of the designs into hardware...In addition, the experiments that are so frequently referred to as having to do with missiles and radar and so on, were just very extensive, and the unmistakable conclusion you come to is that the Soviets had a very definite objective in mind. The United States, on the other hand, I would say, conducted some very interesting scientific probes into the phenomenology of nuclear effects. Now, whether or not one approach or the other is of overriding importance, I honestly do not know."

He agreed, however, with Senator Byrd on the possibility that the Russians in conducting their elaborate test series acquired information about weapons effects which would place us at a severe disadvantage. Senator Byrd insisted:

"...unless some scientist can tell me that we can indeed extrapolate information through underground
testing which will satisfy our fears with regard to weapons effects upon sites and systems, I am not satisfied with the argument that we should take into consideration the political judgments, because I do not believe that the military leaders are prepared to weigh those political judgments and I do not believe the scientists are..."

Said Dr. Foster: "Sir, there is no existing experimental data or theory or, to our knowledge, future underground tests that can provide you with the complete assurance you want."

Senator Byrd continued to struggle with what he called a momentous and awesome decision. He said the situation has developed to the point where rejection of the treaty would have an adverse effect upon our relations with other nations. He felt, however, that it might be better to be alive as a sovereign nation and have a few of our friends down on us than not to be alive and have our friends say that we were good fellows. He wondered whether Dr. Foster, as a scientist, held the same views. Dr. Foster said he could put it no better and he added:

"If the treaty is ratified, the best thing we can do is to see that it does not happen to us again; that we indeed are prepared, and that we are, in fact, following out these promises that we are making to ourselves, by our deeds."203

But Senator Byrd had not quite given up hope of being able to vote for the treaty. After Senator Jackson had questioned the witness and had indicated a determination to see that the Joint Chief's stipulations would be carried out, Senator Byrd returned for one more hopeful question. This was at the end of Dr. Foster's testimony, and it was a fitting end, with the tone,—God forbid!—of Greek tragedy:

Senator Byrd of W. Virginia:

"I would just like to carry Senator Jackson's questions one step further, if I might, and tie
them in with such a question as I asked earlier. Dr. Foster, I asked you earlier if by using the information that we already have, and by conducting aggressively underground tests under the conditions of the treaty, we could acquire information which would satisfy our fears with regard to weapons effects upon our sites and systems, and you indicated, I believe, that we could not. Would your answer still be the same if I had framed my question differently to the extent that I had included the safeguards the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended?"

Dr. Foster: "Yes, it would have been the same. It is simply that the question of how hard anything is to electromagnetic phenomena, be it antiballistic missile defense or hardness of silos, has to do with matters that, in my opinion, are not sufficiently well understood to be able to say with full confidence that they will function as designed in a nuclear environment; and this nuclear environment cannot be created by underground experiments."

Senator Byrd of W. Virginia: "And safeguards are no--"

Dr. Foster: "Correct."

Senator Byrd of W. Virginia: "Are we taking a great chance with the security of this country if we approve a treaty which prohibits our further testing in the atmosphere, and, consequently, learning by such testing important facts dealing with effects upon sites and systems?"

Dr. Foster: "You are taking a risk and you cannot calculate it."

Senator Byrd of W. Virginia: "Regardless of these safeguards?"

Dr. Foster: "Regardless of these safeguards."

Senator Byrd of W. Virginia: "Even though they are implemented to the fullest?"

Dr. Foster: "That is correct."

This was the end of Senator Byrd's struggle to reconcile optimism with honesty. He would vote against the treaty.

Almost everyone had left the chamber. Senator Fulbright had long since departed and Senator Aiken had assumed the chair. It had been a long day, beginning with the cryptic assurances of Dr. Brown,
continuing with the earnest hopes of Dr. Bradbury, and concluding with
the grim realism of Dr. Foster. Said Senator Aiken: "After listening
to the two witnesses today I feel personally as if I consulted two
lawyers. I did not know that scientists and lawyers were so much
alike." Senator Aiken would vote for the treaty.

He went on to announce that the witnesses on the following day
would include Dr. Libby, Admiral Strauss, Harold Stassen, and Norman
Cousins.

The morning papers of the following day carried only an inkling
of painful struggles of mind and spirit that had taken place in the
committee room. Both the New York Times and the Washington Post
carried stories of normal length which permitted only a few column
inches for each of the three witnesses' testimony. The Times' story
on Buddhist troubles in Vietnam was longer, and the brief heading of
the test ban account was "Teller Disputed by Defense Aides." Only
four sentences were devoted to the entire testimony of Dr. Foster
and most of the article was related to the theme: "Dr. Brown disputed
virtually every point made yesterday by Dr. Edward Teller."

The Washington Post article, by Murray Marder, was only slightly longer,
but somewhat more informative, and devoted seven sentences, about 10
percent of its space, to Dr. Foster's bold dissent from the official
position as repeated by Dr. Bradbury and Dr. Brown. Marder provided
interesting biographical information and comment:

"Brown, who is 36, worked under Teller at the
Livermore Laboratory which Teller helped to organize;
and in 1960 succeeded Teller as its director. He called
Teller 'a dear personal friend.' Foster, 40, succeeded
Brown as director at Livermore in 1961, and was a
protege of Teller. Bradbury, 54, has been director of
Los Alamos since 1954. He said he has great 'profes-
sional respect' for Teller, but often disagrees with
his 'personal opinions.' Both Bradbury's and Teller's (Foster's) laboratories operate under the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC commissioners have unanimously endorsed the Treaty. Brown's testimony yesterday was intended to demolish Teller's testimony...

With so little in the way of news coverage and analysis, it is not surprising that columnists and editors continued to concentrate on the better known names, never mentioning Foster, sometimes referring to Brown, and preferring to quote Bradbury's determination "to take this chance, to count on this hope." They continued to discuss the personalities who already had received more than mention in the press: McNamara (supported by Brown), and Teller. General LeMay and the other Chiefs were left in the middle, which was about where they really were. On August 22, Walter Lippmann airily disposed of the discrepancies by saying, "The opinions of General Power and General LeMay on the probable results of future tests in the atmosphere are not one bit more expert than the opinion of Secretary McNamara. They are all laymen in this field..." However it may have been intended, this new leveling must have given scant satisfaction to the authoritative Secretary.

Lippmann recounted that Teller and others believed in "the absolute weapon." He ignored the fact that Teller and LeMay had each ridiculed the idea of such a weapon. In one short column Lippmann repeated this phrase three times, and he spoke of "the absolute weapon, an anti-missile defense," thus implying the absolute weapon was defensive! In any case, no one need worry about such things, according to Mr. Lippmann's unique insight. He assured his readers that "the belief in a unique breakthrough is a romantic form of self-deception."
On the same date the Washington Star was less than happy about these visions of a technologically egalitarian future. The Star produced one of the very few unhappy editorials about the way the hearings were going:

"How can Mr. McNamara say that we are not behind the Russians in our knowledge of anti-missile missiles, while Dr. Teller insists that the Russians are ahead of us in this area? One explanation may be that this conflicting testimony as far as the published accounts go, is opinion testimony. Specific information and facts which support the opinions have not been made public... we hope that all the information and facts, consistent with true security, will be made available to the people. Otherwise, the public mind will be bedeviled for years to come by doubts as to whether we have traded our security for a possibly vain political hope." 209

DR. LIBBY EXAMINES DEAD MORATORIUMS AND EXPLORES UNKNOWN THREATS

While Dr. Foster had thought hard about the most fateful issue of the age, Dr. Willard Libby, inventor of the atomic time clock, had been thinking about it longer. His testimony which opened the hearings on the 22nd showed a mature balance of thought and emotion that no other witness quite matched. Dr. Libby's position was made less difficult by his refusal either to oppose or to endorse the treaty, but there was no evasion whatever in his judgment of the issues involved. Even the Committee Chairman, Senator Fulbright, whose attempts at irony usually came out as sarcasm, managed to give him neutral introduction as "former Chairman" of the Atomic Energy Commission, distinguished scientist, Nobel Prize winner, and winner of many other honors. The Chairman then went on to cloud his introduction by complaining that not all scientists had agreed (not even
the official witnesses, whom he had apparently expected to go along
with the official policy just as the military witnesses had managed
to do). Said Senator Fulbright:

"One of the most unexpected developments, at least
from my point of view, has been the wide divergence of
views among the acknowledged experts, particularly in
the basic scientific areas in which you operate. I
thought that these intellectual giants would arrive at
some sort of common conclusions. But I find they differ,
just as much as politicians, and this has been very
puzzling to me."210

Apparently the Senator did not reflect that as a politician he
was demonstrating a discipline beyond that of the military by plung¬
ing into the task of pushing the treaty through the committee and
the Senate with no idea what the best-informed scientists thought of
it. He said: "You have had time to think about these matters at
great length. Will you proceed?" Dr. Libby then proceeded to add to
the Chairman's disappointment.

Fewer than half the appropriate committee members were present
now, as compared with full attendance at the beginning of the hearings
ten days earlier. The official broadside defending the treaty had
already been fired in the direction almost everybody wanted to believe
was the right one. The few bold dissenters had been rather quickly
dismissed as outnumbered and outclassed extremists and those who
followed Dr. Teller were scarcely noticed. Few, other than those who
had heard the secret testimony, were very much worried about the
problem. The questioning would be less pointed now, the exchanges
more relaxed, and the sessions less extended.

Dr. Libby was very brief. He said bomb testing was a most vital
part of modern armament, and that the power of our stockpile had been
increased substantially, and sometimes unexpectedly, by every major
test series we had conducted. Not wishing to comment on the anti-
missile issue because of incomplete information, he concentrated on
the big bomb problem, on interference with the peaceful application
of nuclear explosives (Plowshare), and on the impracticality of
designing for atmospheric tests when no tests are planned. He was
less concerned about current theories of military application for
big explosions than with our failure to find out what they are like:
"We debated seriously whether to proceed with the H-bomb and for¬
tunately did so just in time, and the present 100-megaton question is
in some ways similar. I am worried that we have not fired one and
observed the effects which must be awful indeed."211

This was very surprising. Dr. Teller had been pictured, and
would yet be pictured by Dr. Kistiakowsky and other witnesses, as a
monomaniac on big bombs because that was his specialty. Yet Dr.
Teller's principal concern had been for missile defense and not for
the big bomb at all. It was the relatively conservative Dr. Libby
who felt it was dangerous for us not to have tested the big explo¬
sion. He refused to budge on this point, even after Senator Sparkman
informed him that the leadoff men Secretary McNamara, Dr. Seaborg,
General Taylor, and Dr. Brown had all discussed it and had stated
that the decision was made some years earlier not to go into the
high yield testing. Dr. Libby answered flatly: "It is a question
that was never quite settled." Senator Sparkman insisted the other
witnesses testified that we had deliberately chosen not to test the
big one and Dr. Libby explained: "But you see the Russians chose to
do this. And that is a new issue in the debate."212 Dr. Libby was
not particularly curious about the testimony of these other
witnesses. When Senator Sparkman asked if he had read their testimony, Dr. Libby explained that he had been traveling.

Senator Sparkman, whose comments had all been strongly pro-treaty, then insisted that Dr. Teller's statement that he did not attach very great importance to the big bomb certainly was entitled to consideration. This was practically the only time during the entire hearings that a strong pro-treaty Senator quoted Dr. Teller with approval.

Dr. Libby, along with a few Senators, had been worrying about nuclear problems much longer than the recently responsible officials of the Administration. He said the hundred megaton bomb was an old issue, which for some reason the Russians decided differently from us.

"I think a point that you would want to examine is why they would do this. I think it is a possibility they have learned something we do not have. Now you have heard testimony from the most responsible officials who should have all the information that we have. But it still is a portentous question and the fact remains they did it and we didn't...we had the chance, we could have, but we didn't and they did. This worries me..."213

It developed that the great decision against the great bomb was by no means the clear-cut incident Mr. McNamara and Dr. Brown had claimed it was, and that General LeMay's correction of their statements had been more than justified. Senator Aiken kept talking about it, and wanted to know who made the decision not to continue with testing the larger bombs. Dr. Libby did not answer this question directly but stated that the argument over testing the larger bombs had never ended. "My disposition" he said "has always been to push in this direction for knowledge."

"Up to a hundred megatons?" asked Senator Aiken.
"Or even larger," replied Dr. Libby, "for understanding. This question of usefulness is out of the province of the Commission to a considerable degree. But the Commission, you see, in a sense must develop the knowledge that the Department of Defense has to have to decide what it needs."214 (Dr. Libby may not have been aware of the current Secretary's attitude as to the need for such knowledge.)

On the question of fallout, Dr. Libby also had a long perspective. He said there was a long debate about the effects but he had never felt that it was of such major importance that the national policy should be made on the basis of it. He said it was an issue which was not being ignored for there was a great deal of work being done on it.

Senator Aiken said it appeared to him "that some of the assertions relative to fallout had a touch of ideology mixed in with them."215

Senator Humphrey picked up this issue and expressed himself at considerable length, leaving the witness little chance to speak. The Senator succeeded in getting into the record what he called controversial material concerning fallout. The material involved Dr. Lapp, the very-well-publicized ex-employee of the AEC who had written extensively on supposedly secret nuclear information, and a Dr. Reiss of St. Louis who was not so well publicized. Senator Aiken, though a strong supporter of the treaty, wanted no more of this sort of thing and he interjected: "...the scientists appearing here yesterday not only disputed it but they apparently refuted every part of it," and Senator Hickenlooper added: "I think the President refuted it in his speech."
Senator Humphrey, however, was not going to permit the story headlined "Nevada Children Possibly Harmed" to be sacrificed so readily. He continued in his characteristically voluble vein:

"Much as I admire the President, I have never looked upon him as a scientist or atomic scientist. He is not a doctor although he goes to doctors. I am not a scientist or a doctor nor do I claim to be...This appears in several of the larger newspapers...I want to make my position clear, Doctor. I don't know whether this story has any merit or not but I do know as one in public life that what people think is true is often more important than what is true. People have some concern about this...I am pleased at least that you have recited once again that our Government is concerned about this...we do have a radiation council, we do have ways and means of measuring radioactive fallout, is that correct?"

Dr. Libby said that we did, and that fallout could be controlled in Nevada to any degree necessary. "It is a matter of how deep you dig the holes."216

Senator Kuchel's contribution was more amusing as well as more dramatic:

"In the scientific community with very great regret I observe there is cleavage. Later on today we are going to have a very able American, one of your friends, and co-workers, Admiral Strauss, who will oppose the treaty; a very great scientist, Dr. Teller, at great length and with great eloquence, opposed it. We had others yesterday who approved it. Now let me put my tattered senatorial toga over your shoulders for a moment." (Laughter)

Senator Gore: "That is dangerous."

Senator Kuchel: "Well, just on a temporary basis." (Laughter) "How would you make a decision when some scientists urge that we approve this, when others with equal and no greater patriotism urge we disapprove it, when the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it, and when other renowned military leaders now on active duty disapprove it?"
Dr. Libby: "Well, Senator, it seems to me you have no choice but to make up your own mind by careful investigation." (Laughter)

Senator Kuchel: "You give me my toga back." (Laughter)217

Since Dr. Libby was himself a participant in the tragedy of the moratorium, his comments on it were particularly instructive. The Russian surprise series that broke the moratorium changed the balance from one where we were far ahead to one where they are far ahead in yield. The preparation for that test series must have been going on for a long time, said Dr. Libby, perhaps all during the moratorium.218

Senator Kuchel then asked an embarrassing question: "Did you participate, Dr. Libby, in the discussions that I assume took place before General Eisenhower announced his unilateral moratorium?"

Dr. Libby: "Yes, I was on the Commission, Senator."

Senator Kuchel: "Did you recommend such a moratorium by General Eisenhower?"

Dr. Libby: "Well, we had many, many discussions and I think it fair to say that the Commission was worried about this but went along with it... It does prove rather difficult to keep the laboratories right on instant notice...there is no doubt that the Soviet series, as they undertook it in 1961, far outshadowed the significance of our testing in 1961. We were caught off base, to put it bluntly."

Dr. Libby later stated that his position on the treaty was "more or less a worried reluctant acquiescence."

THE INFORMED OPINIONS OF DURABLE MR. STRAUSS

As Senator Kuchel had predicted, Admiral Strauss, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, opposed the treaty. Although the Admiral's record as a public servant was outstanding and his knowledge of nuclear policy almost unparalleled, his advice was neither
sought nor desired by those who favored the treaty. He had once been severely, and perhaps fairly, attacked in the Senate for his conservative politics and his business associations. He had been most unfairly attacked by some individuals who found it possible to sympathize with the controversial scientist Robert S. Oppenheimer, and who had blamed Admiral Strauss for the so-called crucifixion of that very secular scientist. Perhaps because of all this, the questioning of the Admiral was brief. Chairman Fulbright, who was absent during the opening statement, said: it was a very interesting presentation but that most of the points had already been explored.219

Senator Sparkman kept urging Admiral Strauss, as he had urged others, to read Secretary McNamara's statement, seemingly oblivious to the fact that the Admiral and other outsiders had not had the privilege of reading any of the testimony other than the fragments which had appeared in the press. Admiral Strauss professed great respect for the Secretary but he seemed to have difficulty with those portions of the Secretary's testimony which were then quoted to the Admiral as the final word. Here Senator Sparkman could not remember the exact language but Secretary McNamara had said in his conclusions that we had an overall nuclear superiority. When Admiral Strauss said he was certainly surprised if we had developed larger weapons, Senator Sparkman said Mr. McNamara was basing his statement on exact figures never given to the public.220

This ended all discussion on this point. For all his bumbling, Senator Sparkman understood very well that the public information game can be won by any official who has the privilege of deciding which cards will be dealt face up and which will be dealt face down.
Such purposeful control of information in one direction may lead to difficulties in another. Senator Carlson said he had noticed in his mail that many people were writing that they hoped for ratification of the treaty on the theory that greatly reduced military expenditures would result. This was something the Defense Secretary had wisely tried to avoid, and against which he had warned. Nevertheless, the Senator quoted one of the Secretary's more ambiguous statements: "...Since testing underground is not only more costly but also more difficult and time consuming, the proposed treaty would retard progress in weapon developments in cases where added cost and other factors were not sufficient to preclude it altogether." Here the Secretary was simply trying to establish, in his impressive manner, "one of the great advantages of the treaty...retarding the spread of nuclear weapons."²²¹ He meant this sweeping generalization to apply to others, not to us. Senator Carlson had derived the not unreasonable inference that since we would have to go on testing to the limit, it would become much more expensive. He said that on the basis of Mr. McNamara's statement, the treaty might cause an increase in our military expenditures. He asked for comment and Admiral Strauss obliged by pointing out that a conventional military establishment is more expensive than an atomic establishment and by saying that he was puzzled by the Secretary's statement.²²²

Perhaps Admiral Strauss sensed that the Secretary intended the theory of increased expense to apply only to others. He rejected this idea also, and insisted that any nation capable of fielding a modern and effective conventional force can eventually develop a more threatening nuclear force for less money, whether in underground secrecy or in the open atmosphere.
Of the several senior military men who were recently retired, and free to state their uninhibited views about the treaty, not one was invited to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Admiral Strauss came nearest to being a non-official military witness, but with a modesty which was out of fashion in the new Washington environment, he disclaimed any great or even considerable military competence, being a Reserve officer, "retired at that," with only five years of active duty. He did claim over the last 45 years, some experience with international negotiations.

Admiral Strauss was disturbed about the lack of a precise definition of underground testing. He said: "In my opinion, one man's opinion, this treaty was made to be breached. I think it will be breached...I think the breaching of it will be to our disadvantage...therefore both its military and its political connotations are bad for us."223

Admiral Strauss quoted a prominent American scientist who wrote in 1960 that he had been deeply embarrassed at Geneva the year before because he had to point out to the Russians the possibility of underground explosions which would not be detected without inspection. "I think they would have been quite justified" wrote the indignant American scientist "if they had considered this an insult and walked out of the negotiations in disgust." Admiral Strauss commented that the Russian scientists toward whom our scientist had felt so apologetic were not so thin skinned after all. At that very time they must have been engaged in intensive preparations for cheating on a massive scale. In barely twelve months after the article appeared
they staged a surprise series of tests which, for length, and number, and size of weapons, astonished the world.224

Although Admiral Strauss was modest on most counts, he could say proudly: "The record will show that in 1945, near the end of World War I, as an advisor to Secretary Forrestal, I opposed the use of atomic bombs, without warning, over cities inhabited by noncombatants...." He could relate with equal pride:

"It was once said that the thermonuclear weapon, even if it could be built, could be transported to target only by an oxcart. At that time I was one of a small minority, which included the late Dr. Ernest Lawrence and Dr. Edward Teller, believing the contrary and contending against great odds, because of our conviction that world freedom was at stake. I wished with all my heart that the oxcart forecast would prove to be right and the H-bomb impossible to make. It became a reality."225

Some years had passed since this member of the original Atomic Energy Commission, and later chairman, had been publicly influential. Admiral Strauss had received much abuse and scant thanks, for the crucial decision which he had shared with Dr. Teller and President Truman, and he expected no thanks now for an ominous warning which no one was anxious to hear, that a radical new weapon discovery or a breakthrough in countermeasure systems, suddenly tested and found workable, could put the possessor nation in command of world events. He said we ourselves were twice in that position, first with our invention of the fission bomb and later of the fusion bomb. Of course, we never considered making such use of our advantage, "but what if in the future the situation is reversed, as well it may be?"

It had been said that the Soviets might elect cheating with a single test which might even escape detection; that we could surely detect a series of tests but that one test by itself alone would be
of little significance. "This unfortunately will not stand up in
the light of history," said Admiral Strauss.

"We cannot forget, we should not forget, that one
single test proved the atomic bomb, and one test proved
the principle of the H-bomb. If such a radical inven-
tion is made on our side of the Iron Curtain, one that
is provable only by testing it above ground, the treaty
will firmly bind our hands. Thus paralyzed, we can
only file the idea away in a safe place and pray fer-
vently that the same invention will not occur to
scientists on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Un-
fortunately, there is a well recognized and frequently
experienced phenomenon known as simultaneous invention.
It may operate against us. If the discovery--the
breakthrough--is made on the other side of the Iron
Curtain...would the Soviets, in that circumstance,
or other circumstances favorable to them, clandes-
tinely breach the treaty?...Soviet policy does not
always defy prediction."...226

Admiral Strauss explained that civilized man abhors war, and is
apparently attracted by any reasonable proposal that is labeled
"Peace." Too often, however, and too late, some action hailed by a
hopeful majority as signaling "peace in our time" actually turns out
to be a first step toward disaster. "In the past it has been only our
strength which has kept us at peace. For many years our strength
will be our surest, perhaps our only, assurance of peace."227

A SAMPLING OF DIVERGENT VIEWS

The record indicates that only 13 Senators had assembled in the
morning to hear Dr. Libby and that less than half that many were
present in the afternoon to question Admiral Strauss. Only half of
that half-dozen would remain to hear Harold Stassen and other wit-
nesses of the late afternoon.

Governor Stassen's statement was brief and to his point that
practically any treaty is better than none. He said the treaty
should not be measured against perfection, but in terms of ratification or rejection. Although his statement contained phrases such as future "holocaustic war," the Governor went on sensibly to say that misgivings and opposition to this treaty had been both wholesome and natural. Under threatening circumstances the United States should give notice and resume atmospheric testing, Mr. Stassen added, but he agreed with Senator Carlson that this might not be an easy thing to do. 228

Mr. Norman Cousins, the renowned advocate of both peace and disarmament, was even more brief. He made the valid point that some of the reported testimony had unfortunately made it appear that the Chinese were right in saying the Russians were suckers for ever agreeing to such a treaty. 229

Mr. Robert Bauman, of Young Americans for Freedom, condemned the treaty with surprising eloquence and Mr. Andrew E. Rice of the American Veterans Committee defended it briefly. On the following day Mr. James P. Warburg, the New York financier, hoped the Senate would not be swayed by "the disproportionately publicized apocalyptic warnings of a singular nuclear physicist whose allegations of fact have been authoritatively contradicted." Not content with such tongue and brain twisters, Mr. Warburg suggested that not trusting the Russians would make them untrustworthy, and quoted former Secretary of State Stimson to the effect that there is no surer way of making anyone trustworthy than to trust him. Strangely enough Mr. Warburg went on to quote Senator Humphrey’s contradictory opinion that any head of state who did not scrap a treaty when it was no longer in the interests of his nation would not be in power
very long. Bismark, said Mr. Warburg, had made the whole thing very clear years ago when he said treaties are good "sic rabus stantibus."^{230}

Mr. Edwin P. Neilan of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States favored the treaty and said, somewhat inappropriately, that redirection of defense expenditures into civilian use would raise the level of consumption. He announced the Chamber's concern over public disagreement among honorable and patriotic members of the United States military and scientific communities.^{231}

Mr. Carl McIntire of the International Council of Christian Churches opposed the treaty and introduced statements from Vice Admirals Cooke, Freeman, and Sharpe; Lieutenant Generals Almond and Stratemeyer; Major Generals Blake, Campbell and Ruestow; and Brigadier Generals Moran and J. M. Smith, all retired and all opposing the treaty.^{232} On the other hand, retired Brigadier General J. H. Rothschild of Phoenix, Arizona favored the treaty on behalf of the United World Federalists. Mrs. Aileen Hutchinson, of "Women Strike for Peace," agreed. Her statement was a serious one and indicated no concern with the women's strike technique of Lysistrata. Opposition to the treaty by "disillusioned Wilsonian democrat" Stanley Andrews of Americans for National Security prompted Chairman Fulbright to say that "spokesmen for the public seem to have somewhat similar differences, as do the great scientific geniuses that we have produced in this country."^{233}

Mr. Sanford Gottlieb, Political Action Director, National Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy, defended the treaty with an intensity of sanity that confused at least one Senator. Mr. Gottlieb attacked
the assumption that national security can be protected primarily by military means and quoted, of all people, Secretary McNamara, to support him. (Mr. McNamara's previously quoted dialectical digression was: "I cannot allege that the vast increase in our nuclear forces, accompanied as it was by large increases in Soviet nuclear stockpiles, has produced a comparable enhancement of our national security.") More appropriately, Mr. Gottlieb quoted Walter Lippmann in thinking-man's rhetoric resembling that of Mr. McNamara:

"Limiting the experiments will remove the hysteria, the violence, and the poison from the competitive search for absolute supremacy."

When Mr. Gottliev had finished these and other quotations and opinions Senator Fulbright said: "Do I understand that you recommend we ratify this treaty?" Said Mr. Gottlieb: "Absolutely." Said the Chairman: "I think you have given some very forceful reasons...."^234

THE MILITARY PRECEPTS OF DR. YORK

The testimony of Dr. Herbert York, who had preceded Dr. Harold Brown as Director of Defense Research and Engineering only to become Chancellor of a branch of the University of California, proposed to simplify the antiballistic missile problem into a race between defense and offense which the latter will always win.

Dr. York began by restating Mr. McNamara's most popular paradox: "The military power of the United States has been steadily increasing; over the same period the national security of the United States has been rapidly and inexorably diminishing."^235 Dr. York had held a highly responsible position during some of this expensive loss of security. He was Director of Research and Engineering under
Secretaries of Defense McElroy and Gates. Dr. York felt responsible to explain that the inexorable diminution of American security was nobody's fault but the Russians. "This steady decrease in national security was not the result of any inaction on our part," he insisted, "but simply the result of the systematic exploitation of the products of modern science and technology by the Soviet Union." In other words, the situation would have been no better or no worse with either more or less inaction on our part, or on Dr. York's as Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Dr. York seemed to say that inexorable events were controlled by the Soviets. Such employment of rhetorical abstractions as absolutes was increasingly popular in 1963 as a device for giving fateful failures the sound of fate itself. Ever since Sputnik I the higher sanctums of the Pentagon had produced more Hamlets than many schools of classic drama.

Getting down to specifics Dr. York devoted most of his testimony to establishing that the antimissile defense advocated by Dr. Teller was unimportant. There was some confusion.

Dr. York's principal difficulties came from his efforts to be clever in answering questions and at the same time positive in his opinions. Whatever his gifts in the higher mathematical powers, Dr. York was repeatedly caught in the traps of simple logic laid by foxy Senator Lausche and, worst of all, he seemed not to understand what was happening to him.

First Senator Lausche caused Dr. York to admit he could scarcely remember who were the military chiefs of staff during his own recent tenure of high office in the Defense Department. Then Senator Lausche mentioned what he called the old philosophy of the military leaders
that offense is the best defense and Dr. York endorsed eagerly, but not without admitting that security of the offensive forces is essential.

Dr. York suggested also that we should develop penetration aids for our own missiles against every defense. This forced him to admit, under further questioning, that we should develop antimissile missiles after all, though he still insisted they would be ineffective. Senator Lausche proceeded in this manner through the question of high yield weapons and finally got Dr. York to admit, after much dodging, that in the very high yields the Russians knew facts that we did not know. 237

Senator Lausche returned to the antiballistic-missile project: "...the Joint Chiefs of Staff say that in the antiballistic-missile field, development of the U.S. system does not depend on atmospheric testing and hence this treaty will not significantly influence any imbalance that may exist." Dr. York hastened to agree with this statement and Senator Lausche's next question was cruel: "What imbalance do you think exists?" Again Dr. York had been tripped by his own anxiety to score points. This time he sensed it, and tried desperately to recover: "In this area I doubt that there is any significant imbalance, and I state significant imbalance. Since their program has apparently been different from ours, it is like asking whether an hour is longer than a mile. But I don't know, on balance, I think there is no imbalance."

Senator Lausch kept on: "...do you know that we have allocated 25 million for the development of the ABM? ...Would that signify there is a belief we can ultimately break through on the ABM?"
Dr. York said there was a very slim hope, and he announced what he called the important reason for the project: ..."this is the only way you can learn how to make your own missiles penetrate somebody else's hypothetical antiballistic missile."

A better example of self-contradiction can scarcely be found than this dizzying statement that antiballistic missiles are so ineffective they should be built primarily to learn how to counter somebody else's antiballistic missile. Such inverted logic as this at the highest scientific level of the Eisenhower administration helped to explain why the Defense Department of the new administration was considered an improvement.

Dr. York then rushed into another contradiction when Senator Lausche asked: "Is it your opinion now that the ability to develop an antiballistic missile is beyond the realm of achievement?" Dr. York answered: "Yes, and that it will stay that way." Having failed to defend himself successfully, Dr. York evidently decided to adopt his own dogma and return to the offensive, but Senator Lausche was unrelenting. He asked "what would your judgment on this treaty be if the fact is that Russia has achieved what you think they are incapable of achieveing?"

Dr. York then returned to first principles: "What I believe is the case is that in any development race between offense and defense, offense can always win. Therefore...I would say accelerate the development of penetration aids and be confident of the outcome."

Senator Lausche said soothingly: "That makes the issue very clear as to what your position is."
The Senator then changed the subject again. What are the military disadvantages to the treaty? Dr. York answered: "Certain information on weapons effects... will not be obtained. Certain technical progress... will not be obtained." "Then," said the Senator, "what do you visualize the advantages to be, one—militarily, and two—politically?"

Dr. York tried to repeat the approved line:

"Well, militarily—and strictly militarily—if you define the purpose of the military, too, as in fact the oath of office says, defend the Constitution, it is, if the purpose is, to increase the security of the United States, a step in the direction of decreasing the arms race, of preventing things from getting still worse than they are, is a step in the direction of improving national security, and that is just from a military point of view."

Obviously, Dr. York was trying to follow General Taylor here, but he lacked the practiced smoothness of that soldier-diplomat. When asked about the political advantages, Dr. York was in trouble for having translated them all into military ones. He could only say:

"Politically, well, the answer is more or less the same, plus other things which I am sure you know better than I with regard to our relationships, and so on. I am concerned primarily about the fact that without—if we do not do anything about the arms race, the security of the United States will just get steadily worse, will get less. We will get stronger but our security will get less."

Senator then asked whether Dr. York agreed we must maintain superiority.

This was the same hard question on which other witnesses had foundered, but none more cruelly and massively than Dr. York. He tried desperately: "We must maintain the capability to wreak unacceptable revenge in a strategic situation. At the present time,
that probably means superiority, yes. It does mean superiority."

Poor Dr. York was back in the arms race again, and with vengeance as a goal!

Senator Lausche did not pause. He wanted to know why Russia had deployed an ARM system if it was not effective. Dr. York said that some scientists or engineers had sold them a bill of goods and he added: "That happens here too. I mean, the situations are not all that asymmetrical." At this point Senator Lausche deferred to Senator Hickenlooper for the moment. The latter Senator offered no relief. Had not Lord Rutherford said originally that power could not be produced from the atom? Dr. York agreed but insisted that his own predictions had not been negative. He had not predicted that the defense would certainly fail but rather that the offense would always succeed, and he considered that a positive prediction. Senator Hickenlooper was in no mood for sophistries: "I understood through your testimony, you just said an anti-ballistic missile system just would not work. I thought you were pretty dogmatic about it." Dr. York admitted: "That is right, and that is because the ballistic system, the ballistic missile system, will always be able to defeat it."

Senator Hickenlooper listed prophesies, such as Dr. Vannever Bush's rejection of the long range missile as impossible. He mentioned the surprises in Russian missile progress, and their near-victory in the race for the H-bomb. Senator Hickenlooper said: "I would hate to wake up one of these days and find...that they have a means of intercepting...and we did not have it. If we would not be naked before the world...."
Dr. York interrupted to say the Russians simply were not going to do that, and that even if they did do it they would require time to deploy what they had developed. But the Senator continued to talk about false predictions and finally Dr. York reversed himself once more to say: "I believe it is possible to develop an antiballistic missile."

Dr. York then emphasized that when he was in the Defense Depart¬ment 300 million were spent on antiballistic missile development and that recently 425 million more had been allocated.

Senator Lausche concluded by remarking that there were now two separate explanations for the Russian antimissile installation. Number 1, that a bill of goods had been sold to Khrushchev and, Number 2, that is was all a bluff.

Dr. York assured him: "There is plenty of evidence that the Soviets have been very strongly defense minded for years. I mean, you know with respect to certain other things they have done. They try very hard. Trying is not enough."

Said Senator Lausche: "I hope you are right." Dr. York's arguments had been upset but his doctrines and his confidence remained supreme.

The confidence of his questioners had, on the other hand, been diminished. Senator Hickenlooper chose this moment to claim he was on record two or three times while the Russian moratorium was on saying he believed they were preparing to test: "I was not clairvoyant, but I was going on information of a lot of people who had put two and two together and presented those facts." The Senator was right, of course, since there were many people in the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Defense Department and the CIA who knew of evidence that the Russians were testing underground and preparing to test in the atmosphere. The evidence, which was admittedly incomplete, was suppressed and sometimes even denied. During the Eisenhower administration the evidence was not suppressed in the personally punitive manner adopted by the succeeding administration, nor was it denied in the name of deliberate news management, but it was suppressed and denied nevertheless.

Senator Hickenlooper concluded that he hoped the nation could see clearly what it was getting into, and understand exactly the limitations and the very meager results that could come from this treaty at the moment. Given good faith on both sides he thought some progress might be possible, but he added: "I do not think we should blind ourselves to the drawbacks in trying to sell ourselves on the benefits which do not necessarily exist." This latter statement applied specifically to those eager witnesses who were trying to convince the nation it could believe what it wanted to believe. Had they convinced themselves on principle instead of on fact?

The exchanges between Senators Lausche and Hickenlooper, and Dr. York were especially significant. They indicated that the policies and attitudes of the McNamara Defense Department were not basically different from those of the previous one. Dr. York's mental reflexes revealed standard similarities in the thought patterns of scientists at the budget-balancing level as contrasted with most of those at the operational level. Further, Dr. York's confusion and contradictions emphasized the care with which previous witnesses, who espoused the same arguments, had prepared themselves.
Most interesting of all, Dr. York's strongest opinions were concerned with the lag in antiballistic missile development, for which he was to a considerable degree responsible. The lag could not be made up without further testing, and this was a basic reason for Dr. Teller's strong opposition to the treaty.

The Chairman, Senator Fulbright, showed more and more concern about Dr. Teller. He complained to Dr. York that on television emphasis was given to Dr. Teller's opposition to the treaty. He feared this might persuade some that the treaty had gone down the drain. For several minutes the Chairman tried to get Dr. York to say something against Dr. Teller, but without much success. The Chairman said Dr. Teller was upset the treaty would restrict the expansion of knowledge but that he seemed to be fascinated with the problem of weapons, especially antiballistic missiles, and resented any limits on investigation into this field. The Senator wanted to know if Dr. Teller had always been as positive in his views.

"Well," said Dr. York, "he always has been a devoted and singleminded person in this particular field. As I mentioned earlier, it was through his singlemindedness and devotion that we got things moving as rapidly as we did in the early fifties. He has remained the same."

Senator Fulbright went on and on. Was it true that Dr. Teller had refused to participate in the first atom bomb? If so, he had a high regard for his own opinion. Did Dr. Teller regard the hydrogen bomb as a "means of liberation, of freedom, of justice?" Did Dr. York so regard it? Dr. York replied only that he believed it necessary "that we have these weapons at the present time as a part of our deterrent forces." With reference to Dr. Teller, however, Dr. York saw him as possessing a narrower view because he had worked only with atomic weapons.
Senators Hickenlooper and Lausche felt called upon to help defend Dr. Teller. Said Senator Hickenlooper: "There was a connotation left, I believe, that Dr. Teller, since he now takes a position different from the administration, is not such a great scientist after all."\textsuperscript{241}

This only aroused Senator Fulbright the more, and the scholarly and sympathetic approach of his earlier questioning soon gave way to something more in the code of the Arkansas hills. He attacked Ray Scherer's television program as a "gross distortion" of the hearings and insisted Dr. York was a proper critic of Dr. Teller, since Dr. York was "not interested in this administration."

Here the Chairman let himself go:

"Who else is going to do it. He didn't say he isn't a good good scientist, but all scientists are also human beings and they have emotions and they have attachments. He was born in Hungary. I don't hold that against him. He has a great attachment to his home country. I don't hold that against him. He has had a very noted career in his well-publicized attack on Dr. Oppenheimer. That is not my affair, either. But I think all of these matters go into an evaluation of how sound his judgment is. I do not think there is anything improper in asking Dr. York how he evaluates Dr. Teller's testimony which has been given more publicity than all the other witnesses together before this committee."

All this was too much for Senator Hickenlooper. Very quickly and neatly he disqualified Dr. York's claim that he was not associated with the administration. In doing so he provided a fine object lesson in how deeply almost any scientist or academic administrator is involved with any administration.

This was the significant dialogue:

Senator Hickenlooper: "Dr. York, you are disassociated with the government now, is that correct?"
Dr. York: "I am a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

Senator Hickenlooper: "How much of the contracts at the University of California has the federal government right now? What is the total?"

Dr. York: "There are several hundred million dollars consisting primarily of the nuclear weapons laboratories."

Senator Hickenlooper: "So you are wired in with the government pretty expensively at the University of California?"

Dr. York: "Yes, I am. I have friends here and I do some consulting."

Senator Hickenlooper: "May I make it clear I don't think that has the slightest effect on your opinion, Dr. York...I think very highly of you and I have known you for a good many years. So you are connected with the government to that extent by way of several hundred million dollars worth of contracts. Be that as it may, I saw the Scherer program last night and I don't think it was particularly exaggerated."

The Chairman: "No. It agreed with you, it supported you."

Senator Hickenlooper: "And furthermore, I have never said I agreed with Dr. Teller 100 percent or 90 percent. I have listened to his testimony with great interest and I have given it great attention as I have Dr. Brown, just as I do Dr. York, and other eminent people in this field.... But I do notice, in looking at the television and radio and reading the news, the fantastic overplus of emphasis is that this treaty is the greatest thing that has ever presented before the American people...they are being encouraged to think it will do many things that it will not do. We have to live with that kind of emphasis on one side or the other and, on balance, I think the emphasis has been completely influenced in many ways by the handouts that come from the administration on this treaty. Thank you, Dr. York."
There would be no more personal attacks on Dr. Teller or other witnesses. Senator Hickenlooper would eventually vote for the treaty, and his vote, troubled and hesitant as it was, would be the most reassuring to the very small number who followed or read the hearings.
CHAPTER IV: WITNESSES SPEAK FOR CITIZEN GROUPS
AS THE HEARINGS CLOSE

Following Dr. York came Dr. Marshall Darrow Shulman, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts, and President of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies at Harvard. Dr. Shulman addressed himself to the problem of why the Russians wanted the treaty and explained it principally in terms of the evolution of policy toward "creative Marxism." In part said Dr. Shulman, this new policy was designed to remove the stimulus for further Western military appropriations and to reduce the level of Western military mobilization. Also, the new Russian policy was designed to inhibit the Western reliance on nuclear weapons. This was illustrated by Soviet protests against United States underground testing and against the transfer of nuclear warheads to Canadian territory. The Russians had already condemned these actions as contrary to the spirit of the treaty.\(^2\)\(^\text{3}\)

Dr. Shulman noted an increase in Soviet literature on what we call arms control and they call partial measures of disarmament. He said the Soviet manipulation of the international climate was aided by our tendency to indulge in wild swings of mood from extreme hope to the depth of despair. He hoped the treaty would not enhance this. He opposed any reservations that might endanger the treaty, and he feared that the establishment of mutual interest in the treaty was a value that might have got lost in the course of the hearings. Said
the Chairman: "It has got lost, as you noted in this morning's testimony; it is completely lost."244

EXPERT OPINION AND AN OPINIATED EXPERT:

MR. DEAN AND DR. KISTIAKOWSKY

Lost or not, the idea of mutual interest was discovered again in the outstanding and very informative testimony of Mr. Arthur H. Dean, our principal negotiator. It was too bad that almost all the Senators were absent, as the Chairman explained, at a conference on the railway labor bill. Only faithful Senator Hickenlooper was there to ask questions, but he did a good job of it. Mr. Dean began by discussing the treaty he had submitted to the Russians at Geneva one year earlier, and he introduced a copy of that treaty, corrected to the present one, in order to demonstrate some interesting changes that had been made in the course of the negotiations. Mr. Dean had even examined the reservations proposed by Admiral Strauss, and he explained very well why he opposed trying to achieve them. He explained, much better than the military witnesses, the value of the 100 megaton bomb as a terror weapon and also as a weapon to flood the cities of both coasts or to obliterate electronic communication and control.245

Mr. Dean advocated immediate denunciation of the treaty; if there is reasonable assurance of cheating and if we think our national security is at stake. Senator Hickenlooper spoke of his regret that the Senate found it awkward to amend the treaty. Mr. Dean recognized the Senate's complete right to do so but advised that changes would play into the hands of the Chinese and hamper further negotiations with the Russians.246
Mr. Dean agreed with the less optimistic scientists on the ominous significance of the Russian tests of 1961 and 1962. He told of an instance, which had been published in the press, involving Russian missiles: "They brought the second one down in practically the same place...although launched 35 minutes apart, within three minutes of the time the first one came down. Now all of the scientists in England and the United States said that showed they had developed remarkable controls over their--." At this point Senator Hickenlooper warned that he thought the subject was not declassified even though it had been in the papers.247

Mr. Dean indicated that with a gross national product well below half of ours, the Soviets manage to invest just as much in defense as we do, if not more.248 He said the Chinese think the Russians have become "fair, fat, and forty," are disturbed by the Russian interest in a higher standard of living, and are determined to capitalize on their own intermediate color through its appeal to the Africans.249 Mr. Dean hoped all precautions and preparations would be taken against failure of the treaty and concluded: "I think we ought, under no circumstances, to be lulled into any sense of security with the signing of this treaty."250 Ambassador Dean's formal statement to the committee is perhaps the most forthright and informative of all single documents about the treaty, its problems, and its critics.251

At the conclusion of Ambassador Dean's testimony the Chairman announced for the record that former President Harry Truman had written President Kennedy his complete agreement with the approval of the treaty by the Senate. Ex-President Hoover had asked to be
excused from comment because of ill health. General Eisenhower wrote a lengthy letter endorsing the treaty on the assumption that all the safeguards suggested by the Joint Chiefs would be maintained and with one special reservation that would provide that in the event of any armed aggression endangering a vital interest of the United States this nation would be the sole judge of the kind and type of weaponry and equipment it would employ. Not even Senator Dirksen could tell from this language whether General Eisenhower wanted a formal reservation. Perhaps the General, as was often the case, wanted it just as vague as he put it. More understandable was his warning against lighthearted claims made for the treaty, and his comment on the statement that he had proposed the same thing years before. General Eisenhower protested: "I now understand that later Soviet tests may have indicated important differences in the 1958 relative positions...In any event, the result of that earlier moratorium should not be forgotten...Communist leaders still regard duplicity and deceit as laudable and justifiable tactics." 252

The last scientist to testify as such was Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, Professor of Physical Chemistry at Harvard and scientific advisor to President Eisenhower during the last half of his last term. Since Dr. Kistiakowsky supported the treaty, the Chairman had no comments, such as he had made on Dr. Teller's origin, on the fact that Dr. Kistiakowsky had lived in Russia (Ukraine) until he was 26. Dr. Kistiakowsky said the treaty may prove to be an important first step toward a change in the international climate. 253 He considered Dr. Harold Brown the only witness so far heard who could speak with real authority regarding the total ARM problem,
and the related developments in offensive systems. He said Dr. Brown had access to all the intelligence regarding Soviet activities and all of the expertise in the United States on our future capabilities that relate to the problem. Whether or not nuclear scientists had produced the absolute weapon, they seem to have been accepted in some scientific quarters as universal men.\(^{254}\) Other items in Dr. Kistiakowsky's testimony were more debatable. He said policing a test ban really depended on how much we were willing to pay for the deployment of sensors. This was in contradiction to almost all other scientific testimony, and to that of our negotiators, all of whom had said sensors without inspection were unreliable.\(^{255}\)

Dr. Kistiakowsky assured the committee that during the Eisenhower test ban there was an improvement in the effectiveness of nuclear weapons research effort. This was contradictory to much of the testimony, especially that of Dr. Bradley and others who had been in charge of the laboratories. Perhaps Secretary McNamara might have agreed with Dr. Kistiakowsky that when the weapons development program during that period turned to extensive theoretical research involving the wider use of modern high-speed computers there was more progress than would have been accomplished through testing, but no other scientist who testified had taken such leave of reality.\(^{256}\)

Dr. Kistiakowsky enthusiastically subscribed to Dr. York's doctrine of the eternal superiority of the offensive, but he did admit in this connection that "when one looks into the future, scientists can also be as wrong as anybody, they are not a different breed of cats."\(^ {257}\)
During this testimony, Senator Hickenlooper seems to have been absent for once, and the Chairman returned to his personal attack on Dr. Teller. He asked: "Could you tell us the reasons, in your opinion, for Dr. Teller's dogmatic and very positive judgment...."

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was not qualified to penetrate another person's mind, but he tried. Dr. Teller, he said, must have reached a point where he was convinced that this project constituted a matter of life and death to the country. He said this was a very dignified explanation of Dr. Teller's position. When questioned concerning Dr. Stanley Ulam, another nuclear expert who was endorsing and supporting the treaty, Dr. Kistiakowsky said Dr. Ulam was a broader person.  

(Dr. Ulam's breadth was not easily achieved, as will be seen later.)

Dr. Kistiakowsky was as strongly in favor of massive retaliation as was Secretary McNamara. He boasted: "I am so confident of what we have and of the correctness of our evaluation of what they have that I am deeply convinced that in case of a so-called first strike on us by the Soviet Union, we will be able to retaliate with a devastating force." Although his wording was confused, Dr. Kistiakowsky was less defeatist than most witnesses: "We cannot survive, no free society could survive this kind of terrific devastation. But we as a nation will survive and we will militarily win."  

Like Dr. York ahead of him, Dr. Kistiakowsky was either ignorant of the facts concerning the large bomb or indifferent to them. Dr. York had said the "consensus" of the Department of Defense and the AEC was always against their development, but General LeMay and Dr. Libby showed that the policy against developing them had
been anything but a consensus. Dr. Kistiakowsky managed to relate these enormously large weapons to an unprovoked first strike, though he did not explain how the lack of provocation would make any difference. "To people who are trying to create a deterrent, a retaliatory force, these weapons are not attractive, because the means of delivery are so awkward, so huge, that they are difficult to protect." This statement contradicted other testimony. It also ignored the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had desired the weapons for some time and the Air Force, which had created the deterrent force, had always considered these weapons useful.

Dr. Kistiakowsky's respect for Communist responsibility and sensitivity corresponded to that animosity of scientists and amateur diplomatists. When Senator Pastore asked if potentially decisive knowledge acquired by the Russians might have caused them to seek a test ban treaty the scientist replied: "Oh, no, sir, I am certain that this thought has never occurred to any of the sensible competent Soviet leaders." He thought the Russians would never break the treaty by abrogating and starting to test right away because, in his words, "the political disadvantages of the bad odor of what they have done will persist." Dr. Kistiakowsky then provided a sounder reason for optimism by saying: "I don't think any President of the United States accepts, and that is fortunate, the advice of scientists a hundred percent." His most sweeping opinion on the treaty, like that of most "detente" enthusiasts, amounted almost to an eventual abandonment of it. He expected that no such treaty could exist in a vacuum by itself indefinitely, and that it would either be abrogated or followed by more far reaching agreements.
He was so sure of this that he was unworried about the treaty's elimination of the peaceful Plowshare program. It would last only a few years, he thought.

COMMON CONSENT AND UNCOMMON ADVICE FROM VARIED GROUPS OF CITIZENS

Dr. Kistiakowsky was followed by someone considerably more experienced in the arena of human conflict if not in the chemistry of weapons, Mr. George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. Mr. Meany wasted few words. This limited agreement, he said, could serve as a first step toward the assurance of world peace only if our country and its democratic allies develop ever greater unity of purpose, and an overwhelming capacity for self defense. "We of the trade union movement are realists" he explained. "We hate war. We are for peace, but not at any price--never at the price of losing our freedom, never at the cost of submitting to communism or any other type of tyranny." Mr. Meany commended President Kennedy for being very cautious in his plea for ratification. He recalled it was Karl Marx who said that the Russian bear is never so dangerous as when he embraces you. "We all know," Mr. Meany concluded,

"that there can never be a genuine disarmament without effective mobile on-site inspection. But the Communists, to date, have given no indication that they will ever accept such international supervision and control. Armaments in themselves do not necessarily cause world tension or lead to war. In fact, the reverse is true...When two contestants face each other and one of these contestants is bent on destroying the other it would be fatal for the latter to shun an arms race. If the democracies in the years 1933 to 1938 had built up their arms, if they had
really raced with and beaten Hitler in building up their arms, mankind would, in all probability, have been spared World War II...we should not forget the lesson of the late 1930's."

Following Mr. Meany was Representative John R. Pillion of the 39th District of New York, a persistent foe of the treaty. (It was Mr. Pillion who had been threatened with the "mother vote" during an outburst of negotiator Harriman's anger a few days earlier.) He saw the treaty as an act of nuclear disarmament and he pointed out: "This Nation's Army, Navy, and Air Force are built around the maximum utilization of nuclear fire power...A mutual disarmament of nuclear power would immediately give to the Soviets a clear superiority of manpower, firepower, and conventional military might." Nobody wanted to ask him any questions about this embarrassing problem. The next witness would bring up happier subjects for discussion.

He was Donald G. Brennan, President of the Hudson Institute, accompanied by Freeman J. Dyson, of the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, representing the Federation of American Scientists. Neither of the Institutes adopts public policy positions, said these spokesmen. The Federation of American Scientists did have a position. It believed that failure to ratify would be a national catastrophe. Mr. Brennan's views on offense and defense resemble those of Dr. York, but he introduced a refinement that would have saved the latter some contradictions. Mr. Brennan said if offensive technology were to remain static at today's level then almost surely one could install antiballistic missile systems that would be highly effective. If the defensive system were then to remain fixed one could improve offensive missiles and penetrate easily. Surely Dr. York would have had to agree with this as a more complete
statement of reality than was his own pseudo-military formula
worship. The trouble was, of course, that even Dr. Teller could
agree with Dr. Brennan's statement. Despite the confidence of
Doctors York and Kistiakowsky, many scientists as well as many mili-
tary men were worried by the fact that the Russians had an ABM sys-
tem while we had none, and that we would be handicapped by the
treaty in achieving what the Russians had already achieved.

Despite their support for the treaty, Brennan and Dyson dis-
agreed with some of the more political-minded scientists supporting
the treaty. These witnesses were actually clever. Chairman Ful-
bright remarked that a surprising number of nuclear scientists and
of scientific witnesses before his committee were not born in this
country. Also, he noted, the principal contributors to the devel-

"Why do you think this is so?" asked the Senator. "Are you
more inquisitive or more belligerent than Americans?" Dr. Dyson
brought laughter with his reply: "There are simply more of us, I
think." 269

The following witness, Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, spoke for her-
self against the treaty as representing an escalation of appeasment
and she managed to discomfit a Senator. When she wished to ask a
question Senator Sparkman said that ordinarily the questions flowed
in the other direction, but he allowed her to go ahead. Mrs. Schlafly
wanted to know: "How can you keep us militarily strong if this
treaty is the first step toward disarmament? What does disarmament
mean if it does not mean dismantling our strength?"
Senator Sparkman's response showed that he regretted permitting the lady to ask so difficult a question:

"Of course, any idea of disarmament—any program of that kind would be far off in the future and certainly I believe, and I have always believed, that we not only can but that me must work out some kind of program...or else we simply can't go on indefinitely increasing our budget...building up tremendous stockpiles of weapons, building high tension at the same time, but I don't think this is a point to argue."^70

For the next witnesses there was no answer other than disarmament. Mr. Arthur Watson of Wm. Penn College and Mr. Edward Snyder represented the Friends (Quakers). Their plea was simple enough: Peace, and Hope. They considered even 5 nuclear powers preferable to 15, and hoped that perhaps France and China would not develop a full nuclear capability.271 Mr. Paul Weaver of the Church of the Brethren agreed. Daniel Dekin, M.D., represented an organization called Physicians for Social Responsibility and was alarmed about the possibility of future testing, especially without the treaty, and the fallout problems that might occur. Francis Wilcox, of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, represented the National Council of the Churches of Christ in America, which favored the treaty and opposed the arms race. Mr. Wilcox, interestingly enough, had been Assistant Secretary of State at the time of President Eisenhower's late lamented moratorium.272

Herman Reissig of the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ made a definite statement in favor of the treaty which contained some frank and interesting comments. He said force has a necessary place in the relations between nations, as well as within the nation. His church had not advocated
unilateral disarmament or, what amounts to the same thing, a one-sided reduction in arms. Some members of his denomination were pacifists, on what they believed to be Christian grounds, but most were not. As many others had done, Mr. Reissig slipped into a contradiction by opposing the development of more effective weapons. (Such a policy would, in effect, be unilateral disarmament.) Mr. Reissig said "the search for security through the development of ever more sophisticated weapons is an illusion." This much was in agreement with Secretary McNamara in some of his more philosophical sallies, but Mr. Reissig parted company with the Secretary's repeated threats of massive retaliation. He saw a growing consensus among leading Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish ethical thinkers that massive counter-cities warfare could not be supported by the moral conscience. Mr. Reissig's argument, taken as a whole, was one of the most tightly reasoned and best stated of all those favoring the treaty.  

Mr. Matthew Meselson, of the Council for a Livable World (at Harvard), also made an effective statement for the treaty and predicted that in undecided nations, the test ban treaty would greatly strengthen the hands of those who argue against building nuclear bombs. 

More support for the treaty came from James B. Carey of the Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, who asked what had happened to atoms for peace and quoted Pope John XXIII, Albert Schweitzer and Walter Reuther as favoring the treaty. Mr. Edward Behre, of the Cooperative League, thought "the flexing of nuclear muscles...is at very best a race which will deplete us economically and throw us up exhausted on some totalitarian beach" only to be
followed by a Mr. Robert Morris, of Dallas, who noted with approval that the safeguards demanded by the Joint Chiefs were more drastic than the current posture of the Department of Defense.

When this last witness had concluded the Chairman said

"This concludes the public hearings, so far as I know. We have had I believe 44 witnesses—government witnesses, invited witnesses, and public witnesses. From here on we will have executive sessions. The committee itself chose some 12 experts without reference to their attitude. As you well know, we have had a fair balance between those who opposed the treaty and those who approved of it." 275

Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m. on August 28, 1963, the committee was recessed, having discussed, both evasively and frankly, the most momentous issues and the most awesome dangers ever to face a nation.

During its deliberations the committee had received a number of communications, some of which were pertinent to the debate. Norman Thomas, in the course of what he called testimony for the treaty, which was mostly a criticism of its critics, listed some of its most unpopular opponents and accused all opponents of aiding communism. In a striking example of guilt by artificial association Thomas charged: "Its opponents are a curiously assorted company: Mao Tse-Tung, de Gaulle, the John Birchers, the editors of the National Review, and Dr. Teller. Should they prevail—which I do not anticipate—communism at its worst will score a tremendous victory." 276

John P. Roche, National Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action repeated an old slander which had been mentioned, apologetically, in the hearings by Senator Fulbright and immediately refuted by Dr. Teller. Mr. Roche put it in parentheses in his statement, apparently to indicate a whisper: "(Drs. Ulam and Teller together hold a secret patent on the device that made the H-bomb..."
More original was Mr. Roche's suggestion: "We should turn from nuclear competition...to other sorts of conflict...with the U.S.S.R. This could range from folk-singing contests to guerilla warfare." James G. Patton of the National Farmers Union provided enthusiastic approval of the treaty:

"Our country has a stockpile of bombs sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union many times over. Those responsible for our security have assured us that they deliberately chose the manufacture of medium-sized bombs rather than the 50- and 100-megaton variety. The military has assured us that the prohibition of atmospheric testing in no way will slow down the antimissile program."

All this showed that Mr. Patton had followed the hearings, even if not very thoroughly. He could scarcely be blamed for confusing Secretary McNamara with the military or for the usual bewilderment as to just who is really responsible for our security. Famed nuclear physicist Dr. Leo Szilard, a passionate proponent of nuclear disarmament, predicted as evil a fate for the treaty as did any of its opponents:

"If the Government proceeded with an extensive program of underground bomb testing, then, rather than furthering the cause of peace, the test ban agreement would be likely to do just the opposite. By engaging in this type of testing on a large scale the United States would force the Soviet Union to conduct numerous bomb tests also. The underground testing of bombs is very expensive, however, and since the Soviet Union is economically much weaker than the United States, it would in the long run be forced to abrogate the agreement. Such a turn of events would prove my old friend and distinguished colleague, Dr. Edward Teller, to have been right--for the wrong reasons...If I were a member of the Senate, I think I would want to know at this point how the Government proposes to follow up the conclusion of the test ban agreement before casting my vote for the ratification of the agreement."
Most Senators did want to know how the government proposed to follow up the treaty, and it was for what Dr. Szilard would have called the wrong reasons. A less polite scientist, Dr. Hans Bethe, an advisor who was once over-optimistic about the possibility of detecting underground tests, wrote to the Chairman to say that he, Dr. Bethe, knew Dr. Teller to be no expert on ballistic missiles.281

Finally, one of the most experienced of all military men, Admiral Arthur Radford, a longtime Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, penned his misgivings:

"Military men whose responsibilities include the defense and security of our country are worried about this treaty...Almost certainly it is an agreement that will ultimately result in the USSR obtaining important advantages in the development of more advanced atomic weapons with all the disadvantages this implies for us. The treaty is imprecise...The security of the free world has depended since World War II upon the atomic deterrent possessed by the United States of America. The free world will continue to depend upon it until it fails us or the USSR is willing to accept international inspection and control in a treaty to reduce armaments. Our free world allies who have signed and who will sign this test ban treaty, are doing so because they trust us for they cannot possibly understand the pros and cons of atomic weapon development. The decision of the Senate of the United States in connection with this treaty will change world history, either way it goes."282

It is, of course, too early to say that the unhappy predictions of Dr. Szilard, Dr. Teller, and Admiral Radford were wrong. It is, as yet, too early to say their predictions of disastrous abrogation were right. If they should be proved right, it may be interesting for some survivor to record whether Dr. Szilard, the treaty's gloomy advocate, or Dr. Teller and Admiral Radford, its alarmed opponents, had the right reasons for predicting its failure.
CHAPTER V: THE OFFSTAGE ANTI-HEARING

While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was conducting its hearings on the test ban, the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee was doing the same thing in a somewhat different manner. All of the hearings of the Preparedness Subcommittee were secret, while only a portion of the Foreign Relations Committee hearings had been held behind closed doors. A veteran and respected Senate Democrat, Stennis of Mississippi, was chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee.

Because it was responsible for recommendations on national defense measures and the very high defense budgets since 1950, the Preparedness Subcommittee was important. Because it was important it contained a high proportion of senior senators which naturally included a number of Southern Democrats. Some of the senators on the Committee held reserve commissions in one of the military services. All of the members were on familiar terms with the Service Chiefs and other high-ranking military officers, and in most cases their contacts with these men had inspired the highest mutual confidence.

Extended hearings on military matters in the Preparedness Subcommittee had brought an understanding of military problems and views, and even of military terminology. This was not true of Senator Fulbright’s committee, a somewhat more scholarly and theoretical group, most of whom tended to regard all military men, foreign and domestic, with vague suspicion. The inadvertent and sometimes troublesome involvement of military men in foreign policy had not lessened these tendencies.
Senator Fulbright in particular had launched several attacks against what he considered to be the dangers of the military point of view and of military men in general. This feeling came to be mutual, for in the Potomac area frictions are not entirely avoidable. Criticism by that portion of the press and public which is often called conservative and patriotic only added to Senator Fulbright's increasingly anti-military bent. This comment from the Chicago Tribune is an example:

"Since the Fulbright memorandum, gagging military officers, was drafted two years ago, the military has labored under a standing warning not to impede 'public acceptance of the President's program and leadership.' Disarmament negotiations were specifically mentioned as one subject in which they were not to interfere."

During the Senate debate on the test ban treaty, Senator Fulbright provided another example of his attitude, this time in an amusing vein. He gave what a Baltimore Sun reporter called a sardonic speech, describing how seagulls usually avoid mortal combat by pulling grass as a ceremonial expression of hostility and suggesting that military men might well follow the same procedure.

This was a form of humor appreciated on a campus or among Fulbright scholars, but American military leaders did not regard combat or its avoidance as funny and ridiculous. No military man on active duty could reply to the Senator, but retired General Albert C. Wedemeyer, author of the famous "Wedemeyer Report" on China in the late 1940's, provided a rather heavy rebuttal. In a letter to Senator Curtis, Wedemeyer referred to Senator Fulbright's further comment that military men have neither the capability nor the responsibility of considering economic and political factors.
The General went on to say: "We have fought and won two wars at great sacrifice of life and treasure. In each case we have lost the peace, primarily because our political leaders and their representatives were naive, trusting and inept. The Versailles Treaty, Yalta, Teheran, Potsdam, Korea and Cuba were the products of political minds, not military."

General Wedemeyer noted that Senator Fulbright had engaged in levity when he suggested emulating seagulls and engaging only in ceremonial combat. He recalled that he had told his combat troops they were fighting to protect their heritage of freedom and to give similar opportunities to other peoples. He concluded: "If United States senators taunt military leaders and make light of a terrible threat to the security of the United States, what is there left to defend?" 284

General Wedemeyer's response may have been as strained as Senator Fulbright's humor, since he and other military leaders certainly felt there is more in America to defend than Senator Fulbright and his views. Nevertheless the exchange helps to explain why there were two hearings, and why the conclusions derived by the two committees were contradictory.

The Foreign Relations Committee sent the treaty to the Senate floor on a 16 to 1 vote urging adoption. The Preparedness Subcommittee held an opposite view. With only two dissenting votes, it concluded that the Soviets had surpassed us in high-yield nuclear weapons, that their knowledge of weapons effects and defenses was superior to ours, and that "under the terms of the treaty it is entirely possible that they will draw even with us in low-yield
weapon technology."

It is only prudent, said the Preparedness Subcommittee, to assume that high-yield tests had given the Soviets superior knowledge on blast shock, communications blackout, and radiation and electromagnetic pulse effects. Commenting that the treaty would cancel 12 to 20 tests scheduled and regarded as essential by our scientists, the Subcommittee warned that the U.S. will be unable to verify the ability of its warheads to penetrate against defensive nuclear attack, or of its hardened sites to survive close-in high yield nuclear explosions. The report noted that the Joint Military Chiefs had agreed to support the treaty only with certain safeguards, and added that no safeguards can provide the benefits of testing. 285

The findings of the Stennis Committee were not a complete surprise. Proponents of the treaty had regarded its work with misgivings. As early as August 26, Columnist Marquis Childs had complained "this has been a kind of private sideshow, with secret testimony given out from time to time." 286 There were to be many more objections to this committee and its secrecy, despite journalist Chalmers Robert's placing of the blame where it unavoidably lay. "Committee members," said Roberts, "Will tell you that what is known as a sanitized version of much of the testimony could have been made public. That is, a version eliminating figures on such things as nuclear weapons or precise details of what we know of Soviet weapons. The Administration should have insisted that such versions of its official testimony be made public." The trouble is, Roberts explained, that the Administration is obsessed with the security bug. 287 In reality, the trouble was considerably more than security.
The simple fact was that Subcommittee hearing was the only remaining sanctuary where military men could express views that had not been censored by their civilian superiors. This was possible only when the testimony was secret. All statements had to be examined by Mr. McNamara's censors, who determined what portion of the testimony could be released to the public.

The Subcommittee was not appealing directly to the public, although apparent leaks of some testimony indicated a desire to influence opinion. Most committee members were trying to get at the bottom of a problem concerning which they already had considerable knowledge. They also wanted to hear knowledgeable testimony against the treaty, partly to counterbalance the efforts of Senator Fulbright and his committee toward getting the treaty ratified in a rush. As a result of this conflict of purposes, the Fulbright Committee called more witnesses favorable to the treaty, while the Stennis Committee called more witnesses who had doubts. Outstanding among the latter were General Thomas Power, of the Strategic Air Command, and General Bernard Schreiver of the Air Force Systems Command.

Both General Power and General Schreiver voiced their misgivings about the effects of the treaty on the relative strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union. Power, always outspoken, was now especially so. He knew that he was out of favor with the Administration and that his days of active service were already numbered. He attacked the whole philosophy of trying to disarm and maintain superiority at the same time. He said we had in the past depended upon military superiority which "resulted in this country being around today," and said he would be wary of any new philosophy.
Power attacked the overkill theorists for their lack of knowledge of military requirements, said he knew many of them personally, and knew their conclusions came easily, from a lack of knowledge and an absence of responsibility. He did not expect the U.S. would maintain indefinitely the nuclear strength necessary to deter attack if it adopted the vague goal of parity proposed by the treaty.²⁸⁸

Though he was not as famous as General Power, General Schreiver gave testimony that was equally pertinent and considerably more sacrificial. As a Colonel, Schreiver had pushed for the development of long-range missiles against the reluctance of General LeMay. His scientific knowledge and management skills had contributed immeasurably toward overtaking the Soviet lead in missiles during the mid-1950's. He told the committee in closed session that he felt he could carry out his mission to develop and procure major weapons systems better without the treaty than with it. While he believed our missiles could survive a first strike, "we could never be certain...if there is a prohibition on atmospheric testing."²⁸⁹

To a knowledgeable person, such a statement was no more than simple honesty, but since the Administration had already demonstrated quite pointedly that no such dissent would be tolerated even in a congressional committee, it was generally assumed in Washington that advancement and recognition for this brilliant and fast-rising officer would henceforth be minimal. This did indeed prove to be the case.

During the hearings, the humorist, Art Buchwald, wrote a newspaper column on how military men who dared to speak their minds, even under congressional questioning, were quite ceremoniously
steered along the road to oblivion. Despite this well-established practice, Schreiber, perhaps because of his high standing in the scientific and industrial community, was allowed to keep his important job.

The former Chief of Naval Operations, who had not been allowed to keep his job, also testified before the Preparedness Subcommittee. Admiral George W. Anderson was the most celebrated example of what could happen to an officer who dared to differ, even in private, with any of the views of the Secretary of Defense. One newspaper suggested that the new term "Portugalled" might survive, but Anderson's appointment as Ambassador to Lisbon was too attractive to enlist much sympathy, regardless of its comparative importance. This appointment was President Kennedy's method of supporting his most prominent Secretary McNamara, in the least objectionable manner. (According to Washington Columnist Jack Anderson, the break between Admiral Anderson and Secretary McNamara had become overt when the Admiral hesitated to order a warship moved to tidy-up a chart which was being observed by the Secretary.) Admiral Anderson managed to endorse the treaty, but with the same reservations and safeguards as those demanded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was scarcely surprising since he had so recently been a member of that body.290

Admiral Arleigh Burke, who preceded Anderson as Chief of Naval Operations, was less cooperative. He told the Preparedness Subcommittee that the treaty was a dangerous departure from the principle of proof-testing all weapons and said the treaty should have provided for inspection and enforcement. He conceded the treaty would be ratified, but he insisted the nation would regret it. As
had Admiral Anderson, he pointed out that reference to territorial waters in the treaty, if not more precisely worded, would allow the Soviets to test under waters which are considered high seas by other countries.  

Another plain-spoken opponent of the treaty was Retired Air Force General Nathan F. Twining, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Senator Symington, who was the only member of the Subcommittee to support the treaty other than Senator Saltonsall, revealed that General Twining had modestly disclaimed competence to testify on political or other considerations but had said the treaty would be a mistake from a military standpoint. General Twining explained that the Soviets had made enormous progress in exploding huge nuclear bombs which could provide them with important knowledge for anti-missile design and could also provide information concerning the mysterious effects of very large weapons.  

If President Kennedy was annoyed by what was going on in the Preparedness Subcommittee, he had the grace and the wisdom to hide it. Hiding annoyance was not one of Senator Fulbright's virtues, and he was especially put out by reports coming from the Stennis group. It was Senator Robertson (Dem.-Va.) who brought the dispute into the open on the Senate floor. There the equally irritable Senator Robertson accused Senator Fulbright of playing down the testimony of the military experts. Fulbright denied this, and countered by saying that the Stennis Preparedness Subcommittee had no business holding hearings on a treaty that came within the jurisdiction of his own committee.
Senator Robertson did not dispute the Foreign Relations Committee's primary interest in treaties, but he said American negotiators in Moscow had urged that Fulbright's hearings be started ahead of the Stennis investigation so that the public would get a favorable first view of the treaty. Fulbright replied he did not believe it proper for Stennis to receive testimony from "former military men who now have no responsibility for the security of this country." This left out of condemnation the testimony of Generals Power and Schreiber who had opposed the treaty while on active duty. Later in the day, Senator Sparkman filled this gap by interjecting that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the treaty, "I don't see why we should talk to some subordinate officers."  

Here Senator Thurmond (Dem.-S.C.) cleared up the question of responsibility for the disputed secrecy by condemning Pentagon censorship which prevented any release of the full military arguments against the treaty. He protested that if all the military testimony in the secret files of the subcommittee were made public, every man, woman, and child in the United States would be against the treaty. This remark scarcely matched Fulbright's prior statement that since everyone of significance had endorsed the treaty, even a ten year old child would support it. On the same level was a remark by Senator Clark that Senators opposing the treaty were conservative members of the Armed Services Committee who were used to hearing military demands for more and bigger arms.

In contrast to Senator Clark's view was that of Senator Lausche. The Ohio Senator objected that members of the Foreign Relations Committee were not permitted to consult and seek the advice of the
members of the Senate Armed Services and Atomic Energy Committees, who knew most about the impact of the treaty on national security.

Senator Lausche, one of the few members of the Foreign Relations Committee who attended faithfully and questioned patiently, complained of being called upon to vote three weeks after the President sent to the Senate a treaty of historic importance. He said that accompanying this stampede there was a publicity barrage from Administration sources, stressing the theme that an overwhelming vote of approval was certain and calculated to push doubtful Senators into a what's-the-use attitude. The Senator said he found most of his flood of letters to be from people swayed by emotion. The writers did not know the evidence. "How could they?" he asked. "Almost two-thirds of the Senate had not heard the evidence."

Senator Fulbright's method of conducting the hearing, said Senator Lausche, caused all Senators to be interrupted in their questioning after ten minutes, so that complete development of an issue was impossible. It was necessary to wait as much as six hours to resume a line of questioning, and most gave up. In the final days only Fulbright and two or three other senators were present. The Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, on the other hand, questioned at length many witnesses who could be given only spasmodic interrogation under the Fulbright ten-minute rule.

Senator Lausche concluded that the nation had been committed to such lengths that to reject the treaty would require serious explanation and "Under these circumstances," he concluded, "I resent its being railroaded through the committee without time to consult our own Senate experts who know most about its military aspects."
On the morning following Senator Robinson's clash with Senator Fulbright in the chamber, the Washington Post supported the latter in a pointed editorial that employed Fulbright's own language in saying the Preparedness Subcommittee "had no business" holding simultaneous hearings. The editorial went further to charge that opposition to the treaty seemed inspired by indignation against President Kennedy and all his works. The Post said, "notably they are Southern Democrats." Carefully, the Post added: "To charge that the treaty is opposed in punishment for the President's stand would be to libel the demonstrated patriotism of these distinguished senators. But obviously the bitterness engendered from the one is carrying over into the other."296

To justify this bitter editorial would not be easy. It overlooked the fact that the most searching doubts about arguments favoring the treaty had been expressed in the hearings by Senator Lausche and by Western Republicans. Nevertheless, the fact that the Preparedness Subcommittee contained so many Southern Senators definitely detracted from its influence at the moment. It was neither the first nor the last time in American history that the race problem in the South would confuse other issues and prove a persistent handicap to Southerners.

The same Washington Post Editorial indicated, however, that questions raised in the hearings had served to dispel some of the much-feared euphoria which the treaty's friends and foes alike had agreed was bad.

The Post said: "Quite frankly we are not 100 percent persuaded that this treaty will accomplish any great benefit for the United States. But...we cannot see that it threatens any serious harm."
Having displayed this reasonableness the Post tended to spoil it by concluding that "The virtual filibuster now in progress in the Senate is an embarrassment to President Kennedy...it should be ended." Aside from the fact that many Senators would be forced to vote with no real understanding of this stupendous problem and that their responsibility was just as constitutional and as inescapable as that of the President, there were yet other considerations, as we shall see. What was going on in the Senate was not one tenth as enlightening as the hearings, which few had attended and few would read, but it was by no means a filibuster. It was a faltering and often bewildered discussion of an issue far greater than the treaty.
CHAPTER VI: THE CONTRAPUNTAL CHORUS ON CAPITOL HILL

The test ban hearings before Senate committees were followed by two weeks of speeches for and against the treaty in the Senate chamber. The speeches were far less dramatic, despite the oratory. The Administration had steered the treaty past its most formidable detractors and into the calm waters of comparative consensus. Doubts about the final outcome had been stilled. What happened in the Senate after that was largely ceremonial, but it was a necessary and important ceremony. Only a few speeches were revealing. Most of them were just for the record.

One news magazine observed that usually there were less than a dozen Senators on the floor and few spectators in the gallery as the Senators read prepared statements, yet the further comment that debate was a "lackadaisical affair" seems scarcely justified. There were several moments of considerable interest and a few that revealed basic issues which were much broader than the treaty.

During the hearings only a few Senators had followed the testimony with sufficient regularity to learn very much. Few, if any, took time to study the testimony as Senator Lausche had done. Along with the press and the public, they were distracted by many other things, including the war in Viet Nam, which for the first time seemed to be getting out of Mr. McNamara's customary control. Despite the slump in public interest, the Senator who had worked hardest found his job was not finished. Senator Fulbright, in the Senate as in the Committee room, was responsible for keeping the ratification parade on the move in the right direction. Stuart Loory, in the New York Herald Tribune, described the Senator's increasing fatigue as the debate wore on:
"As he prepared to open the great debate of 1963... Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and a former Rhodes Scholar, was confidence personified. Nothing, it seemed, could rattle this man. Not even the fact that,...a mere half-dozen Senators were in their seats to listen to his low-keyed, scholarly foot-noted presentation."

By Wednesday, said Loory, Senator Fulbright seemed a bit bored as his colleague, Senator Church (Dem.-Idaho), droned through a written presentation. Suddenly, Senator Fulbright jumped to his feet and called for order. There was only one other Senator on the floor, Senator Russell, who was quietly talking to a clerk. On the following day, further friction developed between the two. Senator Russell objected that "some Senators" had lost interest in the rights of the Senate.

When Senator Fulbright demanded, "Was the Senator referring to me?" Russell answered: "Not specifically; if the Senator wishes to crawl under the mantle he may do so. The Senate rules prohibit me from referring to the Senator directly in that regard. However, there is no rule in the Senate which prohibits the Senator from assuming the role."

The trouble was that Senator Fulbright was under pressure from the White House to get the debate over with and the treaty ratified before the President's scheduled speech at the United Nations. The Senate was getting tired of being pushed. It was not being obstructionist, in fact it was acting rather hurriedly for a matter of such import. No explanation of the President's impatience was offered at the time, and it was scarcely justified by history. John Hay, who was Secretary of State under McKinley, once remarked that a treaty entering the Senate was like a bull entering the arena; no one expected
it to come out alive. The Senate had become much less lethal. The nuclear test ban treaty would be the 623rd treaty between the U. S. and a foreign power. No treaty had been rejected for a generation. 299

President Kennedy's difficulties were as nothing compared to those of earlier presidents. The high-pressure hearings had made the Senate debate an anti-climax in which the Senators, said journalist Loory, "put forth their reasons for assuming preconceived positions....The proponents repeat over and over again all the arguments the Kennedy administration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the majority of the scientists testifying used in supporting the treaty. The opponents rehash the testimony of...the principal critics of the treaty." 300

At the beginning of the debate, Senator Mansfield (Dem.-Montana) opened the case for the treaty. He was supported by a 16-1 Foreign Relations Committee recommendation for its passage. (Only Senator Russell Long dissented.) Senator Mansfield's language was a bit fulsome: "This treaty is but a slender strand of hope drawn painfully from the web of conflicting interests, hideous fears and fatuous and immature arrogances out of which are spun the relations of nations in our times...this treaty is a feeble candle. It is a flicker of light where there has been no light." 301

Senator Margaret Chase Smith (Rep.-Maine), a member of the Preparedness Subcommittee which had just issued an unfavorable report on the treaty, spoke briefly and more to the point: "I ask if Russia, through a series of massive, sophisticated and impressive tests with which it broke a 3½-month moratorium, has achieved military superiority." 302
It had been five years, almost to the day, since President Eisenhower had announced that the United States was willing to negotiate an agreement banning atomic tests. That offer was accepted by Premier Khrushchev, and the prolonged Geneva disarmament negotiations opened shortly afterward.

The role of ex-President Eisenhower in this new test ban treaty debate was minor. He made a statement about the advisability of a reservation. This statement was finally interpreted by Senator Dirksen as imprecise language which did not really call for a formal reservation to the treaty. There was no opposition to the treaty which could be called Republican, although Senator Goldwater was a very active opponent.

During the formal debate, Senator Goldwater pointed out that an important difference between the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Secretary of Defense had been overlooked. The former conceded the treaty would be harmful militarily, while the Secretary claimed its military values were substantial. No one else appeared surprised by Secretary McNamara's unique military enthusiasm for the President's treaty. After all, he was a political appointee and not a military man.

Senator Goldwater made a prophetic statement about his own political difficulties. In an impassioned speech against the treaty he said: "If it means political suicide to vote for my country and against this treaty, I commit it gladly. It is not my future that concerns me. It is my country--and what my conscience tells me is how best I may serve it." No one questioned Senator Goldwater's sincerity, and his willingness to commit political suicide in support of his personal views was soon demonstrated.
Other Republican Senators spoke for or against the treaty in less significant fashion, although Senator Dirksen was trying hard when he said he would not want it written on his epitaph that he knew what happened at Hiroshima but refused to take some step that might help avert a nuclear war. Senator Hickenlooper, a conscientious questioner at the hearings, deplored the fact that the Foreign Relations Committee had not been kept informed of the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence leading up to the treaty but he was no longer interested in it and finally decided to vote for the treaty. Republican Senator Curtis of Nebraska refused to be converted. No one rose to debate with him after he said undiplomatically: "When we have a parade of nations not possessing a pop-gun, an air rifle, or a cherry bomb, coming in and solemnly swearing that they will not set off a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, there is something about the procedure that is tainted with hypocrisy."

Republicans were not President Kennedy's problem. Some were very useful in their support for the treaty. Washington Columnist Murray Marder observed the Teller arguments were overwhelmed by the Administration with a mighty assist from former Eisenhower Administration officials. The President's trouble was principally with Democrats, and his biggest disappointment was Senator Russell, whom he had come to respect as a fellow Senator.

At the end of August, Senator Russell seemed to be taking a fatalistic attitude: "I guess it will pass. The Senate is in a position where it can't very well reject it." Just a week later he and Senator Stennis announced they would vote "no." According to Scripps-Howard Columnist R. H. Shackford "Senator Russell's decision
was a special disappointment and surprise.... A week ago the Administration optimistically hoped only a dozen or so Senators would vote against the treaty. But with the Russell-Stennis announcement Friday, alarm bells began to ring. To bolster support for the treaty, the President had an urgent conference with Senate party leaders Mansfield and Dirksen on Sept. 9, and made a television appearance on the evening of the same day.

Washington Post Columnists Evans and Novak, generally considered Administration insiders, advised against confusing Senator Russell, the Southern segregationist, with Senator Russell, the respected expert on national defense. The power of the first was regional while the latter, though the same man, wielded a pervasive power not limited to his colleagues from the South. In 1954, for example, "it was Russell who called a halt to the well-advanced plan of the Eisenhower Administration to intervene in Indo-China. When President Eisenhower summoned Russell to the White House to sound him out, the Senator came down hard against U.S. action. That was the end of it, so weighty was his power in the Senate."

Russell's opposition to the treaty was primarily psychological and philosophical rather than technological. This placed it in direct opposition to the President rather than to Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, and other experts who furnished analytical and statistical support for the treaty. The President did not pose as a technician but as a man of peace and hope, and in this attitude he was joined by most Senators. Senator Russell, on the other hand, was the voice of experience and caution. He opposed the treaty on the ground that it provided a false hope which would weaken the spirit of sacrificial
resistance against communist pressures around the world. The President saw the treaty as a first step toward further agreements; Senator Russell saw it as a first step toward unjustified concessions and unequal disarmament that would lead to weakness and invite attack.

Senator Russell, far better than most of those who participated in the debate, understood that the treaty itself was not the basic issue. It was related to the basic problem only as the Fugitive Slave Act, for instance, was related to the Civil War. After ten years as chairman of the prestigious Armed Services Committee, Senator Russell's thorough and thoughtful approach to national security issues was so highly respected that if he had decided to go all out against the treaty on national security grounds there was no telling how many votes he would influence. 310

Perhaps it was fortunate that Senator Russell chose to continue his usual policy of restraint. At this time all Senators who refused to advocate Federal desegregation were handicapped in their national influence except, strangely, Senator Fulbright. There could have been considerable bitterness, at least, if Russell's attack had been more specific or personal. As it was, his fear that a series of hopeful gestures would lead to weakness was bound to be defeated by the President's hope that they would lead to peace.

The mood of the times remained optimistic, despite the recent failure of President Eisenhower's optimism on Russian nuclear deployment. No disaster had resulted, as yet. By hedging against failure with a hopefully fool-proof treaty, the President made optimism appear more soundly based. As it turned out, neither the hopes of President Kennedy and the fears of Senator Russell were to prove justified, at least not within the next few years.
The net effect of Senator Russell's opposition was to increase the "no" votes from a dozen or less to some twenty. Evans and Novak suggested this would prove "enough to inform the Russians of the high level of suspicion about their intentions," but too few to interfere with ratification. This outcome was satisfactory to most of the treaty's supporters, but it was far from satisfactory to President Kennedy and many of his closest advisors, as we shall see.
CHAPTER VII: WITH BATON AND CATTLE-PROD:

THE ROLE OF THE CONSENSUSMASTER

The test ban treaty agreement with Khrushchev and its rapid ratification by the Senate is said to be the outstanding achievement of an Administration which offers few other achievements for comparison, and the greatest personal triumph of President Kennedy. Just how personal was this triumph? To what extent did President Kennedy inject his personal influence? To what degree did he commit the powers and the prestige of his office to bring about a quick and overwhelming ratification? Why were these pressures applied? What caused so intense a campaign for a treaty which was declared by most of its advocates to be primarily of symbolic importance and of very limited significance in itself?

During the three months of discussion and debate over the treaty, President Kennedy was by no means idle. His interest in the treaty was far greater than that of the public or of the Senate as a whole. Though he had many other responsibilities, he made it unmistakably clear that the treaty was his principal concern. He had been preparing for it as far ahead as January 16, 1963 when he announced that all nuclear testing, including even the underground nuclear explosions in Nevada would be postponed during what he called the "present discussion of the nuclear test ban treaty." This was, of course, not a discussion of the specific treaty which was finally ratified, but simply the disarmament talks in Geneva which had centered on nuclear testing as the principal issue. President Kennedy's action
in ordering the postponement of testing showed how far he would go in hopes of getting some kind of agreement with the Russians.

Gestures of this sort convinced most military men and many scientists that the President was more ideological than practical. It appeared to them that stopping the tests would simply prolong any efforts to reach agreements with the Russians. The Russians were free to go right ahead with their undetected underground testing while the gesturing Americans fell behind, so the skeptics said. Nevertheless, for one reason or another, the Russians, within six months of the President's announcement, were suddenly willing to sign a limited treaty.

On July 25, President Kennedy announced agreement on the treaty, saying that the discussions had taken place in a business-like, cordial atmosphere and adding a more important point that was too soon forgotten. The President stated that Mr. Khrushchev, who presided at the opening session of the negotiators on July 15, had exacted an agreement to discuss later "a pact of non-aggression."314

In a nationwide TV address on July 26, President Kennedy made a persuasive case for ratification. He emphasized reduced tension, relief from fears and dangers of radioactive fallout, control of proliferation, and limitation of the nuclear arms race, in that order. His claims for the treaty were modest. He did say that tests under water would produce unmistakable signs which our instruments could pick up, which was scarcely true without some indication of what water he was talking about, but this can be charged to oversimplification. He said violation would involve "worldwide consequences" for the violator."315 This was an indication of his own
sensitivity, for world opinion concerned the communists very little, as their recent and extravagant atmospheric nuclear tests had proved. President Kennedy also said in this opening address "we cannot make a judgment" on what caused Mr. Khrushchev first to refuse, then to accept this type of treaty.\(^{316}\) This was fair enough, and he was wise not to press this point against the treaty's critics who thought that some kind of judgment was necessary.

At a press conference on August 1, 1963, the President gave an important reason for ratifying the treaty, perhaps the most important reason, though it was to prove vain. He said interest in the nuclear test ban was linked with worry about China as a nuclear power in the 1970's.\(^{317}\) He did not say just how the treaty would hinder China from becoming a nuclear power. It was already clear neither China nor its supporters, such as Cuba and Albania, had any intention of signing such a treaty, either then or later. At this early point, few people were very concerned about the treaty, either one way or the other.

Just before President Kennedy's news conference on August 20, the treaty had encountered stiff and effective opposition. This seemed to surprise President Kennedy, and to anger him. In answer to a question, he exploded:

"I recognize Dr. Teller has made it very clear that he is opposed to it. He opposed it last week and this week....Every day he is opposed to it. I think that question was very clearly answered by Mr. McNamara.... How many weapons do you need? What we have now will kill 300 million people in one hour. I refer you to Mr. McNamara's answer which I think is the clearest and most specific answer you could possibly get...."\(^{318}\)

Here the President was wrong about the issues, for they were not related to numbers of weapons. He could scarcely be expected to
read all the testimony and to understand that the far more modest
and professional answer of Dr. Teller's fellow scientist Harold
Brown contained the most persuasive answers to Dr. Teller. In any
case, such testiness at a press conference was highly unusual for the
usually urbane President, and it indicates his annoyance at the op¬
position, outnumbered as it was, which had slowed the culmination of
his efforts.

Already, in an interview, the President had complained that he
had received more letters on a freight rate case than on his TV speech
in favor of the treaty. He had failed to foresee or understand the
public's bewilderment by nuclear physics. By the time the treaty
was signed he and everyone else would understand that the American
public was becoming more passive on nuclear matters.

In a Huntley-Brinkley interview of September 9, the President
continued to display his impatience. He said if the United States
Senate rejected this treaty after the Government had committed itself
to it, "the sound from the United States around the world would be
very uncertain." Leaving aside the Eisenhower-type language,
this sentiment was unwisely displayed. It was no help to the pres¬
tige of the treaty to tie its ratification to a premature commitment.
That was exactly what his critics were trying to do.

Three days later the President continued to discuss the treaty
with an air of desperation that was scarcely justified by its stand¬
ing in the Senate or in the Nation. In a press conference he said:
"This particular kind of treaty has been sought by us since 1959.
If we are to give it only grudging support, if this small clearly
beneficial step cannot be approved by the widest possible margin in
the Senate, then this Nation cannot offer much leadership or hope for the future."321 This was certainly an overstatement. Why was a wide margin of approval so necessary? Why the impatience? President Kennedy's attitude was reminiscent of Wilson's tragic forcing of the League issue rather than of McKinley's successful patience on the Hay-Pauncefote treaty which gained agreement with Britain on Panama.

In a more persuasive vein, the President at the same press conference recognized that Senator Russell, the treaty's most formidable opponent, was the most "individually respected" man in the Senate. "At the same time," he went on, "we can't turn our backs and tell the 90 nations who have now signed it that the lid is off....This would be the green light for intensive atmospheric testing by a number of countries. You couldn't possibly stop it..."322 What the President failed to explain was how the treaty would stop it. It did not, in fact, stop anything that was not already stopped. It instigated more testing by the United States and it failed to stop the Chinese, who had not yet begun.

PUBLIC PATIENCE AND PRIVATE PRESSURE

In justice to the President, it should be remembered that his attitude of optimism complicated by impatience concerning the treaty was shared by the great majority of journalists and public figures throughout the Nation, particularly those who operated in the realm of ideas and ideals. Further, President Kennedy was always careful to avoid the appearance of stifling debate. This was demonstrated particularly well in the matter of opposition to the treaty by the Air Force Association, an organization of Air Force veterans and
supporters which was holding its convention in Washington at the time of the debate on the treaty in the Senate.

By unanimous vote, the Air Force Association protested the treaty as imposing "unacceptable risks" upon the nation's security. The lengthy statement explaining this stand contained a particularly interesting passage: "We note the Government's promise to maintain constant readiness. We note the promise to make the most of underground testing. We note, as well, that these promised safeguards are not now in being." This passage showed intimate knowledge of a bitter debate behind the scenes which will be examined in the succeeding chapter. Secretary McNamara's solitary claim of military advantages for the treaty was ignored, while the Association questioned political advantages claimed for the treaty. "Those advantages have not been made clear," said the statement. 323

This outspoken statement by the Air Force Association came at a particularly sensitive time for treaty supporters. The New York Times reported that the resolution caused widespread annoyance within the Administration, "all the way to the White House." Unlucky Eugene Zuckert, once a Harvard faculty associate of Mr. McNamara's, was caught in the furor. Mr. Zuckert, a veteran public official, had been ostentatiously pushed around by the newcomer from Ford. As the increasingly obscure Secretary of the Air Force, it was Mr. Zuckert's unhappy chore to refuse attendance at an Air Force Association cocktail party given in his honor, then to relent enough to speak before the same group the following evening. As the New York Times reported it: "Mr. Zuckert's rebuke came with such suddenness that the generals,
ghost writers, and convention planners could not keep pace with the views of their civilian chief. 324

Embarrassing as it was, Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert managed to keep his composure. It was not the first time his dignity had been sacrificed, and he would eventually be sacrificed himself by Mr. McNamara--discharged suddenly and replaced by key test ban witness Harold Brown.

Mr. Zuckert, a friendly man who never sought to embarrass anyone publicly, had scolded the Air Force Association in a statement which sounded completely unlike him. Some of the treaty's more ardent supporters went much further and demanded the President rebuke or punish members of the Association who might be susceptible. At the 12 September press conference, a reporter asked President Kennedy's opinion on the propriety of any military officers who might belong to the Association contradicting their Commander-in-Chief. Here, the President, whatever his annoyance, kept his head admirably. Although he did say something about not knowing "who took what position" he managed also to say, "I think the Air Force Association is free to give its views...So I would not suggest any reproof in any way of those who made their judgments, and I just don't agree with it." 325

This incident indicates the importance of timing and of personalities in the treaty debate. It was an issue on which the public was more puzzled than divided. The contradictory attitudes displayed by respected experts made the personalities of the disputants all the more important. Mr. Zuckert, whose views on the treaty had scarcely been requested, achieved embarrassing and momentary fame by cutting
his own reception, while the Air Force Association got its position and arguments widely distributed by the same action.

Theodore Sorensen, in *Kennedy*, referred to this treaty incident inaccurately. He wrote: "The Air Force Association...came out against it (and the Association's dinner was consequently shunned by the Administration)."\(^{326}\) Ironically, the treaty was attacked by the much larger Veterans of Foreign Wars, and supported by the still larger American Legion, with very little public attention for either action.

While the Secretary of the Air Force was being kept away from his own cocktail party and the President was winning applause for his expression of tolerance for all views, there were more influential events beyond public knowledge. Washington columnists reported the President to be personally masterminding an extraordinary high-pressure drive to get the treaty through the Senate speedily and overwhelmingly. He had conferred by phone with Senators of both parties, with other officials and with administration supporters outside the government, especially women active in local and state politics. Secretary of State Rusk and White House Congressional Liaison Chief O'Brien had been taking Senators for cruises on the Potomac in the yacht of the Secretary of the Navy.\(^{327}\)

It was reported that when the President urged Senate Democratic Leader Mansfield of Montana to hurry the hearings and begin the debate, Mansfield explained this would be difficult because of the tough questions asked of Administration witnesses by Senator Lausche and Senator Mundt, especially Senator Lausche. Everything possible to speed things up had already been done. Work on the Foreign Relations Committee favorable report had begun a week before the hearings were
completed. Proxies of committee members who could not be present for the final voting were obtained in advance, and the same arrangements were made for the action of the full Senate.\textsuperscript{328} Just before the debate began the President conferred with Senate Leaders at the White House.\textsuperscript{329}

These activities of the President were ignored by the majority of newspapers and columnists, and they were emphasized principally by the minority of commentators who were skeptical about the treaty or about the President. Not even the latter, however, knew the full extent of the President's efforts. According to Sorensen, President Kennedy called a series of off-the-record meetings of prominent leaders to form a "Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban." The President counseled them on their approach, suggested business and other leaders for them to contact and approved their newspaper and TV advertisements. Not content with this unusual display of Presidential pressure, he extended himself to lengths which many members of Congress considered to be well beyond the Presidential function--he advised these pressure groups "which Senators should hear from their constituents."\textsuperscript{330}

Whether or not some of these activities were improper for the President was a question that would have been answered differently by opponents and by proponents of the treaty, but it is interesting that they were kept so quiet that not even the hostile columnists heard about them. Not even the milder actions were mentioned by those journalists who were friendly. The question of pressures applied to so many officials, and particularly to men in uniform, was much more delicate.
The problem with the military men was that the President wished not only to diminish or muffle their doubts about the treaty; he wished also to capitalize on their support for it. The uniforms they wore exempted them, theoretically, from political pressures in their testimony before Congress. The President knew they were skeptical of the treaty, and he was much more concerned about their opinion than was Secretary McNamara who, as was mentioned in a previous chapter, had not bothered to consult with them.

Too much pressure might cause the Chiefs to unite against the treaty. This would influence a number of votes in the Senate and disturb the public. Too little pressure, on the other hand, might permit the Chiefs to testify so freely that the treaty would be in danger. How to profit from the traditional professionalism of the uniformed leaders and at the same time not to take too many chances with it was the President's dilemma. In his intense, all-out effort to get the treaty ratified, it was his most delicate performance.

Secretary McNamara could be counted upon, as usual, to state with the utmost confidence the position which was desired, and his usefulness in this respect had not yet been vitiated by the testing-ground of Vietnam. General Taylor was more useful, although he was regarded by many military men as an opportunist who had gambled and won on the election of Senator Kennedy. He had openly attacked President Eisenhower, both during and after his service under that tolerant gentleman. As one Chief of Staff put it privately, "We consider him (General Taylor) a political appointee, but after all he is a big help as a go-between and a hedge against the crackpot theorists around President Kennedy."
The Chiefs of the Services would feel most uncomfortable in their uniforms before Senators who were also performing their constitutional duty regarding the treaty if they were pliable and evasive. Some of their private and sincere views were already known. Their problem, as discussed previously, was almost as great as the President's. Their uniforms signified a responsibility for professional judgment and testimony. It had already been demonstrated, however, that against this Administration's personal pressures their uniforms were insufficient.

As the Associated Press explained it:

"Mr. McNamara has said in the past that if a general or admiral is asked a question by a congressional committee, he is free to answer, specifying that it is his own personal opinion. But there are others who believe that Admiral Anderson and others in the Navy and other services, in the past, have found themselves in difficulty because they followed that guidance...Admiral George W. Anderson is retired...because testimony he gave congressional committees clashed with that of Secretary of Defense McNamara."331

Many newspapers expressed editorially their belief that the Chiefs were not hiding anything as they agreed with General Taylor's testimony that there had been no arm-twisting by superiors. Some commentators remained skeptical. Said one: "Our feeling from all this is that the White House has done some arm-twisting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, despite these gentlemen's denials."332 Hostile columnist Holmes Alexander summed up the complaining of the minority opposition by saying of the President: "He has sent his Administration spokesmen to Capitol Hill with slickly prepared testimony that bore the evidence of collaboration and ghost-written unanimity...his form of presentation has left many Senators and observers with the impression that he demands a cabinet and a military staff who will sing for their suppers."333
The military men were embarrassed by this charge. They could only deny it. That the President did manipulate their ostensibly independent testimony has been revealed by Presidential Aide Theodore Sorensen. On the President's close control and his use of General Taylor Sorensen writes:

"He took pains to coordinate the testimony of the witnesses on Capitol Hill....General Taylor understood the net advantages to our security in a test ban.... But...the Chiefs began to hedge....The President blocked a maneuver by the less friendly Senate Armed Services Subcommittee to cross examine the Chiefs before Taylor could present their views to the Foreign Relations Committee."

Concerning the alleged arm-twisting, Sorensen says only that Taylor testified "it was not responsible for the Chief's position."

Sorensen rates General LeMay's testimony as of no value. "The support of the other Chiefs was helpful," he writes, "and the President held similar sessions with the nuclear laboratory directors to ensure their backing." There still remained a noticeable difference that salvaged some of the credibility of the professional military man and scientist as compared with the eager-to-please political appointee. Sorensen pays the Joint Chiefs an unintended tribute in his summary sentence regarding the Presidentially "coordinated" testimony: "McNamara, as always, was the most impressive, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as always, were the most difficult."334

It had been a long time since military men had been used by the White House as weapons for the application of pressure on congress. In the struggle over the power of the Adjutant General of the Army during the Taft Administration some military men had been used in the opposite direction--by the congress against the chief executive. In the intervening generations a strong tradition had
developed that military men were completely apolitical and that their positions were not to be distorted in order to gain legislative or political goals, no matter how commendable these might be.

Just as military men were not to be considered as "helpful" or employable in any political matter so they were not to engage in political actions themselves. Most military men whole-heartedly supported President Truman's relief of General MacArthur for this reason. The General had entered a political dispute and it served him right. But the inhibition had to work both ways, and military men were not to be pressured or even influenced by one political party or by one branch of the American government to gain advantages over another. It had long been agreed that the legislative branch had as much right of access to their unbiased and uninfluenced views as did the executive.

This tradition has been so highly valued by some presidents that they have leaned over backward to observe it. President Eisenhower, for instance, permitted General Vandenberg to defend himself publicly against Secretary of Defense Wilson without the slightest censorship or restraint. He permitted General Taylor to make public speeches against policies of the Administration while Taylor was serving as Chief of Staff of the Army. Without question, President Kennedy's practices, though not his statements, differed considerably on this. Secretary McNamara's statements and practices differed even more.

Whether or not the tradition is worthy of the respect which other presidents have accorded it, its existence was a great help to the Kennedy Administration in getting the treaty approved by the Senate. The general belief that the military chiefs would not succumb to
such pressures maintained Senatorial and public respect for their testimony accepting the treaty. The tradition is now much weaker than it was, and this is one of the major items in the price of securing ratification. It should be noted, however, that the traditional separation of the military from political issues and pressures had already been heavily compromised by the Administration before the treaty was considered. Many statements against the treaty, and some in its favor, assumed that the testimony of the Joint Chiefs was a compromise and a bargain. Indeed it was, as we shall see.

There are two other features of administrative activity in support of the treaty that deserve examination. One is the new problem of free-wheeling and politically-minded scientists in and out of the Administration and especially the Department of Defense. The other is the new method of manipulating secrets which became more prominent during the treaty debate than had been the case before. Out of the difficulties surrounding the testimony of the Joint Chiefs, Senator Jackson was able to arrange a reasonable compromise which greatly eased the Administration's problem as well. To a degree, he was able to accomplish the same result in the case of the far less disciplined scientists.

THE JACKSONIAN COMPROMISE

The question of whether the increased underground testing which had been forced upon the Administrator was really necessary was dropped as quickly as it had been raised. Two years later Theodore Sorenson revived the problem in his book on the late President. He pictures Senator Kennedy as having sought to bring an end to nuclear
testing since 1956 when Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson advanced
the proposal in the campaign against President Eisenhower. Despite
the fact that the Joint Chiefs were convinced the Russians were doing
underground testing in violation of the Eisenhower moratorium, Presi¬
dent Kennedy had opposed any resumption by the United States.
Sorensen says the Chiefs were for all types of testing, the Defense
Department for putting off the decision. In the face of a two to
one margin favoring test resumption, as reported in a Harris poll of
July 1961, President Kennedy had agreed with the State Department on
postponement while pressing for a nuclear disarmament or a test ban
treaty. Finally he ordered preparations for underground testing,
but no testing.335 (As it turned out, the preparations were extremely
meager.)

When informed the Russians had resumed atmospheric testing,
President Kennedy's reaction, according to Sorensen, was unprintable.
Nevertheless, he wavered on a decision to resume atmospheric testing.
This was despite what Sorensen calls a unanimous military and scien¬
tific opinion that such tests were necessary. In this connection,
Sorensen recounts an almost incredible event. He states that just
before the new series of tests began "McNamara startled Rusk and
Bundy at lunch by suggesting that they were not really necessary."336
It is scarcely surprising that Rusk and Bundy were startled. The
statement by the Secretary of Defense was suddenly contrary to the
official recommendation of the Defense Department and contrary to
what its military members believed to be the Secretary's strong
stand. Mistrust of the Secretary as representative of military
judgments had by no means reached a point where a reversal, so
sudden and drastic as to shock the Secretary of State, was even con-
considered possible. Sorensen unfortunately offers no explanation, nor
does he indicate why Secretary McNamara pressed his point no further.

Sorensen completely vindicates Dr. Teller's and Dr. Foster's
contention, so strongly rebutted by Senator Humphrey, that the extent
and nature of the tests were severely limited by the administra-
tion. Schlesinger portrays the President as a Hamlet, forever
taking up arms with one hand and putting them down with the other,
and once with Prime Minister Macmillan driven to drink by the neces-
sity for action. Although Schlesinger was, by his own account,
the key to many great decisions, he established that the President
personally reduced the last series of American tests to short periods
of low-yield detonations. This was the reason, which only two
bold scientists had dared state during the hearings, why the United
States was so far behind the Russians in atmospheric testing when the
treaty to stop it was proposed. Schlesinger says of President Kennedy
that the whole idea of testing left him cold. "But," says
Schlesinger, "he could not forget his responsibilities for the na-
tional security of the United States."

Schlesinger also quotes President Kennedy announcing his determi-
nation to "win" on the treaty even if it cost him the 1964 elec-
tion. Strangely enough, Schlesinger argues that the test ban
indicated a willingness on the part of President Kennedy to halt
the weapons race "more or less" where it was, yet he agrees with
Richard Rovere that the treaty led directly to an increase in
nuclear testing. Schlesinger claims also that the treaty meant
Soviet acquiescence in American nuclear superiority. He makes this
claim despite acknowledged Russian superiority in atmospheric testing, which was the only important thing limited by the treaty.

President Kennedy is further quoted by Schlesinger as saying "the treaty is being so chewed up in the Senate and we've had to make so many concessions to make sure it passes, that we've got to do something to prove to the world we still mean it. If we have to go to all this trouble over one small treaty, people are likely to think we can't function at all--unless I can dispel some doubts in New York." Here the President was referring to his scheduled speech at the United Nations, at which he could only predict the passage of the treaty because the Senate refused to be rushed by three days. The remainder of the President's statement is more difficult to explain.

How was the treaty chewed up? It passed without amendment of any kind. What concessions were made? Was his reluctant promise to achieve effective underground testing, some kind of concession that would prevent the President from proving something to the world? What was he trying to prove? Why did he say the treaty was worth the Presidency and then refer to it impatiently as "one small treaty" which was scarcely worth the trouble?

These and many similar questions Schlesinger makes no attempt to answer, and it is too bad that he does not. The impression is left that the President was voicing impatience with the United States Senate for failing to recognize that it had no right to delay him when he was trying to prove something to the World. Just what he was trying to prove also remains vague, though Schlesinger speaks repeatedly of detente (using always the French word,) and finally lists
other items on the agenda, such as "completion" of the nuclear test ban, measures to restrain nuclear proliferation, possibilities in reciprocal unilateral arms reduction as suggested by Gilpatric and Wiesner, and "the old dream of general and complete disarmament."

Considering these samples, it was indeed true that much remained on the agenda. With all of this on his mind, perhaps it should not be surprising that the President was annoyed at the few days delay over one small treaty.

Nevertheless, to get the test ban treaty through the Senate, it was necessary to convince key Senators and the military Chiefs that vigorous underground testing would follow. To accomplish this a mere public promise was inadequate. The specific actions to be taken had to be spelled out and the precise amount of funds destined for nuclear testing had to be stated, including the very considerable amount required atmospheric testing facilities to be used only in case of violation or renunciation of the treaty. The sincerity of President Kennedy and the civilian Defense Department heads in promising to do all these things was fortunately never an issue. It was considered inadequate from the start.

A SENTIMENTAL PRESIDENT AND HIS SOLDIERS

Public confidence is notably easier to gain and maintain than the confidence of legislators and journalists who are in constant contact with events. Yet the former ultimately depends upon the latter. It is interesting to examine why so serious a lack of confidence in the Administration had already developed in Washington. Why was it that Senator Jackson could state that a formal treaty
between the Senate and the Administration was required, and then proceed to prove he was right? Here again Sorensen and Schlesinger have made explicit certain circumstances that were obscured in 1963. Among these circumstances was the President's admirably sentimental dream of universal peace in our time which was encouraged and pressed upon him as a practical goal by so many of his advisors. Another circumstance was President Kennedy's highly emotional reaction to the problem and to the existence of nuclear radiation.

On this latter point the fact that Sorensen and Schlesinger, both unabashedly sentimental historians, should repeat the same strange story is especially interesting. Schlesinger's repetition in almost the same words used by Sorensen is unique in the two highly competitive books.

Sorensen's language contains more of the rhythms of a Biblical parable. He introduces the scene by stating that the President could not accept the bland assurances of Teller and others that fallout posed no danger at all. (As we have seen in connection with the Senate testimony, this is a misstatement of the positions mentioned.) Sorensen goes on to say that the President felt responsible for "even one more case of leukemia, cancer or sterility." Then Sorensen introduces a jarring note in an attack on certain members of the John Birch Society, and this serves to tie nuclear testing to extremism. He says President Kennedy, "thought it remarkable that extremist groups opposed to flouridation of urban water supplies should strongly favor this pollution of the air."

Sorensen then introduces the touching parable:

"One rainy day, seated at his desk, he asked Jerome Weisner what brought the radioactive particles down on
areas not immediately beneath an explosion. 'And I told him,' said Weisner, 'that it was washed out of the clouds by the rain, that it would be brought to the earth by rain.' President Kennedy then said, looking out the window, 'You mean, it's in the rain out there.' Weisner continued 'and I said "Yes;"' and he looked out the window, looked very sad, and didn't say a word for several minutes."

Schlesinger's version of the story is, by comparison, neatly related. Its tone is essentially the same:

"Jerome Weisner, his Science Adviser, reminded him one drizzling day how rain washed radioactive debris from the clouds and brought it down to earth. Kennedy, looking out the window, said, 'You mean that stuff is is in the rain out there?' Weisner said, "Yes." The President continued gazing out the window, deep sadness on his face, and did not say a word for several minutes."

For some fifteen years, ever since the early tests in the Nevada desert, newspapers had printed occasional headline stories of how rains had carried traces of nuclear radiation to milk cows in Senator Humphrey's Minnesota and elsewhere. That a President who had been Congressman and Senator during this period should have missed all this is surprising. Yet the story is illustrative of the boyish charm which so endeared President Kennedy to the public and to many who knew him well.

As is the case with all men, President Kennedy demonstrated other attitudes which were less endearing to those involved in them, although they were perfectly understandable. His attitude toward soldiers and soldiering was almost as sentimental as his view of fallout in the rain. Sorensen quotes a sympathetic poem about soldiers that was a Presidential favorite.

We have seen that certain Senators and journalists deplored the fact that President Kennedy retained only those military professionals
who would sing for their suppers whenever their supposedly professional endorsement of an administration position or project was desired. Schlesinger frankly admits this practice and questions why the President retained Chiefs who even occasionally seemed out of sympathy with his policy.  

The reason President Kennedy failed to discharge all military leaders who did not always agree with him was that "in his view, their job was not policy, but soldiering." Just what the President meant by "soldiering," Schlesinger does not feel it necessary to explain. He does go on to quote the President as saying "It's good to have men like Curt LeMay and Arleigh Burke commanding troops once you decide to go in." Since neither Air Force Chief LeMay nor Navy Chief Burke commanded any troops whatever, nor airmen nor seamen for that matter, this comment is especially amusing. Their assignment to the staff of the Secretary of Defense made them his assistants, theoretically, for the development and implementation of high policy. The Pentagon was surely a most awkward place for soldiering, even for soldiering by President Kennedy's sentimentally conceived men of iron. They were often expected to become as soldiers of tin when moved with unexpressive faces from place to place on the field of public policy.

THE UNTAMABLE SCIENTISTS

The confused military picture in Washington in 1963 contained first of all the nouveau military. These included economists, the profit managers, accountants, and representatives of those pseudo-academic institutions, the schools of business administration. These
individuals had shown the greatest gusto in taking over the most authoritative portions of the military role, in brandishing a perverted military vocabulary, and in pronouncing military judgments with the over-acted dogmatism of military professionals. For all their flamboyance, however, they could not match the influence of that older institution, the government scientist. The scientists had been there much longer, ever since World War II, and they were well established when the new soldiers of industrial fortune and academic controversy arrived on the heels of the new President in 1961.

For all their seniority in point of time over the nouveau military, the scientists suffered from two difficulties. First of all, it was impossible to establish just when and to what degree each was a government scientist. Second, the scientists could not admit to being political without losing scientific face. Neither of these problems bothered the nouveau military. They were frankly partisan members of the new governmental establishment and managed always to be loyal and enthusiastic supporters of any administration policy. This was in contrast to the usurped military leaders in uniform who could not quite abandon the old practice of professional detachment from politics. The scientists, like the professional military men, were also inhibited by a tradition—the tradition of scientific objectivity.

By the time of the test ban debate the tradition of the detached and apolitical scientist in government had suffered considerable erosion. In a very perceptive study, printed in The Reporter for September 26, Meg Greenfield explained what had happened.
So many scientists had been speaking out on so many political, diplomatic and military issues that the image of the man in the white coat had become blurred, to say the least. According to Greenfield, the President and his advisors had learned that simply to quote a scientist, or some scientists, would no longer persuade Congress of the wisdom of a particular decision. The Congress had "learned that a scientist's own emotions and his personal politics may affect the advice he gives."

It had become a problem also to determine when a scientist was speaking for government and when he was speaking on his own. Many scientists were determined to capitalize on traditions of professional and academic freedom by refusing to accept any of the restraints that were imposed upon the practitioners of military science (and imposed also upon other scientists who worked very closely with loyal political appointees). As Greenfield put it:

"Most attempts to bring scientists further within the framework of ordinary governmental procedures are suspected as attempts to compromise them; and many scientists who have no trouble understanding, say, the need to 'muzzle' the military on subjects that may affect the conduct of foreign affairs consider a call for restraint on the part of government scientists and attack upon their intellectual freedom."

This was despite the fact that difficulties in negotiating with the Russians had sometimes resulted from statements made by scientific advisors to President Kennedy, either in public meetings or to Russian scientists in private. On one occasion Khrushchev, in a correspondence with the President, had alluded to the views of official scientists to bolster his own position, and Khrushchev had to be told by the President that the President's advisors had been speaking privately. According to Greenfield, the progressive dissolution
of lines of responsibility in government science "had been hastened by the informal out-of-channels way in which the Kennedy Administra-
tion likes to operate."

Greenfield explained further that on Capitol Hill one heard of two groups of scientists in government. One group called "fuzzy-
wuzzies," consisted of the "do-good, left-wing, academic basic-
research set" such as I. I. Rabi and Hans Bethe, and the other was supposedly made up of "heartless, scheming, and above all irrespon-
sible" fellows who would just as soon blow up the Taj Mahal as look at it. In actual fact the split was nowhere near as severe, but there were differences between two general groupings.

Greenfield concluded that government science advising was a sort of Harvard-MIT-Bell Telephone-Caltech situation, with lines out of a few eastern universities and to Palo Alto, Berkeley, and the RAND Corporation. On questions having to do with nuclear armament and disarmament, one special group carried more weight in Washington than all the rest. This was possibly because their unmatched knowledge and personal characteristics brought them the respect of administra-
tors Norris Bradbury and John S. Foster whose outstanding and influen-
tial testimony we have already examined.

To satisfy these men that the treaty was safe for the country, and to secure at least a grudging concession that this was so, was a delicate task for President Kennedy in his efforts to push the treaty through the Senate speedily and overwhelmingly. Here the "treaty with the administration" engineered by Senator Jackson to guarantee an aggressive program of underground testing was of the greatest ser-
vice to the President, to the Senate, and to the scientists
themselves. It prevented what might have been an ugly split in the scientific community and in the Senate. It enabled the President to rescue the treaty's cause and to present it as a personal triumph.

On August 24, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric promised the Senate committee that the Jackson-Joint Chiefs stipulations would be met to the letter, that underground testing would be expanded over that previously planned, that nuclear laboratories would be improved, and that a quarter of a billion would be provided for standby facilities at Johnston Island in the Pacific for use in case renewed atmospheric tests became necessary. Further, new devices would be developed and deployed to detect any Russian clandestine tests insofar as it might be possible to detect them.348 Significantly, Gilpatric admitted that at least a year would be required to reinstate any effective program of underground testing.

Nearly three weeks after the Gilpatrick statement, Senator Jackson, citing these promises by the Administration, finally endorsed the treaty unenthusiastically, calling it a loose commitment rather than a treaty, and stating that the inescapable risks it imposed were tolerable. According to the Washington Star, this was welcome support for the administration, for Senator Jackson probably knew more about nuclear weapons than any other Senator.349

Because Senator Jackson chose not to emphasize the importance of his actions (other than to establish it in the dialogue with Dr. Foster quoted in a previous chapter), and because most newsmen and commentators shared the hopeful optimism of the general public, the false impression that these promises by the Administration were superfluous was allowed to stand.
In one of the most interesting comments on the treaty, Richard Rovere pointed out (in the *New Yorker*) that the attack on the treaty mounted by its opponents was far more effective than the final vote showed. "It turned an agreement to limit nuclear testing into a limited warrant for increased nuclear testing." While this fact may have been lost on the general public, it was by no means lost on the Senate, as some of the more outspoken Western senators revealed. Senator Miller of Iowa, for instance, in stating his support for the treaty, announced also that the treaty would increase the cost of national defense and step up the arms race, at least as far as nuclear testing and weaponry was concerned. As will be noted in a later chapter, historians Sorensen and Schlesinger differ considerably on the meaning and importance of the "price" President Kennedy had to pay in order to get the treaty through the Senate with the nation's consensus intact.

The difficulties of military men with the Administration, and of the Administration with scientists, involved only small groups. It was too early to estimate the future impact of the new precedents. Obviously there was a contradiction in the expectation that military leaders would behave like political appointees by lending public support to all policy judgments of the administration and at the same time be considered as merely soldiers in command of troops. President Kennedy would not live to face the consequences of this confusion. (For that matter, he and the nation had already paid a high price for it at the Bay of Pigs.) The next president would be a master at understanding the roles and attitudes of other people and how these could be directed toward support of his own. This new
dilemma of military Chiefs as subordinate policy salesmen or as super-sergeants would be perpetuated in the next administration only in the person of the Secretary of Defense. Another problem, however, would continue. This was the growing loss of confidence in the truth of statements emanating from administration officials, and especially from officials of the Department of Defense.

THE CALCULATED IMPACT OF CAREFULLY SELECTED SECRETS

Years after the nuclear test ban debate, the growing loss of faith would be called the widening "credibility gap." In 1963 it was already wide enough. One of the first examples was a stir over an order issued at Lockbourne Air Force Base in Ohio which read "We have been directed by higher headquarters not to discuss, comment on, or otherwise express out opinions, officially or unofficially on the current subject of the nuclear test ban." In this case it was unfair to blame the order directly on the Department of Defense itself. The order had actually been disseminated by word of mouth, from Air Force Chief LeMay. It was merely an example of how pressures generated at the top tend to proliferate and intensify in the hands of eager subordinates, until every officer and airman on some base distant from the troubles of the Pentagon is warned that even his private opinions must be completely suppressed.

More serious than this suppression of views was the burgeoning practice of manipulating confidential and secret information in such a manner all of it which failed to support administration policies and projects remained under lock and key, while the darkest secrets
which could be used for support were pushed into public view. Some commentators protested against the secret classification which had been imposed on a bit of testimony by Dr. Teller that the Russians were quite capable of conducting underground testing effectively and on a large scale.\textsuperscript{352}

More embarrassing to the Administration was a complaint by staff reporter Howard Simons in the normally pro-administration Washington Post. Simons charged that many items of highly secret information had been blandly released by the administration whenever it desired to make a point. Worse than that, information was often revised or completely changed to meet new needs. For example, when President Kennedy wished to emphasize the amount of testing that had been conducted underground he said there had been 97 such tests. The officially released figure had been 70, but that was immediately upped also, to match the President's statement. The President had made a mistake on the figure by including some hitherto secret surface bursts and nonmilitary experiments, so the Atomic Energy Commission had to use the term "nuclear events" in an attempt to cover the error, but the figures were changed nevertheless.

Simons listed secrets which had long been on the totally forbidden list but had been suddenly brandished by Secretary McNamara in his Senate testimony, such as the 35 megaton warhead, the capacity to develop and deliver a 50 megaton warhead, and some revelations by Mr. McNamara's assistant, Harold Brown, concerning what was known of the Soviet tests. Other instances were cited in which the Administration, from time to time, had told carefully selected secrets. "This," Simons charged "is to win congressional support for, or to
muffle congressional criticism of, Administration policies." Simons concluded: "When is a secret not a secret? The answer seems to be when political necessity dictates." 353

Another respected reporter, Roscoe Drummond, pushed the dispute further proposing that the President set the Senate and the public somewhat at rest by offering to share the responsibility for abrogation of the treaty if the occasion should arise. 354 Drummond felt the Senate, or the appropriate committee of the Senate, should be kept informed of all intelligence data bearing on the problem. This would keep down rumors, and would enable the Senate to back the President immediately against domestic pacifists and other potential trouble-makers if some Russian or Chinese action made it necessary to resume atmospheric tests. He thought the President would welcome such an arrangement. Sorensen and others had not yet revealed the President's irritation at being delayed a few days in his United Nations speech by Senate interest in just one small treaty.

Whatever may have been President Kennedy's cast of mind or his attitudes toward the Senator and his numerous types of subordinates, he was still the President, and he held the trump card. For some reason this trump card was seldom mentioned in the discussions. Richard Rovere mentioned it in the New Yorker article already mentioned, and Ted Lewis of the New York News emphasized it. Lewis said the treaty simply provided a vehicle for a broad challenge of Kennedy nuclear policies. "The fact is, and both sides in the treaty battle know it, that mere defeat of the treaty will not mean a resumption of U.S. tests," said Lewis. The Senate could kill the treaty, but it could not kill the President's June 10th declaration
that the U.S. would not be the first to resume testing. Strangely enough no one except Senator Goldwater had tried to raise a fuss about the declaration at the time it was made and even Senator Goldwater was content "with one big cry of alarm."\textsuperscript{355}

From what had occurred since June it was obvious that regardless of the Senate's action on the treaty, President Kennedy himself would insist on keeping his June 10 pledge intact. Lewis made the point that the June pledge was the kind of high-level declaration, with references to "our good faith and solemn convictions," that President Kennedy was already completely committed to continue. So the discussion about the treaty was really academic. In order to get it passed, the President had to endure an annoying debate, had to promise to do things he had not intended, and had to accept an unwanted degree of Senate participation in his decisions. This helps to explain the President's irritation at being delayed in his long range purposes by Senate discussions which could never force him to resume testing anyway. It does not explain why he was willing to make the sacrifices just to get the treaty passed. That problem remains partially inexplicable, but it will be considered in a later chapter.
CHAPTER VIII: FAIR AND FOUL TO THE FINISH

Senator Aiken of Vermont said his mail had never contained so much vituperation. It was running 60 percent opposed to the treaty, but most of that part of his mail was from the West; the portion from New England favored the treaty by 4 to 1. The mail of other senators was mixed as well. Senator Margaret Smith’s mail from Maine turned against the treaty when the summer visitors left. She received some abuse because she had been cool toward the treaty. Years earlier, when she was the first Senator to speak out effectively against Joe McCarthy, she had been the target of extremists on the right. Now she was a target of extremists on the left.

Senator Smith said many of those who in the fifties had decried tactics of guilt by association and trial by accusation as practices of the extreme right had become guilty of the same abuses and excesses on the extreme left of the ideological spectrum. Those who opposed the treaty were called murderers who would poison the milk of children with strontium. One Senator had stated that all who opposed the treaty ought to have their heads examined. Asked Senator Smith: "Have we lost all sense of reasonableness?"

Crusading columnist Drew Pearson, a slashing advocate of the treaty, charged that Senator Smith was allowed to vote only by Senatorial courtesy. He said the fact that she had once been a reserve officer in the WAF caused divided loyalties. The same was true of three other Senators, according to columnist Pearson. These, in addition, had ridden free on military airplanes on some occasions; Pearson listed all the dates and destinations. Senator Jackson had
already said he would vote for the treaty, but he was denounced as a
tool of aircraft makers for having criticized the treaty. Senator
Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force, had criticized the
treaty less. His free rides were not listed. 358

England's Manchester Guardian attacked the treaty's official
proponents for having boasted that the treaty would not reduce the
nuclear superiority of the United States or its ability to test
underground. The Guardian thought this was a poor way to prepare for
the kind of sacrifices which disarmament would entail. 359

The Guardian's reasons for criticism were no more unusual than
the reasons given by three of the Senate's most newsworthy members.
Senator Hartke of Indiana, former chairman of the Democratic campaign
committee, joined recent Democrat Morse of Oregon to put the President
on notice they would not support his treaty unless he took the proper
attitude toward General De Gaulle's nuclear ambitions. The replies
they received from administration witnesses were evasive, as well
they should have been, for President Kennedy was trying to persuade
General De Gaulle to sign the treaty in return for help at under-
ground testing. 360

The third bargaining Senator, who was even farther west than
Morse, threatened to disapprove the treaty unless Russians catching
crabs off the Alaskan coast were arrested and brought to trial. 361
Senator Gruening managed in the end to go along with ideological and
party discipline to back the treaty, even with Russian fishermen
still at large in their fast boats off his coasts. Senators Morse
and Hartke also found it possible to go along with the treaty,
perhaps with less subsequent strain. General De Gaulle did what
they had threatened to do. He actually rejected the treaty rather than have nuclear assistance given to France. 362

On the other side of the argument the columnist who was perhaps the most skillful, certainly the most persistent, opponent of the treaty was Holmes Alexander, a hard-working veteran whose conservatism had caused him to be relegated to the outer areas. His column was printed nearest Washington in Norfolk, Virginia. Alexander's conservatism was basically Darwinian, and he said flatly that we live in a world where the fittest survive. He was up to date, however, in his belief that knowledge is fitness and that it cannot be put back into a test-tube or a genie-bottle, as President Kennedy wanted to do with nuclear energy. "It is a world where science cannot be wisely or safely locked in a cave," said Alexander. 363

Columnist Alexander's attacks on treaty advocates were at least as high as the heart. He did not picture his ideological opponents as disciples of antichrist, but rather as pied pipers. He accused President Kennedy of sending Administration spokesmen to Capitol Hill with slickly prepared testimony that bore the evidence of collaboration and ghost-written unanimity. President Kennedy's credibility rating was low when the treaty was broached, said Alexander, and it had dropped even lower. This columnist's judgments were not especially bitter and some would stand the test of at least a few years. This was his summary of President Kennedy's performance; "In the promotion of the treaty he seems to show himself more as the political campaigner whose fluffs and mistakes will be forgotten tomorrow, rather than as the leader who is making decisions that must stand the unrelenting proof of time." 364
THE INCREASING POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF SCIENCE
AND OF SCIENTISTS

The attitude of the treaty's more reasonable opponents was summed up by Holmes Alexander with the statement that the President's case was little else than a political appeal to Russia and to world opinion. As a military and scientific proposition, he said, the treaty had reached the brink of unbelievability. Official censorship continued to plague those who wished to have the military and scientific issues debated. Senator Stennis's persistent efforts to have Secretary McNamara release testimony indicating a military need for a high yield weapon were unsuccessful. The Secretary had chosen to release only opposite testimony on this subject.

Two scientists, Dr. Kuypers of Stanford and Dr. Vodica of Joslyn Electronic Systems Division, called for a release of classified information on the hush-hush subject of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) which had been under study for several years. An unpublished analysis by these scientists, and comments by other students of the phenomenon, indicated that even a 10 megaton explosion would completely disable communications systems for a radius of some 100 miles and that the 50 megaton variety such as the Russians had tested would have this effect over an area some three hundred miles in diameter. In this area there would be vaporization and explosion of electrical conductors and a burnout of electrical equipment, especially of solid state devices. At present, said these scientists, although American nuclear weapons were designed against shock effect, "They may not dependably survive the electromagnetic nuclear environment."
The explanation for failure to take electromagnetic pulse effects into account in defense design resulted from the fact that these forces had caused instrumentation failures during early tests. The reasons for the failures had not been understood. Although Soviet analyses of our high altitude shots were available even in the United States, high secrecy classifications were placed on many of their consequences in this country. Not only did critical defense systems suffer disabilities from distant nuclear explosion; an undersea coaxial cable across the North Atlantic intermittently failed after a low-yield shot at 200 miles altitude. 367

Despite the rigid censorship of all testimony relating to these radiation effects, several articles and comments were published by individual scientists who were beyond official control. John Crittenden of General Electric pointed out that an explosion in space as low as one megaton could harm electronic circuits over a radius of more than 100 miles. Extrapolation of this figure to a Russian 60 megaton bomb was difficult, according to the scientists. One high altitude Soviet explosion in 1962 crippled the electronics of a U.S. satellite used to monitor the explosion.

One scientist explained that a 60 megaton bomb released at least 5 percent of its energy in the form of rays all the way across the spectrum from gamma-type protons to the very soft radio waves, and he added that "five percent of 60 megatons is one helluva lot of energy." Knowledge of this type caused one of the few serious students of this problem in the Senate, Robert Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, to express the view that the Russians had changed their minds and favored a treaty shortly after they analyzed the possibilities opened to them by their last series of tests. 368
While the general import of these partially exposed realities may be fairly clear, it remains true that the fantastic phenomena of modern science achieve a mystical quality that is almost as undigestible as the religious dogma of the middle ages or the political dogma of the present. The case of the lead balloon is an example. This was mentioned as a possible device for nuclear explosions in space, in violation of the treaty, from detectors on earth. A huge self-inflating balloon, filled with microscopic dust of lead, could absorb the earthward rays of a spatial nuclear experiment. That such an experiment would be attempted is unlikely, but a lead balloon in counter-gravitational orbit is a possibility.

Scientists able to levitate lead balloons nevertheless have quite ordinary political troubles. At the Eleventh Pugwash Conference held in the ancient citadel of Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, during the treaty debate, Mr. Gromyko's idea men produced more proposals than did those of President Kennedy. Dr. Alexander Rich, professor of biology at MIT, said it was the first Pugwash conference during which governments had mirrored the trend of the talks. The New York Times reporter covering the event subtly implied that it was the other way around, since Mr. Gromyko's proposals had found an echo at the conference.

One of Mr. Gromyko's proposals popular with the scientists was for the nuclear powers to retain only a small portion of their stockpiles. (There would naturally be no inspection.) The other proposal was for nuclear nations to guarantee the nuclear immunity of all nations agreeing to maintain nuclear innocence. The latter proposal split the scientists, since many recognized the guarantee
would involve a possible use of nuclear weapons, which they opposed. Dr. Rich was able to claim, however, that the proposal for a joint U.S.-Russian moon shot, which had just been advanced at the UN by President Kennedy, had originated from a Pugwash meeting in 1961. (Schlesinger says that President Kennedy had suggested it to Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961.)

One of the problems of international scientific conferences was that scientists from all nations not working on nuclear weapons were anxious for these weapons to be abolished through almost any kind of agreement or formula. Another difficulty arose from the widening gap between the "pure" scientists and the practitioners. A saving circumstance arose from the fact that no one could agree on just where the division between scientists should be drawn. Meg Greenfield, quoted in a previous chapter, indicated that the pure scientists originated the most lethal weapons developments. They managed to blame the so-called engineers--the less theoretical scientists--for making practicable the terrible weapons they had made possible. Equating purity with righteousness, scientists of other types and especially those in fields relating to biology or medicine, allied themselves with the purists. Thus they achieved enough unity to produce a number of statements and manifestos, some of which have been cited previously.

The Christian Science Monitor, after giving President Eisenhower credit for bringing physical scientists into government (President Roosevelt II usually gets credit for the earlier introduction of the social scientists) praised the stand of the scientific community on the test ban. One hundred and fifty members of the MIT faculty, for example, had sent an open "word" to Senators that limiting nuclear
tests would enhance the security of the United States. However unqualified most of its members may have been to pass judgment, there was no question that the national scientific community was strongly in favor of the treaty, and that they were commendably anxious to publicize their views. Unfortunately some members of the community, most often found among the purists, wished to deny that privilege to others.

In a previous chapter the efforts of a few scientists to personally discredit Dr. Teller and to stifle his expression were cited. A more flagrant example was provided by Dr. Bernard T. Feld, professor of Physics at MIT, and president of an association called the Council for a Livable World. Dr. Feld wrote to Dr. Stephan Possony, a director of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, to protest the appearance of Dr. Teller at a symposium. Dr. Feld wrote that Dr. Teller would not set the proper tone for the symposium, since "he symbolizes the cold war and the desire for its continuation."

Dr. Possony made the most of Dr. Feld's blunder. He had hoped, he said in reply, that physicists might side with Galileo rather than with the inquisition. To Dr. Possony, Dr. Feld seemed to imply that Dr. Teller should never have testified at all, thus allowing the Senate to receive partial evidence and to rubberstamp decisions made by the executive. Dr. Possony had been under the impression that the cold war was inspired by the communists rather than by Dr. Teller, and suspected Dr. Feld of being unable to refute in open debate some of the points made by Dr. Teller. He thought Dr. Feld should apologize for his efforts toward academic gleichschaltung
(enforced equalization of minds) and also because his letter attacking Dr. Teller "violated the ethos of science as well as the ethos of democracy." 372

The ethos of science became a more and more difficult thing to define as its practitioners became more involved in governmental responsibility, as we have seen. They were repeatedly revealed as humanly fallible, especially in certain instances of a typically human thirst for power and influence beyond the realms of their limited specialties. The military men, at least, had the advantage of a traditional detachment from politics in its most competitive forms. For example, that most respected of veteran military journalists, Mark Watson, wrote definitely: "Whether military disadvantages outweigh political advantages, as contended successfully, is not for the military to say." The consequence, Watson admitted, was public ignorance of what the military disadvantages really were. Nevertheless, Watson stuck to his principle of military non-involvement as more important.

It was his partial seduction from this principle by President Kennedy that disappointed some military associates of General LeMay, despite their admiration for the General's stubborn candor at the hearings. They knew he had been "rose-gardened" by the President, and he had resisted fairly well this effort to enlist his support for the treaty in a new role as statesman. Yet they felt his professional prestige had been employed to support publicly the disastrous illusions of power-hungry military amateurs.

Said a military leader of more and greater experience in the Washington cockpit than General LeMay:
"If only he had not been talked into saying the political advantages of the treaty could outweigh the military disadvantages. What could he know, for sure, of the world political arena? He was no expert at that, and basing a position on his own judgment of political factors made him look a little like those accountants and economists who pose as military experts in the office of the Secretary of Defense."

Some two years later, after his shortened term of office was finished, General LeMay was able to ask publicly where the supposed military advantages had gone. What had become of the great benefits for which the military risks had been taken? Obviously, the so-called political advantages had been oversold, but General LeMay's position, said some of his friends, was weakened by the fact that he had willingly, though skeptically, participated in the sale.

Associates of General Twining who learned what was happening before as well as after the treaty debate, were intrigued by that reticent gentleman's role as a buffer between the President and some famous scientists. Not long after the Russian tests were completed, General Twining was named chairman of a committee of scientists to study and recommend what should be done. The committee was carefully balanced to include some of the more pure and pacific scientists such as Ulam and Bethe. The committee members decided that the Russian tests placed the United States in a position of dangerous inferiority regarding knowledge of certain types of nuclear explosions and their effects, and recommended an intensive series of tests to redress the balance. The committee was particularly interested in high altitude explosions, in certain types of low altitude, low yield explosions, in high yield explosions and their effects, and in the survivability of warheads approaching the atmosphere against high-level nuclear radiation. Extensive and rapid experimentation in these areas they
considered to be a matter of urgency. Then came the Russian switch to the campaign for a treaty and President Kennedy's desire to achieve a treaty in the fastest possible time.

The President was informed about the Twining committee and its findings. He was determined to modify the impact. The most prominent member of the committee, Dr. Hans Bethe, proved the most persuasive. It was impossible to erase his signature from the committee document, so Dr. Bethe decided to submit a minority report, saying that while he still agreed with the findings, he did not agree with the tone of the recommendations, and therefore wished to go on record as dissenting from the report he had signed. Dr. Ulam did not so record his change of views, but he did express himself publicly and at some length in support of the treaty.

More significant, especially for the light it cast on how the President was able to secure such reversals, was his encounter with General Twining. The General, who had retired as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was invited to the White House and told bluntly: "You have stabbed me in the back." General Twining did not understand how the President could make the disagreement so personal, but he came to understand that the President expected him to be personally and politically loyal, even to the point of modifying or suppressing his own convictions. General Twining said he had been trying to perform a service by helping some highly qualified men get together on some important facts, but the President judged this effort only in relation to its possible influence. He asked if General Twining knew of the extensive standby provisions for testing which were being prepared on Johnston Island. General Twining, who had been on
familiar terms with at least two previous presidents, was somewhat
taken aback by President Kennedy's attitude, which struck him as
imperious. He said he did not know about the Johnston Island pro-
ject and neither did, so far as he knew, any of his responsible
associates. Hearing about so extensive a project this late and this
suddenly caused him to suspect that the whole project was basically
a "public relations maneuver," and he said so. This reaction did not
improve the cordiality of the meeting, and General Twining departed,
regretting that something about the conversation had caused him almost
to forget, for a moment, that he was speaking to a president.

Since General Twining had been a counselor of Presidents for more
than a dozen years it is interesting that the feature of the interview
which surprised and puzzled him most was the accusation of a "stab in
the back." How the chairmanship of a fact-finding committee of
scientists could have been interpreted as personal treachery was be-
yond him. This was especially true since the committee had included
scientists of varied political hues and a wide range of opinions con-
cerning the benevolence of communist intentions. The line between
personal loyalty and institutional loyalty is not always clear, but
men like General Twining who had served leaders of competing politi-
cal parties had learned there was such a line. He knew at the time,
of course, that his new experience was not unique, especially among
those who served in the vicinity of the Pentagon.

Sorenson and Schlesinger have since documented, perhaps uncon-
sciously, this new tendency to translate many functions of democratic
government into questions of personal and even of family loyalty.
As short-term participants in government they missed its significance.
Yet President Kennedy must have realized, as well as did General Twining, the falsity of translating this rare contact between them into a personal conflict between two men. Perhaps it was really a conflict between the historic Anglo-Saxon tradition of institutional government and the equally historic Celtic tradition of fidelity to a clan.

In any case, President Kennedy's problems were unquestionably stupendous, and he was not helped in solving them by the stereotypes that were perpetrated by some of his closest advisors. Scientists in government were new and they were too mixed-up in their own conception of their proper role to permit stereotyping. Professional members of the State Department and of the armed services, however, were easy targets. Schlesinger, even more than Sorensen, reveals through hundreds of pages of his famous history the popular attitude toward governmental professionals among the newest tenants around Lafayette Square. He was often at the President's elbow and sometimes prepared papers on atomic testing. Schlesinger was extremely irritated when the Joint Chiefs prepared a paper on the same subject. He quotes his own comments on the JCS product: "assertive, ambiguous, semi-literate and generally unimpressive." Perhaps carried away by such passionate views, he committed a surprising error.

A NOTABLE BLUNDER IN TREATY DEBATE STEREOTYPING

A case could be made that the most popular histories, at the time they are written, are those which ride the trends of the moment and caricature those who oppose those trends. Caricatures and theatrical props make lively reading and often they do no harm. A
harmless, perhaps even a genuine dramatic prop appears in Schlesinger's *A Thousand Days*. The occasion is at the beginning of the test ban debate when Mr. Harriman, the distinguished negotiator, had just returned to Washington from Moscow. His Georgetown neighbors serenaded him (a truly rare event in Georgetown) with old campaign songs like "H-A-double R-I-M-A-N spells Harriman." Suddenly into this scene of transplanted Ivy, there steps a young woman with a baby in her arms. Such a woman has appeared in other dramas by the same historian, particularly in connection with events of the Depression Years.

This time the young mother is called a girl, and she has a very small baby in her arms. She says to Mr. Harriman: "I brought my baby because what you did in Moscow will make it possible for him to look ahead to a full and happy life." With such a literate and expressive girl for a mother it is understandable that the very small baby could be optimistic, though he might someday forget to give credit where it was due. Mr. Harriman's agreement to a treaty which both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev wanted so much seems a rather small basis for a full and happy life. Nevertheless, such familiar stage props are harmless, and they do help to break up the dull historical page.

The stereotyping of entire groups of men who make up institutions necessary to the functioning of government is another matter. Even the most popular historian has some responsibilities in this regard. If he specializes in singling out individuals to participate in his type-casting, he should at least make sure they fit the rules. In the unfortunate case of General Thomas White, Schlesinger made an unfortunate mistake.
Perhaps General White could be blamed for starting the quarrel by making Mr. Schlesinger angry. In the course of a lengthy tribute to Mr. McNamara's achievements, Schlesinger says that Mr. Gilpatrick, "despite his Air Force background" was an able partner in the reorganization of defense. On the other hand General Thomas D. White, a former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, wrote "bitterly," says Schlesinger, about the "tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional defense intellectuals" and about "over-confident, sometimes arrogant young professors, mathematicians and other theorists." There is no evidence that General White had Professor Schlesinger in mind, though it might be difficult to exclude him entirely from this description. The characterization by General White includes too many categories to be a true stereotype. It does sound rather bitter, as Schlesinger says, despite the fact that the late General White was a notably reserved and kindly man.

General White employed terms that were perhaps overly descriptive, but Schlesinger names names, as historians will do. When he states in A Thousand Days that sections of the military and scientific community continued in strong opposition to the treaty, the name which leads all the rest is that of General Thomas D. White. An irrelevant quote from General White is presented to document Schlesinger's charge. In addition, General White is listed in the index of A Thousand Days as being in opposition to the test ban treaty.

The simple and public truth is that three weeks before the vote by the Senate, General White, in his featured article as a Newsweek Contributing Editor said: "...the test-ban treaty is worth the gamble....It is a small beginning which could lead to vitally important agreements with the Communist world."
General White's support for the treaty was clear and it was important. He and a few other military leaders refused to conform in opposition just as so many refused to conform in support. General David Shoup, commandant of the Marine Corps was, in the administration's view, obliged to support the treaty, since he was on duty. He was scarcely expected to support it with great enthusiasm. Yet, General Shoup, a dedicated and intense man who wrote poetry at Tarawa on the death of a comrade, declared that "the test ban could, in the future, be as important to humanity as the birth of Christ."379

Only Dr. Albert Schweitzer went further. His letter, handwritten in French, was sent from Africa to the President at Cape Cod. Dr. Schweitzer spoke of his friend Einstein, who "joined in the fight against atomic weapons. He died at Princeton in despair."

Dr. Schweitzer continued, in the letter which must have given the idealistic President great satisfaction, "thanks to your foresight... the world has taken the first step on the road leading to peace."380

As his crowning tribute, Dr. Schweitzer said that the treaty was perhaps the greatest event in the history of the world. Since most of the world remains non-Christian, Dr. Schweitzer's tribute was the ultimate, surpassing General Shoup's statement that the treaty may have been the greatest event since the birth of Christ.
CHAPTER IX: A LADY SPEAKS AND ALL SENATORS VOTE

By mid-September the treaty debate in the Senate had become mostly a matter for the record and the premature counting of votes had begun. An Associated Press survey reported 73 senators as committed or inclined to vote for ratification, 12 opposed and 15 doubtful. The treaty at this point appeared to be in no danger, but the President was anxious for an early and overwhelming triumph. Both Senator Fulbright and the Majority Whip, Senator Humphrey, were pushing as hard as possible. Their pushing kept the Senate on edge. Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island, chairman of the House-Senate Atomic Energy Committee, became particularly emotional.

Senator Pastore was nettled by the speech of Senator Miller of Iowa in which the westerner pointed out that by confining atomic testing underground, where it was much more secret and expensive, the treaty would step up the arms race rather than slow it down. For some reason Senator Pastore then exploded into a challenge that any Senator who thought either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy had sold out to the enemy ought to vote for rejection of the treaty. He insisted that anyone who was inclined to doubt the treaty had a double responsibility because the two-thirds majority requirement for ratification meant that every senator voting "no" really had two votes. "If by their vote they destroy and kill the treaty, God help us, God help us," cried Senator Pastore.

On the 18th of September the hard-working administration floor leaders abandoned their strenuous efforts to force a vote before President Kennedy's United Nations speech of the 20th. There was
unanimous consent for the final vote on the 24th. There remained the matter of amendments to be disposed of. It was understood that an amendment would virtually kill the treaty, so none was expected to pass. A vote to make the treaty conditional on Russian withdrawal from Cuba was defeated 75 to 17. The largest and most interesting vote came on a proposal to attach a declaration that the treaty did not affect the right of the United States to use nuclear weapons in war.

This proposed understanding on freedom to use nuclear weapons was sponsored by Republican Senator Tower of Texas and Democrat Russell Long of Louisiana. Considerable support developed and administration leaders had to enter the debate to point out that there had been a general agreement to the effect that the treaty in no way affected the right to use nuclear weapons. The proposal was finally killed by a vote of 61 to 33.\(^3\)

The vote for this amendment would have been exactly enough to kill the treaty (more than one third of available members). The vote against it was far too low to have passed the treaty. This proportion indicated that many senators would vote for the treaty reluctantly and it also demonstrated a widespread apprehension that the treaty would be interpreted by the Russians as a sign of growing irresolution and weakness regarding the possible use of atomic weapons in some future crisis.

At this crucial moment in the treaty's progress the \textit{Washington Post} saw fit to print the second of two Public Opinion polls showing not only strong support for the treaty but a considerable switch since July. The poll was taken by a new service called "The Harris
"Survey" and the July test ban poll was its second effort. Comments by Louis Harris on the July poll, which were more editorial than analytical, emphasized support for the treaty. This support was put at 73 percent approval, including 47 percent unqualified approval. The percentage opposed to the treaty in July was 17.384

In the September report, also copyrighted by the Washington Post, the emphasis had changed completely. This time the headline was the great switch to the treaty since July: July figures were ostensibly reprinted for comparison. Yet the July figure of 72 percent had disappeared, leaving only the "unqualified support" figure for July which was very much lower. Strangely, there was no comparable figure for September, the new September figure was a whopping 82 percent. In addition to this very obvious slanting for effect, Harris had arbitrarily changed his July "opposed" figure from 17 to 19. This provided greater contrast in opposition to the treaty for the new September figure, which had surprisingly dropped to a mere 8 percent.385

Gallup's figures showed only 63 percent in favor of the treaty in September as against 17 percent opposed (20 percent had no opinion). Thus Gallup's "opposed" figure for September was exactly the same as the Harris figure for July, 17 percent (the figure originally printed by Harris). Gallup also showed that in the south only 48 percent supported the treaty as against 31 percent with no opinion and 21 percent opposed. In the Far West the percentage opposed was the same but the number supporting the treaty rose to 61 percent, which was just below the national average.386
These comparisons help to explain the greater opposition to the treaty by western senators and especially to explain the much greater opposition by southern senators. Sorensen chooses to ignore all this and attribute Southern opposition to an effort for "use the treaty as a bargaining counter" against the administration's civil rights bill. Since there is no evidence anywhere to support Sorenson's thesis, it is understandable that he should ignore available evidence against it, and that he would use only the manipulated Harris figures. Schlesinger makes no such charge against the Southerners, but concentrates on his claim of what President Kennedy had "wrought on the mind of the nation. Public opinion polls indicated a marked swing in favor of the treaty--80 percent by September." Public opinion "polls" showed no such thing. Only the new Harris poll, which had modified figures and avoided any straightforward comparison could give any such indication. Schlesinger quotes the Gallup poll on half a dozen other points but he chooses to ignore it here on the test ban issue where it was most important.

Assuming that the first Harris polls on the treaty in July to be approximately correct (they bear no evidence of manipulation), a comparison with the Gallup figures for September shows a full ten point drop (more than 10 percent) in support for the treaty! The percentage opposed in July and September remains exactly the same at 17 percent. This sudden usefulness of the Harris poll followed only a few months behind the admission of news manipulation by the Defense Secretary's publicity man, Mr. Arthur Sylvester. The question of manipulated polls and of carefully selective poll citation did not arise, but apparently that too has now become history.
The fact that the respected Gallup poll indicates a possible drop in public sentiment for the treaty goes a long way to help explain the unseemly haste in pushing it through the Senate. Certainly opponents of the treaty were in no hurry to bring it to a vote. Senator Anderson of New Mexico, for one, was quoted as saying that if the hearings were not speeded the treaty might not pass. In retrospect it appears well nigh impossible that the treaty would fail to pass after it received the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the early vote was in any case a blessing, for the debate was getting on everybody's nerves.

On the eve of the final vote only two Senators had failed to commit themselves in some degree. These were Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine and Senator Howard Cannon of Nevada. Senator Cannon had very little to say and he voted for the treaty. Senator Smith finally decided to vote against the treaty and she had something very interesting to say concerning her reasons. Regardless of agreement of disagreement with her logic and with her final decision, Senator Smith's speech reveals an ordeal of mind and emotion and a plain spoken sincerity that is unsurpassed in any other treaty speech.

Senator Smith spoke last. Her speech was lost in the news of the vote and was scarcely mentioned anywhere. This, in part, is what she said:

"What does the majority of the American people want? The Gallup poll and the Harris poll show that an overwhelming majority of the American people want the treaty ratified. But that is not what my mail shows, and it is the heaviest mail I have ever received. It is not pressure mail. Instead it is individual mail—from every section of the Nation."
Senator Smith went on to say that her mail ran heavily against the treaty. She could only conclude that those who supported the treaty would not write, while the "articulated intensity" of its opponents was much greater. (The greater tendency of conservatives, or of opponents, to express their views in writing is a phenomenon well known to American political scientists.)

If the treaty were rejected, continued Senator Smith, Khrushchev would accuse us of poisoning the air, though he is most guilty. Rejection would not influence testing, because of the position President Kennedy has already taken. Of course, she said, Khrushchev wants us to leave the Russians with a testing advantage, but he did not need a treaty to achieve it—he already had it. Her conclusions, she insisted, were no more speculative than the official ones, which were admittedly speculative. Therefore the political and psychological advantages of the treaty must be balanced against the national security disadvantages stemming from its ratification.

"Fortunately, the political and psychological disadvantages of treaty rejection have been very ably and fully presented out in the open to the public. And make no mistake about it, they are tremendously impressive arguments—almost compelling arguments."

"Unfortunately the national security disadvantages stemming from the treaty have not been as fully presented out in the open to the public.

"...In the questions that have been asked I have tried very hard to find a basis for which I could conscientiously vote for ratification of the treaty. I regret to say that the answers have not been supplied."

Senator Smith completed her argument by saying that while she could see the harmful effects that would follow rejection of the treaty, she felt that considerations of national security were paramount.
"That is why," concluded Senator Smith, "I shall cast a very troubled vote against the treaty."\textsuperscript{389} 

This ended the debate. After all the hearings and the arguments, the vote for the treaty was only slightly lower than had been predicted all along. It was 80 for ratification to 19 against. All Senators voted except Engle of California, who was suffering from what proved a fatal illness. He sent word that if he could have been present he would have voted for the treaty.\textsuperscript{390} 

The final Senate vote was on September 24, 1963. As befitted the dignity of a bigger nation, the Soviet Parliament moved last and ratified the treaty just two days after the United States Senate had acted. In the absence of Mr. Gromyko, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov made the official statement. He said:

"The nuclear power of the Soviet Union, which keeps the imperialists from unleashing aggression, is not based at all on the types of nuclear arms which are perfected by means of underground tests, but precisely on those weapons in which the Soviet Union has superiority, a fact recognized by many American leaders."\textsuperscript{391} 

On the day of the Soviet ratification of the treaty, President Charles de Gaulle of France announced that he would run for reelection and said:

"The two camps, the two rivals, have carried out hundreds of tests so far. Thanks to these tests they have built up armaments capable of destroying the universe. Now they want all other peoples to engage themselves never to carry out other tests....If it were agreed that in the world two privileged states should hold forever the monopoly of power, that would mean delivering the world to a double hegemony."\textsuperscript{392} 

Also on the same day Secretary McNamara said again on television that even a surviving remnant of United States nuclear forces would "literally be capable of destroying the Soviet Union," and he added
that if other nations developed nuclear forces that would endanger this country, the United States would have the right to resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere. This was before the Chinese began to test.
CHAPTER X: A SEQUEL OF HOPES DEFERRED
AND FEARS SUSPENDED

After the final vote was counted the nation seemed to breathe a sigh of relief. This was particularly true of reporters, commentators and columnists. It had been a long hot summer in Washington and there were more pleasant ways to escape the burdens of urban life than by pondering the adequacy of underground fission and fusion. Eric Sevareid remarked that most informed proponents and opponents of the treaty were ridden with doubts about their stand because the issue was so clouded with uncertainties. No such uncertainties trouble the semi-official historians of these events, Sorensen and Schlesinger. Sorensen, having charged President Kennedy with believing the Southern Senators would bargain with the treaty against civil rights, counts the vote in what he considers a significant manner, the opposition being "only 11 Democrats (all Southerners except for Lausche) and 8 Republicans (all west of the Missouri except for Mrs. Smith)."

Sorensen is approximately right in his geography; the doubtful classification of West Virginia as Southern robs him of exact accuracy. His thesis had been dormant for some two years. In addition to attacks previously quoted against the civil rights theory of test ban opposition, William S. White had practically demolished it. (White was once famous as the conservative columnist so moderate that even President Kennedy read him).

Junior-grade cynicism, said White, was responsible for attacks against Dirksen as seeking the mantle of Vandenberg in his support
for the treaty. Academic-minded skeptics, he said, also had attacked Russell of Georgia and Stennis of Mississippi as opposing the treaty for obscure reasons. According to White, Dirksen and Saltonstall supported the President because they thought he was right, while Russell and Stennis opposed him because their main legislative responsibilities had been in the field of military defense and they were peculiarly aware of the misgivings that existed among the highest military officers. Whatever may have been the motivation of the votes, White's explanation was certainly the predominant one.

No theory is offered by Sorensen to explain the Republican opposition west of the Missouri, nor is a convincing analysis available from anyone else. The Senators voting against the treaty were:

- Bennett (Rep. - Utah)
- Byrd (Dem. - Va.)
- Byrd (Dem. - W. Va.)
- Curtis (Rep. - Neb.)
- Eastland (Dem. - Miss.)
- Goldwater (Rep. - Ariz.)
- Jordan (Rep. - Idaho)
- Lausche (Dem. - Ohio)
- Long (Dem. - La.)
- McClellan (Dem. - Ark.)
- Mechem (Rep. - N.M.)
- Robertson (Dem. - Va.)
- Russell (Dem. - Ga.)
- Simpson (Rep. - Wyo.)
- Smith (Rep. - Me.)
- Stennis (Dem. - Miss.)
- Talmadge (Dem. - Ga.)
- Thurmond (Dem. - S.C.)
- Tower (Rep. - Tex.)

Despite the wide interest in the treaty debate, the wire services did not carry a listing of the vote, except for the few senators who had been prominent in the debate, nor did any major newspaper. There was very little analysis or discussion of the vote. No one showed
surprise that so many senators from states that received more fall-out had voted against the treaty. Further comment on Sorensen's and, as he says, the President's southern bargain idea was also lacking.

Yet in Sorensen's book, if not in President Kennedy's, civil rights and the peace crusade were somehow related. In a peculiar passage of President Kennedy's famous American University speech on June 10, 1963 there is expressed a philosophy that appears more Unitarian than Catholic. After speaking indirectly of civil rights President Kennedy said: "All this is not unrelated to world peace. 'When a man's ways please the Lord,' the scriptures tell us, 'he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him.'"

TRUST AND DRY POWDER

"Nobody here feels very happy or confident about the treaty. But this is a hopeful and optimistic country" wrote New York Times foreign affairs analyst James Reston from Washington on the day following the Senate vote. He explained that the American people and the Congress are inclined to go along with the President when he is hopeful on the complex issues of foreign policy. It was not always so, as both Wilson and Roosevelt had learned to their sorrow. Woodrow Wilson went to his grave convinced that the Senate was so negative it would never again ratify a major treaty. Yet in the test ban case, according to Reston, despite all the scientific and military testimony, the decision in the end had to be political and even philosophical, and in the end the nation's currently optimistic spirit prevailed.
Eric Sevareid made the observation that few of the citizens who wrote letters about the treaty appeared to have read the testimony with care, which is certainly not surprising since to do so requires a few hours a day for about a month. Many of those who made speeches also betrayed ignorance. Sevareid noted that most who had strong opinions considered the treaty a Russian trap, or, conversely "an irreversible step toward peace and friendship, an end to the cold war and sanity at long last in the affairs of men."

The danger reflected in the treaty, said Sevareid, is not so implausible after all—not something exclusively "conjured up in the passionate anti-Russian recesses of Dr. Teller's complicated mind." It is possible that the Russians may develop a workable antimissile system before this country does. There is a more likely possibility that our laboratories will decline and that our missiles will deteriorate with inadequate testing. Also, said Sevareid, the treaty may not slow down the arms race, and it may increase tensions for some time to come. It multiplies things not known about the enemy, which causes more worries and suspicions. Yet the treaty does reduce the amount of radioactive dust and possibly slow down the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. 401

Sevareid, one of the most successful prophets of the treaty's consequences, hoped that it would not paralyze NATO still further (it did), and warned against believing the Chinese were about to become amenable to reason, even if it should prove true that the Russians were. He said "if there is any basic flaw in the American world stance it is a leaning toward trust rather than distrust... [and] the clamorous, guilt-ridden claims of all those groups which
arrogate to themselves the desire for and the label of 'peace.'"

In one of the most accurate of all observations following the treaty Sevareid predicted: "If from here on we are led into policy errors by reason of domestic pressures, it will not be the pressures of the overly suspicious right wing minorities but the pressure of left-wing minorities who persistently equate American with Communist responsibility for the dangerous condition of the world." These groups, said Sevareid, would have us withdraw from Viet Nam and other countries which happen to have a nasty right wing government, and draw closer to nasty left wing governments. "Brutality, itself, does not bother these groups; they are concerned only with the words of the torturers chant as he wields the whip."\(^{402}\)

Even after the treaty vote, Walter Lippmann was still repeating his insistent conviction that further scientific surprises of a decisive nature are impossible: "There is a dissenting minority, led by Dr. Teller in this country and reflected in the negative votes in the Senate, which continues to believe that a breakthrough can be made if enough atmospheric tests are conducted." He thought the Russians might have a Dr. Teller who believed in breakthroughs and that the treaty was negotiated because both governments rejected the views of these people. Mr. Lippmann's fascination with absolutes in the form of weapons had not abated: "If there were any real chance of achieving the absolute weapon, the risks of not testing would be absolutely enormous."\(^{403}\) Mr. Lippmann's conception of military and scientific reality was indeed absolutely absolute.

Mr. Lippmann was simply reflecting the dogma of the \textit{nouveau} military (and some of the \textit{ancien} military) in hot pursuit of the
detente so often cited by Schlesinger. Since peace was desired, the military and scientific realities were arbitrarily distorted into a simplistic formula that would promote the hope of peace. Thus the absolute formula or statement, so often employed by Mr. McNamara and his economist aides, became an effective psychological weapon until tested by events. As long as the formula reflected what the bomb-frightened populace desired, and as long as nothing happened to reveal its fakery, it did seem to work very well.

Mr. Lippmann occupied the middle ground on the new battlefield of military and anti-military formula-flinging. A sample of the farther left, which featured esoteric social theory, was provided by famed introspective sociologist David Reisman, author of The Lonely Crowd. Reisman editorialized in The Correspondent for July-August, 1963 on a report by Craig Comstock in the same magazine. Comstock had been attending a Scientists for Survival Meeting in New York and reported his understanding of the corridor conversation at the meeting. It was skeptical of the treaty, for new reasons.

To the Commentator's writers reality was so far left that their positions on the test ban treaty coincided with that of the far right—a phenomenon which is not unusual. They felt the test ban might really be a step backward. By carrying fears of mutual delusion into a second sequence, Reisman came up with this ping-pong of nation-group delusion-juggling: "the Americans will not believe that the Russians are not preparing a new series of tests which might lead to some breakthrough." Since this was precisely what had just happened, Reisman's judgment of American judgment was not as pejorative as he seemed to think. "In addition," said Reisman,
"there is the fear that the Russians will not permanently accept the second place position...." This was an interesting afterthought. Reisman did not question that the treaty had actually put the Russians at a disadvantage just as Mr. McNamara (but none of his military or scientific aides) had proclaimed.

Why would the Russians not accept second place? Mr. Reisman's group could always be trusted to find a militarist in the stockpile—whether our militarist or theirs really made no difference. The Russian generals and military scientists (note military scientists) according to Reisman, will not permit their more culpable counterparts on our side to "go on manufacturing underground experiments" while Russian hands are tied "because miniturization isn't their style." Reisman would imply, apparently, that the Russian military and scientific generals are big and hearty men of the open steppes—sharp minds, perhaps, but thick fingers.

Reisman did not quite go along with the idea that the test ban is regressive, because it fails to give sufficient weight to the "symbolic importance" of the test ban. He was more interested in repeating what Norman Thomas and others previously quoted were saying: that the Right Wing (always capitalized) "fears a loss of momentum in the cold war;" the Right Wing's attitude being, of course, "exactly the same as that expressed by the Chinese Communists."

The Chinese, said Reisman, assume that American weapons makers are purely rational. They do not understand that weapons are made "because various groups have an interest in keeping the laboratories
going." Here Reisman was saying, in effect, that the Chinese did not believe their own propaganda while he, Reisman, understood it to be true!

Reisman concluded that the Chinese and the Right Wing at home fear the same thing, namely detente, (Schlesinger's holy grail). Reisman expressed the idea, to be repeated ad infinitum by Schlesinger, that while the treaty did not accomplish disarmament "in the military sense" it was a first step "toward a detente in the political sense." "Of course" added Reisman in a warning common to all eager pilgrims on the road to detente, "it will backfire if the momentum is not taken for such further initiatives...."^^

Still further to the left on the broad highway to detente, as might befit a true Englishman, was Lord Russell. Out in his distant left field he did not become entangled in full-circle collisions between left wing and right wing. Lord Russell was, in a sense, peripheral to both. He would believe just about anything. Writing from Penrhynedudaeth, Wales, to the New York Herald Tribune, he charged: "The U.S. is now giving nuclear warheads to Canada, negotiating with France with a view to giving her a nuclear device, flirting with west Germany along these lines, establishing new nuclear rocket bases in Turkey and placing nuclear submarines in Japan."^^

One of the conscious or unconscious results of left wing volatility was that it kept the right wing in a state of near apoplexy. Except for the letter writers, the latter had few articulate spokesmen. For some reason, the blue portion of the ideological spectrum does not spread like that of the rosier hues on the left--on the free
Perhaps the rightists are less adept at debate because they are not continually debating with each other. Their position seems to them so obviously correct that it is important only to repeat it, while the leftists have repeatedly to justify their own shifting across a broad range of presumed possibilities. William Buckley stands out as a rare specimen, a clever conservative, who is willing to practice his footwork by jostling other conservatives.

On the test ban treaty issue, Buckley disagreed with another Republican, Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, whose position in uneasy support for the treaty appears in a previous chapter. Buckley summarized Governor Rockefeller's position in support of the treaty very neatly: President Kennedy had so maneuvered fears of radioactivity and of war that they overshadowed in the public psychology the military superiority which had been considered essential since World War II. The circumstances had become such, said the Governor, that we would damage the United States more by failing to ratify the treaty than by failing to cultivate our nuclear superiority. This impasse between strategy and philosophy would not have been reached, said Buckley, if the moral and imperative purpose of American defense superiority had been made clear:

"We are, after all, arming ourselves not because American citizens desire atomic superiority for its own sake, but because our atomic program has been the basis of the defense of the free world and the only hope of the enslaved world."

Although he did not refer to it here, Buckley was echoing the view which had been eloquently expressed by Churchill, and generally accepted at mid-century, that only the atomic bomb in the hands of
the United States had saved Western Europe from communist enslavement. Nor did he mention an opposite view, completely though foggily expressed in General Taylor's *Uncertain Trumpet* which became the military textbook of the New Frontier. It so happened that General Taylor's dream of "returning the battle to the battlefield," his conventional army battlefield, coincided with President Kennedy's dream of putting the atomic genie back into the bottle. Out of this union the so-called McNamara strategy was born, which lead to spasmodic conventional buildups in Europe and steady troop buildups in Vietnam, plus endless preachments on the feasibility of defeating both the Russians and the Chinese hand-to-hand. All of this reversal and confusion contributed to the conflict between the good opinion of mankind and the demands of national security which Buckley deplored. "That there should be so critical a tension between the two" concluded Buckley, "suggests a philosophical Waterloo."

The purpose and significance of our nuclear advantage had been so misrepresented and undervalued in our own country by General Taylor and others that the failure of "world opinion" to grasp it was understandable. Buckley thought that if the purposes of our atomic development program, and its necessity, had been made clear to the peoples of the world they would have been applauding rather than resenting our efforts to maintain nuclear superiority. Perhaps this was a vain hope, but Buckley considered the treaty a vain hope. The votes of a lot of stern and rigorous anti-Communist Senators made the treaty possible, he said, "but however less the radioactivity in the atmosphere, this citizen of the free world will breathe less easily."
It is interesting to note that emotional supporters of the treaty attacked not only its opponents but also those who supported it for other reasons. Drew Pearson and an editorial writer of the New York Times attacked Senator Jackson for his "half-hearted" endorsement of the treaty and Senator Pastore attacked Senator Miller and others for their realistic interpretation of the treaty as a green light for underground testing. Marquis Childs of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the Washington Post, who was considered in Washington the prototype of "bleeding-heart liberal" columnists, promptly attacked Governor Rockefeller despite his pro-treaty decision. Not only was Childs displeased with the Governor's reasons, he was also disturbed by the gubernatorial advisors. These included Professor Henry Kissinger of Harvard and Ted Walkowicz, in addition to Dr. Teller.

Childs hinted vaguely that Dr. Teller had investments in a company that was associated with some Rockefeller interests, and charged that Walkowicz, whom he called "Colonel," once had a leading role in weapons development. In addition Walkowicz was "believed to have been a factor in the Oppenheimer opposition." This last charge evidently Childs considered too serious to state bluntly. In identifying Professor Kissinger, Childs could only repeat the type of comment previously made about Dr. Teller by Senator Fulbright. This type of subtle suggestion was not uncommon among emotionally committed test ban enthusiasts because so many anti-communist hard-liners were foreign born. Child's only characterization of Dr. Kissinger was: "quiet and soft-spoken with only a trace of the accent of his native Germany."
VARIETIES OF FOREIGN REACTION

In a review of Earl Voss's *Nuclear Ambush* for the *Wall Street Journal* conservative critic William Chamberlain said "One factor in the wobbling course of American policy has been excessive concern for 'world public opinion.'" He did not blame this on anybody in particular and it was just as well that he did not, for President Eisenhower was by no means immune to the temptation of making grand and futile gestures, as the Camp David and U-2 announcements incidents demonstrated.

In *Playboy* of May 1966 liberal critic Schlesinger says President Kennedy's great achievement was *detente*, a word that seems to fascinate the tense Schlesinger as much as the word courage fascinated President Kennedy. One of the ways this *detente* had been achieved, said Schlesinger, was by destroying "the notion of the Fifties that neutralism is immoral--that those who are not with us are against us...." Unfortunately, Schlesinger then goes on to contradict himself by saying that this maneuver "gave the neutralists and ourselves a position on which we could unite in resistance to Communist expansion."

If Schlesinger had not contradicted himself in *Playboy*, history as written by Schlesinger would have provided a contradiction anyway. The self-styled neutrals had united with the communists very consistently in condemning nuclear testing by the United States. Yet they failed to unite even with each other in condemning the massive Communist testing that broke the moratorium. Schlesinger quotes Kennedy himself as saying "I don't hear of any windows broken because of the Soviet decision. The neutrals have been terrible."
The neutrals were said to be afraid of Russia, while not in the least afraid of the United States. Because of this their failure to protest at all against the massive Russian tests which exploded more megatons than had been exploded in all history up to that time was said to be understandable. Perhaps it was.

The test ban treaty, by comparison, was no problem at all for the neutrals. The Russian's were for it one hundred percent, and so were the neutrals, including the Russian satellites but not including the Chinese satellites. Schlesinger says President Kennedy's problem was signing up France while Khrushchev had the problem of signing up China. He does not profess to know what efforts Khrushchev made with China but "As for France, Kennedy made a determined effort."  

President Kennedy told David Brinkley that Charles de Gaulle would be remembered for one thing only, his refusal to sign the treaty. This statement not only underlines the President's strange obsession with the treaty, but also the intensity of his efforts to persuade the General to save his reputation for posterity. He promised de Gaulle any data he might gain from atmospheric testing, plus assistance in underground testing. It was certainly a generous offer and it would have brought near-hysterics from Senators Morse, Hartke and a few others, but the offer came too late. It was not entirely President Kennedy's fault that it was too late, for the policy of excluding France from the nuclear program we shared with the British had been in effect for several years. American diplomats who had nursed the alcoholic Charles Bidault and other inept French premiers simply had no confidence in French leadership.
In the troops-to-Europe hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, young Congressman Kennedy of Massachusetts volunteered to testify against sending four American divisions to Europe. The Congressman said he simply did not think the Europeans would fight, and especially did he not think the French would fight. He had lived among them intimately, he said, and he enjoyed it, but he did not consider them as basically serious about such matters as resisting aggression. Therefore he did not think any American troops, beyond a token force, should be sent to reinforce the occupation force already in Germany. No record of these hearings is available because they were not open hearings, but participants were impressed by the sincere young man who had not yet developed a public style.

Just a dozen years later this same young man as President would go practically on his knees to Charles de Gaulle in an effort to persuade him to sign the treaty, so great was his own commitment to the treaty. He would offer de Gaulle everything the United States had denied for years in the way of nuclear assistance—everything now that France had needed during a long decade of buying uranium at inflated prices from Norway on the international black market; everything France had desperately struggled to achieve since the humiliation of Suez when she had been deserted by Britain and reproved by the United States. Now it was too late, de Gaulle was too proud, and there was too much glory to be salvaged by finishing the job alone. Small wonder that although President Kennedy was not surprised, he was bitterly disappointed.\textsuperscript{414}
At the time of de Gaulle's refusal France was fighting protests from Pacific nations, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Peru, against plans for French nuclear tests on the greatest ocean. The French ambassadors replied that with the exception of New Zealand, none of these nations had been heard to protest when the United States began high altitude tests at Johnston Island in 1962. They had not protested when the Russians broke the moratorium with heavy testing in the atmosphere a year earlier. The Manchester Guardian added that even those Frenchmen opposed to nuclear tests in general resented the attitude of English Speaking countries that tests were all right except when carried out now by somebody else. They particularly resented the boasts of British ministers that their possession of an independent deterrent had caused them to be invited to Moscow for the treaty discussions.

German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had avoided taking a stand in direct opposition to the test ban treaty, and Germany had signed, but he remained opposed to it in principle. In a television message he disagreed that the treaty would bring about any relaxation (detente) in the international atmosphere. He explained the treaty by saying it would be highly useful to President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan for the 1964 elections. "They need something to go into the elections with" concluded Chancellor Adenauer.

Among the uncommitted neutrals, U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, failed to join in the general outburst of enthusiasm among members of that organization who for the first time since Suez could cheer something important without irritating the Russians or even the Americans.
In his annual report as Secretary General U Thant said of the treaty: "This has given the world a feeling of hope and I trust that the year to come will justify the current mode of optimism." The tone of the statement indicated little surprise if the hopes were not realized, which was fortunate.

Assuming that the Russians had nothing up their sleeves that might prove decisive, and especially nothing they might consider to be decisive, the real problem with the treaty was China. Schlesinger thinks Khrushchev, in seeking the treaty, was impelled primarily by his need of a visible success to help isolate China in the Communist civil war. This hypothesis does not explain the rather sudden Russian reversal on the treaty question, but it is at least debatable. In any case the Chinese were not isolated. Not only did they hold on to North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania, all of whom embarrassed the Russians by refusing to sign the treaty; they also persuaded Castro to follow their lead despite his dependence on Russia for protection.

The Chinese fought right back against Russian words and actions. Reuters reported from Peking that an elaborate indictment of Russia covered the first pages of Chinese newspapers. The Russians, they said, had torn up in 1959 a two year old agreement to help China make atomic bombs. The Russians had finally promised nuclear support for China in the Formosa crisis of 1958, but only after it was obvious such support would not be needed. The Russians had rashly put missiles into Cuba and then indulged in "capitulationism" by withdrawing them. Worst of all, the Soviets were cowards who believed that the world's population would die in a nuclear war, a "pessimistic and despairing view."
"We say that, if...the worst came to the worst, half the population of the world would be killed. We are optimistic about the future of mankind." In language similar to that used for many years by Communists and their friends in attacks against U.S. military policy, the Chinese went on to say that the Russians were "worshippers of nuclear weapons." Nevertheless the Russians feared their objects of worship, for their leaders, according to the Chinese, held the opinion that "in this nuclear century to remain alive is everything and there is no aim in life....It is a truly bestial concept."

The Chinese tirade cited Korea, Viet-Nam, Algeria and Cuba as examples of communist victories in which the imperialists had not dared to use their nuclear bombs. The Russian judgment that China was too poor to make its own nuclear weapons was derided.\textsuperscript{419}

The Russian analysis of the test ban debate and the vote was less detailed and relatively unemotional. Some of it was familiar. Tass, the Soviet news agency had the same theory Sorensen attributed to President Kennedy concerning votes against the treaty by "racists from the South--Eastland, Long, Talmadge, Thurmond and their like." Opposition from the western Senators was explained by the military-industrial complex theory, familiar to far left believers in the "warfare state" popularized by Fred Cook and mentioned by David Reisman in a previous quotation. Tass said that other than racists, the senators in opposition were "closely connected with munitions monopolies connected with the arms race--Russell, Stennis, Harry Byrd, Robert Byrd, and Goldwater." Apparently there were not enough arms racers, so the list had to be filled out with southern racists.
"Naturally," said Tass in a sweeping truism, "the United States Senate could not defy world opinion and the will of the American people." Naturally, "such wild men as Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Lausche and Tower" went down to defeat. To complete the Russian coverage of the opposition, a ranking colonel wrote in Red Star, the Defense Ministry paper, that the Peking Communists and the Pentagon militarists were both rabid representatives of the breed of wild men on the issue of war. The wild men of Peking and of the Pentagon, wrote the Russian Colonel, "find themselves on the same side of the barricade."

Nevertheless, the Russians did not sound as dangerous as the Chinese. That they were seriously worried about the Chinese getting the bomb there was no doubt. With the increase in the population of China since World War II already exceeding the entire population of the United States, there was also an expansionist pressure, directed toward Southeast Asia and Indonesia, which was causing additional concern. Here at last was a mutual problem for the United States and Russia besides each other's nuclear weapons. The optimistic American commitments for hand-to-hand fighting against this horde in jungles of the Asian subcontinent was perilous enough to make the Muscovite power look like Big Brother Russia.

In a peculiar statement of sympathy for the Russians' problem, as well as for ours, Ambassador-Negotiator Averell Harriman said that if Red China continues to test nuclear weapons "Russia hopes the scorn of the world will be heaped upon them...." Considering how well the Russians themselves had borne up under increasingly timid international disapproval, Russia was not invoking much of a curse; in view
of the reckless Chinese attitude toward nuclear attack, they may be
expected to bear up fairly well under the world's scorn.\textsuperscript{422}

The Minuteman rocket, which now constitutes the major portion of
the United States intercontinental nuclear force, contains an automatic
electronic computer. This computer is loaded with a code disc con-
sisting of $167,184$ signals directing the flight of the rocket after
launch. It is claimed that electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear
explosion can erase or distort this magnetic recording while still in
a silo many miles away from an explosion. So wrote Colonel Pavlov in
\textit{Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)}, of 9 January 1964, less than four months
after the treaty was ratified.

Colonel Pavlov continued in \textit{Red Star} (the Russian Defense Depart-
ment publication): "The diehards support, in every possible manner,
the appeals of T. Power and B. Schriever (rocket boss of the U. S. Air
Force) for the resumption of high altitude explosions. The sector of
the press which supports them describes in great length the difficulties
connected with the creation of nuclear space weapons based only on the
data obtained previously, or under laboratory condition."

The account in \textit{Red Star} said further that Secretary McNamara was
interested in the yield-weight ratio of the particularly powerful
nuclear weapons "with which the Soviet Union has appreciably over-
taken the USA." In addition to concentrating on the problems of
nuclear fulx in space which could melt the plutonium-filled atomic
detonators of nuclear warheads in flight and also incapacitate space
vehicles, the American scientists were reported to be studying other
matters. These included nuclear weapons effects on surface and sub-
surface and installations, and the explosion-triggered production of
californium for use in small nuclear weapons including a nuclear bullet.

Colonel Pavlov concluded that the underground test program in the USA aimed to improve nuclear weapons "in order to intensify the nuclear arms race, and to increase international tension." Nothing was said about underground nuclear explosions such as two which occurred in Central Asia at Semipalatinsk the following year. These explosions were measured in Sweden, some three thousand miles away, at 6.4 on the 9 point Richter scale for earth shocks. Western experts in Moscow said the Russians were developing a warhead for huge new rockets. In the United States, the Atomic Energy Commission estimated the Russian shocks to indicate tests of nuclear devices of from one quarter of a million tons TNT equivalent up to one full megaton. Unlike the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the Russian testing agency never announced its shots. Explosions as heavy as the Russian ones would shock a large portion of the American West. Perhaps they pass in Russia as earthquakes. Little public notice in this country is paid to reports of explosions--almost none as compared to the attention once bestowed on atmospheric explosions. Perhaps not paying attention to such things contributes to preserving the famous detente, and perhaps it only creates a deeper uneasiness. In any case, there is no relaxation for the shaking earth.

CONFIDENCE IN THE EXECUTIVE IMPROVES

"Is this really, honestly, the way you have to run a country?"

So said the Baltimore Sun, in defense of the President, after his letter to the Senate giving "unqualified and unequivocal assurance"
that the stipulations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding nuclear testing would be implemented.

The Sun thought the letter, at last, ought to answer the test ban treaty doubts of all senators "except those few who can think in military terms only." The necessity for the letter was not questioned. It had been urgently requested by Senators Mansfield and Dirksen, who were trying hard to get the treaty through the Senate with maximum approval. The point was that before this letter of September 11, the Secretary of Defense had repeatedly assured Senate committees that the Joint Chief's stated requirements would be met, and the President himself had given such assurance publicly. This was not satisfactory. The President's letter ended on a querulous note in stating the hope that this and accompanying assurances would be "helpful in dispelling any concern or misgiving which any member of the Senate or citizen may have as to our determination to maintain the interests and the security of the United States."

This touch of petulance was passed over at the time, and so was the fact that the letter was a humiliating thing to have to write. The Sun saw it as "high comedy, played on a stage that could be swept next by tragedy, but comedy all the same," for senators had demanded that the President "say it again, and scout's oath this time, cross your heart and hope to die." The significant fact was that the letter had been requested by friends of the treaty, not by its foes. What Senator Jackson had said about the necessity for a treaty between the Senate and the Administration sounded funny, but it was true, and it was not funny at all.
Shortly after the treaty was ratified, the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee reported to the Senate on the number of points it would periodically investigate concerning actions the President had pledged. These points were very detailed; they included the scheduling of monitoring aircraft flights, the completion of Johnston Island test facilities and the availability of rocketry and instruments for the tests which would be made at Johnston Island if necessary, and an annual exercise by a joint task force to study the changing requirements for testing in space if the need should arise. A thorough examination of the adequacy of underground testing was, of course, included in the Committee's responsibility. Here the matter rested from public debate. Apparently the Senate and the country reposed a confidence in Senator Stennis, Senator Jackson and others of the responsible committees which had not been granted to the Administration.

The desire for checks and double-checks on administration activities relating to preparedness was not confined to the Senate. This was demonstrated a month after the treaty ratification, when the House Foreign Affairs committee insisted the House retain its voice in defense matters whenever its consent was considered appropriate. The law called for either Senate ratification of "affirmative legislation" by the Congress as a whole, including the House, on all disarmament and arms control measures.

Two years after treaty ratification the Chairman of the Nuclear Safeguards Committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee reported to the Senate on the implementation of the famous safeguards. The underground test program, said Senator Jackson, had been satisfactory.
It had included 62 underground tests since the treaty was signed. Some had been weapons research tests, some weapons effects tests, some peaceful purposes (Flowshare) tests, and two were for research on seismic detection of underground explosions. The latter were related to the continuing discussions at Geneva of a possible comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement.

Senator Jackson reported that safeguard number two, the maintenance of laboratory facilities and programs in nuclear technology, had been adequately supported. He was not satisfied with action on safeguard number three, the ability to test at Johnston Island. He recognized that instant readiness was impossible and that the situation was much improved over that of 1961 at the time of the surprise Soviet abrogation, when there was no readiness at all. Yet the Senator believed there should be still a greater readiness to test in a comparatively short time, if necessary, particularly in the light of "extraordinary developments by the Chinese Communists."

Soon after the signing of the treaty, some members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had traveled around the world to inspect capabilities for detection of treaty violations and actions by nations not signatory to the treaty. The detection facilities had been greatly improved in two years, especially in the field of seismic detection. Point four of the Joint Chiefs was therefore satisfactory also, but Senator Jackson added a note of warning: the art of concealment of nuclear tests was capable of progressing more rapidly than the art of detection. The Russian negotiator at Geneva, after years of stimulating loud echoes from certain groups in all countries to the effect that underground tests are detectable and require no
inspection, had finally admitted that the Russian seismologists could not tell whether all subterranean "events" were nuclear explosions or not. He did not go so far as to admit that on-site inspections are necessary to monitor a comprehensive test ban treaty.\(^{427}\)

There were those who thought that Senator Jackson was too optimistic, and that not nearly enough was being done about nuclear testing within the treaty. Not all offices or officers of the Defense Department were trusted, but confidence in the administration of 1965 was well above that of 1963. Senator Jackson concluded his report by saying that the Congress could not rest on what it had done. The annual reports would continue, but there was no desire for added assurances such as those which were repeatedly demanded in 1963.

A simple explanation of this improved confidence in a partially new team of administrators may be found among the many remarkable revelations by Schlesinger in *A Thousand Days*. According to Schlesinger (and Sorensen as well), President Kennedy did not really want to test at all, not even after the Russians had broken the moratorium and tested the super-bomb. He quotes the President as having said at this point: "Personally I hate the idea of resuming atmospheric tests. But its going to be damned hard to stave off the pressure...."\(^{428}\)

The American test series, according to Sorensen, were severely restricted and reduced by the President himself. Schlesinger reports dissatisfaction with underground testing as well as atmospheric. President Kennedy was disturbed, says Schlesinger, that the underground tests had been "by no means as fallout proof as advertised," and that radioactive debris, primarily iodine 131, had been discharged into the atmosphere by 17 cases of venting.
Concerning the atmospheric test portion of the limited American series, Schlesinger reports an even more surprising and non-scientific reaction. After all the clamor about necessity for tests says Schlesinger, the President was dissatisfied with "the meagerness of their results" (this was in the face of not having wished to perform them in the first place), and was "more determined than ever to bring the whole thing to an end." The dominant reason for quick termination of the restricted American tests was the most irrational of all; according to Schlesinger it was the President's dissatisfaction that "all the tests seemed to have proved was the need for more tests." Comparison of these revelations and the sworn testimony of high administration officials which were quoted in earlier chapters is somewhat disillusioning, to say the least.

In all accounts of the test ban debate and discussion, there is one notable absence—the Vice President. None of the many hundreds of accounts examined or considered in previous chapters mention the name or the office of the Vice President. The relationship between the Vice President and the President at this time may have been influenced by the relationship between the Vice President and the Attorney General, and this may help to explain the Vice President's meager role as compared with that of Vice Presidents Nixon and Humphrey. This problem need not concern us here. There is one rare bit of insight provided by Schlesinger, in connection with nuclear testing, which indicates that some of the Congressional mistrust of the President resulted from the activities of his all-purpose advisors.
A crucial incident during one of the thousand days in described by Schlesinger. The Soviets had just announced their intention to resume nuclear testing in violation of the moratorium agreement. At a meeting of the National Security Council there was general expectation of an announcement that American testing would be resumed. The President wanted to put it off a few days, and he asked the Vice President what would be the reaction on the Hill if the announcement were delayed. The Vice President replied that the President's reaction need not be hurried. He said an indication of preparations for the resumption of testing would be sufficient for the moment. The President then edited Mr. Rusk's proposed statement as the Vice President had suggested.

Meanwhile, according to Schlesinger's account, he and Sorensen were whispering in the back of the room. They passed their complaint on to Ed Murrow, who then persuaded Mr. Rusk that the statement ought to be changed to avoid the announcement of preparations to resume testing. The President put the statement aside for the moment, but eventually he changed it to conform to Schlesinger's and Sorensen's suggestions rather than the suggestions of the Vice President. 430

In retrospect the decision either way seems unimportant. There may have been a temporary propaganda advantage in the announcement advocated by the two literary aides. What was much more important was the actual readiness to test, not the announcement of it, and that was deplorable. Worse yet, the tests themselves were inadequate and unsatisfactory, even to the President, as we have seen. Here the literary aides had considerable influence also, as they both claim. Sorensen says that Schlesinger opposed any resumption of
testing. Whether and when these men were right or wrong was beside the point. That they, and particularly Schlesinger, distrusted diplomats, military men, and many other professionals normally considered necessary to the operation of government Schlesinger repeatedly emphasizes throughout *A Thousand Days*. The mistrust was mutual, of course, and it was communicated to members of the Congress. Through his voluble partisanship Schlesinger managed to draw others under the mantle of distrust, even those who presumably had some professional competence to advise the President despite strong ideological commitments. "With Wiesner as Kennedy's science advisor" Schlesinger writes, "the doctrines of finite deterrence and flexible response were clearly in the ascendency." These doctrines were basically attitudes which divided scientists and non-scientists alike. Regardless of the strengths and the limitations of the doctrines, the question of appropriate and competent advice for a President is always legitimate. Confidence improves as individuals who notably inspire the question are seen to depart.

THE NEXT STEP REMAINS IN THE DARK

Throughout the test ban treaty debate there were repeated affirmations that the treaty was but a first step. To some the next step was something for which to hope, no matter what it might be; it was presumed that the next step would somehow be directed toward a solution of the world's dangerous problems and toward assurances of peace. For others, the next step was a cause of apprehension and concern; no matter what the step might be, it would probably blunder into some trap.
For a very small few, the next step was simply another round of negotiation and maneuver between the United States and Russia which would produce a gesture of agreement on some secondary issue. There were grounds for hope that the first round, the test ban round, had resulted in a draw in the contest between the two nations and the two systems of government. There were equal grounds for hope that in the next round the United States might do as well.

Better than anyone else, Senator Jackson summed up the guessing and hoping. In a Senate speech in support of the treaty, he said the treaty itself had been described as a step toward peace and also as a step toward war. If it were plainly one or the other there would have been no extensive debate. "The fact of the matter," said Senator Jackson, "is that although the treaty indeed is a step in some direction, we do not know, and moreover we cannot know, in what direction it leads. For the treaty does not determine the direction. What we do from now on, and what the rest of the world does from now on--these are the determining factors." 

Reasoning of this nature was scarcely typical. Most of those who took a special interest in the treaty were firmly, sometimes passionately convinced that the treaty moved directly toward triumphant peace or toward disastrous war. The great majority of commentators, few of whom had studied the treaty issues closely, were content to regard the mysterious next step with fear or with favor in accordance with the amount of confidence they had in the Administration.

There were indications that the correspondents who derived most of their information from official sources (responsible official
sources) were conservative in their predictions and hoped that little else would happen right away. Among these were Roscoe Drummond of the New York Herald Tribune and R. H. Shackford, of Scripps-Howard. They simply exposed the State Department's knowledge that there was nothing in the wind. Whatever President Kennedy might do, and they were not talking about that, the people at State knew that Khrushchev would not, and could not, make an important move without careful exploration of the problem by Russian foreign policy experts. No such intensive exploration had been made on any major issue.

On the other hand, commentators who were closer to the assortment of advisors around the White House tended to reflect a view that almost anything, anything good, might happen. Among these was Walter Lippmann, who managed to believe even in the Russo-American trip to the moon as a viable proposal, as will be seen in a following section.

A most remarkable performance was turned in by Drew Pearson, who interviewed Khrushchev at his swimming pool and reported a fascinating series of conversations. Pearson reported Khrushchev's challenging statements in a manner which some called too sympathetic, but most were quite convincing. Two of the principal subjects discussed were the Pope and a possible summit meeting. Strangely enough, these two subjects, in combination, were taken up by Khrushchev's successor nearly three years later. Khrushchev also blamed his military leaders for that troublesome nuclear testing, and for Cuba, and for almost everything that had worried and frightened the rest of the world.

For sensational and even spicy reporting of Khrushchev's thinking and talking during this period, Schlesinger tops all. "Don't
piss in your pants—you'll have your chance soon enough," he quotes Khrushchev as saying to his scientists who were impatient to test the super bomb. Actually Schlesinger was quoting negotiator John J. McCloy, who was quoting Khrushchev, who spoke Russian. How a four letter Anglo-Saxon word could have come through all this is a puzzle, but synthetic tricks are often applauded by those who consider them authentic. Schlesinger pictures Khrushchev as blaming his scientists for his defiance of world opinion; with Pearson it was always the militarists. Perhaps Khrushchev chose the scapegoat to please the audience, but the Russian scientists were evidently an impressive and persuasive lot. There was always a question whether the next Russian maneuver would be a show of force or a display of science, and the two were drawing ever closer together.

It became more and more obvious after the treaty that the next step was largely up to Russia. At first it had appeared a non-aggression pact would be the goal. The American negotiators had resisted attaching such a proposal to the treaty, but it had cropped up again at a conference of the International Parliamentary Union in Belgrade. Journalist Roscoe Drummond, who attended, was impressed by the popularity of the test ban treaty among the parliamentary delegates. Into a resolution endorsing the test ban, Soviet-bloc delegates had managed to insert the approval of a non-aggression pact to create denuclearized zones for areas where such an action would insure Communist military dominance. The Soviet-bloc representatives were friendly. "They are courting a detente, a relaxation," Drummond reported, and at last we learn, in an unfortunate association, the meaning of the magic word. "All they want are a few
agreements which will help Soviet purposes and not do the free world any good.437

Obviously the Russians were not interested in relaxing for the sake of relaxing. They would not look back, as did Schlesinger in the Playboy interview, to detente, which "finally began to pay off with a test ban treaty," as the greatest achievement of a great leader. Relaxation was a chance to lower the relative nuclear capability of their competitors. They had no need to worry seriously about the relatively piddling counter-threat of free-world conventional arms. They were vastly superior in such forces everywhere they needed to be superior. Khrushchev told Pearson that he could put two men in Germany for every one sent by Kennedy, and that was an understatement.

So it was that the Soviets pressed for anti-nuclear agreements, any kind of such agreements that the United States would accept without inspection: nuclear-free zones, nuclear-free atmosphere, nuclear-free space. Who did not wish to be nuclear free? There were many proposals and rumors of proposals.

Space Business Daily reported that the banning of space weapons systems might be the next area for treaty discussion, and predicted that the controversy over this issue would eclipse the test ban controversy. They were wrong only in the latter prediction. Since there could be no inspection of space, and the Russians never permitted inspection of anything on the ground, the agreement on weapons in space became, for the moment, a problem of definition. No one, always with the possible exception of the Russians, wanted to put a bomb in space as yet. (Only the Russian super-bomb would be
practicable there.) Nuclear-free atmosphere had proven very popular, so why not nuclear-free space? No one pretended it could be enforced, inspected, or even accurately defined. Terminology was about all that could be acted upon.

*Space Business Daily* concluded that the possibility of "banning the military from space" could be deduced by a new administration policy of substituting "observation" for "reconnaissance" in the designation of space vehicles. In space, at least, there was yet room for the harmless enjoyment of military relaxation.

In connection with Russian efforts toward agreements that might keep other people's weapons out of space, John F. Loosbrock, editor of *Air Force-Space Digest* raised an interesting question. Loosbrock was one of a very small number of people who had pondered the significance of nuclear and space activities for many years. He compared the language of the resolution sponsored by 34 Senators, on May 27, 1963, with that of the final treaty. The Senate resolution had proposed a ban "on all nuclear tests that contaminate the atmosphere or the oceans." Such a ban would have permitted tests in outer space and any other tests that would not contaminate the atmosphere.

Few would have protested against such a ban, for the tests that were needed to study the possibilities of antiballistic missiles and the mysterious phenomenon of nuclear flux were mostly tests in space. Such tests would have left no permanent residue and would have revealed a lot about the possibilities of defense against nuclear attack. Tests in the atmosphere of new type weapons which create no fallout would also have been possible, and they are possible anyway on a small scale, without detection, for any large nation.
Why were these tests specifically banned in the treaty? As Loosbrock said, no one else had raised the question, and it was a good question. In the case of deep space weapons, one answer may be that they are sometimes visible and so would cause people to think about them. When it comes to nuclear explosions people may be happier if they do not think. Apparently the Russians were more anxious than our Senators to keep people unthinking and relatively happy about nuclear weapons while maximum invisible testing goes on apace. If only some way could be found to avoid the earthquakes that result from Soviet underground tests of half a megaton or so, people might be happier still.
CHAPTER XI: WHILE THE BOMB TESTS ARE HIDDEN
THE RACE MOVES TO SPACE

The partial nuclear test ban treaty outlawed exterior testing which causes no fallout. For this reason, speculation concerning the Russian nuclear explosions cited in Chapter I was stimulated by further information. On September 16, columnists Allen and Scott claimed that information on three recent Soviet explosions was in the hands of Senators who planned to reveal startling news on the Senate floor before the vote on the test ban. No such revelation was made, but Allen and Scott's record of accuracy as proved by subsequent events remains high. It is possible that the Senators mentioned were dissuaded. The story related by Allen and Scott matches earlier revelations by respected Washington Star foreign affairs analyst Earl Voss, and it deserves consideration.

The earlier acoustic signals of a shock wave, mentioned in Chapter I, were later identified as nuclear blasts. Atmospheric samples recovered by U.S. Air Force planes contained a surprisingly small amount of radioactive material for such heavy shocks. Allen and Scott declined to publish the sizes and locations of the explosions, two of which had occurred just after President Kennedy's conciliatory speech at American University. The third explosion occurred two weeks later, on June 30. Allen and Scott said this one was revealed to the Washington Star by "a highly reliable government official who was deeply disturbed by a White House order surpressing the information so as not to upset the test ban negotiations." Most interesting was the statement that nuclear experts who analyzed the evidence believed the Russians had developed a bomb so low in
radioactive debris as to permit testing in the atmosphere without
detection, and the suggestion that this type of weapon was especially
appropriate as a warhead for antimissile missiles.440

From a report which was confirmed by other information and by
later events, we may turn to a startling bit of prediction that met
no tests whatever. Stewart Alsop, a reputable writer, friend of
statesmen, and brother of columnist Joe Alsop, wrote for the Saturday
Evening Post of September 28, 1963 that the test ban was the first
step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons facilities in Commu-
nist China. Alsop said the President and his advisors had agreed on
a project known as "the nuclear sterilization of the Chicoms" which
would involve the elimination, with conventional bombs, of the two
main Chinese atomic plants.

According to Stewart Alsop the President had in mind that after a
few more tests France would sign the treaty in return for American
nuclear help. The four nuclear powers would then proclaim the test
ban applicable to all nations. If China demurred the "tonsillectomy"
would be performed. It could, of course, be performed by the U.S.
alone, and there was an understanding, said Alsop, that the Russians
would not interfere.441

This was soon after the incident of the Cuban missiles.
Stories of checking with Penkovskiy and of preliminary contacts with
the Russians through newsmen as intermediaries had not yet revealed
that the Cuban confrontation was less bold and daring than it
seemed. More recent knowledge of President Kennedy, and especially
of his advisors whom Alsop includes in the plan for denuclearizing
China, indicates that no such action as this could possibly have been
in the cards. Schemes of this sort were wrongly imputed to Senator Goldwater, but they seem scarcely possible for responsible Americans today. Bold and desperate action by statesmen, when it can be postponed, is completely out of style in America. For good or for ill, it is the fashion always to hope that serious risks can be avoided. As theologian Rheinhold Niebuhr once said: "If the democratic nations fail, their failure must be partly attributed to the faulty strategy of idealists who have too many illusions when they face realists who have too little conscience." With as little provocation for attack as China had provided in 1963, it is difficult to imagine any American administration so long on realism and short on conscience as to carry out the otherwise tempting plan Stewart Alsop presented.

AN ENIGMA OF VERBALISTIC LEADERSHIP

Sentiment, idealism, and devious methods are seldom mutually exclusive in great personalities. Was President Kennedy capable of Machiavellian maneuvers of a sort different from that just described? This is an important question for anyone who studies the record already available, or who reads carefully through Schlessinger's superficially idolatrous A Thousand Days. Some early judgments already appear naive. Venerable pontificator Walter Lippman wrote just two days after ratification of the test ban that the cold war would smolder for generations but the great nations had decided that the issues between them would not be settled by nuclear weapons. This and other observations by Lippmann indicated he was getting his interpretations from advisors at the White House, rather than from the
more sophisticated State Department. He failed to acknowledge that
the drive for the test ban greatly stimulated American testing and
improved American readiness to test. He must also have overlooked
the fact that the Russian desire for the treaty indicated a nuclear
achievement on their part in addition to their monopoly of the big
c bomb. Lippmann saw the treaty only as the literary aides and other
personal associates of the President interpreted it—a great step
toward nuclear peace. He went on innocently to predict a number of
other cooperative enterprises with Russia as a result of the treaty.

Lippmann was especially irritated by Europeans who already had
begun to see the American drive for a rapprochment with Russia as a
weakening of commitments for the defense of Europe. The Secretary
General of the Gaullist party in France had said Europe must be on
guard against the new closeness between the United States and the
Soviet Union. "Monsieur Baumel need not worry too much about that
closeness," advised Lippmann; Baumel simply had read too much European
history and not enough American history. Lippmann boasted that even
if we wanted to make a deal behind the backs of our European allies,
it would be impossible for us: "How to play Machiavelli or Talleyrand
or Richelieu is not in the American educational curriculum."

The Schlesinger revelations must be a blow to Mr. Lippmann's
confidence in the American educational curriculum, at least in the
Harvard version of it. On the matter of a possible Soviet-American
understanding Mr. Harriman is reported as telling the President he
would need "something to sweeten the package." Then, says Schlesinger,
"Kennedy mentioned possible concessions." The President added, "I
have some cash in the bank in West Germany and am prepared to draw on it if you think I should."

This exchange could only have meant that the President was prepared to "sweeten the package" with concessions which he felt Germany owed him the right to make. As C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times has pointed out, Schlesinger's publication of the statement "must inevitably reinforce European suspicions that the United States could contemplate a deal with Moscow over Europe's head." Mr. Lippmann must now recognize that the Charles River schools can not only produce statesmen capable of Machiavellian maneuvers but also historians to boast of them.

Sulzberger objects also to Schlesinger's revelation that the proposed seaborne nuclear force for NATO, so long and so disastrously sponsored by the Administration, was considered by the President "something of a fake." He deplores the revelation that diplomat George Ball was sent to Bonn to break up the growing friendship between France and Germany. Even if these acts are construed as more like the slippery Talleyrand than the more forthright Machiavelli, the revelation of them in so defamatory a manner, for whatever personal prize, would probably have been beyond either of these gentlemen. Sulzberger acknowledges an indebtedness to Schlesinger for his penetrating analysis of policy complexities which explain our present attitudes but he adds "as a U.S. citizen I could have postponed the pleasure."

Sulzberger regrets that President Kennedy mistrusted State Department and Foreign Service professionals "thus sometimes sacrificing patient expertise to gung-ho activists." This tendency was dramatized by the President's discounting of the experienced Mr. Rusk in favor
of the amateur military and diplomatic enthusiasms of Mr. McNamara. It was an administrative blunder which vitiated the usefulness of the indispensable Department of State. Schlesinger says President Kennedy "had to have a McNamara at defense in order to have a foreign policy at all" and he "always had the dream that a McNamara might some day take command" of the State Department. Sulzberger wonders "whether Rusk is demeaned because he refused to contribute secrets to Schlesinger's accumulating record." This appears doubtful in view of the fact that Schlesinger was capable of creating his own separate versions of events even though they were well known, as we shall see.

Concerning the hypothetical deal with Russia over Germany Schlesinger is by no means the only source. The non-aggression pact which Khrushchev tried to attach to the test ban treaty was such a deal and Chancellor Adenauer's open opposition to the treaty indicated his suspicion of what might happen next. Strangely enough, while Mr. Lippmann was so confidently laying the ghost of Machiavelli, others were disturbed by it. Europe-wise Dean Acheson, architect of NATO, spoke of it just three days before the tragic assassination of President Kennedy. Acheson was clever enough to chose another target, George Kennan, whom he accused of indiscreet Machiavellianism for raising the possibility of an East-West "deal" over German heads. In the same period the astute New York Times diplomatic observer Gilbert Frankel wondered "whether there is any relation between the principles that, we believe or hope, govern our policies, and the strategies, some amateurish, some Machiavellian, which we adopt to serve those principles." It may be recalled that Mr. Frankel it was who first used the word "euphoria" in the connection with the
test ban treaty—the word which was repeated three times in the famous Presidential evidence coordinated testimony of Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, and General Taylor before the Fulbright committee. Mr. Frankel, as might be expected, received scant credit.

Both Sulzberger and Frankel discuss the phenomenon of word-worship, which was certainly more obvious than the associated recrudescence of Machiavelli. Sulzberger considered the Kennedy foreign policy obsessed with high-sounding slogans, although he admits they were often supplied by ghost writers; amateur ghost writers, he might have added, for responsible ones in Washington learn to beware of booming overtures inappropriate for the action to follow.

Frankel deplored the tendency "to treat certain words as things in themselves and to deal with problems by throwing words at them rather than looking at the facts." He admitted that, despite "apocalyptic political language," actions had been moderate, but there remained too much eagerness to demonstrate that "things are simple to men of clear moral vision" and to "reduce the awful tragedies and surging hopes of this century to the terms of bad melodrama." Frankel thought impatience to get things moving could be productive if disciplined, and if the dangerous "quasi-policies we follow now" could be replaced by a capacity to use words with respect for their meanings.

A visitor to the White House in 1962 might hear a strange sound while being escorted along the long passageway between the entrance and the lunch room. He would pass beside the indoor swimming pool and from small, high windows he might hear a surprising sound—a long and uninterrupted explosion of words, uttered at a high pitch and with somewhat exaggerated elocution. "What is that noisy tape being
played in there," the visitor might ask, and the escort would reply with a discreet smile, "That is the President. He is just practicing his next speech. Yes he does that quite often, beside the pool, just as you hear him now."

There was nothing wrong with the President belting out a speech in a rapid and monotonous manner, even though his mildly strident voice dominated the surrounding area. Yet there was something special about this frank devotion to the sound of words for the sake of the sound and the words. For a man of such apparent ease, such lack of pomp and bombast, it was strange. Few would have guessed that the insistent voice declaiming from the echoing cavern of the swimming pool belonged to a man who was dapper, clever and quick with repartee.

It should not be forgotten that the President and his ghost writers, including Sorensen and Schlesinger, were supplying what most people wanted to hear. Frankel's diagnosis was concerned with a national weakness as much as with the current exploiters of it. It should also be remembered that people of foreign nations, especially the less sophisticated people and the less sophisticated nations, were not immune to a flow of words and symbols. If the words and symbols proved inconsequential, if they did not exorcise the fears they attacked or satisfy the expectations they aroused, there would be trouble; but for the moment there was negotiable value in the pleasant, polished and practiced words the President uttered with such forensic glitter. To be able to turn a treaty which resulted in much more expensive and extensive nuclear testing into a symbol of nuclear disarmament was no mean achievement. This was true despite the fact that the real and practical effects of the treaty were apparently quite the opposite of what the President and his aides had desired.
The true reason why President Kennedy was willing to accept some humiliation, to make deals, to sacrifice much, and to commit more of his time than he could afford for a treaty that accomplished the opposite of its advertised purpose remains to some extent a mystery. Although he realized he had never really given Vietnam his full attention he concentrated heavily on a treaty which was considered mainly symbolic, even by its most vigorous advocates. It is understandable that the President's literary aides and ghost writers should be preoccupied with symbols. Despite criticism of the President's symbolism and verbalism, it is necessary to consider other and more practical uses of the treaty as well.

Writing in the Washington Post shortly after the ratification, staff reporter Chalmers Roberts reflected the Administration view that Soviet preoccupation with Red China and the farm problem would continue for a while. The only question, said Roberts, is: "will it last until next year's presidential election?" If the Soviets would just continue to cooperate by keeping quiet for a time, the President would be able to concentrate on domestic issues "closely related to the election." Further, the relaxation itself (Schlesinger's détente, everybody's "euphoria") was popular. President Kennedy had found on his Western tour that the "peace issue" was epitomized by his championing of the test ban treaty and was highly favorable to him. "If he could just leave it this way until election day," said Roberts "he doubtless would be most happy." Sorensen indicates that as the result of the treaty the President's popularity went up, and that according to a Gallup poll "for the first time, the Democrats were regarded as the 'peace party,'
best able to keep this country out of war.\textsuperscript{452} This was a truly im-
portant issue which some political observers believed responsible for
two victories by Eisenhower over Stevenson. A single-minded poli-
tician might regard the influence of this issue as sufficient reason
for the President's unique concentration on the treaty, but this
appears unlikely in the light of other events. To examine the most
important of the other events we may turn to one more impulsive
effort by the President toward a "next step" beyond the treaty.

LUNAR COEXISTENCE FAILS AT LAUNCH

Writing in \textit{Foreign Affairs} for April 1964, Italian diplomat and
scholar Roberto Ducci passed a sophisticated judgment on the test ban
treaty. He saw no chance of China subscribing to it and suggested
that since it applied only to Europe, excepting France, and to under-
developed countries, it could serve no useful purpose. "Nations
that have accepted the lower status do not need such engagements;
others, whenever they are able, will pay no heed to them," Ducci
prophesied. The test ban treaty was, to Ducci and perhaps to most
experienced students of international affairs, simply a device for
keeping the control of nuclear weapons in the hands of \textit{beati
possidentes}, the fortunate possessors.\textsuperscript{453} Nations wishing to join
the favored group could simply invoke the precedent of France or
China and test as they liked--a privilege which even the originators
of the treaty reserved for themselves.

Despite his realism regarding the very popular treaty, Ducci
did not discount the influence of President Kennedy as a world per-
sonality. He said it was more difficult for the Communists to use
the imperialists as scapegoats "once the United States began to be impersonated by Kennedy's smile."

During his intense preoccupation with the treaty President Kennedy's smile was less in evidence. His impatience with the hearings and the Senate debaters almost caused it to diminish. His desperate effort to recapture the initiative and to satisfy in some degree the great expectations raised by the treaty caused him temporarily to lose his poise.

On all sides those who were inspired and excited by detente were pressing for more action. Dr. Bernard Feld, for example, who was previously mentioned in connection with his attack on Dr. Teller, wrote to newspapers to point out that both President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev had emphatically stated the test ban agreement was meaningless unless followed by further agreements aimed at reducing tensions and nuclear armaments.

Dr. Feld, President of the Council for a Livable World and a professor at Harvard, wrote with overwhelming optimism. He saw no difficulty in reaching an agreement to ban underground tests as well. Further, it should be possible to take a first step toward disarmament by the "partial elimination" of long range nuclear weapons. The production of fissionable materials of weapons grade should also be eliminated, urged Dr. Feld, while the spread of weapons technology should be stopped and safety against surprise attack guaranteed. All hope for embarking on this next round of negotiation, said Dr. Feld, would depend on support for the test ban in the Senate. Admittedly, Dr. Feld furnished extreme examples of a scientist's dreams of diplomacy, but he was not much further from reality than the
President's literary aides and many in the influential academic community.

After the Senate had given its decisive support to the treaty, the next step was up to the President. As we have seen, President Kennedy was in an increasingly difficult position. Despite certain disclaimers concerning the treaty, he had not only promoted euphoria for the masses, he had also raised high hopes among very articulate people. Among such people, hopes denied are hopes defied, and something had to be done. The scramble to do something, which for President Kennedy meant first of all to say something, might have been amusing except for its tragic implications.

For an understanding of the frantic maneuvering that preceded the ill-fated proposal for a joint American-Soviet moon-shot it is helpful to consult the principal historian, to date, of those proceedings. First, it may be advisable to examine the manner in which history was written, by proud participant Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in his *A Thousand Days*. The thousand page volume begins with the Kennedy inauguration. On page one the journey of the President and his wife from the Inaugural concert is related.

As Schlesinger develops the opening scene of his history, the President and his wife in the presidential car are cheered along their route by other motorists stranded in the snow. The light was on in the limousine as they moved along and the President "settled back to read Jefferson's first Inaugural, which had been printed in the concert program. When he finished, he shook his head and said wryly, 'Better than mine.'"
It is a fine dramatic story, typical of Schlesinger's touch, and a fitting opening for his history of the thousand days. There is only one element missing—the truth. The story is necessarily imaginary. The concert program contained some quotations from Jefferson, but none from his First Inaugural, nor his Second, nor any other inaugural.

The story of one of President Kennedy's most spectacular fluffs is a matter of much greater importance. Since the account of this episode in A Thousand Days is as yet the most complete, presumably the most authentic, and has doubtless been read by more people than any other, it may be well to examine it critically. According to Schlesinger, while he and Richard Gardner of the State Department were "casting about" for dramatic forms of cooperation with Russia, "there swam into our minds the thought of merging the Russian and American expeditions to the moon." Gardner warned Schlesinger that the proposal would cause trouble in "the bureaucracy." Recently someone in NASA had asked the State Department to request a study of this proposal. The State Department had declined the request for fear of what Schlesinger, apparently in jest, calls "so subversive an inquiry." Schlesinger continues:

"One thought, what the hell; and on speculation I wrote the idea into an early draft of the President's UN address. I had forgotten that the President himself had suggested this to Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961, or I would have been better prepared for his quick approval. He discussed it with James Webb, head of NASA; and when we went over the draft a few days later with representatives from State Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, no one voiced objection." 

Schlesinger's account of the joint moon-shot proposal agrees only with itself. It is difficult to understand how a supposedly
responsible ghost-writer could possibly forget a fantastic proposal which had been discussed between the heads of the two most powerful countries, how the writer could fail to check with someone who had a record or a memory, or how he could ignorantly inject this proposal into a major speech with the self-confessed attitude of "what the hell." There is a contradiction between canvassing government agencies for some such suggestion as this one, which had already been considered by NASA and discussed in the press, only to have the idea "swim" into his head. Fortunately it is yet possible to learn what really did happen, and it was completely different from Schlesinger's fantastic story.

Three days before the speech at the UN, Charles Bartlett, a close personal friend of the Kennedy family, wrote in the Washington Star:

"Mr. Kennedy had been persistent in urging that the moon race be fused into a combined effort. He mentioned the idea in his first speech to Congress and carried it to Vienna, where Premier Khrushchev seemed so menacing that he kept it in his pocket. He has put it privately forward again in the warmer climate of recent weeks and is now awaiting the response from Moscow."

Here Charles Bartlett, who was so close to the President that his accuracy on White House stories once provoked an apology by the President, reveals that the combined moonshot proposal was not presented to Khrushchev at Vienna. He also states that the President was waiting for a response from Moscow on the proposal, which had been revived during preceding weeks. This was the period in which the idea is reported by Schlesinger to have been swimming in his admittedly extensive mind. Bartlett's article may have been intended to establish that the idea had been swimming in the President's mind for quite a while, in order to hold credit if he should decide to propose
it. Bartlett's modest and apparently honest effort in this regard could not succeed. It was already known and discussed in Washington that Sir Bernard Lovell, the British astronomer, had been approached five weeks earlier by members of the Soviet Academy of sciences who told him the Russians wanted to explore steps that could lead to an international man-on-the-moon effort. Administration officials were reported as skeptical of the Russian suggestion and there had been speculation as to the reasons behind it.  

Soon the reasons became clear. The Lovell proclamations led to contacts between Dr. Hugh Dryden of NASA and A. A. Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The Soviet Academician left no doubt that his country was interested only in a procedure which would slow up American efforts indefinitely while the cooperative agreement was being negotiated.

On the day following the speech Simons wrote that the President's proposal at the UN had already encountered disapproval in Russia and had caused bewilderment in the United States. It had overshadowed five down-to-earth proposals for cooperation in medical research, global communication systems, world health, conservation, and food for peace. The spectacular untimeliness of the moon shot statement had probably guaranteed the failure of the more modest efforts. American space experts were caught by surprise.

The *New York Times* headline was "Washington Surprised by the President's Proposal." Space expert Howard Finney said that among those who would have to carry out such a program "bewilderment was confounded" by the President's speech. Only two months earlier, at a press conference, the President had said that such a project
would "require a breaking-down of a good many barriers of suspicion and distrust and hostility" and he had added there was "no evidence as yet that those barriers will come down." Also in July President Kennedy had said that the capacity to dominate space was "essential to the United States as a leading free world power." The moon flight he had said, would demonstrate this capacity. Several billions of dollars had already been spent on the moon program under these representations.

Every effort was being made by Administration spokesmen to cover up and explain away the President's blunder. Finney learned that the proposal had been examined during a search for ways of cooperating with the Russians. "One of the ideas advanced--one which had been frequently discussed within the Administration and previously ruled out as impractical--was a joint expedition to the moon."

How could the President have been tricked into espousing this abortive proposal only to have it rejected by the Russians who had instigated it, and to have it denied acceptance at home? Finney did not ask this question specifically, but he provided an answer:

"There were reliable indications that the proposal for a "joint-expedition" was a last minute insertion in the President's speech, and that it was kept secret from many lower-level staff officials directly and indirectly involved in determining space policy. Earlier drafts were reported to have included no reference to the lunar expedition."

Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post wrote an equally disturbing analysis of what he called the "moon project switch." He emphasized that the President's theme all along had been that the U.S. had to get to the moon first so that space would not be dominated militarily by the Soviet Union. Roberts quoted one high
official as saying "How do you sell Congress a multibillion dollar space program on the idea of cooperation after having labored so long to sell it on the basis of competition?" In general the reaction was that Russian habits and policies of secrecy would defeat any such effort from the start, and that proved to be the case, fortunately before permanent harm was done. 463

By September 22 Howard Simons learned that there had been considerable private correspondence between President Kennedy and Khrushchev on the space cooperation idea. Only a few people knew about this but the number included, surprisingly, the Vice President. The decision to include the proposal in the UN speech was not taken until the day before the speech. This was the only possible explanation of why NASA administrator James E. Webb had contradicted the President in a speech approved by the Administration. Webb was away from Washington and did not receive word of the President's switch until after distribution of his own speech which declared that the U.S. must be first on earth and in space. Obviously Schlesinger's account that Mr. Webb had agreed with the President's proposal some time prior to its delivery is not in accord with the facts. 464

One columnist who stoutly defended the President's speech explained that the nation's top space experts had been overruled at the last minute. He mentioned that Dr. Robert Gilruth, head of the space center at Houston, just three days before the President's speech "had flatly and publicly stated that joint cooperation with Russia was incredible." National Space Agency director James Webb had said almost the same thing just one day prior to the President's speech. The columnist, Drew Pearson, exulted that the U.N. speech
had "bucked the wrath of the senior and sometimes wrathy moguls of Congress" and that Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston would "bellow like a Texas steer." Pearson saw the proposal as taking part of the space program away from Houston and putting it in Moscow.

The reason the President did all this, Pearson explained, was part of his "new strategy of pushing for peace: the belief that we have to build one success on top of another." After scoring one success with the test ban treaty "he had the alternative of sitting still and letting the favorable atmosphere which it created slowly get nibbled away by the harpies; or of proposing new and dramatic moves...." Pearson's explanation of the strange UN speech agrees almost word for word with that of Schlesinger. His account of what happened differs completely from Schlesinger's, but so do all accounts.

Representative Joseph Karth (Dem.-Minn.) put the President's dreamy suggestion into perspective by pointing out that the Russians had shown no evidence of cooperation for the simplest endeavors, much less for delicate complexities that have to be assembled like fine watches. Not even major elements, such as rockets from one country and capsules from another could be combined. One country would have to provide the hardware, the other some kind of technical and engineering help, plus money. Two separate systems would be unimaginable, so which country would it be?

Many officials, who declined to be identified, charged that the President had endangered the success of the American investment in its space program. One said the President had demonstrated that "either he is privy to information more optimistic than that available to NASA or he is demonstrating complete irresponsibility by introduction of a psychological disturbance factor into the issue."
After a few more days Business Week summed up the strenuous efforts of government officials to repair the damage. President Kennedy's suggestion had received loud and enthusiastic welcome at the UN, because it indicated a very significant agreement on one of the most difficult joint projects possible, and this should mean peace. By encouraging such a belief the President had scored another psychological victory with millions around the world. Care was taken not to disillusion them too suddenly. Clever business men such as Harrison Storms of North American Aviation went along with the game to say we can do the job ourselves but "if the government wants us to cooperate with the Russians we can do it." Mr. James Webb had to say something to the scientists. Since these gentlemen were accustomed to disillusionment he disclosed that the President's proposal was simply a call for a look at the possibilities.

Just why the President did not wait for some kind of favorable response from Moscow, as Charles Bartlett indicated he was doing, remains unexplained. Perhaps, as Drew Pearson indicated, he wanted to pile a rhetorical triumph on top of a symbolic one. Perhaps he just wanted to make a speech which would be cheered at the UN and applauded by millions around the world. In any event, the story offered by Schlesinger—that the idea swam into his own head, that he thought "what the hell" and put into a speech which was cleared with all the responsible officials, is best forgotten.

Other than Drew Pearson, only dour Mr. Lippmann, faithful to the end to his White House advisor, made a serious effort to support the proposal. He termed the entire project to place a man on the moon "a morbid and vulgar stunt." He said "the best way to purify
the moon project is to do what the President has suggested."^468

The proposal itself was purified by immediate disapproval in Moscow, where the Soviet censor eliminated it from all published accounts of the President's speech. On Sept. 28 a commentator for the government organ Izvestia wrote of the headlines in America, the surprise of responsible officials, and of the "somewhat premature" project. Emphasis on the project, said the Russian commentator, is hardly worth while, and it "distracts attention from joint earthly exploits."^469 Just what were these joint earthly exploits was not revealed, but then the Russian government was not under the same pressure as was President Kennedy to produce them.

EFFORTS TO GET RELAXATION MOVING AGAIN

After the humiliating elimination of the moon-team that was not meant to be, the foreign ministers of the U.S., Britain and Russia met in New York to probe for ways to "enlarge the field of East-West amity" which had been opened by the test ban agreement. Nothing was accomplished. Mr. Gromyko was most unenthusiastic. Evidently the Russians were already smarting under Chinese charges that they had abandoned Communist solidarity in favor of collaboration with the imperialists.

Mr. Gromyko reverted to the old Russian theme of absolute and complete disarmament with no inspection by anybody. He had begun to allude to this in speeches, and also to a proposal for an exchange of military observers in East and West Germany to guard against surprise attack. Since this would involve West German recognition of East Germany, and since it would not be effective against surprise
air attacks, which were the only ones feared, it was obviously a hopeless proposal.470

The question of the nonaggression pact was best explained by Ernest Gross in The Reporter. Gross's point was that the history of such pacts showed that they had been "abortive when well conceived, treacherous when ill-intentioned." As for definitions of aggression, necessary to make any pact plausible, a British Foreign Secretary many years ago had said precise and legalistic definitions "would set traps for the innocent and signposts for the guilty." Gross deplored "the science of meteorological diplomacy," which consisted of doing things to generate a better "climate" or "atmosphere."

As many of the citations in previous chapters plainly show, Gross's objections were well justified. He also detected a tendency, "too prevalent in an anxious age, to look to the 'climate,' just as, in an earlier time, the zodiac was studied for political portent.471 Perhaps, in the absence of solid achievement, it was possible to take credit only for the weather.

A nonaggression pact would involve recognition of East Germany and sanction the partition of Europe. It would neither assure security nor favor the rights of some 100 million people under Communist domination East of the Iron Curtain. Such were the most elementary objections to Russian proposals for a nonaggression pact as the next step after the test ban. No such pact desirable to the Russians could possibly have been accepted in Western Europe. It would have offered the ultimate discouragement to hopes for freedom in Eastern Europe.
Against the hopes for disarmament which were built upon the treaty, David Lilienthal, articulate former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, had some hard words. His observations were too obviously true to be refuted and too unhappy to be quoted in the euphoric fog of treaty ratification. In a letter to the New York Herald Tribune Lilienthal wrote that the treaty which had emerged after years of negotiations was "not in any sense nuclear disarmament or arms control." Its proponents, regardless of party, had emphatically denied that the treaty would limit or control further development and production of nuclear weapons. It had been necessary, said Lilienthal, for the Administration, in order to allay fears, doubts and suspicions, to proclaim its intention to maintain and increase nuclear weapons. If all this was necessary for a treaty having little to do with disarmament, he asked, what furor would result if any real disarmament measure, however limited, were negotiated?

"The test ban treaty deliberations," Lilienthal wrote "provide a clear demonstration of the illusions, and indeed the dangers to peace that lie in a preoccupation with arms control and disarmament. Even an attempt to negotiate would increase the very tensions it is intended to allay. This does not mean that there can be no progress away from war. What it means is that the next step must not be attempted in the sensitive area of weapons, but rather in seeking accommodation in other areas."472

In the most complete study yet of Pentagon activities, Power at the Pentagon, veteran New York Times reporter Jack Raymond points out how difficult it was for the Chiefs of Staff to avoid the image
of obstinate recalcitrance toward disarmament and yet perform the minimum duty of trying to maintain a military balance against the Soviet union. "Steps toward disarmament" said Raymond "can affect that balance in the same way that increments of power affect it." Unbalanced and uncontrolled disarmament could be as disastrous as unmatched increases in enemy strength.

Any disarmament action, of course, would have had to be entirely unilateral, since the Russians would never discuss inspection, not even inspection by neutrals. No other armament activities could be observed as could nuclear tests in the atmosphere. There were many proposals for unilateral disarmament by the United States, and these proposals took many forms. These were the Quakers, Jehovah's Witnesses and other pacifist groups who desired simply to throw away all weapons and hope the Communists would do the same. There were more sophisticated plans for neglecting to improve weapons in the hope that the Soviets would not improve theirs either. Much of the attack against the test ban treaty was basically an attack against this latter school of hope.

An intermediate form of disarmament proposal which was pushed more vigorously after the test ban treaty was that of "slowing down the arms race" by reducing arms production and hoping the Russians would follow suit. Most writers, regardless of military, or anti-military ideology, referred often to the "arms race." It was generally accepted that such a race was on.

A few writers resisted the arms race cliche. One reporter noted that Mr. McNamara's armament plans for five years to come had been spread out for all to see. He claimed that the programmed neglect
of innovation in arms had left the secretary open to charges of seeking unilateral disarmament. "We could build ever so much faster if there were a 'race,' and indeed we would have to." Eminent military historian S. L. A. Marshall explained the problem of correcting a popular misconception: "The reasoning goes that arms races have always led to war, that we are in an arms race, that hence, as things are going, we must be headed for the nuclear holocaust."

Marshall insisted this was a false reading of history, for no arms race caused World War II, but rather the failure to arm against Hitler. No arms race made the Korean War, for that war had begun when American forces, in the course of a general military cutback, pulled out of Korea and indicated no further interest there. Marshall admitted that he and other responsible officers who tried to prevent this move had failed, and war had resulted. He agreed with Senator Jackson's statement that international peace and security derive not from a balance of power, but from a certain imbalance favorable to those who really believe in peace.

These were rare voices. After the test ban treaty the doctrine of military equality everywhere rather than superiority anywhere, already popular in higher administration circles, came more and more to be generally accepted. Balance in Europe, balance in air and space, and balance in Asia were the new goals. "Escalation," a new word, was something that could be "avoided." The new theory was that an enemy would also seek to keep the military competition equalized, the fighting at an indecisive level. The new administration gambled on this idea and tested it in Vietnam.
THE SUBSTITUTE NIGHTMARE OF VIETNAM

With nuclear weapons now legally out of sight as a result of the test ban treaty it was easier to keep them out of mind as well. Full attention could now be given to guerrilla warfare, which had already become a fad within the Administration. "Robert Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor and Richard Bissell pushed the cause" Schlesinger explains. After the departure of Ridgway, Taylor and Gavin, says Schlesinger, the army had fallen into the hands of "organization generals" who looked on counterinsurgency as a faddish distraction. (Two pages later Schlesinger admits it was faddish.) "The professionals, infatuated with the newest technology and eager to strike major blows, deeply disliked the thought of reversion to the rude weapons, amateur tactics, hard life and marginal effects of guerilla warfare," Schlesinger charged. The President however, his literary aides, Robert Kennedy, Walt Rostow, and a few others embraced all this, in theory, especially the amateur tactics. General Taylor, although a professional, was always around and always willing to help.

Word went out through the armed forces that the way to get ahead was to become an enthusiast for guerilla fighting--or appear to become one. It was soon well known that the President, along with his family and his personal-official aides, had been easily converted to General Taylor's very-limited-warfare thesis. Schlesinger says the President believed "that the main communist reliance in the coming period would be on neither nuclear nor conventional but on guerilla war."  

The newest and most promising career in all the armed services, and the one which received the President's most detailed personal
attention, could scarcely keep an unpleasant title like "guerilla." "Counterinsurgency," for all its confused meaning, sounded much more polite though less romantic, and this awkward, polysyllabic word was prescribed as the official designation of the new military fashion. General Taylor managed a committee with that title to develop "the nation's capability for unconventional warfare." President Kennedy began reading Mao Tse-tung, and the once great Che Guevara. He "told the Army" to do likewise (an action reminiscent of Kaiser Wilhelm II prescribing the American Admiral Mahan for all his naval officers at the turn of the century). This was the "soldiering," in words at least, that excited the President most: "He used to entertain his wife on country weekends by inventing aphorisms in the manner of Mao's 'Guerillas must move among the people as fish swim in the sea.'" Whatever may have been Mrs. Kennedy's reaction to this form of entertainment, Mao soon replaced Clausewitz in the lexicon of military officers in the know. Hapless students at military schools soon were hearing one lecturer after another quote Mao's "fish in the sea" story to the point of nausea.

Many of the more daring and ambitious officers in the Air Force and Navy, as well as the Army, were eager to join up for a ride on the President's new hobby. Conventions on the new unconventional warfare were the order of the day (the old unconventionality was nuclear). Research money, development money, equipment money, even travel funds were made available to any organizations that could connect their activities with Counterinsurgency, the President's own form of warfare. It was presented as a new and simple, if not easy way to save the remainder of the free world—perhaps even to recover
some that was lost, although the latter idea was mentioned only in whispers, since it had no official sanction.

It was made to seem logical to most Americans that hand-to-hand fighting in the brush would not only halt the march of communist hordes, but would somehow cool expansionist fevers that might otherwise build into a nuclear war. In General Taylor's litany, since war was bad, limited war was better, "brushfire".wars were better yet, and unconventional, special, or counterinsurgency operations were best of all. Vietnam was the great opportunity to prove this point, and many brave men hurried to get there before it was over. Mr. McNamara, in the first flush of confidence in his new office, suggested it might all be over in six months. George Tanham of the Rand Corporation, who had written a sound book on the subject,*483 sent Mr. McNamara a note suggesting that eighteen months was probably a minimum. Mr. McNamara cheerfully accepted the latter figure and used it for the next few years.

Rationally or not, most Americans believed nuclear war to have been indefinitely postponed by the test ban treaty. To keep this optimism alive it was helpful to have a new and relatively cheap plan for holding communism at bay, and for this purpose the doctrine of victory, or stalemate, through "special operations" had a particular appeal. It was pointed out that this form of activity would surely not upset the Russians as much as the development and deployment of superior weapons.

Among more sophisticated academic and intellectual groups the theory of balancing the communists in the jungles was popular, since it balanced nicely against the theory of maintaining a balance in
space. The personal enthusiasm of the President made the idea fashionable among the new "in-groups." In addition the concept of "peoples armies" has always appealed to those who are not of the people. Not that anyone wanted an American people's army; it was said that volunteers in special uniforms could do the job by helping and training other peoples' armies.

The ever-present economists around the White House and the Pentagon were well represented in this new military field. "Guerillas were an old preoccupation of Walt Rostow." It was he who "analyzing the guerilla as part of the pathology of economic development, carried the gospel to the State Department. Eventually Foreign Service officers were put through courses, sometimes of dubious value, in counterinsurgency methods." Schlesinger is often quite candid.

Thus the personal campaign of General Taylor and a few less military intellectuals to "bring the battle back to the battlefield" found an ideal application in Vietnam. It was a battlefield which was happily far away. The fighting would be in hills, forests, flooded areas and other isolated places, far from cities and people. This was good too. The Russian nuclear threat, though ceremoniously buried by the treaty, had left Americans much more sensitive about attacks of any kind against cities. The fighting, as General Taylor had promised when President Eisenhower had let him begin the Vietnam experiment on a small scale, could be planned and even directed by very small numbers of American volunteers--anonymous ones at first, in civilian clothes! Under President Kennedy, with the name changed from "guerilla," it was easier to forget that this is the cruelest
and most beastly of all forms of warfare, and that it almost always involves the killing, deliberate or accidental, of a large number of civilians. Three years after the test ban treaty had made civilian populations feel less endangered by nuclear threats, this oldest and most painful form of fighting began to lose its appeal as a substitute and as a solution to the problem of how to resist the advancing communist threat. In South Vietnam the head of the United States aid program said the war there was causing "more casualties to civilians than to the military because of the nature of the fighting."\(^{485}\)

In the three years required to discover that no acceptable substitute for true military strength had been found, it became obvious also that the overshadowing nuclear issue had not been successfully buried. Before President Kennedy's term of office had come to its tragic close, the much-prized detente was all but shattered by his most trusted deputy for foreign affairs, and for three years to follow, threats of more and more complete nuclear destruction were exchanged between the American Secretary of Defense and his Russian counterpart. At the end of the period Mr. McNamara could at last claim an uncontested victory in the threat exchange by stepping up his boasted capability to destroy the Soviet Union and Soviet "society" to the ultimate of being able to destroy Russia and China at the same time. This proclamation, which may remain unmatched, occurred near the end of the third year following the nuclear test ban treaty, at a time when a new and rapid series of nuclear events demanded the world's attention. We turn now to these developments.
CHAPTER XII: THE DEFLATION OF DETENTE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF NUCLEAR PREPARATIONS

It should not be assumed that the accounts of White House chroniclers Sorensen and Schlesinger, and particularly Schlesinger, are unique in their imbalance and inaccuracy concerning events surrounding the nuclear test ban treaty. Despite the long range importance of their subject, the brief treatment accorded it in the major work of each of these writers is the most complete of any to emerge within three years of the treaty's birth. For a flattering comparison, we may consider a book by Donald W. Cox, entitled America's New Policy Makers, The Scientists Rise to Power, published in 1964. Mr. Cox's thesis is that with scientists helping to run the government things will be different, and very much better. He gives scientists credit for the test ban, very much as women in politics were credited with the Prohibition Amendment.

According to Cox, the test ban treaty was the first breakthrough to peace achieved by American "and other" (Russian) scientists since the end of World War II. He states that in the hearings Dr. Teller was "demolished" by Senator Symington and that apprehensions concerning Russian progress in antiballistic missiles were "not borne out in the highly classified briefings"—both completely new ideas. He states also that Dr. Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission was never called to testify, and that scientists opposing Dr. Teller did not receive an equal opportunity to testify—also very original thoughts. Nevertheless, concluded Cox, "a new era for mankind—and science—had begun.
The President's statement on ratification was more modest. It concluded "this instrument is good for the people of the United States and people all over the world" which is not quite the same as saying that what is good for the United States is good for the world. Despite the humiliating setback for the joint moon-team, other projects continued to be advertised. These included disarmament; arms production; safeguards against military accidents, miscalculation or surprise attacks; pooling of scientific efforts in various fields; West Berlin, and strengthening the peacemaking powers for the UN. All of these were worthy subjects for negotiation and the Russians were glad to discuss them on their terms, none of which were remotely acceptable either to the United States or to its allies. Schlesinger blames the failure of all these projects on Mr. Rusk, Mr. Gromyko and their assistants who had to discuss them before action could follow the speeches. The test ban treaty failed to have a sequel, in his theory, because "the professionals brought things back to normal...and foreign policy slipped back from men to institutions."

PUBLIC CAUTION AND OFFICIAL BOASTING

A more convincing discussion of the question is provided by George Gallup's comment on his survey of September 16, 1963, to determine whether further agreements with the Russians would be acceptable to the American public. A modest majority, 63%, voted yes but always with the proviso that there should be adequate inspection, something which was out of the question as far as the Russians were concerned. Gallup found no significant differences in these views between parties, age groups or educational levels, an unusual circumstance.
An indication of how the treaty debate had served as a warning against uninspected disarmament is provided by Gallup's comment: "With the immediate risk of nuclear war thought to be reduced by a test ban agreement an indication of how much the treaty had been oversold and in addition, the feeling that an arms reduction agreement is harder to police than a ban on atmospheric testing, the public is less ready to try Russia's sincerity further."\(^{490}\)

This observation helps to explain some of President Kennedy's frustration after the treaty. A prophesy of Senator Russell has since proved accurate, though not exactly in the way he intended. "We are giving up the principle of on-site inspections in the treaty" he said, "and we'll never be able to revive it."\(^{491}\) Senator Russell had feared further and more risky disarmament ventures. Instead, the treaty debate had served to educate the public concerning the difficulties and the risks involved.

Just before President Kennedy's assassination there was another strange speech in New York. Only the assassination itself could mask the portent of the speech and its unfortunate after-effects. Whether from frustration at failure to make further dramatic progress in negotiations, or for domestic political reasons, President Kennedy authorized the most belligerent and aggressive speech yet made by the new foreign policy expert, Mr. McNamara. The speech was certainly the antithesis of any move toward relaxation of tensions and it was in painful contrast to President Kennedy's surprisingly conciliatory speech at the UN just two months earlier. Respected foreign affairs correspondent Joseph C. Harsch of the Christian Science Monitor analyzed its effect in Europe.
Harsch reported that prior to the Kennedy assassination, the highlight of the week in world affairs had been Mr. McNamara's speech. What he said was not new, but the fact that he chose to say it was important. It was another extensive, (adn debatable) boast that the U.S. had achieved conventional superiority over the communist bloc to match its nuclear superiority. Both alleged superiorities were paraded in vastly oversimplified statistics.

Harsch considered the speech a pep talk for embattled Democrats in the U.S., but he said "one would have to sit up late many nights to think up a more inept thing for a high Washington official to toss out on the world stage." He said Mr. McNamara's belligerent claims had made it impossible for any Communist country to negotiate on anything without appearing to do so from fear and weakness. The bragging speech could only mean there would be no more quiet accommodations or discussions before the next presidential election and that Mr. Khrushchev would now have to talk to Mao if he talked to anybody. Were he to fail, after this speech, to attempt accommodation with Red China "he would be hopelessly tarred with the appearance of cowering before Washington." Such was the condition of detente in the hands of President Kennedy's candidate for Secretary of State in the last days before the assassination.

Raymond Moley, a veteran of the New Deal had written in Newsweek (June 17, 1963) that the Constitutional requirement for civilian control over the military was only one of many efforts to prevent too great a concentration and exercise of power, for "no official head--whether it be covered by a Homburg, a wool hat or a bespangled military cap--should grow beyond the size appropriate to a good and faithful servant."
NUCLEAR REVIVAL AND DENIAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

At the end of April 1966 the Washington Post reported that the Kennedy administration's doctrine of a practicable defense for Western Europe without the use of nuclear weapons had at last been abandoned. According to the report, American plans in Europe again proposed the use of nuclear weapons at the outset of any massive invasion of NATO territory. The newly authorized nuclear response would be automatic but would be restricted to nuclear mines placed along the frontier of West Germany, together with the immediate employment of nuclear anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons.

None of these nuclear weapons would strike Soviet territory. They could not be considered by the Russians as a pretext for intercontinental or intermediate missiles. The Post report added that the new proposals would "go a long way toward restoring a balance and putting nuclear weapons back into NATO war plans."493

As may have been expected, the report was denied by Mr. McNamara's office the following day. It was recalled that in 1961 there had been a public denial of plans to abandon the immediate use of nuclear weapons, when such plans had in fact been adopted by the new Administration. The defense of NATO was originally founded on President Truman's and President Eisenhower's promises to counterattack with nuclear weapons at the outset of any Communist invasion. President Kennedy had, in effect, withdrawn that guarantee. Secretary McNamara had become the principal apologist for the claims that an effective defense of Western Europe was possible with conventional forces alone.
This proposition was never accepted by NATO military commanders—not even by the American commanders in Europe—and it contributed heavily toward the breakup of NATO signalized by the withdrawal of France. European confidence in American resolution was greatly weakened. As a British military leader stated it: "McNamara is practically telling the Soviets that the worst they need expect from an attack on Germany is a conventional counterattack."\textsuperscript{494}

European confidence in American nuclear support was weakened by the new doctrine of the nuclear "pause" to such an extent that a NATO nuclear force was demanded. The American response was to revive and expand the strange "Multilateral Force" proposal, for which Dr. Klaus Knorr at Princeton has taken considerable credit, and which even President Kennedy regarded as a fake.\textsuperscript{495}

The problem of NATO confidence in American resolution and support had more recently been pointed up by the speech of Prime Minister Pompidou in the French assembly which had effectively stifled any censure for President De Gaulle on his independent nuclear program. Regarding the Kennedy-McNamara doctrine of pausing indefinitely before employing nuclear weapons for the defense of NATO, Pompidou pointed out that the "pause" theory was adopted by President Kennedy without the slightest consultation with the rest of the alliance. France, therefore, would have to look to its own protection and to its own bomb.\textsuperscript{496}

Whatever the justification of the report, or for the expected denial, it was clear that the French withdrawal from NATO had strengthened the German resolve not to become, or to remain, an easy target for invasion. The Germans had become more insistent on some
assurance of a prompt and effective nuclear defense. Despite all efforts to obscure this demand and to smother open dissent, it could no longer be ignored. The withdrawal of France and its independent nuclear progress, the continuance of the British independent nuclear force, and finally the growing demand of Germany for a quick and dependable nuclear defense made it obvious that the advertised creation of an effective conventional defense for Western Europe had been a shallow pretense indeed.

THE INDELICATE IMBALANCE OF TERROR

In late April of 1966 former Secretary of State Dean Acheson testified before a Senate committee that the Russians were spending huge sums on what appeared to be a gamble for a technological success in nuclear weapons development that could give them a decisive superiority over the United States. Soviet officials admitted that their defense expenditures expanded. They blamed the Vietnam war, which was costing them little.

The Associated Press in March reported that the Russians were building a defense network against intercontinental missiles around Moscow and Leningrad. "Large, mysterious structures" which appeared to house radar networks and guidance systems were going up in the vicinity of Russia's two main cities. Dr. Teller, Dr. Foster and a few other scientists who had predicted this were unhappily vindicated in their unpopular views.

A month later Stephen Rosenfeld in the Washington Post revealed that the Soviets would soon deploy an antimissile system despite U.S. attempts to discourage the plan. Indirect approaches had been made
to the Russians by a "prestigious nongovernmental committee" which appealed for an antimissile moratorium last December. The committee had warned that the new systems would "retrigger an arms race" in both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. It would necessitate the building of fallout shelters in both countries, "disturb the existing nuclear balance and contribute to world tension."501

The committee seeking to persuade the Russians not to build an antimissile defense was led by President Kennedy's science adviser, Jerome Wiesner, and former Undersecretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. These original members of the Kennedy Administration had long been prominent exponents of the theory that formal or informal arms control agreements with the Russians are practicable and may lead to a safe reduction of arms expenditures.

Unfortunately for their theory, and unfortunately in every way, the Russians simply refused to respond to their efforts. Comments on their report published in Russia eliminated the antimissile section. No one in Moscow made any effort to respond to the last-resort appeal.

The very great significance of these events is disturbingly well explained in the non-military magazine The New Republic of May 1966. The writer is Raymond D. Senter, pseudonym for a well-known analyst of military affairs who writes frequently for the New Republic. Most of Senter's articles have been highly critical of the Defense Department, and particularly of its uniformed members, with occasional indication of tolerance for the Army. Senter outlines the Wiesner-Gilpatric effort to bring about a moratorium of at least three years in the deployment of antimissile systems. Following the formula which produced the test ban treaty, the
committee made no effort toward halting research, which could not be policed. Both countries can keep check on the large and visible antimissile deployments, by means of reconnaissance satellites.

Wiesner and Gilpatric were trying to apply the theory of escalation avoidance at the very top level of violence. Its failure there is a much more serious development than its failure in Vietnam. The Russian refusal even to respond to this attempt to negotiate from weakness presents a puzzle. American scientists believe that although the U.S. is behind in antimissile deployment we are ahead of the Russians in maneuverable and maneuvering missile warheads which are especially difficult to intercept. They believe the Russians are aware of the difficulties of warhead interception.

Putting aside the possibility that the Russians may know a better method of interception, (an echo from the test ban debate) the question arises as to why the Soviets insist on making the huge investment these installations require. One suggested solution is that the new defenses would be useful against the simple missiles the Chinese are expected to develop in the next few years.502 Another is that such a defense would furnish some protection against an accidental missile strike that might otherwise set off a war. In any case, Senter arrives at a conclusion quite different from the usual for him and recommends an antimissile project, even at a cost of ten billion dollars, for the United States.

The United States Defense Department has long resisted recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and demands by Congress to begin work on the deployment of an antimissile system. A principal reason, as Senter explains, was the fear that by doing so we might
encourage the Russians to do the same and also to build more missiles to saturate our newly built defenses. Recent events, however, have led to even greater doubts among members of congress that the no-escalation, no-arms-race theory of defense is practical or safe. Objections to Mr. McNamara's policies in avoiding the construction of an ant missile system, or bombers to evade the Russian system, reached a new high pitch in April of 1966. William S. White, writing in the Washington Post to defend Mr. McNamara on the grounds that "somebody has got to be trusted," stated that the complaints against his policies, and his manner in defense of them, reached "a pitch of violence rarely seen in a Senate committee."\textsuperscript{503}

CRATERS AND MUSHROOM CLOUDS IN THE TREATY'S THIRD YEAR

A surprising number of nuclear events and disclosures near the end of the third year of the nuclear test ban treaty began to raise doubts as to its durability. Least serious among these was the disclosure that informal talks had already begun toward arriving at some understanding between the United States and Russia that would permit violations of the treaty's original terms. Here the testimony of both Dr. Teller and Dr. Seaborg was vindicated in that the predicted requirement for nuclear excavations had become urgent. The United States was anxious to exploit the great reduction in cost that would be possible in digging a new interocean canal. The secretive Russians apparently were working toward some major excavation project for they had, accidentally or otherwise, produced large craters by underground testing since the treaty. On January 15 of 1965 there had been a
nuclear blowout near Semipalatinsk, in the deep interior of Asia, so large that some of the fallout had reached Japan.

Whether the crater was deliberate or whether it resulted from an accidental overpressure from one of their earthquake-producing underground tests was not known. The United States Atomic Energy Commission had announced nine Russian underground tests large enough to be detected from great distances, three of which occurred early in 1966. In the United States there had been nine cases of venting or minor cratering from underground tests, none large enough to cause fallout beyond the immediate area. The most serious incident, in late April of 1966, produced only enough fallout to cause milk cows grazing in the surrounding area to be put on dry feed for a time. The Russians were continually setting off much more powerful nuclear explosions than the United States, as had been the case in atmospheric testing, so that more serious cratering and fallout problems were to be expected. In early 1966 the Soviets were increasing the size and the number of their underground blasts.

One encouraging event in the third year of the treaty was the appointment of Dr. John Foster, the outstandingly forthright and candid official witness of the test ban hearings, to the important post in the Defense Department formerly held by Dr. Harold Brown. Dr. Foster succeeded Dr. Brown as Director of Defense Research and engineering when the latter became Secretary of the Air Force. In assuming the post Dr. Brown stated his satisfaction with the manner in which the Johnson administration had carried out the safeguards which Senator Jackson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had achieved before the treaty was ratified.
With the possible exception of the ominous Russian antimissile deployment, the most disquieting events to follow the test ban treaty were the Chinese nuclear tests. The first of these occurred on October 6, 1964, the second on May 14, 1965. Both appeared to be successful experiments in the development of a fission trigger for a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb. The French, who had first exploded an atomic device in 1960, had not achieved a thermonuclear explosion by mid-1966. More testing in the Pacific was announced by France for the summer of 1966. Protests by neutrals were expected to be no more effective than such protests would have been if made against Russian or Chinese testing. It was expected that France might attain a thermonuclear explosion in the new tests.

The dreaded third Chinese nuclear blast came on May 9, 1966. It was accompanied by a statement blaming the imperialist powers for making the Chinese explosions necessary. Two days later, winds had carried radioactive particles from the Lop Nor test site in the Sinkiang desert all the way to Japan. Prime Minister Sato called an emergency session of his cabinet to consider what precautions to take in view of the unusually heavy fallout, which exceeded that received from the Russian and American hydrogen bomb tests of 1961 and 1962. Many Japanese carried umbrellas for protection.

After studying atmospheric samples, the United States Atomic Energy Commission announced that the Chinese explosion did indeed contain thermonuclear material as their announcement had claimed. This was not a true thermonuclear device, however, and appeared to be another experiment directed toward that goal. It was primarily a fission explosion, first estimated to have a power of 130,000
kilotons. On May 20 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission released an estimate revised upward to between 200,000 kilotons and one megaton. The type of explosion was said to indicate a capability to produce large quantities of uranium 235 and 239. The rate of Chinese progress toward a hydrogen bomb was rapid in comparison with that of France. It was estimated by nuclear experts that Red China would have a successful thermonuclear device in less than four years and an armament of hydrogen bombs in less than a decade.509

On May 21, Dr. Ralph Lapp, who has made a useful career of revealing information guarded by the Atomic Energy Commission, estimated that the Chinese could produce a true thermonuclear explosion within one year.

The nuclear events of three years, rising to a crescendo in the spring of 1966, indicated that the hope of nuclear balance and stability which had been encouraged by the test ban treaty remained a vain hope. The treaty itself had proved a paradox. There was no possibility that such a treaty could achieve what was expected of it, although it served at least one useful purpose in reducing for a few years the amount of fallout that might otherwise have collected.

The requirement for ratification by the Senate had caused the treaty to become a means of reinstating an underground test program after all testing had been suspended on a gamble that the Russians were not serious in competing for superiority in the most decisive weapons. The continuing Chinese and French explosions released all nations signatory to the treaty who might wish to resume testing. The ever bigger Chinese blasts and the beginning of a stupendous antimissile system by Russia indicate that another round in the struggle for nuclear supremacy might be imminent.
Among the signatory nations the treaty was still in force. It needed no epitaph. If an epitaph should ever be needed for this illusory pause in the nuclear struggle, a good one already exists. It was written by German philosopher Guenther Anders, whose book about Hiroshima, Der Mann auf der Brücke, is famous in Europe. His statement is ponderous, as an epitaph should be:

"On August 6, 1945, the day of Hiroshima, a new age began: the age in which at any given moment we are able to transform any given place on our planet, and even our planet itself into a Hiroshima. Since that day we have become [at least modo negativo] omnipotent; since, on the other hand, we also can be wiped out at any moment, we have also become totally impotent. However long this age may last, even if it should last forever, it is the Last Age, for there is no possibility that its differentia specifica, the possibility of our self-extermination, can ever end—except by the end itself."

On the other hand, back in the days when the test ban treaty was new and shiny and before the Chinese tests, Dr. Walt Rostow of the Department of State made a more cheerful comment. The test ban, he said, marked the third effort since 1945 to promote peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union. He advocated making the most of this third round and suggested that patience might be necessary to wait for the fourth. He did not suggest what the waiting-time might be.
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