The Places of Colonialism in the Writing and Teaching of Modern German History

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This article explores two oddities that face someone who is considering teaching or writing about German colonialism. The first one is this: even though overseas empire was a part of German identity and popular imagination in the Kaiserreich and at least a hundred years before that, since the Kaiserreich the absence of colonialism from the German past became a quiet, but stubborn, part of German identity. (The German Democratic Republic was, at least at the official level, an exception.) German identity after 1919, that is, German postcolonial identity, has been insular, even self-consciously provincial. This is especially surprising given that Germans have traveled and lived all over the world, and that people from all over the world have traveled to and lived in Germany. There are provincial parts of the world, but twentieth-century Germany is not one of them. Some of the most eloquent descriptions of what I am calling an insular or provincial postcolonial identity have been formulated by Afro-Germans. In a recent documentary film on the poet May Ayim, who was born in Germany, she says: "The first question is always, Where did you come from? and the second question is, When are you leaving?"

The second oddity is the treatment of German colonialism in the historiography of Germany. General works on modem Germany reflect a certain provincialism and a quiet, but stubborn, white identity for Germans. That identity is the historical outgrowth of ideas widely held in the nineteenth century - and most pointedly articulated by colonialists. It was also the outgrowth of Germans' responses to defeat in the First World War and to a decolonization forced upon them by other colonial powers (and not primarily by colonial subjects, who had tried and failed to shake off German rule). Such ideas included the racist principle that only white people can define and practice German culture. Another such idea, current until around 1945, was that the assimilation of white Germans to other cultures did not erase a rightful belonging to Germany. After Hitler and his supporters gave that notion a bad name, postcolonial and post-Nazi German identity was connected neither to a project of assimilating others to a second-tier German status (and being faced, as European colonizers
were, with individuals who demanded first-tier German status), nor to claiming a global reach of German culture.

Studying formal empire is not the only way to get at the nature of contacts between Germans and Africans, Pacific Islanders, or Chinese, or German intercultural contact in general. It does offer specific advantages, notably a formal institutional setting in which policies and opinions had to be negotiated and therefore clearly articulated. Since identity has been shaped historically to a great extent by state rule and bureaucratic practice, formal colonialism offers a good context for examining identity issues. Formal colonialism also offers a way to anchor racist ideas in a specific social and economic context, which helps prevent them from becoming free-floating, decontextualized essences in their own right. In and out of colonial projects, it has made all the difference in the world who has had racist ideas and what kind of power they had to implement their ideas. Many would rightly argue that Germany's investment and emigration outside its colonial empire was far greater than within it. I can only agree. Yet that fact too hardly gets its due in the historiography on Germany. This is probably because the relationship between state and identity is a difficult issue and one doesn't want to allow every discussion to become bogged down in it - or, to put it another way, history-writing remains overwhelmingly defined by the nation-state. It is probably also due to a wish not to resuscitate a pan-German or Nazi-era expansionist view of German world power. From a number of points of view, it has been easier to minimize the history of German interactions with people around the world, and to be surprised when confronted with evidence of Germany's economic and cultural reach. [End Page 10]

In fact, there is a rich historical literature on German colonialism, both contemporary to the German colonial era and since - richer than many historians suspect. It is necessary to spend some time locating it; a lot of German history is to be found under the rubric of Pacific history, the history of anthropology, or in Africana collections, and has been written by geographers, anthropologists, and literary scholars as well as by historians. (What soon frustrates the historian seeking to use it in teaching or research is the fact that most of it does not weave together the colony and metropole, Germany, in its discussion of issues.) In spite of that rich literature, however, the conventions of German history-teaching - the syllabuses you and I teach or were taught, and textbooks with their suggestions for further reading, show an overwhelming consensus. They dismiss Germany's formal empire as a brief episode with an at most superficial impact on Germany both at the time and over the long term. Eight well-known English-language textbooks on modern Germany that are in print or recently were in print reveal a trend: the newer the textbook, the more sweeping the dismissal of German colonialism in the German past. 3 If we compare Hajo Holbom's 1969 account in A History of Modern Germany 1840-1945 with Volker Berghahn's 1994 account, for example, we see that while Holbom's account is brief and the concepts of race and gender that interest many people in colonial studies these days are absent, he supplies information and arguments that students can pursue. In the case of Berghahn's and indeed most recent textbooks, the student (or the instructor hastily assembling a lecture) would have to contradict directly what the textbook says in order to raise any questions about German colonialism. It may well be that the increasing prominence of social history, and the decreasing prominence of foreign- and high-political history, have given us a more provincial view of German society - even though social historians have brought us a sophisticated literature on gender, race and class that is now being applied in work on intercultural contact and imperial domination.
Who among historians of Germany has been producing that rich literature on German colonialism? They can be roughly grouped in five clusters. Three of these clusters might be termed oppositional to the larger trends in the historiography on Germany. The first of these is the valuable corpus of work by historians in the German Democratic Republic. Their scholarship was not necessarily oppositional in their own institutional context, but was very much so in the context of longer-term trends in German history writing and much of the writing in the Federal Republic. The East German historians argued that colonialism had a logical and important place in the history of capitalist and “imperialist” (used in the largest, indeed overinflated sense) Germany. A second oppositional group took up Aime Cesaire’s and Hannah Arendt’s suggestions that German colonialism was a totalitarian predecessor to Nazism. Historians in this group have often focused on the anticolonial uprising in Namibia between 1904-1907, which resulted in a military goal of annihilation of all Herero (as well as high fatalities among other Namibian combatant groups), and on post-1907 expropriation, forced labor, and compulsory identification, as examples of totalitarian thinking in a colonial context. More recently, a third oppositional group has taken up the subject matter of German colonialism, mostly to find sources for analyzing the cultural importance of race in German history, including in the history of German women. The other articles in this journal issue can be linked to this group, as can recent work of, for example, Sierra Bruckner, Tina Campt, Pascal Grosse, Susanne Zantop, and myself. A fourth cluster of historical work, not necessarily pitched in opposition to major interpretive trends in German historiography, is comprised of the basic political and economic monographs on each German colony and on the colonial movement in Germany. Neither the oppositional approaches nor the basic colony-by-colony monographs have become part of dominant narratives of German history. They are, so to speak, optional, not required.

But there is a fifth cluster of work that has not only fully entered the dominant narrative of general German historiography, but has even decisively shaped it since the early 1960s. That is the history of German colonialism in its guise of social imperialism. Two pathbreaking books, Fritz Fischer’s Germany’s Aims in the First World War, published in German in 1961, and Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s Bismarck and German Imperialism, published in 1969, launched social imperialism as a paradigm for understanding German politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The social imperialism thesis held that German politicians used imperial ambitions to gain and manipulate domestic popular consent to policies that in fact went against the interests of most Germans, especially working-class Germans. Those two books drew upon materials from the German colonial empire. Later books took up Fischer’s and Wehler’s arguments but no longer included actual material on German colonialism. The literature on social imperialism soon gained a consistently domestic, internal focus on political coalitions and struggles over industrialization inside Germany. While real existing German colonialism was, on this social imperialist model, described as insignificant, the effect of social imperialist politics within Germany was described as very great. As a result, colonialism, by way of social imperialism, became a central part of German history - but in a way that obviated the need to refer to actual colonial affairs or to any people besides white German speakers living in central Europe. The possibility of discussing contact and exchange was thereby lost in the most extensively researched aspect of German colonialism.

What, historically, produced the stubbornly non-postcolonial postcolonial German identity? and, by extension, a historiography that, where it has discussed German colonialism, has stressed its insignificance, left out people of color, and turned it into a domestic political affair? By 1914, and especially between 1907 and 1914, the idea of Germany as a colonial power
had become a normal part of German national identity. ¹¹ There were many controversies within Germany about how to run the overseas empire, but no one expected it to disappear. Many people sensed that war was imminent in the early 1900s, but neither Germans nor the people living under German colonial rule foresaw that a war would mean the end of Germany’s colonial empire. The Versailles Treaty of 1919, in that mixture of power politics and moralizing so typical of the postwar settlement, distributed Germany's colonies as League of Nations mandates to the victors: Britain and South Africa, Portugal, Belgium, France, Australia, and Japan (Italy was otherwise compensated). Germany lost its colonial empire on the official grounds that it had been cruel and that “dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilization” made it impossible for the Allied powers to "again abandon" millions of "natives" to them. ¹² In 1919, Germany became a postcolonial society - not postcolonial in the way that Britain, or France, for instance are, but in its own way. Germany became a postcolonial society at the hands of other colonial powers.

Looking back from the vantage point of 1999, we view German colonialism through accreted layers of German history. Each layer has acted as a lens on the past. The history of the understandings of German colonialism that we have today, the history of placing it as a finished chapter in the context of the larger German past, started in 1919. Some historians of that time, looking through that earliest postcolonial lens, pitted Germany for losing its colonies in such an undignified way and produced apologetics for the achievements of German colonialism. ¹³

The most stubbornly pro-colonial Germans were committed to revising the Versailles Treaty at all costs. Allied with those who resented the displacement of ethnic Germans from the newly-independent Central European states, they drifted in the late 1920s and early 1930s with a greater or lesser degree of enthusiasm to the most insistently revisionist party, the Nazis. That was not the only reaction to Versailles at the time, however. More flexible revisionists had another, more pragmatic response that actually had greater importance over the long run for that stubbornly white identity in Germany and provincial view of Germany's relationships to other peoples in the world. Even though the pragmatic response to forced decolonization in 1919 did not prevail in the early 1930s, it came again to the fore during the next period of defeat and crisis, after 1945.

The more flexible revisionists' response embraced two ideas. One was that colonizers were white, Germans were white, and white people should stick together. The idea was hardly new - both rivalry and solidarity characterized the modern European colonial powers. Already during the negotiations over the Versailles Treaty, proposals appeared that Germany be included in oversight commissions for its own former colonies and even all European powers' colonies. It was argued that, even if Germany were to lose its own overseas empire, Germans, as whites and civilized people, ought to share in a pan-European alliance of colonizers over against the non-white rest. In 1920, the former governor of German Samoa and former Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf drew upon this idea as he called for European cooperation in the development of Africa. Solf argued that since abuses had existed in all the European overseas empires, all colonies and not just the formerly German ones ought to be placed under boards of international oversight. ¹⁴ Later in the 1920s, as the idea of German participation in international monitoring groups gained ground, some Germans questioned the need for individual states' overseas possessions, as previously conceived of, at all. ¹⁵

A second guiding idea of the pragmatic response to forced decolonization was that Germans, having suffered humiliating defeat, had a special knowledge of what it meant to be a victim, and even a sort of moral virtue deriving from that victim status. The feminist and social
imperialist Else Lüders exemplified this response. In a 1920 brochure directed at newly-enfranchised German women, she [End Page 14] conceded that defeat in the First World War had shattered the "beautiful dreams of a greater Germany with a strong, well-rounded colonial empire." Yet she claimed, "Germany is called upon, precisely by virtue of its suffering and its tragic fate, to become the leader in the struggle for a new moral and social order in national and international life." Lüders envisioned this role of international moral leadership as a profoundly national experience as well: she urged that all Germans, from western and eastern Germany as well as from the former colonies, stick together, and alluded to a century-old worry that Germans living in non-German states were too ready to assimilate to other cultures:

Now we too have to pass the test of our Germanness. All too often through the centuries, the German has suffered from losing his Germanness much too rapidly, of always only fertilizing lands with culture on behalf of foreign states. Now at this time of need we must prove more than ever our loyalty to Germandom. Then one day again - God grant by the peaceful path of an agreement - that will come together which belongs to Germany as one people [das zusammenfinden, was als ein Volk zu Deutschland gehört].

Like Solf, Lüders supported the restoration of Germany's colonies to German rule and the simultaneous placement of all European-ruled colonies under League of Nations oversight. Germany would then administer its colonies as "deputy" of the League of Nations. The proposals of Solf, Lüders, and others were symptomatic of a new white colonizing identity mediated by "international" (white) institutions. It was a pan-European white colonizing identity that might have replaced the German colonizing identity of the Kaiserreich era. It was a creative response - perhaps not as creative as that of members of the Pan-African Congress of 1919, who called for direct League of Nations administration of the former German colonies, but it was more creative than inflexible revisionism. And it was couched in the language of humanitarianism and welfare of colonial subjects that was very current in interwar colonial discourse. However, the common white colonizing identity did not prevail in the 1930s, of course. [End Page 15]

Germany's forced decolonization was not one of Hitler's favorite issues, but it was useful as an addition to the Nazis' list of German humiliations. In a sense, Nazism rejected colonialism as a project of white international cooperation in favor of competing with other colonial powers over which would be the most internally racially pure, disciplined society. Racial purity involved the disfranchisement, expropriation, dislocation and extermination of Jews as racial others, as well as the exclusion of Germans of color and the persecution of foreigners forced to live in Germany. Nazism and the Holocaust are the second postcolonial lens through which we look back at German colonialism. Seeing German colonialism through the lens of Nazism and the Holocaust has led to two kinds of responses in the history of German racism: to ignore anti-African and other racisms in exploring the history of racism that led up to the Holocaust; or to collapse all racisms together. Neither is adequate. The former implies that racism against Africans and other non-Europeans does not really need much explanation, while antisemitism does. The latter assumes that anti-African racism, for example, necessarily throws light on antisemitism or vice versa. But that is something to be established through detailed research, and not taken as given. It can be pointed out, for example, that the colonial movement and the colonial bureaucracy, as eclectic and relatively less prestigious organizations, were not among the most antisemitically exclusionary realms of the deeply anti-Semitic Kaiserreich. A second kind of problem with collapsing forms of racism together is the implication that anti-African
racism is related to genocide when expressed and implemented by Germans, but not when it is expressed and implemented by the United States, Britain, France, or Italy, for example.

Colonialism was (and is) much more diverse in the political views that it encompassed than Nazism or fascism. Colonialism is better compared to capitalism or racism than to fascism. All three are large, complex, flexible systems that we live within, whether we live in democracies or dictatorships and whether we live in the nineteenth, twentieth, or twenty-first centuries. Like capitalism and racism, colonialism has transformed the world politically, culturally, and economically. It has flourished under all kinds of regimes, as fascism could not. Like capitalism, the history of colonialism does not deliver simple lessons. One must bring carefully formulated questions to capitalism, racism, and colonialism, and because all three are so dynamic, one must test answers to those questions in various contexts. There is no single interpretation of colonialism, or racism, that can be the key to German history. German colonialism is not a mirror we can hold up to a putative German national character. German colonialism provided instances both like and unlike Nazism and the Holocaust, and it was both like and unlike other modern European empires and the United States of its day.

After the Second World War, the major colonial powers began to lose their hold on non-Europeans. At the same time, the idea of Germans as white survived its Nazi appropriation and came into its own. Germans were once again defeated and humiliated, and they turned to internal sources for a new kind of national identity that would draw upon the "best" of German culture as well as the moral wisdom that supposedly comes from being defeated. In one post-1945 manifestation of that stubborn white identity, the children of African-American GIs and white German mothers were in some cases deemed permanently inassimilable to German society and sent for adoption to the United States. Even as the Holocaust became a global symbol for the importance of antiracism, Hitler's legacy was a Germany that was ideologically, if not absolutely de facto "without Jews" and "white." Contact, mixing, and assimilation were thought to be elsewhere or, in a pessimistic light, they were seen as threatening to enter Germany, as the keyword "Americanization" suggested.

The most recent postcolonial lens through which we look at German colonialism is the racist violence against people of color and people from poor countries in West Germany and post-1989 Germany. Critical discussion of this issue is often dated only to German unification in 1989-1990, but in fact it extends back at least to 1984, the centenary of the first German colonial annexations. Around that year, a number of books appeared that analyzed current racism against people of color in Germany through histories of colonial and postcolonial encounters. Through these books and through occasional press articles about Kiao-Chow, Namibia, and other places once under German colonial rule, Germans discover and rediscover their colonial past and the history of German contacts all over the world. Yet the stubbornly white German identity remains. It will probably continue to remain as long as it is linked to some combination of insularity, victim status, and the desire for the moral high ground - or its opposite, the special guilt of an exceptional and extraordinary German racism, which is all that some oppositional histories have been able to offer.

How can we teach and write against this white postcolonial identity? These days, German colonialism is likely to appear on syllabuses as a way to add material on gender and race to a "regular" German history or German studies course. With reference to the making of "multicultural" syllabuses, the literary critic Christopher Miller has posed the question: "... how do we decide what to include? How do we justify the necessary exclusions when inclusion is our only goal?" Miller's answer is to strive for "intercultural literacy" rather than
"multiculturalism." With the example of a French reader for elementary school students, set in a Wolof village and penned by a francophone Senegalese, that narrates literacy as a French colonial - and not Muslim precolonial - legacy, Miller shows how a text interacted with both white French and black African understandings of colonialism at the same time that it fused the two understandings together. It is true that Germanists face a serious deficiency of such sources from the period of formal colonialism, and of their critical analysis. There is very little genuinely intercultural work done on the German colonial encounter; most of it, it is fair to say, analyzes what white Germans said among themselves, about non-white and/or non-German people. This unfortunately perpetuates the illusion that German culture is continuous among white Germans but discontinuous in the context of non-white people. Moreover, it keeps historical work on race and racism out of sync with current, and lively, literary production and criticism by and about Germans of color or Minderheitsdeutsche.²⁹

When looking for ways to situate German colonialism in the modern German past, better answers may come from reexamining the goals of focusing on colonialism in the first place. Colonialism offers no simple answers to Nazism or the meaning of "race"; indeed, to seek the meaning of "race" beyond concrete historical contexts would be to accept the premise of racist thought that race is transcendent. There is no contact without context. That leaves us with more questions: not only what people of undisputed Germanness thought and did about rule, culture, "race," and the spread of a Europeanized capitalist social order, but also how other people reacted to Germany and Germans and how Germanness did or did not become a part of their own lives. [End Page 18]

Notes


9. This literature is too vast to list. A typical example is Karl Holl and Gunther List, eds., *Liberalismus und imperialistischer Staat. Der Imperialismus als Problem liberaler Parteien in Deutschland 1890-1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975).

10. Two historians of this cluster apparently recognized these issues and turned their work in new directions: Woodruff D. Smith, who wrote the basic English-language survey of the German colonial empire (*The German Colonial Empire* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978]) as well as a monograph on the history of imperialist ideology (*The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1986]), brought his knowledge of colonial science to bear in his more recent *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1840-1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). The other major exception is Klaus J. Bade, who wrote an important early social imperialism study, *Friedrich Fabri und der Imperialismus in der Bismarckzeit. Revolution - Depression - Expansion* (Freiburg i.B.: Atlantis, 1975), and has since written a great deal about migration, labor, and racial politics in twentieth-century Germany, the best of which are: *Deutsche im Ausland- Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992); and *Ausländer - Aussiedler - Asyl. Eine Bestandsaufnahme* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1994). The early Bade exemplified the above-mentioned insular German identity; in an early book on immigration, he expressed doubt as to whether Muslims and Christians could ever co-exist peacefully in Germany (*Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland 1880-1980*).
11. With about one million square miles and about twelve million inhabitants, the German colonial empire was third largest in territory and fifth largest in population among the British, French, Dutch, Belgian, United States, Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish overseas empires. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Imperialismus. Seine geistigen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen. Ein Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1977), 37-38. States today whose lands were wholly or partly under German colonial rule include: Namibia, Tanzania, Togo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda, Burundi, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, China (a portion of the Shandong Peninsula), the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, the Federated State of Micronesia, and Western Samoa.


13. E.g., the numerous titles by Heinrich Schnee, such as *Afrika für Europa. Die koloniale Schuldlüge* (Berlin: Sacher & Kuschel, 1924); Mary Evelyn Townsend, *The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918* (New York: Macmillan, 1930).


15. E.g., "Braucht Deutschland Kolonien?" in *Hamburger Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, vol. 5 (1927), 609-676 and *Für oder gegen Kolonien* (Berlin, 1928). The secret German memorandum to the council of the League of Nations of 20 September 1924 stated a willingness to join and included a request to be active in mandate system; on 9 September 1927 a German representative joined the standing mandate commission of the League of Nations. Horst Grunder, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien* 3rd, rev. ed. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1995), 223. This book has the most up-to-date bibliography on German colonialism.


17. Lüders, *Frauengedanken*, iv. See also 29.


