Before us is a case study of Joseph P. Farrell who, as his many-sided persona appears on the Web and in books, interests us on account of his effective and transgressively unusual popular culture use of our categories of Hidden History, Transtheism and Gnosticism. To understand the significance here of Farrell and his audience, it is necessary to recall the competing senses of marginalization and victimhood in contemporary American society and politics as one moves back and forth from elite or official culture and the populist culture. In this connection, the theme of political and economic struggle and struggle for control of the broader culture comes to the fore. Likewise, that theme is written between the lines of Farrell’s conspiracist and transgressively alternative nonfiction books even as it is explicitly brought out in Farrell’s learned, theological direct attacks on the developments leading to what Farrell reconstructs as the theological deep causes for Western secularity.

As our intent is to furnish a preliminary map of a multifaceted phenomenon, our study simply connects the dots found in publicly available material, without verifying the accuracy of the factual claims in Web and published material. Such material is here taken at face value rather than investigated in skeptical depth. The Farrell phenomenon has made heavy use of arguments concerning the Western obsession with a principle of “simplicity” in thinking about matters divine. For Farrell this is a false divinity, a dubious kind of thinking which has led to growing distraction from the God of Abraham and early Christianity. Likewise this has led to the appearance in antiquity and subsequent history of items that the Farrell phenomenon characterizes as “Gnostic.” This is a process which, over the course of Western history since the Franks and Charlemagne, has purportedly been hidden from critical view in Western literature.
THE BASICS

Joseph P. Farrell has become a Web, radio, YouTube and Amazon.com phenomenon despite or because of obtaining 1987 doctoral credentials from Oxford in patristics. An American convert from Protestantism with a background in mathematics and sciences, Farrell studied patristics at Oxford under the Greek Orthodox convert Kallistos Ware. After a short career in the academy with learned publications, including some in patristics and in anti-modern cultural criticism, Farrell returned to his American roots and began establishing a new self, that is, a popular and populist identity for himself on Amazon.com and on the Web and on talk radio. He has operated out of South Dakota, attracting attention in alternative culture circles, including the right-populist or conspiracist and religious and spiritual segments studied by social scientists like Michael Barkun, Colin Campbell, and Christopher Partridge, areas of concern for those who follow scholarship on the sociology of alternative spiritual and religious culture, the “cultic milieu” or “occulture.” In Campbell’s words, “it can be seen, more generally, to be the point at which deviant science meets deviant religion. What unifies these diverse elements, apart from a consciousness of their deviant status and an ensuing sense of common cause, is an overlapping communication structure of magazines, pamphlets, lectures and informal meetings, together with the common ideology of seekership.”

Farrell’s positioning as a public figure can be tracked with coordinates from social scientist Christopher Partridge, with his notion of a loose community of the alternative-minded, the so-called “occulture.” Partridge has contended, with reference to George Lindbeck, that “occulture is leading to the establishment of ... an occultural-linguistic community” characterized by “a gradual occultural ecumenism.” There is “less opposition to certain forms of Christianity.” Thus, “traditional, ‘hard’ Christian belief ... is losing out” in favor of “‘soft’ occulture-friendly Christian belief” in view of the underlying fact that “Western spiritual seekers are starting to speak the same language” with “occulture ... providing a lingua franca.” The public presence of Joseph P. Farrell can well be considered as an example of this occulture. He maintains an authority status on the Web, even as his public position emerges as hovering between two points: Partridge’s “traditional, ‘hard’ Christian belief” at war with New Age spirituality when he writes the Christian parts of his publications and Web presence; and another, ironical location within Partridge’s “‘soft’ occulture-friendly Christian belief” when he addresses non-believers as an author of books of alternative nonfiction.

Considering the entire phenomenon in broad context, even though his popular works of alternative nonfiction avoid proselytizing, we may well suppose that Farrell’s foundational identity as an Eastern Orthodox historical theologian should alert us to how he may quietly seek to move readers toward a mode of holding religious and factual options congruent with what, for him,
is the preferred option: Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Farrell’s sophisticated
tactics, his passing familiarity with fringe physics, and his skill in orienting
his positions within the loose norms of alternative culture make tracking him
difficult. He, among other things, constructs in his popular works of alterna-
tive nonfiction a universe in which ancient biblical and mythic events possess
real-world referentiality. This referentiality is congruent with advanced sci-
ence, Christian theism, and supernatural transcendence.¹⁰

It would be simple to document how the academic and patristic Farrell
develops a strong criticism of Western Christianity and modernity as ongo-
ing abandonments of original Christianity. This abandonment allegedly took
place by converting Christianity into a kind of incipient philosophical monism
addicted to increasingly bold and reductionistic redefinitions of Trinitarian
theology. This theology was borrowed from Neoplatonism and Middle
Platonism and increasingly obsessed with divine simplicity. It culminated first
in Joachim of Fiore and Left Hegelian Marxist revolution, then theologically
in Tillich’s “God beyond” or “above God.” It entailed a post-Christian obes-
sion with the divine process, which was reinterpreted as a pursuit of power
through physics and technology, and an amoral outlook instantiated in the
Bolsheviks and Nazis. It is a process of steady decline which Western observ-
ers cannot properly diagnose nor understand due to their own addiction to
the results of Neoplatonism as it entered the Western bloodstream in the early
Middle Ages. Augustine of Hippo’s theology of the Trinity which took over
Western religion is the basis for Farrell’s account of subsequent decline and
perversion in the West. His account is a history of declension that Western·
academics purportedly ‘hide’ from themselves as the West continues its slide
into the amoral destruction of its historic identity, while sinning against
moral, political, cultural, and economic common sense.¹¹

Thus Farrell in his theological attack on Western developments puts
Charlemagne, Rudolf Bultmann, Elaine Pagels, Hitler, and Soviet Communism
all into the same trajectory of Western decline – though they do not show
up in a single list, being instead indicted by their common Latin or Frankish
outlook-ancestry. Indeed, he relates them genetically to early Gnosticism
and its Voegelinian recurrence, with all sharing in the misunderstanding
and misappropriation of Neoplatonic obsession with divine simplicity at the
expense of the personal God of Abraham and original Christianity.¹² Eastern
Orthodoxy, however, like ancient catholicism, purportedly threw off all the
successive waves of attacks from the Neoplatonizers. Thus Farrell explicitly
invokes and intensifies Adolf von Harnack’s famous reading of Gnosticism
as “acute ‘Hellenization”, taking Hellenization as Neoplatonizing. Yet Farrell
tacitly weakens or rejects Harnack’s reading of catholicizing as “chronic
Hellenization.” Provisionally speaking, it could appear Farrell’s construction
of an Eastern Orthodoxy immune to Hellenization-as-Neoplatonism depends
on his accepting a reading of the Cappadocian Fathers according to which
Gregory of Nyssa in particular was not at the most important level a follower

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of Neoplatonism or Stoicism, limiting the use of philosophy chiefly to matters of ethics.¹³

Farrell's use of the Harnackian Hellenization thesis may distract our attention from another point. Though Farrell's upholding of an origin for Gnosticism in Hellenization may strike readers as a fossil from earlier days, still, Farrell's underlying theological interest approaches a motif of interest. Recall that the first essay in this volume was Professor DeConick's fascinating study of John 8. Her essay makes an important argument for her view of the location of and stages in an origin of Gnostic material. Her essay brings to our attention reasons to look at a version of Christianity onto which there had not yet been, as she puts it, any "grafting of the supramundane Platonic god into the system."¹⁴ Now Farrell, though he would not endorse an adoptionistic Christology nor admit any proto-Gnostic reading of the Fourth Gospel's Jesus-message, nonetheless would probably show a lively interest in Professor DeConick's argument as in some sense helping strengthen his own broader claim that not only is salvation of the Jews,¹⁵ but that salvation originates, not with some first principle but instead with the personal God of Abraham and with the humanity involved in Jesus Christ. In other words, one is advised to make a strong repudiation of any contamination of Christianity by either Middle Platonism or Neoplatonism. For both the academic and the popular Farrell prefers instead his original Christianity not-yet-Hellenized in its conception of God. This preference comes through in Web appearances as an advocate for Eastern Orthodoxy and its antique roots, a tradition which Farrell understands maintains a strong continuity with ancient Israelite cultic practice. There is also an implicit advocacy for the reasonable possibility of an ancient catholic orthodoxy written between the lines in his popular works of alternative nonfiction,¹⁶ in this sense Farrell would be intrigued by the emphases in April DeConick's reading of John.

With regard to alternative nonfiction, Farrell has ten books out, three translated into German, along with a new DVD.¹⁷ These publications appeal to an audience interested in alternative history and archeology: the Great Pyramid as an ancient weapon constructed on Tesla-like principles for use against ancient astronauts from Mars and elsewhere; current fringe physics retrieving ancient antigravity technology; Nazi plots involving weaponized antigravity research; Nazi flying saucers in the southern hemisphere today; the Nazi experimental saucer crash disaster at Roswell in 1947; bankers' plots to suppress general knowledge of advanced technology; "paleoancient" atomic war on earth; alchemy and Hermetic writings and Neoplatonic doctrines of emanation as ancient metaphorical encoding of half-understood advanced physics from our remote extraterrestrial ancestors who fought interplanetary wars three million plus years ago before disappearing and leaving our remotest civilized ancestors (left behind to struggle as novices on earth) half-comprehending what they were unable to explicate in rigorous mathematical terms – that is, a hyper- or multi-dimensional physics that can potentially
account for ancient tales of miracles and strange occurrences, including angels and demons that exist in multiple dimensions as plasma or electron clouds.\textsuperscript{18} Though his work is shot through with conspiracism, Farrell is anti-Nazi and pro-Jewish, putting the evil Nazis past and present in the place where conventional conspiracists used to put the Jewish population, that is, as the bad guys. In his publications to date, Farrell’s conspiracism falls into that rare category defined by Michael Barkun: “Conspiracy theories that reject anti-Semitism and portray Jews entirely as victims are a relatively minor area of the literature.” Farrell is striving valiantly to increase the number of pages so denominated.\textsuperscript{19}

THE RESULTS

In our first approach to the Farrell phenomenon, the method has not been to look for “facts” behind Farrell’s Web presence. Instead, it has been to map the public features and functioning of the whole, taking claims at face value. In so doing, the obvious matter requiring attention was the overtones and evaluation of Farrell’s double track, that is, his Eastern patristics identity connected with a negative reading of Western modernity and Western theology on the one hand; and, on the other hand, Farrell’s increasingly unusual series of scenarios in his popular writings, ranging as they do from ancient astronauts to contemporary Nazi conspiracies involving weaponized antigravity technology and flying saucers.

Our results include the following findings:

1. Farrell works with categories such as Transheism, Hidden History and Gnosticism, but in a way politically and culturally in polar opposition to the categories of the postmodern academy and mainstream or official culture. The postmodern academy and mainstream culture fuse leftist rhetoric with the realities of a corporate financial basis composed of transnational military and economic enterprise under strong government direction. This requires the destruction of historic personal and communal identity through indoctrination and, if necessary, re-education or marginalization of troublemakers and dissenters objecting to globalist reductionism. Farrell emerges as a voice of populist protest in the face of this process, as his interest in the banking and corporate aspect of conspiracism shows.\textsuperscript{20} This backward-looking personal and communal identity, encompassing an attachment to the most archaic version of ecclesiastical institutionalism, grounds and shapes Farrell’s learned and popular stance as a populist and American traditionalist alternative critic of contemporary trends. He even claims additional weight and perspective because his perspective is pre-American and indeed in a sense pre-European antiquity.

Notably, in Farrell’s popular works, Nazis come on stage and pursue a Neoplatonized, philosophical kind of Transheism derived from medieval
misunderstandings of true Christian theology that long ago had been theologically diverted. This results in the perception that the entire West before the Nazis had been distracted into the peripheral and tragic pursuit of what Neoplatonism really was, mistaking Neoplatonism for the true theology leading to the living God. In Farrellian context, this implies a devastating critique of current theory and “praxis” in America. For Farrell, Western history is the Hidden History of the replacement of original Christianity with Hellenization through Neoplatonizing. This leads to increasingly alarming pursuits of the real content of Neoplatonism by the theologically derailed and deranged in the West. But what exactly does Farrell take Neoplatonism to be or to have been?

2. What Neoplatonism really was, according to Farrell, and also what the Hermetic corpus and much of ancient Egyptian lore really were, and what alchemy really was, is the half-understood, metaphorical encoding of a “legacy” preserved semi-intact from a “paleoancient” and in part extraterrestrial “donor” civilization. This donor civilization was incredibly advanced in physics and technology and it knew the transcendent God of Abraham in some sense. More than three million years ago the donor civilization fought wars on earth and elsewhere in the solar system. Later alchemical and Hermetic pursuits constituted a desperate encoding of this once rigorous science in a form that primitive human cultures could preserve, hand on, and do things with.

As for Nazis past and current, whether in Germany or from their bases in Argentina, they have been pursuing attempts to retrieve this ancient technology of antigravity and alchemical transmutation of elements for evil purposes. They have been misled like all of Latin Europe by the confusion of Neoplatonism as a metaphor for advanced physics with the totally distinct theology of the true God. While this content of Neoplatonism and other ancient works like the Hermetic corpus constitutes a physics in itself neutral, for the Nazis and their European predecessors, it is dangerous. The pursuit of power in technology intoxicates if one lacks proper religio-moral safeguards.

Thus, in Farrell’s version of the medieval West, the true God was replaced with a philosophical principle of divine simplicity borrowed from Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism itself was a series of metaphors for a rigorous physics based on the notion of a “manipulable” “aetheric” “substrate” “underlying” all phenomenal reality in all possible universes or dimensions. Thus it is for Farrell not all that startling that the Western world has gotten into a series of predicaments.

3. Examination of Farrell’s alternative nonfiction shows that it does not contradict the possibility of a rationally upheld supernaturalist version of ancient catholic orthodoxy. In fact, one can argue that subtle apologetic for the rational possibility of classic Christianity within the framework of advanced and fringe physics is part of the Farrell phenomenon. Cutting-edge and fringe versions of physics, introduced in equation-ridden detail, support for Farrell
the implicit suggestion that Christian supernaturalist claims will eventually prove consistent with advanced consensus science. No preaching intrudes into the popular books, merely hints of this, such as the claim that ancient astronauts knew of the God later revealed in the Bible, or the suggestion that angels and demons can be rationally understood as existing in a plasma or electron cloud state having a temporal start but no terminus. More important is the fact that despite his own fascination with advanced technological and physics hypotheses, or perhaps because of it, Farrell puts his narratives and hypotheses concerning technology into a conventional moralizing framework of evaluation and distancing. This framework is one in which, in typical postwar fashion, the unspeakable evil of the Nazis constitutes the tent pole of a decidedly non-Eliadean moral universe. Farrellian Nazis are evil misusers of intelligence and diligence and ancient lore once donated to "legacy" civilizations. However extreme the fascination with the power of a morally neutral technology, however unknown the other Forces that may lurk at the edge of the universe for Farrell's as yet unwritten scenarios, nonetheless the reader comes up against reminders that the Farrellian universe is a morally familiar one. His villains are familiar figures of evil, stock items constituting the moral coordinates of a contemporary America that is perhaps multicultural but forever post-Judaico-Christian, forever marked by cultural assumptions of good versus evil and of the polarity of the Nazi versus the Judaico-Christian heritage.

4. In view of this - constructing a popular alternative nonfiction series in which conventional morality and obstinate insistence on openness to conventional Christian transcendence are upheld - we are thus entitled to report a not insignificant further finding on the basis of our survey. The writings and Web presence of Farrell constitute an exception to the claim of Andreas Grünschloß, according to which ancient astronaut narratives inevitably and by inherent nature tend toward a simple kind of "Euhemeristic" unmasking. Grünschloß, looking at pré-Farrellian ancient astronaut material, argues for seeing there a "disenchantment" in which contemporary fascination with technology and its power must take the place of conventional religion even for those such as Zecharia Sitchin. They apparently began their adventures with ancient astronauts hoping that retrieval of event-referentiality for ancient extraordinary or mythic narratives would end by retrieving religiosity. The outcome has proven disappointing and religiously limited, says Grünschloß. While Grünschloß has chronicled the emergence of forms of pallid religiosity and the growth of "post-scientific" and "post-religious" UFO religions or cults, his assessment appears to be that this enterprise is largely incompatible with conventional religiosity given its foregrounding of fascination with technology, and unfulfilling in the long run. At this stage, however, one may call for a bit of revision in this area. While Farrell's alternative nonfiction occasionally opens the theology portal slightly, his main move has nothing to

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do with direct injecting of divine action or a cosmicized soteriology or explicit discussion of conventional theism. Instead Farrell wrenches the narrative of ancient astronauts, fringe physics, pursuit of alchemy, crystalline lattices, UFOs, anti-gravity propulsion, and Tesla-esque weaponry out of the domain of morally ambiguous science fiction and sets it within the most conventional of American moralizing frameworks. So the case of Farrell necessitates some rethinking, as Farrell self-consciously and reflectively mitigates his own fascination with technology and physics by consistently installing around these topics a strong framework of a conventional moral nature, a framework joined to a desire to uphold a place for the conventionally transcendent and theistic.

MATTERS FOR ADDITIONAL EXPLORATION

For the Latin West and its secularity, contends Farrell, the real hidden narrative is the narrative of the forgetting of the God of Abraham and the substitution of a seductive but truncated and misleading allegorical encoding of the principles of advanced physics for true theology and true worship. Farrell argues that already with Augustine the direction is set with a fateful concentration on “an increasingly impersonal unity” in God, which pays no attention to the “Monarchy” of the First Person of the Trinity. This direction appears as part of a Western, Gnosticizing, Hellenizing concentration on divine simplicity. “Obsession with divine simplicity” is for Farrell a theological misunderstanding that, rooted in Neoplatonism and the alleged encoding of “paleoancient” technology, leads the West to produce theological thinkers like Tillich, and Sorcerer’s Apprentice technology. It results in a slide toward philosophical monism in the West, a declension away from concentration on a personal, transcendent God known to Abraham and to the Christian Church from Jesus as its founder through the ecumenical patriarchates and creeds. So triumphed the Augustinianized, Neoplatonized, simplicity-in-God-obsessed movement sponsored by the power drive of Charlemagne and his ecclesiastical take-over of the Latin world. This triumph, according to Farrell, was over an original Christian emphasis that survives in the Eastern Churches, which have rejected philosophical Hellenization consistently. Farrell declares, with regard to the difference separating Christendom before Charlemagne from Augustinianized Christendom and faith after Charlemagne: these amount to “two Europes” that “worship different Gods.” Farrell explains:

at its core the Second Europe [imbued with Frankish, Augustinian, Neoplatonized theology] is pagan, for it worships a pagan definition of God ... From the standpoint of the First [ancient and Byzantine] Europe ... the Second is in the continual process of actualizing the unwitting, but nevertheless, great apostasy ... in the system of Augustine. Even its “bold” and “radical” modern “reinterpreters”
of Christianity — an Elaine Pagels or a Rudolph [sic] Bultmann or a Julius Wellhausen— are less revolutionary than they think, for they are as much products of the Second Hellenization as their mediaeval forefathers.32

Farrell’s “hidden history” — his populist-alternative construction — appears transgressive in its devaluation of the Western trajectory toward modernity and its elevation of a “non-Hellenized” version of ancient catholic orthodoxy said to persist in the Byzantine and Russian traditions.33 So in his theological writings Farrell can construct a transgressive implied ledger in which those on the wrong side include Elaine Pagels, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich and most of the Popes from the time of Charlemagne forward, not to mention the inner circle of the Nazi SS — though, to be sure, constructing such a bookkeeping balance depends on the active faculties of the alert reader. Modernity, Western theological pseudo-orthodoxy or pseudo-conservatism, the feminist retrieval of Gnosticism, and the Nazis all suffer from the same degenerative pathology for Farrell. Farrell brings forward the specter of a “hidden history,” pointing to secret Nazi development of technology later coming into general use, a development connected with his claim that a post-war Nazi conspiracy lies behind the alleged Roswell UFO episode of 1947.34

All this could be studied in greater depth were resources available. What could call loudest for detailed treatment are the following points. First, one could look into the details of how Farrell’s Heinrich Himmler was allegedly captivated by purported mystic schemes for SS retrieval of “paleoancient” technology that could (if I do not misunderstand?) allow reconstituting of extraterrestrial Nordic forebears according to a Germanized worldview framework — a framework that, in some of its features emerges as looking not too distant from a Germanic-veneered version of Paul Tillich, here taking a broad but not unreasonable reading of Farrellian texts and their implications.35

Then, second, one could go into Farrell’s use of themes from René Adolphe Schwaller de Lubicz and Paul LaViolette to put forward a notion of “paleoancient” rigorous physics later encoded for the use of less advanced “legacy civilizations” in Egypt and elsewhere. This rigorous physics is related to an infinitely “manipulable” “aetheric” “substrate” of reality and, for Farrell, not only retrievable in practice potentially, but also capable of being modeled by adapting the mathematical language of topology.36 Here, though, we are not engaged in exercises in mathematics however extended. Therefore we close on a different note.

WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

To those making their first acquaintance with the Farrell phenomenon, it may appear so anomalous as to defy comprehension. Recalling the remarkable
details, we may wonder about the entire matter. We, however, find cause to take Farrell as serious when he adopts a stance in which he can combine his propounding of increasingly unusual alternative scenarios with his public role as representative of ancient catholic orthodoxy. Thus we ask where the appeal of this Farrellian mix lies for its author and its consumers, especially as the more baroque material here joins with Eastern Orthodox theology and religious practice – which, however unusual it may appear, still constitutes only an imperfect simulacrum of the highly contemporary exotic cults that truly belong in the “cultic milieu” or the New-Age related inner sanctum of alternative spiritualities. Why, then, the Farrell saga with its particular components? On reflection there occur two possibilities, not mutually exclusive, here leaving out of consideration the limited financial reward for the author.

The first is cast in the terms of the Foucauldian academy, where struggle for power and dominance underlies all “contestation” between myths and linguistic codes. Perhaps a sizable part of the non-university population pays limited attention to official narratives, instead taking an instinctive cue as if they had been reading Nietzsche on myth, but myth in its application with a political and socio-cultural valence opposite to that of the contemporary university. So in popular culture one encounters myths that empower a populist populace rather than university professors, theoreticians of community organizing, mainstream journalists, and government officials, implying a worldview and a politics radically at variance with those of today’s establishment power structure – instead, the worldview and politics arising from a non-mainstream, American populist culture. After all, we have been dealing with a writer of Christian profile who (at one place or another) puts Elaine Pagels and Rudolf Bultmann into the same implied ledger column as Heinrich Himmler. That constitutes a populist rejection of quite a bit.

Perhaps the first possibility is too hard to envision or accept. If so, consider another, summed up in the words of Alphonse de Lamartine in the Chamber of Deputies: “Messieurs, la France s’ennuie!” Perhaps, like France, the general public is bored. For the accepted academic view of the origins of the human species and human societies and the status of cultural rules is so boring, so banal in its implications, that it will perpetually spawn alternate accounts – simply because the official account, with its gradual processes and calculatedly unsurprising celebration of uniformitarianism and expectation of uniformity everywhere in physical processes and rules of the politically and culturally acceptable, offers little in the way of reward for non-elite, non-guild-members who accept it. It is not simply that the political result of official narratives and codes for much of the population seems to boil down to powerlessness repackaged as democracy; further, those narratives and codes reduce the importance of the human spirit and human moral purpose to such a level of amoral triviality and such a state of insignificant loneliness in the immediate neighborhood of earth that all the Carl Sagans and Richard Dawkinses and Stephen Jay Goulds and James Randis and John Rawlses imaginable will never
be able to close out the desperate quest for exciting and satisfying alterna­
tives, quite possibly the wilder the better.

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NOTES

1. This investigation concerns the print and online image of Joseph P. Farrell, making no claim to investigate facts supporting or altering that image. Popular culture aspects remain in view throughout. For Farrell himself, see, for example, Farrell (1987a; 1997; 2001a; 2006c; n.d.). See also Farrell (2001a: 69–78; 2003; 2005a: 13, 74, 81–2; 2005b; 2006a: 192–5, 199; 2006b; 2007a: 252, 325–6, 413, 416f; 2008d: 267, 388; 2009a: 277; 2010a: 245; 1987b; 1989; 2001b); Anonymous (2008); Farrell (2010a, 2010b); Anonymous (n.d.a); Farrell (1996); Anonymous (n.d.b); Farrell (1987b, 2008b, 2008c, 2007b, 2009b, 2009c); Rubinstein (2008: 164, 194 n. 50); Farrell (1997: 104, 318, 319) cites Tillich’s “abyss of everything specific.” For classic beyond and above, passages, see Tillich (1948: 136–49; 1966; 1968: 51; 2000: 186, 188). Background: see for example Clayton (2000). My interest in Farrell has been intensified by the fact that Farrell, despite his hypotheses, was not completely dismissed in the one secondary work of repute that took notice of him. This was historian Professor William D. Rubinstein’s eminently skeptical work, Shadow Pasts: History’s Mysteries. Rubinstein disperses of all manner of legends and myths. However, with regard to Joseph Farrell’s portrayal of the Great Pyramid as, in Rubinstein’s words, “actually a weapon of some kind, employing Tesla-style scalar impulse waves,” Rubinstein appears stumped, saying simply that Farrell’s three books on the Great Pyramid are full of “innumerable scientific equations and the like, which make his work difficult to assess” (Rubinstein 2008: 164). Likewise, with regard to Farrell’s claim that, as Rubinstein writes, “both the Nazis and the Japanese set off atomic bombs in 1944–45: before the first American atomic bomb,” Rubinstein appears not to know what to conclude, simply saying that Farrell “employs a wealth of intriguing evidence, making it impossible to dismiss” (Rubinstein 2008: 194, n. 50). Perhaps Farrell could open up more than popular culture, or perhaps destroy all criteria of conventional objection altogether. But first to the issue of popular culture here. For a useful treatment of ancient astronaut notions but with no particular mention of Farrell, see also Fritz (2009, esp. 211–14) on Zecharia Sitchin and the problems with his claims. Refer as well as to Anonymous (n.d.j); Hoagland & Bara (2009); Anonymous (n.d.f); and Grünschloß (2003).

2. Anonymous (n.d.g); West et al. (1992); Strauss (1988); Codevilla (2010).


6. Barkun (2003). And see this standard observation in Campbell (1998:122–3), with refer­ence to Campbell (1972: 122): “The term cultic milieu was coined by Colin Campbell to refer to a society’s deviant belief systems and practices and their associated
collectivities, institutions, individuals, and media of communication. He described it as including "the worlds of the occult and the magical, of spiritualism and psychic phenomena, of mysticism and new thought, of alien intelligences and lost civilizations, of faith healing and nature cure." See also Partridge (2005). As Gleig (2007: 33) notes, for Partridge, "occulture" signifies "the dynamic array of alternative spiritual ideas, practices and methodologies which is both fertilized and disseminated by popular culture and bears witness to the extraordinary confluence of secularization and sacralization occurring in modern culture. At the heart of this, is the 'subjective turn': the rejection of duties, obligations, and external authority in favor of the privileging of the self as the locus of meaning and value. Where critics find self-indulgence, inauthenticity, and appropriation, Partridge unearths individual responsibility, sincerity, and creative 'bricolage' as he traverses through the increasingly populated landscapes of holistic healing, ecology, paganism, and the more exotic terrains of cyber-spirituality, the sacralization of psychedelics, Ufoism, and demonology, arriving finally at the 'eschatological re-enchantment' of apocalypticism, millennialism, and millenarianism."

13. Farrell (e.g. 1997) rejects some aspects of the reading of Gregory in Johannes Quasten. However, as certain areas of Farrell the historical theologian are unavailable to me (I refuse to join Farrell's password-protected community), and as I am not myself a scholar of patristics, I decline to give detailed answers concerning Farrell's arguments for his evident thesis of a persistent immunity of Eastern Orthodoxy to the kind of Hellenization attack held to have deformed Western faith, thought and practice over the last twelve hundred years. Cf. Grillmeier (1975: 423-88, 454-6); Yamauchi (1994); D.H. Williams (1994); Helleman (1994); Rowe (1994); Droben (2008); Altaner (1961: 519-23); Wilken (1981); Mejering (1985: 141-2). Kippenberg (2002: 11) notes the similarity between Harnack's attitude and Kant's. Without mentioning pathology, M. A. Williams (1996/1999: 80) implies the diaGnostic mode. For Hellenization and the success of the East and the failure of the West in defeating it, see Farrell (1997: 8, 71, 87-90, 112, 117, 124, 136, 193, 201, 216, 278, 309, 384, 389, 399, 418, 430, 454-6, 493, 622, 946, 958, 975).
14. See her contribution to this volume.
15. See Farrell (1997: 5-6) on ancient catholic orthodoxy and the continuation of it in Byzantium and beyond: "For the First Europe ... then, God is literally seen in a particular historical tradition ... It is no mere 'God-in-general' Who is the Subject of the Vision of God, it is this God, for Ambrose, Christ Incarnate. All of this is to say that the First Europe's Christianity has stamped on its very essence a 'quasi-Jewish' character ... "
16. Farrell (1996); Anonymous (n.d.c); Anonymous (n.d.d); Farrell (2007b). Note the converage of Farrell's conservative theology with the mention of his alternative interests in Farrell (2006b), an online publication of the California Graduate School of Theology, describing Farrell as Professor and D. Phil., illustrating Farrell's movement between ancient Gnosticism and modern views approaching the characterization of them in Voegelin; note the concluding footnote, implying Farrell's work in alternate nonfiction can be taken as something like a critical work of scholarship. Also Anonymous (2008); Farrell (1996, 2009c); Anonymous (n.d.b).
17. See Farrell (2009e).
18. Farrell (2007a: 325-7); Ankerberg and Weldon (n.d.); also the citation of John Keel and the interdimensional hypothesis to support a Christian evangelical reading of UFOs as identical with classic demons in Gleghorn (n.d.); Anonymous (n.d.m); Anonymous (n.d.k); Vallée (1991); Eyre (2009). On John Keel, see Jeff Kripal’s essay in this volume. See also Cook (2001); Witkowski (2003); Cornwell (2004); Karlsch (2005, 2007).
20. Farrell (2010b, 2008c); and see above. Refer also in general to Gray (1995).
25. See above. Farrell (2007a: 301-23), two distinct “creations”; Farrell (2001a: 289ff., 91 n. 93), possible paleoantique service of the God of Abraham; Farrell (2007a: 411-12), close relatives of human beings existed or existing on other planets. Farrell has not produced a full-scale appropriation of Jacques Vallée or John Keel for purposes of completely vindicating Christian demonology; he knows the writings of the former.
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36. Farrell (2005a: 209, 222–6; 2009a: 36, 80; 2001a: 6, 66f., 69f., 132, 210); LaViolette (1995); Farrell (2009b; 2009a: 47; 2003: 265–9). Significant for Farrell is twentieth-century occultist/"alternative Egyptologist" René Adolphe Schwaller de Lubicz (1887–1961), whose work on the Temple at Luxor, Farrell takes to show ancient Egypt possessed an important physics legacy from a preceding, "donor" civilization, wherever headquartered, summed up in a complex concept of a "topological metaphor" for the aether or primary medium that can be rendered in "the mathematical language of harmonics" such that, at the start, "the undifferentiated medium" can be represented as "an undifferentiated hyperset" susceptible of varied subsequent differentiation, with the result that – as later alchemists grasped semi-metaphorically – matter can be "back-engineered," even as Egyptian magicians knew to apply these principles for "analogical action at a distance." (Here closely following the language of Farrell.) See Farrell, (2005a: 109, 127; 2009a: 36, 48). Rubinstein (2008, 195 n. 64) observes that Schwaller de Lubicz emerges "as the father of unorthodox Egyptology." "Legacy": see above.

37. Or, I do not read Farrell's writings as stimulated by Kierkegaard's reaction to the possibility of human demonstrations concerning God and divine existence; see Kierkegaard (1985: 34): "What an excellent subject for a comedy of the higher lunacy!"

38. Cf. Harrington (1983). See also Cornel West in Anonymous (n.d.h): "you have to fight in the life of the mind as well as fight in the streets, as well as fight in the courts, as well as fight in congress and the White House. Every site is a sight [sic] of contestation. There are various forms of weaponry ... Because we are on the battlefield, and there are bullets flying, some symbolic, some literal and the life of the mind is a crucial place where the battle goes on."


40. It might not be far off to see Farrell's career as reacting to the dechristianization of America. Cf. Gress (1998); Kaufmann (2004).

41. See Whitehouse (2007: 280, 171) for variations on this passage, with punctuation adapted.

42. On "basic threads in motivation and fascination" with regard to ancient astronaut "discourse," refer to the description of "A lay-people's revolt against the academic establishment," in Grünschloß (2006: 15): "Following the ubiquitous reverence to Schliemann, the Paleo-SETI endeavors are attempts to participate in academic discourses as emancipated lay individuals, who are frustrated by the compartmentalized specialization and the arrogant self-certainty of established academic discourses and who want to be heard in their new attempt at re-evaluating 'damned' data."
the implicit suggestion that Christian supernaturalist claims will eventually prove consistent with advanced consensus science. No preaching intrudes into the popular books, merely hints of this, such as the claim that ancient astronauts knew of the God later revealed in the Bible, or the suggestion that angels and demons can be rationally understood as existing in a plasma or electron cloud state having a temporal start but no terminus. More important is the fact that despite his own fascination with advanced technological and physics hypotheses, perhaps because of it, Farrell puts his narratives and hypotheses concerning technology into a conventional moralizing framework of evaluation and distancing. This framework is one in which, in typical postwar fashion, the unspeakable evil of the Nazis constitutes the tent pole of a decidedly non-Eliadean moral universe. Farrellian Nazis are evil misusers of intelligence and diligence and ancient lore once donated to “legacy” civilizations. However extreme the fascination with the power of a morally neutral technology, however unknown the other Forces that may lurk at the edge of the universe for Farrell’s as yet unwritten scenarios, nonetheless the reader comes up against reminders that the Farrellian universe is a morally familiar one. His villains are familiar figures of evil, stock items constituting the moral coordinates of a contemporary America that is perhaps multicultural but forever post-Judaean-Christian, forever marked by cultural assumptions of good versus evil and of the polarity of the Nazi versus the Judaean-Christian heritage.

4. In view of this — constructing a popular alternative nonfiction series in which conventional morality and obstinate insistence on openness to conventional Christian transcendence are upheld — we are thus entitled to report a not insignificant further finding on the basis of our survey. The writings and Web presence of Farrell constitute an exception to the claim of Andreas Grünenschloß, according to which ancient astronaut narratives inevitably and by inherent nature tend toward a simple kind of “Euhemeristic” unmasking. Grünenschloß, looking at pré-Farrellian ancient astronaut material, argues for seeing there a “disenchantment” in which contemporary fascination with technology and its power must take the place of conventional religion even for those such as Zecharia Sitchin. They apparently began their adventures with ancient astronauts hoping that retrieval of event-referentiality for ancient extraordinary or mythic narratives would end by retrieving religiosity. The outcome has proven disappointing and religiously limited, says Grünenschloß. While Grünenschloß has chronicled the emergence of forms of pallid religiosity and the growth of “post-scientific” and “post-religious” UFO religions or cults, his assessment appears to be that this enterprise is largely incompatible with conventional religiosity given its foregrounding of fascination with technology, and unfulfilling in the long run. At this stage, however, one may call for a bit of revision in this area. While Farrell’s alternative nonfiction occasionally opens the theology portal slightly, his main move has nothing to
do with direct injecting of divine action or a cosmicized soteriology or explicit discussion of con\ntentional theism. Instead Farrell wrenches the narrative of ancient astronauts, fringe physics, pursuit of alchemy, crystalline lattices, UFOs, anti-gravity propulsion, and Tesla-esque weaponry out of the domain of morally ambiguous science fiction and sets it within the most conventional of American moralizing frameworks. So the case of Farrell necessitates some rethinking, as Farrell self-consciously and reflectively mitigates his own fascination with technology and physics by consistently installing around these topics a strong framework of a conventional moral nature, a framework joined to a desire to uphold a place for the conventionally transcendent and theistic.

MATTERS FOR ADDITIONAL EXPLORATION

For the Latin West and its secularity, contends Farrell, the real hidden narrative is the narrative of the forgetting of the God of Abraham and the substitution of a seductive but truncated and misleading allegorical encoding of the principles of advanced physics for true theology and true worship. Farrell argues that already with Augustine the direction is set with a fateful concentration on "an increasingly impersonal unity" in God, which pays no attention to the "Monarchy" of the First Person of the Trinity. This direction appears as part of a Western, Gnosticizing, Hellenizing concentration on divine simplicity. "Obsession with divine simplicity" is for Farrell a theological misunderstanding that, rooted in Neoplatonism and the alleged encoding of "paleoancient" technology, leads the West to produce theological thinkers like Tillich, and Sorcerer's Apprentice technology. It results in a slide toward philosophical monism in the West, a declension away from concentration on a personal, transcendent God known to Abraham and to the Christian Church from Jesus as its founder through the ecumenical patriarchates and creeds. So triumphed the Augustinianized, Neoplatonized, simplicity-in-God-obsessed movement sponsored by the power drive of Charlemagne and his ecclesiastical take-over of the Latin world. This triumph, according to Farrell, was over an original Christian emphasis that survives in the Eastern Churches, which have rejected philosophical Hellenization consistently. Farrell declares, with regard to the difference separating Christendom before Charlemagne from Augustinianized Christendom and faith after Charlemagne: these amount to "two Europes" that "worship different Gods." Farrell explains:

at its core the Second Europe [imbued with Frankish, Augustinian, Neoplatonized theology] is pagan, for it worships a pagan definition of God ... From the standpoint of the First [ancient and Byzantine] Europe ... the Second is in the continual process of actualizing the unwitting, but nevertheless, great apostasy ... in the system of Augustine. Even its "bold" and "radical" modern "interpreters"
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of Christianity – an Elaine Pagels or a Rudolph [sic] Bultmann or a Julius Wellhausen – are less revolutionary than they think, for they are as much products of the Second Hellenization as their mediaeval forefathers.32

Farrell’s “hidden ‘history” – his populist-alternative construction – appears transgressive in its devaluation of the Western trajectory toward modernity and its elevation of a “non-Hellenized” version of ancient catholic orthodoxy said to persist in the Byzantine and Russian traditions.33 So in his theological writings Farrell can construct a transgressive implied ledger in which those on the wrong side include Elaine Pagels, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich and most of the Popes from the time of Charlemagne forward, not to mention the inner circle of the Nazi SS – though, to be sure, constructing such a bookkeeping balance depends on the active faculties of the alert reader. Modernity, Western theological pseudo-orthodoxy or pseudo-conservatism, the feminist retrieval of Gnosticism, and the Nazis all suffer from the same degenerative pathology for Farrell. Farrell brings forward the specter of a “hidden history,” pointing to secret Nazi development of technology later coming into general use, a development connected with his claim that a post-war Nazi conspiracy lies behind the alleged Roswell UFO episode of 1947.34

All this could be studied in greater depth were resources available. What could call loudest for detailed treatment are the following points. First, one could look into the details of how Farrell’s Heinrich Himmler was allegedly captivated by purported mystic schemes for SS retrieval of “paleoancient” technology that could (if I do not misunderstand?) allow reconstituting of extraterrestrial Nordic forebears according to a Germanized worldview framework – a framework that, in some of its features emerges as looking not too distant from a Germanic-veneered version of Paul Tillich, here taking a broad but not unreasonable reading of Farrellian texts and their implications.35

Then, second, one could go into Farrell’s use of themes from René Adolphe Schwaller de Lubicz and Paul LaViolette to put forward a notion of “paleoancient” rigorous physics later encoded for the use of less advanced “legacy civilizations” in Egypt and elsewhere. This rigorous physics is related to an infinitely “manipulable” “aetheric” “substrate” of reality and, for Farrell, not only retrievable in practice potentially, but also capable of being modeled by adapting the mathematical language of topology.36 Here, though, we are not engaged in exercises in mathematics however extended. Therefore we close on a different note.

WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

To those making their first acquaintance with the Farrell phenomenon, it may appear so anomalous as to defy comprehension. Recalling the remarkable
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details, we may wonder about the entire matter. We, however, find cause to take Farrell as serious when he adopts a stance in which he can combine his propounding of increasingly unusual alternative scenarios with his public role as representative of ancient catholic orthodoxy. Thus we ask where the appeal of this Farrellian mix lies for its author and its consumers, especially as the more baroque material here joins with Eastern Orthodox theology and religious practice — which, however unusual it may appear, still constitutes only an imperfect simulacrum of the highly contemporary exotic cults that truly belong in the "cultic milieu" or the New-Age related inner sanctum of alternative spiritualities. Why, then, the Farrell saga with its particular components? On reflection there occur two possibilities, not mutually exclusive, here leaving out of consideration the limited financial reward for the author.

The first is cast in the terms of the Foucauldian academy, where struggle for power and dominance underlies all "contestation" between myths and linguistic codes. Perhaps a sizable part of the non-university population pays limited attention to official narratives, instead taking an instinctive cue as if they had been reading Nietzsche on myth, but myth in its application with a political and socio-cultural valence opposite to that of the contemporary university. So in popular culture one encounters myths that empower a populist populace rather than university professors, theoreticians of community organizing, mainstream journalists, and government officials, implying a worldview and a politics radically at variance with those of today's establishment power structure — instead, the worldview and politics arising from a non-mainstream, American populist culture. After all, we have been dealing with a writer of Christian profile who (at one place or another) puts Elaine Pagels and Rudolf Bultmann into the same implied ledger column as Heinrich Himmler. That constitutes a populist rejection of quite a bit.

Perhaps the first possibility is too hard to envision or accept. If so, consider another, summed up in the words of Alphonse de Lamartine in the Chamber of Deputies: "Messieurs, la France s'ennuie!" Perhaps, like France, the general public is bored. For the accepted academic view of the origins of the human species and human societies and the status of cultural rules is so boring, so banal in its implications, that it will perpetually spawn alternate accounts — simply because the official account, with its gradual processes and calculatedly unsurprising celebration of uniformitarianism and expectation of uniformity everywhere in physical processes and rules of the politically and culturally acceptable, offers little in the way of reward for non-elite, non-guild-members who accept it. It is not simply that the political result of official narratives and codes for much of the population seems to boil down to powerlessness repackaged as democracy; further, those narratives and codes reduce the importance of the human spirit and human moral purpose to such a level of amoral triviality and such a state of insignificant loneliness in the immediate neighborhood of earth that all the Carl Sagans and Richard Dawkinses and Stephen Jay Gouls and James Randis and John Rawlses imaginable will never
be able to close out the desperate quest for exciting and satisfying alternatives, quite possibly the wilder the better.

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NOTES


Background: see for example Clayton (2000). My interest in Farrell has been intensified by the fact that Farrell, despite his hypotheses, was not completely dismissed in the one secondary work of repute that took notice of him. This was historian Professor William D. Rubinstein's eminently skeptical work, Shadow Pasts: History's Mysteries. Rubinstein disposes of all manner of legends and myths. However, with regard to Joseph Farrell's portrayal of the Great Pyramid as, in Rubinstein's words, "actually a weapon of some kind, employing Tesla-style scalar impulse waves," Rubinstein appears stumped, saying simply that Farrell's three books on the Great Pyramid are full of "innumerable scientific equations and the like, which make his work difficult to assess" (Rubinstein 2008: 164). Likewise, with regard to Farrell's claim that, as Rubinstein writes, "both the Nazis and the Japanese set off atomic bombs in 1944–45: before the first American atomic bomb," Rubinstein appears not to know what to conclude, simply saying that Farrell "employs a wealth of intriguing evidence, making it impossible to dismiss" (Rubinstein 2008: 194, n. 50). Perhaps Farrell could open up more than popular culture, or perhaps destroy all criteria of conventional objection altogether. But first to the issue of popular culture here. For a useful treatment of ancient astronaut notions but with no particular mention of Farrell, see also Fritz (2009, esp. 211–14) on Zecharia Sitchin and the problems with his claims. Refer as well as to Anonymous (n.d.i); Hoagland & Bara (2009); Anonymous (n.d.f); and Grünschoß (2003).

2. Anonymous (n.d.g); West et al. (1992); Strauss (1988); Codevilla (2010).


6. Barkun (2003). And see this standard observation in Campbell (1998:122–3), with reference to Campbell (1972: 122): "The term cultic milieu was coined by Colin Campbell to refer to a society's deviant belief systems and practices and their associated
collectivities, institutions, individuals, and media of communication. He described it as including "the worlds of the occult and the magical, of spiritualism and psychic phenomena, of mysticism and new thought, of alien intelligences and lost civilizations, of faith healing and nature cure." See also Partridge (2005). As Gleig (2007: 33) notes, for Partridge, "occulture" signifies "the dynamic array of alternative spiritual ideas, practices and methodologies which is both fertilized and disseminated by popular culture and bears witness to the extraordinary confluence of secularization and sacralization occurring in modern culture. At the heart of this, is the 'subjective turn': the rejection of duties, obligations, and external authority in favor of the privileging of the self as the locus of meaning and value. Where critics find self-indulgence, inauthenticity, and appropriation, Partridge unearths individual responsibility, sincerity, and creative 'bricolage' as he traverses through the increasingly populated landscapes of holistic healing, ecology, paganism, and the more exotic terrains of cyberspirituality, the sacralization of psychedelics, Ufoism, and demonology, arriving finally at the 'eschatological re-enchantment' of apocalypticism, millenialism, and millenarianism."


13. Farrell (e.g. 1997) rejects some aspects of the reading of Gregory in Johannes Quasten. However, as certain areas of Farrell the historical theologian are unavailable to me (I refuse to join Farrell's password-protected community), and as I am not myself a scholar of patristics, I decline to give detailed answers concerning Farrell's arguments for his evident thesis of a persistent immunity of Eastern Orthodoxy to the kind of Hellenization attack held to have deformed Western faith, thought and practice over the last twelve hundred years. Cf. Grillmeier (1975: 423-88, 454-6); Yamauchi (1994); D.H. Williams (1994); Helleman (1994); Rowe (1994); Drobner (2008); Altaner (1961: 519-23); Wilken (1981); Mejering (1985: 141-2). Kippenberg (2002: 11) notes the similarity between Harnack's attitude and Kant's. Without mentioning pathology, M. A. Williams (1996/1999: 80) implies the diagnostische mode. For Hellenization and the success of the East and the failure of the West in defeating it, see Farrell (1997: 8, 71, 87-90, 112, 117, 124, 136, 193, 201, 216, 278, 309, 384, 389, 399, 418, 430, 454-6, 493, 622, 946, 958, 975).

14. See her contribution to this volume.

15. See Farrell (1997: 5-6) on ancient catholic orthodoxy and the continuation of it in Byzantium and beyond: "For the First Europe ... then, God is literally seen in a particular historical tradition ... it is no mere 'God-in-general' Who is the Subject of the Vision of God, it is this God, for Ambrose, Christ Incarnate. All of this is to say that the First Europe's Christianity has stamped on its very essence a 'quasi-Jewish' character ... "

16. Farrell (1996); Anonymous (n.d.c); Anonymous (n.d.d); Farrell (2007b). Note the convergence of Farrell's conservative theology with the mention of his alternative interests in Farrell (2006b), an online publication of the California Graduate School of Theology, describing Farrell as Professor and D. Phil., illustrating Farrell's movement between ancient Gnosticism and modern views approaching the characterization of them in Voegelin; note the concluding footnote, implying Farrell's work in alternate nonfiction can be taken as something like a critical work of scholarship. Also Anonymous (2008); Farrell (1996, 2009c); Anonymous (n.d.b).
17. See Farrell (2009e).
18. Farrell (2007a: 325–7); Ankerberg and Weldon (n.d.); also the citation of John Keel and the interdimensional hypothesis to support a Christian evangelical reading of UFOs as identical with classic demons in Gleghorn (n.d.); Anonymous (n.d.m); Anonymous (n.d.k); Vallée (1991); Eyre (2009). On John Keel, see Jeff Kripal’s essay in this volume. See also Cook (2001); Witkowski (2003); Cornwell (2004); Karlisch (2005, 2007).
20. Farrell (2010b, 2008c); and see above. Refer also in general to Gray (1995).
36. Farrell (2005a: 209, 222–6; 2009a: 36, 80; 2001a: 6, 66f., 69f., 132, 210); LaViolette (1995); Farrell (2009b; 2009a: 47; 2003: 265-9). Significant for Farrell is twentieth-century occultist/“alternative Egyptologist” René Adolphe Schwaller de Lubicz (1887-1961), whose work on the Temple at Luxor, Farrell takes to show ancient Egypt possessed an important physics legacy from a preceding, “donor” civilization, wherever headquartered, summed up in a complex concept of a “topological metaphor” for the aether or primary medium that can be rendered in “the mathematical language of harmonics” such that, at the start, “the undifferentiated medium” can be represented as “an undifferentiated hyperset” susceptible of varied subsequent differentiation, with the result that – as later alchemists grasped semi-metaphorically – matter can be “back-engineered,” even as Egyptian magicians knew to apply these principles for “analogical action at a distance.” (Here closely following the language of Farrell.) See Farrell, (2005a: 109, 127; 2009a: 36, 48). Rubinstein (2008, 195 n. 64) observes that Schwaller de Lubicz emerges “as the father of unorthodox Egyptology.” “Legacy”: see above.
37. Or, I do not read Farrell’s writings as stimulated by Kierkegaard’s reaction to the possibility of human demonstrations concerning God and divine existence; see Kierkegaard (1985: 34): “What an excellent subject for a comedy of the higher lunacy!”
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42. On “basic threads in motivation and fascination” with regard to ancient astronaut “discourse,” refer to the description of “A lay-people’s revolt against the academic establishment.” in Grünschloß (2006: 15): “Following the ubiquitous reverence to Schliemann, the Paleo-SETI endeavors are attempts to participate in academic discourses as emancipated lay individuals, who are frustrated by the compartmentalized specialization and the arrogant self-certainty of established academic discourses and who want to be heard in their new attempt at re-evaluating ‘damned’ data.”