WHEN John Milton wrote the "Areopagitica" and predicted the future greatness of the English people, that people had staked its life upon its liberty, and was in danger of losing it. It was in the midst of the unspeakable disasters of civil war. During the centuries which have succeeded Milton's day the English nation has never ceased to struggle against obstructions without and obstacles within. It is a nation tried to its uttermost. But, on the whole, and to an extent which is rare in human affairs, its history has verified the vision of the poet. Its prosperity in all matters of lasting worth has been very great. It has borne well the weight of its responsibilities, and, in spite of imperfections, it has so fulfilled its mission to mankind that though England, like Israel, Greece, and Rome, were now to perish, it would, like them, remain for the human race a precious possession forever.

It may be profitable for you, whose nationality has also "been welded not in peace but in the storm of battle," to inquire what was the ground of the poet's assured confidence in his country. What evidence lay there and then before him which would justify his trust in the destiny of his people? In its circumstances there was none, for these were

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1 Three lectures presented at the inauguration of the Rice Institute, by Sir Henry Jones, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, and Hibbert Lecturer on Metaphysics at Manchester College, Oxford.
untoward to the last degree. It had neither wealth of ma-
terial resources, nor greatness of population, nor weight of
armaments, nor vast extent of territory. It was a small and
a poor people, without great traditions or high rank among
the nations, and inhabiting a portion of a little island.
Yet, with rarely paralleled political pride, Milton called
upon "the Lords and Commons of England to consider
what Nation it was whereof they were, and whereof they
were governors," so that they might match the greatness of
their trust. In doing so, he referred solely to the intrinsic
character of the people, and indeed to one element therein.
He found them "a nation pliant and prone to knowledge."
They "prized the liberty to know, to utter and to argue
freely according to conscience, above all liberties." It was
only on this ground that the nation seemed to the poet to be
"like an eagle renewing her mighty youth." In his sight she
was first among the nations of his time, because she was first
in her love of truth; therefore was "she destined to be great
and honourable in these later ages."

From one point of view we may say that there was noth-
ing new in Milton's attitude. The truth to which he gave
such stately expression is, in fact, a truism. It is as old as
man's first reflection upon his own destiny. Homer teaches
it when he makes the Greeks advance to battle in ordered
and silent ranks, under wise commanders inspired by Athena,
while the Trojans stream out in a confused and shouting
mob, driven forward by Ares, the god who is the embodi-
ment of animal ferocity and passion. This is the conviction
of the wise in "all generations": that if there be any law in
human affairs or any continuity in their confused history, it
is that which dwells in man's own soul and secures the victory
of the ordering intelligence and the disciplined will over the
blind forces that operate in his world.
But from another point of view the attitude of Milton may be called unique and even surprising. Stern moralist as he was, and a spirit which was devoted to the service of the Highest, we should have expected him to dwell first upon the ethical or the religious conditions of a nation's welfare. But it is its "proneness and pliancy to knowledge," and the store it set upon the liberty to know, to which he assigns the highest value and the first importance.

Had he lived in our day, we should have reduced the significance of his mission and called him an "intellectualist"; for we are prone to prize faith in some domains, and practice in others, above knowledge, and to regard "truth" as mere means to a further good. I believe, however, that Milton spoke well and wisely. "The liberty to know" is in fact greater than all other liberties; for it is their condition. Man cannot enter into his inheritance, whether that inheritance be natural or spiritual, except through this door. As the beauty of the natural scene is there only to the seeing eye, so the utilities of Nature's forces and the treasury of her resources are open only to him who can comprehend them; and the obligations which are also the opportunities of man's moral achievement exist only for him who adopts them as the convictions of his own mind and the purposes of his own will. Efficient practice, whether on the minutest or on the widest scale, rests upon clear and relevant knowledge. It is as necessary to the artisan in handling his tools as it is to a statesman guiding the affairs of a nation. The fact which is not comprehended is an outer necessity which limits man's freedom, frustrating his intelligence and obstructing his will. The discoveries and inventions of modern science in all their wide range, and man's whole progress in civilization, bear witness to this truth: it is the intelligence of man which alone...
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can emancipate him. His charter of freedom is inscribed in her own soul.

Now it is the main characteristic of our time that it has, at least in one great department, laid this lesson well to heart. We consider no labor too severe or continued, no equipment too costly, which promises, by means of the natural sciences, to secure more intimate communion between the reason of man and the reason which is embedded in the physical order. It is only in this way that we can bring its powers to our will. We have learned that the iron-hearted mechanism of nature, which were it not for man's rational endowment would entangle him in its vast scheme, can by means of his understanding of it be changed into the rich possession of his mind and the instrument of his will. Its unchangeable and inexorable laws, seized by way of their meaning, are made to minister to his purposes and to express his spontaneity. By means of knowledge man stands a sovereign among the natural powers, and he is free, not in their despite, but by their help, for they enlarge the scope of his effective will.

This, indeed, is the ultimate and by far the most significant consequence of man's intelligent converse with the outer world, the greatest of all the gifts of the natural sciences to mankind. But it is not that which has attracted our attention. As a rule, we trace the influence of the theoretical discoveries of science no further than the practical inventions in which they result; and if we discern, we do not reflectively consider, the manner in which they recoil upon man himself. The achievement upon which in this age we justly pride ourselves is the interpretation of Nature's laws, and our consequent sway over her energies. We seek little more, and we look no further, as a rule. We forget that it is the indirect, the remote, the unexpected and unsought consequences of man's actions which mean most. It is a law of his life, and a
symbol of the generosity of the scheme within which he lives, that he always builds more wisely than he knows. He is guided unconsciously as by an architectonic mind, which comprehends him and his environment, and whose purposes he cannot guess until he beholds them accomplished.

It is my purpose to call your attention to this aspect of the scientific enterprise which you are so auspiciously inaugurating here to-day. I would fain indicate the manner in which the natural sciences, for which you are making your most generous provision, must not only extend your mastery over the outer world, but reverberate within your inner selves, enriching and enlarging the powers of your rational nature.

When man's thought sets free the forces of the open world, these take up his deeds and carry them forward to issues which he cannot clearly foresee, and yet which he dare not leave unconsidered. For these also yield their best gifts only to the spirit which can at once obey and control them; and neither the obedience nor the control is possible except in the measure in which they are comprehended.

This consequence is seen to follow the moment we discern what takes place when man acquires knowledge of any object. It is that the nature of mind is itself exhibited in the process. He cannot enter into closer communion with the natural world by means of the sciences without at the same time both manifesting and realizing the powers of his own soul. Mind, like every other form of energy, natural and spiritual, shows what it is in what it does. It exhibits itself in its operations. It is by matching his intellectual power against the world and forcing its obdurate facts to yield their meaning that he reveals the splendor of his rational endowment. Could we have known the potencies which slumber within him, if we could have known his mind and his ways of life when the phenomena of nature, instead of being open to
his thought and subservient to his will, were nothing more than objects of fear and wonder? Or is it not true, rather, that the process by which he has gradually withdrawn the veil from the face of nature and brought to light order among its contingencies, is the same in its other and great aspect as the process of the self-revelation of his own spirit? For knowledge comes neither from mind nor from its object, but from both. It is neither \textit{a posteriori} nor \textit{a priori}, because it is both the one and the other, and that always. Truth is neither unveiled by man, nor is it given to him ready-made. It is, in every item of it, the result of the interaction of mind and its object. Light springs from the impact of spirit and nature. Nay, as we shall see more fully hereafter, these imply each other, they are elements in one scheme, opposed but complementary aspects of the one reality. And it is only in their unity that they have significance, value, or use.

I do not anticipate any contradiction when I say that the greatest and by far the most significant of all the consequences of man's triumphant progress in his comprehension of the physical cosmos is the light which that process has thrown upon man himself. But its full meaning can be seen only when we consider another and a still remoter consequence. Man's more intimate communion with nature by means of natural science has brought him into closer communion with his fellows. Seeking no such end, the sciences have made men, throughout the civilized world, members of one another. They have broken down man's isolation, refuted his egoism even when it leaves him selfish, made him independent whether they will or not, welded their interests together, and constituted them into organs of a vast whole to which they give and from which they borrow all the elements of their larger life. Within it they find their in-
individual functions; and, seeking their own ends, they nevertheless constitute a vast, complex, and single whole whose elements collaborate even when they conflict, and whose power for all human purposes no man can measure.

The first revelation of the potencies which slumbered in man's spirit was made when the reason within him succeeded in holding rational communion with the reason that is embedded in the physical cosmos. But this second revelation is greater. We can see his powers in the fullness of their might when he is thus united in one scheme with his fellows, and spirit communes face to face with spirit. Then is the range of his personality in truth extended, and the reach of his mind and will. The blacksmith at his forge, like the thinker in his study, is seen to serve and to be served by the interchanging enterprises of the general mind of his times. For it is no flight of rhetoric, but the simple truth, to say that our interests now are cosmopolitan. This is illustrated in the common ways of our daily life: in the food we eat, the clothes we wear, and the tools we use. The same change which has passed over the face of nature has passed over the spirit of man. Science is translating facts into instances of universal laws. It is tearing facts out of their seeming isolation. It is revealing them as temporary resting-places of unresting energies, momentary combinations of forces which have come from the beginning of things and are moving onward on an endless way. Nature is no longer an aggregate of disconnected facts, or the scene of contingent happenings. It is the realm of concrete universal laws. These have not supplanted the facts, it is true, nor arrested the happenings; but they have illumined them, showing that they are the mere foci of the world's unresting energies.

But the universal in nature is at once the offspring and the parent of the universal in man; so that he too, by the indirect
influence of the sciences, is being reinterpreted and regenerated. Man remains, it is true, and must remain, a unique personality. To the end he will maintain his subjective integrity and inviolable privacy; he will look upon the wide world through his own most individual thought, and act upon it from the secret depths of his own most exclusive will. But the thought and the will which are his own and exclusive are capable of a wide comprehension. He is also being revealed as an individuated organ of a vast whole. He is the intense because the self-conscious focus of the meaning and the use of the world. He is a pulse-throb of a universal mind which sustains the natural order, and operates in him, through him, by him, and, I believe, for him. And this discovery, it seems to me, is the crowning achievement of the modern age. Its interest in the meaning of the outer world, and the consequent conversion of its forces into man’s ministrants, have, without man’s knowledge or purposed seeking, begun the integration of humanity, and set it forth on an adventure more generous in its promise than he can compass by his freest thoughts.

Now it has seemed to me that if a votary of philosophy has any mission among you to-day, it is to invite your attention for a little to this vaster and remoter realm of the consequences of devoting your thoughts in this institution to the discovery of nature’s secrets. For every truth attained breaks out into a new problem demanding a new solution; every practical achievement brings into it a new task; and every goal of spirit is a point of departure on new adventures. And it is the peculiar task of philosophy to suggest to the minds of men the regions not yet conquered and the inheritance not yet gained and secured.

The main outlines of our next adventure are becoming obvious. It is to comprehend the laws according to which
this new world of the interconnected wills of men must operate. The demand for knowledge—for knowledge that is systematic, tried, and secure—of this world of man is already felt to be urgent in some directions. I presume that there is no maker or seller of material things among you who does not know that if he is to secure his own economical well-being, he must know something of the world's mind and be able to interpret and anticipate its wants. This problem is infinitely more complex, and the risks of error are incalculably greater than they were when human society consisted of small, isolated, simple, self-centered and self-supporting units. His success or his failure in his business enterprises comes upon him from the ends of the world, and he must widen the range of his purposes.

But what applies to the economic phase of our modern life applies in like manner to all its elements. Control can come only by the way of comprehension, and forces which we do not understand are inexhaustible sources of risks and surprises. And who comprehends the social forces of these times? All the civilized nations of the world exhibit the same phenomena. We have emancipated the people; we have awakened their sense of their rights; we have multiplied their wants and extended the range of their desires; and, in one word, we have ushered in what we can hardly do more than name and fear—namely, Democracy. It is a thing which is to be its own law; it is to walk in the light of its own convictions; it is to map out the lines of its own welfare; it is to repudiate every authority, political, moral, or religious, which wears a despotic face; it must issue its own imperatives, and every appeal is to itself alone.

The greatest discovery ever made by man was made by the Greeks when, cutting themselves free from the traditions of the ancient world, they alighted upon the conception of a
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civil state where citizens should be free. The most momentous experiment of mankind is that of carrying out their conception to its ultimate consequence in a true democracy. But that experiment, conducted among the elemental powers of man's world and involving all the major issues of his welfare, is carried on in the bewildering twilight of mere opinion. First, appearances are taken for facts; there is little inquiry, and there is less logic or method. The democracies of the world, guided by no prophetic seer and possessing little light of their own, are stumbling along an untried and unknown way to an unimagined goal. They are convinced of their illusions only by suffering their consequences, and they discover the truth only by exhausting the possibilities of error. It is a costly method and an insecure one. Universal unrest verging constantly toward conflict characterizes all their ways.

I do not think that we can trust this method much longer. The need for self-comprehension is becoming urgent. The risks of ignoring the problems of the general life of man are growing greater as the democracies wax in magnitude and strength, assert themselves with less and less reserve, and are less and less patient of restraint. And, moreover, a fundamental discrepancy has arisen between the inner or self-conscious life of recent times and its outward circumstances. Man's knowledge and control of himself have fallen out of step with his knowledge and control of his physical environment. In the case of the latter the boundaries of the nations are overleapt and the exclusiveness of their individualism is multiplied. Scientific knowledge and inventions and the vast economic resources which issue from them are objects of cosmopolitan interchange. But our ethical temperament has received no such enlargement or emancipation, and is still narrow and class-tainted and parochial. And this dis-
crepancy will bring its penalties. Have you ever known any instance of incongruence between the inner and outer conditions of a nation's life which has not been fraught with peril? It is this cause which divides a nation against itself and constrains it to have recourse to the violent remedy of revolution. A reinterpreted world is a reconstructed world. It propounds new problems for man. And they are like the riddles of the Sphinx: they must be answered on pain of death; they have no answer except Man himself.

Surveying the modern situation as a whole, what is it, then, that we see? It is the vast extent of the domain which the physical sciences have conquered within so brief a period of the history of the human race that it seems but the hour of the dawn; the great army of explorers in every civilized land, equipped with every instrument which can aid their search, who are year by year and almost day by day pressing its boundaries further; the growing marvel of the practical inventions which follow hard upon the theoretic discoveries; the utilities, latent from the beginning of time in the structure of the physical world, which these inventions are setting free; and, on the other hand, the inexhaustible variety and unconfined range of man's wants and desires which all these things have called into existence, and which are clamorous for satisfaction; the complex, restless, tumultuous, and yet unruled world of industry and commerce which has been welded together and is designed to meet these wants; the consequent integration of mankind into organized communities; the rise of the great order of national, political states which are themselves but organs of a still wider humanity, all of them from time to time disturbed and occasionally well-nigh distraught by the economic and social collisions of their elements. Such are the results which we must attribute mainly to the devotion and the triumphant progress of modern
science. Guided and inspired by them, the multitudinous activities of individual minds and wills, each of them permanently set upon its own personal ends, have put together a vast social structure with almost as little conscious purpose as that which guides the coral insects building their reefs amid the ocean's waves. That structure has its own laws of being and ways of operating, and these are as remorseless as the laws of the physical cosmos. But I believe that they are as beneficent, too, provided they are understood. How, then, can we doubt that man must fit himself for this new world which he has called into being, or that in order to do so he must go forth on a new adventure? It is not only that of comprehending the physical world and employing its energies, but of comprehending the master-power which is the cause of the great change. Side by side with the sciences of Nature, the sciences of man must arise. Man must come back to himself, contemplating the mystery of his own spirit, for in it is the key of the final enigma of the world.

But this is the specific venture of Philosophy, and Philosophy has fallen into disrepute. So scanty has been the harvest of her long toil, as compared with that which the natural sciences have brought triumphantly home, that the general mind of the modern age would turn away from her. Philosophy, the mother of all the sciences, has now to plead, and even at times to plead in vain, for permission to erect a humble lodge among the mansions of her daughters. We would prize her gifts beyond all others, could she but bring them within our reach. But we despair of her powers. Even the incomplete, tentative, errant, but slowly progressive interpretation which man alone can give of any object, seems to be impossible for us when our problem is Man. An obstacle lies across the very threshold of this, the most urgent as well
as the greatest of man's spiritual enterprises: it is his diffi-
dence when face to face with the mystery of his own being.

And, in truth, the mystery is very great. Even his physical
structure is revealed by science to be the consummation and
the most complex epitome of the cosmic scheme, and all its
problems converge in him. And his soul, his mind, his spirit
is the self-conscious counterpart of all his world. He is its
expression, in him brute force emerges into meaning, and its
reality takes upon itself the form of truth. The complexity
of the problem is infinite, and the consciousness of its magni-
tude paralyzes the inquiry of philosophy.

Moreover, when we are dealing with spirit and its mani-
festations in any one of the arts or sciences, or in the most
complex social world in which all these are sustained, the
method which has been so successful in the investigation of
the facts of the outer world cannot be employed, except at
the greatest risk and under constant correction. The natural
sciences can, without much violence to their object, distin-
guish and even isolate its aspects and deal with them sepa-
rately. But when we leave the physical sphere, where
relations are relatively external and contingent, and ascend
stage by stage along the internal relations of organic life to
the intense unity of self-consciousness, in which all differences
are at once sustained and overcome, abstraction becomes
more and more misleading. There every element depends
for its being, function, and meaning upon the whole system of
which it is a part. The problem of the whole comes upon
us everywhere, and it seems impossible to attain any truth
without grasping it in its totality.

It follows that philosophy has no more right to be
abstract than a work of art, or to be fragmentary than re-
ligious faith. Even the pragmatist, whose main mission
seems to be to maintain that the world is, at least in part, the
playground of contingencies, must make the apparently preposterous claim of pronouncing upon its final nature and grasping it as a whole. He also is "a spectator of all time and all existence," and its condemning judge.

And it follows that even as an outline the philosopher's version of the universe of reality must fail, and fail in every way. Its principles are mere hypotheses, and nothing is fully demonstrated. The application of the hypotheses to facts is incomplete on every side; they retain their secrets, remain enigmatic, and they seem to conflict with one another and with the system as a whole. And the failure of philosophy, which we might well prognosticate from the magnitude of its task, seems to be more than indorsed by its troubled and apparently futile history. We are driven to think that the enterprise exceeds our powers, that there is no resource in reason, and that the philosopher must take his seat among humble men, and say, like them,

\begin{center}
\emph{I stretch lame hands of faith and grope,}
\emph{And gather dust and chaff, and call}
\emph{To what I feel is Lord of all,}
\emph{And faintly trust the larger hope.}
\end{center}

And man cannot set aside the enigma. He must persist in the attempt. But the question arises, Why do men persist in the attempt? And the wisest of men, why do they not turn aside from the vast inquiry and "cultivate their gardens"? Can it be that it is impossible for them to do so without violating their own rational nature? Is there some necessity either in man himself, or in the nature of things, or in both, which he cannot escape, but which constrains him to confront the mystery? Can he not take refuge in his own limitations? What reflective man is ignorant of the answer?
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Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch,
A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
A chorus-ending from Euripides,—
And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears,
As old and new at once as Nature's self,
To rap and knock and enter in our soul,
Take hands and dance there, a fantastic ring,
Round the ancient idol, on his base again,—
The grand Perhaps!

This fact, sustained by the experience of mankind always and in all ages when it is at its best, sustained by its despair no less than by its hopes, by its agnosticism and skepticism no less than by its faith, leads us to look again at the adventure of philosophy and its assumed failure. What does it mean?

In the first place, it throws a fresh light upon the nature of man. It shows that he cannot escape the sense of his infinite environment. To shut it out of his mind were to rend his own spirit in twain, for it enters within. The infinite is part of the furniture of his soul. He is like a dweller on a little island in the midst of the open ocean, everywhere within the sound of the thunder of the breakers. If he endeavors to satisfy himself with a narrow scheme of life, he finds that he is at war both with himself and with the nature of things. He may seek satisfaction, as Carlyle and many others have advised, by lowering his demands and limiting his outlook. His first crude expositions of himself reveal within nothing but animal wants on a large scale, and he may neither see nor desire to find in the world around anything except that which promises to stay their hunger. But reflection enters if the process of his own rational life is not arrested within him, and reflection breaks down his com-
placency and dispels the fake show of first appearances. His spirit is launched forth on its endless task.

And this is philosophy. It is not the quaint guest of star-struck souls which have forgotten their finitude and are doomed to range along the horizon of existence, peering into the darkness beyond and asking questions of its emptiness. Philosophy is the process whereby man, driven by the necessities of his rational nature, corrects the abstractions of his first sense-steeped experience, and endeavors, little by little, to bring to light and power the real—that is, the spiritual—meaning of his structure and of the world in which he lives. I cannot believe in a destiny so cruel as to condemn man to seek and to return home empty. I even venture to say that the quest is never vain.

It is true that philosophy does not reach its goal, if that goal is a full and flawless and final scheme. But is it? Which of the enterprises of the human spirit either has, or ought to have, such a consummation? Not the sciences, not any one of the arts, not any form of man's practical activities. There is, with regard to every aim which he has sought to attain, the same incompleteness, imperfection, and lack of finality, and the same ground for skepticism to seize upon and condemn it.

But, in the next place, the skepticism which distrusts philosophy is itself philosophy, and a philosophy which has not been careful to examine its own assumptions. Let me indicate a few of these as we pass on our way.

In the first place, it is evident that skepticism cannot condemn except by reference to a standard or criterion, and that standard must itself be capable of justification, whether through carrying it within itself or as a means to that which does so. It must itself, in fact, assume an Absolute, and a knowledge of it. That which pretends to be true, even
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though it be negative, bears within it a reference to a final end, and in its own place and context to embody it. Hence skepticism cannot condemn a conception which it must assume and use in its condemnation.

In the second place, the criterion set up by skepticism is not valid. Skepticism places a static goal for a nature which is through and through dynamic. It demands that mind should come to rest in a knowledge that is final. But self-consciousness is a process. To arrest its activity is to extinguish it. It is active no less in possessing than it is in achieving knowledge. For knowledge or goodness to be, is to be in process of being maintained by the active powers of the intelligence and will: in other words, the moment that men cease to think and to will, these cease to exist. They are in process of being continually produced. The whole world of mind, like the physical cosmos, is the scene of the play of energies which never rest. Its existence is its becoming; it continues through continuous regeneration, and is ever new as well as always old. Both beginnings and endings are fictions. Man's mind lives and moves within a self-inclosed system for which to be is to change, and probably also to evolve, radiating forever into new splendors. And for man to live as spirit is to partake in the process. It is in some other world than that of man's experience that the skeptic should seek a reality that is fixed or a perfection that is static.

In the third place, skepticism has not only assumed for mind an end which contradicts its nature, and is on that account alone irrational as well as impossible: it has also misconstrued the process of knowing. It is represented as self-defeating. Instead of revealing the nature of things as they are, it exhibits them only in their relation to man's means of knowing them, or as they are reflected in the medium of his
consciousness. This is held to distort them; so that in strictness man does not know real things, but phenomenal objects. Mind cannot get into actual touch with reality. It is shut up within a world of appearances; consciousness can deal with its own contents and see only the pictures on its own walls. And, further, every attempt which philosophy has ever made to establish a relation between ideas and facts, or phenomena and real objects, has failed. And its failure is necessary and inevitable, for it is manifestly impossible for reason to establish any relation between what is and what cannot be in consciousness. This suspicion of thought, "this disease of subjectivity," has penetrated deeply into the modern mind, and skepticism has assumed many forms. It is at times the positivism which affirms necessary ignorance of final causes; it is at others an agnosticism which endeavors to stop short of both affirmation and negation; it is at other times an intuitionism which on occasions and for rare moments comes into touch with reality in a way that is inexplicable and miraculous; it is at other times a dogmatism of either the intelligence or of the will that is a resolve to affirm when we cannot know, a pragmatism or a pluralism. In all cases it relegates those things which man most desires to know into a region which lies beyond the reach of his intelligence, or it attributes to subconsciousness, or to mere feeling, or to mysticism and intuition, what it denies to the use of man's rational faculties.

To deal with these skeptical assumptions with any fullness lies beyond my immediate purpose. But we may observe in passing, what is obvious, namely, that the skeptic cannot condemn all human knowledge without condemning his own. His pronouncement on the nature of mind, the relativity of its processes, the phenomenal character of its objects, the
unknowable nature of reality, must share the fate of all other knowledge.

He must choose between denying the validity of all knowledge and affirming his own, and in both cases alike his conclusion is self-contradictory.

But, in the next place, his attitude is exposed to other ways of refutation than that of a mere *argumentum ad hominem* or a *tu quoque*. The skeptic converts the condition which is necessary to knowledge against the possibility of knowledge, as if that which constitutes it could also destroy it. No doubt knowledge is relative; that is to say, it depends upon the nature of mind as well as upon the nature of things. But is its relativity a defect? What would the skeptic have? Is it a mind which has no affinity with the world of objects, or a world which is divorced from, and independent of, the intelligence? The relation of things to mind and of mind to things may be an indication of the fundamental character of both. Indeed, there is no attribute of the real so indisputable as that by which it interacts with mind, and through and by and only during that interaction exhibits and even realizes its fullness of being. Knowledge, or rather knowing—for there is no such ambiguous reality as "a world of knowledge" supposed to intervene between consciousness and the facts with which it deals—is the interaction of mind and things, and a living intercourse. And that intercourse is direct and immediate even when we form erroneous opinions. Error is the pathological activity of undeveloped minds. We borrow the whole contents of our intelligence from the world in which we live, even our illusions, and we can *create* neither truth nor falsehood out of the emptiness of an isolated and self-closed mind. On the other hand, the world owes to reason alone the evidence of its existence and the expression of its order and meaning. But we recognize
neither that which we borrow nor that which we lend, and we speak of parts of our knowledge as \textit{a priori} and of parts as \textit{a posteriori}, as if some truths were fabricated by ourselves without the aid of the world, and others were emitted by the world without the use of mind. Knowing is a joint enterprise in which both are involved.

There is, perhaps, no phenomenon of modern thought which demands a closer diagnosis than this "disease of subjectivity," which is not only a cause of the distrust of philosophy, but which would paralyze the enterprise of reason in all other directions, if in our practice, which is wider than our theories, we did not set it at naught. It seems to me to rest, in the last resort, like all the forms of modern skepticism, upon unjustifiable dualisms. For we have been separating when we ought only to have distinguished, and converting differences into contradictions. And, on the other hand, we have been assuming that to reconcile differences is to remove them, leaving nothing but flat and stale sameness. We have not distinguished between sameness and identity, nor realized that identity can—and, I believe, must—express itself in change and maintain itself thereby.

The assumptions arise from the fact that we naturally carry over into our philosophical research the conceptions which we have found useful in our physical inquiries, and endeavor to interpret the phenomena of mind in the same way as objects in the outer world. As in space every part excludes every other, and its continuity allows no diversity: thus only, it is presupposed, can the reality of all objects, including minds, be maintained. They must, we assume, be kept in isolation. Their relations to one another must be treated as contingent addenda: things into which they may enter and out of which they may live again, without any change in their real being. To be real, they exclude one an-
other. Interpenetration, the being of one object through and by reason of the being of other objects, is held not to constitute but to destroy. The finite and the infinite must stand apart. The will of man, if it is to be free—that is, if it is to be a will—must shut out the world. The subject must have only a negative attitude to objects; nature and spirit, mind and matter, must be absolute opposites.

When I endeavor to catch a glimpse of the trend of the thought of the present times, and to define, however generally, the problems in which it finds itself entangled and which it must try to solve, I find that it is occupied with some one or other of these dualisms. The tissue of reality has been torn asunder; and if there be any movement which above all others is indicative of the special mission of the times which are coming, and are already at the door, it is that of healing the rent and of finally refuting all notions of the primacy either of the whole over its elements, or of the elements over the whole. We must find room for the freedom of both mind and the world in knowledge; for both spiritual freedom and natural necessity in our practice; for both God and man in religion; for both individualism and socialism in our politics; for both the one and the many, the universal and the particular, everywhere; and we must view them as interpenetrable; for there is but one reality, and without its cooperation with its elements nothing exists or happens.

LECTURE II

We concluded the last lecture by showing that both in our thoughts and in our actions we first distinguish and then tend to sunder the contents of reality: our thoughts are always to some degree abstract and our practical purposes one-sided. Reality, even at its simplest, has more
aspects than we can either recognize or use: it takes all the sciences, each of them taking up its own set of relations, to explain the qualities of a lump of iron ore; and most, if not all, of our industries to extract its uses. All thoughts and all ends are abstract.

But, among the conditions under which man lives, we must reckon as one of the most beneficent that he cannot be satisfied with abstractions. Both his own nature and the nature of things conspire together to secure him against narrowing the interests of his life. The reflected elements of reality press for recognition; and the elements which are recognized refuse to yield either their truth or their use, except in their context. They even refute themselves: one-sided truths become misleading errors, and one-sided purposes refuse to work. They call forth their opposites, and demand to be complemented and corrected by them and harmonized with them. The world resists being shredded into parts, and persistently maintains its concrete totality.

On the other hand, man’s own nature also constrains him to move and to cooperate with the trend toward unity. Abstract experience is a mind divided against itself: it cannot stand. Man must either widen his outlook and extend the range of his purposes in response to the call of circumstance, or else do violence to his own rational nature by becoming the bondsman of habit and an automaton. And in either case he makes for some kind of completeness—either the completeness which shuts out or that which lays hands upon and utilizes the environment; and the process of experience always changes him. The final effect of the deeds of his intelligence and will does not lie in the truth attained, or in the purpose realized, but in the recoil of these deeds upon himself. He rises from his acts either with hardened habits and strengthened prejudices, or else with a mind en-
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riched with new ideas and a more effective will. Nor by any means can he return to his past. Strictly speaking, spirit has no past; for it always incorporates it with the present. Man gathers his experience into himself; carries it along with him, as an element in his mental structure, assimilated by his living personality. He can sometimes unravel his past out of his present by conscious memory directly demonstrating its presence within him; and even if he cannot give this direct proof of the existence of the past in the present, he gives indirect evidence of it either in the automatization of his life and the fixity and reiteration of his mental operations, or else in the added skill and compass of his thoughts and purposes. This arrestment of the past and its conversion into a living element in the moving life is the mark and marvel of the rational nature of man, distinguishing him above all other things from other beings, as the condition of his progress.

Moreover, it is in this way that he maintains his personal identity. For that consists not in any immutable sameness such as we attribute, rightly or wrongly, to material existence. The self-extenuating space, the succession of the contents of time, each supplanting its predecessor, must be overcome and its flow arrested if personal identity is maintained. And this is not possible except by the activity of a self-consciousness which retains the past by waking it into the present. Even the sameness or permanence of the outer order implies, as Kant has shown, the reintegrating activity of self-consciousness. Reason in man thus becomes ever more concrete, systematizes ever more fully both its own life-content and its outer world. Its war with abstractions is perpetual: to lay down its arms is to yield its life.

It is not a defect of human reason that it must reach the concrete by way of abstractions: it is its nature. Error does
not consist in merely entertaining abstractions, but in treating
the abstractions as representative of the concrete whole of
reality. It arises when man endeavors to fix the abstractions,
or to employ them as final characterizations of reality.
There is a true sense in which human knowledge may be said
to begin with the particular and the simple, and to make its
way toward the universal and concrete—to start from "the
Many" and to seek "the One." But there is also a true
sense in which knowledge may be said to begin with the in-
definite "an undistinguished continuum," and to proceed to
articulate and define its contents—to start from "the One"
and to seek "the Many." From the first point of view, our
experience is at first a sensuous manifold which has to be
connected first into perceptions, then into conceptions, and
finally into the organic and hyperorganic ideas of reason.
And, pari passu, the object of experience, nature, at first
appears to be the scene of disconnected happenings and to be
a loose aggregate of unrelated facts, and eventually to ap-
pear as a universal cosmos. From the second point of view,
our experience is at first a confused mass of sensations press-
ing into us through the pores of sense, and perceptions arise
by distinguishing and articulating. And the object of experi-
ence, the world, changes its character in a corresponding
way. Now error arises when either of these views is
adopted against the other, or as the whole truth, and made
the basis of a philosophical account of the real. And that it
is an error is shown by the necessity of correcting the original
hypothesis by means of its opposite. For whichever presup-
position we assume at the beginning is nothing but a starting-
point from which its complementary opposite must be
reached. If the pluralist begins with the Many, particulars
he must confessedly synthesize and unite; if the absolutist
begins with the One, the indefinite whole he must analyze and
articulate. Philosophers may differ as to the nature of reality, and their doctrines may range between an absolutism or pantheism that engulfs the many and deletes all differences, and a pluralism or monadism. It is true that neither on the side of its difference nor of its unity is human knowledge complete—that is to say, the distinctions which are made are not clear, differences escape our observation; and, on the other hand, the unity in which they are comprised may have both little compass and little significance. But pure difference and pure sameness baffle the intelligence by their meaninglessness; indeed, neither can be affirmed or denied except in relation to its opposite. Every judgment, every opinion, false or true, wide or narrow its influence, implies differences within a unity, and is always a system. The assumption of pure particularity which the pluralist makes, and of pure unity or sameness which the absolutist makes, is not valid of the object of knowledge at any stage, from the crudest ordinary consciousness to the completest constructive height of the speculative philosopher. The problem of passing either from the Many to the One, or from the One to the Many, is insoluble; but it is also a problem that the human mind is not obliged to ask. It is a problem asked neither by the nature of things nor by the nature of reason. It is as unnecessary and as insoluble as the problem of proving that \( 2 \times 2 = 91 \). And the way to deal with such a problem is not to ask it. The several philosophies which ask the question are the ordines of abstraction, and their error is revealed whenever the abstractions are faithfully pressed home. They will then be seen not only to call forth, but to pass into, their opposites, and thus to refute their own starting-point.

A general survey of the reflective thought of the present day will prove, I believe, that it is engaged upon this task; and its main province lies in the explicitness of the assump-
tions and the rigor with which they are being followed to their conclusions. At no previous time were the advocates of the Many and of the One so frankly opposed or so evenly balanced, nor their contradiction more direct and full. Except in one or two instances, pluralism exists in order to complete absolutism, and means to have no mission except to maintain the existence of contingency and multiplicity, and it must itself perish in the hour of its victory. But the pluralism which aims at being constructive is an unusually interesting phenomenon, and much more characteristic of the times than the absolutism which it would refute and supplant.

As a matter of fact, the absolutism which is supposed to begin with a bare "universal" or "One," and to proceed to evolve the varied contents of experience from that "One," employing an a priori method of mere analysis, need not detain us. Such a method may have been employed by the Eleatics, and can be attributed, not without justice, to Spinoza. It is also supposed by critics to be employed by Hegel and his followers. But it does not concern us at present to determine by whom the theory is or has been maintained, nor under what great names it may shelter itself; for we are not engaged with the history of philosophy. We need not seek to ascertain whether the Absolute of Hegel stood for an empty One, or for the whole of reality as it is in all its concreteness in itself and for itself. Only the first, as the abstract Absolute, engages the attention of the pluralist and concerns us.

But it concerns us only to be dismissed. I admit at once, and without any reservation, that philosophy cannot begin from such an Absolute; that if it could begin, it could find no way from it to the rich complexity of real being; and that the method of mere analysis and a priori deduction can elicit nothing out of its emptiness. No doubt the psychological
history of man's mind may give evidence of a process by
which the indefinite mass of its original sensuous consciousness is distinguished into elements and sights and sounds, and even the Ego and the non-Ego are practically defined and their differences made explicit. But absolutists are held to be guilty of neglect, or even contempt, of psychological evidence rather than of converting psychology into a metaphysical absolutism, though I should find great difficulty in admitting its existence elsewhere than in the minds of its critics.

But it is not so with the opposite theory, which professes to start with "the Many" and to seek "the One"; which maintains that particulars are given and universals are found; that experience proceeds from discrete sensations to perceptions, and from perceptions to more general conceptions, and from those to the still wider "ideas of reason"; and that the object of experience, the whole region of ordered facts, presents itself at first as the scene of separate, individual occurrences, and an aggregate of things real in their independence of one another, each of them isolated, impervious, exclusive, an object of simple apprehension. The pluralists maintain, in so far as they are logically faithful to their fundamental hypothesis, that such is the true or final character of reality. If we affirm its unity as a whole, or the harmony of its elements in virtue of any universal principle or law of being, we go beyond our evidence: we even flout the facts. All the objects of man's thought are finite; even God is one among, or, what comes to the same thing, one above and over above, other beings. Real existence implies singularity. A thing, in order to be, must be itself, must carry within it a private core, which is its own true being, and which remains its very self, whatever relations it may enter into or come out of.
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All realities are particulars, we are told. Nothing exists beside particulars. There is “no unity” or common element, no real or existential universals, which exist or subsist in addition to the particulars. There are no things-in-general, and no events-in-general. Nothing exists which corresponds to such a general conception as “animal” or “tree” or “man”; but only this or that animal or tree or man. Nor is there any universal substrate which constitutes them into a class. A class is due to our classification: it is an idea, not a thing. We may, and do, find similarity between different objects: but each of them exists in and by itself, and the similarity is an idea which we form by comparing them with one another. Anything that destroys their intrinsic singularity or uniqueness destroys them: for them to be is to be each its own unique self.

How, then, do we account for law and order? It is simply and purely the outcome of intelligence. Everything that exists is its own law, an active essence, or character, behaving in its own particular way. There are, therefore, no repetitions in the realm of the real, any more than there are similarities, and no absolute fixity. Repetition, enumeration, measurement, mathematics are not possible except by abstraction, and are not true of any real existences. “All our assertions of identity among reals are at bottom negative, amount simply to saying that we discern no difference.”

But what comes of this view of the universal laws, which science seeks to establish, and the uniformity of nature which they postulate? Does not this doctrine “let contingency into the very heart of things”? Must not a perfectly discrete world be in every part of it unintelligible? The consistent pluralist answers these questions in the affirmative. So far as science deals in universals, it does not touch the reality of things. Thought must start from the particular, but it can-
not return to it. Thought gives us only the universal, and
universals are only hypostasized epistemological entities.
Facts and universals, in short, belong to different orders:
the former to the world of objective reality, the latter to the
objective world of knowledge. Moreover, they do not even
correspond. The universals are not true—that is, they in-
dicate no existing realities, as perceptions may do. The so-
called laws, and the universal and necessary causes of which
natural science speaks, correspond to nothing that exists in
reality. There are no laws or necessities or uniformities of
nature. These are mere results of our own thinking, concep-
tions fabricated by our minds through observing, selecting,
summarizing and generalizing the multitudinous, particular
occurrences which really take place. "In the real world we
can nowhere find that exact similarity which the mathema-
tician can readily conceive, and the contention is that it no-
where exists." "There are never two beings which are
perfectly alike, and in which it is not possible to find an
internal difference"; and, a fortiori, no two events or occur-
rences or activities can be identical. There is, to our loose
and general observation, an apparent repetition of events, of
acts in the world, and we speak of "same causes" and "same
effects"; but sameness and uniformity, together with the con-
tinuity and necessity which are assumed to spring from them,
are mere thoughts. There are no natural laws, nor any real
being corresponding to any concepts the physicist can find it
convenient to frame regarding the ultimate constituents of
matter. Continuity must destroy particularity. Each real
thing has its own unique constitution. Pluralism thus does
not hesitate "to let contingency into the very heart of
things." "I not only admit it," says Dr. Ward, "but contend
that any other world would be meaningless."

But there is another application of this pluralism to which
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I must briefly refer. It is its application to the subjects of knowledge. The particularity, uniqueness, and exclusiveness which is the essential character or true being and essence of natural things, is attributed to minds, and to their experiences. Every mind exists, and for itself. There is no continuity between or in them, and each is absolutely impervious. Every mind maintains the absolute isolation of its own being. And the same holds of their experiences—or the same would hold if any general affirmation could be true. The presentations of one man cannot become the presentations of another. Every mind is the exclusive owner or retainer of its own truths and its own errors. To every self its own world, to every Ego its own non-Ego. Above all else, we must not play fast and loose with the uniqueness and isolation—with the being in itself and for itself—of personality, or of its experience.

How, then, can they agree? How can they disagree? How is any communication between them possible? Not by changing places, not in such a way that “the presentations of one could become accessible to the others.” “This is just the most impossible thing in the world. Individuality consists precisely in this impossibility.” There is no element common to the several experiences. Each monad mirrors its world “from a unique standpoint of its own.” Universal truth, in the sense of a truth that is possessed or attainable by all minds, has to go the way of all other universals; and if general conceptions are still possible, they are possible only in the sense that every mind has its own private stock of them. There are thus as many experiences as there are persons, and as many sciences as there are scientific men—probably more. And they are all interpretations, equally true or equally false—if, indeed, either falsity or truth can appertain to different worlds where every mind has its own object.
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Pluralism implies solipsism. "So far as reality consists in particulars, so far it pertains to each experience for itself alone; and so far the solipsist in theory, and the egoist, a solipsist in conduct, are logically unassailable, even though the proper place to put them be, as Schopenhauer said, the madhouse."

But we have just seen that on the pluralistic theory reality consists exclusively of particulars. What, then, can be the meaning of introducing the qualifying phrase "so far"? It is necessary in order to escape from solipsism, and, in other words, to enable the several persons to communicate with one another—communication consisting "in establishing relations between these primary realia." There must be a medium for mutual understanding, and by means of it they must arrive at common knowledge.

But what can "common knowledge" mean for the pluralist? Evidently not that the knowledge which L has is also possessed by M and N. They "cannot change places so that the presentations of one become accessible in their actual entirety to the others." "This is just the most impossible thing in the world. Individuality consists precisely in this impossibility." The knowledge of L, M and N may conceivably agree, but no part or element of the knowledge of L can be the knowledge of M or N. Each of them "mirrors the universe from a unique standpoint of his own." Every Ego has its own non-Ego. "Thus, when in place of the Ego L we have M or N, so too in place of the non-Ego non-L we have non-M or non-N." The mutual independence and isolation of the subjects of knowledge thus carries with it the isolation and mutual exclusion of the objects of their knowledge. All experience, to begin with, is, we are told, "individual." It is the private knowledge of each person, and it is a knowledge of different objects.
the sun or moon, "each of these persons sees a different object." How, then, and in what sense do the ten come to know that the actual object of each is the same individual object for all? How can they hold any communication with one another so as to agree, or even disagree? "Except on the basis of individual experience, communication is impossible," for it is evident that, first of all, each must have something which he wishes to communicate. The difficulty would seem to be insuperable.

It is overcome, however, by one author in a very simple way. He assumes just the least possible "common knowledge"! "The most that L can indicate or communicate to M of any part of his own experience is so much of it as is common to the experience of both." We may be sure that the earliest intercourse is very slight: just simple indications, a mere pointing to a particular thing as this or that. But once it is begun, the process goes on successfully. "We point to other particulars resembling it, other shining, moving, round objects, and so, by suggesting its likeness to these, take the chance that parallel relations or comparisons will be verified by our fellow-men."

Criticism of this view seems to me to be superfluous. It is directly self-contradictory; and the contradiction is not in the least removed by admitting as little common knowledge to begin with as possible. For "common knowledge" or "common" anything is just what pluralism denies.

Nor does practice come to the help of theory, as we are asked to believe. I do not doubt in the least that "the case of ten hungry men and a loaf would be an impressive object-lesson"; and it ought to be specially impressive to the pluralist. For he would find it difficult to live up to his theory were he one of the ten. To do so, having his own unique experience of his own unique loaf, he should not object to any of the
others eating their own unique loaves—supposing, indeed, he could be aware of their loaves. A pluralism that is consistent is certainly not supported by practical experience, and there is absolutely no transition possible from individual experience, such as it is represented by the pluralist, to that experience which is universal in the sense that different men understand one another and mean the same things by the same things.

It would be interesting to observe the manner in which the pluralist repeats, in his final philosophical account of reality as a whole, the same contradictory process as he employs in order to enable his theory to start on its way. For we find that the deity is introduced as a background of unity, or as some kind of substrate, or is even spoken of as “immanent.” It is admitted, however, that such a conception of the unity of the whole cannot be “empirically verified.” “The pluralist halts at the Many and their interaction; he declines to go further because he finds no warrant for so doing.” But if it is objected that the hypothesis of unity is of no use unless it can be verified, we are reminded that philosophy is not science. Science must verify empirically. The facts with which science deals “fall within experience, and this is sure, therefore, sooner or later to furnish a crucial test of the validity” (of its hypotheses). But philosophy cannot justify its ideas in this way. It employs another method. It justifies its “ideas” by appealing to “experience as a concrete whole”; “and they are justified in proportion as they enable us to conceive this whole as a complete and systematic unity.” But, we ask, is not the conception of the whole as “a complete and systematic unity” precisely what the pluralist cannot have? For, as we are told in the next sentence, “the pluralist halts at the Many and their interaction; he declines to go further because he finds no direct warrant for doing so.”
He gets his indirect warrant by an appeal to theism—that is, by an appeal to that which cannot be included in his theory because it contradicts it. The pluralist, being also a theist, admits a unity for which he has no warrant in experience, and with which the facts which are held to be given in experience, being a "Many," are directly inconsistent. Pluralism begins and ends with a contradiction.

The failure of pluralism in its application to the objects of knowledge is not less evident than it is in its application to the subjects of knowledge. The relation of the former to one another is as unintelligible and impossible as intercommunication between the latter. In fact, the problem in both cases is the same; for all objects of knowledge turn out to be in the last resort all subjects of knowledge, and all "things" are held to be persons. "The only things of which we have positive knowledge are subjects with intrinsic qualities, things that are something in themselves and something for themselves."

The pluralist admits relations between objects, as he admits the intercommunication of subjects and an experience which is universal. But they are not relations between things, in the sense of existing over and above that which they relate. There are not things here and relations there; in other words, there are no existential universals.

What, then, are relations? They are the activities of particulars, "the intercourse, the coöperation or conflict, actual or possible, of the individuals themselves." "The passion and action of things must take the place of relation. . . . There are no objective relations other than this living action and passion." But we know nothing that is active or passive except minds, and nothing else can be for itself. Hence "the only causes of which we have positive knowledge are minds: these have a nature of their own, and hence can interact,
determine and be determined.” Pluralism ends in pan-
psychism. “The attractions and repulsions of which the
physicist speaks only metaphorically, are to be taken literally
—that is, as implying impulses initiated and determined by
feeling.” “For modern pluralism the universe is the totality
of monads really interacting.” The “Many of pluralism
constitutes the class of entelechies or persons in the widest
sense—beings, that is to say, who are something for them-
selves, conative and cognitive individuals bent on self-conser-
vation and seeking the good.” “They are severally related
by their mutual interaction. . . . We have not two distinct
and separable facts—first, the Many, existing in isolation,
and then their interaction.” “The universe is the totality of
monads really interacting, and this is one fact.” “The plu-
rality implies the unity, and this unity implies the plurality—
a fact which is an inexhaustible wonder.”

Now it is evident that the crucial question for this doctrine
is the possibility of the interaction of the monads, or the cog-
nitive and conative persons into which all reality, including
so-called material reality, has been resolved. But we have
found already that this is impossible, and I shall add only
one consideration to those I have already advanced.

Let it be assumed that the monad or personality A knows
and wills, and also that for it to be is to know and will. Let
it be admitted, further, that monads B, C and D do and are
the same. It is plain that the action and passion of A are
exclusively its own; so also are the actions of B, C and D. Is
it less plain that in that case the relation or interaction of
these several experiences, supposing it does result, is no part
of the action or passion of any one of them? The assump-
tion that the actions and passions do interact, and that they
are experienced as interacting, may be quite true: but for
the pluralist it must not only be made gratuitously and dog-
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matically, but in flat contradiction of the fundamental hypothesis of the particularity and exclusive individuality of every item of the "Many."

Moreover, I must ask one more question of the pluralist. Can any particle, monad, person or subject either be active or passive purely from within itself? The pluralist finds his clue to the nature of all reality in his own mind. Has he known his own mind, either mind or will, entirely apart from the universe in which it exists? Is action or passion in vacuo possible? And is not a mind out of all relation to the world, a self which has no not-self, a vacuum and pure fiction? To will, think, or even feel nothing is neither to think nor will nor feel; and a mind without any "content" is a nonentity.

On the other hand, if it has a content, that content, for all the purposes of "conation and cognition," is an object and a non-Ego. But an Ego which has its non-Ego or world as its content or object of experience is not the "particular," exclusive Ego of the pluralist. It at least implicitly contains its world! The Ego, instead of being exclusive and particular, turns out to be at least potentially all-comprehensive. The individual mind is the subjective expression and the spiritual focus of the universe. It is a Many in One; and to explain how this can be is the paramount problem of philosophy.

It is an old problem, this of the relation of the One and the Many; and I agree entirely with Dr. Ward when he says that "the solution is not to be obtained by passing over the Many at the outset, trusting to deduce them afterward from an absolute One that is reached a priori"; and that "this method has proved itself illusory; the seeming attainment of the One has meant the disappearance of the Many." If, as he avers, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and others less distinguished verily held such an "absolutism or singularity,"—a question which I do not raise at present,—their
recent thought does well in recoiling from their doctrines. I can only say that I have not understood them in this and that way. On the other hand, I find that Dr. Ward admits that pluralism has also "failed to reach a satisfactory solution of the problem of the One and the Many"; he allows "that no philosophy has ever managed to reconcile these two notions of an infinite power and an infinite variety of limited, individualized expressions of that power." But I would apply to pluralism, mutatis mutandis, precisely what he says of absolutism or singularism. The solution is not to be obtained by passing over the [One] [Many] at the outset, trusting to deduce [it] afterward from the Absolute [Many]. For the Many is not "given." The pure Many is as much an a priori construct as the "Absolute One," and as little given in experience. And as it is admitted that "Pluralism fails or has so far failed to account for the unity that it in fact involves," then the right and the duty of recoiling from the doctrine is as absolute and imperative as the right and duty of recoiling from its opposite.

Indeed, the promise as well as the problem of the philosophic thought of the twentieth century arises from the exposure of the impossibility of both of these abstract theories, and its rejection all along the line, from the most elementary perception to the most comprehensive reflective knowledge of the premises and the methods of both.

**Lecture III**

No theory can be satisfactory if it is inconsistent with itself; and none can be satisfactory if it attains self-consistency by merely ignoring or abolishing differences. Pluralism cannot afford to be self-contradictory, and singularism or absolutism cannot afford to affirm empty sameness. These rival schools, starting from opposite poles and
employing opposite methods, would arrive at the same goal. They would admit in their scheme both unity and diversity, and they would reconcile these notions. And reconciliation would, for both alike, mean more than the admission of unity and diversity side by side. The One must be explicable only through the Many, and the Many only through the One. Such is the acknowledged condition and criterion of philosophic truth: it cannot contain ultimate incongruities nor be incomplete; it must be a system which is all-comprehensive, and in which all the elements have their own place and function.

It ought, it seems to me, to be obvious that the condition and criterion of reality must in these respects be the same for the real. To maintain a different criterion of truth and reality is not possible with establishing a fundamental discrepancy between them at all points. Reality can as well contain ultimate contingencies as truth can contain ultimate contradictions. Pluralism must as a philosophical theory be a doctrine of the universe as a whole, and if its doctrine must be self-consistent its universe must be one. And absolutism, if its "One" is to have meaning, must affirm the real diversity of the real. In a word, on any theory, the destiny of reality must be the same as that of truth. Epistemology and ontology, even for those who recoil from saying that "reality is experience," must be two names for one doctrine. For the real gains no expression except in knowledge, and knowledge must have the real for its content.

No one will affirm that the concrete truth of the concrete real either has been or can be attained by human knowledge. In that sense no philosophy has ever pretended to be "absolute." But we found in the last lecture that such a truth cannot be approached, and that not even the first step can be taken toward it by a philosophy which omits either the
One or the Many from its original premises. There is no way either from differences to unity or from unity to difference. Indeed, it might be shown that both pure difference and pure unity are confused and contradictory notions. To endeavor to start from either the one or the other is to start from the abstract and the meaningless.

What alternative remains for philosophy? Evidently to start from unity as expressing itself in diversity, or as already concrete. Knowledge must exhibit at every stage—even the first—the essential characteristics of a system. Every object, whether it be that of immediate perception or that of philosophic reflection, whether it be a so-called simple fact or the universe in its totality, must have the character of individuality. This means that it must consist of parts or elements between which there are real differences; but, at the same time, the differences must so complement and sustain one another as to constitute one reality. And that reality is not the mere sum of the parts or elements, nor is it anything superimposed upon them by way of a containing supplement or envelope. For the one can neither be indifferent to the elements nor independent of them; nor are they, on their part, indifferent to or independent of one another or of the whole. The One and the Many must derive their intrinsic character and their very being and function from each other. They must be distinguishable, for they are different; but they must not be separable, for they constitute a unity. On the other hand, they must be One, for they are forms of one reality; but they must not be fused into sameness, for they are different. But this means that individuality belongs both to the whole and also to every real element of the whole or instance of the Many. To deny the individuality of the whole is to disintegrate it into inexplicable and unreal differences, every one of which "is a surd
for thought”; and to deny the individuality of the parts or elements is to reduce unity to emptiness and to make it meaningless. Hence, further, the One and the Many must be both dependent upon and independent of each other. They must exist in themselves, and nevertheless exist only in virtue of their relation to each other in a whole which is at once constituted by them and constitutive of them.

But, it may well be asked, does this not also imply that philosophy starts from and deals with a self-contradiction? It depends, I shall try to show, on the meaning of “individuality,” of dependence and independence, of real being and of relation. In all cases it is the problem of philosophy to explain this apparent enigma. It is not to show that this view of the individuality and reality of the whole and of all its elements is true. We have seen that philosophy postulates this view of truth and reality in attempting to be a coherent or systematic doctrine. Nor is the postulate a mere a priori assumption, unsustained by experience. On the contrary, there is no department of experience which does not contain, or rather consist of, instances of the unity of the diverse, and of the diversity or complexity of the One. The problem confronts ordinary thought on every side, only it ignores it, and it is presented in every one of the arts and sciences. Let me exemplify this fact by citing one or two examples. When four voices sing together the notes C E G C’, or G C D, or D F A, harmony ensues. Now harmony is not mere unison, nor is it mere multiplicity. It is a single effect in which all the voices are fused into unity, but the fusion does not annul the differences nor destroy the individuality of the voice. The individual harmony consists of individual voices each of which is enriched by its relations and intensified in its beauty.
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It is evident that the same holds of a piece of music as a whole. It consists of sequent movements, the first of which passes away to make room for its successor, and yet the character of the movements which come last depends upon—that is, somehow carries within—what went before, and continuity—nay, unity—remains by means of the succession.

Every work of art exhibits the same character of being a One in value of the Many, and presents the same problem. A turret depends for its artistic value upon the place it occupies in the edifice; and so does the artistic value of the edifice. Each gives and borrows its significance and worth from the other, and yet each has its own meaning. So it is also with a picture or a poem. Both the parts and the whole have their individual being and value, and yet these depend on their relation to one another in the whole.

When we turn from the arts to the sciences and to philosophy—to systematized knowledge—the same truth holds. The meaning of a statement depends upon its context and all its cognitive value. A statement may be rendered meaningless by changing its context; and truth itself becomes error when it is placed out of "the appropriate universe of discourse."

Nevertheless the unity of the systematic truth is not obtained by mere fusion. Every element in it retains its own value, and makes its own contribution to the whole. When the mathematician, for instance, proves a theorem in geometry he is engaged in demonstrating one, and only one, truth: e.g., that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. But the single proof of a single truth somehow consists of many truths, and these are at once independent and interdependent. They are independent in that they cannot be done without, and nothing can replace them or perform their function in the proof; they are interdependent in
so far as none of them has either significance or value except by reference to one another and to the single truth they subserve.

In short, the testimony of rational experience to the reality and the interdependence, to the individuality and to the essential and even constitutive interrelation of the Many and the One, is universal. The mere Many of the pluralist and the mere One of the absolutist are alike nothing more nor less than fictions. Experience gives no example of them. They are the results of the abstract treatment of experience.

It follows, therefore, that the interpretation of experience, which philosophy is, must accept this apparent enigma. Its problem is not to show whether, but how, this can be possible—to maintain the reality both of the One and the Many, and to reconcile in its theory what is already reconciled in reality.

But to maintain this view of philosophy, and to carry it out into its results, is to challenge a formidable array of abstractions. For, as we have already seen, the tissue of reality is torn by human knowledge and its seamless raiment rent asunder. We convert differences into contradictions, and isolate and fix our distinctions; and, in consequence, we find the differences irreconcilable. The reality and independence of the Many is assumed to imply that they are exclusive; and any degree of community of existence is held, as a matter of course, to destroy their individuality. The sway of abstractions is very wide.

Nevertheless I believe, as I have said, that if there be any movement of thought in this twentieth century which specially characterizes its mission and promises significant results, it is that of first exposing and then rejecting these abstract opposites. It is, in one word, to repudiate the categories—what Kant by a new abstraction called the Cate-
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categories of the Understanding, which are the categories of external and of both contingent and necessary relation. It is to reject in toto the view that the reality or individuality of anything can consist in or depend upon its isolation. It is to discover that to negate is not to contradict, and that to affirm is not to reduce into mere sameness. On the other hand, it is not to say that reality consists of relations; but it is to say that it is not independent of relations, and that if relations are abolished nothing whatsoever remains. It is to hold steadfast to the truth so plainly illustrated in every work of art, which consists at all times of individual parts every one of which has its own character and function, and which nevertheless is dependent for both its character and its function upon the work of art as a whole. For, whether we can explain it or not, a piece of music does consist of individual notes, and not of mere relations; and yet if the relations between the several notes be annulled they are changed, and no music remains. And whether we can explain it or not, every rational judgment, true or false, makes one affirmation, and that affirmation contains a diversity of elements.

But if this be the special mission of the philosophy of the twentieth century, it must be admitted that the promise of its fulfilment is, so far, faint. Its exposure of the necessary failure of the one-sided assumptions of both pluralism and abstract absolutism is incomplete. It has not taken to heart that experience furnishes no example of either mere unity or mere diversity, and that these rival theories have pure fictions for their premises. Hence it has not repudiated either the method or the aim of these abstract doctrines. It is continuing the attempt to bring the One and the Many together, instead of proceeding from the presupposition that they always are together. Its process is either synthetic or analytic; synthetic in so far as it seeks to proceed from the mere
Many; analytic in so far as it seeks to proceed from the mere One. It does not begin with the conception of system, of reality as a concrete element, nor proceed to observe its growth or evolution, by which unity becomes more deep and significant and the diversity of the parts more clear.

Let me illustrate this truth in the first place with regard to knowledge. The subject of knowledge—namely, the finite, rational self—is still regarded as a res completa; and the object which the subject seeks to know is regarded as another res completa. The problem of knowledge, therefore, assumes the form of showing how they can be brought together. And, further, it is assumed, though with a confidence sharply shaken, that the way of bringing them together is to resolve the one into the other, or, in other words, to abolish the difference between them. And if we have despaired of resolving the subject into its object by the way of materialism, we have, on the other hand, not repudiated the opposite method of resolving the world into the subjective experience of one or more subjects. Subjective idealism is still in vogue, for we say that reality is experience, and in panpsychism the monadism of Leibnitz is being resuscitated, so that all reality is made to consist of what one may call spiritual points, which have only intensive magnitude and no "body" except their own activities.

It is true that philosophers now speak of subject-object, and will even admit that spirit and nature are somehow correlates; but only the most limited use is made of the conception. And when it is affirmed that reality is experience, "experience" is allowed to remain utterly ambiguous so as to carry either an objective or a subjective reference at will. Or when it is explained, as for instance by Mr. Bradley, experience, and therefore reality, is said to consist of feelings, thought and volitions, and subjective idealism reappears.
That little use is made of the conception subject-object beyond the admission that reality is somehow spiritual, is evident from the fact that the psychologist, and also the epistemologist, not only distinguish but separate the functions of mind and things. The world of reality presents the data for mind, and mind then makes the knowledge. But the world cannot give until the mind takes, and the mind cannot take until the world gives; and there is no priority of any kind, either temporal or logical. The statement that reality is experience is meant to convey their intrinsic correlation. But the statement is allowed to remain vague; and experience is, after all, made to belong exclusively to the subject. It is his living conation and cognition, and the object world is its product; and the idealism which practically all philosophers now profess becomes a doctrine which reduces reality either into phenomena of consciousness, such as thoughts, feelings and volitions, or into spiritual monads, more or less confused personalities.

But consciousness cannot be active—that is to say, it cannot be consciousness—except in relation to objects, and the data of knowledge cannot be the results of knowing. Hence the function of the real in the act of knowing must be restored, and consciousness, with all its activities, must be its activity as consciousness, and as a consciousness which is individual. We must make room for the function of both mind and the world in knowledge, and maintain that, as separate, they can neither do nor be anything. Knowledge proceeds neither from minds nor from objects. It is the self-revelation of the whole which comprises both, and is both in their interaction. However true it may be that experience is subjective, personal, private to every individual finite spirit, it is still a consciousness which has contents, which exists only by reference to it, and which cannot make it. To account
for knowledge we must assume a reality which is wider than either subjects or objects, because it comprehends both, and neither is except in relation to its opposite. To begin with, either is comparable to the process of a mathematician who looks for a product by beginning with one of the factors, starting from either 6 or 7 in order to arrive at 42. Knowledge is the result of the interaction of the two aspects of reality which we not only distinguish but separate and then strive to bring together. We endeavor to find a way out of consciousness and into a relation with facts, whereas we are at all, and are conscious, only in virtue of our relation to the reality which comprehends both our minds and the facts.

But if this is true we shall cease to speak of the self and the not-self, of subjects and objects, of mind and matter, of soul and body, of spirit and nature, of God and man as first existing apart, and then brought together through the interaction which reveals itself in knowledge, in the fine arts, in morality and in religion; for that interaction is, as we have seen, impossible unless they are together. Our distinctions must remain and the differences must be real, and the individuality and even the personal privacy of the human spirit be maintained, but they must be maintained within the unity of the real which comprises both the opposites.

That the thought of the present day is making toward this genuine universal standpoint is not to be doubted. There is evidence of it especially in such doctrines as that of the "natural-supernaturalism of Carlyle," in the spiritual realism of Goethe, of Wordsworth; in the indefinite view of the immanence or indwelling of the divine in nature; in the repudiation of materialism by natural science and its clearing consciousness of the abstract character of its hypotheses and task; in the growing conviction of the intrinsic interaction of man and society; in the growing suspicion of both individu-
alistic and socialistic theories, and in the thinning down of the partition between the secular and the sacred, so that man finds his duty, which is his spiritual opportunity and privilege, in every station, and believes that every service of man may be the service of God. The sense of man’s affinity with the universe is deepening in every way, and the universe itself seems to acquire a spiritual significance because man is an element in it.

The justification of this new attitude which philosophy must furnish is difficult. But psychology on the one side, and logic on the other, are preparing the way for the new metaphysic. The former finds no evidence that mind, however spontaneous, can create its own content. Even imagination, when it is more free, only selects and rearranges. If it creates its heaven as it pleases, it must borrow its material, as Hume has shown, from the present world, making its streets of gold and gates of pearl, etc. All knowledge is both relative and anthropomorphic, just because both man and his world are necessary factors in the function of knowing. If man is and must be spontaneous in his cognitive and conative activities, it is not because he is separate from the world. In isolation he is helpless. As he cannot lift a hand or move a foot except by means of the resistance which is also the help of the physical cosmos, so he can neither know nor will, and is in fact only a name or nothingness in his isolation. The world is not a hindrance to man’s “spontaneous” spiritual activities, but their indispensable condition. In truth, his knowledge is the activity of the real in and by him; but it is his knowledge none the less, for by it he comprises the real.

On the other hand, his affinity to and dependence upon his cosmos is also its dependence upon him. The cosmos of the materialist is as inconceivable as the knowing subject or de-
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tached self of the abstract idealist. If mind is not except in its relation to the object, neither is the object except in relation to the subject. The dependence is interdependence, and the real is never only one of its aspects. It is neither natural nor spiritual if these are considered apart.

Nor does the dependence of the world of objects on mind mean that mind, as we know it, makes them, and in making them infects them with its own subjectivity. The objects do not turn out on examination to be nothing but experience, if by experience is meant—as it ought to mean—thoughts, feelings and volitions, which somehow become substantiated into these ambiguous realities, hovering between being and non-being, which we call phenomena. There is no such thing as a "world of truth" which stands over against things in themselves, and mediates between them and minds, being, as Lotze called them, "a replica" of the real. The problem of discovering the connection between ideas and their objects, and all the attempted solutions of the problem by making the former images or symbols or representatives of the latter, or the latter reifications of the former, are as unmeaning and futile as the problem of the relation of the world of fairies to the world of every-day life. There are minds and there are things, and because they are elements of one reality they interact. During their interaction there is knowing, and the result of the activity of knowing is to modify the subject which knows so that it can repeat the process, even when the objects which first contributed to it are not present. But there is no such result as a concatenated system of ideas, nor even a single idea that has any permanence or being of its own. The relation of minds and of things is direct in the last resort, and the relation between them is constitutive of both.
But this, it will be said, makes reality depend for its existence upon being known, and at the least derive a new stage of existence and a higher manifestation of itself from and through man's mind. In that case must not the act of knowing defeat itself? It is the object of knowing to apprehend facts as they are; but that is surely not possible if the act of knowing changes them. Knowing them changes them, I should answer, and defeats thereby its own purpose, only if we continue to assume the dualistic point of view which, at present, we are endeavoring to repudiate, and continue to treat them as separate existences brought together. But the difficulty does not arise if knowing is neither the function of mind nor of objects as apart, but of the reality which comprises them both as elements and aspects. From this latter point of view reality may be shown to enrich itself, to allow fuller being, to set free and to realize new potentialities through the cognitive activities we have been attributing to the self, but which belong to it as comprising the self.

An illustration may indicate the possibility of the truth of the view I am trying to express.

The physicist is supposed to give an account of sound. He tells us that it is wave movement. But the least analysis will show that he professes no such thing. He explains only one of the conditions of sound. Apart from the psychological structure of the human organism, and also apart from the presumably non-physical but psychological structure of his consciousness, there is no sound. Delete any one of these three distinguishable elements—the physical, physiological, or psychical—there would be no sound and the universe would be silent. Sound is not analyzable into any one of these factors, nor attributed to any one of them rather than to the others; and when all the elements of a unity are necessary there is a true sense in which it is not possible to give priority to any
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one of them. On the other hand, it is true that the physical conditions of sound—the wave movements produced by the pressing down of the keys of the organ and the filling of the pipes with wind—gain new significance and value when the organ is played by a great artist and the physical conditions are subordinated to the musical purposes of a great composer. The coming in upon the scene of the musician's soul reveals a new range of meaning and beauty which before were dormant in the physical structure of the natural world; and reality as a whole, which has produced and contributed to the instruction and which comprises the musician, assumes through him a new way of being. And yet, though without him there can be no music, we cannot attribute the musical effect to him alone, as we do knowledge, an experience, to the activities of the subject. Without his context he also is helpless. The distinction of meum and tuum does not hold. The musician's spontaneous—or, as we say, creative—power is conditioned by the real world as a whole in which he lives and moves and has his being, and at the same time the real world needs him in order to realize the significance even of its natural elements.

This illustration suggests the possibility of maintaining that finite minds by their cognitive and conative activities have a more significant function in relation to the world of reality than that of "manifesting" or "expressing" its meaning in the way of truth; and that their relation to it is more intimate than can be accounted for by any theory which attributes their activities to themselves alone, and which makes consciousness contain an idle, epistemological replica of reality. If in order that there may be music, or any other of the productions of fine art, reality as a whole comprising the artist must be effectively present, so reality as a whole must be that which thinks and wills. Not that minds in willing
and knowing are mere instruments upon which the world of reality plays, or by which it gains better and fuller expression. The idea of "instrument" is inadequate to the occasion, and we obscure the truth and lapse back into dualism when we represent minds as operated upon. It is the mind which introduces the purpose. In the case of both the musician and the scientific man or philosopher the natural elements of the cosmos are in a sense subordinated to their purpose; and yet the purpose is not alien to the natural cosmos, or superimposed upon it from without. For nature's own potencies are realized in and by them, and in him they acquire themselves a better and fuller way of existence.

But in that case we must start from a new hypothesis as to the nature of reality. We must no longer speak of it as either natural or spiritual, nor, in order to account for it, endeavor to make the natural disappear in the spiritual. Nature as merely natural is now discovered to be only a fragment of reality, even of reality as finite minds know it. It is and remains "natural," for it is the condition of the spiritual activities, which condition is fulfilled in the finite minds into which it breaks. The facts which we speak of as given in actual experience are real as manifesting themselves in finite minds. Reality has this dual character. It functions in the thinking and volition of men as truly as in the form and the color of plants. Reality has a dual character, or rather it is natural-spiritual. We may distinguish but we cannot separate its elements. Hence mind and reality do not need to be brought together, and thought has not the impossible task before it of going out of itself to reality. It is by comprising the real: and the real exhibits its full and true nature only in the activities by which truth and goodness are attained. When mind appears on the scene the real breaks into knowledge as well as into music, and into moral lives as
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well as statutes and stately edifices. It remains natural, but it is a nature with spiritual potencies that break out into actuality in man. He is nothing apart from it. He is continuous with it. He is effective as mind and will in the degree in which as subject he is saturated with its truth and purpose. For his purpose is a revelation and liberation of Nature's purpose. He is no external addendum, but her product. But when he appears, being her highest product, he recoils upon her, sublates her lower forms of being, assimilates them with and incorporates them into activities which are his activities without ceasing to be Nature's own.

There is a psychological problem for which, so far, no solution has been found. It is that of the relation of soul and body. Psychologists at present propose one of two theories. They suggest a panpsychism which converts all bodies into souls, or a parallelism between them and their phenomena. The former theory introduces more difficulties than it solves, and, so far, has not shown itself worthy of serious discussion; the latter confesses its failure in that it only states the problem and, in fact, offers no solution of it. If our criticisms have any validity, no solution of this problem is possible; and it is impossible because it contains a surd. It is like the problem of proving that $2 \times 2 = 91$, which would baffle all mathematicians; or of inventing a perpetually moving machine, which must baffle the physical inventor; or like saying, "Why should we be moral?", which must baffle the moralist. The mathematician, physicist and moralist who know what they are about will not ask these questions. Nor will the psychologist endeavor to relate—that is, to bring together in thought—what he assumes to be separate in existence. He will rather take to heart what Aristotle has said of such a dualism. He will regard the soul as the highest expression, the full reality, the Εὐρυγεία of the body.
—not deleting it, nor supplanting it, nor yet subordinated to it as a mere consequence or effect, but rather as that in which the body exhibits and realizes its full being, and in doing so proves its intrinsic spiritual potentialities. In man also we find exemplified always, not a soul plus a body, not merely natural or physical and superadded spiritual powers, but one being whose spiritual activities are at once conditioned by, and sublate, or take up, the so-called natural elements. The problem of the psychologist as at present stated is insoluble, because he is unjust to his body and ignores its function in all volition and thought, attributing cognition and volition to a mind in isolation, mind as merely subjective, of the existence of which there is no least item of evidence in any experience.

Man, like the cosmos, is nature at its highest and best, and nature is not a dead mechanism and mere opposite of spirit, any more than it is spiritual apart from mind. The beauty and truth and goodness which appear when man is upon the scene are not only his, but nature's also. And spirit does not dwell in it as in a dead husk, but is its own intrinsic power. This, it seems to me, is the view toward which recent thought is gradually moving. It is the theme and the inspiration of the greatest poetry of our time, from Goethe and Wordsworth to Robert Browning, and it is the aspiration of the highest morality and of the most elevated and reflective religious consciousness of the present age. It is the special mission of philosophy to demonstrate the validity of this view, and make good the truth of the one radiant ideal.

There are evidences that philosophy has entered upon this task. But the task is great and very difficult. It implies not merely revulsion from the consequences of the abstractions which have hitherto obstructed its path, but the most fundamental revolution of all the revolutions of the world of
mind. It implies a change of method. It must start from a different hypothesis and must therefore reinterpret every fact in the light of this hypothesis. I must content myself at present by merely indicating the main obstacles which obstruct its path as it enters upon its problem, all of them due to the abstractions which we have substantiated into contradictory opposites.

The first of these are logical, and therefore metaphysical also, or ontological. I acknowledge that it is precisely in its logical doctrine that modern philosophy has made its greatest advance toward the adoption of this point of view, which, in fact, is that of spiritual realism or concrete absolutism. Nevertheless, even at its best, it is not free from the entanglements which issue from the use of the external categories, which Kant called the Categories of the Understanding. That it is not content with their use and that it aspires to a better is illustrated by its appeal to intuition. Intuition is found to achieve what lies beyond the power of the understanding. It grasps things in their veritable unity: it does not obliterate differences, but it makes them harmonious or transparent—to employ its metaphors. It bridges the gulf between knowledge and reality, and brings mind into immediate illuminating contact with that which is. But it does this at the expense of all method. Its operations are mystical and miraculous. It explains by means of the unintelligible. It has no value except in so far as it expresses discontent with the external methods of "the mere understanding," which, after all, it cannot supplant and must merely supplement.

The method of intuitionism is too easy. It is like the optimism which finds that all is right with the world by denying or ignoring its unhappiness and wickedness. It cannot help until it turns back upon the topics of the understand-
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ing, and reveals the unity within its opposites, and shows it to be intuitive in the double sense that it always grasps unity and is always in actual touch with the real. But owing to the domination of these external categories the judgment is still treated as if it were the result either of a purely analytic or of a purely synthetic process, and reasoning as if it were either deductive or inductive. The predicate is either attached to the subject as a new thing, or it is a mere repetition of a part of the subject. In the first case the judgment is a mere accretion of elements; in the second, a mere tautology. In the first case it cannot be true; in the second it can have no meaning. Moreover, both of these processes rest upon a false supposition as to the nature of the relation of the part of the judgment, as well as of the parts themselves. Their agreement is assumed to mean their identical and indistinguishable sameness—bare unity; their disagreement or negation, to be contradiction and repulsion. In no way, therefore, can either of these theories represent the judgment—that is, any rational opinion—as concrete; and the process of judgment as beginning in the subject with what is already a system, and exposing the nature of the system in the course of judging and reasoning, distinguishing its elements and deepening its unity by the same movement.

Again, on the epistemological side, the “that,” or real being, of the object of knowledge is held to be distinct from its “what,” or its qualities; and judgment is made to consist in bringing these together. And, further, as I have already indicated, knowledge itself is separated into forced abstractions, and the content is assumed to come from the data, while the form is supplied by the activity of the subject. The consequence is that knowledge and reality themselves remain in inexplicable opposition, and truth is in fundamental contra-
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diction with itself. For it is assumed that to agree with or to represent the real as it is, it must cease to be as truth, and be merged in the real, or else be transmuted in an unknowable way by an unknowable Absolute.

But such results indicate the need, not of escaping from methodical thought by means of mystic and methodless intuition, but of recognizing that thought is always systematic and its object always a One in the Many, and therefore of ceasing to set the dualistic problems which baffle all attempts at solution.

The second main obstacle, and possibly the more serious in practice, may be called ethical. It is assumed, to put the matter as directly and concisely as I can, that the ethical world will disappear if man is not the genuine creator of his own actions, or absolutely spontaneous; and, further, that his creative power or spontaneity must mean that he stands apart and absolutely isolated from the so-called outer world. He is a pure subject, as represented by Kant, ontologically separate from all objects, and even from himself when he is the object of his own knowledge—his knowing self falling into the noumenal, and his known self into the phenomenal world. We are jealous, and rightly jealous, of our own intrinsic individuality, and assume that in order to maintain it we must hold the world, so to speak, at arm's length and extrude it. Let the outer conditions, and even our own past history, be what they will, we must at any moment have the power of acting upon it and from it in a manner that, for all computation, must be contingent. “Contingency,” as we have seen, must be “let into the heart of things.” The inner life shuts out the outer world; or if it shuts it in or comprises it, it is only in the form of “experience”—that is, of thoughts, feelings and volitions—and its realities become “phenomena.” We have “gone back to Kant,” and we still
dwell among his contradictions, for we have not gone forward from Kant.

Now I have no desire to minimize or to obscure in the least degree the privacy of personality, or the subjective and intensely individual character of all experience. On the contrary, there is no apparent excuse into which I would not follow the solipsist in this direction. All experience is in the fullest sense individual, and there is no such thing as universal experience in the sense that one finite man can think the thoughts or will the volitions of another. Every man’s thoughts and every man’s volitions are exclusively his own, and no other’s; they remain his own even if it be true, as it is, that other men may know the same truth and will to bring about the same change.

When the idealist, in endeavoring to meet the evident objections to solipsism, affirms that a man’s mind is not a particular thing, like his pocket-knife, but has a universal nature, which makes his mind one in intrinsic structure, subject to the same laws, active in the same manner as all minds, or as mind “as such,” I have no concern in contradicting him. But such an argument does not obviate the difficulties of solipsism. However universal in nature a man’s mind may be, it does not lose its intensely private and personal character, and all his experiences are his own in a sense that is exclusive. In other words, the subjective, personal, private character of experience remains, and every mind looks at the world with its own eyes. Were all men, like the gods, possessors of the real truth of all reality, their thoughts would still be their own; and were all human wills one with the will of God, they would still be personal wills and the moral perfection would be their own.

The reputation of the solipsist is implied in his own premises. There is no solipsist who in making an affirmative does
not consider that his affirmation refers to, and is an ideal construction or representation of, reality. He is expressing his own thoughts of the real, and his thoughts are his own. But, unless he confuses the results of his thinking with that about which he is thinking, and the object which he strives to comprehend with the products of his effort, he will not maintain that the real about which he thinks is also subjective. He cannot at the same time profess that he is expressing the truth and maintain that he is not dealing with the real. His thoughts, however subjective, have an objective reference, and however personal and private, they are his personal and private conception of that which is. Truth, affirmation, negation, judgment have in every instance this reference to the real. The reference is direct in every experience, and the reference is always to the real—that is, for each mind, to only one real.

Hence every solipsist considers that he knows the truth; and it is not possible to affirm or deny except on this presupposition. The question of agreement or disagreement is subsequent and secondary. What concerns us now is the universal and necessary character of every experience, however personal. The reference of a judgment is not to a private real; not even when he says, "This is only my opinion." Even that statement is a statement of a fact. And it is alleged that the result of the dealing of different minds is a different experience, or as many opinions as there are minds. Still, each mind in every affirmation refers to what is real, or to what his thought represents or misrepresents.

Nor can it be affirmed that each subject refers to a different reality, a reality infected with the illusions of his own thought. Once more it is the result that may be illusory, or merely phenomenal. And, as we have seen, the results of knowing cannot be the data of knowledge; nor have they
any existence except as ways of the activity of the cognizing subject. Phenomena do not constitute a class of existing things, over and above the subjects which know, and the reality which the subjects endeavor to know.

Thus every experience is bipolar. It is the living relation or interaction of two elements of a reality which is at once spiritual and natural. Knowing and willing is the act of the self by means of this world and of the real world. For no existence can refer to any other.

The question of the agreement or disagreement of the different experiences, or of any community between them, is subsequent and secondary to the reference of each experience to the real, which every judgment is. And it also concerns reality, which is capable once more of being rightly or wrongly interpreted. And the real is in this and every other case the criterion of what is held to be true or false. So that the reality also is assumed in every experience, in every act of cognition, to be bipolar. It is, and it is capable of expressing itself subjectively to the knowing mind. Reality, we may perhaps be allowed to say, expresses itself in many self-conscious foci and in many degrees of accuracy and fullness. But the presupposition of the real—that is, of one single reality—is as inevitable to every subject as the presupposition of his own existence.

When the solipsist, therefore, affirms that every subject has his own experience, which is true, he overlooks the fact that the object with which each experience deals or which it endeavors to represent is that which is. No subject can assume that there are as many systems of reality as there are interpretations of it; he denies to the experience of others that which is essential to his own and to the very possibility of experience.
It follows from this that there is one criterion for all experience, and one ideal. It is reality. It is by constant reference to it that he corrects and extends his own, and affirms or denies the truth of the experience of others: for their expressions of it are also objects for him, and parts of the reality which he endeavors to know. And the reference to the real is a reference to the Absolute—that is, to that which is all in all and exists in its own right. It is by their seeming congruence or incongruence with the presupposed whole of reality that particular opinions are called true or false. But this is as much as to say that reality is held to be a systematic whole, within which each particular fact has its own place and function. If we work to correct another person of error in any judgment, we do so by compelling him to choose between that opinion and his interpretation of that which is real. The admission of a new truth may compel us to revise our conception of the system of reality. A new hypothesis may carry with it a revolution in our view of reality; but the reality which is the aim of our intellectual attempt, and the criterion of the value of its results, is no new reality. It is not true, therefore, that there are as many realities as there are opinions of reality; although there may be as many interpretations of it as there are cognitive subjects. On the contrary, each subject is necessarily assumed to be from his own standpoint endeavoring to interpret the world of reality. Experience, false or true, has otherwise no meaning.

It is this truth that Spinoza expressed when he said that knowledge is adequate in the degree in which the subject of knowledge contemplates objects sub specie aeternitatis. And the moral life of man—that is, his practical life when considered in the light of its ultimate issues—gives an interesting illustration of this truth. For morality also carries within at
all times this immediate reference to the Absolute. The action may be, and always is, particular in one of its aspects. But it is also a particularized universal. The right action is a specific affirmation, and the wrong action is a specific violation, of a Universal Good. The right action may be in itself insignificant—the mere giving of a cup of cold water; but being right, it is what is required in that particular context, and neither gods nor men can improve upon it. It is the particular reification or incarnation of the best. It is doing the work of God, in the language of religion. It is accord with the nature of things. And thereby it acquires inexhaustible worth and power.

Hence issues the dignity of an act which we call good, and the splendor which cannot be obscured. Hence also flows the sense of unconquerable strength which the moral agent always feels when he is in his duty. The nature of things is at his back. God is with him. His will is one with the divine. It must prevail. Its language always is, "If God be with us, who can be against us?"

Both in cognition and volition, therefore, both in knowledge and in morality, once we have freed ourselves of the fixed abstractions of the understanding, we find that immediate continuity with reality which is our own life; and the service of the true and the good, being the service of what is real, is the service of freedom so perfect that it finds nowhere aught that can limit or obstruct it. The service is fuller, the closer and the wider our communion with what is real; and the natural cosmos, in all its wealth, is not a limit but a condition of the life of our own spirit, and the living partner in all our spiritual enterprises.

Henry Jones.