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CANADA VERSUS GUADELOUPE IN BRITAIN'S OLD COLONIAL EMPIRE:
A STUDY OF GEORGE LOUIS BEER'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE PEACE OF PARIS OF 1763

by
Leland Joseph Bellot

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PROLOGUE

The eighteenth-century struggle for empire between Great Britain and France reached a climax at Quebec in October, 1759, when British forces commanded by General James Wolfe defeated the French under the Marquis de Montcalm, thereby removing the main obstacle to the eventual conquest of all Canada. The people of Britain were jubilant in their praise of the heroic Wolfe and of the victory won on the Plains of Abraham; Horace Walpole wrote exultantly that "like Alexander, we have no more worlds left to conquer."

He felt that peace was now impossible, for England could not return her conquest and France would never give up this lost possession, but he sounded a note of defiance when he added "they have nothing left for it but to conquer us."

By 1760, however, Canada was being evaluated for its potential as a colonial possession rather than in terms of the glories of its conquest; and the British public debated whether Canada or the West Indian island Guadeloupe should be demanded in the negotiations for peace with France. In this debate one element argued convincingly that the tiny French sugar island would be more valuable to Britain's colonial commerce than the vast North American conquest. Nevertheless in the Treaty of Paris of 1763 Great Britain retained Canada; Guadeloupe and other West Indian conquests were returned to France.
Britain's decision to retain Canada rather than Guadeloupe in 1763 has often been discussed and debated during the last two centuries by both British and American historians. This study, however, will focus on one of the most important of these interpretations--that of George Louis Beer.

Chapter I will be devoted to a presentation of those factors which provided the colonial and diplomatic background for the Treaty of 1763. Chapter II will examine Beer's interpretation of the treaty, especially in the light of contemporary British opinion on the subject. And Chapter III will consider the work of three historians, Curtis P. Nettels, Klaus E. Knorr and Richard Pares, who have provided either direct or indirect criticism of Beer's theory. The last chapter discusses several of the most significant interpretations of the eighteenth century debate over Canada versus Guadeloupe suggested by historians whose works have appeared since Beer's analysis of the Peace of Paris. The Epilogue is devoted to a synthesis of these various studies as part of an effort to find an answer to the question which originally inspired this thesis--Why did Great Britain retain Canada rather than Guadeloupe in the Treaty of Paris of 1763 in spite of the fact that her self-sufficient empire required the addition of sugar islands not expansion on the North American continent?
Chapter I
The Colonial and Diplomatic Background of the Treaty of Paris of 1763

During the first seventy-five years of the seventeenth century England's trade with her American colonies was greatly overshadowed by her more lucrative commerce with Europe and the East Indies, and English mercantilists paid relatively little attention to the economic development of the colonies. However, in the latter decades of the century the influx of such colonial products as tobacco and sugar brought merchants and statesmen to reconsider the commercial significance of colonial possessions; and by 1696 Parliament was asked to consider means to regulate the long-neglected plantation trade which was now quite as important as that to the East Indies.¹

The volume and variety of colonial goods continued to expand at such a rate during the eighteenth century that British mercantilists developed the theory of a self-sufficient empire in which "the mother country, the sugar and tobacco colonies, the provision or bread colonies, the fisheries, and Africa formed a single economic and commercial whole..."² Within

² Ibid., 345.
this empire Barbados, Jamaica, and the Leeward Islands, would produce such staples as sugar molasses, rum, and dyewoods; Maryland, Virginia and the Carolinas were to contribute tobacco, rice, indigo and naval stores; Pennsylvania, New York, and New England would provide wheat, flour, bread, and livestock for the other colonies; and, Bermuda and the Bahamas would be useful as strategic outposts. The fisheries of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia would also occupy an important place in this empire. The ultimate advantage of this system was intended of course for the mother state which would gather together (with the aid of monopolistic trade regulations) all of the colonial raw materials for the purpose of producing manufactured goods; or, if this was impossible, she could re-export the raw product at a profit. The manufactures would be exported to Europe, and the surplus would be sold to the colonies.

This self-sufficient empire was the ideal of eighteenth century mercantilism whereby Great Britain was to attain a favorable balance of trade in her commerce with the states of Europe and be relatively free from other nations for her material needs. Several factors, however, prevented the realization of this goal. The lands of the British West Indian Islands were already so fully exploited in the first half of the eighteenth century that they could hardly increase their
yield. Only Jamaica had room for more plantations, and it became evident that the sugar islands had ceased to attract new capital. Consequently, Great Britain was unable to match the tremendous production of the French West Indies, and she lost the European sugar market to the cheaper French product. The British sugar islands were able to find an outlet for their sugars only through the monopoly of the home market.

This situation had repercussions on the northern provision colonies who for years had considered the British West Indies their most lucrative market. The stagnation of the British sugar islands, at a time of rapid expansion of North American produce, brought gluts in the British West Indies market and forced northern merchants to sell their provisions to the French, Dutch, and Spanish islands. This provisioning of the colonies of commercial rivals was a gross violation of mercantile principles, and for this reason (as well as for their insolent independence) the northern colonies were not cherished by British mercantilists.

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4 Andrews, 347.

5 Dorn, 286-287.
The French West Indies, in sharp contrast to the situation in the British sugar islands, enjoyed a great period of prosperity during the first half of the eighteenth century. The populations of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and San Domingo had grown in such numbers that the provisioning of these possessions constituted a considerable portion of French trade. During Cardinal Fleury's ministry (1726-1743) the sugar planters and merchants of the French islands ousted their English and Dutch rivals from the markets of Europe, and by the middle of the century sugar refining had become one of the major industries of France.

Canada, on the other hand, was not so important to French mercantilism as the West Indies. Other than furs, the only significant Canadian product during the French regime was provided by the fisheries; and the continental colony was not absolutely necessary for the success of this industry. Furthermore, several obstacles prevented any trade between Canada and France.

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from reaching its potential. The Canadian climate rendered the harbor at Quebec useless for six months every year; storms, and sandbars, rocks, and the currents of the lower St. Lawrence were other natural hindrances to commerce. Therefore in spite of the fur industry the balance of trade remained adverse to Canada (except in 1731, 1739, and 1741) making it necessary for the king to make annual grants to keep the colony from bankruptcy.\(^8\)

The structure of society and government in both England and in France were important factors in determining both the manner in which each nation viewed colonization and also their demands in the negotiations ending the various phases of their colonial rivalry. In England the commercial and manufacturing interests were closely allied with the landed interests; and this relationship between the two dominant elements in English society usually meant that state policy, when related to considerations of international commerce, was in the hands of the masters of trade and industry.\(^9\) British ministers were usually

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\(^8\) Allana G. Reid, "General Trade Between Quebec and France During the French Regime," The Canadian Historical Review, XXXIV (March, 1953), p.29.

mercantilist in their sympathies, however their attitudes toward commercial or colonial policy were frequently determined (as we shall see) by diplomatic necessities which could not always be reconciled with the prevailing principles of trade.\(^\text{10}\)

Furthermore, English mercantilists were not all in agreement concerning the remedies which should be applied to dangers from the trade of other countries or the means for establishing the ideal self-sufficient empire. Some advocated adjustment and a stricter enforcement of the laws of trade; others demanded colonial expansion at the expense of rival powers or at least destruction of their overseas possessions.\(^\text{11}\) Consequently British mercantilists could not dictate foreign policy even though their principles dominated the general view of commerce.

In the first half of the eighteenth century the welfare of the French state was not so closely associated with the interests of the commercial classes as it was in Great Britain; for France was dominated by the monarchy and a feudal aristocracy, which was steeped in a tradition of luxury and military ambition.\(^\text{12}\) To this aristocracy the glory of the nation demanded the maintenance of a great overseas empire, and the feudal military tra-

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10 Andrews, 328.
11 Ibid., 326.
12 Dorn, 7.
dition required land expansion in North America rather than naval development as part of maritime trade. However such continental expansion, necessitating the maintenance of armies and the erection of forts in North America, made enormous financial demands on the state; and to a debt ridden monarchy involved in the dynastic struggles of Europe, colonies such as those in the West Indies which produced a great profit for the royal treasury were of greater immediate importance than possessions such as Canada which drained off bullion for the sake of colonial prestige.

Thus we can see that colonies occupied an important position in the power relationship which existed between Great Britain and France in the eighteenth century. However it must be remembered that colonial-commercial considerations were not the only factors which determined the course of the struggle for colonial supremacy in the New World. For during this same period—roughly 1700-1760—the rise of Prussia (and also of Russia) upset the continental balance of power, and the colonial struggle between Britain and France became inextricably involved with the wars and diplomacy of the European continent.

After the Peace of Utrecht (1713) France and England were

13 Klaus E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories, 1570-1850 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1944), pp.xii-xiii.
the two most powerful survivors of the colonial and commercial rivalry which had been going on since the sixteenth century. After the wars of Louis XIV Holland was no longer the threat to the mercantilism of England and France that she had been in the seventeenth century; and Spain, in spite of her vast American possessions, was hard pressed to keep her colonial empire intact. The colonial settlement of the Treaty of Utrecht only intensified the rivalry between England and France; yet open conflict was postponed for a while as Sir Robert Walpole and Cardinal Fleury pursued policies of peaceful commercial expansion.

By the 1730's, however, the needs of England's rapidly expanding industry and commerce collided with the exclusionist policies of Spain in her American colonies. During the decade before 1739 British trade had remained almost stationary, and English mercantilists had become alarmed at the rapidly expanding trade of France based upon the export of West Indies sugar to all of Europe and of other merchandise to the Spanish-American markets. There was a conflict in England between the aims of those who sought expansion in the West Indies at the expense of

14 The Asiento and the "annual ship" granted by the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1714, were not enough to satisfy British trade appetites, and also alienated Spain from granting privileges to the British. See Lillian M. Penson, "The West Indies and the Spanish-American Trade 1713-1748," The Cambridge History of the British Empire, I (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), 336-345.
Spain and those who wanted only outposts for trade in the Spanish colonial dominions; nevertheless Walpole was forced to give way to the demand for war with Spain in 1739. France could not ignore a war between England and Spain, for she had a great stake in the Cadiz trade; and besides she could not allow her sugar trade to be challenged by what appeared to be a British attempt at expansion in the West Indies.  

Fleury was determined to limit the conflict with Britain to a colonial contest in which Bourbon France would be allied with Bourbon Spain. To this end he developed a skillful diplomatic policy aimed at guaranteeing the neutrality of the rest of Europe—the most important element of this policy being the French acceptance of the Hapsburg Pragmatic Sanction in 1738. But after the death of Emperor Charles VI in 1740, Frederick the Great of Prussia invaded Silesia; and Fleury, unable to restrain the traditional opposition of France to the Hapsburgs, saw his colonial schemes overwhelmed by French participation in the conflict in Europe.

Great Britain, ruled by a German Prince who was more directly concerned with the safety of his electorate of Hanover

15 Dorn, 129.

than that of Britain's colonial possessions, became absorbed in the attempt to construct another Grand Alliance against the Bourbon ascendancy in Europe; and as a matter of state policy the colonial contest faded into the background. Until 1743 both England and France acted as seconds for the European rivals, but in that year open conflict broke out between the two nations. France challenged England's commercial and naval position, and England undertook to aid Austria against the Franco-Prussian coalition.

If the war in Europe eventually became a contest of endurance among the combatants, the British naval war with France brought about the virtual destruction of the French navy and the disruption of her commerce by 1747. The British blockade of the French West Indies cut off a valuable source of revenue to the French monarchy which was burdened by a costly and unprofitable continental war in which no vital interest of France was actually involved. In North America although neither the New Englanders nor the French-Canadians had wanted a war the repercussions of the European struggle led to a colonial conflict which resulted in the capture of Louisburg in 1745 by the British-American colonists. 17 The North Americans now de-

17 Dorn, 165.
manded aid for the conquest of all of Canada, but the cam-
paigns of the French general Maurice de Saxe in Flanders
forced the British government to consider the immediate inter-
est of "old" England rather than those of New England.

In spite of her naval victories and commercial superior-
ity, by 1748 financial exhaustion seemed as imminent to Great
Britain as it did to France. The result was that these
nations overcame the objections of their continental allies
and brought about the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, whereby
Britain and France agreed to a mutual restoration of colonial
conquests—along with new French guarantees of the Flemish
barrier. However the Peace settled none of the basic issues
in the colonial rivalry between England and France; indeed it
was little more than a truce during which the antagonists col-
lected their forces for the ultimate showdown which was to de-
termine the future of the North American continent.18

The truce between the powers of Europe lasted eight years.
In North America, however, the peace treaty hardly affected the
relations of the two powers; and the commercial competition in
the West Indies became more intense with the rapid recovery of
French trade. It was in North America that the French and

18 W.F. Reddaway, "Rivalry for Colonial Power, 1714-1748,"
British colonial interests most actively come into conflict; for French fears were aroused by the expansive energies of the vigorous British-American colonists, numbering perhaps a million and one half, who seemed destined to overwhelm French North America if steps were not taken to contain them on the eastern slopes of the Appalachians. British occupation of the Ohio Valley would endanger the line of communications between New France and Louisiana meaning the isolation, and perhaps the loss, of all Canada. Although the French government did not desire a general war with Great Britain, the military aristocracy at the French court, as well as the officials in Canada, demanded the maintenance of the colonial balance of power; and instructions were issued for the expulsion of English settlers from the region between the Mississippi and the Appalachians and for the erection of forts to prevent future British encroachments. In 1754 and 1755 clashes took place in America where British forces were defeated by the French, and the American colonists looked to the home government for support. But during this undeclared war of 1755 both England and France

19 For population figures see Cecil Headlam, "Development of the Colonies Under the First Georges, 1714-1755," The Cambridge History of the British Empire, I, 400-401.

were trying to construct a new balance of forces in Europe to replace the old alliances which had been upset as a result of the rise of Prussia—and to a lesser degree of Russia; and in both countries the ministries were momentarily able to withstand the clamor of the war parties. 21

In the period of peace following the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Europe experienced a great diplomatic revolution whereby the old system of alliances was abandoned and was replaced by a new alignment of opposing powers. Austria, under the leadership of Count Kaunitz, was determined to regain the Hapsburg possessions lost in 1748—her main goal being the recovery of Silesia from Prussia. Frederick the Great, who was fully aware of the Hapsburg intentions, feared a rapprochement between Austria and France; and he became greatly concerned over the activities of Kaunitz at the Court of Versailles. In Great Britain George II was still fearful that Hanover would be overran in the approaching war with France, and early in 1755 England invited Austria to renew their alliance making a definite offer respecting the defense of the Austrian Netherlands. But, since England was unwilling to support Austria's efforts

21 Dorn, 288. The Duke of Cumberland, William Pitt and Henry Fox were leaders of the group which demanded general war with France.
to recover Silesia, in May, 1755, Kaunitz met this proposal with a polite refusal. 22

Great Britain now sought an alliance with Prussia, and the result was the Convention of Westminster (January, 1756) by which England gained continental security and Frederick obtained an ally against a Franco-Austrian combination. 23 France, on the other hand, fearing isolation on the Continent and tempted by the possibility of annexations in the Low Countries now abandoned her traditional opposition to Austria, and by the Treaty of Versailles (May, 1756) entered into an alliance with the House of Hapsburg. 24 Thus in their efforts to gain European security for the rapidly approaching colonial clash, France and England once again had become involved in the struggle between Austria and Prussia for predominance in Germany. The truce between the powers of Europe ended in August, 1756, when Frederick the Great invaded Saxony beginning the Seven Years War.

During the first two years of the war Britain suffered a

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22 Hassall, 235.
23 Ibid., 236-237.
24 Ibid., 240-242. Later in 1756 Russia accepted the defensive alliance between Austria and France by the Convention of St. Petersburg.
series of reverses both on the continent and overseas. Oswego was lost to the French in America; and, in spite of British naval power, French fleets sailed freely to the sugar islands. Minorca was lost in 1756; in 1757 Hanover was occupied by the French; and despite several victories in 1756, Frederick the Great pitted against the might of Austria, France and Russia also lost ground. In the face of public despair and indignation George II was forced to call Pitt into the Cabinet and then allow him practically to dictate the conduct of the war.

Under Pitt's leadership the entire energies of the nation were devoted to the successful prosecution of the war, and following his broad outlines of strategy the rejuvenated and reorganized British war effort turned the tide of defeat into a flood of victories for Great Britain. In 1758 Louisburg was recaptured; and in the West Indies, Guadeloupe fell to More and Hopson in the spring 1759. Later in the year the nation was thrilled by the daring conquest of Quebec by Wolfe; by 1760 Montreal had fallen, and the possession of all Canada was certain. France had planned to save Canada by the invasion of England, but the British naval victories at Lagos (August, 1759) and Quiberon Bay (November, 1759) meant the loss of New

France as well as the destruction of the French fleet.  

After a series of disasters on the continent Frederick's victory at Rossbach (November, 1757) broke up the imperial army and forced the French to retire across the Rhine; and Pitt, who for twenty years had denounced German entanglements, now determined to "win America in Germany."  

British and Hanoverian forces took the offensive in the electorate and by 1758 the French forces had been driven out of Hanover. In order to keep the French occupied in the costly German campaign Pitt supplied Frederick with large grants of money, but the Prussian king was fighting against overwhelming forces, and often only his iron will and the failure of his enemies to cooperate saved him from being crushed. In spite of the British subsidy by 1761 he was on the verge of exhaustion, and Britain again faced the prospect of losing colonial conquests for the sake of preserving continental interests.

France, however, had become weary of the war which threatened her with financial ruin; and she was equally unhappy about the alliance with Austria whereby she had lost a colonial empire for the sake of furthering Hapsburg aims. In March, 1761,

26 Dorn, 361.

27 Ibid., 323-324.
Choiseul suggested the assembling of a European peace conference preceded by a separate peace between France and England, and the British government accepted this proposal. On June 17, 1761, Choiseul proposed to restore Minorca to England in exchange for Guadeloupe, Marie Galante and Goree; France would cede Canada with new boundaries. However Pitt drafted a reply (accepted by the Cabinet on June 26) demanding all of Canada; Guadeloupe and Marie Galante would be restored only if the territory of England's German ally was immediately evacuated. The French reply of July 20 demanded a share of the fisheries and refused to restore the French conquests in Prussia. Britain by this time had taken Poindicherry in India and captured Dominica, and Pitt's ultimatum of July 29 insisted upon the restoration of the lands of the Prussian king and demanded the restitution of Minorca in return for Guadeloupe and Belleisle.

Since Spain was now secretly allied with France, Choiseul determined to continue the war; and he sent the "French ultimatum" of August 5 to Pitt. This ultimatum demanded St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, and Marie Galante and refused the restoration of

29 Ibid., 490-491.
Minorca or the evacuation of the territories of the King of Prussia. Pitt proposed to return a stiff reply; but George III, who had succeeded his grandfather in October, 1760, cared little for Hanover and was principally concerned with associating himself and his supporters with the return of peace and prosperity by having his own adviser, the Earl of Bute, arrange the settlement. Consequently the king and Bute forced Pitt to send a conciliatory reply to France (on August, 1761). England offered to share the Newfoundland fisheries and made concessions concerning the problem of Dunkirk; Guadeloupe, Belleisle and Marie Galante would be returned to France while Minorca would be restored to England. Pitt still demanded restitution of French conquests in Prussia.

Pitt suspected that a secret alliance existed between the Bourbon kingdoms, and in September, 1761, he demanded that Britain anticipate the danger by attacking Spain. The British public, however, was opposed to a war with Spain; and, when Choiseul indicated that he would no longer negotiate with Pitt, George III seized the opportunity to secure Pitt's resignation (October 2, 1761).

30 Ibid., 488.
31 Ibid., 492.
Now Bute was placed in charge of the peace negotiations; however, he was unable to prevent the deterioration of relations with Spain; and in January, 1762, war broke out between England and Spain. But the combined Bourbon powers were unable to defeat British naval superiority; and in 1762 Martinique and all of the other French West Indies except San Domingo were taken. In the same year Havana and the Philippines were captured from Spain. Bute had treacherously abandoned Frederick after Spain entered the war; however the withdrawal of Russia from the Hapsburg coalition saved the Prussian monarch from possible disaster and, in fact, enabled him to launch an offensive which would eventually force Austria to renounce her territorial ambitions at Hubertsburg in February, 1763.

England was now dominant in North America and the West Indies, and her continental interests were all secure. However France and Spain were still capable of waging war; and Bute was determined to grant concessions for the sake of peace, rather than prolong the negotiations in order to obtain all of the British conquests. The possession of Martinique was the main obstacle to Bute's peace efforts; Choiseul had demanded the restoration of that island (April, 1762). However, Bute realized that he could not restore Martinique without compensation, and yet he felt that he would not obtain peace if he asked for a
settled colony such as Guadeloupe or Louisiana. He finally hit upon a compromise which would assure him the peace he desired so greatly; Britain would demand Grenada and all the neutral islands and the North American continent as far as the left bank of the Mississippi; the other West Indian Islands including Guadeloupe would be returned to France. By mid-August Choiseul had agreed to the British terms; and on November 3, 1762 the Preliminaries of Peace were signed at Fontainbleu between France, Spain and England.

By the Treaty of Paris of 1763 Great Britain secured Canada and all of its dependencies and undisputed possession of North America as far West as the Mississippi; from Spain she received Florida in exchange for Havana--Spain having been compensated with the cession of Louisiana by France. In the West Indies, Britain retained several small islands--St. Vincent, Dominica, and Tobago; but Guadeloupe, Maria Galante, Disrade, Martinique, Belleisle and St. Lucia were returned to France. Great Britain also granted North American fishing rights to France and ceded the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon for French fishermen. 33


33 For the details of the Treaty (including the European settlement) see Journals of the House of Commons, (1761-1764) XXIX, 576-580.
Pitt denounced the preliminaries to the treaty when they were presented before the House of Commons. He was especially vehement in his opposition to the return of Guadeloupe and Martinique, and he insisted that France be deprived of all her overseas empire—both Canada and the West Indian conquests should be retained. Britain, however, was weary of war; and the King's supporters were able to persuade the House of Commons to accept the preliminaries by an overwhelming majority.

The colonial conquests which Great Britain retained in the Peace of Paris were not compatible with the commercial and colonial views that prevailed in England prior to the Seven Years War. We have seen that the development of a self-sufficient empire became impossible when the relative decline of sugar production in the British West Indies forced the North American colonists to trade with the French and Spanish islands. Yet by this treaty England returned to France those islands which were the foundation of the French monopoly of the European sugar trade and which—if they had been kept by Britain—could have


made possible the realization of the ideal self-sufficient empire. Canada, a colony which had been a financial liability under French rule, was retained; and the commercial disequilibrium which existed among the British colonies became even greater than it had been before the war.
Chapter II
George L. Beer's Interpretation of the Treaty of Paris

The first major historical work that presented an interpretation of the motives which promoted Great Britain to retain Canada rather than Guadeloupe in 1763 was George Bancroft's History of the United States of America, first published in 1852. Bancroft, in his discussion of Britain's decision, observed that Pitt had wished to retain both conquests; but the cabinet refused to support such extensive demands. According to Bancroft, Pitt's view of the colonies was marked by liberality and respect for American rights. Consequently, Bancroft theorized that Pitt decided to demand Canada because he was determined "to extend the region throughout which English liberties were to be enjoyed... ."

In A History of England in the Eighteenth Century (first published in 1878), W.E.H. Lecky examined the terms of the treaty in that section of his study which dealt with the causes of the American Revolution. He pointed out that many Englishmen recognized that the removal of France from the American continent might eventually lead to the independence

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2 Ibid., 528-530.
of the colonies from the mother country. But Lecky explained that the British public desired "to remove at any risk the one obstacle" to the "future happiness" of the American colonies, and Canada was essential to the security of the homes of the North American colonists.

The most important interpretation of the treaty, however, was advanced in 1907 by George Louis Beer who theorized that Britain's retention of Canada instead of Guadeloupe indicated that England had experienced a great change in viewpoint concerning the utility of colonial possessions. Beer presented his views in *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765* (1907) the work which comprises the final part of his five volumes devoted to the examination of the British colonial system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In his undergraduate years at Columbia University, Beer had been introduced to the study of British imperial policy by Herbert L. Osgood whose own works were critical of the "patriotic school" of American historians. According to Osgood this group, including such historians as George Bancroft and

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4 Ibid., 5-6.

John Fiske, had failed to consider the British point of view in the colonial and revolutionary periods and had labeled British policy unjust, oppressive and corrupt. In his master's thesis at Columbia, *The Commercial Policy of England Toward the American Colonies* (1893), Beer, following the line of thought laid out by Osgood, approached England's colonial policy as something to be studied and explained, not simply to be condemned as tyrannical; he presented the constructive side of British mercantilism and pointed out that the desire to make colonies beneficial to Great Britain was both natural and reasonable. Such a departure from the traditional interpretation of the colonial period seems even more amazing when one notes that Beer was only in this twenty-first year when he produced this work which was considered worthy of publication in the new "Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law."  

Beer was invited to remain at Columbia as a lecturer, but he did not enjoy teaching, and after four years he gave up lecturing entirely (1897) and entered the tobacco importing

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business. In this new endeavor Beer was quite successful, and by 1903 he was sufficiently independent to retire from business and devote his time to his scholarly interests.

At Columbia, Beer had been greatly impressed by the rigorous research methods of the German scientific school of historiography, and he had become aware of the imperfections of his earlier work which was based on printed sources available in the United States. Consequently he went to England in 1903 and spent over a year investigating the manuscript material related to British colonial policy deposited in various London archives especially in the Public Record Office.  

He returned to America in 1904 with a great mass of information gleaned by an exhaustive study of sources which had never before been used by historians. Charles M. Andrews who was in close personal contact with him during this period has pointed out that the elaborate plan which Beer formulated, after sorting and assembling his notes, was one designed "to describe and explain the origins, establishment, and development

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of the British colonial system up to the outbreak of the disagreements that directly culminated in the American Revolution; to analyze the underlying principles of British colonial policy, especially insofar as they found expression in the laws of trade and navigation; to study the English fiscal system to the extent that it concerned the colonies; to deal with colonial legislation in all matters that vitally affected the economic relations of the dependencies to the mother country; to investigate the economic life of the colonies themselves in all that concerned their commercial and manufacturing activities; to describe the British official system in America, with the specific object of ascertaining to what extent the laws were enforced; and finally, to discuss the relations of the economic to the political system, inseparably connected, as they were the one with the other."\textsuperscript{11}

Although Beer planned to deal first with the origins of the colonial system, he found that his notes on the eighteenth century were more extensive than those relating to the earlier period.\textsuperscript{12} Consequently the volume which he intended as the last of the series, \textit{British Colonial Policy 1754-1765}, appeared first (1907). The introductory volume, \textit{The Origins of the

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 19.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 21.
British Colonial System, 1578-1660, came out in 1908; and in 1912 after spending six more months of research in England, he published The Old Colonial System 1660-1688 in two volumes which were to constitute the first part of an examination of colonial policy from 1660 to 1754. The final parts were to bring him to the period encompassed in his first volume thus completing his study of the British colonial system. He intended to deal with the period from 1688 to 1754 in three additional parts of two volumes each. 13 But before he could begin these final volumes of his work World War I had begun, and Beer became convinced that he should not persevere in the study of the eighteenth century at a time when western civilization faced the crisis of the twentieth century. He abandoned his great project, unfortunately never to take it up again. 14

Charles Andrews has noted that, although Beer's contribution to history is incomplete, it is "a torso, powerfully built, rugged, and superb even in its unfinished state; but it is not

13 Ibid., 23.

14 During World War I Beer's literary efforts were devoted to a propaganda campaign designed to arouse the United States from its isolationism. In 1919 he was named Chief of the Colonial Division of the American Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Unfortunately, Beer was unable to resume his scholarly interests before his untimely death in March 1920. See Cockroft, 277-282.
incomplete in the lesson it teaches, the standards it maintains, and the method it applies."\textsuperscript{15} His greatest contribution to colonial history was a new point of view which considered the British interests in colonization rather than limiting this study to an examination of the origins of American national development. Beer was also the first to use new materials—the reports and statistics of seventeenth and eighteenth century officials of the colonial system—to follow the ideas gradually forming in men's minds and the attempts to put these into practice.

The general character of Beer's major works have not altogether escaped criticism. Several historians have observed that in his effort to view colonization from the other side of the Atlantic he treated British colonial administration with excessive kindness, and even Osgood thought that Beer had gone too far in his reaction against the old American interpretations of colonial history.\textsuperscript{16} Andrews felt that by limiting himself to economic features of the old British empire Beer failed to present a perfectly balanced picture of British colonial policy, but he also noted that Beer treated the economic aspects in

\textsuperscript{15} Andrews, \textit{George Louis Beer: A Tribute}, 27.

\textsuperscript{16} Cockroft 276.
a manner "so elaborate and with a temper so restrained as
to make it unnecessary to go over the ground again with the
same thoroughness and care."  

Among the more specific points in Beer's interpretation of colonial history none has been criticized more often than his explanation of the Peace of Paris of 1763 in *British Colonial Policy 1754-1765*. This criticism is discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Here we are concerned first of all with Beer's interpretation of the colonial aspects of the treaty and with an analysis of Beer's theory in the light of his own sources and also of those contemporary sources which he neglected.

Beer begins his analysis of the Peace of Paris by pointing out that according to the earlier theory of colonization, a colony was considered valuable if it produced commodities that the mother country would otherwise have to buy from foreigners; consequently, greater stress was laid on colonies as sources of supply than as markets for British manufactures. Although the importance of colonies as markets was not ignored, the significant prerequisite was that the colonies supply the mother country with raw materials not produced in Great Britain.  

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Beer then observes, however, that the sharp increase (to 1762) of British exports to the rapidly increasing populace of the continental colonies had strengthened the arguments of those who looked upon colonies as markets for the surplus manufactures of Great Britain. Of special importance was the fact that North America, because of its climate, furnished a much larger market for the important woolens industry than did the tropical West Indies. Beer theorizes that the landed classes who had great interest in the woolen industry allied with the manufacturers, as opposed to the trading and commercial interests, and impressed their views on the terms of the Treaty of Paris; and Canada which would give security to the expanding North American market was retained instead of Guadeloupe the raw materials source. He then concludes that "This treaty marks a turning-point in British colonial policy insofar that thereafter greater stress was laid on colonies as markets for British produce than on colonies as sources of supply."  

In supporting his thesis Beer reviews the pamphlet controversy which arose in 1760 over the retention of either Canada or Guadeloupe; and he states that in this manner he intends to follow "some of the contemporary thought leading up to this

19 Ibid., 139.
20 Ibid.
changed attitude." The first of these pamphlets is *A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men* (1759) supposedly written by the Earl of Bath who advocated retaining Canada. Beer observes that the author considered the West Indies insignificant in comparison to the removal of the French from Canada, which would bring security to the continental colonies. These colonies had a large population and afforded a desirable market to be supplied with British manufactures. In Beer's opinion it was on this economic fact that the author "laid chief stress" although he did not ignore other advantages of the continental colonies such as the number of ships in the commercial trade to these possessions, and the importance of their supply of materials such as iron, indigo and naval stores.

Beer then presents an example of the raw materials argument—the pamphlet *Remarks on A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men*—apparently written William Burke, a member of Parliament and kinsman of the great Edmund Burke, advising the return of Canada rather than Guadeloupe. This island, Burke argued, was

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21 The Earl of Bath is better known as Pultney—the leader of the Opposition against Walpole. John Douglas later Bishop of Salisbury probably aided Bath in writing this pamphlet and may even have been its main author.

22 Beer, *Colonial Policy, 1754-1765*, 143.

23 Ibid.
more likely to repay the expense of the war than Canada; for Guadeloupe would enable Britain to compete with France's sugar trade in Europe. Beer observes that Burke emphasized the raw materials argument on the ground that Canada could only produce furs and skins and pointing to the fact that West Indies produce in no way interfered with that of England; whereas the continental colonies and the metropolis produced the same things.  

Beer's position was, in turn, criticized by Benjamin Franklin in the pamphlet The Interests of Great Britain Considered (1760), which defended the acquisition of Canada for the security it would give to the continental colonies. Beer contends that Franklin's argument was based on the rapidly increasing population in North America and the ensuing large exports from England to them; and he maintains that the author emphasized the importance of North America, secured by British possession of Canada, as a market for British manufactures. Beer then examines the manner in which the irrepressible Burke defended his earlier views in An Examination of the Commercial Principles of the Late Negotiations. Burke now called

\[\text{Ibid.}, 143-146.\]

\[\text{Ibid.}, 146-147.\]

\[\text{Ibid.}, 149-151.\]
attention to the fact that Great Britain had entirely lost the foreign market for sugar; while this trade was the most valuable branch of French commerce. The imports of England from the West Indies were greater than those from North America, and he urged retention of Guadeloupe rather than Canada; because the exports of the former totaled £603,296 compared to Canadian exports, £14,015. In 1762 the pamphlet The Comparative Importance of Our Acquisitions refuted Burke's arguments and, according to Beer, emphasized the relative importance of North American imports from England in its defense of the retention of Canada.27

In summarizing his interpretation of the pamphlet debate Beer states that the argument favoring the retention of Guadeloupe "... laid stress on colonies as purveyors of tropical products and of raw materials for British manufactures..." whereas the demand for Canada was based on an argument which "estimated the colonies according to the extent that they furnished a market for British manufactures."28 Since Canada was retained by the peace treaty and Guadeloupe was returned to

27 Ibid., 151.
28 Ibid., 152.
France, Beer then concludes that the new markets view of colonies had prevailed over the older raw materials theory.

A closer examination of both the pamphlets used by Beer and of other sources of opinion in which the views of the public were expressed concerning this controversy seems to indicate, however, that the arguments for retaining Canada were not basically inspired by concern for commercial principles; and, when commerce was considered, the writers generally pointed to the value of North America as a source of raw materials as well as a market for manufactures. The pamphlet A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men, for example, emphasized the acquisition of Canada for security—not security for the sake of commercial interests as Beer maintains—but the security which would prevent France from laying the foundation for another war. The potential of the North American market is indeed discussed; but in the same paragraph this pamphlet observed that England carried North American products such as rice, tobacco, and fish to all the markets of Europe and that the whole English navy could be equipped with naval stores from the northern colonies. It seems impossible to

determine (as Beer does) on which economic factor this writer "laid chief stress." The London Magazine published extracts from this pamphlet but did not include those passages related to the commercial advantages of North America; the editors selected instead those arguments which demanded Canada as a prerequisite for future peace:

... something more must be done, or our American colonies will tell you you have done nothing. In a word, you must keep Canada, otherwise you lay the foundation of another war.30

In his Remarks on a Letter Addressed to Two Great Men, Burke placed emphasis on the raw material produce of Guadeloupe; however in summarizing his arguments he did not neglect the point that this island would be a valuable market for British manufactures.

In short Sir, in whatever light you view this island of Guadeloupe, you will find it a most valuable, and a most desirable object. Do you ask to deprive your enemy of an advantageous post, from whence he might materially molest your trade in time of war. Do you wish to extend your trade in time of peace, and to have a new market for all your manufactures? From being scarce able to supply the home consumption with sugar, do you desire to be foremost at the foreign market? This island, Sir, of Guadeloupe, that you esteem so little, will answer all these ends... 31

30 London Magazine, XXVIII (December, 1759), 627.
The editor of the Gentleman's Magazine regarded as inconsequential Burke's contention that Canada did not have a considerable trade; for even if Canada produced nothing it should be retained for the security which would protect the English colonies from the cruelty of the Indians and save the vast expense of forts, garrisons, and troops. 32 The editor rejected Burke's arguments against demanding Canada -

> It does not appear from any of this writer's remarks, that it is not to our interest to obtain it if we can, preferable to any other acquisition, which the wonders of this war have put into our hands. 33

Franklin's answer to Burke in The Interest of Great Britain Considered (1760) certainly included a discussion of the growing population of North America as a future market for British manufactures and noted the strategic importance of Canada to the security of the expanding colonies. However the economic argument seems directed especially to the task of refuting Burke's commercial position, and Franklin lists two other kinds of security to be considered—security from war and expenses for defensive purposes and security of the


33 Ibid., 27.
colonists from the inroads of savages.\textsuperscript{34}

He stated that Canada in the hands of France had disturbed and vexed even the best and strongest colonies, and he pointed out that disputes arising in America were often the occasion for embroiling all of Europe in war.\textsuperscript{35} Franklin emphasized the cost of over two or three million pounds a year that the defense of the long frontier would entail if Canada were to be returned to France, arguing that England "therefore shall not need to be told by our colonies that if we leave Canada, however, circumscribed to the French we have done nothing; we shall soon be made sensible ourselves of this truth and to our cost."\textsuperscript{36}

Franklin was especially vehement in his denunciation of Burke's contention that Canada should be left in French hands to check the growth of the American colonies and prevent them from becoming independent of the mother country.\textsuperscript{37} He stated


\textsuperscript{35} Franklin also noted that the security of North America would release forces which could be employed elsewhere thus increasing the strength of Great Britain. (p. 16)

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 42-47.
that there were several causes which would prevent inde
dependence—among them the fact that a union of the colonists
was impossible "without the most grievous tyranny and oppres-
sion." In fact he insisted that the presence of France in
America would instead provide revolting colonists with aid
or asylum. But the greatest evil of supporting this policy
was that all Britain was acquainted with the manner in which
the French and Indians checked the growth of the colonies--
by the massacre of men, women, and children. The most stimu-
lating and persuasive point in Franklin's argument was reached
in this passage:

But if Canada is restored on this principle, will not Britain be guilty of all the blood
to be shed, all the murders to be committed, in order to check this dreaded growth of the people? Will not this be telling the French in plain terms, that the horrid barbarities they perpetrate... are agreeable to us? Will not the colonies view it in this light? Will they have reason to consider themselves any longer as subjects and children, when they find their cruel enemies hallooed upon them by the country from whence they sprung; this government that owes them protection, as it requires their obedience.38

A long review of Franklin's pamphlet appeared in The Scots
Magazine which commented that the purpose of this tract was
"to expose and correct the false opinions and erroneous
reasoning" of the Remarks on A Letter Addressed to Two Great

38 Ibid., 47.
Men, and the magazine noted that several of Franklin's observations were "the same that the reader will find in our own account of that pamphlet."\(^{39}\)

A discussion in the *Auditor* (November 1762) of Burke's *Examination of Commercial Principles of the Late Peace* stated that the author had failed in his *Remarks on A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men* to render Great Britain jealous of the commerce of North America and now had endeavored to represent its commerce as valueless.\(^{40}\) The article points to the importance of American consumption of British products; but it notes, as well, the fact that colonial exports of Indian corn, flour, lumber and livestock to the French and Spanish West Indies brought in return sugar and molasses and a large balance of cash; the writer stated that the enemy islands were consequently at the mercy of the British North American colonies. The *Auditor* also observed that the "Examiner" had ignored the value of colonial naval stores which freed Britain from dependence on the Baltic states and had consequently forced Sweden to lower its prices.\(^{41}\)

\(^{39}\) *The Scots Magazine*, XXII, (May, 1760), 273.

\(^{40}\) *Auditor*, quoted in *Gentleman's Magazine*, XXXII (November, 1762), 533.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
The author of the *Comparative Importance of Our Acquisitions* also criticized Burke; however he based his argument in favor of North American expansion on factors other than the market theory which Beer emphasizes. The strategic importance of naval stores was again brought out; but the emphasis which this pamphlet placed on other raw materials produced in Britain's North American colonies is much more important to our examination of Beer's thesis. For this writer stated that wealth flowed into Great Britain with such imports, and he remarked that the expenses of the government and the enormous war debt could not even be paid without these products which furnished industry "with materials for employment, and art for improvement... ."42 He also observed that the demand for these products was not, like sugar, based on the craving for luxury. The pamphleteer of course argued that exports to America were a major factor to be considered in evaluating colonial trade, but he did not make a distinction between imports and exports from the colonies; he viewed both as parts of the whole advantage to be derived from any colonial possession. And he reminded his readers that the profits made from re-exportation to Europe of products such as furs, rice, and tobacco were greater in value than the colonial

imports consumed in England and had to be added to the North American account. 43

The British public maintained an active interest in the peace negotiations and in the pamphlet debate concerning the British demands. The opinions expressed in various journals favored overwhelmingly the retention of Canada, and the reason most consistently given for demanding the northern conquest was the obligation to protect American colonists from the barbarous cruelties of savages incited by the French. Some writers stated specifically that commercial advantages should be considered secondary to delivering settlers from the savages.

... the importance of Canada to this nation, does not arise from what it may produce...; it arises from the quiet and security which will, accrue to our other colonies by the acquisition of it; from putting an end to the inroads and massacres of the savages... 44

An article in the *London Chronicle* expressed surprise that any man calling himself a Briton would desire to leave "an inch of North America" to the French and stated that only "Frenchified scribblers" wanted to put scalping knives back into the hands of those who murdered the North American

43 Ibid., 35-36.

44 Auditor quoted in *Gentleman's Magazine*, XXXII, (November, 1762), 531.
"bretheren" of Great Britain. One author wrote facetiously that England should return Canada; for by keeping it they would appear revengeful, "though the blood of thousands of unarmed English farmers...; of harmless women and children murdered in their beds; doth at length call for vengeance... ".

An article in the *The Scots Magazine* shows that sympathy in Scotland for American settlers threatened by Indian massacres was strengthened by religious ties:

As the frontier counties of Pennsylvania and Virginia were mostly settled by people of the Presbyterian persuasion, their ministers have felt the blow severely. Several of their congregations were entirely broken up, and numbers of their people led into captivity, who are many of them in bondage among the Heathen to this day...

The Indian threat to the Southern colonies inspired many writers to advocate not only that Canada be kept but also that Louisiana and the whole Mississippi territory be taken from France. One writer pointed out that

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45 *London Chronicle* quoted in *The Scots Magazine*, XXIII (September, 1761), 499.

46 *Gentleman's Magazine*, XXIX, (Supplement for 1759), 620-621.

47 *The Scots Magazine*, XXII, (May, 1760), 267.
till the French cease to have one foot of land on the continent of North America, experience has proved that even in time of peace, the British subjects can have no security against their encroachments and the massacres of the Indians spirited by them.

In 1762 The Scots Magazine carried an account of "A Letter to a Noble Lord" in which the public clamor against the terms of the negotiation was justified on the grounds that the ministry should demand that France abandon the continent entirely in exchange for their former West Indian possessions. For, even if Canada were ceded to Britain, the French could continue to intrigue among the savage tribes within their southern colonies, and after a time war would again erupt. The author then commented that "safety, therefore, as well as prosperity, are the precious objects of our regard... ."

We have seen that in Beer's interpretation of "contemporary thought" Guadeloupe represented the raw materials argument; the demand for Canada was equated with the markets theory. But public opinion during the controversy does not seem to have considered the raw material products of North

49 The Scots Magazine, XXIV, (September, 1762), 457.
50 Ibid.
America an insignificant factor in the arguments favoring the retention of Canada. To the charge that the fur trade did not employ the "hundredth part of shipping and seamen" that the sugar trade did, Canadian advocates replied that the demand for sugar could be supplied without Guadeloupe; but the fur trade could not be carried on "advantageously" without Canada. 51 A letter to the author of the London Magazine disagreed with those who preferred Guadeloupe over what the writer called "Wolfe's legacy"; he stated that the security which this legacy would guarantee to the northern plantations would enable them to supply the mother country with plenty of naval stores. 52 But he maintained that these materials could not be produced so long as a French governor by sending out scalping parties of savages could prevent the British colonists from safely spreading through the woods. It was often pointed out that security for the British fisheries which would be gained by the cession of Canada was just as important commercially as the security of American markets—and even more vital since fisheries were the training grounds of seamen. 53

52 London Magazine, XXIX, (February, 1760), 75.
One Canadian advocate admitted that products of the northern colonies often interfered with those of Britain, but he felt that the American settlers were obliged to produce these commodities to supply the sugar islands with the necessities of life. And, consequently, he opposed additions to these islands since North America might eventually produce many other commodities "much wanted in this kingdom such as materials for manufacture." It is surprising that at this early date one writer considered the security of the northern colonies important because North America produced great quantities of cotton better than that of the West Indies, and he stated that the return of Guadeloupe would never be regretted "on account of this article." The cession of Canada and the North Louisiana territory to Britain in the preliminaries to peace brought approval from the Gentleman's Magazine; for it pointed out that these areas abounded with fish, furs, timber, Indian corn, coffee, hemp, tobacco, and naval stores.

It must be noted also that Beer's argument that the Treaty of 1763 represented the victory of the markets argument over the

55 Ibid.
56 Gentleman's Magazine, XXXII, (December, 1762), 580.
raw materials argument does not seem to be supported by his own figures concerning the value of exports from Britain to North America and to the West Indies during the period of controversy over continental versus island expansion. He points out that exports to the West Indies increased but slowly, from £704,000 in 1751-1752 to £777,000 in 1756-1757, and to £1,060,000 a decade later; whereas exports to the continental colonies increased from £783,000 in 1746-1747 to £1,218,000 in 1751-1752; by 1761-1762 they totaled £1,441,000, and in 1766-1767 £2,016,000. However in this summary he neglects certain figures which are included in his tables and which are quite significant in evaluating his interpretation. For these tables show that, although British exports to the West Indies were only £776,882 in 1756-1757, the conquest of Guadeloupe, Havana, and Martinique brought an increase of £453,199 in exports to the West Indies; so that the total for 1761-1762 rose to £1,397,875. During the same period exports to the continent actually fell from £1,726,518 in 1756-1757 to £1,440,740 in 1761-1762.

58 See table no. 1 in Beer, Colonial Policy, 1745-1765, p. 138.
Thus Beer's figures show that during the period when the British government decided what possessions would be demanded in the negotiations with France and when the public debated the relative importance of the British conquests, exports from Britain to the West Indies including Guadeloupe, Havana, and Martinique almost equalled those sent to the North American colonies. Consequently Beer does not seem to be justified in equating the demand for the retention of the West Indian conquests with the raw materials argument nor in representing the return of these islands in the Peace of 1763 as triumph for the markets argument of colonization.

A memorial from the merchants of Liverpool addressed to the Earl of Egremont, one of the king's ministers, provides evidence concerning the important position which Guadeloupe had attained by 1762 as a market for British exports. For these merchants stated that the most extensive trade of their port was that carried on with the West Indies and with Africa. And they pointed out to the minister that, though their commerce had been extensive before the reduction of Guadeloupe, the possession of that island had increased their trade beyond all comparison with its former state, in the demand for British manufactures, for slaves and for the produce of that island (at foreign markets) purchased with British manufactures.60

60 London Magazine, XXX, (February, 1761), 85.
They also noted that this demand would be "prodigiously increased" because the island was not yet more than "half cultivated to reasonable not to say possible advantage."\(^61\) This memorial ended in an appeal for the retention of Guadeloupe:

Prompted by these considerations of particular and national advantage, your memorialists intreat your lordship to lay before his majesty their humble but earnest hopes, that the possession of Guadeloupe, and its dependencies, so valuable at present, and so constantly and greatly increasing may... be deemed an object worthy of his majesty's attention in the negotiation of a peace.\(^62\)

These merchants did not ask that Canada be returned; they only requested that Guadeloupe be retained. Many writers saw no reason for returning any conquest to France; there was room in the self-sufficient empire for expansion both on the continent and in the West Indies.

... the whole produce of Canada, which was formerly sent to France, and consumed there, or from thence exported to other countries, must now be brought to Britain, and exported from hence to foreign ports; and that all the manufactures which the inhabitants of Canada formerly had from France... they must now have from Great Britain:... all the produce of Guadeloupe which was formerly sent to France, and consumed there or exported from thence, must now be brought to Britain and exported from hence; and that all the manufactures and all provisions consumed by the inhabitants of that island or their slaves, which

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 603.

\(^{62}\) Ibid.
were formerly sent to them from France, must now be sent them from Britain or the British dominions. 63

Beer's final proof of his contention that the Treaty of 1763 "embodied the change in the economic theory of colonization" rests upon his interpretation of the defense presented by the supporters of the treaty in the Parliamentary debates in 1762. 64 He states that this group asserted that the original object of the war, the security of the continental colonies, had been attained; and this meant the rapid growth of the colonies and, consequently, an enormous market for British manufactures. Beer, quoting from the Parliamentary History, adds that this party claimed that the value of the North American conquests "ought not to be estimated by the present produce, but by their probable increase." 65

It must be admitted that the advocates of the treaty did use the prospect of increased markets to defend the acquisition of Canada, but in supporting his thesis Beer was guilty of the historian's sin of omission. For if the lines preceding his quote are inserted the meaning of "their probable increase" seems changed:

63 London Magazine, XXX, (February, 1761), 85.
65 Ibid., 154.
They expatiated on the great variety of climates which that country contained, and the vast resources which would thence arise to commerce. That the value of our conquests thereby ought not to be estimated by the present produce, but by their probable increase.66

Beer neglected as well their other arguments defending the retention of Canada— that the removal of France from America would prevent another war and that although some of the sugar trade was lost it was little more than a luxury, while the other produce of the West Indies "might be in a great measure and in part already was, supplied by our possessions on the Continent, which daily increased not only in the quantity, but in the kind of its produce."67

The various sources of British public opinion examined above show that Britain's acquisition of Canada rather than the West Indian conquests in 1763 should be attributed to a number of complex reasons ranging from the altruistic desire to save the American colonists from murderous savages to the belief that peace would be impossible if cession of the sugar islands were demanded. In sum, the available evidence does not support Beer's theory that the Peace of Paris "embodied the change in the economic theory of colonization... ."

67 Ibid.
Chapter III

Three Critics of George Louis Beer:
The Work of Curtis P. Nettels,
Klaus E. Knorr and Richard Pares

Among the various studies dealing with the history of Britain's old colonial system the works of Curtis P. Nettels, Klaus E. Knorr, and Richard Pares provide valuable criticisms of George Beer's interpretation of the significance of the Peace of Paris in British colonial policy. Nettels first examined Beer's theories in "Markets in the Colonial System" an article which appeared in The New England Quarterly in 1933; the following year he published The Money Supply of the American Colonies Before 1720 in which his earlier study was expanded and incorporated as chapter five--"The Problem of Returns." In these works Nettels' basic purpose is to refute Beer's theory, that the markets argument favoring colonies was not emphasized until the middle of the eighteenth century, by showing that from the earliest days of colonization the desire to secure markets was just as important as the demand for colonial raw materials.

Nettels first points out that as long as raw wool was England's main export, her markets were limited to the industrial areas of Europe where finished products could be produced and then sold to the consumers; however once England began to make cloth (after 1550) she had products which could be used everywhere, and her merchants seeking the widest markets possible looked to the colonies as markets for their goods. He then notes that, although the major economic regulations before 1650 were applied to the colonial tobacco trade, these restrictions did not mean that England was interested only in monopolizing the colonial tobacco supply; for it was also recognized that the tobacco sold to England would be used to purchase English manufactured goods. Nettels observes that the Staple Act of 1663 aimed at insuring the monopoly of colonial markets by demanding that most European exports to the colonies be landed first in England where prohibitive taxes were levied.

The efforts of English officials in the early eighteenth century to direct the industry of the northern colonies to the production of goods which would not compete with British manu-

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2 Nettels, "Markets," 493-494. The sources used by Nettels in his criticism include the (manuscript) colonial office papers and also Beer's own works.

facts are presented by Nettels as another proof of the importance of colonies as markets long before the turning point indicated by Beer. Before 1700 the northern colonies were unable to pay for English cloth since they produced few goods which could be exchanged in England for manufactures. Consequently they had developed a thriving woolens industry which threatened not only to reduce northern purchases of the English product but also to compete with the mother country's market in the southern colonies. The woolens act of 1699 and the hat act of 1732 were both designed to prevent colonial manufacturing and secure the colonial market for the metropolis. However several officials recognized that some industry had to be fostered in the northern colonies so that they would be able to purchase British goods.

In this respect Nettels points out that, although on the surface the efforts of the English government to foster the production of naval stores in New England seemed to emphasize the colonies as sources of supply, England was not primarily interested in colonial naval stores for the sake of the navy.

4 Ibid., 499.
5 Ibid., 500.
6 Nettels, Money Supply, 158-159. The study of the encouragement of naval-stores production is the section which Nettels expands in this later work.
His view is that the major interest in this endeavor lay in providing the northern colonies with staple exports that would enable them to pay for English goods—"The naval stores bounty of 1705 certainly emphasized the northern colonies as markets: they should produce in order that they might buy."\(^7\)

One of the best points in Nettels' criticism is his observation that several measures adopted after 1763 contradict Beer's view that the markets argument dominated colonial policy after the middle of the eighteenth century. The sugar act of 1764, for example, was designed to make trade between the foreign sugar colonies and the mainland unprofitable; yet northern colonies depended upon this trade to secure the coin, bills of exchange, and commodities which were accepted as payment for British goods. Nettels asks "By what logic can this act be construed as an aid to the marketing of goods in the northern colonies?"\(^8\)

The proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act of 1774 were instituted to check the advance of the settlers into the Old Northwest thereby preventing conflict between the Indians and the colonists, but Nettels shows that this was inconsistent

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8 Ibid., 506.
with a markets policy. For England recognized at this time that, if the Northern colonies were not allowed room to expand, their crowded condition would force the population to turn from agriculture and develop manufactures. Nettels reasons that had the manufacturing interests been in power they would have hardly embarked upon such a program.

Nettels also points out that after 1763 England did not neglect the colonies as sources of supply. He observes that the new western policy placed much more emphasis on preserving the Indian fur trade than on the extension of markets which could be achieved only by allowing the colonists unlimited expansion. He also shows that the enumerated articles which Beer regarded as the cornerstone of the supply system were actually extended in 1764 to include bar and pig iron, whale fins, hides, lumber, raw silk and pot and pearl ashes.

In summarizing his views Nettels points out that in the seventeenth century the southern colonies were preferred because they offered the best opportunity for profit--they were the best markets as well as the best sources of supply. How-

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9 Ibid., 507.
10 Ibid., 508.
11 Ibid., 509.
ever as the population of the northern colonies grew they became better markets; England did not change her colonial policy (as Beer had theorized) "the northern colonies gradually changed so as to conform in part to old ideals."\(^{12}\)

Nettels observes further that such measures as the proclamation of 1763 and the sugar act of 1764 show that English officials could not consistently apply a policy which emphasized colonies either as sources of supply or as markets.\(^{13}\)

Individual issues were decided under pressure of special interest groups and the pressures of the moment often resulted in measures which contradicted earlier policies.

The assumption behind all acts was that the colonies were valuable as sources of supply and as markets; the contradictions arose because conflicting interests were seeking profit through the application of general principles in which nearly every one believed.\(^{14}\)

Klaus E. Knorr in *British Colonial Theories 1570-1850* (1944) directly criticizes Beer's contention that before 1745 emphasis was placed on the colonies as areas producing useful raw materials and that thereafter they were mainly


\(^{13}\) Nettels, "Markets," 511.

valued as markets for metropolitan manufactures. On the basis of his study of the development of theories of colonization Knorr states that he "is of the opinion that before and following 1745 the colonies were highly appreciated as outlets for British manufactures."15 A brief study of Knorr's examination of the evolution of the raw materials and of the markets theories, therefore, seems essential to a thorough evaluation of Beer's interpretation of the Peace of 1763.16

Knorr points out that England's desire to secure her own sources of salt, wines, fruit, silk, sugar, and tobacco prompted the colonization of North America. The earlier English writers suffered illusions concerning the commodities which could be raised in America; for they assumed that, since that area was situated in the same geographical latitudes as Portugal, North Africa, and other countries, it could be expected to yield the same raw stuffs. Thus in 1583 Christopher Carlile had written:

But when it is asked what may be hoped for from thence after some yeeres, it is first to be considered, that this situation in fourtie degrees, shall bee very apt to gather the

15 Knorr, 105 (see footnote no. 175)

16 The raw materials theories from 1570-1660 are examined by Knorr pp. 50-56; those from 1660-1776, pp. 81-95. The markets arguments 1570-1660 are discussed pp. 56-59; those from 1660-1776, pp. 95-105.
commodities either of those parts
which stand to the Southward of it,
as those which are to be Northward...
In the Northerlie may be expected not
only as especiall good fishing for
Salmon Codde, and Whales, but also
any other such commodities, as the
Eastern Countryes doe yeeld us now;
as Pitch, Tarre, Hempe, and therof
Cordage, Masts,... hides, rich Furres,
and other such like without being in
any such beholding to a king of Denmarke,
or other prince or state that shall be
in such short able to command our shippes
at their pleasure, as those doe at this
day, by meanes of their straite passages
and strong shipping... As for those
partes which lie West and to the Southwardes,
it may well bee hoped they will yeeld Wines...
Olive being once planted, will yeelde the
like Oyle as Spaine, Province and Italie...

All of the writers of the period of exploration had similarly
exaggerated opinions of range and quantity of goods to be ex-
pected from America, and generally they held that these raw
materials would not only become dependable but also cheaper
than those purchased from foreign nations.

Mercantilistic policy aimed at increasing the welfare of
the national state while injuring that of rival states.

Richard Hakluyt, consequently, pointed out that the substitu-
tion of colonial raw materials for the manufactured commodities

17 Christopher Carlile, A Briefe and Summary Discourse upon
the Intended Voyage to the Hithermost Parts of America (1583),
p. 139, in Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, VIII.
(Quoted in Knorr, p. 52.)
of France and Flanders would permit an increase in English industry and "... employment of a wonderful multitude of the poore subjectes of this realme in returne."  

Knorr finds that in the eighteenth century the fantastic view of the potential range of colonial products remained as strong as ever. In the House of Commons in 1738 Sir John Hynd Cotton defended colonial expenses in Georgia on the basis that this colony could produce raw silk saving the nation "upwards of 300,000 pounds which is now yearly sent out of England to Italy and other countries."  

However Knorr points out that from 1660 through 1776 the English desire to obtain more dependable sources of naval stores than those of the Baltic was a more realistic consideration in theories of colonial production than were silks and wines.  

Knorr observes that in the period following the Civil War much more attention was also paid to the fact that the replacement of foreign imports by colonial raw materials would diminish the dreaded outflow of bullion and improve the balance of trade. In fact treasure could be increased

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18 Richard Hakluyt, *Discourse on Western Planting* (1584) p. 42. (Quoted in Knorr, p. 55.)

by re-exporting to foreign countries those colonial supplies exceeding the needs of the mother country. In 1671 the Earl of Sandwich claimed in the House of Lords "that, by encouraging the English sugar plantations... we might in a short space of time engross that manufacture to ourselves, and serve the Straights and other countries therewith to the advantage of doubling at least the balance of trade we now enjoy by the same."20 Almost a century later in 1751 Erasmus Philips wrote: "Tobacco, cotton, Ginger, Sugars, Indigo, Rice, and the rest of the Plantation Goods have brought us (besides what was necessary for our Consumption) a Balance from France, Flanders, Hambrough, Holland and the east Countries, of above six hundred thousand Pounds a Year."21 Apart from the staples such as tobacco and sugar, Knorr finds that fish, naval stores, raw silk, wines, fruit and raw iron—all products which England imported from Europe—were the raw materials which Britain sought to produce in the colonies down through the American Revolution.

Perhaps the most valuable point brought out by Knorr (at

20 Stock, Proceeding and Debates, I, p. 383, (Quoted in Knorr, pp. 87-88.)

21 Erasmus Philips, Miscellaneous Works (London, 1751), p. 32, (Quoted in Knorr, p. 88.)
least for the purposes of this study) is the close relationship which existed between the raw materials argument and the markets argument in the theories of those who advocated colonization. For these writers recognized that the colonial products that replaced the foreign sources of raw materials would still have to be paid for in some manner. Little or nothing would be gained for the mother country if bullion were sent to the colonies to pay for their products; but the theorists argued that colonial raw materials could be purchased with British manufactured goods. Raw materials would be obtained without the diminution of treasure, and a market would be supplied for excess manufactures. In 1731 Fayne Hall wrote "... whatever we have from our own plantations costs us nothing, but the Labour of manufacturing Goods for them, and that of bringing theirs here... .", and as late as 1772 Arthur Young could say "what a prodigious difference there is between paying to the French a million sterling for sugars, or exchanging a million's worth of our manufactures for the same commodity with our own colonists."23

22 Knorr states that this concept was a result of the over-valuation of bullion, and the under-valuation of exports. (p. 87). It should be noted, however, that given the frame of reference of the mercantilist period bullion could hardly be over-valued.

23 Fayne Hall, Importance of British Plantations in America (1731), and A. Young, Political Essays (1772) (Quoted in Knorr p. 86.)
In his discussion of the markets argument Knorr points out that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Reformation had brought about a trade dislocation whereby the old markets became increasingly precarious. It became obvious, therefore, that only the possession of dependable markets would guarantee a certain volume of trade; and the early English writers turned to the founding of colonies for trade with the American Indians as a solution.

Moreover, it is well known that all savages... will take marvellous delight in any garment... which being so, what vent for our English cloths will thereby ensue, and how great benefit to all such persons and artificers... .

Knorr admits that in the period before the Civil War writers did not devote as much space and effort to the markets argument as they did to that favoring colonies as sources of raw materials; however, he states that in the period from 1660 to 1776 the markets argument was second to none. He points out that an important factor in the significance of colonies as markets was the "balance-of-employment" doctrine whereby expansion of markets would necessitate a larger volume of output and, consequently, mean a larger working population. Not that employment was considered an end in itself by the mercantilists;

24 Sir Humphrey Gilbert, A True Report of the Late Discoveries (1583) (Quoted in Knorr, p. 58.)
to them the significant fact involved the concept that a larger number of employed workmen would mean competition for employment bringing a lower wage level and, consequently, cheaper costs of production for export.

In 1697 John Pollexfen stated that "Our trade to our plantations or West-India Collonies takes off great quantities of our Products and Manufactures... ", and in 1728 Defoe advocated that "new planting colonies then, and farther improving those already settled will effectually encrease this Improvement... . Clothing new nations cannot fail of encreasing the Demand of Goods, because it encreases the Consumption."25 By 1740 Sir William Keith could call attention to an impressive list of commodities which found markets in the colonies—

The colonies take off and consume above one sixth Part of the Woolen Manufactures exported from Britain, which is the chief staple of England... . They take off and consume more than double that Value in Linen and Callicoes, which is either the Product of Britain and Ireland, or partly the profitable Returns made for that Product carried to foreign Countries. The Luxury of the Colonies, which increases daily, consumes great Quantities of English manufactured Silk, Haberdashery, Household Furniture, and Trinkets

25 John Pollexfen, A Discourse of Trade, Coyn, and Paper Credit (London, 1697.) (Quoted in Knorr p. 95.) and Daniel Defoe, A Plan for the English Commerce (1728.) (Quoted in Knorr, p. 101.)
of all Sorts; also a very considerable value in East-India Goods. 26

Passages such as these, all written before 1745, led Knorr to reject Beer's conclusion that it was not until after that date that emphasis was placed upon colonies as markets for British exports.

In War and Trade in the West Indies (1939) Richard Pares shows that the politically powerful West Indian merchants and planters were actually opposed to British expansion in the West Indies through a conquest of the French islands. Furthermore he points out that even later, when a large part of this group advocated retention of the conquered islands, they did so for reasons other than the desire for increased sources of raw materials. In this way Pares indirectly criticizes an important support for Beer's thesis—that the demand for keeping Guadeloupe represented the old raw materials argument of colonial policy. In developing his own argument concerning the motives which inspired the West Indies interests to demand that Britain keep Guadeloupe and the other French islands Pares first examines the evolution of British policy in the eighteenth-century rivalry with France in the West Indies.

26 Sir William Keith, A Collection of Papers and Other Tracts (London, 1740) (Quoted in Knorr, p. 95.)
Pares points out that for a long period Great Britain was not interested in expanding her West Indian possessions at the expense of the French. Although the French island of St. Kitts was kept by England at the Peace of Utrecht, he observes that the instructions proposed by the Admiralty for the West Indian expedition of 1703 seem to indicate that if Martinique or Guadeloupe had been taken they would have been depopulated of Frenchmen and the plantations destroyed but not colonized by the English. He also points out that during the War of the Austrian Succession both governments were indifferent to the acquisition of sugar islands; the French only proposed expeditions—not for acquisition but for destruction; and the English did not even attempt any offensive expeditions. Pares states that the policies of both the British and the French governments resulted largely from the influence of their West Indian colonists who opposed expansion because they feared that increased production would reduce the price of their own sugars. He characterized their desires as "the ambitions of the respectable merchant who hopes

27 Pares, 174.

28 Pares discounts the expedition which empowered Townsend to attack Porto Rico or St. Lucia as purely defensive. (p. 182.)
to increase his custom by hiring the racketeer to destroy his neighbor's shop." He notes that in 1744 only in North America did English colonists support conquests at the expense of France (in Canada and Cape Breton.)

However Pares observes that in the Seven Years War the English and French governments changed their attitudes towards conquests in the West Indies—both nations sending large expeditions there. Although the avowed object of the war was North America, the English subdued all the Windward islands, and annexed the neutral islands.

In the earlier years of the war the West India interests were still opposed to the acquisition of French sugar islands. Pitt's friend William Beckford, a West Indian planter, stated that he wanted no West Indies expeditions until Cape Breton was conquered; and, although Beckford later supported an attack on Martinique, Pares points out that he proposed to exchange that island for Minorca not add it to the British West Indian possessions. And yet Pitt (who was sensitive to the wishes of his merchant supporters) sent expeditions to the West Indies before he had conquered all of Canada. Pares explains that an attack on the French colonies in two places at

29 Ibid., 181.
30 Ibid., 185.
once would disorganize the French defenses and that Pitt already had the key to Canada, Louisburg; moreover at that time he only wanted a satisfactory military frontier in Canada and the rest of the province was no more a *sine qua non* than Guadeloupe. 31

The terms of the surrender of Guadeloupe made it certain that the island would remain wholly French under the English flag, at least until the end of the war; under these arrangements English merchants would reap the advantages of its trade but settlement by British planters was forbidden. Pares comments that Guadeloupe which had seen few French ships since the war was now saved from starvation; as English and American merchants rushed in with provisions for the island and marketed the large stocks of sugar which were decaying on the plantations. The slave-merchants established an extensive new trade with the French island, and this trade was especially resented by British West Indian interests who considered themselves undersupplied with African labor. 32

Pares quotes a letter from the Duke of Newcastle to the Earl of Hardwicke in which the Duke indicated that "American proprietors" were not satisfied with the terms of the capitu-


lation; they wished to have the island destroyed, the negroes taken "and the whole demolished." But, since the Government would not impose such harsh terms on the conquered islands, the planters tried hard to persuade the Treasury not to admit the produce of Guadeloupe on the same terms as the English sugars.

The pamphlet "Reflections on the true Interest of Great Britain with respect to the Caribee Islands" represents to Pares the best example of the consent of the West Indies interests to new acquisitions in the West Indies as long as they were not permitted to hurt the older colonies. He states that this conversion of some of the West Indians to some conquests was due to the fact that the English sugar colonies had all been exposed to serious alarms of invasion, and above all because their trade had been molested by the privateers of Martinique and Guadeloupe.

The petitions and addresses of the British West Indian

33 Ibid., 192-193.

34 Ibid., 194. Pares believes that the West Indian interest's acceptance of the annexation of new sugar islands was furthered by the fact that sugar prices took a turn for the better after a drastic decline when the Guadeloupe sugars were admitted to the market. He feels that by the end of the war perhaps many planters could afford to meet new rivals and even hoped to make a profit "on the virgin soil of the conquered islands." (pp, 219-220.)

35 Ibid., 220-221.
legislatures are Pares' main source for his interpretation of the change in the attitude of the British sugar interests. He states that these sources show that the planters had convinced themselves that Guadeloupe and Martinique were less dangerous as rivals "within the Empire" than they were as French neighbors. Just as the North American colonists had always sought security by the expulsion of the French from Canada, Pares believes that some of the elements of the West India interest considered acquisitions in the West Indies necessary for the security of their own possessions. 36

The significance of this desire for security rather than commercial expansion in the West Indies is the most important element in Pares' discussion of British West Indian policy; and these observations should be kept in mind when evaluating Beer's interpretation of the Canada-Guadeloupe controversy. For in his examination of the arguments favoring the retention of Guadeloupe, Beer includes only those which viewed acquisitions in the West Indies as new sources of raw materials.

36 Ibid., 223.
Chapter IV

Canada or Guadeloupe? Historical Opinion from Beer to Gipson

In the five decades since the publication of George L. Beer's *British Colonial Policy* (1907) the eighteenth-century pamphlet debate over the retention of Canada or Guadeloupe in the Treaty of Paris of 1763 has often occupied the attention of both British and American historians. A brief examination of these interpretations of the controversy is essential to our evaluation of Beer's theories, since they provide several alternatives to his analysis of the treaty.

C. H. Hull criticized Beer's use of the pamphlet debate as evidence of a change in the economic theory of colonization from raw material sources to markets in a review of *British Colonial Policy* which appeared in the *American Historical Review* (1909). Hull stated that of course Beer realized ...

... that both ideas had long prevailed, as indeed was almost inevitable, since each is complimentary to the other; but his desire to find in this change of theory a clear and striking explanation for ensuing changes in the colonial system has perhaps led him to exaggerate its importance, or at least its abruptness.

E. B. Greene in his review of *British Colonial Policy* in the *Political Science Quarterly* (1908) observed that Beer had

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exaggerated the "novelty" of the idea of colonies as buyers of British manufactures. Greene also pointed out that in his treatment of the peace negotiations Beer had devoted his attention to "the conflict of opinion among English and American publicists" but gave little consideration to international diplomacy.²

Beer's thesis, however, survived such criticism; and his interpretation of the treaty and the pamphlet debate that preceded it has been accepted, or at least used, by several historians. Clarence W. Alvord examined the pamphlet debate in *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (1917) and observed that this controversy "was not of much avail, except to offer an opportunity to assert the platforms of the factions", because the British ministers had decided to retain Canada "long before the pamphlet warfare ceased."³ However he accepted Beer's view that terms of the Peace of Paris were a result of the victory of the markets argument over the old raw materials argument, and he pointed out that the treaty also represented the triumph of "progressive politicians" in Parliament, who were inspired

by the manufacturers' new view of colonies, over the political faction which still maintained the "time-worn" raw materials theory.\(^4\) In *The Fall of the Old Colonial System* (1945) Robert L. Schuyler discussing the value of the New England and the middle colonies as markets for British manufactured goods pointed out that

In Beer's opinion, the Treaty of Paris of 1763 marked a turning-point in British commercial policy, in that thenceforth 'greater stress was laid on colonies as markets for British produce than on colonies as sources of supply.'\(^5\)

Although Klaus Knorr in *British Colonial Theories* (1944) rejected Beer's analysis of the evolution of the raw materials and markets theories, he stated that Beer's conclusions were "mainly based on a careful analysis of the debate preceding the Peace of Paris of 1763."\(^6\) E. Lipson in *The Economic History of England* (1956) used Beer as a major source for his discussion of the rising importance of the continental colonies and also for this statement:

"... the discussion over the retention of Canada instead of the French West Indies, after the Seven Years' War, turned on the


\(^6\) Knorr, 105. (See note no. 175.)
question of whether colonies were more important as sources of supply or as markets for English manufactures.

Several historians who examined the Canada-Guadeloupe controversy arrived at conclusions which were quite different from Beer's interpretation, although they did not directly criticize his analysis. W.L. Grant in an article in the American Historical Review (1912) stated that the central theme of the pamphlet debate involved the dilemma that by 1760 it was obvious that British possessions in North America were to be greatly expanded, yet this greater America would be unable to find an adequate outlet for its raw materials unless all the West Indies were retained. And he observed that since the advocates of expansion in North America won the day, the treaty of 1763 meant that the British Empire "became long on the products of farm and forest, and short on sugar." In discussing the general significance of the debate


8 Grant, "Canada Versus Guadeloupe" (cited previously), 742. Grant had criticized Beer earlier for limiting his study to well known pamphlets rather than those "less well known and in some respects better worth quoting" which could be found in the British museum. See W.L. Grant, Review of British Colonial Policy by G. L. Beer, English Historical Review, XXIII (April, 1908), 373.
Grant said

This Old-World controversy seems to prove that at the time imperial theories were much more a subject of discussion than is sometimes thought to be the case; and that the field was still held by the advocates of an empire commercially self-contained. Not till the American colonies had torn away, not till the attempt to carry on the old system after their loss... did the new idea of an empire based on liberty rise above the horizon.9

In England in the Age of the American Revolution (1930) L. B. Namier criticized Alvord because he had ascribed more permanence and coherence to eighteenth century Parliamentary groups than they possessed and had assumed that the question of Canada versus Guadeloupe was a major issue in which the members of any one group had to think or at least vote alike. Namier observed that even when opinion matured on this point it did not become an issue between Parliamentary groups. Namier used the letters of various statesmen of the period to show that they were convinced that British opinion favored the retention of Canada because of considerations of security and a distrust of the French.10 He also cited a letter from Lord

9 Grant, "Canada Versus Guadeloupe," 742-743.


11 Ibid., 321.
Morton to the Earl of Hardwicke to show that the "current notion" among historians that the West Indians had all united in opposing the retention of Guadeloupe was not correct. Namier explained that

it would seem from his letter that while "saturated" planters of the old Islands, who did not contemplate further extension, were averse to including a competitor in the British commercial system, planters "on the make", who wished to extend their activities to new islands, favored conquests.\footnote{Ibid.}{12}

J. F. Rees had stated in the \textit{Cambridge History of the British Empire} (1929) that from the mercantilist point of view the case for retaining Guadeloupe had been overwhelming, but the British West Indian interest had opposed this course because the acquisition of new fertile islands would mean the loss of their monopoly of the home market.\footnote{J. F. Rees, "Mercantilism and the Colonies," \textit{The Cambridge History of the British Empire}, I, 590.}{13}

The West Indian interest, therefore, supported the restoration of the sugar islands to France; and they gained their point, despite the fact that it meant dear sugar in Great Britain and it limited the British market to which the Northern colonies had access. Thus the creation of a vested interest by mercantilistic policy engendered an opposition to the further extension of the very principle on which it was grounded.\footnote{Ibid., 591.}{14}
Richard Pares criticized this view in *War and Trade in the West Indies* (1939) showing that many of the West Indian planters and merchants actually demanded the retention of the conquered sugar islands; however he disagreed with Namier's explanation that "saturated" planters opposed expansion in the West Indies whereas planters "on the make" supported acquisition of new islands.\(^{15}\) Pares stated that the basic reason for the sugar interests' support of the demand for the West Indian conquests was their desire to remove the French threat to those possessions which they already held.\(^{16}\)

Lawrence H. Gipson in *The Triumphant Empire*—volume nine of *The British Empire Before the American Revolution* (1956)—found that the basic issues involved in the Canada versus Guadeloupe debate were, on one hand, the principle of a British Empire economically self-contained to the greatest possible degree and, on the other, the principle of British North American Continental security.\(^{17}\) He stated that acquisition of the sugar islands would have enabled the

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15 Pares, 220-221.

16 Ibid., 223.

continental colonies to exchange their produce for molasses within the Empire rather than by illegal trade with these islands under the French flag. But Gipson observed that, since the principle of continental security won, the sugar islands were returned to France leaving "a potentially dangerous even explosive force" within the Empire—*the problem of a chronic shortage of molasses.*

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The overwhelming success of British arms in North America during the Seven Years War assured Great Britain of the acquisition of valuable additions to her colonial empire in the negotiations for peace with France. British statesmen were convinced, however, that the return of some conquests to France was a necessary prerequisite to peace. The question thus arose in 1760 whether Canada or Guadeloupe should be demanded in the negotiations with the Bourbon monarchy, and the British public engaged in a heated debate over the relative merits of these two colonial conquests.

We have seen that in the two centuries which have passed since the Treaty of Paris there has been a wide difference of opinion among historians concerning the major factors which prompted Great Britain to retain Canada rather than Guadeloupe in 1763. Furthermore, our study has shown that George Louis Beer's analysis of the treaty—the most important of these interpretations—must be rejected on the basis of criticisms provided by other historians and also in view of our own research into eighteenth-century sources of opinion. Both Curtis P. Nettels and Klaus Knorr have pointed out that colonies were appreciated as markets long before the date emphasized by Beer and that after the Treaty of 1763 the securing of raw materials was still an important factor in determining colonial
policy. In our investigation of the public debate over the negotiations with France, we noted that Canada was consistently represented as a valuable source of raw materials and that Guadeloupe was often demanded because of its importance as a market. Consequently Beer's theory, that Canada was retained because Britain had experienced a change in colonial thought whereby colonies were valued as markets rather than as raw material sources, cannot be accepted.

The rejection of Beer's interpretation, however, does not provide an answer to the question which was presented in the Prologue as the ultimate purpose of this thesis—Why did Great Britain retain Canada rather than Guadeloupe in the Treaty of Paris of 1763 in spite of the fact that her self-sufficient empire required the addition of sugar islands not expansion on the North American continent? For an answer we must turn to the interpretations of the treaty and the pamphlet debate which other historians have advanced and also to our own examination of contemporary British opinion.

Both L.B. Namier and Lawrence H. Gipson observed that British opinion favored the retention of Canada because of the desire to gain security on the North American continent. Our own survey of opinion showed that the British public was convinced that, until France was completely driven from North
America, Great Britain would face the prospect of waging costly wars to resist French aggressions against the continental colonies. Thus a major factor in the demand for Canada was colonial security, not for the sake of markets as Beer maintained, but simply to prevent future wars with France.

However the most effective argument employed by pamphleteers in persuading the public that Canada should be retained rather than Guadeloupe was their assertion that Great Britain had a moral obligation to protect the American colonists from savages incited by the French. Canadian supporters pointed out again and again that the blood of settlers massacred by savages would be on British hands if Canada were returned to France. A similar interpretation of the pamphlet debate was expressed by W.E.H. Lecky who observed that the English people "had learned to look with pride and sympathy upon that greater England which was growing up beyond the Atlantic"; he pointed out that the British public demanded Canada because British possession of this conquest was essential to the security of the homes of North American colonists. The pamphlets and journals which we have examined support this view, for they are filled with statements of sympathy for the Anglo-Americans who were being terrorized by France's savage allies.

Some historians have insisted that the public debate had little influence on the decisions of the statesmen who directed
negotiations. Richard Pares, for example, has observed that the "whole Canada-Guadeloupe controversy was much less important than historians have supposed, and is a good example of the danger of reading into the actions of statesmen the motives invented for them by pamphleteers." However this view fails to consider the significance of public opinion during this period. We have seen that Pitt, who had been forced upon George II largely by public opinion, was extremely sensitive to the wishes of the public; and we have also noted that in the final negotiations with France Bute was guided mainly by the desire to associate George III with a popular peace. These ministers could hardly have failed to weigh the arguments advanced in the public debate when they decided which conquests should be demanded from France.

This study of Canada versus Guadeloupe has shown, therefore, that although commerce provided the raison d'être for colonization, the decision to retain Canada in 1763 was not basically inspired by commercial considerations. During the negotiations with France, British mercantilists showed concern for the future economic development of the self-sufficient

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empire; but the public view, which was instrumental in determining the nature of the Treaty of Paris, was largely based upon emotional ties binding the mother country to her colonial empire and upon considerations of the future military security of North America.
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