According to Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930), scientific scholarship (Wissenschaft) is “the knowledge of the real for purposeful action.”¹ In the case of history, this scholarship has the purpose of fitting us “to intervene in the course of history” by rejecting “the past when it reaches into the present as a hindrance,” by doing “the right thing in the present,” and by preparing “prudently for the future.” That is, Harnack’s historian decides “what of the past shall continue to be efficacious and what must be done away with or transformed.”² In Harnack’s terms, then, the question for us is this: what in nineteenth-century German Protestantism can (and ought to) be of enduring significance and usefulness?

Western history from 1815 to 1914 may be seen as an attempt to come to terms with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the revolutionary imperialism carried out by Napoleon. If we leave out of consideration the advocates of the continued search for radical upheaval without limits, our nineteenth-century story becomes a tale of varying attempts to arrange matters after the recently survived earthquake in order to ensure that future shocks would do minimal damage. Virtually all these efforts mixed concessions to
the Enlightenment cataclysm with attempts to insulate certain items from the catastrophe of modern times.

Such a story can be written about European politics and society as a whole. It can also be written about European ecclesiastical and theological activity. The religious proposals, like those in politics, sort themselves out into two kinds of methods for restoring order. Some wished to admit as few concessions as possible to emancipation and rationalization. Others instead made a virtue of necessity and acknowledged in their theology the just claims of reason to be freed from control by the institutional church. This emancipated approach has rightly been called liberal theology. In choosing this theology as my topic, I am judging the liberal tradition of cooperation with modern culture to constitute German Protestantism's enduring legacy to the church in an age of pluralism.

The liberal stream in German Protestantism is distinguished by the refusal to allow the course of modern history to assign Christianity to barbarism, and scientific scholarship to unbelief—a refusal enunciated by F. D. E. Schleiermacher in 1829, and by Harnack in 1923 during the controversy with Karl Barth. Indeed, Schleiermacher (1768-1834) contended that the Reformation itself had concluded an "eternal treaty" between living Christian faith and independent scientific research. On the basis of this treaty, Schleiermacher tried to keep Christianity and culture in contact, refusing to separate them. This distinctive refusal led Schleiermacher, in his sketch of theological study published for use in his Berlin lectures, to put forward a philosophical theology vitally concerned with determining the essence of Christianity on historical-critical principles.

The same distinctive refusal marks the career of Harnack at Berlin. He embraced modern scholarship so as to commit himself to a program of historical-critical searching for the essence of Christianity. Harnack's program eventuated in the conclusion that with Luther "the history of dogma, which had its beginnings in the age of the Apologists, nay, of the Apostolic Fathers, was brought to an end." For with Luther's reform, "the inviolable system of doctrine established by the Holy Spirit" was "abolished." Thus for Luther (1483-1546) and for all Protestants who let "Luther be Luther," the faith resulting from the Reformation can in no way be constrained by reverence for human dogmatic formulas. Luther's criticism of Catholic dogma led to a Protestant religious faith which "rises superior, not merely to this or that particular dogma, but to dogmatic Chris-
Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition

tianity in its entirety." Harnack went so far as to maintain that, in the Reformation view,

Christianity is something else than a sum of traditional doctrines. Christianity is not Biblical Theology, nor is it the doctrine of the Coun­
cils, but it is the spirit which the Father of Jesus Christ awakens in hearts through the Gospel. All authorities which support dogma are abolished; how then can dogma maintain itself as infallible doctrine; but what, again, is a dogma without infallibility? Christian doctrine establishes its rights only for faith; what share, then, can philosophy still have in it? but what, again, are dogma and dogmatic Christianity without philosophy?

On this account, Harnack could recognize no "history of dogma in Protestantism" after Luther's "great Reformation writings." Instead, Harnack could only point to the continuing Protestant criticism of all doctrinal formulae, a criticism which embodied a continuing struggle for a "right understanding of the Gospel" within modern civilization. The enterprise of Protestantism becomes then a critical search for the essence of Christianity. This search leads directly to the Enlightenment's radical breach with confessional rigor—a breach which, Harnack asserts, "can be described by no one as a breach with the Reformation."

An openness to modern culture, joined to willingness to criticize finite expressions of the Christian tradition regarded as absolute, can be taken as characteristic of the German liberal Protestant tradi­tion. This trait was most strikingly evident in university theology, and it was nowhere more manifest than in the idea of theological education upheld in the University of Berlin in the century from Schleiermacher to Harnack.

The fundamental statement of the liberal Protestant idea of theo­logical education is Schleiermacher's 1811 outline of theological study, revised in 1830. The outline connects the theological disci­plines with the purpose of leadership in the church. Schleier­macher makes plain that the goal to which the church must be directed is that of striving "ever more purely to present the idea of Christianity." Here as well is the notion of a free and open application of philosophy and historical research in Christian theology so as to serve the church.

These ideas received institutional codification in the statutes of the Berlin theological faculty. Although not promulgated until 1838 (long after Schleiermacher's independence of spirit had
caused him to fall from favor during the era of reaction), the statutes still in many ways hark back to Schleiermacher. He, together with Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), must rank among the chief founders of the University of Berlin (c. 1810).

The statutes of the Berlin theological faculty recall the original impulses active in the plans for setting up the university put forward by Schleiermacher and Humboldt. Particularly important is the first paragraph of the statutes:

The theological faculty has the vocation of proceeding according to the doctrine of the evangelical church so as not only to propagate the theological sciences in general, but also especially to make competent by means of lectures and other academic exercises the young men who dedicate themselves to the service of the church.

The weight accorded here to the advancement of theological scholarship is striking. Anyone familiar with the regulations and organization of the Berlin theological faculty will realize that here was an institution so set up as to encourage not simply the practice of theological scholarship by the faculty, but as well the recruitment of new scholars and teachers—and the training of pastors actively supportive of the liberal and critical approach. That even the reaction after the close of the Napoleonic period did not permanently impair the ability of Berlin to function in this way can be attributed to the enduring power of the ideas about education and scientific scholarship put forward by the founders of the University of Berlin.

These ideas ultimately derive from the single idea of scientific scholarship as a process brought about by the free, inner drive to know for its own sake. One of the most important statements of this idea was made by Schleiermacher in 1808. The same idea animates Humboldt’s memorandum of 1809-1810 on the organization of higher scientific institutions in Berlin. During the difficult period of the Napoleonic Wars, Humboldt characteristically avoided any search for immediate utility, arguing instead that scientific scholarship was to be freely pursued for its own sake, driven by an impulse emerging from the depths of the human spirit; it was not to serve any immediate practical purpose, but to seek an answer to problems which are never to be regarded as fully solved. As one recent historian of the University of Berlin has put it in this same connection:

Scientific knowledge [Wissenschaft] is something incomplete. It depends on seeking and finding new truths—that is, upon research;
and even in transmitting truth the point is not handing on something given, but rather a spontaneous reflection upon principles. 17

Such an idea of Wissenschaft could appeal to the pioneers of Idealism and Neohumanism for many reasons—not least of which was the way it could be used in opposition to the narrowly utilitarian pedagogical notions of cameralist social engineers in the service of the absolutist state. 18 For the proponents of the all-encompassing Idealist concept of knowledge did not oppose purposeful action as an educational goal; the careers of Schleiermacher and Humboldt abundantly demonstrate that they favored such action. They did, however, criticize the view that education should be dissolved into processes of technical training in which each discipline would be pursued in virtual isolation from all others according to norms of immediate social and economic utility.

The reception of Idealism at Berlin and elsewhere meant, as Walter P. Metzger has pointed out, that “the search for truth” was seen as being “not an occupation, but a calling—a transcendent necessity.” 19 As a result,

the very notion of Wissenschaft had overtones of meaning utterly missing in its English counterpart, science. The German term signified a dedicated, sanctified pursuit. It signified not merely the study of the “exact sciences,” but of everything taught by the university; not the study of things for their immediate utilities, but the morally imperative study of things for themselves and for their ultimate meanings. 20

The unified concept of scientific knowledge in German Idealism encompassed what we now separate into natural sciences and humanities. They were held together by use of the speculative philosophy of nature; in consequence, it seemed possible, as Thomas Nipperdey puts it, for the founders of the University of Berlin to regard Wissenschaft as “a whole; philosophical reflection upon the totality of the world and upon meaning is proper to each discipline.” 21

As it was institutionalized at Berlin, the idea of a search for total knowledge was one that could be seen to have three corollaries. First, because the new view of science in Idealist transcendental philosophy implied “a universal and coherent . . . system of the unity and universality of man’s total knowledge,” 22 the then-current proposals to dissolve universities into separate specialized technical academies had to be rejected—even though they were favored by
The University of Berlin

The French example. The professors and students in a university, rather than being forever isolated within the confines of glorified technical schools lacking mutual ties, ought instead to "represent the totality of knowledge." In other words, the inculcation of a drive for true knowledge and the development of a mind capable of living and creative scholarship depend on initial and recurrent exposure to what Martin Redeker sums up as "the scientific spirit as expressed in philosophy." Schleiermacher's statement of this point links the notion of a totality of knowledge with the realization that one's own branch of learning can be fully appropriated as a way of life only when studied in connection with the basic philosophical curriculum: "The totality of knowledge should be shown by perceiving the principles as well as the outline of all learning in such a way that one develops the ability to pursue each sphere of knowledge on his own." Thus knowledge is to be sought without having the direction of investigation chiefly determined by considerations of immediate utility; each branch of knowledge gains its true significance only when questions of meaning and issues of relation to the totality of the world are taken into account. Therefore, within the university, students are expected to begin their studies in the philosophical faculty before proceeding to specialization; furthermore, professors in the faculties of theology, law, and medicine are expected on occasion to teach some part of pure scholarship.

The second corollary of the search for total knowledge was the linking of research and teaching: professors at the university should also when possible be active in the academy of sciences. (Schleiermacher was permanent secretary to the philosophical division in the Berlin Academy of Sciences.) Humboldt argued that an academy of sciences should be independent of the university (which had its own program of research), yet in part composed of university professors. Such an arrangement would be profitable for the academy and would stimulate the productivity of university professors and students in all disciplines. Thus students would be caught up in the spirit of search and research, and those who went on to specialized study would not limit themselves to the narrowly technical or the dogmatically prescribed.

Next came the third corollary claim: the state should permit freedom in teaching and research so as to help create within the framework of the state what Redeker, echoing contemporary terminology, describes as a "community of justice and culture." In general,
this meant that professors should concentrate on research and that students should think first of study rather than of issues of career.\textsuperscript{30} In practical terms this signified that, though the state "drew up the [university] budgets, created new chairs, appointed professors, and framed the general scheme of instruction," still the universities were granted a certain autonomy: the faculty ordinarily controlled "the election of academic officials, the appointment of lecturers . . . , and the nomination of professors."\textsuperscript{31} Since the advancement of research and the training of researchers or professionals serving in institutions sympathetic to the ideal of research in their field was a basic aim, students were free to study what they liked wherever they wished. Moreover, the professor was "free to examine bodies of evidence and to repeat his findings in lecture or published form." In Metzger's elegant phrase, academic freedom was regarded as "the atmosphere of consent that surrounded the whole process of research and instruction."\textsuperscript{32}

The double purpose of the Berlin theological faculty was that of propagating and advancing the theological disciplines while training pastors able to carry out the tasks required of them. Clearly the concept of \textit{Wissenschaft} held by the founders of the University of Berlin is one important presupposition for the existence of the theological statutes of 1838. Merely to list the other presuppositions threatens to require a socioeconomic history of nineteenth-century Germany.

The Berlin attempt to institutionalize Schleiermacher's and Humboldt's ideal of research and teaching was the product of a remarkable coincidence of circumstances. The Evangelical church and the university theological faculty were distinct from each other. The church carried out its own program of selecting candidates for ordination;\textsuperscript{33} the task was not abandoned to the university. Hence the possibility of fostering an ideal of theological scholarship was enhanced: education for ministry could take place in a setting not under the direct control of the church and to some degree potentially insulated from the direct effects of those periodic waves of irrationalism commonly legitimated in ecclesiastical circles by invocation of the claims of faith.

Other circumstances tended to create the ideal of theological education as a search. A well-established German Evangelical tradition maintained the necessity of massive amounts of learning for leaders in the church.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, in Protestant Germany the territorial churches—though they were bound to the symbolical
The University of Berlin

documents—lacked any one organ whose interpretation of doctrine could reasonably be asserted as correct and valid for all the Evangelical churches.35

Moreover, a network of humanistic Gymnasien in the nineteenth century made it feasible to expect a certain level of linguistic proficiency in university students. Though traditional Christianity was out of vogue with many of the educated at the opening of the century, the concept of a theology influenced by a nonecclesiastical Christentum could readily be joined to the ideology of Idealism and Neohumanism to produce a theological version of Bildung (cultivation of the person by education). Updated Christianity played a significant part in the ideology of the classically educated, morally and aesthetically formed, and totally rounded personality. By means of this ideology of Bildung, the non-noble educated sought to advance their social claims in a society still dominated considerably by the nobility. Liberal Christentum could be used as part of this set of ideas, and such ideas required that theology be pursued in a university setting.36

Behind all these presuppositions was the circumstance that Prussia as an artificial creation was a state resting on an ethos of bureaucratic rationalization and an ethos of duty and diligence. As Hegel put it, the Prussian state was built on intelligence.37 Within this setting, theological education could not avoid taking on at times a scientific (or at least a scholarly) shape rarely seen in modern times outside Northern Europe.

Schleiermacher as one of the founders of the University of Berlin tried to find a form for the idea of theological education corresponding to the aims behind the new university. Already in 1808, in an influential book on the general task of the university, Schleiermacher contended that the theological faculty had arisen in order to preserve for the church its heritage, to separate truth from error, and to furnish for “the further elaboration of doctrine and the church an historical basis, a sure and determinate direction, and a common spirit.”38 Here he foreshadows the bold reorganization of theological study that he was to put forward in 1811 and 1830.

Schleiermacher’s presentation of the system of theological study is organized around the relation of the theological disciplines to the task of providing guidance and leadership to the church.39 Yet, as Wolfhart Pannenberg has shown, the unity of theology for Schleiermacher derives from the inner principle according to which the components of theology are connected to the “essence” of Chris-
Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition

tianity. And Schleiermacher's view of most of theology is shaped by attention to historical problems. Philosophical theology has the task of determining the "idea" or "essence" of Christianity by applying philosophical principles to empirical data. Historical theology is described as "verification" of philosophical theology: it "presents each moment in its true relation to the idea of Christianity." "Historical theology" encompasses exegetical theology, the study of postcanonical data concerning doctrine and institutions, and the present state of doctrine and ecclesiastical organization. As such, "historical theology" is for Schleiermacher the "foundation" of practical theology: it constitutes the indispensable precondition for exercising good judgment about how we ought to try to influence the future unfolding of Christianity. Practical theology, then, studies the technical aspects of guiding the current church toward a purer expression of the essence of Christianity in the future.

The Statutes of 1838 not only give guidelines for advanced study, but above all set forth the major disciplines to be studied by future pastors. Enumerated in this connection are encyclopaedia and methodology of theology; introduction to the Old and New Testaments; biblical criticism and hermeneutics; history of the Old Testament with biblical archaeology; exegesis of the Old and New Testaments; church history and history of dogma; dogmatics, ethics, and symbolics; and practical theology.

The period of political and ecclesiastical reaction between the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 and the middle of the century had grave consequences for theological education. The result, as Max Lenz puts it, was that by the 1840s "to a growing degree... the Berlin theology withdrew from the totality of scientific life in the university" in favor of training shepherds of congregations devoted to edification in a traditionalistic sense. Corresponding to this development was the eclipse of the speculative philosophy of nature, which at the start had held together the humanities and the natural sciences. The eventual result would be the rise of positivism in the natural sciences, a positivism which seemed to condemn theology to life in isolation. The theological faculty, which had included not only Schleiermacher but also those of Hegelian persuasion, registered these pressures toward isolation. Particularly significant was the publication of David Friedrich Strauss's Life of Jesus in 1835, an event which the Hegelian Philipp Konrad Marheineke himself admitted was a blow from which Hegelian the-
ology could scarcely recover. Strauss’s conclusions seemed to confirm the inevitability of a narrowly ecclesiastical trend in theology. 48

Reaction and narrowness of focus resulted as well from pressure to limit academic freedom. This pressure, coming from both governmental and Neo-Pietist Junker circles, was a serious factor in the nineteenth-century “overcoming” of theological Enlightenment. Already in 1817 an honorary theological doctorate was conferred at Berlin on grounds of the candidate’s personal piety in the service of religious awakening. 49 In the unrest of 1819, W. M. L. De Wette was dismissed from Berlin (even as Bruno Bauer was to be transferred from Berlin to Bonn in 1839). 50 By 1822 Schleiermacher himself was in danger of dismissal on account of his opposition to censorship and the secret police (a danger averted by the responsible government minister). 51 In 1817 a Neo-Pietist seminary had been established by the government at Wittenberg; 52 this was, however, but the prelude. Neo-Pietist reaction continued to grow, especially with the increasing influence of the unstable crown prince Friedrich Wilhelm, who well before his accession in 1840 saw to it that anti-Enlightenment religion came into fashion. 53

Especially important here was Schleiermacher’s opponent Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg, an exegete who taught at Berlin from 1828 until his death in 1869. He is remembered not only for his political acumen and his bouts of depression but also for his success in seeing to it that only men of the properly ecclesiastical temper proceeded to habilitation. Particularly favored in the Prussian universities during this era were academic studies defending the Mosaic origin of Deuteronomy, the Johannine authenticity of the Fourth Gospel, and the historicity of the canonical accounts of Balaam’s ass and Joshua’s address to the sun. 54 Moreover, from 1852 on, the church officials regularly had something to say about new appointments to the theological faculty. 55

These developments challenged Schleiermacher’s idea of theological education. The political overcoming of theological Enlightenment doubtless contributed to the decline in the number of students of theology at Berlin from 641 in 1830 to 214 in 1847. 56 Yet the ideal set forth in the statutes under Schleiermacher’s general influence was not dead.

To begin with, the second half of the nineteenth century saw a gradual easing of pressure on the university. Metzger observes that this “more permissive attitude” was built into the Prussian Constitution of 1850, with its specification that “science and its teaching
shall be free." Indeed, by 1891 the American psychologist and educator G. Stanley Hall could proclaim, "The German University is to-day the freest spot on earth."57

Hall's claim ought not to be taken to mean that ecclesiastical and governmental pressures had ceased. Recurrent serious incidents affecting academic freedom illustrate how pressure continued—for example, the celebrated controversy about the Apostles' Creed.58 Harnack's difficulties with the ecclesiastics continued for much of his career. Though Harnack was selected by the Berlin faculty as its first choice,59 his appointment to Berlin was opposed by the ecclesiastical bureaucracy because of his views on the New Testament canon, miracles, and the dominical institution of baptism.60

The instances of ecclesiastical narrow-mindedness (or confessedional rigor, as one will) did not end with Harnack's call to Berlin after a session of the ministers presided over by Bismarck himself.61 Still, the second half of the century saw a less traditionalistic attitude in Berlin; so great was the change that, for example, a Neo-Pietist attempt to cast doubt on the Copernican cosmology aroused only ridicule.62 The closing years of the nineteenth century witnessed a rebirth of freedom in teaching and research. The research carried out under Harnack and the work at Berlin of the Hegelian Otto Pfleiderer (1839-1908) attest to this rebirth.63 Responsible for it was not only the fact that the government and its bureaucracy were now determined to promote solid theological scholarship, but also the willingness of the government to buy off the reactionaries by creating for them a Gegenprofessur in systematics filled by Adolf Schlatter (1852-1938) and then by Reinhold Seeberg (1859-1935).64

The climate at the end of the century allowed a certain return to the grand, universal ideal of theological education. As Max Lenz notes, the later nineteenth century was not lacking in efforts to use the concept of development as a way of reasserting the unity of natural and humane studies that had been shattered by the turn from speculative philosophy and by the emphasis on specialized research.65 Corresponding to this in theology was the growing importance of the school of Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889). His approach laid great stress on the historical character of revelation, and thus held it to be obligatory for the church to encourage rigorous scholarship.66

The embodiment of this vision of theological education was Adolf von Harnack. He and his pupils constituted a mighty reassertion in practice of an idea of theological education that took seriously a
universal concept of scientific research put at the service of the church.67 This fact can readily be forgotten if we concentrate only on Harnack’s repeated difficulties with the institutional church, or if we regard him simply as a product of influences from positivism, Kant (1724–1804), Goethe (1749–1832), and Ritschl. Though all these points are well taken, a close reading of Harnack shows that he advocated a reworking of the grand and universal idea of theological study put forward by Schleiermacher.

Fundamental here is Harnack’s universal concept of scientific investigation.68 The universality of his concept of *Wissenschaft* was perhaps best stated only a few months before his death in 1930, when he asserted that “natural science and the sciences of the spirit and culture should work together; neither may be pursued at the expense of the other, for both are equally required for the knowledge of the universe.”69 Harnack’s dependence on the classic Idealist concept of *Wissenschaft* and education can be seen in his simultaneous demands for connected pursuit of teaching and research and for what at the close of his career he termed a “universal philosophical overview.”70

Harnack’s reliance on what Ernst Troeltsch calls “the great idealistic-historical method,”71 with its insistence on the unitary character of the historical method, meant that church history acquired a key place in theology.72 This well-known reliance also furnished the presupposition for Harnack’s specific views on theological education, views that have attracted relatively little attention. An examination of Harnack’s ideas in this connection shows first that Schleiermacher (and the whole tradition of liberal Protestantism) was in Harnack’s mind when he wrote on this topic, and second that—even in the twentieth century—Harnack was determined to uphold the Berlin tradition of a unitary concept of *Wissenschaft* broad enough to encompass theology as a rigorous discipline put at the service of the church.

Evidence for these two points occurs in abundance if one examines writings stretching from the turn of the century to Harnack’s death in 1930, a time when consensus on theological education was becoming more difficult to achieve. As a result of the decay of consensus, Harnack found himself reasserting the tradition of Schleiermacher in the face of attacks from more than one front. It was in these years that Harnack felt called upon to stress the significance of Schleiermacher for the University of Berlin.73 In the same period, Harnack brought out the importance of Schleier-
macher's historical approach for theological study, reasserting that all investigation of church history must aim at “comprehending the essence of the Christian religion.” This task was carried out by all the great theologians; here Harnack named Ritschl, Origen, Augustine—and Schleiermacher.74

Harnack put forward his version of the implications of his unitary notion of *Wissenschaft* for theology as an ecclesiastical discipline in the course of at least three debates. The first took place in 1901 and concerned the relation of theology to comparative religion.75 The second occurred immediately after the close of the First World War and dealt with the place of theological education and the church in national life during the time of reorganization.76 The third took the shape of an argument with Harnack’s student Karl Barth (1886-1968), a debate symbolized by Harnack’s famous “Fünfzehn Fragen an die Verächter der wissenschaftlichen Theologie unter den Theologen” (“Fifteen Questions to Those Among the Theologians Who Are Contemptuous of the Scientific Theology”) of 1923.77

In an article written in 1901, Harnack argued against proposals for transforming theological faculties into agencies for the study of comparative religion, that is, faculties in which Christianity might not necessarily occupy the central place.78 In the same article, Harnack criticized ecclesiastical constraints on theological work, for they were contrary to his ideal of a truly scientific theology put at the service of the church.79 Throughout the article, Harnack presupposed a unitary method in scholarship leading to the “reine Erkenntnis des Objekts,” the pure knowledge of the object of investigation.80 Yet Harnack insisted that the exactness and honesty of the rigorous historical method is truly conservative in its “respect for the facts.”81 Furthermore, Harnack dared to suppose that the Protestant church actually wants professors and pastors who, in their “respect for the facts” driving them toward a pure knowledge of the object, can be trusted to use that knowledge for the good of the church.82

Central to the views in Harnack’s article of 1901 is the late-eighteenth-century concept of *Wissenschaft* as being “not completed doctrine, but research that is always to be subjected to investigation” so that *Wissenschaft* “is bound only to critically-ordered experience.”83 Such a concept of *Wissenschaft* could be expected to function for the benefit of the church only if it was held that Christianity rested on some factual source and experience capable of being investigated. In this connection Harnack could call on a tradition going back to Schleiermacher and the Pietists. For Harnack,
The University of Berlin

the "self-witness" of Jesus has produced "an inner fact [Tat­bestand]," an experience of salvation that—transmitted through the centuries—constitutes "an ongoing fact." The temporal results of this religion and its claim are the object of historical investigation, so that theological science can have the task of preserving the "purity" of this spiritual property in the effort to achieve "ever clearer knowledge" of its "historically recognizable traits." The similarity here to Schleiermacher's view is striking, for Schleier­macher had held that a philosophical theology based on historical theology could benefit the church leadership by helping to give "an authentic representation of the essence of Christianity" that could serve to identify "diseased deviations" in the Christian commu­nity" as a precondition for their removal.

Clearly Harnack's idea of theology and theological education in many ways represents a reworking of Schleiermacher's. For Har­nack, exegetical, historical, and systematic data are all to be inves­tigated by the unitary method of historical science; here he differs from certain of the theologians after Schleiermacher, some of whom had hoped to confine historical criticism to areas safely enough insulated to prevent damage to canonical and dogmatic material. Harnack could allow this freedom for ecclesiastical theol­ogy only because he (like Schleiermacher) was convinced that through such rigorous historical investigation the essence of Chris­tianity could be so liberated as to assist in the derivation of norms for the practical guidance of the church. Given this view, Harnack could on different occasions be equally emphatic in insisting that the Berlin faculty must train both scholars and pastors, for only the pastor with a rigorous theological training could be expected to be equal to the task of perceiving the appropriate norms for present and future practical leadership in the church. A steady supply of both academic and parish theologians was demanded by Harnack's view of how theological and religious life determined by the gospel must function.

The First World War and the ensuing collapse signified an end to institutional and theological presuppositions for many of Harnack's readers. Faced with an uncertain future, Harnack reasserted the Berlin tradition. In an article printed in the Preussische Jahrbücher for March of 1919, Harnack rejects the demand for abolition of the theo­logical faculties voiced after the World War. Harnack draws upon Schleiermacher's view of theological study in order to explain what he is now defending.

As Harnack saw matters in 1919, the "object" treated by theologi-
Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition

cal faculties is “the Christian religion.” Their “task” consists in investigating the Christian religion. Harnack repeats the familiar claim that theology is concerned with religion, in particular “with the greatest historical experience which humanity has undergone, with Jesus Christ and the effects that have proceeded from him.” It is this heritage which theological faculties are to protect and put into living effect in all areas of life—particularly by training pastors and teachers.

As for the work of the theological faculty in detail, for Harnack it pursues the investigation in historical sequence of Scripture, the Catholic church, and “Evangelical faith and Evangelical piety” in their connection with intellectual history for a double reason. It does this

not only in order to provide ever more scholarly light on them, but also in order to derive from this [knowledge] the right norms for the guidance of souls and the leadership of the church; for, like all sciences, the theological has a double goal—deepening of knowledge and equipping for practical action.

The possibility of such norm derivation in a theology conceived as historical scholarship is given in Harnack’s very concept of the humanities as Geisteswissenschaften, for according to Harnack they are, in contrast to the natural sciences, disciplines concerned with norms as well as with description and analysis.

In considering these matters, Harnack as it were points to the double task assigned by the theological statutes of the Berlin faculty. In so doing, he shows by his use of the concepts Seelenführung and Kirchenleitung that he stands in the tradition represented by Schleiermacher’s introduction to theology, with its stress on how theological scholarship can assist in the direction of souls and the leadership of the church.

Further, in good Schleiermacherian fashion, Harnack in his article of 1919 defends the retention of systematic and practical theology in the university against critics who called for their removal. In so doing he invokes Schleiermacher. For Harnack, the study of systematic theology is intended to show “how evangelical Christianity is to be presented and taught” and as well to help elaborate a Christian philosophy of religion. That Harnack is here restating and reworking parts of Schleiermacher’s outline of theological study is evident. Likewise Harnack’s defense of practical theology depends on Schleiermacher. For Harnack, practical theology must
provide the "history and theory of ecclesiastical functions" so as to furnish "norms for ecclesiastical activity." Understood in this way, practical theology is the "crown of the theological disciplines, and to eliminate it" would signify "the dissolution of theology." Here we find in Harnack an echo of Schleiermacher's claim that practical theology is the "crown of theological study" and a powerful restatement of Schleiermacher's insistence that theological skills and data, considered apart from their connection with guiding the church, cease to be theological and revert to that nontheological discipline to which their content pertains.

Harnack's general position on theological method and education was thus clearly marked off from several alternatives. Rejected in 1901 was the proposal to move toward turning Christian theological faculties into agencies for the study of comparative religion. Rejected in 1919 was the possibility of replacing theological faculties with denominational seminaries (or their functional equivalent, allowing the institutional church in practice to dictate to existing faculties the extent to which historical criticism could be applied and as well to pronounce on the fitness of candidates for university chairs). Indeed, in 1919 Harnack made plain his opposition to abolition of university theological faculties precisely because he feared the resultant influence of narrow ecclesiasticism on future clergy, who would be subjected to church-controlled training in the name of separation of church and state.

Harnack in 1919 already anticipated a widespread rebirth of theology in the strictly ecclesiastical sense as a discipline ultimately cut off from cultural life as a whole—that is, he anticipated the rise of what was to become the Dialectical Theology. He rejected it in 1919 with a clear call for taking "practical theology" in the broad Schleiermacherean sense rather than as a simple guide to preaching. At the same time, Harnack cautioned that the call for dissolving university theological faculties reflected a tendency that threatened to ruin a German Idealism rooted in the Reformation while depriving the state of any possibility of encouraging a fruitful cooperation of scientific education with religious education. For Harnack this threat raised the possibility of a clergy exercising popular influence of a one-sidedly ecclesiastical variety, for pastors trained only in church seminaries would be isolated from the movement of culture as a whole.

Yet, to reiterate, these points do not mean that Harnack wished to reduce pastoral activity and personal piety to historical scholar-
ship. Rather is it the case that both of the former can flow from it readily, for Harnack believed that “in the Christian religion a major item is the knowledge of God as the Absolute Spirit.” Since, according to Harnack, “religion is a determination of feeling and willing, grounded in inner and historical experiences;” and “all history is Geistesgeschichte;” therefore: “You are yourself everything that has happened . . . in history, and it only depends of your appropriating it with consciousness.” In short, Harnack finds God in inner experience within time and in the historical records that give us access to such experiences. For him, the only meaning of the Christian religion is “eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes of God.” Quite correctly has Peter Berger argued that, in the Harnackian continuation of Schleiermacher, systematic theology became “a primarily historical discipline,” one which—taking its cue from Schleiermacher—“traced back” religion by means of “historical and phenomenological operations” to the original, the “core experience of God” with which each tradition began.

For Harnack, canonical texts are not protected from critical inquiry; there can be ultimately for all branches of study “only one scientific method” and “only one scientific task—the pure knowledge” of the object. Indeed, as Harnack came to hold during the debate with Barth, “the task of theology is one with the tasks of science in general.” All this can be accepted readily because, for Harnack, a witness to Christ proceeds directly from an investigation of how eternal life has been made manifest in the midst of time.

Harnack’s idea of theological education thus restates Schleiermacher’s ideal of the unity of scholarly theology and training for ministry in such a way that the work of the historian (and of the pastor as historical theologian) gives a highly significant answer to the issue of Christian speech about God. Indeed, it would not be amiss to follow G. Wayne Glick here and to observe that, for Harnack, the ultimate human duty is to overcome the world by knowing God—a duty that can be fulfilled only by “knowing history” so as to overcome it. The vocation of the historian begins to merge with the calling of the believer.

This approach was to be repudiated by one of Harnack’s pupils, Karl Barth. Barth would identify the task of theology with the task of preaching in such a way as to reduce historical work to the status of a mere auxiliary discipline serving the needs of exegesis,
dogmatics, and practical theology.\textsuperscript{117} Barth's demotion was a logical one for him, since he denied that "so-called church history" gave any independent answer to the question of Christian speech about God. In this denial Barth was not at all far removed from the view of Harnack's critic Franz Overbeck (1837-1905), who warned that the study of church history was the best school for learning to doubt the existence of a God.\textsuperscript{118}

Moreover, though Barth did hold that theology was a \textit{Wissenschaft}, the early Barth insisted so strongly on the way theology is determined by the special character of its object that this theological \textit{Wissenschaft} threatened to move into total isolation from all other forms of \textit{Wissenschaft}. In the controversy with Barth, Harnack sharply warned that "each age possesses only one science," that Barth wished to "transform the theological professor's chair into a pulpit," and that the contempt for reason and science represented by Barth's method threatened to deliver the church over to "occultism" and "revival preachers, who freely create their understanding of the Bible and who set up their own dominance."\textsuperscript{119} While Harnack's fears were certainly exaggerated, Barth himself wrote that by calling theology a \textit{Wissenschaft} he intended to make a "protest" against the "confessedly 'pagan' general concept of \textit{Wissenschaft}."\textsuperscript{120} Here—despite Barth's great debt to Harnack—was a negative judgment on the theological method taught at Berlin and a denial of the validity of Harnack's effort at using a unitary concept of \textit{Wissenschaft} in theology.\textsuperscript{121}

Another of Harnack's students judged the teacher's historical approach more positively than Barth's premises would seem to allow. In 1930 the twenty-four-year-old Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) spoke to those who mourned Harnack's passing. He said:

\begin{quote}
At this moment, thousands of young theologians look back with me at their great teacher. . . . We saw in him the champion of the free expression of a truth once recognised, who formed his free judgment afresh time and time again, and went on to express it clearly despite the fear-ridden restraint of the majority. . . . But Adolf von Harnack—and for us this was the most important thing—was a theologian, a conscious theologian, and we believed that this was the only standpoint from which it was possible to understand him completely. Therefore it should be stated clearly once again in this context too. He was a theologian. That does not mean in the first place that he wrote a \textit{History of Dogma}. Theology means speaking of God.
\end{quote}

169
The work of any theologian is never concerned with anything less. In Harnack, the theologian we saw contained the unity of the world of his spirit; here truth and freedom found their true connection without becoming arbitrariness... He thought that in the holy spirit of Christianity the spirit of every age found its destiny, and that the message of God the Father and the human child had eternal validity and therefore validity for us also.122

In these words Bonhoeffer pays tribute to the enduring importance of the idea of theological education at Berlin.

NOTES


2. Harnack, RuA 6:7–8, following the trans. in Glick, Reality of Christianity, 97–98; see also ibid., 60, 108. Italics in original text removed by me.


5. Schleiermacher, KD (1830), §§ 24, 27, 32, 34, 35–37, 65. For an English version (not used in the preparation of this chapter unless so noted), see Schleiermacher, Brief Outline on the Study of Theology, trans. T. N. Tice (Rich­mond, 1970).


7. Ibid., 227, 268, 267.

8. Ibid., 267–68.

9. Ibid., 268–70; cf. Sundberg, "Development of Dogma," 73–77; also Pannen­berg, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie, 379, citing T. Rendtorff, Theorie des Christentums (1972), 41ff. The same distinctive refusal to separate theology from the development of modern culture characterized the work of Paul Tillich (1886–1965), who taught at Berlin from 1918 to 1924.

10. For the background in Semler (1725–1791), see H.-E. Hess, "Theologie
The University of Berlin


15. Lenz, 1:125; Schleiermacher, *Gelegentliche Gedanken*.


20. Ibid., 373.


23. For all this see ibid.


25. Schleiermacher, *Gelegentliche Gedanken*, 80, 78; see also Nipperdey, "Die Idee von der wahren, zweckfreien Wissenschaft."
31. Hofstadter and Metzger, 385.
32. Ibid., 386–87.
41. Schleiermacher, *KD* (1830), § 27; cf. § 24. See also Harnack, RuA 4:61, on church history as a means of illuminating the essence of Christianity.
46. Lenz, 2/2:112.
49. Bigler, Politics, 130.
50. Ibid., 44, 178.
51. Ibid., 161.
52. Ibid., 65.
53. Ibid., 137-38; ODCC (1958 ed.), 621.
54. Bigler, Politics, 92; Lenz, 2/2:280f. and n. 2; 379.
55. Ibid., "Das erste Jahrhundert," 493.
56. Bigler, Politics, 122. Halle had a larger enrollment of theological students than did Berlin. For figures, see F. Eulenburg, Die Frequenz der deutschen Universitäten, ASGW.PH 24/2 (Leipzig, 1904).
57. Hofstadter and Metzger, Development of Academic Freedom, 385, 392.
59. AZH1, 156.
60. Ibid., 161. Since 1855 the Evangelischer Oberkirchenrat had been entitled to lodge such objections. Here Harnack's chief opponent was the court pastor Rudolf Kögel (1829-1896). Kögel had formerly been secretary to the Pietist Halle theologian F. A. G. Tholuck (1799-1877), a man noteworthy for his mental instability, his opposition to the ideas of Semler, Herder, and Humboldt, and his grammatical errors in exegesis. See AZH1, 158; Stephan, "Kögel," RGG1 3: cols. 1550f.; Bigler, Politics, 87; Lenz, 2/1:324; W. Schrader, Geschichte der Friedrichs-Universität zu Halle (Berlin, 1894).
64. Zscharnack, "Das erste Jahrhundert," 496.
65. Lenz, 2/2:377.
67. See Glick, Reality of Christianity, 62, 211.
68. See Ernst Troeltsch in W. Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch (New York, 1968), 97; Pannenberg, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie, 377, n. 704; also nn. 69-70 below; Harnack, RuA 8:177-80; Glick, Reality of Christianity, 87-93. For the general relation of Harnack's view of religion to Schleiermacher's, see P. L. Berger, The Heretical Imperative (Garden City, N.Y., 1980), 116-28, and n. 41 above. See also Harnack, RuA 4:56. For background, see the useful but inadequate study by H. Wagenhammer, Das Wesen des Christentums, Tübinger Theologische Studien 2 (Mainz, 1973).
70. For Harnack's requirement of Forschung und Lehre and a universale philosophische Zusammenschau, see ibid., 142-44.
71. See Troeltsch in Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, 99.
173
Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition

72. Ibid., 36 and n. 58, 97, 102; Harnack, RuA 2:165f.

73. See the references to Schleiermacher in the volumes of Harnack, RuA; e.g., "Die Aufgabe der theologischen Fakultäten und die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte. Nebst einem Nachwort," RuA 2:159–87, esp. 161, 163, 170, 177; the standpoint of this article should be compared with that of Schleiermacher, KD (1830), §§ 79–80; "Die Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften," RuA 2:205–6; "Die Bedeutung der theologischen Fakultäten," RuA 8:113–31, esp. 117, 127 = RuA 6:199–217. I realize that in the present chapter one-sided emphasis is given to the significance of Schleiermacher for Harnack. A larger study would need to take account of how Harnack came to terms with the entire Protestant heritage from the nineteenth century and would have to give due place to Humboldt and others in the shaping of the ideal of Wissenschaft.


76. See n. 73 above, citing "Die Bedeutung" (Harnack, RuA 6:199–217 = RuA 8:113–31). Attacks on the status of university theological faculties were nothing new. At the time of Schleiermacher, the French in Napoleonic Germany suggested that faculties of Christian theology be abolished, though this suggestion was not made everywhere and was certainly not carried out. For the nature of the proposals, see J. Stroup, The Struggle for Identity in the Clerical Estate, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 33 (Leiden, 1984), Appendix 1. On Harnack's opposition to the demand of 1919 for abolishing theological faculties, see his RuA 6:208–9, 199, 205–6.

77. Harnack, RuA 8:132–4 (English title after K. R. Crim; see n. 112 below).

78. Harnack, RuA 2: 180; see also Pannenberg, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie, 362–63, for the situation around 1901.

79. Harnack, RuA 2:175.
80. Ibid., 166, 176, 180.
81. Ibid., 166.
82. Ibid., 176.
83. Ibid., 174f.
84. Ibid., 173.
85. Ibid., 174.
86. Schleiermacher, KD (1830), § 40; cf. § 65. The translation here is that of Tice (n. 5 above), 31–32. See also KD (1830), § 258, for an effort to require "ecclesial interest" and "scientific spirit" for those engaging in practical theology (Tice, 81).
87. Cf. P. Meinhold, Geschichte der kirchlichen Historiographie, OA 3/5 174
The University of Berlin

(Freiburg, 1967); 2:278; Harnack, RuA 2:165: "Eine besondere Methode, aber, nach welcher die christliche Religion zu studieren ist im Unterschied von den anderen, kennen wir nicht."

88. See, e.g., Harnack, RuA 2:174-76, as well as many other passages. On axiology in Harnack's work, see Glick, Reality of Christianity, 161-76. See also K. H. Neufeld, Adolf von Harnack: Theologie als Suche nach der Kirche, KKTS 41 (Paderborn, 1977), 22: "Harnacks Grundliebe ist die Kirche, nicht nur in ihren geschichtlichen Gestalten, sondern in erster Linie als Aufgabe der eigenen Zeit."

90. Ibid., 8:127.
91. Ibid., 121-22.
92. Ibid., 122.
93. Ibid., 130.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., 122.
96. Ibid., 124-25.
97. Ibid., 6:208, 211, 213. For the slightly different terminology for these ideas in Schleiermacher, see KD (1811), 7-8, §§ 28-30; KD (1830), §§ 25-26 (Kirchenleitung), § 263 (Seelenleitung); KD (1811), 81, § 21; KD (1830), § 6. The echoes of these secs. of KD in Harnack deserve attention; see Harnack, RuA 6:208-13; cf. Glick, Reality of Christianity, 7, 29, 43, 71, 74, 77, 79, 116, 126, 130, 164, 176, 207, 291-93, 332, 343; Harnack, HD 7:272; RuA 4:159; RuA 2:177.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid., terming practical theology the "Krone der theologischen Disziplinen." Cf. Schleiermacher, KD (1811), 8, § 31: "Die praktische Theologie ist die Krone des theologischen Studiums."
103. Ibid., 8:127. = 6:213.
104. Ibid., 130. = 6:216-17.
105. Ibid., 119f. = 6:205-6.
106. Ibid., 4:55.
107. Ibid., 56.
111. Berger, 120, 121, 123, 125-26. For Hegelianism and Harnack, see Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, 97ff.
112. Harnack in K. Barth, Theologische Fragen und Antworten (Zollikon, 1957), 31. Here in the main I follow the translation of K. R. Crim in J. M. 175
Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition

Robinson, ed., The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology (Richmond, 1968), 186, rather than that in Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, 53. See also Glick, Reality of Christianity, 223–25.

113. Harnack in Barth, Fragen, 14, following the translation of Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, 36, and Crim and Robinson, Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, 171.

114. Additional investigation might suggest that Harnack’s differences with Barth are in some ways linked to differences in the conception of what is historically significant and factual in the events and experiences connected with Jesus Christ. It would be interesting to inquire whether and how such differences could be related to differing positions on the strategy to be adopted so as to guard against the corrosive effects of historical criticism and relativism. Worthy of attention in this connection is Harnack, Die Entstehung der christlichen Theologie und des kirchlichen Dogmas. Sechs Vorlesungen (Gotha, 1927; reprint, Darmstadt, 1967 = Libelli 239).

115. Glick, Reality of Christianity, esp. 10, 312; Harnack in AZH²; 130–31. See also Glick, Reality of Christianity, 209 and 101.


117. Barth, Fragen, 10; idem, Kirchliche Dogmatik (Zürich, 1947), 1/1: 3. See also Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, 188ff.

118. On Barth, see n. 117 above; F. Overbeck, Christentum und Kultur, (Basel, 1919), 265–66. See also H. Schindler, Barth und Overbeck (Gotha, 1936).

119. Harnack to Barth, trans. K. R. Crim in Crim and Robinson, Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, 1:171, 174 = Harnack in Barth, Fragen, 13–17; also Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, 35–39; see also the comments of Jaroslav Pelikan in Glick, Reality of Christianity, xiii; see also Pannenberg’s account of the controversy between H. Scholz and Barth in 1930–1936 in Pannenberg, Wissenschaftstheologie und Theologie, 273 (citing Scholz in ZZ 9 [1931]:48).

120. Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik 1/1:9.
