RICE UNIVERSITY

LEARNING TO LIVE: TACTICAL TRAINING
FOR THE AEF, 1917-1918

by

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ABSTRACT

Learning to Live: Tactical Training for the AEF, 1917-1918

America entered World War One almost totally unprepared. Her most urgent problem was the training of at least one million men. This thesis describes the content of tactical training in the United States Army, the development of an efficient system for producing qualified replacements for combat units, and the theoretical differences between Allies, American Expeditionary Forces and authorities at home.

Because cavalry was employed on only the most minimal scale during the First World War, no attention has been paid to training for "l'arme blanche." Supporting forces such as aircraft, engineers or signals have been left out of this discussion in order to save space.

An analysis of American tactical doctrine concludes this work. Ideas concerning methods of assaulting machine guns are the author's own, for which full responsibility is accepted.

Because the war ended before the full weight of America's military force could be applied, analysis of her performance on the battlefield must be tempered with an awareness that the final sophistication of her training system occurred too late to be of assistance to Pershing's army. The excellence of tactical education as it evolved in World War One would remain unproven until America entered a vaster and more desperate struggle twenty-four years later.
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CHAPTER ONE

THE YEARS BEFORE THE WAR: INNOCENCE AND AMBITION

Americans knew they were special in 1917, when they embarked on their first great overseas adventure. The country had a fresh, clean feeling; and with that unembarrassed sense of purity and lofty purpose went an overwhelming confidence in the American way of doing things. One of the nation's greatest achievements at the end of the war would be the transformation of four million boys into troops tough enough to face the most seasoned army in the world. The story of training Americans in the Great War is a spectacular one of sophisticated organization fashioned under great pressure in scant months of crisis and chaos. Only years after the war would weakness and errors become known. Both the accomplishments and oversights, the utility and uselessness, of American training are intimately bound up with the country's attitudes and experiences in the years before 1917. In order to understand America's exuberant performance in the most horrid of wars, it is essential to remember that hers was the happiest of homelands.

World War One represents to the American mind energy, benevolence, righteous vindication, unsullied glory. The overwhelming sense of uncomplicated accomplishment remains but slightly adulterated by feelings of betrayal or lost innocence, for the war did not last long enough to scar America's
youth or acquaint her masses with holocaust. Indeed, the magnitude of America's military achievements finds few rivals even to the present. A "back-water" police force of 127,000 men, distributed in small groups through a vast land, obsolete in equipment and limited in experience was expanded into an army of over four millions. As many divisions were committed to battle over a period of one year as the British or French were able to commit in four. Housing was erected for 1,750,000 men. New industries were created, an entire economy reorganized, vast new bureaucracies established, and an exhilarating sense of mass participation spread throughout a diverse and individualistic society.

Americans saw themselves, without cynicism or trepidation, as crusaders. The generation that led the nation in the great overseas "crusade for human rights," that fathered the "Armies of Democracy," had known neither defeat nor despair. Economic opportunities in a rapidly expanding society had been seized. Technology had been applied to everyday life in a cornucopia of electrification, better roads, Pasteurized milk, efficient means of communication, even the extirmination of the house fly. Political power, drawn out of corrupt hands by the osmotic power of public opinion, had been applied to regulate mammoth industries and fulfill the paradoxical promise of Thomas Jefferson that the good of both society and individual could be maximized together.

There seemed little reason to doubt that the redeemed American could accomplish anything. The period from 1912 to 1914
was one of America's most idyllic, replete with successful men.  

Bernard Baruch, with a Wall Street fortune made on his own speculative ability, was "prepared to rise or fall on ... individualism." Herbert Hoover, an orphan risen to millions in mining, was building a reputation for organizational genius and philanthropy. William Jennings Bryan, prophet of the little man, was Secretary of State under a President very typical of his constituents—Woodrow Wilson. Himself the object of a meteoric rise to power, the intellectually potent and unassailably idealistic Wilson captured the Democratic Party and the imaginations of enough of a progressive nation to be elected President in 1912.

As the war in Europe manifest itself in all its horror and futility, America felt at first all the more justified in her sanctimoniousness as "the last best hope of mankind." 'This European war suggests that maybe the white man's burden is the white man himself," pontificated the Buffalo Courier. The New York Times asserted that the

European nations have reverted to the condition of savage tribes roaming the forests and falling upon each other in a fury of blood and carnage to achieve the ambitious designs of chieftains clad in skin and drunk on mead.

What should the American do to combat this appalling manifestation of human unsucces? "Sit tight, keep his hands in his pockets and his mouth shut," extemporized the Riverside Free Press.

British propagandists sensed that reticence, poise or apathy were not particularly prevalent traits in the America of 1914 to 1917. German atrocities, real and imagined, were used
by skillful press agents to play on the neutralist public's sense of decency and moral outrage. Failure of the Imperial German Government to do acceptable penance for the 114 American lives lost in the May 1915 sinking of the Lusitania more than compensated for ill feelings created by the British blockade's persistent interference with American rights at sea. Prosperity gradually but irrevocably inserted its beguiling influence into the calculus of American opinion on the war, heavy Allied munitions contracts having inflated wages in some areas from 45 cents an hour to as much as $15 a day.

For what British intrigue failed to provide as impetus in pushing America out of neutrality by April 1917, the relentless German talent for tactlessness more than compensated. In San Francisco, consul Franz Bapp was convicted of violating American neutrality and conspiring to restrain interstate commerce by destroying factories, railroad bridges and military trains. Haskell, New Jersey was obliterated in January 1917 when the E.I. du Pont smokeless powder plant exploded with a blast that was felt fifty miles away. Only a few weeks earlier an increasingly alarmed public had found its own Edith Cavell, when Tessie McNamara of Kingsland, N.J. stayed at her telephone switchboard to warn workers trapped in yet another burning munitions plant. German intrigue in Mexico, and the implication of the Imperial embassy in an attempted assassination of J.P. Morgan did much to nullify the $28 million propaganda effort conducted by hyperactive agents of an increasingly nefarious Kaiser.

As America began to feel more and more insecure her attentions
turned with intensifying credulity to the bellicose statements of those whose feelings on German perfidy were anything but mixed. Theodore Roosevelt, perhaps the most colourful and popular public figure of the time, assailed Wilson as "a demagogue, adroit, tricky, without one spark of loftiness in him." For a nation "too proud to fight," Roosevelt admonished that

To treat elocution as a substitute for action, to rely upon high-sounding words unbacked by deeds, is proof of a mind that dwells only in the realm of shadow and shame.

To such calls for a rebirth of national self-respect and virility, a powerful political response was not long in coming.

Prominent Republicans such as Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge attacked the President as early as 1914 for his failure to come to the aid of Belgium and the other western democracies. In December of the same year the American Rights Committee formed in New York to arouse support for active intervention on behalf of the Allies. Although war pressure was not to become serious for another two years, popular attention came to be focused on the military vulnerability of the nation.

That America must rearm herself to survive in the world's raging Darwinian jungle became apparent to all but the most persistent pacifists after the sinking of the Lusitania. National defence became the social crisis to which large segments of the concerned public turned their attention in the middle of 1915. In June, the National Security League displayed its political
muscle by attracting twenty-two state governors to its New York convention. The Navy League raised $25,000 in twenty-five minutes. Masses marched in the streets, women and children waving flags that appealed "Wake Up, America!" Streams of books, articles, and even films with such titles as "Fall of a Nation" and "The Battle Cry of Peace" were directed toward the spineless, the naive, or the unbelieving.

"Preparedness," as the new crusade came to be called, soon brought to surface the prophets and saints attendant on any militant new faith. Most articulate of the apostles was Frederick Huidekoper, long a student of American military self-deception. In the ringing tones of muck-raking fervour so characteristic of American reformism, he declared that

Our historians ... have painted in glowing colors the successes of our past wars and have extolled the prowess of our 'citizen-soldiery,' but they have glossed over the almost uninterrupted succession of blunders which has characterized our military policy in the past.

Huidekoper's voluminous chronicle of short-sightedness and ineptitude, entitled The Military Unpreparedness of the United States, became as scripture to those most alarmed by his evidence of America's perpetual vulnerability. Blame for a pitifully small regular army, further handicapped by gossamer organization for mobilization, a mere trickle of reserves and libratory recruitment was placed not upon the professional military, but upon past and present policy makers whose negligent complacency in matters of
national security invariably manifest itself in a disastrous penchant for waste and manslaughter.\(^{22}\)

General Leonard Wood, since his retirement as Chief of Staff in 1914, had been residing at Governor's Island, New York in his new capacity as Commanding General of the Eastern Department. It was now to be his pleasure, so rare among professional American officers, to find a mass movement supporting his concerns and prescriptions for national security. That America would one day face the necessity of transforming her small peacetime army into a fighting force large enough to face the first-class land powers of Europe was a possibility never far from Wood's mind. He compared the situation of the United States to that of China, her vast wealth serving only to tempt greedy powers well prepared to seize it. Material prosperity would not translate itself into military prowess soon enough to save the country unless careful, deliberate and effective plans were made in peace.\(^{23}\)

Although not the most gifted of speakers, General Wood possessed stature and earnestness sufficient to publicize the need for America to prepare her human and economic resources for a war which would approach as "an avalanche rather than ... a glacier."\(^{24}\)

Most European armies could turn in time of war to an immense pool of trained men who had been conscripted to serve two years with the regular force and a much longer period in reserve. As such a system for developing a rapidly expansible army was clearly ruled out by American political realities, many professional officers despaired of creating an efficient mass
army out of volunteer civilians or tattered splinter National Guard units within any period less than years. General Wood did not share such pessimism. While Chief of Staff he had demonstrated that infantry, cavalry and artillery troops could be trained in one year—an estimate he later lowered to six months' intensive instruction.  

Leonard Wood was not one to separate himself from civilians, as did many of his colleagues. Pressing for the development of America's military potential in a manner compatible with her national habits and traditions, Wood asserted that officer training, that most vital and time-consuming prerequisite of rapid mobilization must be conducted

with the minimum of interference with [the candidates'] educational or industrial careers, under conditions which will permit the accomplishment of their training during the period of their youth, and once this is accomplished will permit their return to their normal occupations with the minimum of delay.  

From these premises was conceived an important model for what was to come in World War One—the so-called Plattsburg camps.  

Since 1866 regular army officers had been teaching tactics at certain public universities and private colleges. In 1913 General Wood decided that much of this training was both defective in quality and deficient in quantity. A circular letter from the Chief of Staff on May 10, 1913 led to the holding of two training camps that summer: one in Monterey, California attended by 63 students from 29 institutions; and one of the fields of Gettysburg, with 151 students from 61 institutions experiencing the conditions of a soldier's life. The object of such training,
stated General Wood to the presidents of the educational institutions involved was

not in any way one of military aggrandizement, but a means of meeting a vital need confronting a peaceful, unmilitary, though warlike nation, to preserve that desired peace and prosperity by the best known precaution.29

From the outset, the summer training camps gained almost meteoric popularity. Henry Sturgis Drinker, president of Lehigh University, stated upon visiting Gettysburg that American youth needed the experience of rigorous, self-imposed discipline, especially

those with well-to-do indulgent parents, and those who, lacking parental control, have developed an independence of action not consistent in all respects with the proper conventions of society and life.30

Drinker and his colleagues formed an uncritical supervisory Board of College Presidents, which included representatives of Princeton, Harvard, Yale and Cornell.31 Save for the hot weather at Gettysburg, the students themselves seemed to enjoy their military experience.32 Willing to pay for their own transportation, food and clothing,33 they returned to campus filled with patriotic fervour and scathing intolerance of members of the Collegiate Anti-Militarism League, those hypocritical, snobbish representatives of the "effeminating tendencies of the times."34

By geometric proportions grew the appeal of the camps. In 1914 six hundred students attended courses in Burlington, Vt., Asheville, N.C., Monterey, Calif., and Ludington, Mich.35 Nine more camps were added in 1916 at Plattsburg, N.Y., Oglethorpe, Ga.,
Fort Sam Houston, Tex., Fort Sheridan, Ill., Fort Douglas, Ut.,
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., Fort George Wright, Wash., and
the Presidio at San Francisco. Enrollment for 1916 was expected
to exceed twenty thousand—a hundred-fold increase in three years.36

Entry into the strange new world of the military was
presented as challenge and adventure. "You will wince at your
blisters," cautioned a popular handbook of the day. "You will
get no sympathy from any one else. It is the spirit of the camp
for every man to bear his own burdens."37 From the moment he
lined up for his typhoid shots, drew his equipment and received
his squad assignment, the student was "on a cadet status; that
is, treated with the courtesy due prospective officers," but
nevertheless under strict discipline.38 Day began at 5:45 with
reveille, followed by breakfast and a meticulous inspection of
tents and equipment. The remainder of the morning passed in
strenuous drill. It had been originally planned to leave after¬
noons free for recreation, but such was the enthusiasm of the
cadets that the work day was stretched to eight hours.39 At nine
o'clock "lights out" sounded over tired bodies and minds content
with the sense of accomplishment.

Much training was crammed into six weeks. Basic drill
movements were taught. Cadets became familiar with army routine
and administration. Hours on the rifle range and drill fields
taught physical discipline and self-confidence. By the end of
the summer, the student was controlling as many as a hundred men
in realistic mock battle, making maps, discussing signals and engineering problems, and finding himself capable of up to a week's strenuous marching with little sleep or mental relaxation.

In the uneasy summer of 1915, more than college students were voicing an interest in receiving officer's training. General Wood, upon granting the request of several New York businessmen to attend training camps at their own expense, charily stipulated that less than 250 "enthusiasts" would not be considered. Sixteen thousand professional and business men, including such figures as the Mayor of New York, were to attend camps at Plattsburg and elsewhere by 1917. Both student and adult enthusiast would spend many an afternoon advancing through fields, taking cover in welcoming folds in the ground, again rushing forward, directing the movements of men, and wondering how many would not get up again were the "enemy" firing real bullets.

If military education has a way of taking the glory out of war, so too does it add a sense of urgency to the demands of the newly informed for truly effective defense measures. At a time when behemoth armies grappled on the blood-soaked plains of Europe, the mobile force of the United States, with an addition of 25,000 men, could be seated in the Yale Bowl at New Haven with room to spare. Of state militia forces totalling 120,000, at best half were effective. The House Military Affairs Committee received testimony in December 1915 that there was enough field artillery ammunition on hand to serve the nation's inadequate
arsenal of guns for but one day. Thence they would stand silent. Powerful speakers such as Hudson Maxim, James M. Gurley, Judge Alton B. Parker and Henry L. Stimson heightened public interest in defence to the point where Woodrow Wilson, facing reelection, had to turn his reluctant attention to military matters in order to prevent a Republican monopoly of the preparedness movement.

Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison received the order to investigate and recommend a program adequate for national security on July 12, 1915. By September, the War College Division of the General Staff, responsible for planning and coordination throughout the army, had submitted its views on "A Proper Military Policy for the United States." An extremely well-written, lucid and convincing document, the War College report stressed that America's record of fortuitous survival blinded many to a full awareness of very real dangers which had "never been driven home by the bitterness of defeat." The ability of various nations to land large forces unopposed on American coasts was coldly displayed, along with the minimum forces which would be necessary to check the advance of the enemy, and serve as cadre for armies large enough to expel him decisively.

So effective were the arguments of the War College that Garrison placed most of its proposals in a bill to be placed immediately before Congress. The regular army was to be doubled in size to 280,000, a veteran reserve corps of 500,000 established, and provisions made to raise an additional Continental Army of 500,000 by voluntary enlistment in time of emergency. No faith
was placed in the National Guard as a reserve, for the War College believed it unreliable due to constitutional limits on federal control over training and deployment.50

National Guard and "states' rights' sympathizers were too strong in Congress to allow the Garrison bill to pass unemasculated. When Wilson proved unwilling to stand firmly behind a Continental Army, Garrison resigned. His replacement, affable ex-pacifist Newton D. Baker, was able to steer a compromise bill through a quarrelling Congress which provided for a slightly larger regular army, a strong National Guard of a half million under firmer federal control, and a small reserve corps of retired officers and enlisted men. A framework for economic mobilization was laid by the creation of the Council for National Defence, a government nitrate's plant, and authorization to commandeer uncooperative industries in time of war.51

Both good and ill resulted from the National Defence Act of June 3, 1916. Loyalty of the National Guard to the President had been ensured, some provision made for emergency economic controls, recognition given efforts to train reserve officers in peace, and authorization granted for wartime recruitment. But the one organization capable of making overall plans for rapid mobilization, the embryonic General Staff Corps, was directed to station no more than half its members in Washington at any time. In the spring of 1917, with war imminent, only nineteen junior officers were on duty in the capitol to plan what would become the most
sweeping mobilization in American history. 52

Unlikely though it is that the Germans ever doubted the flaccidity of America's military muscle, any fears of the high command could not but have been allayed in 1916 by the antics of mobilization efforts along the Mexican border. The National Guard, 158,664 poorly trained amateurs, was at least 100,000 below legal war strength. 53 One unit suffered a 15½% rejection rate due to physical misfits. Railways proved inefficient, portending a repeat of the scandalous logistical chaos experienced during the 1898 Cuban expedition, should the United States attempt to mobilize more than 150,000 men. Artillery was in short supply, motor repair facilities inadequate, aircraft obsolete and unreliable. Most amazing in the light of conditions on the Western Front known even to Americans, the army had yet to make up its mind on what type of machine gun to procure! 54 The German General Staff realized that to open total submarine warfare against Allied shipping would bring America into the conflict. But how could America in scant months turn the tide of victory in Europe before the submarines had strangled Britain? If America could not react effectively against a threat from Mexico, how could her entry into the most colossal and technologically sophisticated war in history be anything more than a pathetic, petulant gesture of impotent bravado?

Sunday, March 11 1917 Dr. Leighton Parks preached at Saint Bartholomew's, Manhattan. His message: Christ was not a pacifist.
The Rev. Clarence A. Eaton echoed the theme at Madison Avenue Baptist--pacifists made him want "to swear, pray, laugh and weep." Following the sinkings of the *Algonquin, City of Memphis, Illinois* and *Healdton*, angry crowds staged "loyalty parades" in major cities, unaware in their righteous outrage that their signs reading "On to Berlin" or "Down with the Kaiser" bore a tragic resemblance to those carried down European streets three years before. America had been insulted by the cynical despots of central Europe, and would not be taken for granted. Two hundred and fifty former Plattsburg reservists formed a "broomstick brigade" down Broadway. Flags, war news and martial music were everywhere.

Wilson's speech to the assembled houses of Congress requesting a declaration of war on Germany brought tears to the eyes of even so crusty an old man as Chief Justice White. In answer to the President's plea to "make the world safe for democracy," both Senate and House voted overwhelmingly for war on April 6, 1917. It was as if, said the *New York World*, "no one could have told that there were two political parties in the nation. It was one patriotically joyous family eager to cry approval of the head of it." Song writer George H. Cohen, born on the Fourth of July and author of "You're a Grand Old Flag" and "I'm a Yankee Doodle Dandy," created an instant hit with "Over There." A suddenly pliable Congress moved rapidly to put formidable war powers in the hands of the President.
Events in Mexico had underlined the truth of the War College's 1916 statement that America's tradition of volunteer military service could not "under the most favorable circumstances produce anything like the number of men required for national defence."\(^{58}\) For years prominent experts on military manpower had assailed the volunteer system as undemocratic, unreliable, inefficient and extravagant.\(^{59}\) When diplomatic relations with Germany were severed in February, Newton Baker had a conscription bill drafted for presentation immediately on the outbreak of war.\(^{60}\) By the time the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917 was law, printed registration forms and regulations had already arrived at newly appointed local draft boards.

A twenty-fold expansion of America's military force was envisaged by the Selective Service Act. The regular army was to be enlarged from 250,000 to almost half a million. National Guard units were to grow in strength from 3,803 officers and 107,320 men in June 1917 to over 450,000. Two added drafts of 500,000 men each were authorized to form a National Army up to one million strong.\(^{61}\) On June 5, in a process as painless as voting, nine and a half million young men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty registered for the draft. A fortnight later, Secretary Baker drew the first number out of a large glass bowl, and each local draft board brought up for consideration candidate number 258.\(^{62}\) By the end of the war, twenty-four million men would be registered and 2,758,542 supplied to the armed
forces, all but 8,000 of whom found themselves in the army. Well might an American ambulance driver serving with the Canadian army comment in April 1917 that his countrymen did not know "what war means: filth, mud, sickness; ruins and rain." Recruiting for the greatest of all adventures was booming, even Civil War veterans trying to get into the army. The offices of the Emergency Peace Federation were smeared with yellow paint. Dachshunds were pelted with stones, sauerkraut became "liberty cabbage," New York ripped up 5,000 lamp posts for scrap iron, children rolled bandages or collected paper and tin cans. "The most effective means of promoting durable international peace is to prosecute the war against the Imperial German Government," echoed the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in response to the unmistakable sentiments of President and nation. Postmasters received instructions to report any "suspicious characters, or disloyal and treasonable acts and utterances." A presidential proclamation of April 6 made it a crime to "tear down, mutilate, abuse, desecrate or insult the US flag in any way." A nation's youth marched off to camp in a commotion of musical lightheartedness and ominous repression. To such tunes as "Let's Keep the Glow in Old Glory (And the Free in Freedom Too)" and "Your Lips Are No Man's Land But Mine," draftee and volunteer boarded his train, sated with the best wishes of friends, family or the Grand Army of the Republic, not to mention ice cream and cake. Merle Hay, a farm boy from Glidden, Iowa must
have thought himself typical. With eight dollars in his pocket and the smell of flowers from his Sunday School class on his best suit, he entrained for Fort Bliss, Texas. He would be the first to die in France.

Residents of communities as scattered as Yaphank, Long Island, Macon, Ga., and American Lake, Wash. soon witnessed spectacular scenes of organized activity such as were to characterize American power to millions all over the world. Typical was the eight week transformation recorded on film by the Little Rock, Arkansas Board of Commerce, of an empty field bordered by a desolate stretch of railroad track into a city of forty thousand. Great piles of pre-cut limber, pipes, nails, glass and roofing were deposited along the rail line. Shortly, teams of carpenters arrived. In one day the framework for an entire two-storey barracks could be erected; on the next, walls nailed and roofing finished. Other crews dug sewer lines, graded roads, and installed electrical appliances, doorways and windows.

Quartermaster General Henry G. Sharpe instructed the Construction and Repair Division of his department in March 1917 to prepare estimates for housing an army of a million men. When Newton Baker created the semi-autonomous Construction Division in May, much planning had already been done. Colonel Isaac W. Littell, head of the new organization, was soon able to draw upon the advice of such men as W.A. Starrett, prominent New York architect, and a board of sanitation experts from the American
Medical Association. The success of the camps, traditional pesthouses, in controlling the influenza epidemic of a year later offered dramatic testimony to the skill with which these facilities were planned, built and operated.

Pleas of prominent Congressmen were ignored in the selection of the thirty-two camp sites which would house National Guard and National Army divisions. Territorial departmental commanders picked camp areas with careful reference to accessibility to railroads and medical factors such as flies, flooding, inclement weather, water supply and living space. A standard plan for a two-storey barracks for the sixteen National Army camps, located mostly in the northern states, was submitted to the Surgeon General for approval. Studies were made of ventilation in the tents which provided housing for the sixteen National Guard camps in the warmer southern states. When it was discovered that the men were tying down the flaps of their tents at night, more tents were quickly provided to lower the occupancy rate from nine to five men. Such concern for hygiene and comfort reflected the War Department's awareness that the cantonments were to be the dwelling places for men not accustomed to military life, but to all the conveniences of the average American home.

In general, the aim to create "an environment conducive to military efficiency and contentment" was realized.

A full division of about one thousand officers and 28,000 men was to be accommodated in each camp. As an infantry regiment required twenty-two barracks of 150 men each, plus six other
buildings for the officers, an entire cantonment amounted to at least 1200 barracks plus an administration building, post exchange, quartermaster's depot, 350 kitchens, myriad shower and restroom facilities, laundries, several hospitals, a commissary and recreation halls. National Guard camps comprised major buildings, and tents erected on wooden platforms with walls up to shoulder level and stoves installed inside. All camps were built around a huge central drill field, the buildings laid out in numbered rectangles on roads totalling twenty-five miles in length. Wayne Heter, with the 40th Division at Camp Kearney, Calif. described his new home as no less than "a big, busy city, minus the vice and street corner loafers." Never since the construction of the Panama Canal had so mammoth a venture been undertaken by the United States government. Using a new devise known as the "cost-plus contract," 200,000 workers built thirty-two complete cities in three months. Five hundred million feet of lumber were consumed, along with six million square feet of roofing paper, 93,000 kegs of nails, 140,000 doors, 686,000 sashes, 29,250,000 square feet of wall boarding, 250 street lamps and three million square feet of screens. When the recruits began to arrive in early September, two-thirds of the camps were fully completed. The remainder reached completion by early October. Recent expansion of the size of a rifle company from 150 to 250 meant that one barracks could no longer hold an entire company. Few problems resulted. So much
housing had been constructed that more barracks space was simply allocated to each company. Even so, most camps were seldom filled to capacity.\textsuperscript{80}

Induction into the army is a traumatic experience for most men. Few cannot remember the day when they first entered the all-encompassing embrace of the military.\textsuperscript{81} At the outset, it was a feeling of shock. Trains for Camp Travis, Texas halted in the middle of the administrative area. Following a light meal, recruits were separated by counties, placed in alphabetical order, and directed to put their valuables in an envelope. Benumbed youngsters found themselves naked, herded into a shower room, their fellows muttering something about civilian clothes being shipped home.\textsuperscript{82} Thence followed the "bull pen," a thorough examination by the "medicos" for contagious diseases and physical defects.\textsuperscript{83} After the hated vaccinations, the recruit found his way to the personnel office where documents on his private history were filled out. He received his clothing and was sent to clean his quarters.

It is a shock to lose one's first name. It is irksome to never be alone. It is utterly dejecting to be spoken to continually in harsh, clipped tones; to receive no understanding when one errs out of ignorance; to be constantly criticized and seldom commended. The unavoidable, onerous adjustments that must be made when entering the military have changed but little since the cold winter of 1917. All the more remarkable to the modern
eye appears the unmitigated enthusiasm and boundless good cheer of those hapless recruits. The Canadian border was closed; Provost Marshal Enoch Crowder was not discouraging vigilante bands looking for "slackers." Remarkably little protest appeared. One expects the youth of then to have known what they were getting into; to have had some grasp, however rudimentary, of the futility and tragedy of their crusade. Could they not at least have been troubled by the sure knowledge, to even so innocent a generation, that many would never return from their adventure across the seas?

Busy men have little time to brood. The human body and psyche display incredible resilience when placed in the cauldron of war. The few hours not filled with exhausting training were the object of generous efforts by public service organizations, most notably the YMCA, Knights of Columbus and Jewish Welfare League, to keep the youth of America happy and occupied. Every camp boasted its library, gymnasium, professional song leaders and sports coaches. Night classes were offered by the YMCA, and plays staged by the Liberty Theater. Good food, wholesome and plentiful, evoked few complaints. Veteran preacher Raymond B. Fosdick's Committee on Training Camp Activities saw to it that no "houses of ill fame, brothels or bawdy houses" were allowed to operate in the five-mile alcohol-free zone that surrounded each camp. Local communities did provide dancing partners on Saturday night, and some such as Houston quite literally brightened Christmas with immense trees decorated in red, white
George Creel's Committee on Public Information flooded camp and nation with war news. Monthly health reports for each divisional cantonment appeared in the Official Bulletin to reassure parents that the government was not abusing their trust. Short, hard-hitting pamphlets vilified the enemy and expounded on America's war mission. Films, popular speakers and visiting war heroes added to the fervour. Society responded: people grew victory gardens, observed meatless Fridays and wheatless Wednesdays, consistently oversubscribed to the Liberty Loans. Wrist watches gained sudden popularity when it became known that aviators wore them. The venerable five-minute drill break may have made the cigarette acceptable—it lasted five minutes, and came in a packet small enough for army pockets. Possessive mothers insisted that they would rather their sons went "to heaven in France than to hell in America."  

America's young men would learn much, and suffer even more, in the next fourteen months. Should their determination falter, Creel made sure that they received plenty of literature on Germany's "vile and filthy treatment of Belgians," her glee in skewering babies on bayonets, her use of priests as cover against machine gun and artillery fire. Recruits in 1917 did not laugh at images of submariners emptying drinking water from the lifeboats of torpedoed ships, or an old Belgian slave labourer sobbing that "perhaps this shell will kill my son." Including the scandal and didacticism of the pre-war years, the entire cognizant
life of most recruits had passed in an environment of moral absolutes and direct cures for evil. World War One was to be not so much a change for America's newly minted troops, as a climax.

Metamorphosing civilians into soldiers has changed little in the half century since World War One. It would seem apparent that human nature, and wisdom too, have not altered much. But it was indeed a different generation that went to war in 1917. It was a generation that trusted its elders—elders who had known much success, little self-doubt. It was a generation only beginning to adjust to the changes of belief and behaviour that must accompany urban life. Youth felt the need to prove its manliness, and thus welcomed combat as had its forefathers. America possessed immense power, but had only recently discovered the immensity of the feats that could be accomplished by sophisticated organization. The very camps the recruits lived in, still smelling of sawdust and fresh timber, were evidence of their country's material prowess. Confidence was a real, understandable, potent force among America's armies as they began massing for their redeeming descent on a decayed and despairing Europe.

But what of professional officers, that select group of experienced men who would dictate the tactics and direct the infinitely complex processes of victory? They had always realized that more than money and flesh were required for success on the
battlefield. Yet no despair existed among their ranks, despite America's hoary and recent shortcomings. Comforting precedents had been set in the confusing years since 1914. Invaluable legislation had somehow passed. It had proven possible to train soldiers in less than a year. The nation's leading young men were amenable to intensive leadership training. A small but expert body of military planners was in existence. And the emotional and economic support of an outraged nation seemed irresistible.
NOTES

1 Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, Through the Fog of War (New York, 1938), 201.


3 Excellent survey works on America's participation in World War One include Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York, 1968); Frederic L. Paxson, America at War, 1917-1919 (Boston, 1939); and Charles Cullen Tansil, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938). A somewhat idealized account is to be found in Lawrence Stallings, The Doughboys: The Story of the A.E.F., 1917-1918 (New York, 1963).


6 Ibid., 10.

7 Ibid., 18.


9 See Link, Woodrow Wilson.

10 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs, 11.

11 Ibid., 16.

12 Ibid., 15.

13 Ibid., 31.

14 Ibid., 30.

15 Link, Woodrow Wilson, 75. General works on the preparedness movement include C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775 (Harrisburg, 1955); Corrine Bacon, Selected Articles on National Defence (New York, 1915); Allan L. Bensen, Inviting War to America (New York, 1916); Granville Fortescue,

16 Link, Woodrow Wilson, 177.


18 Link, Woodrow Wilson, 177.

19 A good example of alarmist literature is Julius W. Muller, The Invasion of America: A Fact Story Based on the Inexorable Mathematics of War (New York, 1916).

20 Probably the most influential account of America's long history of military unpreparedness was written by Emory Upton, (The Military Policies of the United States) in the 1880's. This volume was reproduced by the Government Printing Office in 1912. Upton, also a tactician of note, believed that only a larger professional army had any hope of securing America against an invasion.


26 Ibid., 288.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 2, 12.

31 Kilbourne, National Service Library, I, 137.

32 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LI, no. 1 (September 6, 1913), 17.


36 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LIII, no. 29 (March 18, 1916), 933. For description of life in the Students' Military Training Camps see Allen French, At Plattsburg (New York, 1917); or Perry, The Plattsburgh Movement.

37 Ibid., 5, 22.


39 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LI, no. 9 (September 6, 1913), 17.

40 Ibid., vol. LI, no. 48 (August 1, 1914), 1530.

41 Ibid., 1523. See also Ibid., vol. LI, no. 50 (August 15, 1914), 1593.

42 Ibid., vol. LIII, no. 2 (September 11, 1915), 48.

43 Churchill, Over Here!, 47.


46 Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 334.


48 Ibid., 41-45.

49 See Weigley, Towards, 218.
50 Army War College, *A Statement*, 47.


53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., 351. See also Frank E. Vandiver and the Editors of Silver Burdett, *John J. Pershing* (Morristown, 1967), 68.


56 Ibid., 36-42.

57 Churchill, *Over Here!*, 43.


64 Quoted in Hoehling, *The Fierce Lambs*, 54.

65 Ibid., 53.

66 Ibid., 64.

67 Official Bulletin, no. 3, 6. Published daily under order of the President by the Committee on Public Information, George Creel, Chairman. Hereafter cited as OB, 3: 8.

68 OB, 118: 1.

70 Coffman, *The War*, 29. Prior to the war a War College report had recommended divisional as superior to regimental camps.


73 OB, 220: 23.


75 OB, 97: 2.

76 Churchill, *Over Here!,* 86.

77 Freidel, *Over There*, 11.

78 For financial and legal details of cost-plus contracts for cantonment construction see OB, 26: 16; 34: 6.

79 OB, 97: 1-2.


81 For an overdrawn but humorous account of first entry into camp see Ring W. Lardner, *Treat 'Em Rough: Letters from Jack the Kaiser Killer* (Indianapolis, 1918), 17-19.


83 Nelson Lloyd, *How We Went to War* (New York, 1919), 61; Chris Emmet, *Give 'Way to the Right: Serving with the A.E.F. in France During the World War* (San Antonio, 1934), 7. OB, 89: 2. Some effort was made to prescribe remedial exercises for those who could be helped by them. Close attention was paid to detecting organic nervous diseases and mental deficiencies, as well as alcohol and drug addiction. See OB, 73: 1.

84 Lardner, *Treat 'Em Rough*, 18. Each recruit received, if available, two pairs of boots, one hat with cord, five pairs of socks, two shirts and three pairs of breeches.

86 W.M. Baines, ed., Houston's Part in the World War (Houston, 1919), 91-92; Ralph D. Cole and W.C. Howells, The Thirty-Seventh Division in the World War, 1917-1918 (Columbus, 1926), 205ff; Alice Palmer Henderson, The Ninety-First at Camp Lewis (Tacoma, 1918), 141, 155, 157; Lardner, Treat 'Em Rough, 58.

87 Freidel, Over There, 22; Coffman, The War, 36, 65.


89 Clipping from Army and Navy Journal in Major General Charles D. Rhodes, 1918: Diary of the World War (Unpublished manuscript), 1-2.

90 Churchill, Over Here!, 53-90.

CHAPTER TWO

TRAINING IN 1917: AMBIGUITY, ADVENTURE AND ACCOMPLISHMENT

General Joffre, "Victor of the Marne," carried with him to America as head of a visiting French delegation a well-deserved reputation for imperturbability. His incontrovertible composure, reinforced with a massive frame and impenetrable aura of portly capability, would serve France well in the spring of 1917. For unbeknown to an idolizing public, much less to harried War Department officials desperately seeking consolation in the chaos of sudden mobilization, Joffre came not as a military messiah but as the representative of a beaten, demoralized, mutinous army. Scant weeks before, General Nivelle's bull-dog attempt to smash through the German lines had cost 120,000 men in two days. Between Paris and the enemy there now lay not a single reliable division. Order was to be gradually, cautiously restored by the new commander-in-chief, General Henri Philippe Pétain, only because he promised to "await the tanks and the Americans." Because her own troops would tolerate no more offensives, France needed the Americans as surrogate soldiers for her generals' strategic appetites. In order to survive, the French would attempt no less than to capture the soul of an army.

As a result of the Joffre visit, and possibly encouraged by his insistence that trench warfare required little training, the War Department decided to dispatch to France a regular division, brought up to strength by new recruits. Of much more influence
on the future of the American Expeditionary Force to be assembled in Europe was Secretary Baker's decision to ask the British and French for instructors to assist in training the new divisions being raised at home. Generous French instructional and material assistance was gratefully accepted in the confusing summer of 1917. Who was to know that it was seductively and cynically proffered on the theory that unity in matériel between French and American forces would lead to tactical unity; that American reliance on French weapons, particularly artillery, was expected in turn to create a dependence on French instructors, French tactics, French doctrine, French leadership? Joffre's final report stated that Americans were strong, able to assimilate knowledge quickly, and likely to make good soldiers. The fifteen page letter, to Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau himself, also stressed that should the French actively encourage the formation of an autonomous, separate American army, France would be the more likely to win American support than Britain.

In the first two months of the war, the situation at the War Department was "... as nearly a perfect mess as can be imagined." Five semi-independent bureaus competed with one another in placing supply contracts. Few surplus stocks with which to equip the swarms of recruits that would enter the cantonments in September had survived the Mexican campaign. Care had to be taken not to interfere with vital Allied needs already under production in the nation's factories. And to make matters worse, Congress
passed no appropriations until June 15. General T.M. Bridges of the British Military Mission regarded the War Department as an octopus without a head:

The Chief of Staff is past his work, and nearly all the heads of Departments in the War Office are over sixty years of age.

Joffre noticed hesitancy among staff officers in making decisions, incertitude about organization, ignorance of facts, and a penchant to consult President Wilson on everything. But despite outward appearances of confusion, delay, or even ineptitude, a General Munitions Board had been established, civilian talent was being recruited, and provisions made to stimulate public involvement to the utmost. On May 14, the transfer of "a proportionate number of men of each grade" from regular to newly created regiments had been ordered as a first step in creating cadre for the training camps under construction. Even as foreign critics penned their dispiriting despatches, the education of an army was well under way.

Officer training was by far the most urgent problem facing the War Department. Without sufficient qualified officers, training the private soldiers who would descend upon the army in September would be absolutely impossible. The usual ratio of officers to men is one to twenty. If an army of one million were to be created in September, there would have to be 50,000 officers on hand. Only enough men could be spared from the regular army to provide commanders and staff officers from battalion level up. Many National Guard officers lacked training. No time was wasted in solving America's gigantic leadership problem.
America's junior leaders for World War One were not born. It was necessary to make them. Some officers command by charisma; some by caste; some by contrivance. Charisma, being a gift beyond the power of man to bestow, remained valuable but not mandatory for successful command. Caste often evoked unquestioning obedience and trust in European armies, including the class-ridden British. But American society bestowed no birthright to command. Obedience was owed no man except he who earned it by demonstrating his superiority to those placed under him. Farsighted and astute attention was paid by the military professionals, who selected candidates for commissions, to the social prejudices and habits which the civilians soldier would bring with him to camp and battlefield. For the first time in American history, unfaltering effort was made to adhere to the "merit principle" alone in choosing officers.

An "experienced class of men" was sought after, with varying degrees of success, for officer candidacy. The preferred age was over thirty-one, although men as young as twenty years and nine months were eligible if they could prove "preeminent qualifications or considerable military experience." Interested persons were informed that "no man need make application whose record is not in all respects above reproach and who does not possess the fundamental characteristics necessary to inspire respect and confidence." Particularly prized were an ability, coupled with mental and physical energy, to instruct, manage and lead new regiments as they formed. As many suitable enlisted
men as possible were to be given the opportunity to earn commissions, contingent only upon the principle that "it is better to rely on the excellent men of the next camp than to rely on weak men, no matter how experienced."¹⁷

On the fifteenth of May began the sixteen First Series Officers' Training Camps, located at thirteen army posts. Approximately 38,000 candidates, of whom 8,000 were reserve officers, attended.¹⁸ Pressure on limited positions was immense: 160,000 applications for 30,000 vacancies.¹⁹ When the first camps ended on August 14, 27, 341 new officers were available with which to begin training the first 500,000 enlisted men two weeks later.²⁰ Most commissions were granted in combat branches, with three infantrymen graduating for every artillerist.²¹

In order to supply replacements for officer casualties, and provide leaders for a second half million troops, another series of officers' training camps was conducted at nine different posts between August 27 and November 27. One thousand civilians entered from each of the army's sixteen territorial divisions,²² in addition to 7,000 promising enlisted men, ex-officers, US citizens qualified as non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in Allied armies, and individuals with "valuable military experience and adaptability for commissioned grade."²³ Enthusiasm having been chastened by the imperious notices of the War Department concerning youthful applicants, it became necessary to relax the proscription on men in their twenties in order to solicit
enough applications to ensure wide selectivity. "Men under 31 years of age are what are particularly wanted in this camp," recanted the General Staff. "Lack of military training in no way bars availability." Brains, courage and physical ability to stand the test of war became the new yardsticks by which eager civilians assessed their last immediate opportunity to lead men. Applications, after a slow start, again soared above vacancies by the July 15 deadline. In December the camps made available another 17,237 officers. Henceforth, candidates would be accepted only from among enlisted men and members of military programs at selected universities. Graduates in the new year were to be commissioned only when needed to replace officer losses.

Throughout most of the war, the General Staff groped for the best means of organizing officer training. The first two camps had attempted to draw off qualified persons from army and society in general. After the second camp, it was decided to cease operating separate schools at scattered posts. Officer training was put under the direct control of the divisions being built up since September. Each division commander was to operate his own school and select his own candidates. Accordingly, a third series of camps took place from January 5 to April 19 in each of twenty-seven divisional training areas, producing 11,659 eligible officer replacements. In the spring of 1918, the prospect that most divisions would hurriedly depart for France in the near future made it unlikely that sufficient time would
be available to train a fourth series of officers. Furthermore, events of the preceding winter, both at home and in France, had finally convinced the War Department to establish firm central control over training and tactical doctrine. Hence 46,000 candidates, attending division schools since mid-April, were transferred in June to the five newly established Central Officers' Training Schools (three infantry, one machine gun and one field artillery) that were to provide replacements for the gigantic army of 1919. Senior students at 647 institutions commenced leadership programs as well. But by the time uniform training standards and a coordinated flow of officers had been ensured by this final reorganization, the war was over.

Plattsburg proved to the army that much could be expected of the intelligent officer candidate. The same type of training would be followed now, with students being expected to master the basics of soldiering in one month, and the essentials of infantry or artillery command in a further eight weeks. No veteran of those early camps would forget how impossible it seemed to rise to that challenge upon which the lives of thousands would depend. Perhaps mercifully, lack of spare time squelched such worries with sheer hard work. Reveille sounded at 5:30, followed by a half-hour of "setting-up exercises," group calisthenics designed to develop physique and muscular coordination. After breakfast and inspection, the morning passed in a frantic oscillation of parade square drill, classroom discussions of the Infantry Drill Regulations, and communications or weapons practice. Hard study in the evening followed a busy afternoon filled with target practice, grenade throwing competitions,
tactical problems or short route marches. 36

An atmosphere of grave dedication precluded any complaints about the strenuous six day week. If one were to qualify as "trench digger, clerk, target operator, prosecuting attorney, chambermaid, landscape artist and second lieutenant," 37 it was necessary to temper good intentions with a "grimness that bodes ill for the enemy." 38 One had not only to develop the mind; indifference to hardship and ungrudging acceptance of discipline were prerequisite to leadership. The cadet soon realized that his status, "six inches below that of the assistant janitor," 39 could only be elevated by a combination of aggressive study, attention to detail, and firm resolve to "obey the law and keep your mouth shut." 40

Basic infantry training comprised the first month's curriculum for all cadets. Each camp was formed into an infantry regiment, with cadets alternating as privates, non-commissioned officers and platoon guides. 41 The prospective officer began his professional education by learning how to stand at attention, move in various directions on the parade square, and give drill commands to the other eight members of his squad. He memorized the parts of his rifle, and learned how to care for and aim it. His shooting skill was refined on the rifle range. Packs, tents and cooking utensils became familiar items through a series of short practice marches which developed the physique and accustomed one to living in the open with large groups of men. The basic
methods of advancing against enemy fire be spreading out in
long thin lines or running from cover to cover were made second
nature by repeated "extended order" drills. Commands and signals
for concentrating rifle fire on the enemy prior to the final
assault with bayonet were relentlessly practiced. One cadet
described his afternoon as "like hosing the garden on a rainy
day and lying down every few minutes." Hours of sleep had
to be sacrificed in order to study infantry or field service
regulations, those "perplexing, problematical, particular, pre-
sumptive propositions" which read like Webster's Dictionary.

During the final two months of training the officer
candidate was exposed to the essentials of either artillery or
infantry up to company level. This period of "intensive drill,
long study and nerve-wracking examinations" was even more
demanding than the first four weeks had been. Infantry candidates
mastered the intricacies of large parade formations, studied
the convolutions of court martial procedure, and attended
conferences on hygiene, first aid, or military regulations.
Skills with pistol and rifle were further honed. Hours were
spent thrusting bayonets into sandbags, digging trenches, throwing
grenades, flapping semaphore flags, and studying for endless
examinations in tactics, administration or the abstractions of
trench warfare.

All infantry candidates were expected to make close friends
with Sergeant Hill, a creation of some imaginative officers from
the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth. Problems selected from *Studies in Minor Tactics, 1915* provided all types of vicarious combat experience for cadets who would have few opportunities to lead their fellows because of a plethora of students coupled with paucity of time. A group of students might be required to place themselves in the role of commander of a small patrol hidden beside a road deep in enemy territory. Suddenly, a few enemy soldiers, blissfully unaware of proximate danger, approach the patrol. What should the commander of the patrol do? Why? How would he return to friendly lines? What would he report? To answer such questions one had to know the tactical objectives of the mission, the most prudent and effective means of carrying it out, the capabilities and limitations of friend and foe. Passages laboriously memorized from field service or drill regulations had to be rapidly exhumed from tired minds, and logically applied to the peculiarities of the situation in which one was placed. The imminent certainty of urgently needing such knowledge in war, needless to say, more than compensated for any failings of the imagination with a dogged determination to learn.

Artillery training being a much more technical matter than infantry, most effort was expended in a crash program to make cadets familiar with the basic mechanism and operation of guns, caissons, wagons, signal and range finding equipment, and projectiles. It was still necessary to learn how to train, care for and drive the horses which pulled field pieces. Instruction
in fire control, planning barrages and other advanced aspects of artillery usage was severely handicapped by a shortage of equipment that was not rectified until well into 1918. Cadets were obliged to learn how to adjust fire onto targets chalked on blackboards. Much reliance had to be placed on abstract study of selected passages from the Field Artillery Drill Regulations, which covered everything from basic equipment to signals or the movement of assembled batteries in parade and battle.

Lack of equipment and absence of central control were the major criticisms made by General Snow when appointed Chief of Artillery in early 1918, and charged with developing a truly effective training system. Instructors at Fort Sheridan at one point had only four three-inch guns with which to train six batteries. Partly due to unequal distribution of what little equipment was available, but mainly because of the virtually independent control that each camp or division commander exercised over training in his area, General Snow remarked that as late as December 1917

the only uniformity among officer training camps was the... wholly inadequate course of instruction, ... incompetent instructors and ... inefficient equipment.

Late one October night, a thin, haggard, nervous looking man in an odd blue uniform was apprehended wandering through the rain soaked streets of the Plattsburg Officers' Training
Camp. Brought into one of the cadre's quarters to dry, the
stranger identified himself as Second Lieutenant Henri Poiré,
of the 8th Battalion, Chasseurs à Pied, French Army. An in-
auspicious entrée. An unassuming rank. A friendly, open,
helpful man. This battered veteran, and dozens like him, was
to become the object of some of the most venemous memoranda and
bitter recriminations ever exchanged in the torpid, duplicity-
ridden record of Allied coalition warfare.

Baker's request for British and French instructors was still
being processed at the end of August--too late to be of any
influence on the first officers' camps. The French were
particularly anxious to despatch instructors to America as soon
as possible "to enable them to exercise their influence from the
outset." It was hoped that five officers, fluent enough in
English not to be disadvantaged by their British colleagues,
could be sent to each camp to teach artillery, machine guns,
bombs and grenades, liaison and fortification. One hundred
and thirty French officers reached the second series of camps,
with another 120 being placed in divisional cantonments. By
October 14, an advance party of 55 British officers and 101
senior NCOs had departed the Tower of London for American training
camps. Eventually 261 British officers were employed teaching
gas, bayonet drill and physical training. A total of 268 French
officers concentrated on artillery and staff work.

Almost from the outset, subtle rivalry set in between the
French and British advisory missions for the tactical convictions of the Americans. The British wished, on the advice of the US military attaché in London, to concentrate all their instructors in a central school which would train American specialists. Authorities in the War Department chose rather to disperse British and French instructors through all the training camps. No instructors above the rank of captain were desired as the recent arrival of British majors had caused the French to accuse their Allies of currying undue favour. In March 1918 the same complaint was still being made, although British majors sent to USA served as captains, and the attaché always stressed tact in dealing with the French.

Foreign instructors were seldom in direct contact with American troops. Rather, they served as advisors to those American officers directly involved in training. In the absence of strong central authority and snooping supervisors, it was only natural that inexperienced American officers slipped into excessive reliance on their foreign assistants, even for training decisions. American troops looked up to the decorated, confident, foreign officers, acknowledged experts in the strange, fascinating, frightening art of killing. Very soon, major changes in emphasis began to appear in training.

From August 11 to August 14, candidates at the First Series officers' camps engaged in a three-day field exercise, based on open warfare tactics as taught by the Infantry Drill Regulations.
of 1911. Company was pitted against company. Advancing groups put scouts out in front of their formations, and held support, reserve and main groups in readiness to deploy should major resistance be encountered. Surprise attacks proved a constant threat. When in defense, positions were prepared as directed by field service regulations. There was much exciting scout work, heated clashes, rifle snappings and "battles strenuously fought, with victory claimed by both participating sides." Trench warfare too had not been neglected. Cadets at Fort Sheridan spent nights in a realistic strongpoint, successfully repulsing dark forms which attempted to work their way forward by a caterpillar-like succession of rushes across the furrowed ground.

Those who attended the Second Series had different, less attractive experiences. At Plattsburg, the week of September 24 was completely occupied in digging trenches. The process was repeated on October 15, culminating in a twenty-four hour occupation of the complex. Cadet Chester V. Easum at Fort Sheridan remarked that the trenches he occupied could not be drained, "so we sloshed in the mud in the cold weather. For sheer hardship this surpassed the trenches in France." Conditions at his camp provided very realistic training for European warfare. Exact battle conditions were reproduced as faithfully as possible, with rifle fire and salvos of artillery keeping up a continuous roar day and night. Enemy patrols attempted to steal past sentries, wiring parties went out after dark, careful camouflage
was insisted on as part of a meticulous trench routine. 68 Captain Georges Étienne Bertrand of the Chasseurs Alpins seemed particularly pleased to see Americans expending such effort to learn the realities of modern war. 69

Much vehemence in the future debate on officer training was perhaps unjustified. Fate had indeed been kind to the American army in the summer and autumn of 1917. Shortcomings in artillery training excepted, the nation had been able to produce enough officers to commence training her soldiers in September. Despite the lack of central control and standards for the camps, general use of the same set of drill regulations had been possible. Had prewar work assignments at the War College been different, many manuals might not have been written in time for the hurried training of 1917. The effect on America's crash instruction efforts would have been severe. As it was, a well-chosen group of exceptionally intelligent, extremely motivated and usually experienced men was exposed to enough training and information to set it on the path of successful self-education, once assigned to divisions.

Like long, bewildered lines of school children, the non-descript recruits filed into their training camps in the first weeks of September. One observer, at Camp Travis, described them as

less impressive than any other outfit [he had ever] seen. In intelligence, it was probably a little below the American average, in education certainly. ... Its manners were atrocious, its mode of speech appalling, its appetites enormous, its notions of why we were at war rudimentary. 70
Every effort had been made to prepare draftees in the summer before camps opened. The Official Bulletin, which was displayed in all public buildings and probably reached most persons, printed a thirty-lesson course for the prospective recruit. He was enlightened on America's mission to protect the rights of man. He learned what type of training to expect. And he was prepared for a dramatic personal change:

You will be less wrapped up than you have been in many purely personal questions. You will cut loose from many of the petty details that tend to smother a man's individuality.

The reader was advised to avoid poor food, alcohol, tobacco, and indolence. Especially stressed was the necessity to eschew "those things which tend to promote sexual excitement and desire, particularly obscene conversation, reading matter and pictures."

Creating an army at short notice falls most heavily on the recruit. After assigning men to their units within the division, primarily infantry and artillery, basic training commenced. By a relentless process of "drill, drill, drill, drill and then occasionally ... details more tiresome than drill," it was hoped to teach the recruit in three weeks what his prewar predecessor had learned in three months. Life was orchestrated to the sound of the camp's steam whistle, from reveille at 5:45 until lights out at 10 p.m. The intervening hours passed in rigorous drill, save for an hour or two of lectures on the articles of war, America's war aims, or the need for "soap and sunshine" at all times, flies being regarded as "more dangerous to soldiers than bullets."
Basic training is intended to cultivate discipline and physical fitness. The American army, unlike most of its counterparts, made an appeal to the intelligence of the average recruit in order to obtain fullest cooperation as he underwent the troubling transformation from individualism to a sense of corporate identity, mission and responsibility. "As a citizen soldier you are chosen for a post of special distinction," said the Official Bulletin. General Hugh L. Scott, then Chief of Staff, made known his conviction that the conditions under which modern wars are fought are ever making increasing demands on the individual soldier. ... The individual soldier must know how to interpret accurately orders and signals, for the enemy's fire may so isolate him from his leaders and comrades ... that he may be thrown on his own initiative in making his actions conform to those of the whole line; he may have to use his own judgement in opening fire, in advancing, in intrenching.79 Qualities of loyalty, obedience, physical fitness, intelligence, cleanliness, cheer, spirit, tenacity and self-reliance were express criteria by which the best recruits would be selected as non-commissioned officers to replace their regular instructors after basic training was finished.80

Every day, following breakfast, company commanders inspected quarters, causing one Private C.W. Stubbs to report that he was "learning another trade, ... laundress."81 Each soldier mounted guard once a week from noon one day until noon the next, thus learning the intricacies of the Manual of Interior Guard Duty. Evening parade and retreat, when the flag was reverently
lowered and furled, preceded supper and such evening recreation at the YMCA as tired bodies could sustain.  

For most of the day, it was "fall in, fall out" under "lynx eyed officers" who explained to the skeptical that success in winning victories is the object for which the Army exists. In comparison nothing else matters. ... It is usually the Army with the strongest sense of team spirit that fights its way through to victory.

Drill taught instant unquestioning obedience. Insistence on the minutia of guard duty introduced the individual soldier to direct personal responsibility for the safety of his comrades, that was to be discharged in a definite, precise manner. As groups of men saluted, changed step, marched by a flank or turned on fixed pivots, they were acquiring new habits of humility, precision, concentration, timing, and most important—teamwork.

Infantry soldiers were taught that the rifle was their best friend. In 1917, there were insufficient Model 1903 Springfield rifles to equip all recruits, so recourse had to be made to British Lee Enfields or Krag Jorgensens left over from the Spanish American War. Leonard Wood, training a division at Camp Funston, was obliged to have his soldiers whittle rifles out of wood in order to practice the Manual of Arms. By demonstration if necessary, recruits learned the parts of a rifle, and how to strip, assemble and clean it. The first targets were pieces of paper held on the end of a stick, as future snipers learned how to hold and aim the weapon, control breathing
and gently squeeze the trigger. By early November, rifle ranges had been completed, usually a day's march from camp. Most soldiers gained experience at ranges up to one hundred yards, with some exceptionally well-trained units shooting at six hundred.  

Tactics to the soldier of 1917 meant "extended order drill." Means by which to advance toward an enemy position and once within rifle range to fire effectively upon it prior to bayonet assault were taught successively by squad, platoon and company. Squads of eight men learned how to spread out in a long extended line on receipt of the command "as skirmishers deploy" from their corporal. They were also practiced in the acrobatics of springing from the ground, running forward a few yards, and falling down again behind cover. It took some time to learn how to fling oneself into a full run from lying flat on the ground, without first advertising one's intentions to the enemy sniper by bracing legs or raising elbows and torso. Loading and firing in positions on the ground or behind cover also became matters of squad drill. What was believed by the army's tacticians to be basic survival skills were pounded into the soldier until they became second nature.  

Section drills for forming skirmish lines, or reassembling into marching columns, were duplicated on a grander scale at platoon and company level. When the company commander decided that enemy fire was too heavy to permit further advance in
vulnerable dense columns, the order was given to deploy by squads or platoons in a particular direction. Again, corporals would select their part of the skirmishing line and columns of men would dissolve at the double in a swirl of organized confusion as a thin line of men was formed. Sections or platoons might be directed by turns to rush or crawl a few yards closer to the enemy, until the entire skirmish line had worked its way close enough for effective fire and bayonet assault.

Fire control, as much as the evolution of combat formations, was a vital aspect of extended order drills. Elaborate hand signals were devised by which the company commander could indicate where and at what rate he wanted his men to shoot. Platoon commanders, lying behind their men, would look to the rear on hearing a whistle blast for the hand signals of the company commander. Corporals, lying behind the middle man of their section, would be watching for platoon commanders to pass on signals received from the captain. The section commander would then pull the leg of the man in front of him, crawl up and whisper the new fire information in his ear. This man would then pass the changes in target or rate of fire down the line of riflemen.

Warfare as envisaged in 1917 was an intricate affair. Aside from the usual habits of obedience and self-reliance that must be inculcated into any soldier, a man had to learn where to move on receipt of various hand signals from higher authority, how to operate his rifle rapidly and accurately under any conditions,
and what advantage to take of hillocks, trees, heaps of earth, rocks, gullics, or ditches as cover from enemy fire. A common means of indicating targets had to be established throughout the company so that the shooting efforts of 250 men could be controlled, despite the confusion and noise of battle, by one man. Natural fears could only be overcome by education and discipline. It took time to convince recruits that "a man running rapidly toward the enemy furnishes a poor target." Only long, hot hours of strenuous exertion could develop the physique and tenacious determination to advance against a rested foe taking cool aim behind elaborately constructed defenses.

Marching, according to the Infantry Drill Regulations, constituted the "principal occupation of troops in campaign." Lives could be saved by constant practice in advancing under fire, outshooting the enemy and storming his position with bayonet. Energy was to be conserved for battle by teaching the men how to live in the field and march great distances with minimal exertion. From the outset, daily practice marches hardened the feet and familiarized recruits with packs, shelter tents, entrenching tools and the rest of the sixty pound load designed to render him self-sufficient for several days. One learned how to drain blisters, or make a canteen of water last the entire day. It soon became easy to erect a tent in seconds, or dry boots by placing hot pebbles in them. Such training
evidenced itself, often dramatically, in faces bronzed, backs straightened and shoulders squared. Carriage and mannerisms changed. By Christmas the recruit of September was regarding himself as a veteran, looking contemptuously upon the constantly arriving newcomers.95

Artillery training suffered for at least five months from a severe lack of equipment.96 Little could be accomplished toward training efficient gun crews or skilled fire planners. Use of demonstrations and printed material, plus the rotation of available equipment through regiments, permitted some useful activity. Important progress was made in October, when the Army War College published a sixteen-week syllabus for the guidance of artillery commanders, many of them inexperienced. The first four weeks were to be devoted to subjects common to all field artillery soldiers. Nomenclature and service of guns, care and riding of horses, dismounted foot drill, calisthenics, interior guard duty and hygiene received careful attention. Some instruction was possible in outdoor cooking, protection from gas attack, signals and side arms.97

Twelve weeks of specialist training filled the final three months of the War College syllabus. Personnel were grouped into signallers, telephone operators, mechanics, horseshoers, saddlers, drivers, cooks, and of course gunners.98 Once these specialists had mastered their trades, artillery units were to go to the field for battery live firing exercises designed to
perfect efficiency in operating pieces. Only then could be
developed the skills of officers in analyzing types of fire
appropriate to different targets, adjusting points of impact
or planning various barrages. Most such advanced training was
not to take place until well into 1918.99

For the first two months, training in the cantonments was
a matter of harried commanders and inexperienced junior officers
throwing together such information as they felt necessary from
their own understanding of existing regulations and unfamiliar
conditions on the Western Front. In early November, foreign
instructors arrived at the camps.100 Immediately, these veterans
of the European trenches expressed scorn for teaching the
rigid drills and tactical precepts of manuals written as long
as six years ago. Trench warfare, they said, was not a matter
of drill and mass formations, but rather one of specialists and
small teams. Emphasis at most camps, under the dynamic and
overbearing influence of British and French instructors shifted
from drill to class work. All grasped eagerly for the exotic
new skills introduced by the foreign experts, officers lining
up to do the bidding of tactfully workmanlike British sergeants
or the ingenuously versatile French.101 Subtly but unquestionably
the overriding emphasis in training altered from attacking an
enemy in the open by dash and determination to outsmarting him
in defence, inflicting casualties by artifice and sophisticated
application of a wide range of special weapons.
Immediately upon arrival of French and British instructors, bayonet, sniping and special weapons schools appeared at each camp. Grenades being rare, soldiers learned the awkward overhand pitch necessary to obtain high trajectory by throwing stones or tomato cans into rings laid out at various distances. Gas attacks, "not the kind your father has," were the subject of constant sombre foreboding, the box respirator destined for notoriety as the greatest single nuisance in a soldier's life. Individuals selected to be members of the machine gun "suicide club" received long and demanding training in giving fire orders, estimating ranges, locating a camouflaged enemy, judging windage, or stripping and assembling a complex weapon in the dark. Those not firing became acquainted with the insatiable appetite of this "concentrated essence of infantry," carrying ammunition to the firing points while awaiting their turn on the target range.

Bayonet skills received some mention in the US infantry drill regulations. British instructors, usually hardened sergeant majors with rasping voices and boundless energy, made of cold steel a fetish. "Every goddam mother's son is scared," reported one soldier after viewing his instructor careen wildly from sandbag to sandbag, screaming like a Bantu at the top of his lungs and lunging viciously at the inoffensive, inert forms laid out to represent a hapless foe. Training in this supreme manifestation of the will to conquer began with simple movements,
progressed through man-to-man duels with masks, pads and long sticks, and concluded on a serpentine bayonet course with straw bundles hanging off gallows to represent human targets. Through strenuous practice under the biting harrassment of bellicose instructors, the soldier developed confidence in his ability to "put it where he wants it." The apt pupil could make as many as three lunges in a flash, any one of which would be lethal. Some students entered into the game so heartily that they broke their bayonets pulling them out of dummy Huns. Very scientifically, and with painstaking attention to detail, the primordial savagery of hitherto amiable boys was nurtured.

November brought with it a crucial decision to base all artillery instruction on French methods, largely to bring training in the US into line with that of the American Expeditionary Forces. More time was to be devoted to building shell-proof emplacements, establishing elaborate telephone circuits with forward observation posts, and taking precautions against sudden gas attack. Pamphlets on recent operations in France were distributed in the evening officers' classes to supplement existing regulations.

Trench warfare was an element of American doctrine before the war. Readers of the Official Bulletin the previous summer were advised that it would be foolish to look on practice in digging trenches as if it were drudgery. Skill in seeking and making cover from the enemy's fire is far from being a sign of weakness.
... The day is gone when either officers or men are expected to stand out in the open. They should use every effective means of self-protection as long as it helps to gain ground and defeat the enemy.110

Most instructors had not had time to teach much about trenches by November. Foreign instructors changed matters immediately. Every camp was soon filled with sweating, cursing men as elaborate trenches were laboriously dug. Defensive positions constructed by the 27th Division at Camp Wadsworth eventually totalled eight miles.111 Once constructed, these full-scale trenches became objects of all the sanguinary techniques of attack and defence developed over three years in Europe.

After lectures describing trench routine, troops occupied their subterranean positions for between 24 and 72 hours.112 A vast jargon had to be acquired: duckboard, sap, listening post, sump channel, mortar plate, parados, and parapet all came to signify not simply lines on a neat chart, but items paid for with hours of punishing labour. Once acquainted with defensive routine, one learned how to crawl by night across tortured ground without getting lost, how to cut wire quietly without receiving a welcoming burst of machine gun fire, how to work down an enemy trench by throwing grenades. A full scale assault with supporting artillery fire climaxed a usually thorough course of instruction that left most soldiers confident that when the time came they would go "through them Dutchmen like they was fly paper."113

Trench warfare is a mixture of utter monotony and unmitigated drudgery, punctuated with demoniacal intoxicants of a sudden attack, an eventful raid, a precarious defence. Training for it
was very realistic, including live gas attacks, generous use of available artillery, target ranges lit with flickering lights to simulate flares, and full scale battles with bayonet and barrage. But high American officers were loath to see their troops subtly seduced by machinery and gradually subverted out of their traditional reliance on accurate marksmanship as the prime means to destroy the enemy. General Dickman wrote that great attention was being devoted to instruction in defensive warfare, "grenades and bayonet being considered equal to, if not superior in value to, rifle fire." This looked to many of his colleagues like "false doctrine, ... a departure from the traditional American dependence of skill with the rifle." In their conviction that the novelty of trench warfare was "often exaggerated," America's military leaders by the end of 1917 were forming an implacable resolve to ensure that training returned to first principles: discipline, marching, target practice, and the spirit of the offensive.

Optimism about America's military prowess had considerably declined by the end of 1917. It had been a cold, sobering winter. Once the novelty wore off and September's sunshine became October's winds and November's frost, the camps took on the dreary appearance of lumber mills or mine shafts. Tarpaper shacks floating in mud puddles, the rough hewn barracks with their sparse, cold rooms offered little solace after a day's hard drill in the rain. A nagging insistence on discipline, particularly
saluting "ninety-day wonder" officers, was never well received by the troops. British observers noted a "false democratic sentiment which places officers and men on equal footing off parade," officers who failed to assert themselves, an NCO class without authority. Most soldiers doubtless did not feel any such absence. For many, the winter of 1917 was the most trying period of their service. There was the relentless constancy and sameness of drill. There were nagging discomforts: lack of cots, no warm clothing, oppressive cold. Suicides and rebellion were not unknown.

Progress in forming a vast army was nevertheless spectacular. No less than forty divisions, or one million men, had been inducted, housed, and given at least rudimentary training. If Pershing's loyal followers believed after the war that the adoption by the General Staff of the "heresy of the trench warfare cult" imported by foreign instructors "merely meant that invaluable time was wasted," the retort can be made that American doctrine had not come to grips with the developments in war, and that troops destined for European service could not but have learned much from experienced European soldiers.

General Pershing knew his mind and did not waste time. More independent than perhaps any overseas commander in US history, the purposeful and demanding chief of the American Expeditionary Force selected the Lorraine sector personally as his army's area of operations and training. The trenches between the hills of the Vosges and the forests of Argonne were to be America's
French plans to establish American training camps in Lorraine were already in existence as early as May 28, two weeks before Pershing's arrival in Paris. It was envisaged that infantry troops would be billeted alongside a French division which would train specialists and officers in its own schools, as well as provide instructors for the general soldiers. Billets at Condrecourt and Neufchâteau were soon ready. Artillery was to be detached from parent division for separate training at Le Valdahon, near the Swiss border. As training would total three months, camps were to be available to newly arriving divisions just as their predecessors in turn departed for active service. On June 28, Pershing's headquarters approved the French scheme.

Four divisions would arrive in France before the end of 1917: the 1st and 2nd "regulars" and the 26th and 42nd National Guard. All would comprise mainly untrained recruits, experienced men having been leached out to fill new units being developed in USA. Instruction of the embryonic AEF had to begin at the lowest level. The first month was passed under the tutelage of French divisions, who taught basic weapons and trench warfare: grenades, trench mortars, machine guns, automatic rifles, the 37-mm cannon, rolling barrages, bombing teams, night patrols. American officers tried to ensure that instruction in basic open warfare drills and essential discipline was not overlooked. A second month passed gaining direct experience holding a quiet
sector of trenches under the command and supervision of a French division. At this point artillery units rejoined their divisions to help provide fire support. The division remained together for a third month of open warfare maneuvers which culminated the training process.\(^{127}\) Hopefully, by then the unit was fit both to occupy trenches in the immediate future and exploit the inevitable breakthrough of the following year.

By a combination of design and circumstance, the small American Expeditionary Force of the summer of 1917 was destined to develop into an independent army in all but name, symbolized by the overseas cap and the Sam Browne belt. Pershing from the outset provided the sort of central control and overriding authority that was lacking in America. He had an outstanding staff selected from among the best of the nation's officers to assist him.\(^{128}\) Paternalistic but thoughtful care was taken to ensure that morale remained high. Special postal regulations kept up a supply of American reading material,\(^{129}\) ruthless suppression of prostitution virtually eliminated venereal disease,\(^{130}\) and the establishment of the *Stars and Stripes* provided a sense of corporate identity to a widely scattered army.\(^{131}\)

Despite undeniable elements of truth in the allegations of critics that General John J. Pershing was an autocrat unable "to distinguish determination from stubborn obstinacy in his own conduct," that he was incapable of honest self-examination and surrounded by sycophants,\(^{132}\) Pershing was a man of such
iron character to be capable of genius and error on only the grandest scale. Bearing without complaint the wretched loneliness of the truly superior, he became impervious to criticism—both petty and pertinent. Through a long series of constant carping, nagging intrigue and relentless pressure to conform to Allied concepts of war, Pershing clung to his unshakeable convictions about how an army must grow and fight.

Discipline of West Point standards was expected at all times in the AEF. In September, Pershing wrote in the first of many pleas to Washington that he could not too strongly impress on the War Department the absolute necessity of rigid insistence that all men be thoroughly grounded in the school of the soldier. Salutes should be rendered in ... most military manner. ... The loyalty, readiness and alertness indicated by strictest adherence to this principle will immensely increase the pride and spirit of our troops. 133

Discipline accustoms men to doing the unreasonable, the inexplicable, the unpleasant. It also accustoms them to doing dangerous things, and thus justifies itself.

Underlying Pershing's stress on discipline was a conviction that open warfare alone could bring decisive victory. Trench training was not to interfere with the development of expertise and confidence in offensive field operations. Men had to be made capable of exploiting the impending breakthrough by fighting fluid battles and winning by superior initiative. 134 For such combat, Pershing insisted that rifle and bayonet were the decisive weapons; marksmanship and teamwork, winning skills.
In August 1917 Pershing took the novel step of removing training responsibility from his Adjutant General and placing it under the independent control of a separate branch of the staff—G-5, under Major General Paul B. Malone. Malone's organization was to develop courses, establish and operate training centers, determine doctrine, investigate methods of instruction, write manuals and promulgate regulations. Forceful directives soon began to flow from General Headquarters at Chaumont to arriving troops.

No more than in America could the AEF be trained without making provisions for qualified instructors. One thousand lieutenants from the First Series Officers' Training Camps were sent to French or British schools immediately upon arrival. By October 1 they were sufficiently trained to be sent to the 1st Division as specialist instructors in gas warfare, machine gunnery and minor tactics. During the same two months independent American schools were being established to instruct platoon and company leaders, teach the use and tactical employment of various infantry weapons, and train instructors for such specialties as gas warfare or camouflage. Plans were made for a staff college, courses for higher commanders, and aviation and artillery facilities. On October 15, the first corps schools opened, which produced 12,235 more instructors and leaders by December 21. Artillerists and engineers were emerging from French schools and staff officers hard at study in Langres by November.
Very soon after arrival, Pershing decided that his officers and men were "far and away superior to the tired Europeans." Early establishment of what was to be an extensive system of AEF schools ensured that sometime in 1918 the Americans would be totally free of any reliance on the Allies for training. In the interim, forced to use French instructors while his own were educated, Pershing watched very closely the content of the training of his first divisions and impatiently awaited the day when he would not have to exorcise heresy from his command.

Winter of 1917 symbolized and consummated three years of European misery. The weather was colder than the ubiquitous old men could remember. Food was meager, fuel rare, luxury vanished. In the major cities, such joy as was seen seemed overcast with desperation or shrouded in cynicism. Women were past weeping. There was no more youth to weep for.

Elements of the 1st Division began landing at St. Nazaire on June 17. One battalion paraded in Paris on the Fourth of July, inspiring hope from the desperate and despair from the knowledgeable. An American observer thought the troops of the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry looked "very young and very green." One man in the crowd was known to remark that "if this is what we may expect from America, the war is lost. These men are not soldiers; they are a uniformed rabble." The correspondent of L'Illustration felt that

with their olive-green uniforms, their broad-rimmed
felt hats, their pocketed belts and their appearance reminding one of the cowboys of the American West, they brought a new and picturesque note into our war atmosphere. 144

Both seemingly contradictory observations were accurate. America's first military emissaries to France were at once totally untrained and unreservedly enthusiastic. How literally one might take their image as a blood transfusion for the battered Allied armies would depend on the training they were about to receive as much as on their undeniably invaluable spirit.

Exuberance was soon put to the test. By the 14th of July infantry was at Gondrecourt and artillery at Le Valdahon. Hardship and inconvenience soon became familiar. Bed might be a niggardly pile of rotting straw under a leaky rook in a filthy barn. Rain and mud provided an unchanging backdrop to a dreary life of interminable drill and fitful sleep. It was cold, and fuel strictly rationed. The French were cordial but odd--especially for their lack of cleanliness. Manure piles had to be shovelled away from doorways, and proper urinals built with pictures of the Kaiser in them so the natives would feel encouraged to change their sanitary habits. Food often amounted to little more than hardtack, weak coffee, boiled potatoes, and a few spoonfuls of rice. Pay was a farce.

At five o'clock in the morning, shivering men crawled out of bed and cooked their greasy bacon. Usually while it was still dark the recruits marched several miles to the training fields. There eight hours passed in relentless drill, regardless
of weather. At four o'clock, as darkness approached again, troops marched back to their billets to chase rats, shoot craps and sleep. For those officers not attending schools, evening passed in frantic study for the next day's teaching.145

French instructors provided some comic relief. A short, scrawny, sloppy individual with wispy black moustache and truncated gait, "Froggy" was anything but stentorian. One soldier, underlining with exaggeration a universal impression, noted that his tutor

smokes cigarettes somethin awful and dont say much. ...
...
It must be awful not to talk English, think of not bein able to say nothin all your life without wavin your arms around and then lookin it up in a dickshunary.  [sic] 146

In fact, men of the 1st Division were trained by the elite Chasseurs Alpins--"Blue Devils" of the famed 42nd. Language problems still cannot be overcome by martial prowess. Continual demonstrations without explanations required both liberal patience and imaginative gesticulation. Soldiers nevertheless learned not to throw a grenade like a baseball. Training accidents gruesomely shocked the dilletante into respecting this weapon. Considerable progress was made learning to assemble and strip the Hotchkiss machine gun and Chauchat automatic rifle. Some difficulty was encountered coming to the realization that machine gun fire tends to go high unless carefully watched, that gas masks must be fitted in the smoke room, that dirty rifle grenades misfire.

Once familiar with basic weapons, the men of the 1st progressed to combined operations, with bombers working from shell hole to
shell hole under the protection of bayonet and rifle men, Chauchats firing on the flanks, and 37-mm cannon blasting machine gun nests. Extensive trenches were dug, including a complex known as Washington Center, large enough to stage divisional attacks. Soldiers became accustomed to trench routine, the tactical employment of various weapons, the conduct of small raids, the technique of regimental attack and defense. Brilliant rocket displays livened communications practice with artillery. Dramatic demonstrations put on by the Blue Devils included rolling barrages, bangalore torpedoes, and perhaps some hint of the old French élan.

Pershing was never far away. Like a husband teaching a scatter-brained wife how to drive an auto, he continually made unannounced visits to examine the content of French training and ascertain the progress of the division. Though the French might teach pragmatic survival skills acquired at agonizing cost at Verdun or on the Somme, American soldiers were not to be distracted from open warfare training. Every suitable hill butt became a rifle range. Afternoons passed in turnip fields forming skirmish lines, rolling in the mud, charging through the snow, and marching, marching, marching. Memoranda flowed from Chaumont to the 1st Division and its compatriots. Always stressed were close order drill, the bayonet, the daily march, the infantry drill regulations.

Artillery regiments progressed rapidly in their tidy, comfortable camp. Four and one half hours each day passed in live
firing, gun crews mastering their drill in this most direct
fashion. Pershing interfered very little with the syllabus,
content to trust the famous French reputation in matters of
gunnery. American theoretical training at the officers' camps
the preceeding summer had been sound. For most officers, only
the perfection of theoretical knowledge and practice of skills
were necessary. Gun crews learned nomenclature, orientation
and drill regulations, then moved on to live firing. Afternoons
were devoted to a critique of the morning's performance on
the range. At the end of the first month, specialists departed
for separate training as liaison officers, aerial observers
and orientation experts. By the time the artillery brigade
rejoined its division for practical trench duty, it was able
to adjust fire from different points of observation, plan and
adjust all types of barrages, neutralize targets and move
efficiently on the march.

Save for a surprise German raid which killed three men on
the night of 2/3 November, little of note happened during the
month the division spent in the trenches between Lunéville and
Nancy. Artillery fired desultory shots, the usual patrols went
out, the odd rifle fusilade sounded forth. But in general it
was a quiet sector which the French did not wish to see spoiled
by naïve, rambunctious Americans. The division departed without
medals or citation, but rather with the invaluable confidence
that comes from having been under hostile fire and survived. A
sense of maturity outweighed the frustration of those like Private Ray Congledon, who announced to the Literary Digest how badly he wanted to

Lick the guy whom you have cursed for months and who is the cause of all your hardships and sufferings.154

Yet the intoxicants of 1914, imbibed as it were from the weeks esconced along old battlefields, flowed strongly in the veins of American troops. Only a battle of a nightmare could check effectively the eagerness of a generation raised on peace, progress and patriotism. It was as if the Allies had resurrected their dead of 1914. The Germans might transfer a score of divisions from the Eastern front, but they were tired troops. Enthusiasm, even according to the most pessimistic French observers, was the most valuable asset of the American Expeditionary Force.

Pershing did not want enthusiasm sapped by sedentary training. On October 6, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the French in a strong document which directed all instruction "to contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive."155 Attack was to be a habit of thought. "The general principles governing combat remain unchanged," asserted G-5. Special weapons may have their use, but training was to be directed and assessed according to the venerable trinity of Drill Regulations, Small Arms Firing Manual and Field Service Regulations. Rifle, bayonet and discipline were to receive maximum stress.156

In early December, the 1st Division, under a new commander
and thoroughly purged by Pershing, began a month's open warfare
maneuvers. Full scale assaults were conducted at Washington
Center. Miles of telephone wire were unreeled, command posts
set up and closed down, aircraft flown, gas alarms sounded.
Hot food from the mobile kitchens gave tired soldiers some hope
of survival until they had finished "training their officers."
On January 5, the division was finally decreed ready for combat. 157

Training of the 26th Division, which arrived on October 31,
was slowed by the need to use large bodies of men in construction
gangs along the AEF line of communications. A sound, and rare,
background in marksmanship gained in the USA provided some
relief from a crowded training schedule, basically the same as
that followed by the 1st Division although located at another
camp with another French instructional unit. 158 The 42nd
Division arrived on November 8. 159 On December 12 a three day
march brought the division to a new area. A third move commenced
on December 26 that was to take the division 100 miles in five
days. With ill-fitting boots supplied only hours before
departure, and heavy packs, twelve miles through driving snow
were covered in the first day. Lunch was two slices of cold
bacon on a piece of bread; bed, an icy wooden floor. Bleeding
feet marked the division's path the following day. Upon arrival
at Perrogney five days after setting out, this division was
inoculated to suffering and learning the wisdom of soldierly
stoicism. 160
Allied reaction to the performance of the Americans in the first eight months of the war was much akin to that of a weary teacher to a clever but truculent pupil. Enthusiasm among the troops was admired by all. But what of their numbers and quality? By January 1918 only five divisions had arrived in France. One was ready for action. Things were moving slowly in America, too. An unsigned report of the French Military Mission in USA predicted that Americans would not fight in great numbers during 1918, due mainly to an excessively long period of abstract training, shortage of equipment and insufficient transport.\textsuperscript{161} The "slowness of American military administration, ... and the backward state of mind of some of its leaders"\textsuperscript{162} was also attacked by Field Marshal "Wully" Robertson, who accused the Americans of "proceeding as if they had years in which to prepare." The Chief of the Imperial General Staff regarded Pershing as "rather tired," lacking "a considered view of the nature of his task, or how to set about it." America seemed, with some justification, "a very weak reed to lean upon."\textsuperscript{163}

Not only the Allies wanted change in America's mobilization performance. General Sibert, when commander of the 1st Division, remarked that his troops soon became bored under French instructors. He wished the Allies to provide only advice and guidance in trench warfare exercises for officers.\textsuperscript{163} Pershing heartily agreed, writing to Pétain on January 6 that "our troops
have made better progress under their own instructors and according to our own methods."164

Things were being done to Pershing's army that he did not like. Preventive action would have to be taken before troops set foot in France. On October 2, Pershing noticed some men of the 1st Division failing to use their rifles while taking trenches.165 A cable was immediately sent to Washington, whence it was promulgated to training camps throughout USA. Pershing suggested that all troops receive a complete course in rifle practice before departure for France as rifle ranges were scarce in the AEF. Trench warfare was on no account to be allowed to interfere with the basics of marksmanship and extended order drill.166 But the chief of the AEF could only suggest, not prescribe, training in America's camps. Befuddled, over-worked minds in Washington proved pliable to the suggestions of a large and assiduous Allied training mission. One circular stated trench warfare to be of paramount importance, particularly maddening Pershing.167 Some sort of coordination between training in America and training in France was being requested by both Allies and AEF, although for different reasons.

By December, America was revealing her inherent impatience. Dramatic shortcomings, especially in clothing and weapons,168 provoked Chairman George B. Chamberlain of the Senate Military Affairs Committee to charge that "the military establishment of America has fallen down ... because of inefficiency in every
department of the Government of the United States." Ships were known to have been loaded before coal was available for them to sail, while other vessels full of coal stood idle. Space had been wasted shipping bath tubs, cuspidors, floor wax and lawn mowers to an exasperated Pershing. Shivering troops in the cantonments represented a slap in the face to the trust of American parenthood.

Most supply problems were on their way to solution by December. The need for more rigid training organization had been recognized by foreign advisers, overseas commanders and the War Department. America's army was getting ponderously to its feet, like a massive dinosaur goaded into fight. Problems had been identified and solutions proposed. But war remains essentially a race against time. Would the new year catch America's soldiers short of life-saving training? And would their training fit them for the realities of imminent combat?
NOTES


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6 Joffre to Clemenceau, May 20, 1917, Vincennes, Mission Militaire Française, carton 17, dossier 2.


8 Ibid., 33.

9 General T.M. Bridges to Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) May 3, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/351.

10 Joffre to Clemenceau, May 20, 1917, Vincennes.

11 Weigley, History, 361.

12 OB, 28: 3.

13 See Ayres, The War with Germany, 29; Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 363.

14 OB, 25: 3.

15 Ibid.

16 OB, 26: 9.

17 Ibid.

18 Historical Section, Army War College, Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (Washington, 1931), I, 79-86.
19 OB, 48: 1.


21 OB, 86: 3.


23 Ibid.

24 OB, 48: 1.


26 OB 126: 10; Each division commander could appoint up to 1.7% of his enlisted strength for officer training.

27 See OB, 126: 10; 287: 1.

28 Historical Section, Order of Battle, III, 84.

29 Ibid., 86-87. De Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 179.


31 Ibid., 56.

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33 Ibid., 55.

34 Ayres, The War with Germany, 29.

35 Myron E. Adams and Fred Girton, The History and Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers' Training Camps (Fort Sheridan, 1928), 333.

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37 Kay Pea, From Private to Shavetail (New York, 1918), 10.

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40 OB, 40: 2.

41 OB, 24: 2.
42 Ibid.

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44 Historical Committee, 79th Division Association, History of the Seventy-Ninth Division, AEF, During the World War, 1917-1919 (Lancaster, 1922), 31.

45 OB, 28: 2. See also Captain James P. Cole and Major Oliver Schoomaker, Military Tactics Manual (New York, 1917), 2-39 for an exact daily schedule for the second officers' training camp held at Plattsburg.

46 Adams, History and Achievements, 202.

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48 Adams, History and Achievements, 342.

49 Ibid., 212.

50 Coffman, The War, 58.

51 Spiers to Fagalde, August 13, 1917, PRO, AEF, WA0106474/ELS 201 2.

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58 PRO, AEF, WA0106468/T. 156 pt. 4, no. 85.

59 Military Attaché, Washington to Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), October 31, 1917, PRO, AEF, WA0106484/T. 207 4.
Tardieu to Jusserand and Foch, March 20, 1918, Quai d'Orsay, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 7423/mo.

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Adams, History and Achievements, 205, 208.

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Coffman, The War, 57.

Adams, History and Achievements, 355-372.

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Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs, 74.

OB, 80: 7.

OB, 90: 7.

OB, 86: 8.


Wisconsin National Guardsman John C.Acker quoted in Coffman, The War, 65. One miserable duty seems to have been peeling onions. A soldier at Camp Travis did it with his gas mask on--see Heidel, Over There, 18.

Freidel, Over There, 11.

Ibid., 15.

OB, 85: 3.

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Freidel, Over There, 24.

OB, 81: 7; 82: 9.

OB, 84: 7.

Churchill, Over There, 92.

Cheseldine, Ohio in the Rainbow (Columbus, 1924), 59.

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88 Coffman, The War, 38.

89 Churchill, Over Here!, 92.


91 Lardner, Treat 'Em Rough, 11. Also L. Wardlaw Miles, History of the 308th Infantry, 1917-1919 (New York, 1927), 17; Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn, The 131st Infantry in the World War (Chicago, 1919), 20.

92 Ellis, The Plattsburg Manual provides one of the clearest accounts of extended order drill and tactical doctrine in use during the period under study.

93 OB, 100: 7.

94 Infantry Drill Regulations, para. 623. See also OB, 87: 7.

95 Miles, History of the 308th Infantry, 13.

96 Major General William J. Snow, Signposts of Experience: World War Memoirs (Washington, 1941); Cole, The Thirty-Seventh Division, 326; Rhodes, 1918, 1. The author, commanding the 7th Field Artillery Regiment, 33rd Division at Camp Logan, Texas had only 5 out of 24 guns, one-third of necessary saddles, very few sidearms. Rhodes himself was a cavalryman with no artillery experience.

97 Army War College, Field Artillery Training, Enlisted, 8-14.

98 Ibid., 15ff.


100 Charles F. Dienst, History of the 353rd Infantry Regiment, 89th Division, National Army, September 1917-June 1919 (Wichita, 1921), 8-10; History of the Seventy-Ninth, 30.

101 History of the 353rd Infantry, 11.

102 Mabry, Recollections, 14; Gerald F. Jacobsen, History of the 107th Infantry USA (New York, 1920), 11.

103 Lardner, Treat 'Em Rough, 77.

105 Churchill, *Over Here*, 94.


108 Vignal to Minister of War, Washington, November 11, 1917, Quai d'Orsay, États-Unis, Armées Américaines, II, 194. See also Spiers to Fagalde, November 12, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/484/ELS 976.


110 OB, 88: 7.


112 *Ibid.*. For drawings of the ideal trench system see Pitt, 1918, 9-11.

113 Lardner, *Treat 'Em Rough*, 67.


117 Emmett, *Give 'Way*, 75.

118 Spiers to Fagalde, January 18, 1918, PRO, AEF, WO 106/474/ELS 198 10.

119 Emmett, *Give 'Way*, 75.


125 Weigley, History, 376.

126 OB, 26: 3.


128 OB, 26: 3.


130 See Coffman, The War, 133.


133 Quoted in Freidel, Over There, 115.


137 Thomas, History, 37; OH, III, 355 (General Order, AEF, 1917, no. 45, October 8, 1917); de Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 71.

138 Weigley, History, 387.

139 OH, III, 247.

140 Quoted in Ibid., 355.


146 Streeter, *Dere Mable: Love Letters of a Rookie* (New York, 1918), 50; Broun, *Our Army at the Front*, 87-90.

147 See note 115. Also Broun, *Our Army*, 90; *And They Thought We Wouldn't Fight*, 87-90.

148 *History of the 1st Division*, 20-22.


152 *History of the 1st Division*, 26.


154 Quoted in Churchill, *Over Here!*, 139.


158 Located at Training Area 4—see appended map. *OH, III*, 594.


162 E. Réquin to Minister of War, Washington, August 11, 1917, Ibid., no. 44/B.


164 General William L. Sibert to Pershing, in Freidel, Over There, 117-118. See also letter to Pershing, October 8, 1917 in OH, II (Policy Forming Documents), 56-57. AG, GHQ, AEF: 3140.

165 Pershing to Pétain, January 6, 1918, in OH, III, 262.


167 Ibid..

168 Pershing, My Experiences, I, 258.

169 Coffman, The War, 36.

170 Ibid., 160. See also Weigley, History, 367.

171 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs, 135.
CHAPTER THREE

TRAINING IN 1918: PERFECTION VERSUS NECESSITY

Pondorously, relentlessly, inexorably, the Russian steamroller was moving during the closing months of 1917. But it was moving in reverse. On the night of November 6/7, unpaid soldiers and subverted sailors threatened to turn their guns on Alexander Kerensky's bewildered cabinet, which for six months after the abdication of the Czar had been attempting to drag Russia kicking and screaming into the twentieth century. Kerensky was determined to honour his country's commitment to fight the Germans to the finish. That commitment had already cost over nine millions. But the liberals in Petrograd did not realize that it was Russia that was finished. The next morning, their government fled. Lenin took power as exhausted, humiliated and sick of suffering, the Russian armies walked away from war. On December 22, negotiations commenced between the Soviet regime and the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, a dreary, isolated railway siding in occupied Russia. The Allied sledge hammer poised threateningly in the German rear had dissipated into the arctic mists, leaving the Western Front naked before the inevitable onslaught of the entire German army.

Only America could succour the exhausted British and French, The loss of Russia, threats to Italy, and the impending numerical superiority of Germany on the Western Front put Allied leaders
in a position where they could no longer be obsequious or even
diplomatic in requesting immediate, massive American military
commitment. Impatience was understandable: in January, only
one American division was available for combat. Total AEF
strength was only 120,000 semi-trained men scattered throughout
France. Shipping was scarce, training time-consuming, Pershing
seemingly uncooperative.

General Pershing commanded the AEF virtually without
supervision from President or War Department. His original
instructions from Newton D. Baker directed him
to cooperate with the forces of the other countries
employed against the enemy; but in so doing the
underlying idea was to be kept in view that the
forces of the United States were a separate and
distinct component of the combined forces, the
identity of which must be preserved.

This fundamental rule of military autonomy was subject only to
"such minor exceptions in particular circumstances" as Pershing's
judgement approved. How much Pershing would be required to
cooperate with the Allies was left ultimately to his "full
discretion." President Wilson and Secretary Baker, despite
the pleas and pressures of Allied leaders, never violated this
rule. If the Allies wished to use American troops, they would
have to convince Pershing to deny his own overweening ambition
of commanding a unified army.

Pétain, supreme commander of the French army, approached
Pershing in late December with a new training proposal to speed
the entry of American troops into battle. Each American
infantry regiment, bolstered with artillery and engineers, was to be attached directly to a French division for two or three months' training and combat experience. After this period, which was not to be limited to quiet sectors, these regiments would be regrouped as American divisions. Pershing promptly turned down the plan, partly because he foresaw French reluctance to weaken those divisions from which American regiments would be withdrawn after training, but mainly because of the language barrier to effective instruction, and the impossibility of high-ranking American officers gaining any useful staff and command experience while their regiments were under French control. French designs to engage Pershing's troops on her own front, under the guise of a training expedient, may also have been suspected.

Judging by the training of the 1st and other divisions the previous autumn, it seemed to Pershing that the French had little to offer in return for the use of American divisions under training as temporary reserves. The British, on the other hand, could provide invaluable shipping which would speed the assembly of the American Expeditionary Forces. Britain too was short of reserves, Lloyd George himself writing in December that "even half-trained companies or battalions would fight well if mixed with two or three year veterans." Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson's personal confidant, was asked by the British ambassador to consider presenting a proposal for shipping and
training assistance to the President. Pershing, after initial reluctance to acquiesce in Wilson's decision to cooperate with the British, began discussing training arrangements a few weeks later. On January 30, 1918, it was decided that the British would ship six complete American divisions to France and train them in the British area prior to releasing them to Pershing. Not only would the British provide complete infantry training, with combat employment limited to emergencies in rear areas, but much equipment would be supplied by the British. This arrangement allowed for more rapid application of American manpower to winning the war, speeded the shipment of at least six divisions to France, and aided in the procurement of equipment.

Training for officers and men was placed under firm American supervision after the creation on February 20 of II Corps, directly linked to GHQ, AEF and charged with coordinating all matters of instruction with Malone's training staff.

Those divisions already in France continued their training, comprising drills in the countryside and short spells in quiet sectors under French supervision. The Second Division was ready for service by March 14. Valuable lessons were learned. A full scale raid conducted by the 1st Division in the St. Mihiel sector exemplified a widespread need for better night navigation skills. The loss of four hundred men during a German raid on Seicheprey of March 20 underlined the need for constant patrols to provide information on enemy activity. French
divisions in the quiet Baccarat sector were relieved in the crisis week of April 5 by the 26th and 42nd Divisions, "excited, interested and happy" to have responsibility at last for their own sectors. All American formations engaged in aggressive patrolling to sharpen fighting skills. The inevitable sobering experiences accumulated. Not untypical was an eager soldier of the 26th Division wandering out alone looking for Germans, only to be shot by a friendly sentry as he tried to return. Rescue being impossible, the youth bled to death before the eyes of his comrades, a dreary huddle of trumped-up glory.

With devastating force, the German offensive of March 21 pushed the British back behind the Somme. The entire Fifth Army was wiped out, Amiens threatened, the Germans surging 40 miles before encountering serious opposition. On March 26, Foch was appointed to coordinate the Allied armies. A week later, Pershing offered all possible assistance to Foch, by now holding full powers of supreme command. German attacks were to continue with diminishing force up and down the Allied line until the middle of July, but under Foch's coordination each spasmodic advance of the enemy would be checked. American training during the months of crisis between March 21 and July 15 became a matter of expediency juggled with deliberation. The AEF would have to perfect its curriculum and training facilities under constant pressure to get troops into action as quickly as
possible. But if Pershing's army were to tip the scales in France, the forty-one divisions being prepared in America would first have to arrive much more rapidly than had their predecessors.

In January, the 32nd Division arrived, only to be split up as a reserve. The 93rd Provisional Division, which arrived in February, was disbanded two months later. On April 6, the 3rd Division arrived at Bordeaux, destined for six weeks' training in Area 9 (Châteauville) before entering the line on May 31. As late as March 18 the AEF comprised only six divisions, or 325,000 men, a mere mockery of America's potential to turn defeat into victory.

Soon after the German attacks, Lloyd George expressed willingness to ship 120,000 American troops each month for April through to July if the British Expeditionary Force could train them. President Wilson agreed, contingent on Pershing's approval. Because the British wished to transport only desperately needed infantry and machine gun troops, Pershing disliked the shipping plan. He wished that only complete divisions, including artillery, be sent to France. Moreover, Pershing did not believe that the American people would approve of combat under the British, "even though the President and his advisors should learn that way." As late as the first of May, Pershing seemed adamant, preferring to see the British pushed into the sea and the French behind the Loire, rather than risk piecemeal amalgamation of his troops into harassed foreign divisions.
Victory would in any event be inevitable once a united American army had assembled and singlehandedly beaten the Germans after proper preparation.25

On May 2, Pershing relented, possibly due to an awareness that without British ships the AEF would never grow fast enough to prevent Allied collapse. The British immediately began transporting 10 divisions to their own area for training.26 Only infantry, engineer, machine gun and signal troops, plus divisional and brigade headquarters, were shipped. Artillery and corps troops followed as space became available.27 As a result of British sea power, arrivals soared from 11,000 in April to 244,407 in May, 277,894 in June, and 306,302 in July.28 Pershing built a quarter of his ultimate force of two million on close cooperation with the British. Whether the additional shipping space was worth subjecting ten American divisions to British training seemed a pointless question in May 1917. With the Germans driving toward Paris, insistence on tactical cant was a luxury Pershing could not afford, and Foch could not allow.

It was the bayonet that provided the first connecting link between British and American tactical thought. Bayonet displays by British instructors were often spectacular, involving laying out every German through three successive lines of trenches, clearing dugouts, firing accurately after strenuous exertion. "The more foolish the game, the more rapturously the British joined in," remarked one observer.29 Another more august critic,
General John J. Pershing, noticed with approval the British stress on aggressiveness and self-confidence. American troops undergoing British instruction would be exposed at worst to an excessive emphasis on trenches or certain weapons—not to totally false attitudes such as those of the French.

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, phlegmatic commander of the British Expeditionary Force, cooperated candidly and scrupulously with Pershing. In an order of March 12, he directed that training be "in accordance with American regulations and ... instructions recently issued or to be issued." It was impressed on the Director of Training, General Bonham, that Americans were not to be ordered about, but helped by advice and experience to become leaders and instructors. Particular attention was to be paid to discipline, route marching, musketry and staff work. Haig, in a rare burst of thoughtfulness, even directed that the peculiar appetites of his guests be attended to, with bulk rations such as Hominy or rice increased.

Training was patterned after the original January agreement, Pershing himself believing that "it could not be improved upon." On arrival, American troops were affiliated with British cadre divisions in rear areas for a month's preliminary training in drill, marksmanship, and special weapons such as the machine gun, Lewis gun, trench mortar, grenades and gas. American officers and NCOs, once returned from British specialists' schools, were to play a direct role in this training. Three
weeks were to be spent in British trenches, attached to companies as platoons, then to battalions as companies, brigades as battalions, and divisions as regiments. Staff officers would serve with appropriate headquarters. A final month would pass practising open warfare at regimental level under American officers, whereupon divisions would be reassembled and sent to Pershing. 36

Major General George W. Reed's II Corps administered and supervised all troops passing through British hands, maintaining close liaison with Pershing, who also had personal representatives attached to Haig's headquarters. American officers were at all times responsible for the administration and welfare of their troops. 37 At the end of May, five divisions were located with the BEF (94th, 28th, 35th, 77th and 82nd), 38 all of which were ordered elsewhere by Foch before training could be completed. 39 Most of the five additional divisions sent to the British (27th, 30th, 33rd, 78th and 80th) remained long enough to complete the instructional program. In August, Haig uncomplainingly released the 33rd, 78th and 80th Divisions to Pershing, the 27th and 30th fighting with the BEF until the end of the war. 40

American soldiers made a strong impression on the British. One veteran of the 38th Division described an American sergeant attached to his unit for instruction as a splendid type, brim full of the old enthusiasm we had in 1915. As for me I have been weary, so weary, and this strong American soldier glowing with health and strength and a desire to do his bit and make up
for lost time makes me ashamed I have fallen off and can only pray that fresh enthusiasm may come to me again.  

Sir Philip Gibbs noticed a high level of intelligence among the rank and file of the American 77th Division, which would combine with health, optimism and modest training to produce excellent fighters.

As few men received exhaustive rifle instruction before departure for France, there was little difficulty adjusting to the British Enfield that replaced the Springfield rifle in the first week of training. Contentment about British food, however, was less than universal. "We are on the British ration here so we are all losing weight as no one could get fat on their ration," wrote one private in the 6th US Engineers.

Another soldier recalled that "everyone admired the limeys for their guts, and there were few fights between us. We admired them even more when we ate the kind of chow they fought on." Boiled eggs and "barn rat" notwithstanding, most Americans respected the British, although few were not aware of the exhaustion among even the best units. It was apparent to most students that the British "had learned through the school of hard knocks just about what is necessary to beat the Germans," and that America was "benefitting by being taught ... things that otherwise she would have to learn herself." Officers from the 27th and 33rd Divisions were particularly impressed with a course offered at the Gas Defence School, which was
"thorough, business-like and excellent in every respect, ... as at all British schools. The instructors aimed to teach ... the essentials learned after four terrible years of experience--everything else was eliminated."47

British training by 1918 offered the residue of lessons learned from three years' hard fighting. Instructors circulated from combat to teaching duties to ensure that new tactical concepts were immediately introduced into training programs. Men were taught to master particular jobs with a thoroughness often exasperating to Americans unaccustomed to memorizing perfectly the convoluted formulae of asphyxiating gasses or the myriad sear springs and cotter pins of a machine gun. But hard practicalities had long since replaced theories in British schools after the pitilessly dashed hopes of Loos and the Somme. Training progressed rapidly from bayonet and rifle exercises to very realistic tactical problems for small infantry formations. Attacks on machine gun nests by groups of platoon size were particularly stressed, convincing many that real action was not far in the offing.48 British NCOs could illustrate graphically to the novice the need to treat one's sidearm as a personal friend in a way no tongue-tied Frenchman or inexperienced American could hope to emulate.49

A few weeks in the slimy trenches of the visceral Belgian lowlands cured cocky tendencies such as that of Lewis gunners to impatiently dismantle weapons with hammer and chisel.50
Troops hardened to boredom, discomfort, and casualties. Officers applied lessons of earlier map problems and tactical walks, and made some progress toward that cool state of expertise and confidence that makes it possible to dominate men. The 33rd Division completed its training most realistically in a model Australian tank and infantry assault on Hamel, earning ungrudging praise from General John Monash, himself one of the most innovative amateurs of the war.

Haig, reflecting the prevalent British view, considered the Americans to be "some of the most splendid men he had ever seen." Fresh troops picked up new training very quickly, said the British, and proved robust and adaptable enough to go into the line much sooner than expected. Such compliments, however flattering to the American soldier as an individual, did not include any praise for the organization to which he belonged.

In May 1918 the American army had yet to coordinate training between the AEF and the camps at home. A constant British complaint was the high number of untrained men arriving in France, usually mixed at random with units possessing anything from minimal to considerable training. The 27th Division, for example, possessed little experience except foot drill and physical conditioning. The 33rd Division, at least, was grounded in basic military skills. When the 4th Division hurriedly departed for the Marne on June 10, many members of the 39th Infantry had never fired a rifle. The 8th Field Signal Battalion
still had not been properly equipped, possessing holsters but no pistols. Clearly, if the AEF were to function without the tutelage and paternalistic indulgence of Allied armies, the nation's excellent human resources would have to be better assessed, organized and equipped to fill varied positions in a complex, constantly fluid organization subjected to the acid test of war.

On Monday, January 28, 1918 the hearing room of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs was hushed not with the expectation of momentous decision, but rather with the anticipation of incisive, vitriolic, devastating criticism that would demolish Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. In a few terrible hours, the diminutive, precocious little man would be frightened back to his idealistic, naive coterie of intellectual incompetents in Cleveland. Too often, powerful, ambitious men mistake small stature for simplicity; humility, for impotence. The "gnome in a big black hat," jokingly referred to as "Newtie Cootie," administered a lesson in human nature to Senator George Chamberlain and his fellows, winning their full support in a clear, well-informed and tactful report on the operations of the War Department since the outbreak of hostilities.

Most glaring shortcomings in supply and organization were demonstrated to be exceptions to a spectacular performance in the face of great confusion and haste. Armed with a new fund of public support, Baker on March 4 appointed Peyton C. March, chief of artillery in the AEF, as the new Chief of Artillery. March
immediately reorganized the entire General Staff, and assured
its complete control over army activities in USA by placing
all matters of supply and transportation under Major General
George W. Goethals, who untangled America's logistical problems
in short order. Bernard Baruch as head of a rejuvenated War
Industries Board bludgeoned business into cooperation when
necessary by withholding raw materials. Organizing, equipping
and training the armies destined for Europe could now progress
smoothly under strong and expert central control from Washington,
finally free of demoralizing public criticism, bureaucratic
rivalry and the caprice of incompetents.59

Drastic measures taken to improve artillery training in
February 1918 set a pattern for the elaborate system of instruc-
tion which existed in the American army at the end of the war.
Only 275 artillery officers in April 1917 had more than one
year's experience. The need to rely on unqualified instructors
in 1917 was further complicated by a dearth of equipment.60 When
Major General William J. Snow occupied the new post of Chief of
Artillery in February 1918, he found levels of training in
such basics as fire discipline, occupation of position, communi-
cations and calculations ranging from ghastly incompetence to
marginal mediocrity. Troops lacked a sense of urgency, technical
knowledge, proper equipment, qualified American instructors,
and basic discipline.61 Refusing to allow exasperation to
cloud deliberation, Snow set limited, realistic standards of
gun drill, calculation, knowledge of weapons and fire planning
to be attained by all units. Equipment was to be redistributed, training coordinated with the AEF, and special centralized schools established for all artillery instruction.

Because it would take too long to develop American weapons, it had been decided to rely on French 75-mm and 155-mm guns as standard field pieces. But use of French guns made unavoidable an all too often supplicant reliance on French instructors. When Snow assumed his challenging position in February, French officers at each divisional artillery camp had gained so much power as to be setting training syllabus and schedule without any control from American authorities. The senior French officer at Camp Funston practically commanded the artillery brigade of the 89th Division, and demanded to be made Assistant Commandant of the School of Fire at Fort Sill. Removal of such undue foreign influence would not be easy. French guns were borrowed for training purposes on condition that French officers and NCOs accompany them. Until their departure in August 1918, French officers continued to interfere with and even defy the instructions of an ever more irate Chief of Artillery.

Pershing and Snow had a similar problem with foreign instructors. Neither could operate an adequate training establishment without outside experts; yet lack of control and the propagation of what were regarded as incorrect notions could not be honestly tolerated by any commander. Solutions to this emasculating dilemma came only with the development of an extensive American school system at home and in France. Just
as Pershing placed immediate stress on building an elaborate instructional organization, Snow moved quickly to centralize and rationalize artillery training in USA. All artillery troops were placed in separate camps, beginning in early May. Officer preparation was centralized at Camp Zachary Taylor, graduates being dispatched to the artillery replacement depots at camps Jackson and Zachary Taylor to instruct recruits until called for by the AEF. The School of Fire at Fort Sill was enlarged. Centers where brigades could fire at will on ample ranges under experienced AEF veterans appeared at Camp Jackson, S.C., Fort Knox, Ky., and Camp McClellan, Ala. All specialist training in such fields as radio or surveying were taught by the artillery school, ending a previous debilitating reliance on rejects from the engineer or signal corps. While America's supply of instructors grew, the ability of the French to spare qualified officers from their own hard-pressed organizations diminished. By August 1918, the return home of French instructors may have been as much relief as rebuff to the exhausted matron of Napoleon, the master-gunner.

Measures began taking effect in the first half of 1918 to coordinate training between the AEF and US camps, as well as to put all home instruction under central control. In December 1917 a Committee on Training had been established under Major General J.F. Morrison. This group never obtained firm power to direct instructional activities throughout the country, but was able to function as a coordinating agency through which to
make arrangements with Allies and Pershing. Morrison's board made no ruling on the controversy of what balance between trench warfare and open fighting was to be set in the training syllabus. Instruction remained essentially unchanged from that of the preceding year. A sample program printed in the *Infantry Journal* in July 1918 provided for an almost even balance between rifle and extended order training, and education in gas warfare, the bayonet, bombing, special weapons and trench construction. Marches were interspersed with realistic recreations of trench warfare much alike those of 1917, but more elaborate due to the greater availability of resources. Many of both AEF and French suggestions were ignored, possibly because the Training Committee could not make up its mind on who to believe and consequently preferred to do nothing.

Moulding a motley group of twenty-five thousand strangers into an integrated, uniformly trained division in the American army was as elementary as trying to hold water in a sieve. Results were not so much disappointing as bewildering. Throughout the war, a constant complaint from British, French and Pershing alike was the unevenness of training possessed by virtually all American divisions. The BEF found itself receiving men with six months' training side by side with raw recruits. Artillery brigades from the same divisions, sent to French camps while the British trained their infantry comrades, were no less diverse in levels of accomplishment. Reports of the French
Mission in Washington described one brigade as having "one regiment in fair shape, the other two not well instructed."

Another brigade had just received forty-one green officers from the Replacement Depot. Almost all brigades were labelled as "not prepared for overseas duty." Discipline and thorough training were often lacking. General Harbord, Chief of Staff of the AEF, wrote laconically in his memoirs that many troops were arriving from America who had never fired a rifle or marched a mile, who knew nothing of gas protection, though fairly well set up, with a working knowledge of customs and courtesies of the service.

Harbord sardonically added that nearly all had drilled and ... sung in mass singing under leadership. With that lack of thoroughness in training, some sang but once more, and that the swan song before the enemy.

If Pershing and the Allies agreed on only one thing, it was that America's system of dispatching troops to Europe, and reinforcing those already there, needed drastic revision.

Famous fighting organizations do not spring into existence simply because several thousand brave, eager young men are brought together in one place and given some sort of training that enables them to function as a team. Divisions must be nurtured. But until the last months of the war, most American units were continually being pruned as soon as they started to blossom into effective combat formations. The first divisions
sent to France lost many of their best men to training camps. Half the so-called regulars who arrived in France in 1917 were raw recruits. The process of transferring men indiscriminately from a division in training in USA to another about to depart for France continued through the first half of 1918.

As soon as sufficient officers and NCOs were accumulated in a division to allow combat effectiveness, many of the most competent persons would be called away to provide instructors for other formations. The 79th Division, for example, was worn down by constant drafts to less than 15,000 men at the end of March. After three months' training, 3,000 newly qualified men from the 82nd Division were called away to special schools. Other men were transferred to divisions higher on the priority list for shipping overseas. Infantry companies in the 78th Division fell from 175 to less than 59 men between November 1917 and January 1918. In the first half of April, the division was still less than half strength. Yet this same organization departed for France at full strength two months later—at the expense of some other divisions even lower on the priority list.

During the rapid buildup of the AEF in the spring of 1918, it became blatantly apparent that the depot brigade located at each cantonment, intended to provide specialists and replacements for the parent division, was unable to perform its function without cannibalizing some other unit. Chief of Staff Peyton
C. March decided to set up separate infantry, artillery and machine gun schools which would send men directly to any needy division after training. The new centralized system of training involved the use of then revolutionary new means of personnel selection. All soldiers began filling out five by eight inch cards describing their civilian qualifications and experience. These cards were to be used when making branch assignments, along with tabulated results from the "alpha and beta" examinations administered by a group of experts under the direction of Dr. Walter D. Scott of the Carnegie Institute of Technology. It was planned to sort men by capability and intelligence, thus streamlining training by fitting recruits to the tasks to which they were suited.

Pershing was unable to benefit much from Peyton C. March's changes in training and reinforcement organization at home. During the Meuse Argonne offensive, entire divisions were disbanded to provide reinforcements for others. No help came from home, perhaps because politicians feared linking training directly to reinforcement. Creation of mammoth training complexes, photographed in newspapers and captioned as reserve depots for the AEF, would have indicated to the public that the government expected massive casualty lists. Scattered cantonments, on the other hand, bore much more remote resemblance to slaughter pens. Most inhabitants came from the same part of the country, and had other things in common than an uncertain future in combat.
But the precedent set by the end of the war would be invaluable in organizing America's future mobilizations. At last the principle of selecting men carefully, making maximum use of talents and education possessed on entering the army, and permitting units to draw qualified reinforcements of known ability from a central depot had been stumbled upon after a year of trial and error. Twelve months' spastic fumbling by the War Department for an efficient means of organizing training at home so as to ensure a reliable, homogeneous flow of properly trained men to France had nevertheless been a costly passage from bewildered confusion to unruffled competence. The gyrations of America's emerging pattern of military instruction proved in fact an unspectacular but extremely sanguinary danse macabre, the cost of which would be borne by Pershing's polyglot legion of innocents.

By means far more deliberate than those of the authorities in USA, Pershing had developed an integrated, sophisticated and productive training organization by July 1918. Army schools were educating staff officers, officer candidates and instructors for the three corps school systems established to supply teachers and specialists to the divisions in the field. Most schools were located near Chaumont, as were the divisional training areas. Close personal supervision by Pershing and G-5 was as simple and convenient as an hour's drive by auto.

Under the deliberate program of education initiated by
Pershing in August 1917, the Army General Staff College at Langres had produced 554 graduates by the end of the war; the School of the Line, 497 tacticians; the Infantry Specialists' Schools, 5,382 experts in musketry, bayonet, light trench mortar, 37-mm cannon, grenades and sniping. The Infantry Candidates School had 1,370 graduates and 5,500 students on hand when the war ended. Three series of corps schools, the last of which began operations on September 2, graduated 12,235 instructors in special weapons, machine guns, field engineering, signals and gas warfare.78

Pershing was more than wearied of being forced to allow his troops to imbibe Allied pessimism while procuring inappropriate education. In June 1918, with a steady flow of American specialists emerging from the Army and Corps schools, the commander of the AEF decided to "insist very strongly" to the Allies on getting his troops "out of leading strings."79 In this resolve Pershing had the full acquiescence of irascible Harold B. Fiske, Chief of Training since February 1918. On July 4, Fiske gave vent to his patriotic faith in the AEF by an acrimonious attack on Allied instruction. The French lacked aggressiveness; the British, initiative, thundered G-5. To allow American troops to associate with demoralized armies was to condone the assimilation of bad attitudes and habits which would be impossible to eradicate. Moreover, the time had come to stand up to the smug Allied belief that the Americans were incapable of training their
own men. Because the British and French fatuously distrusted American methods of fighting, they continually blocked training in open warfare and tore down what shreds of individualism the AEF had attempted to graft onto lopsided training. Allied tutelage hindered the development of responsibility and self-reliance, stunted the growth of an independent army, and provided more and more insult to American prowess with less and less justification to train men rapidly for action. Eloquently and effectively, Fiske begged General Pershing to secure American "emancipation from Allied supervision." Accordingly, Allied instructors started disappearing from the Staff College at Langres and other AEF schools. The process was not complete at war's end, but American dominance of her own institutions was unquestioned.

Throughout June, July and August, American troops flooded into France, only to be replaced in the camps at home by a massive new draft of twenty divisions, twelve regular and eight National Army. America's follow-up punch never reached France before the armistice on November 11. The six divisions that arrived in June (29th, 37th, 83rd, 90th and 92nd) had an organized longevity of approximately eight months, although all included a large percentage of men drafted as recently as four months previously. Men of the 89th Division were given an intensive, exhausting six-week training program on arrival in France. This "crash" course, intended mainly to make raw members
of the division fit for combat as rapidly as possible, comprised extended order drill, compact training for specialists, and a great deal of marching. The division conducted trench exercises in the Washington Center at Gondrecourt and suffered through a ten mile forced march before assignment to a quiet sector. 81

As the crucial events of the summer occurred with ever accelerating momentum, newly arriving units were directed to lose no time in rest areas or awaiting the development of the tactical situation. Lectures, night classes, and short demonstrations filled the day, along with spot tests in first aid, care of the feet, protection against rifle fire or trench routine. 82 The 91st Division, one of the seven July arrivals (along with the 6th, 36th, 79th, 81st and 85th) passed the month before departure for the front on September 7 in long, exhausting marches, incessant drill and frequent extended order exercises. 83 Men of the 79th Division built target ranges for those comrades who, by the vicissitudes of the reinforcement system, had arrived in France without so much as firing a rifle. Each division sent an advance party to the AEF to report on the state of training of arriving units, and coordinate with G-5 an intensive instructional program intended to ensure that no man entered combat totally untrained. 84 Remedial training prescribed for the 79th Division was particularly trying. None failed to realize suddenly "that the lessons of Camp Meade had been little more than the primer of warfare." 85 Entry into combat did not end
training. The 77th Division caught up on open warfare training believed to have been neglected in the confusing months between rushed British instruction and hurried participation in the Vesle operations. Field maneuvers were conducted on August 11, during a lull in combat.  

A man of Pershing's organizational genius could not be expected to remain satisfied with a haphazard policy of ten day refresher courses and "on-the-job" training as his main means of ensuring that all combat units were exposed to the basics of survival and victory. As early as December 1917, the 41st Division had been designated a depot division. Located on the line of communications that fed new arrivals into the American training zone, the 41st gathered together miscellaneous newcomers, discharged hospital patients and stragglers, equipped them, apportioned them to temporary training units and provided as much instruction as possible before individuals were called for by the fighting formations. By the end of the war, five more divisions (33rd, 76th, 85th, 39th and 40th) were performing a similar function. Nevertheless, despite the iron grip of G-5 on all Americans at loose in France, insufficient reinforcements were coming through the pipeline at the end of the war to supply the hard-pressed forces in the Meuse Argonne. By November, at least six divisions had to be skeletonized (31st, 34th, 38th, 84th, 86th, 93rd and 4th) to provide reserves for an increasingly exhausted army.
American artillerymen have always been a complacent crew. Ever since the days of John Knox, the United States government has taken trouble to produce technologically advanced gunners, though the rest of the army might languish in incompetence, obsolescence, or even apathy. Good luck, as usual, accompanied the field artillery in the AEF. Their training camps were pleasant and habitable, whereas the infantry passed its rodent existence in filthy hovels and rat infested holes. The French had a good reputation in field artillery, and opened their schools to the Americans without hesitations. Pershing seemed to trust the artillery to manage its own training. By the end of hostilities, American light artillery was training at Le Valdahon, Coëtquidan, Meucon, Souge, La Courtine, Ornans, Rédou, Bordeaux, Rennes and Poitiers. Heavy artillery methodically operated its guns at Libourne, Limoges, Clermont and Angers. The most discomforting experience was wearing gas masks on surprise drill. Intellectual challenge was readily available, with 800 officers a month attending the Saumur and Fontainebleau artillery schools, and other learning specialties such as tractor operation and maintenance, aerial observation and railroad or motorized artillery. American regiments, when returned to their divisions, proved competent and provoked few complaints when the AEF finally threw its ponderous weight into the delicate strategic situation of a twilight war.

World War One was for America a dream-like experience. Serious
combat opened for the AEF in a frantic series of desperate, last-minute reinforcing actions as the Germans staged their last drive between Soissons and Rheims. It is likely that the sudden influx of eager, ardent Americans, anomalously avid for the fray, was instrumental in stopping the German drive toward Paris, during the first six weeks of the summer. Determined American assaults on Belleau Wood, Vaux and Cantigny demonstrated the sort of ardour and blind offensive fury unseen for years on the Western Front. On June 20, Foch opened his grand offensive that crumbled the German army, resulting in the peace of exhaustion of November 11. Nine American divisions took part in a drive across the top of the Soissons salient, which forced the Germans to retreat to their starting point of the previous March. The AEF had made the transition from a sprawling military school to a potent fighting force.

On August 10, the First American Army came into existence, and commenced planning for the first large AEF operation of the war—the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient which had so long threatened communications between Paris and beleaguered Verdun. The assault of September 12 has a euphoric quality very rare for World War I. Seven American divisions (assisted by French infantry, artillery and tanks) advanced against minor resistance to clear the entire objective in four days. Boasting 14,500 prisoners and 443 captured guns, Pershing's army shifted west, through the pastoral countryside of Verdun, toward the convoluted, contorted, treacherous tongue of land between the river Meuse and the forests of the Argonne.
Nightmare descended on the Americans on September 26. Tightly packed divisions were to smash through the German outer defenses in one day, leading to a triumphant march into the enemy's vitals such as had been intended at St. Mihiel. But the German "outer defense" was cleverly sited and carefully prepared with interlocking lanes of machine gun fire. It was to take not days, but long, dreary, discouraging weeks of continual frontal attack, not to mention hours of personal desperation, before the five layers of wily human and malevolent natural obstacles would be pierced. Divisions, whether veteran or novice, aggressive or indolent, were decimated. When armistice mercifully ended the struggle, Pershing had been forced to use eight of the thirteen divisions that had arrived since the end of July as reserves for fueling the hellish baptism of the AEF.  

How well did the AEF perform in combat? The Germans did not regard the Americans as serious tacticians. One report attributed to the German General Staff the remark that the AEF supplied comic relief in the deadly drama of 1918. The enemy seemed to have been impressed with the efficiency of US artillery, and amazed the intrepidy of American troops. But leadership that allowed infantry to attack in dense masses, despite the lessons of 1914 to 1917, came under acid criticism from both Ludendorff and Hindenburg, who believed that a heavy price had been paid in learning the lesson that "the business of war cannot be learned in a few months."
American training was too disorganized and diffuse throughout most of the war to allow accurate analysis of its role in the successes and shortcomings of the AEF. It is apparent that as late as September 15 inadequate men were being sent to Pershing, who was forced to send some into combat with only five or six days' instruction. But the necessary schools had been established, and an efficient organization moulded, by the end of 1918. Had the war continued into the next year as originally anticipated, a dramatic improvement in training would have occurred. Tactics, less than perfect during the Meuse Argonne campaign, would also have been likely to change. On September 6, Pershing directed that instructors be completely rotated between combat and depot divisions every five months. Experienced men would have brought battle field tested techniques into the classrooms within months.

Poring over movements reports in an effort to ascertain how long a division was in training is useless. In World War One, men flowed so rapidly in and out of different military organizations that the only means to obtain an accurate picture of the AEF's training record would be to study each individual who served. This the General Staff did after the war, discovering that the average man obtained six months of instruction; four in USA and two in France. The average division had been organized in USA for eight months before departure for Europe, where it trained for two additional months before entering the line.
Despite erraticisms, foibles, blunders and mishaps, the guns fell silent on a massive, and dynamic, American achievement.

Forty-two divisions, each twice the size of its British and French namesakes, were in France. By July 1919, thirty-eight more, all much better trained, could have arrived. But strategic statistics meant little to the homesick soldier. Insomnia once again replaced nightmare. A few days' extra sleep, a move to more comfortable quarters in the Rhineland, and Pershing's crusaders found themselves crawling once again through turnip patches, marching to rifle ranges, sweeping the parade square. But this time there was no villain to promote ardour, no cause to sanctify suffering. As fast as it had sprung into existence, the AEF disintegrated into a surly mob of individualists, each charting his own course and setting his sights on a bright future in elysian America.

Besides, the surly soldier of 1919 was a veteran. He knew the realities of combat, and had legitimate questions to ask about the same old drills that filled the dismal days before embarking for home.
NOTES

1 Historical Section, Army War College, The Genesis of the American First Army (Washington, 1938), 9.

2 Memorandum on the American Army, General Staff, 3ème Bureau, GQG, December 8, 1917, Vincennes, Fonds Clemenceau 61, no. 8420; Spiers to Fagalde, February 27, 1918, PRO, WO 106/474/ELS 2826 11.

3 Quoted in Pitt, 1918, 65.

4 Historical Section, Genesis, 9ff.


6 See Tardieu to Clemenceau, New York, January 8, 1918, Quai d'Orsay, Opérations Stratègiques, Dossier Général VIII, 29-31, no. 4543.

7 Lloyd George to Reading, December 5, 1917, PRO, WO 106/313/0.1/135/388 41.

8 Extract from Minutes of War Cabinet, December 5, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/478/ war cab 292. Also General Tasker H. Bliss' agreement to open suggestion to Pershing--DCGS to C.M. Wagstaff, December 13, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/466 1; Pershing's initial refusal, although Harbord sympathetic, Wagstaff to DCGS, December 18, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/484/BL 451 3; Pershing's final decision to consider the plan, Wagstaff to DCGS, December 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/466/36/ 410 2.

9 See Versailles agreement, January 30, 1918, PRO, AEF, WO 106/466. Also Notes on Discussion with the Americans, February 4, 1918, PRO, WO 106/466/14A/08/2141.

10 OH, III, 1-2.

11 Ibid., 3.

12 Pitt, 1918, 62.

13 See Coffman, The War, 152; OH, III, 491.


17 Sibley, *With the Yankee Division*, 63.


19 See Pitt for full accounts.

20 Vandiver, *John J. Pershing*.

21 OH, III, 542; Wagstaff to DCGS, April 1, 1918, PRO, AEF, WO 106/466/EM 17/58. Destined to form III Corps with 5th, 35th, 4th, 33rd divisions--had the decision to train with the British not changed original plans.


23 Pitt, *1918*, 141.

24 *Ibid.*.


29 Broun, *At the Front*, 92-94.


31 British training in "Open warfare and the spirit of the offensive" was being ordered by December 1917. See Haig "Memorandum on Defensive Measures" of December 14, 1917, which expressly ordered defence in depth and frequent rifle and field firing practice, "so that infantry may develop confidence in their power to stop the enemy by rifle," Haig Papers, OAD, 291/29 "SECRET."
32 Oh, III, 61.
33 Haig, Diary, May 3, 1918.
34 Ibid., May 31, 1918.
35 Ibid., April 19, 1918.
36 Oh, III, 36—training agreement with British, Versailles, January 30, 1918, AG, GHQ, AEF 14903-2. Also R. Butler to AEF HQ, February 9, 1918, PRO WO 106/466/OB 2141 9; British orders of March 12, 1918, Oh, III, 63ff; DuCane to Weygand, May 29, 1918, PRO, WO 158/72/—.
37 Pershing to Haig, May 7, 1918, Haig Papers.
38 War Office to Bridges, May 3, 1918, PRO, WO 106/500/59284 cipher; Stallings, The Doughboys, 80.
39 Oh, III, 191.
40 Ibid., 3.
41 Extract from British report on morale in France, May 3, 1918, Imperial War Museum, Thompson Papers.
42 Miles, History of the 308th Infantry, 34.
43 See Back, The Fourth Division (Garden City, 1920), 48.
44 "American Troops with the BEF," June 1-July 13, 1918, Imperial War Museum, Thompson Papers.
45 Stallings, The Doughboys, 238.
48 Jacobsen, History of the 107th Infantry, 42; Leland, From Shell Hole to Chateau, 57.
50 Letter of British soldier, July 3, 1918, in Imperial War Museum, Thompson Papers.
51 Major General Harold B. Fiske, new G-5, directed all American officers to inspect and tactfully correct British instruction, plus solve map problems each week to the satisfaction of
the British headquarters to which they were attached. II Corps held weekly tactical walks for all higher commanders in open warfare, OH, III, 142.

52 Sanborn, The 131st Infantry, 37; C. Bonham Carter for CGS to DuCane, July 11, 1918, PRO, WO 106/500/T/1/K.

53 Knowlsby Derby Diary, June 12, 1918.

54 Ibid.

55 See Bridges to DMO, May 17, 1918, PRO, WO 106/499B/1 (Report of GHQ, BEF, June 12, 1918).

56 OH, III, 151.

57 Stallings, The Doughboys, 159.

58 Coffman, The War, 20-21; Churchill, Over Here!, 46; OB, 320: 9-30 for direct reprint.


60 Order of Battle, III, 201.


62 Snow, Signposts, 24-25.

63 Order of Battle, III, 202.

64 Snow, Signposts, 41-46.

65 Ibid., 52-57, 70-87; Order of Battle, III, 199-204; OB, 338: 8.

66 See Spiers to Fagalde, May 4, 1918, PRO, WO 106/474/ELS 3951-23; Tardieu to Clemenceau, May 9, 1918, Vincennes, Fonds Clemenceau 61, no. 9693 MO.

67 Pershing, My Experiences, I, 266; OH, III, 256.


Extract from Minutes of War Cabinet meeting, April 24, 1918, PRO Cab 23/6, para. 2; Reading to Lloyd George, May 24, 1918, PRO, WO 106/496/2356. Also OH, III, 149, Memorandum to G-5, GHQ, AEF, June 12, 1918 on polyglot rifle training of US units arriving for training with BEF.

Snow, Signposts, 64.


History of the 79th Division, 31.

Coffman, The War, 76; Pershing, My Experiences, I, 379; Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 364; Order of Battle, III, 63. Infantry Replacement Centers were at Camps Lee, Gordon, Pike and Mac Arthur; Engineers at Camp Humphries; Field Artillery at Camps Jackson, Zachary Taylor and Machine Guns at Camp Hancock.

Coffman, The War, 59-61; 66, 68; OB, 214: 15; Batchelder, Camp Dix, Camp Lee, Camp Upton (Boston, 1918).


Ibid., 487. For infantry training areas, AEF, see appended map. Corps schools were located at Gondrecourt, Chattillon-sur-Seine and Clamency.


79 Pershing, My Experiences, II, 189-190.

80 See memorandum from G-5 to Chief of Staff, July 11, 1918, in Pershing Papers, National Archives, Record Group 120; also "General Pershing and his Headquarters in France," Military Review, vol. XX, no. 78 (September 1940), 5-9; Colonel Grant, Notes of conversation with General Weygand, June 24, 1918, PRO, WO 106/1456; "United States Army: Notes on Present Situation," by S02b, July 9, 1918, PRO, WO 106/516--.

81 See Dienst, History of the 353rd Infantry, 33-43.

82 Ibid., 34. See also Emmett, Give 'Way, 98-110 for similar experiences of the 90th Division.

83 Story of the 91st Division, 1-7.

84 De Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 58.

85 Story of the 79th Division, 46-47.

86 Miles, History of the 308th Infantry, 57-75.


88 Ibid. Also J.P. DuCane to CIGS, October 19, 1918, PRO WO 106/513/-225/.


91 De Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 69-70; Rhodes, 1918 is a very good account of training in France in the summer of 1918 for artillery units.

92 The period from May 31 to July 15 comprises the battles at Château-Thierry on June 1 and July 5 (2nd and 3rd Divisions), and the defence of Rheims (42nd Division). See Stallings, The Doughboys, 78-89; Coffman, The War, 214-227; Vandiver, John J. Pershing, 81-82 and especially Pitt, 1918, 142-183.


97 Information from the entourage of the King of Greece after a visit to the front, furnished by General Hutchinson, ADC to King George V, Lausanne, April 18, 1918, Quai d'Orsay, *Opérations Stratégiqques, Front de l'Ouest, VI*, 278-281.

98 Intelligence Officer of High Military Command of German Army, reporting on battle of St. Mihiel, September 25, 1918, quoted in Page, *The Truth, II* 84.


100 Cable of September 15, 1918, Pershing, *My Experiences*, II, 278. Some men of the 89th Division got one week of training in the USA and two weeks in France, then were thrown into combat without having fired a rifle, thrown a grenade or handled automatic rifles. Some had to be shown how to load rifles at the last minute--personal note by Captain Francis Leigh, OC B Coy, attached to Dienst, *History of the 353rd Infantry*.


102 Ayres, *The War with Germany*, 25-34.
At five o'clock on the morning of June 6, 1918 men of the 4th Marine Brigade sprang to their feet, took positions yard abreast, and began advancing across the softly undulating fields toward a blot on the horizon known as Belleau Wood. No bitter memories of waste or muddle stunted the faith of those troops in their leaders and training. None straggled, no sergeants with drawn revolvers enforced the mordant rhythm of assault. Fifteen yards behind the first wave, another line of soldiers started moving toward the woodline, followed in succession by yet two more waves. Confidence was high. Had not the artillery pounded and thundered for thirty minutes? Would not this assault, practiced for months, make possible the break in the enemy line that would bring about open warfare at which Americans naturally excelled?

Suddenly, a flat, syncopated slapping sound started chopping overhead. Then the ground was swarming with bullets. As the German machine gunners adjusted their aim, .30 caliber slugs started thudding into stomachs, shattering bone and shredding flesh. Like corn stooks sheared off by a mechanical reaper, Americans lay evenly spaced, in neat regular lines. The survivors looked up from pockets of sheltering earth, some tried to crawl forward or rush to likely fire positions. Again the
slapping sound. Again the cries of the wounded. Most of the brigade never got across the field, let alone entered the woods to clean them out with bayonet. Ambitious lines on a chart at 2nd Division Headquarters looked no less silly at nightfall than those on Haig's maps in the sullen, sorrowful summer of the Somme. The Americans had done no better. Now, as had their enthusiastic British counterparts of two years past, the Marines huddled in shell holes, squirmed for cover from the machine gun fire, and awaited nightfall. Eventually, three weeks later, Belleau Wood did fall, after repeated assault and massive artillery preparation. Courage never accomplishes absolutely nothing. Often in World War One, it missed that nadir by a mere hair breadth. Persistence did gain ground, but at such fearful cost that it became dangerous to count losses. Calm assessment of progress and casualties would have drawn the Allies out of the war years ago.

In later years of less apologetic mediocrity, World War One generalship provided a great deal of comfort to those intellectual narcissists who felt the need to carp at the indemnic idiocy of the military. But if any truly useful lessons are to be drawn from the tactical cant of the Western Front, an honest effort must be made to understand the logic in the minds of the authors of the drill regulations then in use. The same generation that vowed never to fight for "king and country" in the 'thirties did not suffer the consequences of bad tactics
in World War Two, largely because military thinkers learned the lessons of 1914 to 1918 and translated them into appropriate training. Although most of Pershing's close associates insisted that "the Field Service Regulations of 1911 ... stood the test of the war better than those of any other army," a statement more modest than intended, the United States Army was rewriting its manuals of instruction by 1920, incorporating major changes in concepts of land warfare.

American open warfare tactics in World War One followed the Infantry Drill Regulations composed in 1911. Published in a small, blue book, with very close type and numbered paragraphs, the drill regulations bore a scriptural quality that was not mitigated by the tone of prose contained within. The intention behind all the very detailed instructions crammed into the manual was to fit troops for offensive campaigning in open country. Marching, castramentation, close and extended order drill, target training, fire control and the bayonet received painstaking attention.

Basic principles of combat were implicit, when not explicit, in the course matter of cadets in World War One. Verbatim memorization of passages from the drill regulations inculcated a prescribed habit of thought. Inaction is of advantage to the enemy, offense alone delivers decisive results, quick, energetic advance minimizes casualties. An enemy position could be neutralized by accurate, well-controlled rifle fire, without necessarily resorting to artillery support. Constant movement
toward the enemy, whether by rushes, crawling or skirmishing lines, minimized the effect of his fire. The closer one was to the foe, the less likely his chance to inflict casualties. 
Positions once taken were to be held, for it was regarded as death to withdraw in the face of enemy fire made more sure by the confidence of successful defence. Attack by rifle and bayonet, with artillery and other weapons playing a secondary role, was insisted upon as an inviolate, changeless recipe for victory, regardless of recent developments in machine guns, light cannon, trenches, grenades or wire.

Harold Fiske, in a lecture on January 29, 1917 to graduates at Fort Leavenworth, dealt with the question of altering drill regulations in the light of events in the European war. He saw no need to change tactics. Offense remained basic. To conduct only a spectacular defence in the trenches was to be like a boxer who can parry and block, but never drives home the knock-out punch. An enemy could not be shot out of position by gunfire. It was necessary to frighten and pry him out with the bayonet. Advance against modern firepower was still possible in narrow columns, which made of the assaulting team poor artillery targets. Gunners could not react quickly enough to rapid, irregular rushes at constantly changing ranges. Heavy casualties were unlikely before the scattered groups of infantry had advanced and taken cover. The closer one approached the enemy's position, the more rattled he became. The victim's
increasingly shaky aim could be countered once within rifle range by a sudden stream of well-directed steel from 250 weapons. While the enemy was taking cover, an assaulting force could approach safely and assault with the bayonet. 

In order to assure success in the type of war going on in Europe, Fiske suggested not changes in tactics, but a reorganization of the infantry regiment so as to enable it to more easily sustain the existing pattern of frontal advance and bayonet assault. American regulations recommended that regiments deploy for the attack in four groups: one to form a firing line, followed by another to reinforce those marksmen lost to enemy fire, a third group to conduct the final assault, and a final group to reinforce the captured position against counter-attack. As established prior to Pershing's adoption of Fiske's suggestions, the company was not believed to be large enough to successfully carry out any one of those functions without mixing in men from the remainder of the regiment. Fiske recommended a company of 250 men so each quarter of the regiment could play its part in the standard attack tactics without breaking up companies and confusing leadership. The AEF doubled the size of its divisions in the process of expanding infantry companies from approximately 120 to over 250 men, mute but overwhelming testimony to Pershing's faith in the drill regulations of 1911.

Fiske did not wish more machine guns to be added to the
regiment, as they were heavy, consumed awkward amounts of ammunition, and thus hampered offensive mobility. Gas and grenade training was suggested, only as an ancillary aid to assault and defence. Artillery was regarded as limited in value because it could not move forward fast enough to aid advancing troops. All the more reason, then, to insist on a very high standard of marksmanship, for infantry ought to be able to depend on rifle fire alone to cover its aggressive movements.  

Tactical decisions according to American open warfare doctrine rested with the company commander. It was he who decided what formations to adopt for safe and rapid advance; and it was he who selected targets and controlled rifle fire prior to ordering the assault. Lieutenants, or platoon commanders, served merely to train their men, and pass instructions from the captain to their segment of the company. Infantry operated in teams of 250 men, all of whom performed essentially the same function with the same weapons. With enough training, 250 riflemen could maneuver well and produce devastating fire. But they provided a big target. And in World War One, there was not enough time for exhaustive training. Most important, the rifle faced newer weapons of immense firepower and range.

Draftees enthusiastic enough to read the course presented in the Official Bulletin in the summer of 1917 were told that machine guns had little effect against men lying on the ground
or crawling. By using the standard procedures taught in extended order drill, troops could advance as well against machine guns as rifles. Belleau Wood, not to mention the cauldron of the Meuse Argonne, demonstrated that the rifle was not the master of the battlefield, especially when set against machine guns. The inability of American tacticians to understand the nature of the machine gun goes far in explaining why they clung stubbornly to outmoded drill regulations, as well as why the best trained troops often gained no more ground than the worst.

Americans regarded the machine gun as a rapid fire, but cumbersome, rifle. Rapid fire guns were sited alongside riflemen in trenches as a source of additional firepower. Because one bullet kills as effectively as twenty, it was thought that a man could rush as many yards when surprising a machine gunner as he could "steal" against a sniper. Once safely esconced in some shell hole, a man was as safe against machine gun as against rifle bullets. But the Germans did not oblige the Allies by using machine guns in such a simplistic, wasteful manner.

Any projectile follows a trajectory, which near the point of origin is almost flat. Some distance from the weapon, the trajectory attains such height as to no longer pose a threat to a standing man. That portion of space covered by a bullet capable of hitting a man directly from the front is termed the zone of grazing fire. At a range of approximately 1,000 yards, the bullet
attains its maximum height, and begins to fall toward earth. Bullets dropping vertically at the end of their trajectory are termed plunging fire, and the ground beneath comprises the beaten zone. Much like water being sprayed from a hose, the size and shape of a beaten zone can be predicted and controlled according to the angle of the gun and the contours of the ground.

Obviously, hillocks, rocks, trees or gullies do not provide any protection against plunging fire. The Germans, taking advantage of the stability and accuracy of fixed machine guns, sited their weapons to cover with plunging fire every inch of ground before their defensive lines. Extremely accurate surveys of the terrain which would have to be crossed by an attacking enemy were possible over the long years of stalemate on the Western Front.

Any low areas or reverse slopes which were immune to grazing fire were covered by absolutely reliable plunging fire from machine guns sited in front of and beside the main trench complex. Outer systems of machine gun pill boxes, immune to all but a direct hit by artillery, dotted the approaches to the German defenses. Each gun had data with which to set trajectories that would lace every inch of vital ground with death. Come fog or darkness, the machine gunner had only to pull the trigger, and a hail of plunging fire pulverized a substantial piece of ground eight hundred to one thousand yards away.
Snipers make rough allowances for the rise and drop of a bullet's trajectory when shooting at extended ranges. But two hundred and fifty hurriedly trained men, frightened in the heat of battle, cannot hold their rifles steadily enough to play the machine gun's game. Using direct grazing fire, the maximum effective range at which a rifleman can engage an enemy with firm hope of hitting him is six hundred yards. When riflemen, whatever their formation, began to advance on the Germans during World War One, they came under sudden machine gun fire from the flank. Shooting at the side of an advancing line of skirmishers at sufficient range for plunging fire, a veteran machine gunner could place a long net of fire over the helpless infantry. The attackers, when armed only with rifles, could not retaliate as machine guns were beyond effective range. It was impossible to maneuver 250 men under fire to face an entirely different direction, as the punishing fire came not from the main enemy position in front but from a hidden source off to a flank. Unable to risk moving, subjected to constant loss while trapped in the machine gunner's zone of fire, Americans found that attacking was not a matter of invincible onslaught, but of impotent misery until night and the enemy's fatigue or mercy allowed stealthy, painful progress back to friendly lines.

American experience against machine guns was not new. Throughout the futile offensives of 1915 and 1916, the French
and British had endured similar ordeal and greater loss. The instinct for survival eventually wore down the hidebound tradition and pedanticism of even the British army. As the crux of restoring mobility to the battlefield was elimination of machine guns, some means of increasing the range and firepower of an infantry team had to be devised. By the end of 1917, the British and French had perfected a simple, reliable and powerful series of weapons light enough to be carried in an assault. The Lewis, a light automatic rifle, could spit 47 bullets toward an enemy machine gun or trench in seconds. Easily changed magazines were carried by the gunner's assistant. A French invention, the 37-mm cannon, was a miniature artillery piece capable of smashing a one-pound shell into a pillbox. Rifle grenades acted as miniature mortars, dropping explosives on a tormenting machine gunner's head. In the ooze and gore of the Ypres salient, young officers and grizzled NCOs perfected means of using the new weapons in concert to immobilize, dominate and defeat the enemy.

In 1916 British manuals were little different from the American drill regulations. A year later, a revolutionary new system of assaulting pill boxes and entrenchments without undue casualties had developed from the roots of the BEF. Platoons were no longer mere rosters of riflemen trained only to shoot and move on command. Each platoon now comprised four teams of about eight men: a Lewis gun section, a section of bombers, a
squad of riflemen, and a group of rifle grenadiers. These four
elements of the platoon combat team practiced assaulting pill
boxes and trenches until action was taken without hesitation
to dominate and close with the enemy. On coming under fire,
Lewis gunners and grenadiers pinned down the enemy marksmen.
Meanwhile, riflemen and bombers worked their way forward by
clever use of covered approaches. Once the mobile half of the
platoon reached their objectives, Lewis gunners and grenadiers
shifted their fire to cut off any enemy retreat. Germans
cowering to evade bullets and shrapnel were stabbed with the
bayonet, shot, or blown to bits by grenades.\textsuperscript{11}

Division of the platoon into four teams, each with its
own weapons and mission, transferred tactical decision from
company commander to lieutenant. Captains decided only whether
to reinforce hard-pressed platoons, or by-pass time consuming
opposition in an effort to drive as far as possible into the
enemy's rear. Soldiers could no longer passively obey fire
orders. Lewis gunners had to switch their fire late enough
to prevent the enemy from manning his weapons, yet not so late
that friendly riflemen and bombers were endangered as they
approached the objective. Rifle grenadiers had to develop
unerring aim with an awkward weapon. Close cooperation between
riflemen and bombers was necessary to ensure mutual protection
and expedite destroying the enemy before he recovered from the
shock of sudden assault.
American observers charged the British instructors with attaching excess importance to each particular weapon. Such criticism reveals more than a natural desire to find fault with those on whom one is unwillingly dependent. British training was generally acceptable to American authorities, largely because much stress was still laid on rifle and bayonet as the climax of assault. But neither Pershing nor his colleagues understood the nature of trench assault, or the technicalities of the duel between machine gun and rifle. General Alexander asserted after the war that the rifle was the prime weapon of infantry. Pershing supported him in that conceit. The AEF's leadership had not learned new tactics before the war ended. It was probably a mercy that British and French instruction was prevalent in the AEF. When hardened troops in the final battles turned to new weapons when the rifle failed, some knew how to operate the life saving tools.

Pershing underestimated the prowess of his Allies as much as of his enemy. In his memoirs he wrote that

It was logical to expect that the French should take [the view that trench warfare training held first priority] ... as they had been on the defensive, at least in thought, during the previous half century. It is difficult to believe that Pershing knew nothing of the French theorists of the du Picq and Grandmaison schools, who blithely despatched entire armies, clad in horse plumes, red trousers and white gloves, to their death. The French developed a
swollen reliance on massive artillery preparation after the slaughter of 1915, as the only available means by which to save precious lives. French artillery training, reflected in the performance of the AEF, was excellent. French infantry had been developing a system of attack much like that of the British since 1916. But Gallic troops made a poor impression on Pershing. The Americans had not been in the war long enough to appreciate the desperation with which exhausted armiesgrope for cheap means of survival, if not final victory. Pershing never empathized with the French dislike for casualties, and supplemented the training of American troops with the same infantry drill regulations that had served him so well from the plains of Kansas to the howling wilderness of Mindanao. Whether open warfare training would have made the battered French soldier of 1918 more aggressive is doubtful. The poilu did not seek more laurels. That he had survived was glory enough. The breakthrough Pershing trained for never occurred; the grandiose expectations of open warfare tactics were never tested. But the Germans in the Meuse Argonne proved that machine guns were as mobile as an attacking force tangled up in supply problems growing more severe with every yard of newly won ground. There is no reason to expect that the unequal contest between machine gun and rifle would have been any different in open ground than it was between the trenches.

Pershing had an acute awareness of the vital role of morale in successful combat. His belief that open warfare training
developed initiative, aggressiveness and resourcefulness held much truth, at least for fresh troops. Were morale not high in the AEF, it is unlikely that as much would have been accomplished by improperly trained troops as was apparent by the end of the war. How much Pershing would have condoned the sort of grass-roots resourcefulness that gave birth to the British team tactics must remain one of the most intriguing speculative questions of the war. By November 1918, officers returning to training camps from combat units were injecting new tactical concepts into the American army. Men were no longer to be encouraged to deploy in skirmish lines at half-pace intervals. Spacing expanded to fifteen feet at least between men in extended order. Platoons were divided into two groups, each one covering the advance of the other with the assistance of a Lewis gun. A vital step had been taken in the evolution of the tactics that were to prove successful in America's next world war.

Throughout almost the entirety of its existence, the AEF was confronted with a very unusual problem in American history. Neither before nor after World War One has America been a junior partner, forced to scrap for every shred of sovereignty. It would be facile to criticize Pershing for failing to acquiesce to Allied training and command. Reliance on another's ideas was especially repugnant to the American of 1917. The only coherent body of American tactical doctrine had been written by the same group of men who dominated wartime training. It could
not be expected of them to foresake their own concepts of warfare for the diffuse stream of tattered after-action reports and training directives that set Allied instruction after the lessons of three years.

War expresses more eloquently and profoundly the character of a people than literature, music, dress or diversions. America was an optimistic country. Her troops, despite tedium and frequent poor leadership, displayed no serious lapse of enthusiasm until well into the final battle. Civilians exerted themselves to the utmost to master the skills of military life, and rapidly began evolving new ideas to replace those that proved inappropriate in action. Great organizational talent manifest itself in the development over one year of an intricate, dynamic and efficient training system. And perhaps most important, the ability of talented men to rise to positions of great responsibility with relatively minor interference from privileged classes resulted in a concentration of very able leaders at the head of the training establishment in a very short period of time.

Troops returned home to prohibition, xenophobia, crazed greed, cloying self-righteousness. America turned her back on the world, partly out of moral outrage at Allied cynicism, partly out of a disconcerting, although unspoken, realization that her own people bore the same evils of mass paranoia and militarism as the enemy. But frustration is not the most important legacy of America's first crusade. The nation's record was successful and gave her no cause to doubt her ability to make
decisive intervention in the affairs of the world. Americans were also once again wakened to the cataclysmic proportions of total war. Although not herself exhausted by 1918, it was noticeable to America that modern war had no victors. In 1941, there was no outburst of religious zeal such as that which sent a million boys to camp in September 1917. Pearl Harbor Day struck as much tragedy as enthusiasm into the hearts of a new generation of citizen soldiers. Yet these youth could return home four years later chastened but not embittered largely because of very practical, mundane lessons learned by America's military leaders in World War One. For a system of fitting training and tactics to the changing realities of modern weaponry and strategy had been evolved by 1918, and was copied closely in a successful effort to save lives twenty years later. Training in the world's most futile war presents the paradox of mankind learning from history, and the promise of past suffering attaining a small pittance of redemption in the cultivation of human wisdom.
NOTES

1 Pittsburgh, 1918, 64, 152-159, 192; Stallings, The Doughboys, 91-109; The Plattsburger, 1917, 14; Coffman, The War, 215-320; Johnston, First Reflections, 6.

2 Ibid.

3 See Captain J.J. Christian, What Every Soldier Ought to Know (Kansas City, 1917), 38.


5 Fiske, Notes on Infantry (Fort Leavenworth, 1917), 3.

6 Ibid., 17-21.

7 Ibid., 28. On reorganization of the American army see Coffman, The War, 47-48.

8 OB, 94: 7; Infantry Drill Regulations, para. 542, 545-546; Field Service Regulations, art. IX, 157-176.


11 On British tactics, see Major Donald McRae, Offensive Fighting (Philadelphia, 1918), recommended by Secretary of War; McKellar, Machine Gun Practice and Tactics (New York, 1917); Gillman, The New Platoon Commander: Complete in Tactics and Drill as Required in France (Cleveland, 1918); Dion, Tanks, Gas, Bombing and Liquid Fire (New York, 1917); Dyson, Grenade Fighting: The Training and Tactics of Grenadiers (New York, 1917).


APPENDIX A:
Composition of United States Army, 1916 & 1918.
Sources of Commissioned Personnel, 1917-1918.
Location of National Army Cantonments and
National Guard Special Camps in
continental United States, 1917.

### NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL CAMPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Charlotte, N.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Wadsworth</td>
<td>Spartansburg, S.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Hancock</td>
<td>Augusta, Ga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>McClellan</td>
<td>Anniston, Ala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Sevier</td>
<td>Greenville, S.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Wheeler</td>
<td>Macon, Ga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>McArthur</td>
<td>Waco, Tex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Logan</td>
<td>Houston, Tex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Cody</td>
<td>Deming, N. Mex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Doniphan</td>
<td>Fort Sill, Okla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Bowle</td>
<td>Fort Worth, Tex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Sheridan</td>
<td>Montgomery, Ala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Shelby</td>
<td>Hattiesburg, Miss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Beauregard</td>
<td>Alexandria, La.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Kearney</td>
<td>Linda Vista, Calif.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Fremont</td>
<td>Palo Alto, Calif.</td>
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</table>
NATIONAL ARMY CANTONMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Devens</td>
<td>Ayer, Mass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Upton</td>
<td>Yaphank, L.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Dix</td>
<td>Wrightstown, N.J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Meade</td>
<td>Annapolis Junction, Md.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>Petersburg, Va.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>Columbia, S.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>Atlanta, Ga.</td>
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<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>Chillicothe, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Taylor</td>
<td>Louisville, Ky.</td>
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<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Custer</td>
<td>Battle Creek, Mich.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Rockford, Ill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Pike</td>
<td>Little Rock, Ark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Dodge</td>
<td>Des Moines, Iowa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Funston</td>
<td>Fort Riley, Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Travis</td>
<td>Fort Sam Houston, Tex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>American Lake, Wash.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICERS' TRAINING CAMPS.

First Series, 15 May to 11 August, 1917
16 camps at 13 posts

- Plattsburg Barracks, N.Y.
- Madison Barracks, N.Y.
- Fort Niagara, N.Y.
- Fort Myer, Va.
- Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
- Fort McPherson, Ga.
- Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.
- Fort Sheridan, Ill.

Second Series, 27 August to 27 November, 1917
16 camps at 9 posts

- Plattsburg Barracks, N.Y.
- Fort Niagara, N.Y.
- Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
- Fort Sheridan, Ill.
- Fort Myer, Va.
- Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.
- Fort Presidio, San Francisco
- Fort Snelling, Minn.

Third Series, 5 January to 19 April, 1918
27 camps located under divisional control in the National Guard
Special Camps and National Army Cantonments.
APPENDIX B: British Training Areas Used by the AEF, April-July 1918
APPENDIX B: Billeting and Training Areas, AEF, 1917-1918
DIVISIONAL AREAS:

1. Gondrecourt
2. Neufchateau
3. Bourmont
4. Rimaucourt
5. Vaucouleurs
6. Colombey-les-Belles
7. Rolampont
8. Nogent-en-Bassigny
9. Chateauvillain
10. Prauthoy
11. Bourbonne-les-Bains
12. Mussy-sur-Seine
13. Bar-sur-Aube
14. Aignay-le-Duc
15. Angy-le-Franc
16. Tonnerre
17. Fays-Billot
18. Donjeux
19. Seinelay
20. CHAUMONT
21. Semur
22. Norcy-le-Bourg (not used)
23. Tronville-en-Barrois
24. Wassy
50. Le Valdahon
51. Joinville
52. Chalindrey
53. Langres
54. Vitrey

General Headquarters, AEF

Services of Supply (SOS)

CHAUMONT
TOURS

(Map based on Statistics Branch, General Staff,
Headquarters, Services of Supply, American Expeditionary Forces)
Personal notes in the possession of Dr. Frank E. Vandiver, Rice University, compiled by Linda J. Lasswell from original sources. All translations are hers.

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Acknowledgement is hereby made of the kind assistance of Dr. Vandiver, and the excellent standard of research conducted by Miss Linda Lasswell.
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