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Conditioning Descriptive Representation: Institutional Moderation of Unique Group Perspectives in Legislative Debates

by

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much love to my parents, Terry & Yvonne Eichorst
ABSTRACT

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Incorporating legislators from historically underrepresented groups into the legislature should be associated with the introduction of new perspectives to the legislative process. Achieving an ideal form of political representation is not so simple. The institutional structure of the political system shapes legislative choices and defines the process of political representation. Structured legislative choices can have moderating effects on the presence of unique perspectives during the policymaking process. This means that the incorporation of historically underrepresented groups is not always sufficient for group representation. I develop a contextual theory of political representation that isolates when we should—and should not—observe unique patterns of political representation. I argue that ballot type and party affiliation are two distinct factors that shape legislative choices and define to whom legislators are accountable.

The theoretical argument synthesizes previous literature on gender and ethnic descriptive representation to develop an integrated theory of political representation. It
leverages the uniqueness of group identity and cross-cutting factors to isolate where descriptive representatives should express unique patterns of political representation and the extent to which the political context conditions the legislative behavior of descriptive representatives. I develop a new measure of political representation using automated content analysis of legislative debates to empirically explore patterns in speech communication across different types of descriptive representatives. This measure makes it possible to empirically determine the strength of the divide that separates types of descriptive representatives. Unique perspectives should be apparent in the way legislators frame the justification and explanation of public policy to those who hold them accountable. This helps us identify the extent to which incorporating legislators from historically underrepresented groups has an influence on a broadly-defined set of issues.

Bolivia provides a unique opportunity to explore patterns of representation. Indigenous and female descriptive representatives have been historically underrepresented in Bolivia and possess interests that are relatively uncrystallized in the legislative assembly. The historical absence of these interests in the legislative assembly leaves a void in group representation. Indigenous legislators are expected to possess broadly-defined unique perspectives associated with group identity. Party affiliation, however, should structure the primary dimension of conflict for Indigenous representatives, whose interests overlap with partisan affiliation. Unique group perspectives should be observed within party. Female representation is different. The nature of cross-cutting factors should suppress the uniqueness of female perspectives within party, but unique collective perspectives should be obvious between parties.

Overall the empirical evidence supports theoretical expectations. Indigenous representation is structured by party when explored at the chamber-level. The most distinct patterns of Indigenous representation are within party. These differences are
moderated when we explore the strength of the divide for those legislators elected on party lists compared to those elected in plurality districts. The most distinct speech patterns of female representation are at the chamber-level. Cross-cutting interests make it possible for women to speak with a collective voice. Unlike Indigenous representation, distinct patterns of female representation are moderated within party, where there is broader agreement on partisan issues among copartisans. I interpret these results as preliminary support for a theoretical argument that simultaneously explains ethnic and female descriptive representation.

Understanding when interests intersect and isolating the uniqueness of those interests can help us strengthen our broader understanding of gender and ethnic representation. We need to know where to look and how to find these unique patterns of political representation. Plenary debates provide an opportunity for different types of descriptive representatives to frame messages in order to simultaneously strengthen a collective partisan and individual reputation. This is particularly valuable in systems where political parties are unified. This project finds that the political context does indeed condition the behavior of descriptive representatives and moderate observed legislative behavior. Unique patterns of representation of historically underrepresented groups, fortunately, do exist under favorable conditions and fill a void of representation that satisfies normative values of democracy.
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# Contents

- Abstract ........................................ iii
- Acknowledgments .................................. vi
- List of Figures .................................. xii
- List of Tables .................................. xiv

## 1 Introduction ................................. 1
  1.1 Descriptive Representation ................ 3
      1.1.1 Legitimacy and Regime Stability ........ 4
      1.1.2 Information About Group Preferences .. 5
      1.1.3 Enhancing the Possibility of Responsiveness 6
  1.2 Defending Interests ......................... 10
  1.3 Interchangeable Legislators? .............. 12

## 2 A Contextual Theory of Descriptive Representation 18
  2.1 Unique Representation ..................... 19
      2.1.1 The Link Between Descriptive Representation & Legislative Behavior 20
      2.1.2 Political Context and Representation ........ 23
  2.2 A Contextual Theory of Descriptive Representation 25
      2.2.1 The Institutional Mechanisms for Achieving Representation 26
      2.2.2 The Type of Party ...................... 33
2.2.3 Contextual Hypotheses ................................................. 35
2.3 Representation in Legislative Debates ............................. 37
2.4 Exploring Patterns of Representation in Bolivia ............... 40
  2.4.1 Indigenous Descriptive Representation ........................ 42
  2.4.2 Female Descriptive Representation .............................. 46
  2.4.3 Political Context ................................................. 49
2.5 Discussion .............................................................. 51

3 Measuring Unique Speech Patterns ................................. 53
  3.1 Developing the Measure .............................................. 55
    3.1.1 Example: 2010 Bolivian Legislative Period .................. 60
  3.2 Over Time Consolidation of the Government-Opposition Divide . 73
    3.2.1 Determining the Strength of the Divide ...................... 80
  3.3 Discussion .............................................................. 85

4 Channeling the Pachamama In Legislative Debates .............. 89
  4.1 Preliminary Analysis: The Indigenous-Mestizo Chamber Divide .. 93
  4.2 Inter-Party Patterns of Representation .......................... 96
    4.2.1 Pure Party Effects ............................................. 97
    4.2.2 Party and Ethnicity Effects .................................. 100
  4.3 Intra-Party Patterns of Representation .......................... 101
    4.3.1 Ethnicity and Ballot .......................................... 103
    4.3.2 Strength of Ethnic Cleavage .................................. 105
  4.4 Discussion .............................................................. 108

5 Gendered Legislative Debate ........................................... 113
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Male-Female Chamber Divide</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.1 Gendered Word Choice</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 2010 Legislative Period</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1 MAS Gender Divide</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2 PPB Gender Divide</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Discussion</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Conclusion</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Distribution of Speech Similarity Values for Single Iteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Examples of Two Strong Iterations and Two Weak Iterations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2010 Government-Opposition Speech Pattern Separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Over time Speech Pattern Separation for Government-Opposition Divide, 1985-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Speech Pattern Separation and Number of Parties in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Chamber-Level Indigenous vs. Mestizo Iterations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Party Effects on Speech Patterns, Controlling for Group Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Party and Identity Effects on Speech Patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Within Party Differences Between Types of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Within Party Differences Between Types of Representatives, Controlling for Ballot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Contextual Moderation of Indigenous Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Male-Female Chamber Divide Across Legislative Periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Density Plot of Feminine Stop Words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Male-Female Divide for the 2010 Legislative Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>The MAS Male-Female Divide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>The MAS Male-Female Divide, Controlling for Ballot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.6 The PPB Male-Female Divide ............................................ 129
5.7 The PPB Male-Female Divide, Controlling for Ballot ............ 130
List of Tables

3.1 2010 Example: Determining Wordscores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 2010 Example: Speech Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Government-Opposition Divide . . . . . 81
3.4 Empirical Determination of the Gov-Opp Divide . . . . . . . . . . . 84

5.1 The Presence of Gendered Articles and Pronouns in Speeches . . . . 122
Chapter 1

Introduction

Representation is a complex social interaction between authorized governing officials and groups of individuals. This activity involves representatives who are expected to act “in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, 209). Responsiveness, however, can involve many different activities (Eulau 1977, Fenno 1978) and many different groups of represented individuals (Bishin 2009, Fenno 1978). Varied forms of responsiveness and varied interests across constituency groups can blur patterns of political representation that capture the extent to which representatives do indeed act in the interests of the represented (Hurley & Hill 2003). This is further complicated when we expect legislators selected from distinct identity groups to express unique perspectives as patterns of political representation.

Legislators face a number of choices. They must first determine the relevant group to whom they will respond. Legislators must also choose how they will respond and adopt an activity that will express political responsiveness. Finally, different types of political issues will guide how legislators make these decisions. Political institutions fortunately structure choices to a set of viable options determined by those who
hold them accountable. Reelection-seeking legislators will adapt their behavior to satisfy the interests of those groups who hold them accountable (Mayhew 1974). Dependent on the political context, legislators can be directly accountable to party leaders who manage access to the ballot (i.e., indirectly accountable to voters) or directly accountable to geographic constituents who select individual winners from the district (Morgenstern 2004). Isolating these factors are helpful for determining just how legislators are accountable to mass interests in representative democracy.

The political context plays an important role in determining if representation is a collective partisan objective or an individual pursuit (Crisp et al. 2004). Political parties also play an important role in structuring conflict and simplifying choices (Schattschneider 1942). This gives a clear choice to voters not only among political parties, but also among individual candidates associated with the party. Legislators can be held directly accountable to party leaders, primary constituencies, and/or reelection constituencies. Conditional on to whom legislators are ultimately accountable for reelection—something that is often determined by the ballot type (Morgenstern 2004)—legislators face different incentives to strengthen a collective partisan or individual reputation. Electoral institutions structure not only the extent of multi-party competition (Jones 1995), but also the relevant constituencies for political accountability (Crisp et al. 2004, Crisp et al. 2009). This determines whose
interests and positions are incorporated to the political agenda. More importantly, institutional authorization and accountability of legislators in elections can generate incentives to encourage political responsiveness.

Electoral tools are not always sufficient for motivating political responsiveness and can generate deficiencies in political representation. One primary concern is the systematic exclusion of different types of interests and perspectives. These varied perspectives are often associated with a legislator’s identity. The shared identity between representatives and the represented is referred to as descriptive representation. Gaps in descriptive representation become more obvious when the demographic characteristics of the legislative assembly fail to reflect general demographic patterns of the represented.

1.1 Descriptive Representation

Incorporating different types of descriptive representatives is a valuable tool for including diverse types of political interests and perspectives into the legislative process. In addition to providing information about group preferences and enhancing the possibility of political responsiveness, the inclusion of representatives from historically underrepresented groups can improve democratic stability in developing countries and strengthen trust in democracy.
1.1.1 Legitimacy and Regime Stability

The selection of representatives with a mutual relationship to dispossessed groups is a valuable tool for protecting individual rights—which are tied to group membership (Kymlicka 1996)—and achieving political representation in liberal democracies (Dovi 2002). The presence of descriptive representatives can have profound effects on strengthening trust in democratic institutions (Dovi 2002, Mansbridge 1999). Groups who have been historically removed from democratic institutions show improved collective trust in government after descriptive members are incorporated (Scherer & Curry 2010).

Strengthened trust relationships could be useful for moderating the deleterious effects of poor performance on democratic stability in new democracies. States with limited experience with democracy are more likely to suffer democratic breakdown after periods of poor performance. Citizens interpret poor performance to be the fault of opportunist legislators that use the government as a “one-time opportunity to get rich”—even if poor performance is a result of bad luck or part of a natural cycle of development (Svolik 2013). This is most problematic in developing democracies where legislators have not had sufficient time to develop positive individual repu-

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1 Trust does diminish, however, from the group members who have historically controlled these positions. Some of these negative effects are moderated by ideological attachments.
tations to defend against “bad” types. A presence of descriptive representatives, where preexisting individual reputations do not exist, could mitigate some of the short-run negative effects of poor performance on democratic stability. Strengthening trust between legislators and the represented during initial phases of democracy could protect democracy from the negative consequences associated with “bad” types during natural declines in development. This is to suggest that the incorporation of descriptive representatives can fulfill both normative values of democracy and pragmatic concerns for democratic stability.

1.1.2 Information About Group Preferences

Descriptive representatives and their constituents are expected to have shared common life experiences, even if they may not have identical policy preferences. Shared association with a distinct cultural identity—customs, ethos, and values—structures the collective uniqueness of life experiences and the way they are translated into forms of political representation (Kymlicka 1996). A shared common language, geographical isolation, and the practice of a unique religion are some factors that generate unique life experiences within the identity group. Groups, however, are less unique when common factors are also shared with members from different identity
groups (i.e., when factors are “cross-cutting”). These shared life experiences shape an individual’s interests and perspectives. Excluding entire identity groups from access to representation “makes it impossible for the group’s views and interests to be effectively represented” (Kymlicka 1996, 32).

1.1.3 Enhancing the Possibility of Responsiveness

Incorporating descriptive representatives into the legislative process is a greater concern when we know that interests associated with a specific identity are systematically ignored. Mansbridge (1999) argues that selecting a descriptive representative is most relevant when group interests are uncrystallized in the legislative assembly. Shared life experiences make it more likely that a legislator will respond consistently with a voter’s expectation when new issues appear. This allows individuals from historically underrepresented groups a greater opportunity to advance their interests to the political agenda when they achieve some form of descriptive representation (Phillips 1998).

Unfortunately, determining when interests are uncrystallized is more difficult. A strict benchmark is how accurately the demographics of the legislative chamber reflect the demographics of the population. Mirror representation, however, is un-

\footnote{A good example of this is observed in the legislative behavior of conservative men and conservative women. Common ideological factors between the two gendered groups makes female conservative identity appear less unique when compared to male conservative identity.}
necessary and only a minimal threshold of descriptive representation needs to be achieved. Through minimal presence, descriptive representatives can assist other legislators to understand the alternative perspectives of the historically underrepresented in order to influence patterns of political representation (Kymlicka 1996). We should expect new perspectives and new patterns of political representation when new types of descriptive representatives achieve access to political office. The extent to which these new patterns of political representation are unique is conditional on the collective uniqueness of an identity group’s life experiences.

Arguments in favor of descriptive representation more commonly use visible characteristics (e.g., ethnicity and gender) to identity groups that would have unique life experiences (see, for example, Dovi (2002), Kymlicka (1996), Mansbridge (1999), Phillips (1998)). These groups have been traditionally isolated from the legislative process and hold interests that are uncrystallized (Mansbridge 1999). Descriptive representation, however, is a much broader concept of group representation. For example, residency requirements for achieving legislative candidacy and geographic legislative representation are both forms of guaranteeing descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999, Kymlicka 1996). Shared life experiences from living in a common geographic space establish shared perspectives that are expected to inform legislative behavior. A linked association with the district makes it more common that a
legislator will “naturally” act in the collective interests of that district. This same justification exists for establishing the requirement that presidential candidates are natural-born citizens. This isolates the broadest common factor that connects citizens in a democratic state. For the purposes of this project, I will focus on ascriptive characteristics of descriptive representation.

For descriptive representation to function as expected, representatives should demonstrate some form of attachment to group interests. Fortunately there is some evidence of this for both gender and racial/ethnic descriptive representatives of historically underrepresented groups. Reingold (1992) finds that female descriptive representatives express commitment to representing women in surveys. They are more likely than male legislators to mention that they act in the interests of women and attract strong support from female constituencies. Female legislators also structure legislative priorities that reflect the interests of female constituency groups (Taylor-Robinson & Heath 2003).

These findings are not just limited to female descriptive representatives. Broockman (2013, 13) finds that black legislators have an “intrinsic motivation to advance blacks’ interests.” Black descriptive legislators systematically respond more frequently than white legislators to requests from black constituents, even when political incentives to do so do not exist. We can expect that common experiences
between descriptive representatives and group identity are reflected in how a politician interprets her individual role. However, we are unsure of how that translates into legislative behavior in more public forums, where other actors who hold legislators accountable observe legislative behavior.

Descriptive representation can reinforce interest representation in those political contexts where tools of accountability can generate gaps in representation. This suggests that legislators elected from historically underrepresented groups have a “natural” form of political representation that satisfies the interests and objectives of the represented who also share the same descriptive identity. This natural behavior, however, is complicated by the institutional structure from which these legislators are elected. The institutional environment can structure behavior in a way that it is difficult to determine if descriptive representatives are indeed behaving uniquely in the interests of their historically underrepresented groups. Legislators accountable to the same actors, for example, should demonstrate similar forms of political representation, regardless of group identity. The key concern is isolating when we should observe unique forms of political representation among descriptive representatives and when political institutions structure behavior in a way that makes descriptive representatives essentially interchangeable. Unique group perspectives should be most clear during the defense of interests.
1.2 Defending Interests

Representatives must consider different political activities, issue attributes, and constituency groups in order to achieve political representation. These complex decisions require delegation. And, indeed, representatives are delegated discretion to make independent judgments in order to act in the interests of the represented (Pitkin 1967). Delegation, however, has the risk of agency loss. The represented may not consider representative behavior to be consistent with their interests. Or, there may be inconsistencies between the long-term interests of the represented and their short-term will (Pitkin 1967). Legislators must balance the pressures of the political party and multiple constituency groups, in addition to selecting a type of behavior that may not be easily observable in the public domain. The complexities of political representation suggest that conflict will exist between the representative and the represented.

From Pitkin (1967, 209):

And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between representative and represented about what is to be done, that conflict must not normally take place. The representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest.

Explanation can reduce the risks of conflict between the representative and the
represented. More importantly, explanation plays a crucial role in expressing to constituents that the representative is working in the interests of the represented and that constituent interests remain paramount in decision-making (Fenno 1978). For explanation to operate effectively, it requires dialogue between the representative and the represented.

Fenno (1978) isolates three strategies to minimize conflict: description, interpretation, and justification. Each strategy focuses on different sources of conflict. Describing conflict allows the legislator to clarify factual errors to reduce perceived conflict. Legislators can interpret outcomes to demonstrate that policy outcomes truly are in the interests of the represented. Sometimes, however, conflict is real and not a matter of perception. Legislators who are responsive to different groups (with different issues of value) will experience conflict when those groups (or, sub-constituencies) hold non-overlapping interests. Justification allows legislators an opportunity to explain how future policy will reflect the interests of the represented and communicate how she is still working in the interests of the represented.

Public debates allow legislators to shape explanations. Legislators can frame an issue to simultaneously appeal to the collective interests of the party, the district interests of the constituency, and their own natural interests. Unique patterns of representation will be less obvious when the structure of debate—determined by the
political context—more narrowly isolates the types of themes that legislators discuss. Legislators can shape the public dialogue to appeal to specific interests from those who hold them institutionally accountable.

Exploring political dialogue provides an opportunity to uncover nuances in political representation that can be blurred when we explore discrete behavior (e.g., roll call voting), especially in systems where political parties are unified. Plenary debates provide an opportunity for partisans to advance support (or, withdrawal) from public policy, but still express a unique understanding of how that policy benefits (or, undercuts) the interests of constituents and/or group identity. Individual reputation building and communication, however, must still satisfy the broader interest of those who hold a legislator accountable. It is during public debates where we should be able to identify more natural forms of political representation and identify when the unique life experiences of descriptive representatives more clearly influence legislative behavior.

1.3 Interchangeable Legislators?

When should we observe unique forms of political representation from descriptive representatives? Following the literature, I assume that descriptive representatives hold unique perspectives and interests that are associated with group identity. In an
unstructured world, the uniqueness of observed legislative behavior would be directly associated with the uniqueness of a group’s collective life experiences. Legislators, however, work in a structured world. Political institutions determine who holds legislators accountable and to whom they must respond. Political parties can structure incentives to collectively shape legislative behavior. The governing party (or, coalition) can determine the issues that are addressed in the legislative assembly, possibly blocking some issues that are unique to historically underrepresented groups. This is to say that the political context can have profound effects on what we observe as political representation.

This requires isolating those venues where we should observe unique behavior. Where parties are unified, legislative voting behavior will obscure unique forms of political representation among copartisans. Policy outcomes, however, can satisfy multiple interests within the party. I specifically look at how legislators explain policy and communicate to constituents and party leaders during legislative deliberations. Unique perspectives are associated with unique communication (Mansbridge 1999). Descriptive representatives should express their unique perspectives in the explanation of policy, not only when defending the party position but also when explaining how it relates to the interests of historically underrepresented groups. Debates give legislators a broader opportunity to utilize language to strengthen an individual and
collective partisan reputation.

I develop a contextual theory of representation in Chapter \textsuperscript{2} that isolates three factors—ballot type, political party, and group identity—that structure legislative behavior. I argue that the political party structures legislative behavior in a way that moderates observed patterns of political representation. Unique patterns of political representation should be more clearly identifiable \textit{within} party for those descriptive representatives that have \textit{fewer} cross-cutting interests (e.g., Indigenous) and more clearly identifiable \textit{between} parties for those descriptive representatives that have \textit{more} cross-cutting interests (e.g., women). I use information on the unique perspectives of descriptive representatives to understand how the political context conditions the legislative behavior of descriptive representation and institutionally moderates unique patterns of observed political representation.

In Chapter \textsuperscript{3} I use automated content analysis of legislative debates to develop a new measure of political representation that helps uncover nuanced forms of political representation. Plenary debates provide an opportunity to identity how policy is defended, explained, and justified to those who hold legislators accountable. The permissiveness of the political context provides different opportunities to express perspectives that may or may not be unique to legislators from historically underrepresented groups when compared to legislators from traditionally represented groups.
This original measure makes it possible to isolate any interest (e.g., Indigenous-mestizo, male-female, and government-opposition) and empirically determine the strength of that divide.

I compare the legislative behavior of legislators from historically underrepresented groups to legislators from traditionally represented groups to uncover those circumstances when we should observe unique patterns of political representation. I perform this analysis in Bolivia, where the interests of women and of the Indigenous have been relatively uncrystallized. The historic removal of both types of descriptive representatives and their subsequent inclusion in the late 20th and early 21st century provide an opportunity to study the potential shifts in policy-making once legislators associated with unique perspectives and interests are incorporated into the legislative process. The move from a proportional electoral system to a mixed-member proportional electoral system (MMP) makes it possible to explore different contexts where legislators have an incentive to develop an individual and/or collective partisan reputation.

Chapter 4 explores Indigenous patterns of political representation in legislative debates. It finds that the party structures Indigenous behavior at the chamber-level, suppressing unique patterns of observed political representation, but that unique patterns of political representation are observed within party, once controlling for
party factors. I also find, however, that both Indigenous and mestizo legislators in the majority party appear more alike when elected on party lists. This suggests that Indigenous representatives are promoting unique interests along broader policy topics. And, their association with the majority party appears to have some impact on how policy reflects the interests of group identity.

Chapter 5 explores female patterns of political representation in legislative debates. It finds that the cross-cutting interests among women are more clearly observed at the chamber-level. I empirically exclude a potential alternative source of speech variation that could be driving these differences. I find that unique patterns of representation are suppressed once we look at intra-party behavior for both the majority and the minority party in Bolivia. However, female descriptive representatives express more unique forms of political representation within the majority party than within the minority party. This should suggest, similar to Indigenous representation, that association with the majority party—and their control of the direction of policy—provides an opportunity to promote women’s interest in the packaging of policy.

The empirical evidence supports the theoretical expectations, but is still inconclusive. This research provides a foundation for isolating where we should search for unique patterns of political representation in developing democracies, especially
where legislative parties are unified. This is complicated by the simultaneous interparty and intraparty dynamics that are known to structure different incentives of individual behavior (Carroll & Shugart 2007). The packaging and bundling of legislation makes it further difficult to determine when policy reflects the broader interests of those groups who have been historically underrepresented. Fortunately, legislators use plenary debates to explain and justify their position to those who hold them accountable. This makes it possible to use patterns in speech communication to develop an appropriate empirical proxy for characterizing legislative behavior across a broad range of issues.

This dissertation takes seriously Van Cott’s (2010) suggestion to integrate research on ethnic descriptive representation and on gender descriptive representation into a broader theory of political representation. I use differences in the cross-cutting nature of group interest to develop expectations of where we should see differences in legislative behavior between descriptive representatives. These are some of the preliminary steps to understanding how members from different group identities impact the policymaking process and how the structure of government conditions observed behavior. This is important for understanding when legislators are interchangeable and when the political context allows for unique behavior.
Chapter 2

A Contextual Theory of Descriptive Representation

How does the design of institutions structure the presence of unique interests during the policy-making process? Under what circumstances do the unique perspectives of descriptive representatives appear absent? Distinct legislative behavior should be conditional on the types of institutional mechanisms designed to elect representatives and the type of party these legislators belong to. After controlling for these factors we should observe unique patterns of descriptive representation along a broader set of issues. The remaining chapters in this dissertation evaluate how the political context conditions legislative behavior and determines the extent to which we should—and should not—observe distinct forms of legislative behavior among descriptive and more traditional representatives. The presence of unique interests, under the appropriate conditions, should be clear during the defense of political positions in legislative deliberations. This chapter presents the broader theoretical argument of the project, explains the intuition behind exploring policy deliberations, and provides a background for exploring this argument in Bolivia.
2.1 Unique Representation

Increasing descriptive representation is extremely valuable for groups that have been historically absent from the political environment and have consequently been unable to advance their interests in the policy-making process. Group identity is expected to structure life experiences and shape perspectives and interests. The uniqueness of these interests and perspectives are more likely when group identity is associated with life experiences that are not shared with those with other group identities. Therefore, the systematic absence of descriptive representatives in the legislative assembly can leave a void in political representation.

Increasing the descriptive representation of underrepresented groups is expected to introduce new perspectives and new ideas into the deliberative process and improve the quality of debate (Mansbridge 1999). That is, scholars generally expect that representatives of underrepresented groups are able to use their unique experiences to judge policy in a manner that legislators not representing those groups are incapable of doing. This suggests that political representation should change when new types of legislators are incorporated into the policy-making process. In other words, we should expect a link between descriptive representation and legislative behavior.

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1 See also Dovi (2002).
2.1.1 The Link Between Descriptive Representation & Legislative Behavior

As mentioned above, scholars believe descriptive representation is important insofar as it affects legislative behavior. On an individual level, legislative behavior might include bill introduction, committee service, bill cosponsorship, and participation in legislative debates. Each behavior is associated with a particular type of “content.” For example, where the behavior is bill introduction and bill cosponsorship, the content is the type of policy introduced (e.g., one increasing social welfare benefits vs. one decreasing social welfare benefits). Where the behavior is participation in legislative debates, the content is the substance of their language used (e.g., the use of speech to espouse unique policy views). Whatever their legislative behavior, we should expect to see two types of changes reflected in content when there is an increase in descriptive representation: 1) new issues and priorities on the political agenda and 2) new perspectives on other important policies at key stages of policy deliberation (e.g., at the debate and voting stages of the policy-making process).

New Issues and Priorities

Scholars have uncovered empirical support for the theoretical argument that increasing descriptive representation leads to the introduction of new issues onto the political
agenda and that descriptive representatives bring new priorities to the attention of the legislature (Bratton 2005, Canon 1999, Carroll 2001, Carroll 2002, Dodson & Carroll 1991, Jones 1997, Htun & Jones 2002, Lublin 1997, Mezey 2008, Ross 2002, Schwindt-Bayer 2006, Swers 2005, Taylor-Robinson & Heath 2003, Thomas 1991, Tolleson-Rinehart 1992). This linkage has been identified using surveys and evaluating the types of bills that descriptive representatives introduce and cosponsor. For example, research has shown that legislatures adopt policy identified as “women’s issues” (Kittilson 2008, O’Regan 2000, Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 2005) and “racial and ethnic issues” (Preuhs 2006) as the number of female and racial and ethnic descriptive representatives increases, respectively. Most importantly, the empirical literature has uncovered substantial support for one of the primary theoretical arguments for increasing the descriptive representation of historically underrepresented groups—they introduce new issues onto the legislative agenda.

**New Perspectives on a Broad Set of Issues**

The current literature has been unable to establish a link between descriptive representation and legislative behavior outside of the types of issues that have typically been associated with historically underrepresented groups. The first attempts at this have explored voting behavior on non-group related issues, but this literature has
shown that “knowing the gender or race of a member will be much less helpful in predicting how that member will vote than knowing the member’s political affiliation” (Mezey 2008, 82). That is, party affiliation plays an integral role in conditioning the voting behavior of legislators, whether they are elected to increase the descriptive representation of a specific group or elected as traditional representatives.

This should not necessarily be taken as evidence that descriptive representation is irrelevant for broader issues. Scholars have found in Latin America that, under certain conditions, women are in policy-making positions on committees and in ministries that influence a broad set of issues, like finance and defense (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2005, Heath, Schwindt-Bayer & Taylor-Robinson 2005), with similar observations made of racial and ethnic descriptive representatives. Some problems with empirically determining an influence on broader issues may reduce to where we are looking. For example, relying on aggregate voting records can overlook some of the nuances in content that are ignored in discrete choices. My research will explore the content of legislative debates across all topics to isolate those political contexts where we should—and, should not—observe unique behavior along a broader set of issues, not simply on issues corresponding to the identity group’s

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2 Swers (1998) and Htun & Jones (2002) reflect this sentiment in their own research.

3 This should not suggest that this method is impossible for identifying influences. Juenke & Preuhs (2012) use a spatial model of legislative voting to find an underlying minority dimension that is unique to minority representatives in the U.S. states.
more specific interests.

2.1.2 Political Context and Representation

Scholars have shown that the political context influences the incentive structure of representatives, which in turn affects their strategic behavior for achieving future career goals (see Carroll & Shugart 2007). In systems where party leaders control access to the ballot and the spoils of office, representatives pursue the interests of the party and moderate their own behavior—if it deviates from the party’s—so that the content of their representative behavior reflects the interests of the party. The argument is that representatives fear negative consequences from party leaders, like not being renominated in the next election if they fail to toe the party line. In systems where constituents control access to the ballot and reward legislators at the next election (where reelection is the goal), the content of a representative’s behavior will be moderated towards the interests of the voting constituency (Carey & Shugart 1995, Mainwaring & Shugart 1997). Evidence of this has been established in the U.S. context (for an example of this, see Mayhew (1974)), and in Latin America (Crisp et al. 2004).

The partisan organization of legislative assemblies constitutes further evidence of partisan control of individual legislator behavior (see Cox & McCubbins 1993),
and it helps us understand why we do not observe systematic variation in voting behavior across descriptive and traditional representatives in the same party. Political parties strengthen the collective party reputation by simplifying vote choices to a single common factor—party membership. This is not surprising where we find that majority party leaders can keep divisive issues off of the agenda (Cox, Masuyama & McCubbins 2000, Chandler, Cox & McCubbins 2006, Cox, Heller & McCubbins 2008, Jones & Hwang 2005, Neto, Cox & McCubbins 2003), or where party leaders can control the selection of candidates for office or placement on party lists to enforce party discipline (Schattschneider 1942, Gallagher & Marsh 1988, Katz & Mair 1992, Bowler, Farrell & McAllister 1996, Bowler, Farrell & Katz 1999, Mainwaring & Shugart 1997, Jones 2002, Carey 2008), or where party leaders have formal or informal sanctioning mechanisms for those who break party discipline (Carey 2008). Thus, there is clear evidence that the political context modifies individual strategies of political representation for legislators generally.

Building on this work, I propose a contextual theory of descriptive representation that accounts for why the political context should affect the behavior of descriptive representatives in particular, thereby mitigating the link between descriptive and legislative behavior.
2.2 A Contextual Theory of Descriptive Representation

My theory of legislative behavior, like most theories in the legislative literature, assumes that representatives are rational and that their career ambition depends on political context. I assume that legislators from underrepresented groups have different perspectives than legislators from traditionally represented groups. This is based on literature on descriptive representation, which implicitly assumes that legislators from underrepresented groups have an incentive to advance group interests and that these preferences should be observed on a wide variety of issues. But unlike most theories on descriptive representation, I argue that the content of representative behavior demonstrated by descriptive representatives depends critically on the political context. More specifically, I argue that the institutional mechanism for achieving descriptive representation (e.g., plurality or proportional representation election) and the type of party (e.g., ethnic or catch-all party) should influence the ability of legislators from underrepresented groups to represent the interests of their group. This theory applies to the content of all types of representation, although in the empirical analysis, I will focus on only one of these behaviors—the content of representatives’ speeches in legislative debates.

The political context is important because it defines who office-seeking legislators are accountable to and how they are held accountable. These components should
predictably interact to modify the behavior of descriptive and traditional representatives and, as a result, modify the link between descriptive representation and political representation.

2.2.1 The Institutional Mechanisms for Achieving Representation

To increase the level of political representation, Mansbridge (1999, 632-633) makes the case for a selective form of descriptive representation to compensate specific groups for past obstacles—cultural and institutional—that have historically “reduce[d] the proportions of certain groups below what they would [have] achieve[d] by chance.” Oftentimes, this means designing institutions to increase descriptive representation. Such an argument has been used to justify the modification of geographical boundaries to create majority-minority districts in the U.S. (Lublin 1997); to justify the creation of ethnic reserved seats in New Zealand and parts of Latin America (Reynolds 2005, Reynolds, Reilly & Ellis 2005); and to justify the use of gender quotas in proportional representation electoral systems in Latin America and other regions (Jones 2009, Schwindt-Bayer 2009).4 Preexisting electoral institutions

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4 More generally, common institutional methods used for increasing descriptive representation of historically underrepresented racial and ethnic groups include reserved seats (e.g., caste and tribe seats in India, Maori seats in New Zealand, Aboriginal seats in Taiwan, black seats in Colombia, and indigenous seats in Bolivia), reduced vote thresholds for representation (e.g., for national minorities in Germany, Poland and Denmark), minority candidates on proportional representation lists (e.g., minority candidates on lists in Singapore), and race-conscious districting (e.g., black and latino majority-minority districts in the U.S.). Gender quotas are a
can also be favorable to achieving descriptive representation once interests are organized.

Two institutional mechanisms exist to make ethnic and racial descriptive representation possible: 1) the design of plurality districts to guarantee the election of underrepresented racial and ethnic groups and 2) the adoption of proportional representation systems to proportionally correct for underrepresentation. Following the first design, this can involve adoption of reserved seats to guarantee the election of underrepresented racial and ethnic groups. This institutional mechanism requires the selection of candidates based on voters’ ethnic or racial identity, and these candidates compete against one another for the seat. The first strategy can also involve establishing plurality districts so that the majority of voters are members of the historically underrepresented group. In both, candidates must generally make direct appeals to the interests and policy priorities of identity groups in order to win the election. The candidate that appeals most strongly to the interests of the targeted group should win the election. Representatives are making direct appeals to a group that has been historically removed from the policy-making process, and their mere election is coupled with the inclusion of new perspectives in that process. That is, we should expect descriptive representatives who are elected via plurality seats to

common institutional method used for increasing descriptive representation of women in proportional representation list systems (e.g., Argentina, Belgium, Costa Rica, Macedonia, and South Korea).
distinguish themselves from traditional representatives through different content of their representative behavior.  

The second institutional mechanism for increasing ethnic and racial descriptive representation is the use of a proportional representation electoral system. Historically underrepresented groups should have greater opportunities to achieve “mirror representation” under rules of proportional representation than under rules of plurality elections. Simply, PR electoral system more proportionally translate votes into seats, ensuring fairer representation and the incorporation of broader perspectives (Blais 1991, Benoit 2000). One primary caveat to this is the systematic exclusion of groups through the use of nondemocratic means, primarily the exclusion from the right to vote. Assuming universal suffrage, historically underrepresented groups need to be organized to achieve proportional descriptive representation. This can involve joining an already well-established political party or establishing a new party that is organized around specific interests. No matter what, proportional representation is one strategy for increasing the presence of historically underrepresented groups.

One common institutional mechanism to achieve female descriptive representation is the adoption of gender quotas on party-lists in proportional representation systems. This institutional mechanism requires that a specific percentage of women

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5 This distinction is a combination of accountability and unique perspectives from shared life experiences.
be on the party’s list. In these electoral environments party quotas are filled by women who are affiliated with that party. For example, liberal parties select liberal women and conservative parties select conservative women, and the size of the female population in the country—about half—makes it possible to be selective. So, party affiliation for national parties tends to have a cohesive effect, resulting in representative behavior that is similar across women and men in the same party. In fact, Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson (2008) find that the increasing number of female descriptive representatives in Latin America tend to be party loyalists.

Women in these systems, thus, must jump the same hurdles to be on the party list as their male colleagues. However, we should expect there to be some differences between these two groups on issues that are unique to women, since women presumably introduce new perspectives. This suggests that women and men in the same party should have similar representative behavior across most issues, except for those identified as women’s issues. And, when that occurs, we should see women across parties espousing similar views on fundamental women’s issues. For the same reason, we should expect there to be no difference between women not elected on quotas and women elected on quotas if they are affiliated with the same party. These women are expected to have the same unique perspectives (unique to the female group)

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6 The extent to which we see quotas leading to an actual increase in descriptive representation varies across enforcement strength and placement requirements (Jones 2009, Schwindt-Bayer 2009).
and the same ideological leanings. Thus, although gender quotas can be used to increase the number of women in the legislature (which can help get some types of policies passed), the existence of a quota should not influence the strategic behavior of women. That is, it is the political party that structures party members’ strategic behavior in list-systems, and quotas should only play an indirect role in the link between descriptive and representative behavior.

**Effects of Party Control**

Overall, we should expect the extent of party control to play a major role that modifies the strategies of descriptive representatives (Carey & Shugart 1995, Mainwaring & Shugart 1997). Achieving more than just a physical presence in the assembly can be difficult in proportional representation systems. Party elites with extensive control can remove representatives from the party and deny their reelection. One way of doing this is through nominating procedures, which vary between open or closed primaries and centralized or decentralized party selection. Representatives are accountable to voters in primary nominating procedures and to party leaders in party selection procedures. To achieve ballot access, representatives must appeal to the appropriate group while in office; they are punished (i.e., not reselected to be on the ballot) if they fail to satisfy the target group’s interests.
In the case of party control, party elites place party members higher on party lists (increasing the likelihood of election) to reward behavior that is aligned with the party. Partisan control also varies with the incentive to “cultivate a personal vote” (Carey & Shugart 1995). In closed-list proportional representation systems, voters vote for parties, so individual candidates increase the likelihood of reelection when they strengthen the party name. In plurality/majority systems (and to a lesser extent, open-list PR systems), representatives have an incentive to appeal directly to their voters by distinguishing themselves from other candidates, even their own party members. Representatives will behave differently than their party colleagues, perhaps without partisan consequences, in systems where they have an incentive to cultivate a personal vote, because voters directly determine the likelihood of reelection.

This is an important distinction that will allow an examination of the link between descriptive and legislative behavior. When party leaders exercise strong control over the likelihood of reelection, descriptive representatives will tailor the content of their behavior to satisfy party elites (e.g., in closed-list proportional elections). When party leaders do not enjoy such control, descriptive representatives can appeal directly to their identity group without fear of punishment from party elites (e.g., in plurality elections).
This should be clearly observed in systems where ethnic or racial descriptive representatives are elected with traditional partisan affiliations, where descriptive representative’s unique perspectives on policy can still manifest during the explanation of a party’s policy position in legislative debates. However, I would argue that women elected on closed-lists will act similarly in terms of their actual behavior to their male colleagues across most issues, because of the cohesive strength of prior partisan affiliation. Women’s perspectives on cross-cutting issues will appear more distinct at the chamber-level, where female legislators can speak with a collective voice.

In short, my argument is that the institutional mechanisms chosen for increasing descriptive representation—plurality seats or list seats—have a different effect on the strategies of descriptive representatives (by determining who they are primarily accountable to, their identity group or their party) and therefore have different modifying effects on the link between descriptive and legislative behavior. The primary concern here is isolating those political contexts where we should observe unique patterns of political representation. Descriptive representatives accountable to their identity group should express more “natural” forms of political representation that

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7 Evidence of this has been uncovered in Crisp et al. (2004), who show how both the ballot type and nominating procedures influence legislator behavior in the assembly. They find that legislators who are directly accountable to constituents are more likely to produce policy targeted at specific constituents, whereas legislators who are accountable to party leaders are more likely to produce more general policy.
channel shared unique perspectives that are associated with group identity. The political context conditions descriptive representatives to modify patterns of political representation to reflect the interests of those who hold them accountable—in this case, the party—and express those interests through the lens of group identity. This point has thus far not been explicitly recognized (much less tested) in the existing literature on descriptive representation.

2.2.2 The Type of Party

Mansbridge (1999) argues that “perspectives” influence political representation and that different perspectives influence legislative behavior in different ways. Not all political parties are the same in terms of their policy perspectives. Catch-all parties tend to incorporate many different perspectives in their appeals to the electorate. In contrast, more narrowly defined political parties tend to appeal to a specific perspective (e.g., the collective group identity of voters). When faced with a choice, legislators should join parties that are ideologically compatible with their interests. From Kitschelt et al. (2010, 66):

...if a party system in fact embodies programmatic linkages—that is, if the legislative activity of parties is all about issues and politics rather than selective incentives or the faithful support of a particular charismatic leader—then individual politicians will tend to join a party whose preferences are close to their own; their opinions about one issue should
be related to their opinions about other issues; and they should employ shared, issue-based meanings of party labels.

Of course, not all political parties make programmatic appeals (Kitschelt et al. 2010). But, when they do, the structure of the political party should inform our expectations. Isolating the effect of institutions on legislative behavior requires an awareness of the type of party that legislators are associated.

Unique patterns of legislative behavior will appear suppressed in narrowly defined political parties where party membership reinforces a common identity (both ideological and descriptive). Catch-all parties will share a common ideological identity, but will incorporate members from varied life experiences who share that common ideological identity. Given the link that Mansbridge (1999) has suggested between perspectives and the content of representative behavior, I expect that the more traditional parties will have greater variation in the content of their representative behavior than more narrowly-defined racial or ethnic parties. This should be true across all issue types, not just those that are traditionally associated with a particular race or ethnicity. For this reason, it is important to first explore the behavior

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8 This includes the effects from the active role of parties in the recruitment and selection of members, some of which is explained above. Political parties can actively select different candidate types to fulfill the objectives of the party, whether programmatic or clientalistic (Siavelis & Morgenstern 2008).

9 This can currently be observed in Bolivia. During the 2009 election, the Movement to Socialism (MAS) party changed from being an ethnic-based party to making broader appeals to middle-class voters with the introduction of more centrists candidates to the party. This should expand
of descriptive representatives where they are associated with broad-based political parties.

2.2.3 Contextual Hypotheses

I have identified two political contexts that should play a significant role in modifying the link between descriptive representation and political representation. Descriptive representatives are assumed to have different policy perspectives that would be observed in political representation if the political context relating to their reelection goals did not constrain their behavior. The uniqueness of those perspectives are conditional on the extent of unique group identity.

Before continuing, I would like to clarify an important point mentioned above. I, overall, expect ethnic and racial descriptive representatives to express more unique patterns of political representation than female descriptive representatives across a broader range of issues. Kymlicka (1996) argues that the geographic concentration of groups isolates life experiences that are associated with unique perspectives. Isolated groups have fewer shared experiences with other groups, making their perspectives comparatively unique. Ethnic and racial groups are frequently more isolated in their life experiences than gendered groups. And, both men and women are expected the number of perspectives that are represented in the party. Although MAS is an ethnic-based party, their strategy to expand their voting electorate may have negative consequences on how unified their party message can be during policy-making.
to experience many of the same cross-cutting forces (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). We should indeed expect female descriptive representatives to introduce new issues and perspectives to legislative deliberations, but those perspectives should be limited to specific issues.

This is further complicated when ethnic/racial representative are associated with one party and women are associated with multiple parties. Because female interests appear to be cross-cutting, we should observe more unique patterns of political representation at the chamber-level where women can speak with a collective voice (even if the extent of that collective voice is isolated to few issues). This should be suppressed within party where women and men overlap more on party positions and interests. I expect the opposite for ethnic legislators. Because ethnic interests are often associated with party (Htun 2004), their perspectives should be blurred when compared at the chamber-level. In other words, the similarities between ethnic descriptive representatives and their copartisans, in addition to their collective dissimilarity with the opposition party, will overwhelm those unique differences expressed by ethnic descriptive representatives. These patterns should be more clear when we look at intra-party comparisons.
I will explore four hypotheses from my contextual theory of representation:

Hypothesis 1 (Inter-Party Representation) *Ethnic descriptive representatives elected within one party will express similar overall patterns of political representation as traditional representatives. Unique patterns of political representation will be identifiable once controlling for party-level factors.*

Hypothesis 2 (Ethnic Plurality vs. List Selection) *Ethnic descriptive representatives elected via plurality seats will engage in different representative behavior than ethnic descriptive representatives elected on party-lists. This should hold across all issue domains because descriptive representatives from plurality seats are directly accountable to the electorate, whereas descriptive representatives from party-lists are directly accountable to party leaders.*

Hypothesis 3 (Female Cross-Cutting Issues) *Female descriptive representatives will express more unique patterns of political representation across parties when compared to male descriptive representatives. The distinction will diminish within parties.*

Hypothesis 4 (Gender Lists) *Women elected on party lists should tailor the content of their representative behavior in the same way as their male colleagues in the party on most issues. Women and men on the same party lists should demonstrate minimal differences in their representative behavior.*

2.3 Representation in Legislative Debates

Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representatives should influence representation via the quality of deliberations. Therefore, if descriptive representatives are
any different than traditional representatives and are contributing to the representation of historically underrepresented groups, then we should see this in the manner in which they debate policy. Descriptive representatives should not only be using different types of words, but the way in which they use these words should be different. That is, there should be differences in the patterns of communication between descriptive and traditional representatives. Legislative debates can be explored empirically to uncover the extent to which legislators share common language to defend policy. We can evaluate what legislators are saying and how their rhetoric reflects differences among their colleagues.

Plenary debates are a useful venue to communicate priorities and signal that legislators are working in the interests of those who hold them accountable. Although characterizing the legislative floor as a space for “policy refinery” is questionable (Taylor-Robinson & David 2002), it does “provide legislators with more flexibility in framing an issue and argument compared to roll call votes” (Sellers 2010, 20). Debates give an opportunity to legislators to strategically select messages from the overall partisan platform to emphasize specific interests (Gimpel 1996). Public positions can strengthen both an individual and/or a collective partisan reputation (Grose & Middlemass 2010, Hill & Hurley 2002, Maltzman & Sigelman 1996, Martin & Vanberg 2008a, Proksch & Slapin 2012, Sellers 2010).
Public communication is not just a delivery of empty promises. Debates can be a credible tool to convey information about preferences and interests to legislators during policymaking (Austen-Smith 1990, Austen-Smith 1992). Opposition legislators can find them useful to fill information voids and provide oversight of the governing parties (Proksch & Slapin 2011). And, when it comes to voters, public communication has been known to impact voter information (Grimmer, Messing & Westwood 2012, Lipinski 2001). Ultimately, legislators find debates important for “publicly justifying their position on policies they are about to adopt” (Martin & Vanberg 2008a, 503).

Plenary debates fulfill a normative objective of democracy and representation highlighted by Pitkin (1967) and Fenno (1978), which is to explain and justify to the represented that representatives are acting in their interests. Debates are a useful venue for understanding patterns of political representation in the legislature. Given that plenary debate are public and legislators can be held accountable for misinformation, we should expect them to be an appropriate proxy for understanding underlying patterns of political representation in legislative assemblies.

For the most part, party leaders and members use the plenary debate to distinguish themselves from the opposing parties (or even members in the same party where intra-party competition is rife) as a method to communicate strategically to
the electorate. Where prior literature has argued and shown that voting behavior among legislators is best determined by partisan affiliation (Htun & Jones 2002, Mezey 2008, Swers 1998), legislative debates allow us to empirically uncover the extent to which the unique use of language reflects nuanced political positioning that is blurred when we look at behavior as dichotomous vote support or opposition to legislation. I decide to use plenary debates because it is one of few venues where public access to debates allows for the integration of different target audiences (e.g., party leaders and electoral constituency groups). It is also a place where legislators have equal opportunity to espouse their opinion along a variety of different issues, not necessarily those that directly affect their target audience.¹⁰

2.4 Exploring Patterns of Representation in Bolivia

I expect the political context to influence the behavior of both ethnic descriptive representatives and female descriptive representatives, and I explore these two groups separately in this project. I explore this topic in Bolivia, where both Indigenous and women have been historically underrepresented and, following Mansbridge (1999),

¹⁰ Plenary debates are often used by legislators to communicate directly to their target audience to defend their position for a vote choice. Legislative interviews conducted in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru during Fall 2010 and Spring 2011 clearly indicate that legislators see legislative debates as a way to communicate to a target audience. Legislators elected from party-lists tend to recognize the party leader as their target, whereas legislators from open-lists and single member districts tend to identify their constituents as the target audience.
can be seen to have relatively uncrystallized interests in the legislature. Indigenous
and women have been systematically excluded from the legislative arena during fre-
quent periods of democratic and economic instability.

Economic concerns after the return to democracy have traditionally taken prece-
dent over all other issues. Following eighteen years of military control, a democrati-
cally elected government in 1982 was immediately confronted with inflation of more
than 4,000 percent and a fiscal deficit of 23.4 percent of GDP (Lehoucq 2011). This
period of democratic transition was coupled with neoliberal reforms that reversed
many of the Indigenous-negotiated reforms that followed the 1952 revolution, in-
cluding the nationalization of the means of production and agrarian reform. During
this period party elites successfully used “coercion, clientelism, and co-optation of the
Indigenous elite to control and dominate the Indigenous population” (Van Cott 2000,
163), making it possible to pursue policy that opposed the collective interests of the
Indigenous. Although the Indigenous compose more than half of the population—
sixty-two percent self-identify as Indigenous in the 2001 Census—a high threshold of
representation limited the proliferation of small parties and made it difficult for the
Indigenous to organize and compete for votes (Van Cott 2000).

For the purposes of this project, descriptive representation for both Indigenous
and women have increased substantially during the contemporary period. Decentral-
ization reform of the electoral system and governing structure in 1994 established a political context that made Indigenous representation more likely. The adoption of gender quotas implemented for the 1997 national election and beyond introduced more women to the legislature.

2.4.1 Indigenous Descriptive Representation

The geographic and cultural isolation of Indigenous communities made it possible for traditional elites to adopt exclusionary tools—language barriers and racial discrimination—that restricted representation in the interests of the Indigenous (Van Cott 2000). Many of the voting restrictions were lifted—and universal suffrage adopted—after the Indigenous joined the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) during the 1952 revolution. This period of democracy did not last long when military control of government began in 1964 and sustained until the return to democracy in 1982. However, Van Cott (2000, 164) argues that the extended franchise to Indigenous was “not in order to enfranchise them or legitimize Indigenous cultures and forms of political organization but, rather, to dismember autonomous networks.” A high threshold of representation and sustained patron-client relationships with the MNR effectively removed the Indigenous as actors in the political arena during the
1980s.\textsuperscript{11} Prior to 1997 election, Indigenous representatives composed no more than four percent of the seats in the entire Congress (130 seats in the lower chamber and 27 seats in the upper chamber) during any term (Loayza 2012).

Indigenous descriptive representation increased after decentralization of the political system made the development of local organizations politically viable. Two reforms expanded political competition: the 1994 Ley de Participaci´ on Popular (LPP) and adoption of a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1994. LPP created 311 new local government municipalities—from what was formerly less than a dozen—with direct election of municipal officials and redistributed 20 percent of government revenues to the elected local governments (Van Cott 2000). The MMP electoral system replaced the former closed-list proportional representation system for the 130-seat lower chamber, creating 68 single member districts and 62 closed-list seats in nine regional districts (Mayorga 2001). Indigenous and campesino candidates won 28.6 percent of all seats in the first municipal elections in 1995. The administrative departments of Oruro and Cochabamba—two departments with a high concentration of Indigenous communities—showed a higher percentage of Indigenous-won seats, 62 percent and 40 percent, respectively (Van Cott 2000).

\textsuperscript{11} With Indigenous support evaporating before the 1993 election, the MNR selected an Indigenous Vice Presidential candidate, Victor Hugo Cárdenas, to rally Indigenous support for the election. The MNR ticket subsequently won the election and Cárdenas became the first person of Indigenous decent to hold the position.
During this period, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) established a party organization based on Indigenous interests to compete in the 1997 general election. The party includes primarily labor organizations (e.g., labor unions and coca unions) and Indigenous movements (e.g., CSUTCB, CIDOB, Bartolina-Sisa, and CONAMAQ) (Loayza 2012, Zuazo 2009). The preelectoral coalition that included MAS won four congressional seats in the 1997 election. MAS showed greater strength in the following elections. The Indigenous leader of the MAS, Evo Morales, won second-place in the 2002 election and won a majority of the vote in the 2005 and 2009 election to become the first Indigenous president in Bolivia. The MAS demonstrated similar success in Congress, winning 35 total congressional seats in 2002 (27 lower chamber, 8 upper chamber), 84 congressional seats in 2005 (72 lower chamber, 12 upper chamber), and 114 congressional seats in 2009 (88 lower chamber, 26 upper chamber)—following the expansion of the upper chamber to 36 seats.

The growing strength of the MAS resulted in the election of more Indigenous legislators. Reliable aggregate data shows that 27 Indigenous candidates were elected to Congress in 2005 and 43 Indigenous candidates were elected to Congress in 2009 (Loayza 2012). An overwhelming majority of these Indigenous candidates were elected on the MAS ticket in 2005 and all but one Indigenous legislator was elected on the MAS ticket in 2009. MAS is currently the political instrument for channeling
Indigenous descriptive representation. The MAS, however, is recognized as a broad-based party with appeals to Indigenous, poor, and middle class interests (Anria forthcoming). The most obvious of these broader appeals is during preparation for the 2009 election. Centellas (2009) shows that these underlying ethnic cleavages existed prior to government reforms in 1994. Electoral success of Indigenous descriptive representatives, and MAS more broadly, can be attributed to the consolidation of the indigenous movement, institutional changes that made local competition viable, and general dissatisfaction with the government (Van Cott 2003).

Access to channels of political representation have been anecdotally associated with landmark political reforms and legislation that favor specific Indigenous interests. Morales initiated a constituent assembly that convened August 2009 to write a new constitution soon after his January 2006 election. The new constitution entrenched both symbolic and substantive changes that appeal to Indigenous interests. Symbolically, the constitution recognizes Bolivia as a plurinational and secular, rather than a Catholic, state. Substantively, the constitution limits private ownership of land to 12,400 acres. Land must also serve an “economic or social function” or risk government confiscation. The constitution also establishes the concept of consulta previa (prior consultation), which requires the state to consult Indigenous communities via referendum to obtain permission before extracting natural resources.
Electoral reform, which followed the adoption of the 2009 Constitution, continued the use of MMP for the lower chamber and included seven Indigenous reserved seats for each of the administrative departments, except two. After winning a majority of seats in both chambers of Congress after the 2009 election, the MAS has adopted strict anti-discrimination laws and a law that decentralizes some of Bolivia’s judicial recognition for indigenous communities to implement their own communal methods of justice (Loayza 2012). These laws recognize the historical disadvantage of the Indigenous communities and make the first attempts to protecting group interests.

### 2.4.2 Female Descriptive Representation

Expansion of female political rights reflect similar trends for the Indigenous. The adoption of universal suffrage in 1952 created a legitimate channel of political authority for women. Collective female interests were systematically ignored during the

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12 Indigenous communities from the departments of Cochabamba and Beni in 2011 effectively terminated a controversial plan to construct a Brazilian-funded highway through an Indigenous territory (Tioc) and national park (Isiboro Sécure) after the government failed to consult the Indigenous communities. Protests included a 1,500-person march from Trinidad, Beni in the lowlands to the administrative capital of La Paz in the highlands, a distance of 370 miles through the Andean mountains that took two-months to walk and was confronted by police force along the way.

13 Voters have two legislative votes: one for the district candidate (uninominal) and one for the party list (plurinominal). Voters self-select to participate in the reserved-seat election. Because the reserved seats are subtracted from the plurinominal seats, voters make a decision to vote for a list or vote for a reserved seat candidate. Following the 2009 electoral reform, the lower chamber is composed of 70 uninominales, 53 plurinominales, and 7 reserved-seat legislators.
periods of democratic and economic instability from military control of government in 1964 until the mid-1990s. Two political reforms improved greater access to positions of decision-making. Land reform in 1996 established equal land rights between men and women. And, the establishment of gender quotas in 1997 determined a minimal level of female presence in the legislative assembly.

Electoral reform adopted in 1997 mandates a 30 percent gender quota in the lower chamber for closed-list ballots. Party lists must be ordered so that one woman is included for every two men. The law is enforced with few exceptions (Jones 2009). Women composed 10 percent of the legislative assembly prior to adoption of the quota law. The first year of adoption showed similar patterns. Following the first year of adoption, female descriptive representation increased to 25 seats (20 percent of the chamber) after the 2002 election, 22 seats (17 percent) after the 2005 election, and 30 seats (23 percent) after the 2009 election. Women are primarily elected on party lists, but there are few cases where women are elected in plurality districts. For the purposes of this project, I am interested in patterns of political representation for all women in the lower chamber.

Rousseau (2011) isolates two female group identities in Bolivia: Indigenous women and feminist. Indigenous women, for example, protect more traditional roles of women and have greater interest in collective agency. This perspective tends to over-
lap with those of male Indigenous identity. Indigenous women interpret feminist challenges to traditional roles to be incompatible to their interests to protect Indigenous identity, however, there is substantial overlap related to broader concerns dealing with equal access to decision-making and violence against women (Rousseau 2011).

Legislation reflecting the interests of women has been more common since the 2002 election. Legislation adopted in 2002 provides women in private and public sector jobs sixty days of maternity leave with 95 percent of earnings during that period. This includes protections from dangerous work environments while pregnant and job security for a full year after returning to employment (Social Security Programs Throughout the Word: The Americas, 2011 2012). The 2009 Constitution now explicitly guarantees equal rights for both men and women. More recently, the MAS-controlled government passed a comprehensive domestic violence law that legally protects women from all forms of abuse, including marital rape and femicide (Bolivia Hails Law Against Gender Violence 2013). This anecdotally suggests that policy is beginning to reflect the basic interests of female group identity.

Women’s presence in Indigenous movements (both integrated into overall Indigenous interests and separate female indigenous organizations, Bartolina-Sisa) have been credited for advancing women’s interests in the political system (Rousseau 2011). This is also true for the composition of the executive cabinet. The 2010 exec-
utive cabinet achieved gender parity for the first time in Bolivia’s short democratic history. Though the gendered institution definitely still exists (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2009), women are now controlling positions that were traditionally reserved for men—for example, a woman controls the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. This period demonstrates expanding access to decision-making positions for women and possible opportunities of interest representation.

2.4.3 Political Context

The above suggests that interests of the historically underrepresented remain uncrystallized in Bolivia. Important to this project is how the political context structures the behavior of descriptive representatives. The electoral system creates an opportunity to explore legislative incentives to develop an individual and/or collective partisan reputation. More importantly, exploring these questions in Bolivia makes it possible to control for unobserved factors that should equally influence legislators elected on either ballot type.

Plurinominal legislators accountable to party leaders should appeal to collective partisan interests, and uninominal candidates who are directly accountable to constituents should strengthen an individual reputation. Individual reputation should be more closely associated with a legislator’s “natural” behavior in legislative debates.
when group identity is unique. In other words, this allows the possibility to explore if uninominal Indigenous representatives express more unique patterns of political representation than plurinominal legislators. These patterns should be more obvious once we control for party effects. Female descriptive representatives elected on party lists or plurality districts should express some unique patterns of political representation once controlling for party effects, however these unique interests should be muted because of cross-cutting factors.

During the 2009 election, the MAS party changed from being an ethnic-based party to making broader appeals to middle-class voters with the introduction of more centrists candidates to the party. This should expand the number of perspectives that are represented in the party, making it possible to search for unique interests within party. Broadening party support involved broadening the party programme. This makes it possible for isolating those contexts where Indigenous descriptive representatives express patterns of political representation that are unique to group identity. I specifically explore Indigenous legislative behavior in the 2010 legislative session in Chapter 4. The MAS electoral candidates are selected in local party congresses and approved by the central party organization (Zuazo 2009). Legislators have an incentive to satisfy basic party interests to be renominated for future elections, or other political positions. Other political parties have similar centralized
selection structures. Chapter 5 explores patterns of female representation over time across the major parties since the transition to democracy and looks at intra-party patterns of political representation during the 2010 legislative period.

### 2.5 Discussion

I assume that descriptive representatives have a “natural” form of political representation that is related to their group identity. The uniqueness of natural behavior is determined by the commonality of factors shared between different identity groups. This project is concerned with how the political context structures natural behavior and defines incentives that make legislators seem more compatible to party interests.

Overall, legislators are still making choices that reflect natural interests. Those choices, however, can be bundled in a way that strengthens common partisan identity. In some cases, where interests are particularly unique, we may never see those interests unconditionally present on the legislative agenda.

We can explore the content of how legislators explain and justify policy to get a sense of how policy relates to unique interests. Legislators still have an incentive to frame deliberations in a way that advances the collective interests of those who hold them accountable (i.e., party interests). This should be clear when we compare speech deliberations between parties. This should not suggest that their perspec-
tives of descriptive representatives are absent from deliberations, however, it should suggest that the political context structures observed perspectives to appear more common across legislators.

I am interested in those factors that structure common perspectives and isolating those contexts where unique perspectives become more clear. Looking at two historically underrepresented groups—Indigenous and women—helps establish those conditions where perspectives should be more or less unique among party members.
Chapter 3

Measuring Unique Speech Patterns

The theory suggests a measure that quantifies word use similarities and differences among types of descriptive legislators. Legislators with similar speech patterns should measure closer than those with alternative speech patterns. Identifying unique perspectives in legislative debates requires leveraging the speech patterns from those legislators in the assembly who share the same descriptive characteristics and from those legislators who hold opposing descriptive characteristics. This means creating a measure that calculates how unique collective speech patterns are between legislators on both sides of a specific divide (e.g., ethnicity, gender, and majority status).

To do this, I employ a word-weighting procedure developed by Laver, Benoit & Garry (2003)—Wordscores—that allows the user to select the reference documents that compose the distribution of words in order to determine speech similarities and differences between the remaining legislators in the assembly. Performing this procedure for every pairwise combination of reference legislators makes it possible to generate a measure that isolates the strength of the divide that separates speech patterns from different types of descriptive representatives. I interpret this mea-
sure as capturing the uniqueness of patterns of representation for different types of representatives.

This chapter develops an intuition behind the measure and explains how I employ Wordscores to compose a measure that quantifies patterned speech differences between types of legislators. I do this using both analytical derivations and qualitative support. This approach can be adopted to explore unique legislative behavior for any divide in the legislative assembly. For example, I use this approach to explore the strength of the government-opposition divide in Bolivia during the post-transition period from 1985 to 2010. Bolivia’s unique institutional design—known as “Parliamentarized Presidentialism”—has generated periods of multi-party, ideologically-diverse government coalitions and single-party, ideologically-coherent government coalitions. The government-opposition divide should be weak when the government is ideologically diverse and strong when one party controls the government. I explain why we should expect the strength of the division to vary with the number of parties in government. I next employ the empirical procedure and find that it mirrors our expectations. I take this as evidence that the measure is appropriate for capturing the collective uniqueness of legislative speech among and between legislators of a shared characteristic.
3.1 Developing the Measure

Legislators with similar speech patterns will use a similar frequency of word choice. We know this because unique words are empirically associated with different positions and different perspectives (see Monroe, Colaresi & Quinn 2008). Legislators that use a similar frequency of shared, unique words should measure closer to one another than legislators who use different words at opposing high and low frequencies. Those legislators who share some combination of words of varying frequencies should measure somewhere between the two extremes. The proposed measure captures the collective uniqueness of legislative behavior between groups of legislators. Determining the strength of the divide between two opposing groups is the first step to further understanding those political contexts where descriptive representatives express unique forms of political representation.

I employ Wordscores to accomplish this task (Laver, Benoit & Garry 2003, Lowe 2008). One of the major advantages of Wordscores is the users ability to select “reference” documents, from the corpus of available documents, which can be used to determine the divide by which legislators should be compared (e.g., Indigenous-mestizo, male-female, and government-opposition). This assumes that the distribution of words across the reference documents is the “true” distribution. Using a word-weighting procedure, Wordscores derives a value for each of the remaining
“unassigned” documents (i.e., those not selected as a reference document) that makes it possible to empirically identify if a given document sounds more like one reference document than the other.

To identify differences and similarities between legislators based off of a specific divide (e.g. Indigenous vs. mestizo), I select the legislative speeches from one legislator on both sides of that divide as my reference documents. A document is a legislator’s full body of legislative speeches. If speech patterns are common among those legislators on one side of the divide (e.g., Indigenous), then members who share that characteristic should empirically cluster around their respective reference document. Those legislators should also empirically separate from the reference document that has the opposing characteristic (e.g., mestizo). If the divide is strong, this clustering should generally be independent from whomever is selected as a reference document.

Wordscores is an empirical procedure that uses a word count matrix composed of the count of each word used by each legislator (i.e. each word is a row and a column is a legislator). A cell is the number of times that a legislator said a given word, ranging from zero to the total number of spoken words. To perform the analysis, reference documents are first assigned an arbitrary—and, different—number.\(^1\) Each

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\(^1\) For example, an Indigenous reference document is assigned a two and a mestizo reference document is assigned an eight.
w-word from the reference documents, r, along a given d-divide is scored a number, $S_{wd}$. $S_{wd}$ is an empirical derivation of how unique a word is to a reference document. This is derived from the probability that a word is found in one of the reference documents ($P_{wr} = \frac{F_{wr}}{\sum_r F_{wr}}$) and weighted by the user-assigned number ($A_{rd}$) from that reference document. “Uniqueness” is when a word has a weighted score that is proximate to a reference document’s assigned number. The “wordscore” for each word is derived from the following equation:

$$S_{wd} = \sum_r (P_{wr} \times A_{rd}) \quad (3.1)$$

The expected score of the “unassigned” legislators is determined using the wordscore, $S_{wd}$, for each word and the frequency of that word, $F_{wv}$, in the unassigned legislator’s speech, where $v$ is the unassigned legislator. The “similarity” score for the unassigned legislator is the weighted wordscore across all scored words. Two techniques are available to rescale the similarity score for each unassigned legislator. Both strategies attempt to balance the moderating effects that common and noninformative words have on the similarity score. The Laver, Benoit & Garry (2003) transformation uses the mean assigned score, $\overline{S}$, and relies on the standard deviation of the similarity scores from the unassigned documents, $SD_v$, and the standard deviation of the assigned wordscores for the reference documents, $SD_r$, to rescale the raw similarity scores, $S_v$. This looks like: $S_v^* = (S_v - \overline{S}) \times \left( \frac{SD_r}{SD_v} \right) + \overline{S}$. The measure is robust to noninformative content in the reference documents, but sensitive to the selection of the unassigned documents. The Martin & Vanberg (2008b)
derived using the following equation:

\[ S_{vd} = \sum_w (F_{wv} \times S_{vd}) \]  

(3.2)

A similarity score is assigned for every legislator in the analysis. Among scored legislators, those that share a similar score are collectively more like one reference legislator than the other reference legislator. The expectation is that legislators on the same side of the divide of interest will be distributed closer to the reference legislator that shares that same characteristic than the reference legislator with the opposite characteristic. This should be more common when the divide between opposing groups is strong. If this is true, then the means of the legislator scores for each category (e.g., Indigenous and mestizo) should be significantly different from one another. I empirically determine this using a difference-of-means test. Differences are classified as significant if \( p \leq 0.10 \). Significantly different legislator-

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transformation first derives a new similarity score for the reference texts. The derivation uses the assigned scores for the reference documents, \( A_{max} \) and \( A_{min} \), and the new similarity scores for the reference documents, \( S_{rmax} \) and \( S_{rmin} \), to rescale the raw scores, \( S_v \). This looks like: \( S_v^* = (S_v - S_{rmin}) \times \left( \frac{A_{max} - A_{min}}{S_{rmax} - S_{rmin}} \right) + A_{min} \). Although this transformation is robust to unassigned document selection, it is sensitive to reference document selection and the amount of word overlap. Fortunately, rescaling the similarity scores is irrelevant for my purposes. I am only concerned with how legislators cluster and not with the empirical value of the similarity score.

4 Given that reference documents are assigned an ordered value, I perform a one-side t-test to determine significant differences.
clusters between the two categories suggest that the divide is strong, however, *only* for that pairwise combination. Many factors (e.g., region or occupation) could play a role when determining the collective uniqueness of one iteration between two selected reference documents. The empirical separation *could* be unique to just those two reference documents. This problem can be reduced by making inferences from every available pairwise combination of reference documents.

For the purposes of this project, I want to determine the strength of a categorical divide in the legislature. A strong divide exists when legislative speech patterns are unique to the group and not the individual. A single iteration of the above process does not inform us enough of unique group behavior. However, performing this analysis using multiple different reference combinations gets us closer to calculating a unique group measure. I suggest that the frequency of significant mean differences across every pairwise combination can be used to identify the strength of the divide in the legislature. Using a more robust measure reduces the likelihood that potentially overlapping factors are driving differences between legislators. Evaluating every pairwise combination makes it more likely that the category is the only common factor connecting the legislators in the analysis.

Strong divides will have a higher frequency of mean differences that are statistically different from one another across pairwise combinations and weak divides will
have a lower frequency of mean differences that are statistically different from one another.\(^5\) Although I suspect that some reference documents do not separate speech patterns well, I do suspect that if a divide is strong, then \textit{most} of the randomly selected pairwise combinations should separate legislator categories along the given divide. More frequent empirical separation for each iteration helps determine that speech patterns are unique and reflective of the entire group, and not just the reference combination. This means that any random legislator of a shared identity is espousing a coherent and consistent message to voters.

3.1.1 Example: 2010 Bolivian Legislative Period

I show the derivation of the measure using the lower chamber of the 2010 legislative period in Bolivia as an example to help the reader gain a better insight behind its intuition. This measure empirically captures if legislative speech patterns are consistently different across the divide of interest. This measure could be used to explore any categorical divide. The government-opposition divide concerns me for this analysis. One evaluation is a random pairwise combination using one government member and one opposition member as reference documents. A high frequency of iterations where government legislators express speech that is significantly different

\(^5\) I infer the relative strength of the divide because there is no absolute threshold for determining the actual strength of the divide.
than opposition legislators demonstrates a strong divide.

There are 130 members in the 2010 legislative period, 88 members compose the government and 42 members compose the opposition. The MAS controls the majority without a post-electoral coalition (though four legislators from the Movement Without Fear (MSM) split in April 2010 from the pre-electoral alliance), and the opposition is composed of three parties: Plan Progress for Bolivia-National Convergence (PPB-CN) with 37 seats; National Unity Front (UN) with 3 seats; and Social Alliance (AS) with 2 seats. The government-opposition divide is perceived to be strong. The MAS is the first single party to have majority control of the lower chamber (winning majority control after the 2005 and 2009 election) since the post-transition period starting in 1982 and it won unified majority control of the government (including, the senate and executive) after the 2009 election. The opposition is composed of an ideological diverse combination of political parties, however, every opposition party is ideologically to the “right” of the majority party. Though there are some issues where the government and opposition do overlap, there appears to be a strong divide between the unified majority and the opposition. This analysis is an example of how to uncover the strength of that divide.

All debates during the legislative period are first organized by legislator. All non-

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6 Speech processing and organization is completed using Perl programming-language.
informative, common words are removed from the legislative speeches. This includes prepositions and articles, known as stop words.\textsuperscript{7} All words are also systematically stemmed to their root. This has the effect of combining words that convey the same information, but possess an alternative spelling.\textsuperscript{8} Legislators are considered eligible as unassigned documents if they contribute at least 100 substantive words to all debates during the legislative period and are considered eligible as reference documents if they contribute at least one thousand substantive words to all debates during the legislative period. Legislative speeches are removed from the analysis when legislators are in an administrative role, where procedural language is dominant.

Among all legislators, 110 government members and 65 opposition members (4 from AS, 57 from PPB-CN, and 4 from UN) meet the requirement to be an unassigned document and 56 government members and 48 opposition members (2 from AS, 42 from PPB-CN, and 4 from UN) meet the requirement to be a reference document.\textsuperscript{9} Legislative speeches for every member that meets the basic criteria for an unassigned document are organized in a word-count matrix.\textsuperscript{10} Reference legislators who meet the basic criteria are selected from the word-count matrix. The two reference legislators

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item An extensive list of Spanish stop words includes: el, hay, la, nuestro, otro, ser, and tenga.
\item This includes words like pobre and pobreza, ahorrar and ahorrando. pueblo and pueblos.
\item Legislative substitutes are also included if they meet the minimum requirements.
\item The word-count matrix is created using the \textit{JFreq} software (http://www.williamlowe.net/software)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
isolate those words that determine speech similarity among the remaining legislators. Determining speech similarity follows the analytical procedure described above.

Table 3.1 shows an example from the 2010 legislative period of how to derive a wordscore using one government legislator (Tupa Tupa) and one opposition legislator (Franco Vaca). This is a sample of words from the word-count matrix. Each word is considered to be reflective of government, opposition, or shared language, five words from each category. The first five words reflect opposition language, which emphasize fiscal issues, drug trafficking, and transparency. The middle five words are representative of shared language between government and opposition legislators. Common issues are more abstract: corruption, discrimination, spending, youth, and citizens. The last five words compose parts of the MAS platform. The MAS specifically communicates to historically underrepresented groups (rural persons and the poor), defends against persecution of those groups (including the Indigenous), promotes protection of a multilingual society, and supports national and group sovereignty.

The government reference document is assigned a two and the opposition reference document is assigned an eight. The wordscore is an expected value that helps determine how unique the word is to one of the reference documents: wordscores closer to two are more unique to government and those closer to eight are more unique to opposition. We can see in the table that words traditionally associated
Table 3.1: 2010 Example: Determining Wordscores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Reference Speakers</th>
<th>(P_{wr})</th>
<th>(S_w)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tupa Tupa (Government)</td>
<td>Franco Vaca (Opposition)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ahorrar (to save)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economicas (economic)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>narcotráfico (drug traffic)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transparencia (transparency)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscalizacin (audit)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pueblo (the people)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anticorrupcin (anti-corruption)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discriminador (discriminator)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gastar (to spend)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jóvenes (the young)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campesinos (rural persons)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idiomas (languages)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persecucin (persecution)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pobreza (the poor)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soberania (sovereignty)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ A_{Government} = 2, A_{Opposition} = 8 \]

Word ‘Uniqueness,’ \(S_w = \sum_r (P_{wr} \times A_r)\)

with the government have a wordscore closer to two and words traditionally associated with the opposition are empirically closer to eight. Shared words have a score closer to five (halfway between two and eight). The procedure would be performed for every word spoken by the reference legislators. For the purposes of exploration, only words presented in the table are evaluated.

I select three legislators (Aparicio Vedia, Revollo Quiroga, Sempertegui de Matienzo) to demonstrate how to derive a measure of speech similarity to the reference legislators. Each legislator is a backbencher for each of the major political parties in the legislative assembly. Carlos Aparicio Vedia is an Indigenous, district legislator
from the department of Chuquisaca elected under the MAS party label. Marcela Revollo Quiroga is a mestiza, backbencher from MSM, who split from the governing party in April 2010. She is a district legislator from the department of La Paz. The MSM campaigns as an alternative option to the MAS. MSM legislators communicate to similar constituent-types (e.g., poor and Indigenous) with a message regarding long-term economic stability (i.e., language that overlaps with the opposition). Revollo Quiroga’s speech should have overlapping qualities from each of the categories (government, shared, and opposition), making her appear as more of a mixture of government and opposition speech. Ana Maria Sempertegui de Matienzo is a mestiza, list legislator from the department of La Paz elected under the PPB party label. I expect the government and opposition legislators to express speech that is more similar to their respective reference legislator. Revollo Quiroga should be empirically between the two reference legislators and the two unassigned legislators.

Speech similarity for each of the unassigned legislators is derived in Table 3.2. The wordscore is weighted by the word frequency from each legislator. Speech similarity is the sum of each of these weighted wordscores. This can be interpreted as an expected value that indicates similarity of word use. I include the Laver, Benoit & Garry (2003) and Martin & Vanberg (2008b) transformations for illustrative purposes. Both transformations adjust the speech similarity value using either
the wordscore variance of the assigned legislators or the unassigned legislators. We can see that each outcome reflects our intuition. The MAS unassigned legislator measures closer to the government (MAS) reference legislator, the PPB unassigned legislator measures closer to the opposition (PPB) reference legislator, and the MSM unassigned legislator measures between the two documents.

Table 3.2: 2010 Example: Speech Similarity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Wordscore $S_w$</th>
<th>$F_w,_{Government}$ Aparicio Vedia</th>
<th>$F_w,_{Mixture}$ Revollo Quiroga</th>
<th>$F_w,_{Opposition}$ Sempertegui de Matienzo</th>
<th>Weighted Word Value, $F_wv \times S_w$ (Gov.)</th>
<th>Weighted Word Value, $F_wv \times S_w$ (Mixture)</th>
<th>Weighted Word Value, $F_wv \times S_w$ (Opp.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ahorrar (to save)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economicas (economic)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>narcotrafico (drug traffic)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transparencia (transparency)</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscalizar (audit)</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pueblo (the people)</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anticorrupcion (anti-corruption)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discriminador (discriminator)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gastar (to spend)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jvenes (the young)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campesinos (rural persons)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idiomas (languages)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persecucin (persecution)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pobreza (the poor)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soberania (sovereignty)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expected Speech Similarities, $S_\gamma = \sum_w (F_{wv} \times S_w)$

Laver, Benoit & Garry (2003) Transformation, $S_v = \sum_w (F_{wv} \times S_w) \times \frac{A_{\max} - A_{\min}}{4}$

Martin & Vanberg (2008b) Transformation, $S_v = (S_v - S_{\min}) \times \frac{(A_{\max} - A_{\min})}{A_{\max} - A_{\min}} + A_{\min}$

This procedure can be employed to derive speech similarities for all legislators using the entire corpus of legislative debates in the 2010 Bolivian legislative period. Expanding the prior analysis, every reference word from Franco Vaca and Tupa Tupa is scored. Those wordscores are used to derive a measure of speech similarity for every legislator in the assembly who meets the basic criteria for inclusion. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the raw speech similarity values for opposition and government
The MAS legislators populate the government distribution and the remaining legislators (AS, MSM, PPB, and UN) populate the opposition distribution. I am most concerned with the collective uniqueness of legislative speech patterns between government and opposition legislators. This suggests that government legislators should sound collectively the same and different than opposition legislators when
collective uniqueness is strong. The same is expected for the opposition. The plots appear to be cohesive and distinct. Empirically this can be determined using a difference-of-means test. A government-opposition division exists using these two reference legislators if the two groups are significantly different. This is true for this iteration (the t-statistic is \(-7.91\)).

Some reference documents are effective at identifying differences in legislative speech patterns between government and opposition members and others are not so effective. Relying on one pairwise combination of reference legislators can be deceptive. Any number of factors from one iteration could be motivating the result, including the ballot type, ethnicity, and region. Some reference documents are expected to be strong, while others are expected to be weak. Figure 3.2 shows an example of these effects using four different pairwise combinations.

The pairwise combination is indicated at the top of each plot. Descriptive characteristics for each of the reference legislators are listed in parentheses. Those characteristics are: party, region, ballot type, gender, and ethnicity. Bolivia is divided into nine departments (comparable to U.S. states), where a political divide exists between the wealthier eastern departments (Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, and Tarija) and the western departments (La Paz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Potosi). Legislators are elected from either closed party lists (labeled as “Plurinominal”) or
plurality districts (labeled as “Circ”, followed by the district number). These characteristics help determine potentially confounding factors. There could be some alternative overlapping qualities that anchor patterned speech differences, qualities that are overlooked in reference selection.

Figure 3.2 : Examples of Two Strong Iterations and Two Weak Iterations

The top two plots are examples of strong partisan separation. The bottom two plots are examples of weak partisan separation.

The top two plots are good examples of a strong separation. The reference documents in each come from legislators who are informal leaders of the governing
party. Tupa Tupa and Plata Plata have held party leadership positions in the past and frequently espouse the party’s position on the plenary floor. Pierola de Gutierrez performs a similar role for the opposition. She is a frequent vocal critic of the government.

The bottom two plots are examples of weak separation. This is likely due to the degree to which Elio Chavez and Tejada Soruco are accountable to the party. Elio Chavez was nominated from a pro-business Civic Committee, which is traditionally associated with those parties that comprise the opposition. Chavez’s speech patterns could actually be directed towards a target audience that would traditionally support the opposition, but still attract his constituents to support the governing party. This could cause poor separation among the government and opposition unassigned legislators. Tejada Soruco is also somebody who has alternative viewpoints from the members within the majority party. In fact, Tejada Soruco was formerly a legislator from a different party during the 2002-2007 legislative term. She was chosen by MAS party leaders because of her popularity and ability to attract votes in a region where MAS is not particularly dominant (Anonymous 7 October 2010a). Thus, her legislative behavior is expected to diverge from the party for strategic electoral purposes. Because both legislators must make unique appeals to their constituency group, these two legislators are weak references for separating speech patterns among
government and opposition legislators. In other words, the government-opposition divide is weak for these two types of legislators.

Evaluating every possible combination of government and opposition reference documents provides a potential solution to reducing the effects of confounding factors. If a government-opposition divide exists in speech patterns, government and opposition density plots of legislator scores should be different and, depending on the strength of the dimension, that difference should be consistent across random pairwise combinations. This reduces the chance that an alternative factor anchors speech pattern differences and this isolates the selected factor (e.g., government-opposition) as the only common factor among each pairwise combination.

I empirically identify if differences between government and opposition legislator scores exist using the t-statistics. I interpret the divide to be identified if the difference is significant (i.e., members in parties are collectively sounding more like a random government member than a random legislator selected from the opposition) at $p \leq .10$. I suggest that the frequency of significant differences across pairwise combinations can be used to identify the strength of the government-opposition divide. Although I suspect that some reference documents do not separate speech patterns well (as explained above), I do suspect that most of the randomly selected pairwise combinations should separate government from opposition legislators when the
divide is strong.

I perform one-sided difference in means tests for each of the 2,688 iterations (56 X 48) from the 2010 legislative period. Figure 3.3 plots the t-statistics from each iteration. The vertical, dotted line indicates where the t-statistic equals −1.282. Everything left of the vertical line is significant at the traditional level (p ≤ .10). Overall, seventy-six percent of pairwise combinations are significant.

Figure 3.3: 2010 Government-Opposition Speech Pattern Separation

2,688 ‘Government vs. Opposition’ iterations (76% significant).
This conforms to our expectation that there should be a consistent empirical divide between government and opposition speech patterns during the 2010 legislative period. The MAS-controlled government is the first without a post-electoral coalition, where the governing party is internally unified. Although the opposition is fragmented, the government is challenged only from the ideological right. We should see that government and opposition legislators adopt unique speech patterns to communicate to constituents.

This analysis suggests that these differences exist. However, the actual strength of this difference is undetermined until we make comparisons across different legislative periods. In the next section, I further explore if this measure is appropriate for capturing the strength of a categorical divide between different types of legislators. Comparing across different periods will help us determine if the measure conforms to expectations of legislative behavior during political development in Bolivia.

3.2 Over Time Consolidation of the Government-Opposition Divide

We should expect that legislators in the government should have legislative behavior—specifically, legislative speech patterns—that varies more when the majority is ideologically incohesive. In these environments, it should be difficult to determine a con-
sistent government-opposition divide in legislative behavior that separates members of the government from members of the opposition. In other words, the strength of the government-opposition divide is weak in those political contexts where the majority is composed of multiple political parties, particularly when those political parties are ideologically diverse. Empirically, this should mean that a random selection of reference legislators (one government and one opposition) do not effectively classify unique speech patterns in legislative debates between legislators of majority status.

Using the development of the Bolivian party system from 1985 to 2010, I first build an intuition that clarifies expectations regarding the impact of the composition of the government on the strength of the government-opposition divide. I empirically show how this measure of speech pattern differences—the strength of the divide—correlates well with the degree of party diversity in the government. As the government-opposition divide has become more ideologically coherent over time—as determined by the types and number of parties in office—we see that speech patterns have become more consistently different between members of the government and opposition. Given that this empirical approach performs as a reasonable approximation to distinguish between legislators who share a common identity—in this case, majority status—I suggest that we can use this measure as a proxy for pat-
terned speech differences between legislators with shared descriptive characteristics (e.g., Indigenous vs. mestizo).

Bolivia provides an excellent source of over time variation to evaluate how well this empirical proxy conforms to expectations. The type of variation that concerns me is the number of political parties that compose the government and the ideological range of those parties in government. The institutional structure in Bolivia, known as “Parliamentarized Presidentialism,” requires the legislature to select the president if no candidate wins a popular majority of valid votes (Centellas 2008, Mayorga 1997). This creates an incentive to form multiparty post-electoral coalitions to compose majority support in order to win the executive post, where support is maintained via the disbursement of cabinet posts. Under this system, Bolivia has experienced two distinct periods of governments composed of multiparty governments and single party governments.

In the first period, multiparty governments were common during the 1985-2002 period known as “pacted democracy” (Centellas 2008, Gamarra 2008, Lehoucq 2011, Mayorga 1997, Mayorga 2005). The second period starts after the 2005 election. During this period, the traditional party system eroded and a single party, The MAS, has dominated the composition of the government (Centellas 2008, Gamarra 2008, Lehoucq 2011). The government-opposition divide in patterned speech differences
should be muted during the period of pacted democracy and should be more well defined after the 2005 election. The transition of the party system between 2002 and 2005 should also reflect changes in the direction of a strengthening government-opposition divide.

The period of pacted democracy is credited for moderating inter-party conflict and reinforcing cross-party coalitions that contributed to stabilizing Bolivian democracy during periods of economic turmoil that could have led to democratic breakdown (Mayorga 1997, Mayorga 2005, Mayorga 2006). Though beneficial to democratic stability, these ideologically diverse coalitions should make it difficult to determine a clear government-opposition divide among the legislators. Governments composed of diverse political parties have legislators who are accountable to different party leaders. Partisan diversity in the government, as a result, will consist of legislators demonstrating diverse forms of legislative behavior (or, diverse speech patterns). This diversity weakens the government-opposition divide in the chamber. This empirically means that even though a random legislator may have a distribution of words that are shared with others of the same party affiliation, those words are less likely to overlap with those also in the same government, but different party. I expect speech patterns to appear more distinct when the government-opposition divide maps more distinctly over the ideological divide between political parties.
Post-electoral multiparty coalitions dominated government composition from 1985 to 2002. The 1985 election led to a coalition of the two largest parties, known as the “Pact for Democracy,” between the right-wing Democratic Nationalist Action (ADN) and the traditionally leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). After the 1989 election, the center-left Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the right-wing ADN formed an alliance called the “Patriotic Account” to establish a majority government with the populist Conscience of the Fatherland (CONDEPA). This came to a surprise to many given that the MIR originally formed in 1971 in opposition to the Banzer military dictatorship, who subsequently founded ADN (Centellas 2008). The MNR (evolving into a more free-market oriented party), the populist Civic Solidarity Union (UCS), center-left Free Bolivia Movement (MBL), and the left-wing Revolutionary Liberation Movement Tupaq Katari (MRTKL) formed the “Pact for Change” after the 1993 election.

Pacts were less common after the 1997 elections, though post-electoral elections still existed. ADN and the center-right New Republican Force (NFR) coalesced for the 1997-2002 legislative term and MNR, NFR, and MBL coalesced for the 2002-2005 legislative period. We should expect the 2002 legislative term to have a stronger divide between government and opposition legislators because the coalition was dominated by the MNR, especially after the NFR left the coalition in 2003. All of this
is to explain that government coalitions were ideologically diverse and the divide between government and opposition in legislative behavior should be blurred during the period of pacted democracy.

The strongest division in legislative behavior between government and opposition legislators should be observed when one party controls the composition of government. After the 2005 election, the traditional party system collapsed and reestablished with MAS as a dominant party. In 2009, the center-right parties (MNR, NFR, and PODEMOS) formed a pre-electoral coalition to compete under the name Plan Progress for Bolivia-National Convergence (PPB-CN). One single party, the MAS, dominated the government during the 2005-2009 and 2010-2015 legislative terms. Empirically, I expect the government-opposition divide to be the strongest during these two legislative periods. Among the two legislative periods, I expect the 2010-2015 legislative period to show the strongest division, when MAS is ideologically the farthest left and when the center-right opposition is organized into one coalition. These empirical patterns should be identifiable if the measure I propose is appropriate for capturing the underlying intuition that is used to explain legislative behavior during the period of pacted democracy until single-party rule.

The empirical strength of the government-opposition divide should be conditional on the number of parties in government and the ideological cohesiveness of those
parties. The structure of government composition in Bolivia ranges from multiparty, ideologically diverse coalitions to single-party control. I expect my empirical measurement to be negatively correlated with the ideological diversity of the government.

For this analysis, I use a rough approximation of the ideological diversity of the government—the effective number of government parties (Laakso & Taagepera 1979). Though this measure does not capture actual ideological diversity, it does capture the number of parties in the government using a weighted average. Given the ideological diversity of each government detailed above, the effective number of government parties should correlate well with the underlying mechanism—ideological diversity. The measure will also reflect the disproportionate strength of governing parties, especially when one party is more dominant than other parties. I test my measure using debates from every available legislative period since the transition to democracy in Bolivia, this includes 1986, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2006, 2009, and 2010. The empirical analysis, coupled with the above explanation, should demonstrate enough support to justify the validity of this new measure for capturing the strength of a selected divide.
3.2.1 Determining the Strength of the Divide

Following the procedure described above, I demonstrate how this measure can be used as an empirical approximation for patterned differences in legislative speech between different types of legislators. I look specifically at majority status to determine if this empirical measurement captures our intuition regarding the varying strength of the government-opposition divide over time during the development of the Bolivian party system from 1985 to 2010.

If the intuition is correct, we should observe a higher frequency of empirical iterations that are significantly different during the more contemporary period of the Bolivian party system and a lower frequency of significantly different empirical iterations during the pacted democracy period of the Bolivian party system. Legislative periods from the same term should have empirically similar results.

Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics for each of the legislative terms evaluated in this expanded analysis. We see that there is a larger effective number of government parties during the period of pacted democracy. We also see that legislative speech is increasingly more common during democratic development in Bolivia.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Government-Opposition Divide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislature Period</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Effective Number Gov Parties</th>
<th>Reference Gov</th>
<th>Reference Opp</th>
<th>Unassigned Gov</th>
<th>Unassigned Opp</th>
<th>Iterations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1989-1993</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997-2002</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2002-2007</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010-2015</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of t-statistics for every legislative period in the sample. Each bar shows the range of t-statistics: the grey bar captures the range of the middle 90 percent of the data and the black bar captures the range of the middle 50 percent of the data. These bars represent a condensed version of the type of information displayed in Figure 3.3. The black point is the average value of t-statistics for that legislative period. The horizontal dotted line is the threshold to determine if a t-statistic is significant (or, not significant) at the $p \leq 0.10$. Data distributed below the horizontal line are those iterations with significant differences between the unassigned government and opposition legislators.
Figure 3.4: Over time Speech Pattern Separation for Government-Opposition Divide, 1985-2010

Figure 3.5 shows the percent of t-statistics that are significant at $p \leq .10$ and the effective number of government parties for each legislative term. The plot in the left panel is of those iterations for each legislative period with t-statistics that are below the horizontal dotted line in Figure 3.4. The effective number of government parties is derived according to Laakso & Taagepera (1979) using only those members who contributed more than 100 substantive words during legislative debates (i.e., the
minimal requirement for inclusion in the sample). At first glance, the results appear to verify our intuition. We see that as the government is composed of fewer parties and is more ideologically cohesive, speech patterns are consistently different between government and opposition legislative debates across a larger proportion of random pairwise iterations. The most distinct of these is the 2010 legislative period, when the government party is composed of just one party and the right-wing portion of the opposition coalesced in one pre-electoral organization.

Figure 3.5: Speech Pattern Separation and Number of Parties in Government
For empirical validity of the above claim, I employ Ordinary Least Squares on the data. I regress the percent of statistically different t-statistics on the effective number of governing parties for each legislative term. Table 3.4 presents the results of the analysis. We see that the relationship is indeed negative and is significant at $p \leq .01$. This is promising given the size of the sample ($n=10$). I take this as evidence supporting the expectation that more ideologically dispersed governments should have less consistently different messages between the government and opposition.\(^{11}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Coalition Diversity</td>
<td>-31.75**</td>
<td>(6.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>98.62**</td>
<td>(12.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Observations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the effective number of parties does not capture the ideological range of parties in the government, it does capture the types of obstacles that governing parties face in delivering a consistent message when legislators are accountable to different principals. These obstacles are larger in those situations where parties range

\(^{11}\) I also control for the number of iterations and find substantively similar results.
the ideological continuum. The empirical data coupled with the anecdotal evidence suggests that my empirical approximation is an appropriate proxy to capture the strength of a categorical divide between government and opposition legislators over time in Bolivia.

3.3 Discussion

Plenary debates are a venue where legislators can express unique perspectives during the public defense of political positions. Speech serves an informational role that can be used to convince party leaders and constituents that a legislator is working on behalf of those who hold her accountable. Though constituents may not be direct consumers of this information, legislators know that their public statements are recorded. Those public statements could be used during media rebroadcasts during news programming or even used during the next electoral campaign. More importantly, legislators believe that these messages are valuable and public. The legislative floor is one venue with equal public access, where a legislator cannot exclusively target a specific group. There are potential electoral costs to structuring a unique targeted message if that message excludes or challenges the interests of one (or more) of that legislator’s electoral support group.

All of this is to say that although legislative debates may not be a bastion for
substantive representation or policy-making, it does play a significant role to communicate the explanation of political positions to those who hold legislators accountable. Because debates are public and equally accessible, legislators have an incentive to either strategically hide policy positions or coherently communicate to the base of support. I am most interested in how the use of legislative debates can be understood as a credible venue to express that legislators are working in the interests of the party and constituents. The type of political representation that most concerns me is common to a shared factor, for example ethnicity, gender, or party. Although legislators can have unique individual forms of political representation, I am most concerned with group representation.

Unique forms of political representation should be identifiable in speech patterns, if legislators are doing anything different to represent constituent or party interests. This empirical exercise should clarify how the procedure I adopt to approximate the collective uniqueness of legislative debates is adequate for capturing this concept of interest. I want a measure that captures distinct legislative speech patterns and blurred legislative speech patterns. Actively selecting opposing legislator references makes it possible to isolate a common language for comparison. If a categorical divide exists, legislators with shared characteristics will sound alike and will sound collectively unique to the opposition. A strong categorical divide should be robust
to whomever is selected as a reference legislator. This suggests that the one common factor that is used to determine the existence of a divide between every pairwise combination, is the one factor that is structuring the result. This strategy could be used to determine the strength of any categorical divide.

I explore the strength of the government-opposition divide in Bolivia since 1985 for the purposes of illustrating the usefulness of this measure. I evaluate every legislative term where legislative debates are publicly available. The government-opposition divide should be strongest when a single party controls government. This divide should weaken when the government is not structured by a single party. Overlapping interests between government and opposition during periods of coalition government will weaken the observed strength of determining a behavior divide. This suggests that government legislative speech is more coherent when composed of one party than multiple parties. I do not want a measure the determines a divide, but a measure that calculates the strength of the divide. The period of multi-party, multi-ideological government in the 1980s and 1990s of Bolivia is a good example of when the measure should weekly capture the collective strength of the government-opposition divide. It is not until the period of single-party government when we can empirically identify a clear difference between the government and opposition. This measure for collective uniqueness mirrors our expectations.
This exercise shows how to develop the measure and demonstrates that it mirrors our intuition of legislative behavior in the Bolivian legislative assembly. I will use this measure to explore implications from the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2. This measure can be used to explore any categorical divide to determine if descriptive representatives collectively express unique forms of political representation during the legislative process.
Chapter 4

Channeling the Pachamama In Legislative Debates

Differences in speech patterns for a broad set of issues between different types of ethnic representatives should be mostly observed within parties. Parties, even if not completely institutionalized, should provide some organization that makes it possible to distinguish legislative behavior between parties. Ethnic representatives have few cross-cutting interests that overlap with representatives from other parties. If this is true, we should first see that legislators within parties use more common language than those legislators from opposing parties. The broader distinction between parties should overwhelm similarities between descriptive representatives with the same characteristics.

Attributing differences in legislative behavior to the identity of a legislator within the party, however, is complicated by such effects as the basis of election. For example, legislators’ unique forms of legislative behavior could be attributed to one’s identity or responsiveness to district interests (Mezey 2008). Disentangling these differences demands a research design that can control for the effects of party and the pathway of election for different types of descriptive representatives.
Bolivia provides a unique opportunity to explore patterns of representation where the interests of a historically underrepresented group remain uncrystallized. I specifically look at patterned differences across the ethnic cleavage—or, the Indigenous-mestizo divide—in the lower chamber during the 2010 legislative period. Thirty-eight Indigenous legislators populate the legislative assembly during this period. Thirty-six of those Indigenous legislators are affiliated to the MAS. The MAS began as an ethnically-based party in the late-1990s (Van Cott 2005) and has subsequently adapted as a broad-based party since the December 2009 election (Anria forthcoming). MAS party leaders actively participate in the recruitment of candidates, and have expressed a party programme that appeals to broader middle-class interests. This has been observed in the demographic composition of the types of legislators affiliated with the party. Whereas Indigenous legislators were common during the development of the party, middle-class mestizo legislators have demonstrated a substantial growth in the proportion of legislators in the party.

The 2010 legislative period is the first as a broad-based party, and the first with unified control of the government. This is also the only legislative term with reliable individual-level data of ethnic identity.¹ I specifically explore the legislative behavior of the two largest parties in the legislative assembly: the majority MAS (88 seats; 47

¹ Ethnic identity of legislators was determined during field research in Fall 2010. I personally conducted surveys that included questions on self-identity. I classified non-respondent legislators with the help of local researchers, legislative assistants, and public communication.
uninominales, 6 reserved seats, 33 plurinominales) and the opposition PPB (37 seats; 10 uninominales, 1 reserved seat, 20 plurinominales). Both parties have internal party statutes that assess sanctions for rogue behavior.\textsuperscript{2} This is also commonly observed in unified voting behavior.

We \textit{should} observe unique patterns of legislative behavior among different types of descriptive representatives. The extent to which we observe these patterns is conditional on the political context. Legislative speeches provide an opportunity to observe how legislators frame the explanation of policy position. Anecdotally, legislators seem to share this perspective of legislative speeches. A male uninominal legislator from the governing party mentioned, “The media are claiming to be transmitting [the speeches] to the population, so it is necessary to give our political position.”\textsuperscript{3}

The framing of policy should be associated with unique representation of group interests where those interests are uncrystallized. Legislators must balance framing explanation between expressed unique perspectives and common partisan identity. It seems that legislators anecdotally identity this balance. An Indigenous uninominal

\textsuperscript{2} Legislators in both parties referred to a common partisan position during interviews. MAS members frequently mentioned the party statute and sanctions for breaking the party line. PPB members would mention the existence of a party statute, but agreed that sanctions were unnecessary because they were collectively unified against the government.

\textsuperscript{3} “Los medios de comunicación están afirmando estar transmitiendo la población entonces ahí es necesario dar nuestra posición política” (Anonymous 13 October 2010b).
governing legislator mentions, “I am Aymaran, I speak Aymara, I represent what is Aymara and also my district”. \(^4\) The objective of this analysis is to identify how the political context moderates these unique patterns of legislative behavior.

I use the empirical approximation described in Chapter 3 to test the strength of the ethnic cleavage. I perform five separate analyses with five different samples to determine the strength of the Indigenous-mestizo divide in the legislature, those include: 1) a full chamber evaluation of Indigenous and mestizo legislators; 2) MAS Indigenous legislators and PPB mestizo legislators; 3) MAS mestizo legislators and PPB mestizo legislators; 4) all MAS Indigenous legislator and MAS mestizo legislators; and 5) only MAS Indigenous legislators and MAS mestizo legislators elected on party lists. There appears to be a collective intra-party ethnic pattern of representation in legislative debates that is overwhelmed by partisan similarities at the chamber-level. I find that Indigenous representatives do express unique patterns of political representation, however, those patterns are moderated by both institutional and partisan factors.

\(^4\) “Yo soy de aymara yo hablo aymara, yo represento lo que es aymara y también a mi circunscripción” (Anonymous 15 October 2010c).
4.1 Preliminary Analysis: The Indigenous-Mestizo Chamber Divide

Assuming that Indigenous identity shapes social interactions in unique ways, we could observe a clear difference in patterns of political representation between Indigenous and mestizo legislators at the chamber-level if legislative behavior is unstructured. This preliminary analysis explores chamber-level speech patterns to first determine if differences do exist. Every legislator in legislative assembly who speaks on the floor is classified as either black, Indigenous, or mestizo. For the purposes of this analysis, I am only looking at legislative behavior between Indigenous and mestizo legislators. This results in 38 Indigenous legislators and 135 mestizo legislators. Legislative substitutes are included in the analysis if they achieve the minimum criteria of contributing more than 100 substantive words to the debate. Legislators are also considered reference documents if they contribute more than 1,000 substantive words to the debate.

The empirical procedure is employed on the legislative debates using one Indigenous legislator and one mestizo legislator as a reference document. For this analysis there are 16 reference Indigenous documents and 87 reference mestizo documents.

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5 There is one black legislator in the legislative assembly and, thus, not enough variation in the sample to have confidence in any conclusions regarding black descriptive representation.
An evaluation is performed for every pairwise combination of reference documents. Each evaluation produces a “similarity” value for each unassigned legislator. The similarity value empirically determines how similar a legislator’s speech is to one of the reference documents.

Unique group behavior means that legislators cluster around the reference legislator that shares the same identity and those legislators are collectively different than legislators with the alternative identity. I empirically determine this using one-sided difference-in-means test. Unique group behavior empirically exists if differences are significant at \( p \leq .10 \), or t-statistic \( \leq -1.282 \). One evaluation does not tell us anything of overall patterns of representation. The strength of the Indigenous-mestizo divide is determined using every evaluation from each pairwise combination. A stronger divide exists when a higher percentage of random pairwise combinations significantly separate speech patterns between unassigned Indigenous and unassigned mestizo legislators. A weaker divide exists when fewer random pairwise combinations determine unique patterns of behavior. Figure 4.1 shows the strength of the divide.

The left panel plots the distribution of t-statistics from each of the evaluations. The vertical dotted-line designates where the t-statistic equals \(-1.282\). The right panel plots the distribution of p-values from each t-statistic. The vertical dotted-line designates where the p-value equals \(.10\). Seventy-two percent of the pairwise
combinations establish significant separation in legislative speech patterns between Indigenous and mestizo legislators. This means that 72 percent of randomly drawn legislators who hold alternative ethnic identities will express legislative speech that appears unique to group identity.

Unfortunately, this value does not express an absolute determinant of what is and is not unique group representation. However, we can gain some leverage by
comparing this value to prior estimations calculated in Chapter 3. The divide is stronger than the government-opposition divide for all procedures except for the 2010 legislative period, when MAS has unified control of both chambers and the executive. This should collectively suggest that legislators who speak on the floor are delivering a coherent and consistent message to voters that is unique to group identity at the chamber-level.

This preliminary analysis shows some promise for unique legislative behavior that is associated with group identity. Indigenous representatives appear to defend and justify policy in unique ways. These unique legislative speech patterns should be associated with perspectives that are shaped by group identity and group experiences. This suggests that descriptive representatives are contributing something unique to the legislative process that would be absent if removed from the legislative assembly.

4.2 Inter-Party Patterns of Representation

The prior analysis, however, ignores a major factor that is known to structure legislative behavior—party membership. Party organization is known to structure legislative behavior in Latin America (see country chapters in Morgenstern & Nacif 2002). This can be particularly problematic in Bolivia where ethnic identity and party membership overlap in the legislative assembly. All but two Indigenous legislators in the
analysis (of 38 total) are affiliated with the governing party, the MAS. I expect that some of the divisions between Indigenous identity and mestizo identity are driven by partisan differences. This is particularly relevant after the 2009 election when MAS adopted a party programme that appeals more broadly to middle-class interests.

This suggests that the broader differences between Indigenous and mestizo legislators include confounding factors and should not be interpreted as an indication of unique legislative behavior purely attributed to descriptive representation. The next two analyses use the same procedure from above. However, unlike the prior analysis, the next two analyses restrict the samples to isolate party as a moderating factor that structures legislative behavior. We should be able to isolate how much of the differences are driven by party effects and how much of the differences are driven by group identity. This will be the first attempt to isolate the strength of the sources of unique Indigenous representation.

4.2.1 Pure Party Effects

This second analysis establishes the baseline difference to compare party effects. I restrict the sample to the two major parties, the MAS and the PPB, which collectively control 96 percent of the legislative assembly (125 of 130 lower chamber seats). I also restrict the sample to just mestizo legislators, effectively controlling for group
identity. As already stated, the MAS attracts votes from historically underrepresented groups—the poor and the Indigenous—and is making broader appeals to the middle-class since the 2009 election. The PPB attracts votes from more conservative voters who have traditionally held power. The two political parties have unique party programmes that define a clear distinction between the two partisan camps. My primary interest here is to explore if the distinction between these two parties is expressed in legislative debates once controlling for group identity.

Figure 4.2 shows the strength of the partisan divide between the MAS and the PPB. The procedure includes 69 mestizo MAS legislators (37 references) and 55 mestizo PPB legislators (41 references). Eliminating group identity as a factor should help isolate the effects of party on legislative behavior. Following the presentation of the prior analysis, the left panel plots the distribution of t-statistics with a vertical dotted line at \(-1.282\) and the right panel plots the distribution of p-values with a vertical dotted line at \(.10\).

Party organization appears to structure legislative debates. Something that is expected from the theoretical argument. We can see that 71 percent of randomly selected pairwise combinations effectively deliver a partisan message that is consistent with partisan colleagues and coherently different than the opposition. I interpret these results as defining a baseline difference between descriptive legislators from
different parties. The strength of this divide should suggest that the party has an overwhelming influence on how legislators frame the explanation and justification of policy to their constituents. In the next analysis, we will see if ethnic identity has any marginal effects on unique patterns of legislative behavior for a broad set of issues.
4.2.2 Party and Ethnicity Effects

The prior analysis isolated the baseline party effect on legislative speech patterns. This analysis incorporates Indigenous identity to determine the marginal effect of descriptive representation on legislative speech patterns. To more closely capture these two effects—Identity and party—I restrict the sample to Indigenous MAS legislators and mestizo PPB legislators. The sample includes 36 MAS legislators (15 references) and 55 PPB legislators (41 references). This removes any confounding factors that mestizo MAS legislators may introduce to the analysis.

There should be clear separation driven by both party and identity. I expect an overall increase in unique speech patterns. Following the same presentation for the prior analyses, Figure 4.3 shows the strength of the partisan and ethnic divide between the MAS Indigenous and the PPB mestizo legislators.

We observe an increase in the frequency of unique legislative speech, 85 percent of random pairwise combinations show strong separation in speech patterns across the divide. Although the absolute size of the increase is not important (nor substantively meaningful), I do suggest that this increase is attributed to group identity. Compatible with the theoretical argument, it appears that party organization structures legislative behavior in Bolivia. Party appears to systematically determine patterns of legislative behavior. I interpret this as evidence that descriptive representatives
are contributing in some unique ways to the policy-making process, but that these unique speech patterns are observationally moderated at the chamber-level.

4.3 Intra-Party Patterns of Representation

Indigenous descriptive representatives appear to frame the explanation of policy in a way that satisfies the broader interests of the party and also expresses their own
unique life perspectives from group identity. This aligns well with expectations that legislators should respond to those actors who hold them accountable, but also frame debates in a way that exposes unique group perspectives. The next two analyses will explore variation in legislative behavior inside the party. My main concern is identifying if ballot type moderates unique patterns of Indigenous representation. In other words, to what extent do traditional mestizo representatives and Indigenous representatives express similar patterns of representation when they are accountable to the same principal?

I look at Indigenous descriptive representation in the MAS to determine the extent to which legislative speech patterns are moderated by institutional design. As described above, all but two Indigenous representatives are affiliated with the MAS, who has control over the direction of policy as the majority party and who has established itself as a broad-based political organization. Because the party appeals to a broader base, we should observe more varied forms of political interests reflected in legislative debates. However, party control of legislative behavior could subsequently mute subtle legislative differences in the interest of establishing a unified party.

The most important environment for descriptive representation to make a difference is when the party has majority control, or control over the directure of public
policy. So, although it is normatively positive for Indigenous representatives to express unique patterns of political representation at the chamber-level, it is pragmatically more value for descriptive representatives to express unique behavior when they are closer to the policy-making process. Unique behavior in the way legislative speech is framed will help identify if policy is reflecting interests of a unique group identity for broader issues.

4.3.1 Ethnicity and Ballot

This analysis will explore broad patterns of Indigenous representation in the MAS. I expect unique speech patterns between Indigenous and mestizo legislators to exist within party. The shared collective copartisan differences from the opposition party in the above analyses are effectively controlled in the following analyses. This should make it possible to determine how much of intra-party representation is attributed to group identity. Empirically this means that the strength of the divide should be substantially larger than the marginal increase of significant iterations between Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. The sample in the next analysis includes 36 Indigenous MAS legislators (15 references) and 69 mestizo MAS legislators (37 references). Figure 4.4 follows the same presentation as the prior analyses, the left panel plots the t-statistics from each evaluation and the right panel plots the p-values from each
Indigenous representatives in MAS do indeed use different speech patterns to defend and justify public policy, 64 percent of random pairwise combinations express significantly different patterns of legislative speech across the divide. This suggests that descriptive representatives are behaving differently along a broader set of issues within party. Indigenous representatives introduce unique perspectives to the leg-
islative process. We see that unique perspectives are blurred at the chamber-level, but become more clear when we explore intra-party variation. In other words, we see that the political party structures legislative behavior in a way that makes clear distinctions between parties, but allows for unique patterns of representation within party. I take this a strong preliminary evidence that descriptive representatives are acting in the interests of group identity.

4.3.2 Strength of Ethnic Cleavage

The theoretical argument suggests that Indigenous legislators elected on party lists should express moderated patterns of speech that are more similar to mestizo legislators elected on the party lists. List legislators, who are accountable to the party, should frame debates that more clearly emphasize the collective partisan position. The above, within party, analysis provides a baseline comparison of descriptive representation to determine how direct accountability to the party should condition legislative behavior. This gets at the question regarding institutional moderation of legislative debates.

This analysis looks at the effects on legislative behavior after controlling for ballot type. The sample is restricted to legislators elected on party lists, specifically only those legislators who are accountable to party leaders. These legislators have an
incentive to structure behavior to strengthen a collective partisan reputation. I effectively remove legislators elected in plurality single-member districts who have an incentive to strengthen their own individual reputation to win reelection and are less restricted to frame legislative debates in order to express unique perspectives.

I expect unique legislative speech patterns from Indigenous representatives to be less frequent than any of the prior analyses, specifically the analysis from Figure 4.4. Unique behavior should be moderated to the collective partisan message. Figure 4.5 shows the results of the procedure from ten Indigenous list legislators (five references) and 31 mestizo list legislators (19 references). The presentation follows the same structure as before.

Legislators accountable to the party still express unique patterns of legislative behavior in legislative speech, however, the uniqueness of that behavior is moderated. Only 49 percent of iterations show significant differences across the ethnic divide. Legislators elected on party lists have an incentive to frame legislative speech to promote the collective partisan agenda. We see that speech patterns reflect this incentive. However, we also see that unique patterns of political representation still exist among Indigenous representatives. We are observing common patterns of communication across legislators elected on party lists, but subtle differences in how that partisan message is framed. This suggests that descriptive representatives are
Figure 4.5: Within Party Differences Between Types of Representatives, Controlling for Ballot

95 Indigenous List MAS-Mestizo List MAS Iterations (49% significant)

contributing unique perspectives to the policy-making process and explaining public policy in the interests of group identity, but those perspectives are observationally moderated by the design of institutions.
4.4 Discussion

The purpose of this chapter is to explore how Indigenous representatives exploit the flexibility of legislative debates under different political contexts to frame the defense and explanation of policy in the interests of party and group identity. I explore five different samples to uncover how different layers of government structure moderate "natural" patterns of Indigenous representation. Unique collective life experiences and perspectives shape human behavior (Kymlicka 1996) and make legislative behavior appear more unique, especially where interests remain uncrystallized (Mansbridge 1999).

We should expect Indigenous representatives in Bolivia to espouse unique patterns of legislative representation along a broad set of interests in an unstructured environment. However, Chapter 2 explains how different political context should predictably structure behavior that seemingly moderates unique legislative behavior of descriptive representatives. One expectation is that Indigenous representatives should express similar patterns of behavior as traditional representatives elected in the same party (see Hypothesis 1: Inter-Party Representation). Also, Indigenous representatives elected in plurality elections should express more unique patterns of political representation than those elected on party-lists (see Hypothesis 2: Ethnic Plurality vs. List Selection). Collectively the analyses suggest support for the
theoretical expectations.

Figure 4.6 condenses information from each of the analyses in the same plot. Each bar shows the range of t-statistics: the grey bar captures the range of the middle 90 percent of the data and the black bar captures the range of the middle 50 percent of the data. The black point is the average value of t-statistics for that analysis. The horizontal dotted line is the threshold to determine if a t-statistic is significant (or, not significant) at the $p \leq .10$ level. Data distributed below the horizontal line are those iterations with significant differences. The sample type is labeled on the x-axis. The absolute differences in the percentage of significant iterations for each sample type is unimportant, though the relative frequency shift between each analysis is important for interpretation.

The first four analyses collectively suggest that party structures legislative behavior and show preliminary support for Hypothesis 1. The source of overall unique legislative behavior is most clearly observed across parties. We see at the chamber-level that the strength of the Indigenous-mestizo divide (“Chamber” analysis) is almost equal to the strength of the Pure Party divide (“Pure Party” analysis). Restricting the sample to include party and Indigenous effects (“Party & Ethnicity” analysis) shows a marginal increase in unique patterns of political representation. This suggests a strong divide exists between the MAS and the PPB legislative beha-
Figure 4.6: Contextual Moderation of Indigenous Representation

behavior after controlling for ethnic identity. Indigenous group identity does contribute some unique representation to the overall chamber, but unique Indigenous representation is much less than that explained by party affiliation. We see the strongest of the Indigenous-mestizo divide (“MAS Ethnicity and Ballot” analysis) when we control for party effects. I take this as evidence that Indigenous descriptive and traditional mestizo legislators with a common partisan identity express overall similar patterns of political representation. Unique patterns of Indigenous representation
are more distinct once we control for party.

The last two analyses collectively suggest support for Hypothesis 2. Similarities between traditional and descriptive representatives are observed even after controlling for party, but the differences are much stronger. The most distinct of these differences is observed in the overall MAS party analysis ("MAS Ethnicity and Ballot" analysis). There is a substantial drop in unique behavior once we only explore the behavior legislators elected on party lists ("MAS Ethnicity" analysis). List legislators accountable to the party have the most muted patterns of unique legislative behavior. I take this as evidence that the institutional structure moderates descriptive representation. The Indigenous-mestizo divide becomes stronger after including legislators elected in single-member plurality districts. The more frequent differences suggest that plurality legislators do indeed express more unique patterns of political representation as group identity than those who are elected on party lists. In systems where there is party control of ballot access, we see that legislative behavior between descriptive representatives is somewhat moderated. However, within the constraints of party, we see that Indigenous and mestizo legislators still express some unique forms of legislative behavior.

I interpret these results as collectively supportive of expectations. However, this evidence is not conclusive. This is the first step in determining if Indigenous legisla-
tors behave uniquely during the policymaking process. The plenary debates allow us to capture nuanced differences between different types of descriptive representatives that are generally blurred by party effects when looking at other forms of legislative behavior. The empirical procedure makes it possible to isolate the few common factors that link legislators within parties and across parties, however there are still some possible confounding factors that may be driving this analysis.

Overall, it appears that political institutions structure observed behavior in a way that moderates legislative speech patterns. However, unique speech patterns still do exist among different types of descriptive representatives. This should suggest that descriptive representatives—or, in this case, Indigenous representatives—are acting in the interests of group identity along a broader set of political issues. This is promising for normative arguments in favor of incorporating into the legislative assembly historically underrepresented groups with uncrystallized interests.
Chapter 5

Gendered Legislative Debate

Women’s interest in the legislative chamber have been historically underrepresented and have remained uncrystallized in the modern period of Bolivia’s democracy. An increasing presence of women in the lower chamber should, however, be associated with unique perspectives in the policymaking process. These interests are cross-cutting (Kymlicka 1996). Feminine groups in Bolivia hold overlapping interests on fundamental issues—equal access to decision-making and violence against women—but diverge on how to interpret the role of women in society (Rousseau 2011). The divergence of these interests overlap with partisan identity. Indigenous women who are more protective of a traditional role are affiliated with a single party, the MAS, and mestizo women who promote a more heterogenous role of women are commonly affiliated with the PPB.

We should see that women speak with a collective voice at the chamber level along a broader set of issues, but those voices are muted at the party-level. My expectation at the chamber level is that patterns of representation should be more clearly identifiable because women control a larger mass and coherently communicate
the protection of fundamental issues. In other words, a larger presence of women makes a common message more easily identifiable. These messages are blurred at the party-level where partisan framing structures variation in speech patterns.

Delivering a consistent and coherent message requires women to participate in legislative debates. Participation was limited prior to the 2002 legislative period. A maximum of three women communicated more than 1000 substantive words during the plenary debates prior to the 2002 legislative period. I explore those legislative debates where there is some presence of women who speak more than 1000 words during the plenary debates for which I have data, this includes the 2002 legislative period (17 women), the 2006 legislative period (18 women), the 2009 legislative period (17 women), and the 2010 legislative period (35 women). I first look at the broader chamber divide to identify a collective pattern of female representation before looking specifically at the 2010 legislative period for party-level patterns of female descriptive representation in the MAS and the PPB.

5.1 Male-Female Chamber Divide

This first analysis explores patterned speech differences between male and female legislators after the adoption of gender quotas. Unlike Indigenous descriptive rep-

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1 The 1997 legislative period is excluded from the analysis because there is not enough female participation in legislative debates to produce reliable results. I evaluate speech patterns for
presentation, female descriptive representation is evenly distributed across legislative parties.\textsuperscript{2} I am not concerned with party structure as a confounding factor. Because party affiliation crosses the male-female divide, party unique speech will be empirically isolated from the analysis.

Women should appear to have a more distinct collective voice at the chamber level where women can collective address fundamental issues with similar perspectives. Empirically this means that unassigned women who share a partisan affiliation with a male reference document will have a moderated similarity score while still sharing distinct speech patterns with her female reference document. A male legislator who does not share partisan affiliation with a male reference will have a similarity score distant from the male reference. The heterogeneity in party affiliation in both male and female clusters will diminish party effects as a factor at the chamber level. Because interests are uncrystallized for women, a distinct female voice is expected to drive the analysis.

The empirical procedure is independently employed on the legislative debates every period that I have legislative debates following 1997. Debate availability is inconsistent across legislative periods in Bolivia.

\textsuperscript{2} Of the seventeen women who communicated over 1000 substantive words in the 2002 legislative period, there are from MAS, four from MIR, three from MNR, five from NFR, and two from UCS. Of the eighteen women who communicated over 1000 substantive words in the 2006 legislative period, six are from MAS, three from MNR, six from PODEMOS, and two from UN. Of the seventeen women who spoke over 1000 substantive words in the 2009 legislative period, six are from MAS, three from MNR, five from PODEMOS, and three from UN. Of the thirty-five women who spoke over 1000 substantive words in the 2010 legislative period, sixteen are from MAS, one from MSM, sixteen from PPB, and two from UN.
from each available legislative period. The total number of female legislators who participated in debates for each legislative period is 30 in 2002, 27 in 2006, 25 in 2009, and 65 in 2010. Male descriptive representatives demonstrate similar patterns in overall participation: 130 in 2002, 109 in 2006, 88 in 2009, and 110 in 2010. This results in 1,632 iterations in 2002 (17 women and 96 men references) 1,314 iterations in 2006 (18 women and 73 men references), 986 iterations in 2009 (17 women and 58 men references), and 2,415 iterations (35 women and 69 men references).

I employ the same procedure described in Chapter 3. An evaluation is performed for every pairwise combination of reference documents to produce a “similarity” value for each unassigned legislator. The similarity value helps determine if legislators express speech patterns that are collectively similar among group identity and collectively dissimilar between group identity. Speech patterns are unique in one evaluation when similarity values by group are significantly different at $p \leq .10$, or $t$-statistic $\leq -1.282$. The strength of that divide is the frequency to which each evaluation of pairwise combinations produces a distinct separation between opposing group members. Figure 5.1 plots the results from each empirical procedure.

The left panel shows the distribution of $t$-statistics from each iteration for the legislative periods. Each vertical bar is the range of $t$-statics. The grey bar captures the middle 90 percent distribution of the $t$-statistics and the black bar captures the
middle 50 percent distribution of the t-statistics. The black point is the average t-statistic for that analysis. The dotted horizontal line designates where t-statistics are considered significant. The right panel plots the frequency of significant iterations for each legislative procedure.

One thing is clear from this analysis. Legislative speech patterns between men and women are distinct after the MAS wins majority control of the lower chamber.
This period of MAS-majority control shows is associated with an overall shift in policy that protects fundamental rights of those groups who have been historically underrepresented. This is the same period where we have seen an increase in policy that protects fundamental female interests. Because fundamental female interests cross-cut partisan affiliation, we should see clear patterns of female representation. These patterns are more clearly identifiable at the chamber-level because male interests are not expected to cross parties. This suggests that partisan rhetoric is just “noise” in the analysis. Dissimilarity among men and similarities among women will make speech patterns appear more unique.

I interpret this as evidence that there is a broader presence of female interests in the legislative chamber across issues. This suggests that both the number of women in office is important for establishing a collective voice and the party in power is important for setting the agenda for legislative communication. Women appear to communicate a coherent message across party lines when the overall political environment is more conducive for representing female interests.

5.1.1 Gendered Word Choice

“Gendered” words in Spanish provide an additional opportunity to explore the source of unique speech patterns among female and male descriptive representatives. I
specifically look at the gendered use of Spanish pronouns and articles (i.e., stop words) to eliminate a potential source of speech variation. Stop words are assumed to substantively contribute nothing to legislative debates. These words are removed during the data preparation process. However, a source of gendered differences in speech could be observed in the way that women communicate directly to their group identity—for example, communicating as “we” and “us” (nosotras) or speaking directly to women (ellas, ella, tuya). This suggests a positive relationship between gendered stop words and female identity.

The crutch of this argument, however, relies on the association between unique perspectives and unique substantive word choice. This means that stop words should express no real patterns of communication between women and men. I empirically model the frequency of gendered stop words to exclude them as a source of patterned differences, providing greater confidence that substantive word choice drives patterns in legislative speech.

All stop words from the legislative debates compose the data for this analysis. I produce a count from nineteen “feminine” articles, pronouns, and possessive pronouns from the total stop words for each legislator. This makes it possible to create

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3 Stop words are systematically removed from the legislative debates and stored using Perl programming language. There are 306 different possible stop words.

4 This includes the following words: algunas, ella, ellas, la, las, mia, mias, muchas, nosotras, nuestra, nuestras, suya, suyas, tuya, tuyas, una, vosotras, vuestra, vuestras
two dependent variables for each legislator, a percentage and a count of feminine words. The sample includes every legislator who participated in debates in each of the legislative periods evaluated above. Figure 5.2 is a density plot of the percentage of feminine words from each legislator, grouped by gender.

At first glance, there appears to be no real difference of word choice between men and women legislators. I employ Ordinary Least Squares on the percent of feminine stop words to systematically determine this relationship. I also employ a
negative binomial on the count of feminine stop words. This is useful for data that is overdispersed. I expect no relationship to exist between gender and the frequency of feminine word choice. Evidence of a positive relationship would challenge my argument.

I control for majority status and include an interaction between gender and majority status. I also include an additional control for the total number of stop words. This should control for the natural increase in feminine stop words associated with communicating more often on the legislative floor. Table 5.1 shows the results from the analysis.
The results show support for expectations, gendered stop words are not a source of differences between male and female speech patterns. None of the models shows a positive significant relationship between female identity and feminine stop words. A significant negative relationship does exist in models 2 and 3, however, the effect is small (and almost non-existent). The models also poorly explain variation in each of the dependent variables. Although the results do not necessarily isolate the source of patterned differences in speech differences, it does rule out a possible alternative
source of variation. Unique speech patterns appear to be a source of representation that shows women acting in the interest of group identity.

5.2 2010 Legislative Period

The prior analyses help isolate the existence of gendered speech patterns at the chamber-level. The most distinct of those is the 2010 legislative period. I perform a more narrow evaluation of gendered speech patterns at the party-level for the 2010 legislative period. I expect these unique speech patterns to diminish when compared to the chamber-level analysis. Overall similarities between male and female legislators should overwhelm distinct behavior on more narrow issues. The less distinct patterns should exist between male and female legislators elected on party lists.

To simplify the presentation, I separately plot the 2010 chamber-level analysis from Figure 5.1. This determines the baseline comparison for the remaining party-level analyses. Figure 5.3 plots the analysis. As I already described above, there is a balance of women and men in the two largest parties, the MAS and the PPB.

The male-female chamber divide is stronger than every government-opposition divide during the period of pacted democracy. This should help establish a baseline comparison for determining the strength of the male-female divide at the party level. All figures follow the same structure. The left panel is the distribution of t-
Figure 5.3: Male-Female Divide for the 2010 Legislative Period

2415 Male-Female Iterations (62% significant)

statistics from every evaluation in the analysis. The vertical dotted-line shows where the t-statistic equals -1.282. T-statistics to the left of the vertical dotted-line are significant at $p \leq .10$. The right panel is the distribution of p-values from each of the evaluations in the analysis. The vertical dotted-line shows there the p-value equals .10. P-values to the left of the vertical dotted-line are significant at $p \leq .10$. 
5.2.1 MAS Gender Divide

Policy associated with women’s interests has been more frequent since the MAS won majority control of the lower chamber and the executive in the 2005 elections. Women descriptive representatives associated with MAS should have a greater opportunity to express distinct speech patterns in legislative debates because the agenda contains policy in the interests of women. The higher saliency of women’s interests should be clear during all forms of policy debate. However, overall, the existence of women’s interest as a cross-cutting cleavage should diminish the strength of the male-female divide within the party. Figure 5.4 presents the results from the analysis. This includes 70 male legislators (37 references) and 37 female legislators (16 references).

Fifty-nine percent of the 592 iterations are significant. This is much larger than expected. Although the frequency of significant iterations is smaller than the chamber-level analysis, the difference is too close to suggest that there is a major difference between patterns of political representation. In fact, it appears that women in the majority party, the MAS, may be driving the results at the chamber level. One thing is clear, women in the MAS demonstrate unique speech patterns within the party. They appear capable of framing legislative speech as partisan and still espousing perspectives from group identity.

Important to the theoretical argument is if legislators elected on party lists show
more moderate forms of political representation. Both men and women should express similar patterns of political representation because they are accountable to the party for reelection (or, future political position). This suggests that there should be less distinct speech patterns between men and women elected on party lists. The next analysis is composed of only MAS plurinominales. There are 24 male legislators (14 references) and 18 female legislators (10 references). Figure 5.5 presents the

592 Male-Female Iterations (59% significant)
results from the analysis of plurinominales.

Figure 5.5: The MAS Male-Female Divide, Controlling for Ballot

140 Male-Female Iterations (41% significant)

Forty-one percent of the 140 iterations are significant. This decrease is expected and shows support for expectations (specifically, Hypothesis 4). Female and male list legislators have a reason to frame legislative speech to more closely align with partisan messaging. This strategy should suppress unique forms of political representation that are attached to group identity—or, unique perspectives. This analysis does still
suggest, however, that women are justifying and explaining behavior in a way that is associated with group identity. The strength of those patterns is just smaller.

5.2.2 PPB Gender Divide

Women affiliated with the PPB are in a different situation than those women elected with the MAS. Being in the minority demands interest representation to be responsive to an agenda set by the majority. This means that on specific issues, women in the minority may differ from women in the majority. I expect this because women in the majority party tend to be Indigenous and women in the opposition tend to be mestiza. Rousseau (2011) explains that differences on more narrow issues exist between these two group identities. The opposition in general tend to collectively challenge the government with a single, coherent message. The incentive to establish a coherent opposition as a future alternative to government encourages coherent messaging from the minority party. I expect this to be evident in the divide between women and men in the PPB. Differences should be observationally moderated to a collective partisan position. Figure 5.6 presents the results of the analysis that explores all speech behavior in the PPB. There are 34 male legislators (26 references) and 23 female legislators (16 references).

Thirty-eight percent of all iterations are significant. There appears to be a weak
male-female divide in the PPB. Opposition to the majority party appears to be coherent and, subsequently, hides unique group perspectives between men and women. This is less problematic in the opposition where incentives to create a coherent alternative are more valued. The results are compatible with expectations. I expect the male-female divide to be weaker within the party than at the chamber-level. This analysis also establishes a baseline comparison to determine if speech patterns are
less unique for plurinominales.

The final analysis looks at only those legislators in the PPB who are elected on party lists. These legislators not only face a broader incentive to present a coherent party message, but they have an additional incentive to toe the party line to secure future political careers. I expect a substantial decrease in the strength of the male-female divide. Figure 5.7 presents the results from the analysis. There are 14 male legislators (13 references) and 14 female legislators (nine references).

Figure 5.7: The PPB Male-Female Divide, Controlling for Ballot

117 Male-Female Iterations (16% significant)
Sixteen percent of iterations are significant in this final analysis, demonstrating a substantial decrease from the prior analysis. Plurinominales appear to express a coherent partisan message during plenary debates. They defend their position in a common and coherent way for a broader set of issues. Admittedly, it is difficult to determine if female descriptive representatives are actively suppressing unique perspectives during legislative debates or just emphasizing a more coherent partisan message. We do know that legislators elected on the party lists do face similar incentives, which is to emphasize the party position. This expectation is observed in patterns of communication and shows support for Hypothesis 4.

5.3 Discussion

Uncrystallized female interests in Bolivia create an environment where both Indigenous women and feminists agree on fundamental issues that have been historically ignored. These common interests cross party lines. The purpose of this chapter is to leverage cross-cutting interests of female representation to isolate those political contexts where unique patterns of political representation exists. The institutional arrangements of the political system should create incentives for women to moderate legislative behavior and express more common patterns of political representation within the party. More unique patterns of female political representation should
be identifiable at the chamber-level where women across parties can speak with a collective voice. I find preliminary empirical support for these expectations.

The theoretical argument suggests that female descriptive representatives will express more unique patterns of political representation across parties when compared to male descriptives representatives (Hypothesis 3: Female Cross-Cutting Issues). The chamber-level analyses for the 2005, 2009, and 2010 legislative periods shows support for this hypothesis. Expressed speech patterns are unique to female identity at the chamber-level once the MAS controls majority status. I suspect that the increase after the MAS wins majority control is a result of their general programme to advance broad fundamental rights. This creates a venue where discussing female interests is salient and receptive. This analysis effectively controls for party effects because of the cross-party nature of female representation. The balance of gender across parties controls party effects via research design.

The 2010 legislative period shows further support for Hypothesis 3. The theoretical argument suggests that there should also be a decline in unique speech patterns between women and men when explored within party. I find a decline in unique speech patterns for both the MAS and the PPB. However, as discussed above, the strong results within the MAS are surprising. Women elected on the MAS could be discussing themes of fundamental female rights more frequently than expected. This
should not suggest that women are framing debates that are counter to the collective interests of the MAS. However, it should suggests that MAS women express unique interests that are both compatible to the MAS and to group identity.

Women within the political party appear to still be framing the defense of policy to satisfy the broader interests of the political party. The theoretical argument suggests that women and men elected on party lists should demonstrate minimal differences in their representative behavior (*Hypothesis 4: Gender Lists*). In addition to a decline of unique patterns of political representation within the party, we should see a further decline once legislators are accountable to the same principal. We see this empirical similarity for men and women elected in the MAS and the PPB. I interpret this as support for the theoretical expectation.

Overall, we see preliminary support for both theoretical expectations. Women do indeed express unique patterns of political representation during plenary debates, the most obvious of these patterns is at the chamber-level. These patterns are suppressed within parties where male and female legislators express greater similarities in legislative behavior than unique differences. I suggest that this is a combination of unique cross-cutting interests associated with group identity and the institutional mechanisms that moderate legislative behavior. More importantly for the purposes of political representation, descriptive representatives are indeed contributing some-
thing unique to the legislative process that would be absent if they were removed from the legislative assembly.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

This dissertation is concerned with isolating those political contexts where representatives express unique patterns of political representation. It leverages expected differences between types of descriptive representatives in Bolivia to empirically explore the moderating effects of institutions on legislative behavior. Both Indigenous and female descriptive representatives have been historically underrepresented in Bolivia and possess interests that are relatively uncrystallized in the legislative assembly. The historical absence of these interests in the legislative assembly leaves a void in group representation. Incorporating legislators from these groups into the legislative assembly should have profound effects on the types of perspectives that are presented in the legislative assembly. Their presence should be associated with new interests and new patterns of political representation.

Descriptive representatives from historically underrepresented groups express unique interests that are associated with social factors that shape group life experiences (Kymlicka 1996, Mansbridge 1999). These unique life experiences influence the types of perspectives and interests that are introduced to the legislative assembly after the
incorporation of new types of legislators.

Shared association with a distinct cultural identity structures the collective uniqueness of life experiences. However, group identity is less unique when social factors are shared with members from different identity groups. These cross-cutting factors suppress the collective uniqueness of perspectives and group representation. Indigenous group identity is expected to have broad unique perspectives because of geographic isolation and a shared common language that should translate into unique patterns of political representation. Women, however, do not live in isolation and share many cross-cutting factors with men along broader issues (Kymlicka 1996). Female group identity is expected to be associated with narrow unique perspectives on gender and fundamental rights. Broader perspectives are often associated with ideology. In an unstructured world, the observed patterns of these perspectives from descriptive representatives could be considered a “natural” form of political representation. And, interest representation would simply involve the mere incorporation of historically underrepresented group members.

Incorporation of historically underrepresented groups is not sufficient for group representation. The institutional structure of the political system shapes legislative choices and defines the process of political representation. Structured legislative choices can have moderating effects on the presence of unique perspectives during
the policymaking process. I develop a contextual theory of political representation that isolates when we should—and, should not—observe unique patterns of political representation. I argue that ballot type and party affiliation are two distinct factors that shape legislative choices and define to whom legislators are accountable.

Indigenous representatives in Bolivia hold distinct perspectives. Their affiliation with the MAS isolates those perspectives to a single party. The theory suggests that Indigenous representation should be first structured by party and that unique perspectives should be identifiable once party factors are controlled. Bolivia also provides a unique opportunity to explore how institutional factors structure legislative incentives. Legislators directly accountable to the party—those elected on party lists—should adapt behavior to satisfy the collective interests of the party. This means that legislators elected on party lists should express less unique behavior than those elected in plurality elections. The broad-based nature of the MAS allows us to leverage mestizo legislative behavior and Indigenous legislative behavior to isolate when institutions moderate unique behavior.

Female representatives in Bolivia hold distinct perspectives on narrow issues and shared perspectives with copartisans on broader issues. The presence of female representation in each of the major parties in Bolivia provides a unique opportunity to explore unique patterns of female representation. The theory suggests that unique
patterns of female representation should be identifiable at the chamber-level where women can act with a single voice across parties. The cross-cutting nature of female representation makes cross-party coalitions more likely and possible on those issues that satisfy female interests. Female chamber-level behavior is more unique because men have a reduced collective identity and partisan factors of representation are balanced by opposing factors. We should observe a sharp decline in unique female representation once we explore behavior within parties. Male and female legislators within parties should express more similarities than differences because they are collectively accountable to the party. This decline should be most obvious when looking at the behavior of those elected on party lists, contrasted to those elected in plurality elections.

Legislative debates provide a unique opportunity to evaluate theories of political representation. Legislative debates involve the justification and explanation of policy to express how policy reflects—or, ignores—the interests of the represented. Legislators can simultaneously strengthen a collective partisan and an individual reputation during policy deliberations (Sellers 2010). Because unique perspectives are associated with unique speech patterns, we should be able to use legislative debates to isolate similarities and differences between types of descriptive representatives in the way they frame the explanation and justification of policy. The wide variation in
word choice makes it possible to uncover nuances in political representation, particularly in systems—like Bolivia—where unified parties have a tendency to blur unique legislative behavior.

This requires a measure that quantifies the frequency of shared, unique words among legislators with a common identity. I develop a new measure that captures the uniqueness of speech patterns between types of descriptive legislators. The new measure adopts the Wordscores algorithm (Laver, Benoit & Garry 2003) to construct a group based measure of political representation. This measure quantifies the extent to which public speech is collectively unique to group identity. A strong divide will have a higher frequency of legislators who share unique speech patterns with those legislators who possess a common identity. I use this measure to test my theoretical argument. Unique patterns of political representation should be associated with unique speech patterns in public debates.

The measure for unique speech patterns is independently processed in each political context of interest. This makes it possible to identify if the cleavage of interest is strong—or weak—at the chamber level and within parties. There is no absolute value that determines if speech patterns are unique. To isolate the moderating conditions of institutions, I explore the shifts in the strength of the cleavage across the different political contexts.
Party affiliation should structure Indigenous speech patterns at the chamber-level. And, indeed, we find that the biggest difference between Indigenous and mestizo legislators at the chamber level is isolated to party affiliation. Including an ethnic dimension at the chamber-level marginally increases the strength of the Indigenous-mestizo divide. The most distinct differences are within party, suggest that Indigenous representation appears unique once we control for party effects. These differences are moderated when we explore the strength of the divide of those legislators elected on party lists. These results are consistent with the theoretical expectations. Unique patterns of political representation are isolated to the party.

The most distinct speech patterns of female representation should be at the chamber-level. Cross-cutting issues make it possible for women to speak with a collective voice on fundamental issues. There should be a decrease in the strength of the cleavage at the party level, which should diminish even more when looking at list legislators who are directly accountable to the party. I find evidence in support of these expectations. The chamber-level speech patterns are particularly strong because partisan similarities are empirically reduced from the analysis. The reduction of the strength of the cleavage for both the MAS and the PPB show evidence that speech patterns are most unique at the chamber-level. However, patterned speech differences between men and women are particularly strong in the MAS. This find-
ing is theoretically unexpected. This could be because women elected in MAS can frame unique perspectives that follow the party programme without undercutting the party’s political agenda. Women more directly accountable to party leaders (i.e., those elected on party lists) express the least unique speech patterns.

Overall the empirical evidence is favorable to the theoretical expectations. Though, admittedly, the empirical results are inconclusive. I was, however, able to exclude one alternative argument for explaining distinct patterns of female representation at the chamber-level. Future research will further develop the research design to include robustness tests and an expansion of the sample. I do interpret the results as satisfying a fundamental curiosity in legislative behavior and showing preliminary support for a theoretical argument that simultaneously explains ethnic and female descriptive representation.

This projects follows Van Cott’s (2010) suggestion that future research integrate theories of gender and ethnic representation into a broader argument. This project makes a preliminary step in that direction. And, attempts to fill a gap where there has been “insufficient attention to the intersection of gender and ethnic politics . . .” (Van Cott 2010, 401). This attempt includes distinguishing the legislative similarities and dissimilarities between types of identity groups and isolating where we should observe unique patterns of political representation. Integrating this work is a unique
contribution to the literature.

To integrate our expectations of gender and ethnic representation, I isolate the nature of cross-cutting interests for each group to designate where we should observe these differences. Indigenous, whose “boundaries coincide with political cleavages” (Htun 2004, 439), express more unique patterns of political representation within party. The party structures Indigenous behavior at the chamber-level. This is partly due to the non-existent nature of cross-cutting factors. The cross-cutting nature of female interests mutes intra-party patterns of political representation, but amplifies the collective voice. Cross-partisan agreement among females on fundamental issues makes it possible to identify a collective voice at the chamber level. The fact that female patterns of political representation are more clearly distinguished at the chamber-level, where cross-partisan coalitions are identifiable, furthers evidence from Volden, Wiseman & Wittmer (2013) that women pursue an alternative style of legislating that involves cross-party consensus-building activities. Isolating when interests intersect and isolating the uniqueness of those interests can help us strengthen our broader understanding of gender and ethnic representation.

The project also develops a new measure of political representation. It uses patterns in speech to make inferences about the nature of political representation. Legislators frame legislative debates to strengthen an individual and collective rep-
utation in the process of explaining and justifying the defense—or, opposition—of public policy. The content of legislative debates can tell us a lot about to whom legislators speak and the cohesiveness of public debate. Because we are discussing patterns of group representation, we can leverage the collective identity of legislators to extrapolate patterns of communication. This new measure proxies the collective strength of patterned speech communication. It measures if legislators with a shared characteristic speak with a collective voice. It does not, however, measure the size of the collective voice in relation to all speech in legislative debates. We can infer from the measure the coherence of collective voice and difference from alternative voices when specific individuals speak on the legislative floor. It captures the extent to which patterned messages on the legislative floor are unique to individual or collective identity.

The public nature of legislative debates makes it an interesting venue to explore how legislators shape public programmes. I adopt this measure to explore patterns of political representation among legislators with ascriptive characteristics. This measure, however, can also help us understand the development of political parties over time. I would like to take note that there is evidence of this applicability in Chapter 3. I build an intuition of the new measure using the development of the legislative party system in Bolivia since the transition in democracy. During periods
of pacted democracy, we can expect public programmes to be muddled because of partisan diversity in government coalitions. Although individual parties may be delivering a coherent message during pacted democracy, the collective “government” message should be systematically incoherent. The public programmes should be more cohesive during the periods of single-party rule. The measure correlates well with these expectations.

This measure could be useful for exploring the institutionalization of political parties with a more direct measure of the coherence of party programmes. We can use this measure to understand how the political context shapes the public image of the political party. How cohesive are public messages? Do voters receive mixed-messages from the political party? These questions are relevant to issues dealing with accountability and representation. Political parties can structure an underlying dynamic of conflict to simplify choices and make accountability possible. Of course, political incentives also exist to make vote choice more complicated. I find this to be a useful tool for exploring questions of political party development.

Because the measure is derived using all legislative speech, I interpret this as a measure of political representation along a broader set of issues. The results are suggest that descriptive representatives are introducing unique perspectives for all issues, and not just those narrow issues that have been historically associated with
the group. I do not rule out that legislators could be reframing legislative debate to highlight narrow issues. However, even reframing issues to emphasize narrow concerns expresses a contribution of unique perspectives during broader legislative debates. The impact of descriptive representation along a broader set of issues is something that has been overlooked in the literature. This project is an attempt to fill some of that void.

The incorporation of descriptive representatives can enhance citizen trust in political institutions (Scherer & Curry 2010). Democratic breakdown is of pressing concern when there is a failure of trust in democratic institutions (Wang, Dalton & Shin 2006, Warren 1999). This is salient in developing democracies where the reputation of politicians as “good” or “bad” is inferred from government performance. Citizens interpret poor performance to be the fault of opportunist legislators that use the government as a one-time opportunity to get rich. This can lead to premature breakdown when poor performance is a result of bad luck or the natural cycle of development (Svolik 2013). In the case of Latin America, we have seen that poor economic conditions do not always lead to democratic breakdown and that the effects of poor economic conditions on democratic breakdown can be moderated by factors that improve the quality of representation (Mayorga 2005). Leveraging group identity to strengthen trust in political institutions and improve political representation
is one way that developing democracies can reduce the risk of poor performance on premature democratic breakdown.

Ultimately we want to know when the inclusion of different types of legislators is associated with the introduction of new perspectives and new ideas to the legislative process. Varied forms of responsiveness and varied interests across constituency groups can blur patterns of political representation that capture the extent to which representatives do indeed act in the interests of the represented. Legislators are expressing “natural” patterns of representation. The political context, however, can structure those natural patterns of political representation in a way that moderates behavior and defines common patterns among representatives. This research defines when we should observe these unique patterns and where we should expect the representative to uniquely act in the interest of the represented. The political context does indeed condition descriptive representation and moderate observed legislative behavior. Unique patterns of representation of historically underrepresented groups, fortunately, do exist where expected and fill a void of representation that satisfies normative values of democracy.
Bibliography

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