VI

CHINA AMONG THE NATIONS

We have already noted the entry of China into defined relationships with Western nations through the treaties of Nanking and Peking. The conditions then enforced as terms of peace, are, with slight modifications, the content of the so-called unequal treaties against which China is now in clamorous protest. There was, however, little friction or sense of grievance until the last decade of the nineteenth century. That period represented the elevation of European aggression to the level of conscious policy. It flowed from the tireless effort of Russia to open a pathway across the continent and to give herself an impregnable terminus on the Pacific seaboard. Two results followed: one, the Russo-Japanese war which entailed temporary disaster for Russian ambitions; the other, the so-called battle of concessions. China came to be regarded as a field of expansion, and the nations were sufficiently in concert to agree upon the lines of partition. This policy would have resulted in the division of China under the hegemony of the great powers, with exclusive control of resources and exploitation of trade. The Japanese entered the program of continental aggression through their successful war, so only one great power, the United States, was left out of account. It transpired, however, very suddenly that we found ourselves a Far Eastern power through the unexpected acquisition of the Philippine Islands. Moreover, we were not unaffected by the general fever of imperialism, and we saw ourselves
prospectively excluded from all opportunities that China might present.

It was under these circumstances that John Hay gave utterance to the third cardinal principle of American policy, that of the Open Door, coördinate with the principles of the Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. While incidental to this discussion, it may be well to remind ourselves that foreign policy ceases to be wish, and becomes intention, when it has a territorial basis. The very term "open door" was first used in the instructions given the commissioners who went to Paris to negotiate peace with Spain. It was presented as the cogent reason why we should acquire and hold the Philippines. This should be remembered in the futile discussion that goes on endlessly regarding Philippine independence. We can no more withdraw from the Philippines than from the Panama Canal.

The Russo-Japanese war had given pause to the policy of partition, but the open door declaration brought it to an end. Here was a great power without foothold on the continent and refusing to recognize the exclusive privilege of any other nation in any of the preëmpted areas. It did not, however, loosen the European powers from the acquisitions they had already secured by forced lease. Thenceforth, competition for privilege turned into an effort to secure economic advantage through concessions from the Chinese government.

China realized her helplessness, and her only mode of protection was to play the powers against each other and thus keep alive their suspicions and jealousies. The method of diplomacy in China has been to maintain the concert when general pressure was needed, and then to revert immediately to intrigue for separate advantage. During the first decade of this century China was engaged in attempt-
ing to learn how to protect herself by adopting Western methods. The major events from the fall of the mandarinate to the ascendancy of Yuan Shi Kai are particulars of this process of readjustment. Then came the European war and the beginnings of the new story of China's place among the nations.

The period from the opening of the war to the Washington Conference in 1922 may be described as that of Japanese aggression. It will be remembered that to Japan fell the task of reducing and capturing the German holdings in Shantung. The military operations were quickly successful, and Kiaochow, with the city of Tsing-Tao, passed into Japanese possession; also the operation and policing of the Shantung railway. The effect of these operations was simply the replacement of German by Japanese control.

In the next year, 1915, conditions seemed propitious for Japan to attain the ultimate object of her ambitions—that of the domination of Eastern Asia. European nations were fully occupied with their own struggle, and their very existence as Asiatic powers now depended upon the favor of Japan. America was already deeply involved in European affairs with sympathies so oriented toward the success of the Allies, that it was certain she would do nothing to break their cohesion. In Japan, from the beginning of military participation, control of government and of policy passed to the military party whose one outlook was continental domination. These were the circumstances that led to the presentation to the government of China of the famous twenty-one demands. Every privilege that had been jealously sought by other powers was claimed; not only economic domination, but a degree of military occupation that could enforce conformity; and in addition the permanent Japanese possession of German holdings. The effect
of these arrangements was to reduce China to a condition of vassalage. Here was a sudden revelation of what Japan would do if opportunity presented—of stark, brutal aggressiveness—which it will require many years to obliterate.

China was, as usual, helpless. Yuan Shi Kai was attempting to realize his imperial ambition. When it was evident that America would not come to the rescue, Yuan’s government, harassed by Japanese threats, accepted the bitter humiliation. Secret treaties were concluded with England, France and Russia, as a part of the hard bargaining of war, and the only country left free to protest was the United States.

When we entered the war in 1917, we proceeded likewise to sell China as the price of Japanese support, or, what was in truth, neutrality. It would have been impossible to tie this country into complete acceptance, such as had been given by the Western Allies, but the Lansing-Ishii agreement to recognize and respect the special interests of Japan on the continent, amounted to a promise that Japan should have a free hand. It is curious that even war psychology could have carried us so far toward repudiation of our traditional policy.

The next step seemed to seal the fate of China, so far as protection from abroad was concerned. President Wilson, brought face to face with the secret treaties, and hard pressed by the whole course of the peace negotiations, gave acceptance to the Japanese terms.

The strange thing is that Japan should have convinced herself that this patchwork of war bargaining could really secure her in the domination of Eastern Asia. Two new conditions arose. First, the United States, freehanded, uninjured by war, conscious of her power, began to prepare to send Japanese imperialism after that of Germany. It
is hardly realized now how surely and completely an avalanche was forming and beginning to move. The difficulty was averted by the Washington Conference.

Meanwhile, Japan was far from having complete enjoyment of her new privileges. The Siberian adventure had promised much and produced nothing. Military fever subsided quickly; moderate forces came into control; and Japan was not unaware of the menacing rumblings across the Pacific. But a still more important matter changed the course of her ambitions. China had but one effective weapon, the boycott. This was brought into action, when the results of the peace conference were known, with a universality, a unanimity, and thoroughness which quickly showed the Japanese that military power and treaty agreements would never be effective in exploiting China. Trade is more important than domination, and Japan can never be economically independent of China. The boycott was not only a spontaneous reaction of the Chinese, but it represented the first great concert of the people under the leadership of students of Western training. There has been much confusion as to the origin of the Chinese nationalist consciousness. It sprang into existence in 1919, when China, deserted by all the powers, faced with bare hands the unscrupulous and greedy designs of Japan.

Then came the Washington Conference of 1922. Its ostensible purpose was to arrive at an understanding as to limitation of armaments. Its real purpose was to secure a redefinition of the whole Far Eastern situation. In particular, it was the desire of the United States to bring to an end the Anglo-Japanese alliance which presented a serious barrier to the purpose that was slowly forming to eliminate the menace of Japanese imperialism.

Conviction had already been brought home to the Japan-
ese that their continental policy had been mistaken. It was obvious that Britain, now closely associated with the United States in matters of general policy, and with her own vast interests menaced by the Japanese intervention, would not continue the rôle of ally. Nothing but loss and disappointment had been entailed by the military policy. Japan was, therefore, already disposed to a general recession from the demands of 1915, and to a withdrawal from her holdings in Shantung.

The achievements of the Washington Conference included not only the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but also a realignment of the powers on the principle of the open door policy, which was a guarantee of the integrity of China. The powers recognized the unfairness of the customs rates, and prepared the way for an increase. Nationalist consciousness in China was already clamoring for a cessation of extraterritoriality, and the powers agreed that this, too, should be given careful investigation and consideration. A double conference on tariff revision and extraterritoriality was to be called to meet in Peking immediately after ratification of the treaties. Naturally, these deliberations could not be held free of the complications of European politics, particularly those regarding arrangements for limitation of armaments. In order to delay ratification, France used the excuse of her claim that the Boxer indemnity should be paid in gold francs. Finally the treaties were passed, and a conference on the tariff and on extraterritoriality met late in 1925. They amounted to little more than a demonstration of the wish of Western powers to make adjustments on matters that were regarded as of vital importance by the Chinese. At that time, and especially in the beginning of 1926, China's factionalism assumed a most confused aspect which made it impossible for
her to speak in the conference with any accredited voice. As Japan regards an increase of customs duties as inimical to her commercial interests, she spared no method or subterfuge to defeat the program of tariff revision. As China could not possibly display a legal system calculated to give protection to foreigners, the result of investigation of extraterritoriality was a foregone conclusion.

Meanwhile the Far Eastern situation had developed conditions favorable for the peculiar type of diplomacy in which the Soviet republic has become adept. In the earlier stages before 1920, the Russian attitude toward China had been one of hostile aggression. When the tide turned against the White Russians with their backing from Japan and the allied Western powers, the Soviet drive included not only Eastern Siberia, but Manchuria and Mongolia. The so-called Far Eastern Republic sent emissaries to stir the Mongolian princes into revolt and endeavor to tie them into a protectorate. But the Chinese managed to assert their supremacy, and Mongolia presented a typical oriental scene of contention, reprisal and massacre.

In 1920, out of a clear sky came a complete change of Russian policy. An offer was made by Moscow to return the Russian concessions, to renounce the privilege of extraterritoriality, and to forego the benefits of the Boxer indemnity. Soon an arrangement was made which brought an end to the conflict over Mongolia, and provided a fairer basis for control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. When presently a Soviet diplomatic representative was sent to Peking, it was with the rank of ambassador which, ironically, gave him precedence over the representatives of other powers.

These steps were taken under circumstances that made China extremely susceptible to a friendly approach. The
Western powers were deeply involved in their own troubles and had done nothing to protect China from the maw of Japanese imperialism. The ill-fated efforts to aid the White Russians in their counter-revolution had left with the Soviets a bitter resentment that would leave no method untried to injure their enemies. China was dismembered among her war lords, who were ready to avail themselves of any external aid to advance their interests. Ultimately Russia needed a hold upon China in preparation for the conflict which Japanese action was making inevitable.

Russia had discovered through her own revolutionary experience that there was another method of inflicting injury than that of firing projectiles from a distance; it was surreptitiously to place and explode dynamite from within.

The new Russian diplomacy was that of systematically and persistently fomenting revolution by organizing and inciting the working classes. But propaganda needed favorable conditions. Hence the extraordinary gesture of justice and generosity in the retrocession of treaty privileges. For the first time in the whole course of Chinese foreign relations, something was given to China and not demanded from her. Even so, it was a contest between the factions that provided Russia’s opportunity. The Japanese had most assiduously cultivated a confusion that would breed weakness. If there had been no civil war, one would probably have been started by Japan. This wish to prevent unity had enabled Sun Yat Sen to secure Japanese support at the beginning of the revolution. Later, this support was transferred to Chang Tso-lin who held three Manchurian provinces and who seemed a promising tool, not only for control of north China, but for holding back Russian aggression. The Soviet government therefore turned to the South at a moment when help was sorely needed, and by
providing supplies, together with administrative and military commissions, started that association of Canton with communism which is now bearing its fruit. Meanwhile, Feng Yu Hsiang divided the two great Northern war lords, secured and held Peking for two years, and gave Russia an opportunity to work from the Northern capital.

As the stock in trade of Russian propaganda is the incitement of workers against the bourgeoisie, and since China did not provide these classes, it served a double purpose for the Soviet government to teach that all Chinese were oppressed workers and all Westerners were hated capitalists. In this way the normal antagonism of the Chinese to the Western powers was reënforced by an economic motive illustrated only by the few factories in the concessions. There was thus initiated that period of foreign relations which may be described as one of anti-foreignism.

This new era has been characterized by a curious and almost ironic change of attitude on the part of all the powers. The traditional method of treatment had involved a consistent display of firmness toward the Chinese. The powers might be rivals of each other, but the tacit agreement to join forces in dealing with the Chinese government had remained the practically unbroken rule. When China attempted to play for advantage through one of them, equivalent privileges were promptly claimed by the others.

The new attitude of Russia meant an attempt to capture and capitalize Chinese good will. China, even in the chaos of civil war, found herself suddenly regarded as important enough to be treated as an equal, and great concessions made to secure her friendship. Nor was Russia alone in adopting this attitude. Japan's experience of the boycott had brought home the futility of attempting forceful domination, so the policy of arrogant aggression was changed
to one of persuasion. It began to seem to the Chinese that a display of resentment could secure far more favorable results than one of patient acceptance.

The Western powers, lamed and weary after five years of war, had little inclination to undertake aggressive action, and little desire to add to their complications. Leadership in Far Eastern affairs had passed to the United States, which necessarily made the non-aggressive open door principle the keynote of action. After the Washington Conference, the Western powers merely sat waiting for Chinese affairs to sort themselves. The policy was to maintain the status quo, which, however, no longer existed, and could not be recovered. They pretended that there was a Chinese government with an accredited foreign office to which their communications were regularly made. This play with a fiction merely meant five years of paralysis, while the fires of resentment flamed with increasing menace, skillfully fed by the Russian propagandists. There was a series of minor outrages which were duly protested to a government whose authority barely reached the city walls. No attempt was made to hold those with local authority accountable for what was done. The Chinese believed, with good reason, that they could do much as they liked with no resultant damage to themselves. The feeling grew that the Western powers had begun, not only to respect, but to fear China, and that this was a consequence of her own hostility.

The climax came in 1925 when mobs of demonstrators threatened destructive action in the concessions. The foreigners suddenly replied with force in Shanghai, Hankow, and Shameen. This added to resentment a sense of outrage, and China broke into a clamor so loud and bitter that the powers took every step to placate and conciliate. But now anti-foreignism had changed from a feeling to a
policy which required nothing less than the complete retire-
ment of all foreigners from their treaty rights. This has
been the motive and the principle of cohesion in the Can-
tonese or so-called Nationalist Movement of the past two
years. It is, however, one thing to secure unity by an anti-
foreign program, and quite another to put that pro-
gram into effect. There was always danger that teaching
for political results would be taken seriously by those
reached through this method of incitement. The real men-
ace to foreigners is that of mob action out of the reach of
control and accountability. Chinese armies have little dis-

cipline, and the likelihood that troops may join the mobs
or undertake mob action on their own account, is always
present. The feeling of foreigners has been that any form
of retaliation might precipitate a greater trouble, and this
reluctance has increased China's belief in foreign timidity.
It is probable that if the Cantonese had learned to respect
foreign rights at the concession limits of Hankow, the
outrages of Nanking would never have taken place.

Let us now have a glimpse at the future and attempt to
locate the problems involved in China's relations to other
powers. These are of two kinds, those associated with the
present situation, and those connected with future develop-
ments of policy. The rôle of prophet is more than precari-
ous in all that concerns China. Confusion and complica-
tion are there added to the uncertainty which shrouds the
future in the West as well as in the East. The best one can
do is to indicate what seem to be the chief factors and ten-
dencies, and state what seems to be their probable outcome.

It may be said with reference to the immediate situation
that the powers are compelled to face issues now which
must of necessity be relegated to a later period. Present
action is based upon what a Western government conceives
to be its primary duty, to give protection to the lives and property of its nationalists. This necessity may itself lead to great difficulties. The Chinese have forgotten that Western powers have arms that are very long and very powerful. They, themselves, understand little about diplomacy and much about direct action. With resentment erected into a policy, and mob violence the traditional mode of protest, there may easily be outrages which will compel the powers to take forcible action. This could conceivably, but improbably, lead to military intervention.

The great difficulty is that China demands immediate revision of the treaties in a manner, and to an extent, which would amount to a complete retirement of foreigners from their present rights. It happens that these same treaty conditions constitute the foreigner's guarantee of protection for his life and property. The surrender of the concessions would mean the loss of millions of invested capital. It may be taken as perfectly certain that the powers will withdraw from these concessions only when a stable Chinese government can make these investments as secure as they are now. Otherwise, they will remain in foreign hands, and any attempt to take them will be met by force. The same is true of extraterritoriality. The governments of Great Britain and the United States could not dream of leaving their citizens at the mercy of Chinese legal procedure at present, and probably for some time to come. It might be thought that control of the Maritime Customs falls into a different category. As a matter of fact, this is the principal security for the various loans that have been made to China. These three factors in the treaties are all, then, matters of protection of life and property. They can be altered only when a Chinese guarantee can, term for term, replace a foreign right. Our government spokesmen have repeatedly
indicated the readiness of this country to alter the treaty conditions so soon as China can show ability to give equivalent protection.

This situation should be remembered by our people and should forestall the kind of clamor that has been made in recent months for our government to proceed at once with treaty revision without regard to other powers. This is, of course, a futile bid for Chinese good will, which does not exist, and which would have no value if it could be called into being after our complete retirement from Chinese affairs. We took the leadership in Far Eastern arrangements at the Washington Conference; these arrangements depend upon full understanding and concerted action among the powers concerned. Britain has been made to bear the brunt of organized Chinese resentment for the past three years. The British make no more claims to protection of life and property than we ourselves. Why should we step aside and leave the whole difficulty for her to handle? The treaty rights we now possess were secured by stepping in after Britain had opened the way. The President has recently stated that we are not deeply committed in China by reason of the fact that we hold no concessions. In fact, we are equally responsible with Great Britain for the international settlement of Shanghai. Our citizens have invested immense sums in properties located in British concessions at most of the treaty ports. We are perfectly certain that Britain is going to protect her concessions and our investments; it is not quite creditable to pretend that we have no commitments. This is of a piece with the self-righteousness with which we are giving currency to the notion that Great Britain is in some way exploiting China, and that the nationalist movement represents an attempt to free China from foreign tyranny. What the British are doing in China,
is precisely what we are doing—carrying on trade. There
is no special privilege possessed by the British which we
do not equally share; and there is no special privilege of
any kind apart from the protective arrangements already
discussed. These will be relinquished when Chinese pro-
tection is adequate. It is inconceivable that we can relin-
quish them because a Chinese faction is raising a clamor and
trying to exert pressure.

Turning now to future problems, some of which may not
be very remote, we may note the curious fact that China
is attempting to drive away the very powers that are con-
cerned to protect her integrity. The Chinese who feel that
they are sweeping to a realization of their national destiny
by cutting all connections with the West, are acting as cats' paws for the two powers whose ambitions menace the very existence of China as an independent nation. The country is, in reality, a disguised battlefield where Russia and Japan are carrying on their struggle. The Chinese believe they are fighting for the supremacy of one or another faction which they regard as a vehicle of the national hope. They are merely doing the fighting, such as it is, for these two powers. Sooner or later, the fight will come into the open. Each is willing to see the West eliminated, as then the re-
ward of victory will be the control of China.

There is, however, no good reason to assume that the
Western powers will, or can be eliminated from Far Eastern
affairs. Commitments are far too extensive to forego the
benefits of trade, or to permit China to go as a prize of
war under the domination of either Russia or Japan. We
must, therefore, attempt to estimate the possibilities which
may be involved in future developments of Western policy.
Let it be noted that there is nowhere within the present
horizon any menace of territorial aggression by Europe or
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America. Their interests are recognized as lying entirely within the field of trade.

There is, first, the possibility that the old rivalries may reappear, and with them a concert which might again attempt the delimitation of spheres of influence for exploitation. If the situation were as simple as a generation ago, this danger would be very great. War has given European nations a tremendous increase of nationalist feeling. Policy is directed ultimately by what is conceived to be necessary for self-preservation. While the worst suffering may now be regarded as past, the needs of these nations are still so great that they may be driven to seize every possible advantage. Their military establishments are fully effective, and the occasion for their use is not an impossible contingency. With the Russo-Japanese quarrel overt, it may be difficult to avoid intervention with all its disastrous consequences.

The greatest barrier in the way of such a development of European ambitions is the position now occupied by the United States. The open door policy is one of equal benefits of trade, and of unalterable opposition to territorial aggrandizement, or the holding of special privilege by anyone. Any recession from this policy would be very slow and would have to make its way through deep opposition by the American people.

The situation is, therefore, favorable to the other possibility which, if accepted, may transform China from a field of contention to one of international coöperation. And this in such measure as to aid largely in the kind of reconstruction which the world is now seeking to effect.

Our troubles have largely come from an unholy alliance of political with economic organization, which has dominated Western policy for the past three centuries. What we assume to be a perfectly natural relationship may be
seen in a few decades to have been the one destructive factor in Western civilization. Of course, the thing has had a history. European nationalism had grown to vigorous proportions before it seized upon trade as one of its instruments. The Hanseatic League operated throughout Western Europe without political connection or military action. Its merchants were welcomed by all nations and the equal benefits of trade brought a degree of prosperity that none of them had previously experienced.

Then came the discovery of the New World, adventurous conquest, settlement, and the search for new sources of wealth. Expansion quickly led to national rivalries, and the contests of succeeding centuries were nearly always associated with the ambitions incident to the growth of empire. Colonial trade had to be protected, and the economic benefits of colonial exploitation led to the subordination of trade relationships to political purposes. The result has been the continuous seeking of special advantage at the cost of other parties to trade relationships, and especially of the traders of rival nations. The fallacious doctrine of this politico-economic association justifies the enhancement of national welfare no matter what the loss to foreigners. Moreover, in modern times it is a universalization of the principles of warfare. Military action is only the breaking crest of a wave which is in motion at all times in the modern world. The doctrine of economic independence is one of war, like that of seeking special and unfair advantage. A tariff wall has the same character as a military entrenchment. It is absurd to attack the problem of peace and war in its phase of blood-letting, while the actuality of warfare is going on all the time.

The mitigating forces are two in number. First, a slow comprehension that economic organization has no proper
connection with political purpose, and that trade which depends upon national backing for its life, may bring a few abnormal benefits as loot secured by force, but has no permanent basis and can confer no lasting benefits. Economists are well aware that interference by government in trade to secure a special advantage, is fallacious in principle and ultimately self-defeating. Healthy trade has one simple principle—that of mutual benefit in the exchange of goods.

This point of view is obtaining an increased recognition because the world's trade has attained such proportions and so great a degree of complexity, that all peoples are felt to constitute a coöperative society. What has taken place in the domestic organization of each nation is extending beyond national boundaries and thus slowly creating a condition of universal interdependence.

In the second place, we are gradually emerging to a clearer view of the true function of government in human society. It is the old and simple one of maintaining justice. Special classes have in the past used it for their own advantage, a procedure which led to their ultimate destruction. The owners of wealth have sought to entrench themselves behind political authority. Now the workers strive to capture political power for the avowed purpose of taking for themselves the benefits of industry and commerce. Both attempts are, of course, doomed to failure. We now understand that it is the business of government to regulate the whole system in such manner as to insure fair treatment of all participants. This does not mean non-interference, for laissez-faire means a reversion to the law of the stronger. The economic system is a vastly complicated, ever-changing conjunction of interests, any one of which can injure the healthy action of the whole, unless its action is controlled. The competitive society is not as our fathers
thought, self-regulatory; it requires the supervisory action of an independent authority acting solely in the interests of the general welfare.

When this simple principle of government is expanded from the domestic to the universal economy, the possibility of permanent peace will come into view. There is no such thing as the elimination of war by treaties or by leagues for the discussion of differences, so long as international trade is implicitly a battlefield. War must be outgrown, not outlawed. Encouraging steps have already been taken in the effort to substitute adjudication for immediate recourse to violence. This, however, can have little effect until the principle is extended from public to private international law. Causes of dispute in the modern world are almost wholly economic. Business of any kind is private in character. When it is possible to find an even-handed justice in the difficulties that arise in international business, just as it is in one's own county, at that point the world will find itself entering its new era of peace and prosperity. No supernational authority is needed if each nation will give to adjudication based upon an accepted body of legal principles, proper force and effect, and do its part toward enforcement. No nation as a whole can have a quarrel or cause of conflict, until it places its authority behind some group of its citizens. A secure justice which would grow in acceptance would thus forestall national intervention in business affairs.

In spite of the fact that American policy is confused and often fallacious in its conception of national duty, and we are very likely to see the interests of our people as the measure of the universally right, still there are several respects in which America is preparing the way for the new order. First, the United States is a highly organized
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industrial society with specialization and consequent interdependence carried further than elsewhere. The fruit of this is toleration. We are seldom tempted to destroy those who are necessary for our welfare. Again, while the country is surrounded by a tariff wall, the United States is within her boundaries the greatest example of a system of free trade. In the third place, political units have altered from almost national importance to a place of regulatory and administrative usefulness subordinate to the general welfare.

In her external relations our country is capable of doing foolish and harsh things. Our conceptions of international relationships are as unformed as the relationships themselves are novel. We have merely kept away from complications, having a considerable continent of our own. Still this very fact has fixed our policy as defined in the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door as one of non-aggression. Any wide departure from this principle would provoke a deep reaction.

The foregoing has been said in order to secure a point of view for our Far Eastern policy, from which it can be seen for what it is—a thing upon which much of the future of the world is certain to depend. Our leadership in all arrangements is fortunate, because in the hands of a wise statesmanship it can secure the application of the principles of justice rather than those of national advantage.

When China is seen in the tremendous rôle she is to play in the future, our policy may be saved from the dangers of determination by adventitious and immediate circumstances. That rôle is a very special one in the family of nations. China provides no menace to any other people. Military conceptions have no place in her culture, and military action, in spite of present appearances, no place in her national
organization. One cannot say that a few decades of pressure from outside might not produce a Chinese soldier, but this can only be done by changing everything in him that is Chinese. If anyone suffers from the bogy of the yellow peril, let him be reassured by the fact that population alone does not provide military effectiveness, that the Chinese people are poor beyond our comprehension, and that natural resources which could be applied to military equipment are so limited that they can meet simple industrial needs only by the most frugal use. Incidentally, the same may be said of Japan in spite of the belligerent gestures of the past generation. China is, then, necessarily pacific. All that any other nation can do is to trade with her. Attempts at compulsion for special advantage will result in a situation like that of the present. There is no one to compel, and intimidation is soon lost in a mass of four hundred millions. It is to be hoped that Chinese industry will develop to the point that will remove the greater temptations to aggression. In brief, the present situation, which to the traditional outlook of the West is so confusing and paralyzing, gives an opportunity for a redefinition of policy and of methods of handling international relationships, which, if accepted and fully utilized, may be the beginning of that new order about which we dream.

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