



attempt to discover a single, superior point of view: that of Aug., to which the whole scholastic theology ought to return.

EVALUATION

In response to the accusation of Jansenism, brought against him by contemporary adversaries, M. replied that he had developed his interpretation of Aug.'s doctrine long before reading the *Augustinus*. The presence of some points of contact with the most radical forms of Augustinianism and with the thought of Jansen is, however, documented in his early work in which Aug. is presented from a highly polemical angle. Only in a second phase does the thought of Aug. emerge in a more balanced way. M.'s declared passion for Aug. was certainly a central thread throughout his works and led him to define his Scotist school as 'entirely Augustinian'. M.'s works contain the idea, which became more widespread during the seventeenth century, that Aug. had to be defended from false accusations and incomplete interpretations. On many occasions, M. affirms that he seeks a 'middle way' between the extreme readings of Aug.'s theology, in particular on the subject of grace. M. was of the opinion that what really mattered was a contemplative and utopian return to Aug., rediscovered, beyond partial interpretations, in his integrity and purity.

EMANUELE COLOMBO

GRACE; JANSEN, CORNELIUS; JANSENISM; NORIS, HENRY; PREDESTINATION; SCOTUS, JOHN DUNS; SEMI-PELAGIANISM; SOCIETY OF JESUS; THOMAS AQUINAS; VICENTIUS OF LÉRINS; WILL

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary literature

- F. Macedo, *Cortina Divi Augustini de praedestinatione et gratia, adytis in centum oracula reclusis D. Gregorij Magni et D. Bernardi responsis confirmata* (Münster 1648).
- , *Mens divinitus inspirata Sanctissimo Patri Domino Nostro Innocentio Papae X super quinque propositiones Cornelii Jansenii; et Mens Divi Augustini illustrata de duplici adjutorio Gratiae sine quo non et quo* (London 1653).
- , *Scrinium Divi Augustini, in quo arcana illius de auditorio 'sine quo non' sensa continentur. Addita libra cum aequamento Augustini inter Calvinianos et Arminianos* (London 1654).
- , *Lituus lusitanus buccinae anglicanane, Thomae Angli, canenti occinens* (London 1654).
- , *Tessera Romana auctoritatis pontificiae adversus Buccinam Thomae Angli, et classicum heterodoxorum* (London 1654).
- , *Commentationes duae ecclesiasticae polemicae, altera pro Sancto Vincentio Lirinensi et Sancto Hilario Arelatensi, altera pro Sancto Augustino et Aurelio et Patribus africanis* (Verona 1674).
- , *Collationes doctrinae S. Thomae, et Scoti, cum differentijs utrumque* (Padua 1671–3).

—, *Collationes S. Thomae et Scoti in Tertium Sententiarum cum differentijs inter utrumque*, (Padua 1680).

Secondary literature

- L. Ceyskens, 'François de Saint-Augustin de Macedo. Son attitude au début du Jansénisme', *Archivum Franciscanum historicum* 49 (1956) 1–14.
- I. de Sousa Ribeiro, *Fr Francisco de Santo Agostinho de Macedo. Um filósofo escotista português e um paladino da Restauração* (Lisbon 1951).
- E. Troilo, 'Franciscus a Sancto Augustino Macedo', *Relazioni fra l'Italia e il Portogallo* (Rome 1940) 239–60.

Magic

I. MAGIC IN AUG.'S THOUGHT

It is easiest to approach Aug.'s theory of magic as Robert Markus does, as an aspect of his theory of signs. As Aug. explains in *De doctrina Christiana*, signs have meaning because intellectual beings have agreed upon them; there is no necessary connection between a sign and its meaning, and a given sign has no other function but to serve as a token in a given linguistic community. Magic pertains to a semiotic system which is essentially a "private" code, restricted to some members of this community and used only by them, to communicate with demons' (Markus 146). This semiotic logic may be followed through several different channels in Aug.'s thought.

The idea of magic arises most frequently in contexts where Aug. is describing vain religious practices, which he aligns with misunderstanding or misuse of intentionally given signs (*signa data*). Broadly speaking, one can extrapolate from Aug.'s oeuvre three ways in which human beings are liable to magical misuse of signs, all of which are important in the reception of Aug.'s views in later centuries. One is by deliberate demonic invocation, or use of divine names to subjugate lower classes of spirits for private ends rather than the public good. This idea is given an early outline in question 79 of his *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, where Aug. likens Christians who subdue demons with divine names to evil soldiers who terrify property owners by misuse of the emperor's signs. Such Christians are exacting something from powers charged to yield to the honour of Christ, but not on Christ's behalf. Thus, 'magicians [do miracles] through private contracts, good Christians through public justice, and evil Christians through the signs of public justice' (*div. qu.* 79.4). In these cases, the misuse of signs to control *demons in order to effect miraculous phenomena is an explicit and deliberate practice: demons are knowingly subjugated through the unethical misuse of divine signs.

However Aug.'s arguments against magic do not always target explicit and deliberate practices of demonic control. A second context in which Aug. treats magic as a religious error is in his discussion in the *City of God* of the uses and observances of theurgy, or purification of the soul leading to visionary contact with gods or *angels through



rites of invocation and initiation. In various loci, but especially in bks 8–10, bracing his argument against Apuleius, Cicero, the Hermetic *Asclepius*, and Porphyry, Aug. argues that all practices claiming to invoke angelic contacts are actually demonic. The fact that these so-called angels can be subjected to the operator's *will through threats and entreaties implies a passible godhead, afflicted with needs and desires. Since it is not possible to presume thus of God, when the theurgic practitioner successfully invokes any entities at all, even those claiming to be divine or angelic cannot be other than demonic. From the fact that they can be invoked, 'it can be understood what kind of gods they are or what kind of vision it is that he says is caused by these theurgic consecrations, in which those things are not seen which truly exist' (*civ.* 10.9).

There is a third kind of religious error which might seem to the least intentional of all, but in practice was to become a standard component of Christian definitions of magic. This is the error of superstition. In *doctr. Chr.*, Aug. mentions, in the category of superstition, idolatry, magic arts (identified with explicit divination by demons), various divinatory techniques including haruspicy, augury, and 'all ligatures and remedies, which medical science also condemns, whether in the form of incantation or certain marks which they call "characters," or any of those things that have to be suspended and tied on, or even gestured with in any way, not for the purpose of tempering bodies, but for the purpose of some sort of occult or manifest significations' (2.20.30).

Note here that it is not the powers or *virtutes* of the ligatures which are 'occult' but rather the *significationes*. That is, Aug. is not condemning the use of occult natural forces in amulets but rather the use of *meanings*, even (or especially) where meanings are not plainly manifest. It is important to note that the base logic of Aug.'s magical theory really depends upon his theory of signs and meanings, rather than on any theories of natural (or demonic) action. Though demons are called in to explain certain things about how magic works, the base principle is simply that signs, as such, cannot have an instrumental effect upon things in the world, and it is a stupid mistake to believe that they do. This idea will ultimately make his ideas transferable into modern thought even when demonic action ceased to have an important role in natural explanations.

For Aug., however, the ethical component of superstitious sign use remains double edged: these practices are reprehensible from a human viewpoint because they are illogical; but also, because superstitious signs fail to conform to God's logic of Charity, they attract demons, whose natures are sign oriented, but fundamentally perverse: 'And so all arts of this kind, whether of trifling or harmful superstition, from a certain diseased association of humans and demons, a pact, so to speak, constituted of faithless and guileful friendship, are thoroughly to be repudiated and fled by the Christian' (*doctr. Chr.* 2.23.36).

The idea present here becomes central to the Christian conception of magic: magical effects *always* depended on the interception of signs by demons (even when there did not appear to be any explicit

demonic pact present). While in Aug.'s day there was also a widespread acceptance of principles of cosmic sympathy—the idea that some effects of magic can be brought about by the use of occult natural forces—Aug. does not find it philosophically satisfying. So far as Aug. is concerned, all such things have their effects through engendering occult pacts with demonic intellects (see *civ.* 10.11). Cognate understandings governed Aug.'s attitudes towards *astrology and other forms of *divination, which, since they also relied on the interpretation of signs (locating meaning in the stars or other random patterns or images), must therefore be a result either of direct demonic communication, or the interception and manipulation of human signs by demonic intellects. Backing up this idea, numerous loci from Aug.'s work *De divinatione daemonum* are cited through later centuries as references for the kinds of things demons can do, for their nature and substance, and the reasons why they are often able to predict the future correctly.

II. MEDIEVAL RECEPTION—ENCYCLOPEDIA AND LEGAL

Both of the above-quoted passages from *doctr. Chr.* are absorbed (though unattributed) by seventh-century encyclopedist *Isidore of Seville into his entry on *magi* in his encyclopedic book *Etymologiarum libri XX*. The brief entry *de magis*, a compendium of lore on magic drawn from many sources, becomes a standard resource for writers on magical topics for many centuries to come. *Hrabanus Maurus, another encyclopedic writer working in ninth-century Germany, takes up Isidore's entry *in toto* and augments it in his short treatise *De magicis artibus*. Hrabanus extends Isidore's entry with additional anti-magical passages, including an extended quotation (of several pages) from Aug.'s *divin. daem.*, as well as shorter segments of Augustinian exegesis, and some other passages drawn from Maximus of Turin, Ambrosiaster, and *pseudo-Augustinian writings (see Flint 54 n. 57).

One of the longstanding generic problems of encyclopedic writing is that quotations are frequently strung together without attribution, or with only a vague gesture at their original location. Valerie Flint has traced the movement of Hrabanus' adaptation of Isidore into the early eleventh century *canon law collection by Burchard of Worms. Burchard takes Isidore's *de magis* from Hrabanus wholesale, including all of Rabanus' own adaptations and additions, and uses them in his *Decretum* (10.1–47); however, he attributes them entirely to Aug. (Flint 57–8). Extended passages on magic attributed to Aug., but which actually derive from Hrabanus Maurus (probably via Burchard), also occur in the *Panormia* of the early twelfth-century canonist *Ivo of Chartres (*Panormia* 8.66 ff.) As well (probably via Ivo), there are extended passages deriving from Hrabanus attributed to Aug. in *Gratian's *Decretum*, composed toward the middle of the twelfth century. When Gratian addresses five questions on sorcery (*Decretum, pars secunda, causa* 26), question 5, which is attributed to the *civ.*, is drawn entirely from Hrabanus. *Civ.* is also a putative source for the Ps.-Aug. in Ivo, though both Gratian and Ivo do correctly

attribute passages drawn from Aug.'s *divin. daem.* as well as passages from *doctr. Chr.* (passages which appear, but are unattributed, in Hrabanus' text).

Two things may be noted here. First, a strong anti-magical view bearing Aug.'s name dominated the medieval legal apprehension of magic, though in fact it is a sort of potpourri of genuine and pseudo-Augustinian materials through which the rigorous character of his thinking is much diluted. Second, however, at least some of the genuine Augustinian passages were recognizable enough to have been sifted out from Hrabanus' writings and correctly attributed by the later canonists, and thus it can be seen that Aug. continued to wield an influence in canon law despite the misattributions. The legal texts are concerned primarily with the delineation of practices to be avoided and the grounds for their avoidance, and not primarily with philosophical distinctions about possible natural causes or agencies for their effects. Nevertheless, through the legal texts, the basic idea that magic always involves *signs* which entail *communication with demons* gets broad exposure as a working definition of magical action that is embedded in an ethical framework. And Gratian is in fact not infrequently cited as a scientific authority by philosophers, so there was not a firm line between these things.

III. MEDIEVAL RECEPTION—THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL

By the thirteenth century, there had been significant changes in the intellectual climate. New magic texts had begun to proliferate which freshly replicated the kinds of talismanic and ritual practices against which Aug. had originally reacted. Following the influx of Latin translations from Arabic sources which bore the Aristotelian corpus into Europe, there were now available treatises on astronomy which further developed theories of astral influence, as well as a new body of practical texts on talismanic magic. From other quarters theurgic practices, too, began to re-emerge, alongside necromancy or nigromancy (i.e. magic that worked by explicit techniques of demon binding).

As noted, Aug.'s theory gave no ground to the idea that the tempering of bodies could be naturally achieved by an amulet of any type, attributing all effects to occult *significationes*, rather than occult natural powers. The thirteenth century, however, had a substantial new body of theory governing occult qualities. It had become widely accepted that celestial bodies had an effect on matter that could be enhanced by use of sympathetic materials (and sometimes astral images or figures); that bodily *spiritus* could be affected by the imagination; and also that the imagination could affect other bodies through *spiritus*. These principles offered a variety of non-demonic means by which amulets and ligatures might be seen to work even from outside the body, and some amulets were now able to be characterized as working by a philosophically acceptable 'natural magic'.

While there was no specialized qualifier in the Middle Ages to set apart the kind of illicit magic that Aug. understood to be worked by

hidden significations, the term recently coined to cover this area by Nicolas Weill-Parot is 'addressative magic', i.e. magic understood to work because it works by means of an (often occult) addressee. While thirteenth-century thinkers agreed in principle that addressative magic was to be avoided, there was not complete agreement on what constituted addressative magic at the level of practice. This is partly because the texts for constructing images usually included a mix of both natural and addressative elements (a fact widely recognized in the literature), and partly because what constituted a 'natural' property was not always completely clear.

The thirteenth-century *Speculum astronomiae*, an influential treatise on astronomy for a long time believed to be the work of ***Albert the Great**, includes several chapters devoted to sorting image magic texts into legitimate and illegitimate categories, and its criterion for legitimacy is based on the avoidance of addressative magic, including invocations, signs, and characters. The author finds unproblematic astral images that are made without invocations or characters, and even gives some leeway to spoken words when he suggests that words could be used in the making of such images that were purely and clearly descriptive of the operators intent (e.g. 'this is an image for the destruction of scorpions'), and that such words would not probably summon any demons (adding, 'not that I commend them...'; *Speculum* 171). Albert the Great himself speaks with unselfconscious admiration of the power of astral images carved on stones (*Book of Minerals* 140–5). And Roger Bacon, following well-known passages in Avicenna's *De anima*, upheld the idea that words spoken with strong conviction and firm intent could have a power and effect that was entirely natural through mobilization of the force of soul on bodily *spiritus* (*Opus maius* 397).

All such understandings worked (at least loosely) within the Augustinian prohibition against demonic magic, inasmuch as most philosophers concurred that no non-demonic power inhered in signs or language *as such*, though power might inhere in incidental properties of language (such as properties of sound or breath), or in its power to move the soul (to concretize intent, and thereby affect the *spiritus*). Nevertheless, thirteenth-century thinkers greatly broadened the number of actual practices that counted as 'natural', and thereby allowed room for many types of magic which Aug. himself would not have countenanced.

Astrological figures, however, posed a special problem: did such things operate by trapping natural stellar powers at the moment of their making, or were they merely signs? As we have seen, many favoured more leeway in the use of astral images, understanding their properties as essentially natural. In this regard, ***Thomas Aquinas** is one of the most rigorous interpreters of Aug. in the thirteenth century. Like other medieval philosophers, Thomas concedes intrinsic power to the celestial bodies and their affiliated materials, yet he draws a line at astral figures. Thomas deals with magic as Aug. did, under the heading of 'superstition', in the *Summa theologiae* 2a2ae.96 as well as in the *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.104–5. In the *Summa theologiae*, he treats the problem of the natural power of astral images in article 2 of question

96, arguing that artificial shape is not a principle of natural action, since its immediate cause is the conception of the artificer; hence artificial forms cannot obtain power from the stars the way naturally made things do. He quotes Aug.'s passage on ligatures, understanding it to cover the kind of practices used in image magic, and he brings to bear Aug.'s arguments dismissing Porphyry's acceptance of the occult power of natural things in *civ*. Thomas notes that astral images differ from necromantic images in that the latter involve explicit invocations whereas astral images involve what he calls 'tacit pacts' through signs. Thus Thomas notices and explicates the fact that Aug. includes in the notion of demonic 'pact' many signs which do not disclose explicit pacts or make deliberate invocations. With rigorous logic, Thomas narrows down the field of things that can be seen to constitute natural action, and takes a stricter stance against astral images than many others of his day, including the author of the *Speculum astronomiae* and Albert the Great. It may be noted, however, that while it is faithful to Aug. in all the most important respects, Thomas's theory is more reliant on an idea of natural operation than Aug.'s.

IV. RENAISSANCE MAGIC AND THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, would-be practitioners of the new natural magic now had to react not only to the Augustinian prohibitions against signs, but more critically to Thomas's clarification of them, which works in concert with a newly delimited, newly Aristotelianized idea of nature. In some early modern Catholic writings, Aug. and Thomas appear to speak with one voice, and are cited so close together that it sometimes becomes hard to tell who said what. For example in Heinrich Kramer's notorious anti-witch manual compiled in the 1480s, the *Malleus maleficarum* pt 1, question 5, on the origins of witchcraft, is a pastiche of authorities on magic, laying out the principles of natural magic in order to exempt them from suspicion of witchcraft. This section is dominated by Thomas and Aug., but Aug.'s ideas all appear embedded in a Thomistic idea of created nature, which disallows addressative magic while allowing natural magic in principle.

For those interested in *using* the talismanic practices associated with natural magic in this period, theological correctness now necessitated a positive alignment of image magic with Thomistic philosophy. The intrinsic difficulty of this alignment is somewhat eased by the early modern attribution to Thomas Aquinas of a work called the *De fato*, probably written by Albert the Great, containing ideas in line with Albert's more lenient, non-addressative interpretation of image magic. It is somewhat aided as well by Marsilio *Ficino's reinterpretation, in the last book of his *De vita* (written in the 1480s), of one of Thomas's more uncharacteristically ambiguous passages regarding figures in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, which Ficino reads as in fact allowing a potential natural action to *figures* on images (though not writing or characters of other kinds). This passage and its consequences for Ficinian natural magic have been extensively discussed (Copenhaver 532–4; Weill-Parot 2002a, 639–71). It suffices to note

here that Thomas's clarification of Aug., which embeds Aug.'s sign theory more thoroughly in a philosophy of nature, is actually used by the Renaissance magicians who follow him to further a lenient opinion of talismanic magic which is the very reverse of Aug.'s (and would probably have been slightly unfamiliar to Thomas himself).

In a similar way, the specific text condemnations found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas as well as in the *Speculum astronomiae* could be used to further the aims of those early modern magicians (such as Cornelius *Agrippa von Nettesheim, John Trithemius, or John Dee) who might be interested in theurgy (or angel conjuring) for their own reasons. The early modern theurgist could iterate on his own behalf the earlier condemnations of medieval authorities, and by distancing himself from the bad medieval magical practices, in some measure protect his own from condemnation (even while returning, often enough, through Hermes and through the *prisca theologia*, more nearly to the Neo-Platonic and pagan practices which actually triggered Aug.'s anti-magical reaction).

Paradoxically (or not), it is not until attempts are forgone to place magic in a context of natural philosophy that we arrive at a view of magic which can be recognized simultaneously as Augustinian and modern. We must return to a position where the moral imperative that signs should be *comprehensible* overrides the common considerations of physics or 'natural magic', thus rendering visible Aug.'s original semiotic logic.

It is possible to demonstrate that the anti-Papist rhetoric of the Reformation is embedded in a long habit of anti-magical thinking conditioned by Aug. A common feature of the more extreme polemic of Protestant writers against Catholicism was the accusation that priests indulged in sorcery. In these accusations, the term 'sorcery' cuts in two directions, being identified on the one hand with illicit necromantic practices (since necromancy was known to be a genre of text modelled on normal liturgies and written and used by priests more than others), and on the other with normal Catholic liturgical activities, such as blessings, performance of sacraments, and the mass. Helen Parrish discusses Reformation propaganda against Catholic liturgies, quoting the objection to the ritual gestures of the mass by Thomas Crowley in the 1540s, who 'likened the ritual gestures of the priest at Mass to the movements of a magician "full of turnes & halfe turnes, beckeinges and duckeinges, crosseynes, tosseynges and tumblyngs"' (Parrish 68). Here the priest's actions, the 'crosseynes, tosseynges and tumblyngs', appear in the category of signs rendered suspect by their failure to be clearly legible, an index of magic learned from long training in Aug.'s school. The priest's odd actions, seen from a Protestant's (or outsider's) viewpoint, are imaginary signs, without clear purport on their own terms, but with an instrumental aim.

In a similar vein, the famous sceptic and witchcraft debunker Reginald Scot spares no argument in declaring that Catholic liturgies and necromantic ritual practices are exactly the same thing in his *Discovery of Witchcraft*, first published in London in 1584. He attacks in particular the fact that, as he sees it, priests treat the signs they use as instrumental, asserting in their ritual language that their consecrated

holy water, salt, and candles may heal bodily injuries as well as the soul's infirmity; and yet, according to Scot, 'neither soule nor bodie any thing recover, nor the Candles last one minute the longer' (Scot 1539, 272).

It is plain to Scot that the Catholic liturgies are superstitious, because they attribute physical instrumentality to verbal formulations. Further, Scot suggests that most Catholic practices can be aligned either with necromancy (he shows how priests are constantly exorcizing devils) or theurgy (inasmuch as priests expect *ex opere operato* action from divinity, i.e. effect from the mere performance of a religious act, which is hardly better). Although they are directed at Catholicism rather than paganism, these judgements arise directly from Aug.'s categories, and view vain religious practice in the same terms. While Scot's *Discovery of Witchcraft* is a book that has a nonpareil reputation for scepticism, its scepticism lies more in an ethically coloured presupposition about the way signs ought to be used than in a coherent philosophy in which natural causation is explicated.

Yet while Scot is to some extent aware of using Catholic arguments against Catholic practices, he appears unaware of any important debt to Aug. in his anti-magical rhetoric. Like other polemical Reformation writers he is more likely to cast both Thomas and Aug. as mere enablers of the Papist position via their related but distinct expositions of *ex opere operato* sacraments. In Reginald Scot, and other early modern writers of the same stamp, the anti-magical stance becomes less a philosophically informed position than an attitude.

V. MODERN ACADEMIC WRITING AND MAX WEBER

The Protestant attitude lingers and continues to emerge in varying forms in academic discourse on religion, often representing the logic which identifies magic with sacraments as a newly seen idea or newly invented theory. The history of academic apprehensions of magic, particularly in sociology and anthropology from the nineteenth century on, has been analysed most recently and thoroughly in the book *Making Magic* by Randall Styers, though there is still more work to be done in this area to correct the appearance of complete discontinuity between the modern and medieval attitudes. However, Styers's work accurately traces the nineteenth- and twentieth-century intellectual history, showing how writers often in unconscious or unattributed ways replicate the Protestant anti-magical attitudes, depicting all religious beliefs and practices increasingly as antithetical to rational thought and in the end relegating religion itself to the domain once occupied by magic.

Perhaps the most famous work which both embodies and explicates the transit from Protestant religion to modern secular rationalism is Max Weber's landmark book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (first published as a two-part article in 1904–5 in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*). Like many other modern sociologists and anthropologists, Weber is thoroughly Protestant in his own identification of the magical with the sacramental. Indeed, he tends not to use the words 'magic' and 'sacramental' independ-

ently, but may rather use one as modifier for the other (e.g. 'sacramental magic'), or substitute one for the other ('magic as a means to salvation').

The interest of Weber's ideas lies in his perception of the modern secularized world as deriving from religion as a logical *development* of it, rather than as an *antithesis* to religion, or an idea that closes in upon it from without. For him, the 'demagification' ('Entzauberung', often translated 'disenchantment', a concept introduced in Weber 1930, 105) of the world was a demagification of Christianity, by Christianity, and taking place from within Christianity, along theological lines which had been present in Christianity from early on. He depicts this modern *Entzauberung* as the fulfilment of the need of organized religion increasingly to limit and confine the role of sacraments (i.e., in Weber's terminology, 'magic', which is to say instrumental signs), and thus to snip the power lines leading from heaven to earth. For Weber, religion and magic began as the same thing, originated in the same impulse (an evolutionary perspective traced in Weber 1963, 2–19). But religion is magic that *wishes to be rational*; and, thus, wherever it achieves this goal, religion becomes its own antidote—it ends by eliminating all the magic on which its reasoning was founded (as epitomized in the construction of the concept of *Entzauberung*; see Weber 1930, 105).

By this logic, for Weber, religious faith requires a much bigger effort in the modern age than ever before in history; it requires nothing less than a complete surrender of the rational faculty to the illusion of a vanished time in which real contact with the impassible deity actually appeared possible. Defining 'theology' as representing 'an intellectual *rationalization* of the possession of sacred values' (Weber 1946, 153, original emphasis), Weber goes on to state that 'in every positive theology, the devout reaches the point where the Augustinian sentence holds: "*credo non quod sed quia absurdum est*"' (Weber 1946, 154).

This quotation ('I do not believe what is absurd, but believe because it is absurd') appears to be of modern coinage; it has been attributed at different times to both Aug. and Tertullian, though in fact is not found in this form in the writings of either (for exposition of the presumed location in Tertullian that may have engendered it, see Sider 417). It is of interest here for the way that it encapsulates for Weber the stress of religious belief in the modern age, which ultimately requires what Weber calls the 'intellectual sacrifice' (Weber 1946, 154).

Weber is aware of Aug. as a profound exponent of the intellectual rationalization of religion, and refers to him as one who grasped all along the difficult necessity of the world's demagification. To a certain extent this is true; that is, Aug. probably did look toward a kind of demagification of the world as much as anyone placed in his world could possibly have done. However Weber's misquotation displaces Aug.'s real objection to magic onto a pseudo-Augustinian (but more modern sounding) statement about the difficulty of religion per se. Whatever critique can be levelled against Weber's theories (and many have been), it is plain that his ideas remain embedded in an anti-magical matrix that he himself believes consistent with Aug.'s thought.

And although his basis for thinking this is quite wrong, he is also not entirely incorrect.

CLAIRE FANGER

AGRIPPA VON NETTESHEIM, HEINRICH CORNELIUS; ALBERT THE GREAT; ANGELS; ASTROLOGY AND ASTRONOMY; CANON LAW; DECRETUM OF GRATIAN; DEMONS; DIVINATION; FICINO, MARSILIO; HRABANUS MAURUS; ISIDORE OF SEVILLE; IVO OF CHARTRES; PSEUDO-AUGUSTINIAN WRITINGS; SIGNS AND SEMIOTICS; THOMAS AQUINAS; WILL

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary literature

- Albert the Great [attributed], *Speculum astronomiae*, ed. S. Caroti, M. Pereira, S. Zamponi, and P. Zambelli in P. Zambelli (ed.), *The Speculum astronomiae and its Enigma* (Dordrecht 1992).
- , *The Book of Minerals*, trans. Dorothy Wyckhoff (Oxford 1967).
- R. Bacon, *The Opus majus of Roger Bacon*, ed. J. H. Bridges, vol. 1 (Oxford 1897).
- Burchard of Worms, *Decretum*, PL 140:839–51.
- Hrabanus Maurus, *De magicis artibus*, PL 110:1095–110.
- Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum libri XX*, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford 1911).
- Ivo of Chartres, *Panormia*, PL 161:1041–334. On-line edition-in-progress directed by B. Brasington and M. Brett, <<http://wtfaculty.wtamu.edu/~bbrasington/panormia.html>>, retrieved 10 January 2008.
- Gratian, *Decretum*, ed. E. Friedberg (Leipzig 1879). On-line enabled by the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek: <<http://mdz.bib-bvb.de/dig-bib/gratian>> (last retrieved 10 January 2008).
- H. Kramer and J. Sprenger, *Malleus maleficarum*, ed. C. Mackay (Cambridge 2006).
- Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, in *Opera omnia*, Leonine edn, vols 13–15 (Rome 1918–30).
- , *Summa contra Gentiles*, in *Opera omnia*, Leonine edn, vols 4–12 (Rome 1918–1930).
- R. Scot, *The Discovery of Witchcraft. Proving the Compacts and Contracts of witches with Devils and all Infernal Spirits, or Familiars are but erroneous Novelties and Imaginary Conceptions* (London 1665), microfilm and digital facsimile by Early English Books, 1641–1700, 578:03.

Secondary literature

- B. Copenhaver, 'Scholastic Philosophy and Renaissance Magic in the *De vita* of Marsilio Ficino', *Renaissance Quarterly* 37 (1984) 523–44.
- V. I. J. Flint, *The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe* (Princeton 1991).
- R. A. Markus, 'Augustine on Magic. A Neglected Semiotic Theory', *Revue des études augustiniennes* 40 (1984), 375–88; repr. in idem, *Signs and Meanings* (Liverpool 1996) 125–46.

H. Parrish, *Monks, Miracles, Magic. Reformation Representations of the Medieval Church* (Routledge 2005).

R. W. Sider, 'Credo quia absurdum', *Classical World* 73 (1980) 417–19. On-line at <http://www.tertullian.org/articles/sider_credo.htm>, retrieved 10 January 2008.

R. Styers, *Making Magic. Religion, Magic and Science in the Modern World* (Oxford 2004).

M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. T. Parsons (London 1930).

—, 'Science as a Vocation', in *From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford 1946) 129–56.

—, *The Sociology of Religion*, trans. E. Fischoff (4th rev. edn Boston 1963).

N. Weill-Parot (2002a), *Les 'Images astrologiques' au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance. Spéculations intellectuelles et pratiques magiques* (Paris 2002).

— (2002b), 'Astral Magic and Intellectual Changes (Twelfth-Fifteenth Centuries). "Astrological Images" and the Concept of "Addressative" Magic', in J. Bremmer and J. R. Veenstra (eds), *The Metamorphosis of Magic from Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period* (Louvain 2002) 167–87.

Malebranche, Nicholas

(1638–1715)

Could it be that the Oratorian M. was not 'Augustinian'? The question seems at first sight like a paradox, given that M.'s Augustinianism appears so self-evident. Does not his thesis, generally referred to as 'vision in God', find its source in the doctrine of illumination upheld by Aug.? M. himself, in the preface to his *Recherche de la vérité* (1674), frequently invokes the holy doctor and the whole of his work is shot through with references to Aug. An examination of these quotations from Aug., and of their reactivation in the thought of a man who was indebted to René *Descartes (and to a reading of his treatise *De l'homme*) for his conversion to philosophy, may however lead us to modify this initial impression.

The studies in philosophy which M. pursued at the Collège de la Marche (where he received instruction from 'M. Rouillard, a famous Peripatetic', as Père André tells us in his *Vie du p. Malebranche*) left him, it seems, with a sense of disappointment, as his later severity towards scholastic disputes bears witness. For similar reasons he found no greater satisfaction in theology, which he studied for three years at the Sorbonne, from 1656 to 1659. He entered the Oratory in 1660, where he immersed himself in the thought of Pierre de *Bérulle who had founded the Oratory in 1611. Aug. was viewed by him then as a spiritual guide. It was, however, his discovery of Cartesian philosophy in 1664, the very year in which he was ordained a priest, which led him to deepen his understanding of the works of Aug.

It was ten years later, having taken the time to enrich his knowledge, that he published his great work, *Recherche de la vérité* (1674–5). Constantly republished, and soon supplemented by the *Éclaircissements*