RICE UNIVERSITY

Latino Descriptive Representation in Municipal Government:
An Analysis of Latino Mayors

by

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ABSTRACT

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Various questions regarding Latinos’ descriptive representation in the mayoralty are examined in this dissertation including: Where and why are Latino mayors elected? Why do Latino mayoral candidates emerge and win? And, is there a link between Latino ethnicity and electoral outcomes in municipal elections?

The empirical results of a cross-sectional analysis of U.S. cities from 1981-2006 suggest that institutions such as term limits and mayor-council governments influence the representation of Latinos in the mayoralty. These effects, however, are conditioned by Latinos’ numerical strength in a city – which suggests that Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty is largely a function of population size. Despite the prominence of this factor, the results further reveal that Latinos need to swell the ranks of the city council to provide a steady supply of qualified Latino candidates to ultimately win the mayoralty.

An analysis of 648 mayoral elections in 113 cities in the Southwest further tests theories of Latino candidate emergence and success based on city-level factors – that supply elections with Latino candidates – as well as strategic factors in elections – that influence Latino candidates’ cost-benefit decision calculus. The results reveal a combined effect of supply and strategy on candidate emergence and success. For example, in cities where Latinos are sizeable (+40 percent) and the electoral context is more competitive
(i.e., where turnout is high, more candidates are on the ballot, and when incumbents are not vying for reelection), Latino candidates are more likely to emerge. A similar pattern occurs with regard to the success of Latino candidates except that the individual candidate’s previous political experience is particularly influential in improving their chances of winning.

Given the theoretical expectation regarding the impact of ethnicity on electoral outcomes in municipal elections, I also examine whether Latino ethnicity shapes turnout rates and the margin of victory. Latino ethnicity is not statistically associated with these outcomes. However, other factors such as the election timing and the type of election (i.e., runoff election, open seat) seem to be more influential. In sum, the research here examines various aspects of Latino representation in the mayoralty that is the most comprehensive to date.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I dedicate this dissertation to all of my mentors. I’m extremely fortunate that they believed in me no matter what.

I’d like to first thank St. Mary’s University for exposing me to a culture of academic excellence and service to society. Had it not been for the educational venture there, I would have never imagined dedicating my life to scholarship.

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If it were not for my excellent mentors at Rice University, an academic career in political science would be impossible.

I am eternally indebted to my dissertation advisor, Dr. Melissa Marschall, for demanding excellence in every sense of the word. Throughout my entire experience at Rice she provided invaluable lessons in how to be a better colleague, scholar, and professor. I am very fortunate to have a mentor that invested so much time and energy to give me the right tools to succeed. I’m lucky that she believed in me even when I didn’t. Her confidence in me has helped me more than she will ever know.

Dr. Keith Hamm has always been a source of wisdom helping me to navigate the treacherous waters of academia. I’m grateful that he shared many wonderful stories about teaching, networking, and scholarship. The academic rigor in his seminars has paid dividends in so many ways.

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Two colleagues in the profession that cannot be overlooked and have been instrumental in my academic career are Sylvia Manzano and Francisco Pedraza. Sylvia has been looking out for me even before I started graduate school. So, I can say that she’s the best big sister I never had. I can’t thank her enough all the sage advice on everything from the personal to the professional. Lending an ear was often all I needed to keep at it. Francisco is like my brother from another mother. I am grateful that he always took time from his busy schedule to show me the ropes.

To all the undergraduates I had the privilege to teach: I enjoyed every moment of every class. Thanks for reminding me why I started this journey in the first place.

Mis queridos padres, Carlos y Claudia Cuellar; mis divinos hermanos, Cassandra, Pedro Pablo, y Sofía María; y mis abuelos, René y Aminda Cuellar y Gustavo y Magdalena Elizondo: Gracias por todas sus bendiciones. Los quiero y los admiro muchísimo.

To Our Lady of Guadalupe: Thank you for never failing to give me strength and protection throughout my career at Rice.
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Chapter 1

A Voice at the Top: The Case for Examining Latino Descriptive Representation in the Mayoralty

Racial and ethnic minority political incorporation in government has been examined by scholars since the late 1960s. These studies have sought to explain how and why minorities have gained influence in the decision-making process following the civil rights struggles that ensued during the early part of that decade (see Browning, Marschall, and Tabb 1984). Contemporary research has continued to investigate the extent to which racial and ethnic groups are represented in Congress, state legislatures, city councils, school boards, and various bureaucratic agencies. Although this research primarily focuses on examining African American representation in government (see Marschall 2010), many studies do analyze Latino representation (see Lublin 1997b; Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010; Casellas 2009; Casellas 2011). Despite the contribution of this research, no systematic study of Latino mayors exists to date. Additionally, there is no research that examines why Latino mayoral candidates emerge and why they win. This dissertation fills these gaps in the scholarly literature by using data on Latino mayors in the U.S. as well as an unprecedented original dataset on a large sample of mayoral elections in 113 cities in the Southwest.

However, before I delve into describing this unique data and methodology used to answer various unexplored questions about Latinos’ representation in the mayoralty, in this chapter I will introduce the subject of my study by: 1) describing various population characteristics of Latinos in the United States 2) presenting recent developments in

1 Although the concept of political incorporation defined by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984), is very specific as to whether and how racial and ethnic groups are included in policymaking (i.e., candidate
American politics that make Latino Politics a relevant area of study 3) explaining what descriptive representation is and why previous research indicates that it can help improve the status of racial and ethnic groups 4) reviewing the literature on Latino representation and 5) outlining the plan of the dissertation and the components of each chapter.

**Latinos & American Politics**

Latinos (or Hispanics²) in the United States are individuals of any race that identify with Spanish-speaking countries through ancestry or birth. These are individuals living in the United States that are either U.S.-born or foreign-born; native-Spanish speakers or native-English speakers; dark-skinned or light-skinned; working-class or wealthy – and everything in-between. Hispanics do not always identify with the pan-ethnic terms: Hispanic or Latino. In fact, some strongly identify with the national origin of their ancestry such as, Mexican, Honduran, Cuban – or some hyphenated variant (i.e., Mexican-American, Cuban-American, etc.). Despite the ongoing academic debate about whether and why Hispanics identify with the pan-ethnicity (see Garcia and Sanchez 2008, Sanchez 2006a, Sanchez 2006b, Sanchez and Matsuoka 2010), Hispanics share many commonalities such as cultural traditions (language, food, customs, religiosity, etc), various demographic characteristics (income, education, wealth, occupation, discrimination based on language and ancestry), and in some cases historical experiences of disenfranchisement (Garcia 2003; Garcia and Sanchez 2008, Barreto et al. 2009).

The perception of shared cultural experiences among Hispanics has influenced how religious, economic, and political institutions have identified and interacted with this

---

² The terms, Hispanic and Latino, are often used interchangeably by scholars in the discipline of political science to identify people of Spanish-speaking heritage.
ethnic group through laws, practices, policies, and advertisements. These interactions, both past and present, create a strong argument for why Latinos are a politically identifiable group. For example, Garcia-Bedolla (2009) points to how Latinos have been placed into the racial and ethnic hierarchy of society throughout U.S. history. The categorization and essentially the “racialization” of Latinos have historically impacted their “social, political, and economic opportunities” (Garcia-Bedolla, 2009, 4).

Since the civil rights and Chicano movements of the 1950s & 60s, racial and ethnic minorities have become protected under the law to not only do away with these exclusionary practices, but also to prevent future discriminatory laws from being implemented by the U.S. government. In fact, to ensure that social, economic, and political opportunities are distributed as equitably as possible, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as well as the U.S. Census Bureau enumerates individuals from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. According to the OMB it gathers racial and ethnic data to “enforce requirements of the Voting Rights Act, review state redistricting plans, evaluate federal affirmative action plans, monitor the access to minorities of home mortgage loans, and assist minority-owned businesses” (OMB 1994).

Additionally, Latinos are increasingly becoming part of the political discourse taking place in contemporary American society. For example, in presidential politics, Latinos are non-trivial proportion of the population in key swing states such as, Colorado, Nevada, Florida and Arizona. Given that Latinos are continuously being courted by both Republicans and Democrats – they can potentially help deliver victories in those states and determine the winner in the upcoming presidential election (Scherer and Dias 2012). Tied to this courtship, are the political parties’ stances on the issue of immigration.
Barreto et al. (2009) describe estimates of the 2006 immigration protests containing between 3.5 to 5.1 million Latinos protesting congressional legislation that would increase the penalties for undocumented immigrants. Barreto et al. (2008) demonstrate why such a law was a call to action:

“A key provision of the House bill made any organization or person liable for criminal penalties and up to 5 years in prison for knowingly assisting any undocumented immigrant “to reside in or remain” in the United States. Not only would educators and health care workers be affected but so too would priests and pastors, family and friends, and anyone providing aid of any kind (Barreto et al. 2008, 747).”

These types of laws have passed in state legislatures in Arizona, Alabama, Oklahoma, Utah, Indiana, South Carolina, and Georgia – and are being pursued in Alaska, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (Budoff Brown 2010; Gordon and Raja 2012). In fact, Brown (2010) explains that of the 37 gubernatorial elections, candidates in 20 states, have endorsed anti-immigration laws that restrict public resources in schooling, housing, and healthcare to immigrants. However, there are states that have passed legislation that permit undocumented students to qualify for in-state tuition (Gordon and Raja 2012).

Additionally, Latinos are receiving increased attention in political campaigns by both major political parties via Spanish-language advertisements during congressional and presidential elections (Hero, Garcia, Garcia, and Pachon 2000; Segal 2004;
Connaughton and Jarvis 2006; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006). This courtship is a response to the increased Latino population in key demographic regions of the country that can determine whether one party gains (or loses) power. Given this attention, Latinos’ opinion about other issues in political campaigns besides immigration (e.g., the economy, foreign policy, taxes, and education) will continue to play a role in contemporary American politics.

In summary, the current policy debates over immigration as well as the areas of the country with substantial Latino populations that are located in swing states suggest that Latinos are becoming incorporated into the political system as voters. However, in this dissertation, I will investigate a complimentary and perhaps more significant aspect of political incorporation that involves gaining access to political power through office holding in decision-making making bodies.

**Latino Population Characteristics**

To be more specific about how much the Latino population has helped to change the demographic composition of the country – which contributes to their increased role in politics – a U.S. Census Bureau report released in May 2011 shows that there are 50.5 million U.S. residents that self identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish of any race. That is, 16 percent of the 308.7 million people in the United States are Latinos that have some immediate or ancestral connection to Spanish-speaking countries, such as Mexico, Puerto Rico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic and Honduras (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011). What is particularly fascinating about the Latino population in the United States is that it grew by 43 percent since the year 2000. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that
over half of the overall population growth in the previous decade (2000-2010) is specifically attributed to the growth of the Hispanic population (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011, 2; Fry 2008). The speculation as to why the Hispanic population grew so much over the past decade can be summarized into one word: immigration. However, Fry (2008) points out that international migration from Latin America only accounts for a small proportion of the more recent growth patterns among the Hispanic population. Instead, the fact that Latinos, who are currently living in the U.S., are very young; and that contributes to the high fertility rates and low mortality rates that fuel the overall population growth. That said, Hispanic population growth during the decade between 1990 and the year 2000 was primarily due to international migration (Fry 2008).

In addition to the Hispanic population growth that has occurred over the past decade, Hispanic populations tend to be concentrated in certain parts of the country. Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert’s (2011) analysis of Census data find that nearly 77 percent of Hispanics are concentrated in two regions defined by the U.S. Census: the West\(^3\) and the South\(^4\). As for differences in terms of population growth over the past decade, the authors find that states in the South (which includes Texas) experienced a larger proportion of Hispanic growth rates compared to the West. Specifically, all states in the South experienced a 57 percent increase in the number of Hispanics; and the Hispanic population in the West grew by 34 percent (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011, 4-5). These growth rates suggest that new Hispanic settlement patterns are

\(^3\) The U.S. Census bureau includes the following states in this category: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

\(^4\) The U.S. Census bureau includes the following states in this category: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
developing outside of traditional destinations in California, Arizona, and New Mexico to include states such as Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee. In fact, Fry (2008) explains that this trend of population growth outside of traditional destinations began to occur in the 1990s.

Figure 1.1 shows that Hispanics continue to be concentrated in California, Texas, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico. If Texas is considered part of the Southwest, then 54 percent of all Hispanics in the U.S. currently reside in this region (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011, 5-7). Other states with sizeable Hispanic populations include: Florida, New York, Illinois, and New Jersey. In addition to differences in terms of sheer numbers, Figure 1.1 shows that there are several states that have sizeable proportions of Hispanics. For example, New Mexico, Texas, California, and Arizona have Hispanic populations that are nearly over 30 percent of the entire state’s population. States such as Colorado and Nevada have limited population sizes compared to states like New York and Texas, but the proportion of Hispanics in Nevada and Colorado is 26.5 and 20.7 percent, respectively. This non-trivial proportion of the states’ population is also seen in Florida (23%), New York (18%), New Jersey (18%), and Connecticut (13%).

In terms of the national-origin group that dominates the Hispanic population in these states (and regions), we find variation. Figure 1 shows the dominance of Mexican-origin Hispanic populations in the West, Midwest, and the South – except in Florida, which is dominated by Cuban-origin Hispanics. In the Northeast, including Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, the Hispanic population is primarily of Puerto Rican descent. The only state in that region that has a significant
proportion of Hispanics that is not dominated by Puerto Rican-origin Hispanics is Rhode Island, where 12.5 percent of the Hispanic population is predominantly of Dominican-origin.

Figure 1.1 Hispanic Population in the United States (2010)

Circles represent the total Hispanic population in each state
% = Percent Hispanic Population
Source: Ennis, Rios-Vargas, & Albert (2011)

To further investigate where most of the Hispanic population resides within those states, the 2005-2009 American Community Survey Population Estimates described in Table 1.1, show the 20 largest cities by Hispanic voting-age population. New York, Los Angeles, Houston, San Antonio, and Chicago are the five cities with the largest population of voting-age Hispanics in the United States. The proportion of Hispanics in those cities ranges from 24-43 percent of all persons over the age of 18. With the exception of the New York, Chicago, Hialeah and Miami, 80 percent of the largest Hispanic populated cities are located in the Southwestern region of the country. Fry
(2008) indicates that 18 of the 25 counties with the largest Hispanic population growth from 2000-2007 are located in the Southwest United States (Fry 2008, 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Hispanic VAP</th>
<th>Pct. Hisp. VAP</th>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>1,630,010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>1,236,328</td>
<td>43%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>594,185</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>552,098</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>516,726</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>392,525</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>345,561</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>El Paso</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>323,357</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>235,158</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>231,529</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>198,316</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<td>Austin</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>176,856</td>
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<td>Santa Ana</td>
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<td>169,265</td>
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<td>166,279</td>
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<td>Albuquerque</td>
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<td>158,692</td>
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<td>Fresno</td>
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<td>128,170</td>
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<td>Denver</td>
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<td>Laredo</td>
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<td>Southwest</td>
<td>126,224</td>
<td>93%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,591,759</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2005-2009 Estimates

In the South, 4 of the 25 counties with the largest Hispanic population growth in terms of the number of Hispanics are in the state of Florida. The only county outside of Florida, located in the Southern region, with the largest Hispanic population growth is Gwinnett County – where the Hispanic population grew by nearly 67,986. The growth of Hispanics as a proportion (rather than sheer numbers) is primarily seen in the Southern region. Counties in states like Virginia and Georgia experienced over 300 percent Hispanic
population growth from 2000-2007. Although the Hispanic population is around 5,000 – it grew exponentially over the past decade or so in counties such as Frederick County, Virginia, and Paulding County, Georgia (see Fry 2008, 7). Overall, these findings indicate that most of the Hispanic population growth takes place in Southwestern (in terms of sheer numbers) states and in the South (in terms of proportion).

Because this dissertation investigates the representation of Latinos in municipal government, it is important to understand where Latino populations are most likely to be politically incorporated. The section above suggests that although the Latino population is growing in non-traditional immigrant destinations such as in Louisiana and North Carolina, a majority of Latinos are located in the Southwest region that includes states such as California, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. The question remains, however, whether Latino political representation is proportionate to their voting strength. As I will point to in the following chapter, an analysis of Latino mayoral representation does not exist and therefore, this question has not been answered. Given this void in the literature, in the following section I define the major concept of interest that is to be investigated in this dissertation: descriptive representation. Additionally, I will not only describe what the previous literature finds about this concept, but point to how descriptive representation in the city mayoralty plays such an important role in advancing the political incorporation of Latinos.

**Descriptive Representation & It’s Consequences**

The changing demographic composition of the United States is partly responsible the scholarship on how racial and ethnic minorities fit into in the political system – which
focus racial/ethnic minorities’ interactions with government (e.g., voting behavior and public opinion) and how national, state, and local governments are responding to these groups via immigration, healthcare, and education policies – to name a few (Espino et al. 2007; Barreto et al. 2009; Preuhs 2007; Rocha & Espino 2009; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000). Recent research in racial and ethnic politics also concentrates on exploring the representation of African Americans and Latinos in government (Leal et al. 2004; Casellas 2009; Preuhs and Hero 2009; Rocha and Hawes 2009; Spence and McClerking 2010; Scherer and Curry 2010). The representation of racial and ethnic minority groups by those who share their racial/ethnic traits (descriptive representation) has been argued as an effective mechanism to have minority group interests represented in the policymaking process (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1999).

Specifically, Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representation facilitates the communication of interests, needs, and preferences between racial/ethnic minority constituents and their coethnic representatives. Historical exclusion from the decision making process as well as social discrimination experienced by racial and ethnic minority groups may preclude minorities from fully trusting (or relying on) non-minority representatives – which can impede their needs and preferences from being voiced in deliberative bodies.

Additionally, the very experience that coethnic representatives have of being a member of a racial/ethnic minority group may allow them to understand and advocate for the interests without being lobbied by their coethnic constituents. Since constituents are not always aware of the issues and policies being discussed in government, having a coethnic representative arguably helps to have a friendly voice in the decision making
process. Descriptive representation may also allow for interests, concerns, and needs to be voiced within government more effectively because issues salient to racial minorities may have been previously neglected or misunderstood (Mansbridge 1999). Thus, many scholars agree that descriptive representation — although not a perfect means of representation — can be one effective method for incorporating racial and ethnic minorities into the political process (Pitkin 1967; Phillips 1998; Mansbridge 1999).

Scholars have examined how descriptive representation influences political attitudes and behavior (Canon 1999; Tate 2003; Whitby 1997; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Marschall and Shah 2007; Barreto 2007; Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005). In particular, work by Abney and Hutcheson (1981) and Howell and Fagan (1988) suggests that the election of African American mayors (in Atlanta and New Orleans, respectively) is associated with higher levels of trust in government. Bobo and Gilliam (1990) find that blacks residing in black-empowered cities exhibit higher levels of political trust, efficacy, and knowledge. Additionally, descriptively represented African American residents were statistically more likely to participate in political elections than African Americans living in cities with no coethnic representation.\(^5\) Marschall and Shah (2007) explore whether representation impacts trust in local government and in local police (in varying social, demographic, and institutional contexts). Their results point to the importance of descriptive representation on the police force and substantive policies that serve the needs of the minority community as positively associated with blacks’ trust in local police.

\(^5\) More recent evidence on race-based participation rates suggest that minority representation may yield asymmetric effects on political behavior, “both engaging (some black) and disengaging (many white) constituents in the electoral process” (Gay 2001, 600).
Other work has found a positive association between minorities in local elective offices and minority public sector employment (Mladenka 1989; Browning Marschall, and Tabb 1984; Eisinger 1982; Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989), the distribution of government expenditures (Karnig and Welch 1980), and a variety of policies and reforms thought to be beneficial to minority residents (Browning et al. 1984). This research suggests that black mayors positively influence black representation in city administrative and professional positions (Mladenka 1989; Eisinger 1982). For Hispanics the effect of representation in city government is stronger for employment in administrative, professional, and protective services jobs (Mladenka 1989; Dye and Renick 1981). Black mayors also tend to promote public sector contracting with minority businesses (MacManus 1990; Nelson 1987; Browning et al. 1984) and policing policies that are responsive to the needs of minority communities, such as minority hiring policies and police review boards (Saltzstein 1989).

Another stream of research inquires about whether descriptive representation produces policy outputs favorable to the group they represent. For example, representation has been found to play an important role in improving the quality, effectiveness, and equality of school outcomes, particularly for minority students. For example, descriptive representation in schools (teachers and principals) reduces grouping and placing minority students in programs that label them as inferior to other students\(^6\) (Meier and England 1984; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990). Student performance on tests has also been linked to black and Hispanic representation in teacher faculty and

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\(^6\) These policies and practices refer to the overrepresentation of minority students in certain types of classes or outcomes (bilingual and special education classes; dropout, suspensions) and their underrepresentation in other classes or outcomes (gifted/talented and advanced placement classes; graduation, college, or vocational school attendance).
school administration (Meier 1993; Meier and Stewart Jr. 1991a; see also Meier, Winkle, and Polinard 1999; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Meier 1995). Other studies focusing on descriptive representation in a bureaucracy suggest that having females teachers is associated with improved standardized test scores among female students (Keiser et al. 2002). Also, increased representation of females on the police force is associated with more females willing to report sexual assault crimes and more arrests made related to that type of crime (Meier & Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Rocha and Wrinkle (2011) also show that increased representation of female Hispanic school board members is a critical determinant of increased expenditures on bilingual education in school districts.

In addition to the empirical research describing the effects of descriptive representation, it is most poignant to examine Hispanic candidates’ reflections about the importance of descriptive representation. For example, in Políticas, by Garcia et al. (2008) Houston City Council Member, Graciela Saenz explained why she though it was important to have Hispanic leaders in city government.

“Houston was faced with a Hispanic leadership void. I saw where the political elite were always trying to tell the community that they needed to have designated leaders that could speak for them. If there were any issues in the community that needed to be addressed such as education, healthcare, jobs, they would ask, ‘Who is your leader so we can speak with them?’(Garcia et al. 2008, 116).”

This quote exemplifies how minority elected officials can have a mindset that specifically considers the needs and preferences of their coethnic constituency. Granted, the mere
descriptive representation of racial and ethnic minorities does not always translate into substantive policies that benefit these communities. However, there is some level of agreement among scholars that descriptive representation has benefits (either symbolic or substantive) for historically excluded racial and ethnic groups. Because Latino populations continue to be understudied, particularly in term of their descriptive representation in municipal government (and specifically the city’s top executive office), further research is needed to specifically investigate where Latino mayors are located and what factors determine whether Latino mayoral candidate emerge and win. In the following section, I describe the state of the research examining Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty.

Research on Latino Mayors

Studies of minority representation have almost exclusively focused on African American representation (Marschall 2010). More recently, however, many studies have increasingly examined the determinants of Hispanic representation. Albeit this research focuses on studying Latino representation in legislative contexts such as school boards (Stewart, Meier, and England 1989; Leal et al. 2004; Rocha 2007; Shah 2009), city councils (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Zax 1990; Welch 1990; Bullock and MacManus 1990b; Hero 1990; Alozie & Manganaro 1993; Sass 2000; Hero and Clarke 2003; Trounstine and Valdini 2008), state legislatures (Bullock 1992; Thompson and Moncrief 1993; Fraga et al. 2003; Scola 2006; Casellas 2009), and U.S. Congress (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Vigil 1996; Lublin 1997b; Santos and Huerta 2001; Casellas 2007; Casellas 2009; Casellas 2011; Branton 2009). But, none systematically explore where
and to what extent Latinos are represented in U.S. mayoralties beyond single-city studies or small-N analyses.

It is imperative to examine how Latinos fare in local government, particularly in the chief executive office, because leaders at this level are intimately involved with addressing policies that directly impact individuals, such as protective services, transportation, education, and economic development (see Trounstine 2009; Trounstine 2010; Peterson 1981; Svara 1990; Garcia et al. 2008). Additionally, mayors are typically seen as leaders in their communities; and regardless of their administrative authority they often play a role in the policymaking process by acting as entrepreneurs to define problems, offer solutions, broker deals, and create consensus between various interest groups (see Stein 2003; Marschall and Shah 2005). Thus, Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty can help improve the social, economic, and political status of the Latino population in cities across the country. Given the wide variation in local institutions and demographic contexts, focusing on local-level politics helps to reveal what combination of factors helps or hinders Latino representation in government.

The research outlined in Table 1.2 shows that most studies examine some aspect of a single mayoral election (racial/ethnic voting patterns, turnout) with one notable Hispanic candidate in a select number of cities – mainly San Antonio, TX, Denver, CO, Los Angeles, CA, and Miami, FL. For example, Hero (1987), Muñoz and Henry 1990, and Hero (1992) examine the election and reelection of Federico Peña, Denver, Colorado’s first Latino mayor in 1983 and 1987 (see also Kaufmann 2003). Geron (2005), Rosales (2000), and Muñoz and Henry (1990) also provide a descriptive account of Henry Cisneros’s bid to be San Antonio’s first Latino mayor in 1981. Rosales (2000)
also describes the politics surrounding the 1991 mayoral election when Latina candidate, Maria A. Berriozábal, made a competitive, yet unsuccessful bid to be San Antonio’s first Latina mayor.

Other research has focused on examining the 2001 and 2005 mayoral elections in Los Angeles – Antonio Villaraigosa’s bid to become this city’s first Latino mayor in modern history (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002; Sonenshein 2003; Geron 2005; Sonenshein and Drayse 2006; Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005). Mollenkopf et al. (2006) also study the racial/ethnic electoral support that led to the outcome of the New York mayoral elections in 2001 and 2005, where Fernando “Freddy” Ferrer twice made unsuccessful bids to be New York’s first Latino mayor. Geron (2005), Hill, Moreno, and Cue (2001) and Warren and Moreno (2003) examine Miami-Dade County mayoral elections and Hispanic candidates’ bids for the mayoralty there. Barreto (2007) examines two elections in five large cities (Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Denver) to focus on the determinants of Latino turnout and Latino candidate vote share in mayoral elections.

In addition to research focusing on a select number of elections in one city, Garcia et al. (2008) examine the political experiences of three Latina mayors in Texas, namely Blanca Sanchez Vela in 1999 (Brownsville, TX), Betty Flores in 1988 (Laredo, TX), and Olivia Serna in 1979 (Crystal City, TX). Garcia et al. (2008) also trace the political trajectories of two Latina city council members that made unsuccessful bids for mayor (Graciela Saenz, in Houston, TX (1997) and Maria A. Berriozábal (1991) in San Antonio, TX). Thus, this approach provides in depth knowledge about why Latina candidates
decided to run for elective office and further investigates what the major challenges they faced throughout their political careers.

The research focusing on a select number of cities and elections has taken two different approaches to examining electoral outcomes for contexts with prominent Hispanic mayoral candidates. For example, there are those that take a qualitative approach using interviews and news coverage of the election to explain the Latino/a candidate’s background how they won or lost (Rosales 2000; Geron 2005; Garcia et al. 2008). Additionally, there are studies that take a quantitative approach to examine racial/ethnic voting patterns to understand the coalitions that formed during a Latino candidate’s bid for the mayoralty. These quantitative studies use two types of data, namely surveys/exit polls (Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001; Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002; Sonenshein 2003; Kaufmann 2003) or precinct-level election results (Hero 1987; 1992; Barreto, Villarreal, & Woods 2005; Barreto 2007). Despite the use of these two approaches (surveys vs. precinct analysis), these studies have the specific goal to study electoral outcomes. For example, they either aim to examine the electoral coalitions that occur during an election with a Latino mayoral candidate or they want to know whether the presence of a Latino candidate influences coethnic voting patterns such as turnout and vote choice (see Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005; Barreto 2007). However, these studies do not aim to understand what contributes to the emergence and ultimate success of the Latino candidates – which is the principal aim of this dissertation.

On a different note, Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) and Hajnal and Trounstine (2010) examine whether a different candidate would win based on even turnout among racial/ethnic minorities in mayoral elections in two samples of cases: the 10 largest U.S.
cities and the largest 20 U.S. Cities, separately. The authors simulate a candidate’s vote share based on exit polls, precinct election results, and aggregate election results. Although they do have elections with Hispanic candidates in Houston, TX (Orlando Sanchez), San Antonio, TX (Ed Garza), and Los Angeles (Antonio Villaraigosa), and black candidates in other cities, they simulate whether a different winner, based on partisanship or ideology, is successful, rather than strictly focusing on the success of an African American or Latino candidate. Additionally, they predict a candidate’s vote share and not their actual success. That is, if a candidate’s simulated vote share reaches at least 50.1% (as a function of increased turnout) then the authors argue that minority representation is more likely or occur. The research in Hajnal (2010) does not, however, examine the determinants of minority candidate success in mayoral elections.

Beyond a few case studies or a few cases where Hispanics have been successful in their bids for the city’s top executive office there is no systematic study of Hispanic mayors. Specifically, there is no research detailing the extent to which Hispanics are represented in the mayorality nor is there research exploring where Hispanic mayors are geographically located. Given that we do not know these two critical features of the political landscape, we also do not know where and why Hispanics are likely to emerge in mayoral elections and why they are more likely to win. It is possible that elections are more competitive where Hispanic candidate. But, there is simply no research that details the conditions under which this is likely to occur.
Table 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Goal of Study</th>
<th>Cities, Elections, Yrs</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hero (1987)</td>
<td>Examine mayoral election outcome; racial/ethnic voting patterns; campaign strategy</td>
<td>Cities=1, Elecs=1: Denver, CO, Federico Peña (1983)</td>
<td>Personal interview with Peña strategists; analysis of newspaper reports on election; precinct voting data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill, Moreno, and (Cue 2001)</td>
<td>Examine mayoral candidate preference by ethnicity &amp; partisanship in mayoral election</td>
<td>Cities=1, Elecs=1; Miami-Dade County, FL, Alex Penelas, Xavier Suarez, Maurice Ferre (1996)</td>
<td>Three-wave survey of Dade County voters in 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonenshein and Pinkus (2002)</td>
<td>Examine racial/ethnic, SES, and Partisan voting patterns in mayoral elections</td>
<td>Cities=1, Elecs=2; Los Angeles, CA (2001 primary &amp; runoff)</td>
<td>Exit Polls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1.2

#### Empirical Studies of Latino Mayors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Goal of Study</th>
<th>Cities, Elections, Yrs</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mollenkopf (2003)</td>
<td>Examines why bi-racial coalition failed in NY in 2001</td>
<td>Cities=1, Elecs=4; New York (2001 party primaries, 1 party runoff, and general) – Fernando Ferrer (DEM) &amp; Herman Badillo (GOP)</td>
<td>Historical &amp; descriptive account of election outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia et al. (2008)</td>
<td>Examine political experience of Latina politicians in Texas</td>
<td>Cities=5; Cands=5; Brownsville, TX; Blanca Vela; Laredo, TX; Betty Flores; Crystal City, TX; Olivia Serna; Houston, TX; Graciela Saenz; San Antonio, TX; Maria Berriozabal</td>
<td>Candidate interviews</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Goal of Study</th>
<th>Cities, Elections, Yrs</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hajnal &amp; Trounstine (2010)</td>
<td>Simulate winner (vote share and success) of “different” candidates (racial/ethnic/partisanship/ideology) given even turnout among racial/ethnic groups.</td>
<td>2 samples: (ONE) Cities=10, Elecs=10: Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego (2003) (TWO) Cities=17, Elecs=51: Note: Elections do not all have at least 1 minority candidate; Partisanship &amp; ideology of candidates</td>
<td>2 data sets: (ONE) 10 mayoral elections in 10 largest US cities in 2003 using exit polls &amp; precinct returns. (TWO) “any contested primary or general election in the nation’s twenty largest cities over the past decade” (p.54) using precinct returns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dissertation Plan**

This dissertation specifically contributes to the literature in subnational politics, elections, and Latino Politics by examining various fundamental questions about Latino representation in the mayoralty. Specifically, I ask descriptive questions regarding *where* and *why* have Latino mayors been elected in the United States? Second, I examine causal questions about why Latino mayoral candidates *emerge* & *win*. Third, I investigate whether there is a link between Latino ethnicity and electoral outcomes.

In Chapter 2, I provide an account of the total number of Latino mayors serving from 1984 to 2009. I also describe where Latino mayors are located geographically and the population and institutional characteristics of the 247 cities with Latino mayors in 2009. Since no studies to date systematically explore where and to what extent Latinos are represented in the mayoralty, this chapter introduces readers to Latino mayoralties in
the U.S. and helps clear a path to empirically examining the determinants of Latino candidate emergence and success. In Chapter 3, I specifically examine the social, political, and institutional determinants of cities with Latino mayors. I rely on a large and representative sample of cities to examine this phenomenon – which is unprecedented. This empirical chapter is designed to provide the reader with a broad overview for why some cities have Latino mayors and why others do not.

Because there are no Large-N studies that examine Latino representation in the mayoralty, we also do not know why Latino candidates emerge and why they win. Chapter 4 answers these questions by systematically examining the factors that determine the likelihood for Latino candidate emergence, success, and vote share in mayoral elections. I specifically employ a unique dataset of 657 elections in 113 cities in 6 Southwestern states. In Chapter 5, I analyze how the presence of a quality Latino candidate influences electoral outcomes, such as city-level turnout and the margin of victory in mayoral elections. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6 by providing an overview of the major empirical contributions of this study. In addition, Chapter 6 describes the implications of the empirical investigation by outlining the research questions that need to be further studied.
Chapter 2

A Descriptive Analysis of Cities with Latino Mayors

The focus of this dissertation is to systematically examine Latino mayoralties in the United States. The various demographic patterns of the Latino population outlined in the previous chapter suggest that the concentration of the Latino population in the Southwest (including the state of Texas) should point to substantial Latino representation in that region. Here, I descriptively examine where and to what extent Latinos are represented in the mayoralty. I specifically track where Latino mayors have been represented in mayoralties across geographic regions and states from 1984-2009. Additionally, I include a cross-sectional descriptive analysis of Latino mayors in 2009 to examine the contemporary demographic and institutional characteristics of cities with Latino representation in the mayoralty.

To examine Latino representation over time, I specifically rely on the directories of Latino Elected Officials compiled by the National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials (NALEO) from 1984-2009. In this chapter, I also incorporate recent demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau by relying on the American Community Survey 2005-2009 population estimates to describe the demographic characteristics of cities with Latino mayors. Finally, I rely on the International City and County Management Association’s Form of Government Surveys to describe the institutional characteristics of Latino-mayor cities. Given that Latino mayoralties have never been systematically examined beyond a few select cities and elections, it is imperative that a general overview is provided about where Latino mayors are located and what factors are
associated with their presence. Knowledge about where Latino mayors have recently served will inform the empirical studies described in the following chapters that particularly examine the causal determinants of Latino representation in the city’s top executive office as well as Latino mayoral candidate emergence and success.

**Latino Elected Officials in the U.S.**

First, I describe the level of government where most Latino elected officials serve. This will not only reveal the where we expect Latinos to be most politically incorporated, but also determine whether Latinos are sufficiently represented in the city’s chief executive office. Table 2.2 shows that of the 5,667 Latino elected officials, 5,390 serve in local government (County Government, Municipal Government, School Board), 252 serve in state-wide office (Governor, State Auditor, State Senator, State Representative), and only 25 serve in Congress. In other words, nearly 95 percent of Hispanic elected officials serve in governments below the state-level.

Inspecting the statistics on Latino local government officials more closely in Table 2.1, the NALEO data reveal that 548 Hispanic elected officials serve in county government (County Assessor/Treasurer, County Commissioner, and County Clerk) and 842 serve as judges or elected law enforcement officers (Sheriff, County, Municipal, District Court Judge, and Justice of the Peace). However, most Hispanic elected officials serve in school districts. In 2009, 2,037 Latinos served as school board members. The next largest office where a large portion of Latino elected officials serve is in municipal government. Of the 1,713 Latinos elected at this level, 86 percent are city council members and about 14 percent are mayors.
Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Held</th>
<th>Num. Latinos</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Government</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoralty</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Board</td>
<td>2,037</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special District</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table describes the level at which Hispanic elected officials serve (Congress, State government, Municipal government)

Source: National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials

_A Focus on Latino Mayoralties (Over Time)_

Given that Latinos seem to be underrepresented in the mayoralty relative to other local level elective offices, it is imperative to describe the extent to which Latinos have been represented in the mayoralty over time. Combining the NALEO directories of Latino elected officials from 1984-2009, the data reveals an overall increase in the number of Latino mayors. Overall, Figure 2.1 shows that the number of Latino mayoralties has increased by 87 percent in the total 26 year period. Figure 2.1 also shows that throughout this period, nearly 88 percent of Latino mayors serve in Southwestern states including California, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.\(^7\)

\(^7\) The sudden decline in the number of Latino mayors in 1995 reflects a different accounting method used by NALEO after that period.
Focusing on regions outside the Southwest U.S., the trendlines in Figure 2.2 indicate a steady increase in the number of Hispanic mayors in the Northeast and the South. Over the past 26 years the Northeast region has seen an uptick in the number of Latino mayors from having zero in 1984 to six in 2009. The Southern region (not including the state of Texas) has experienced the largest increase in the number of Latino mayors compared to any of the four regions (outside the Southwest). Specifically, the South only had five Latino mayors in 1984 – which nearly tripled in 2009 to 14 Latino mayors. This phenomenon may be associated with the fact that the Southern region has experienced the largest Hispanic population growth rate in the last decade (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011). In the West region, there seems to be a period where very few Hispanic mayoral candidates were successful, particularly from the mid 1990s to 2007. The Midwest region gained some momentum in the early 1990s with regard to having more Latinos serving in the mayoralty, but it quickly leveled off (and declined) in 2009.
The Location of Latino Mayors Within Each State

In addition to describing the total number of Latino mayors serving over a 26 year period in various regions, it is important to show where Latino mayors serve within those regions, and particularly within each state. In this section, I show which states have the most Latino mayors and also describe the demographic characteristics of cities with Latino representation (or Latino-mayor cities).

Figure 2.3 shows that in 2009, approximately 87 percent of Latino mayors served in Southwestern municipalities (within the states of California, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas). Given the concentration of the Latino population in this area, it makes sense that most mayors of Latino descent are located there. Within each state,
however, there are specific areas with large concentrations of Latino mayors. For example, in Texas, most of the Latino mayors are located in the southern part of the state (just south of San Antonio) – where there is a historically large concentration of Latinos. In New Mexico, most of the Latino mayors are located in the state’s north-central region. Arizona’s southern region (closer to the Mexican border) has its highest concentration of Latino mayors. California, on the other hand, has Latino mayors as far north as Daily City, CA and as far south as La Mesa, CA (near the U.S.-Mexico border).

There are pockets of Latino mayors outside the Southwest region. These areas mainly lie in south Florida (Miami and surrounding communities), New England (New Jersey and Connecticut), and in the state of Washington. Figure 2.3 points to a major commonality
among these places: high concentrations of Latino populations are more likely to have Latino mayors. Despite the concentration, these non-Southwestern areas of the country only house 12 percent of the population of Latino mayor cities (compared to the Southwest – which holds 88 percent). The areas outside the Southwest also have the smallest proportion of Latinos in the country. For example, in Florida the Latino population is 8.4 percent of the total population and in New Jersey it is 3.1 percent (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011, 7).

**Demographic Characteristics of Cities with Latino Mayors**

The descriptive statistics outlined in Figure 2.4 show that in all but one region (the Midwest) cities with Hispanic mayors have very high concentrations of Hispanics. More specifically, Hispanic mayor cities (on average) are 68 percent Hispanic. Cites in the West and the Southwest regions are the two regions that typically have the largest Hispanic voting-age population. Hispanic mayor cities in the Northeast and the South also have high concentrations of Hispanics. However, most cities in these regions have a slightly lower concentration (55-60 percent) of Hispanics. In the Midwest, the region with the fewest Hispanic mayor cities relative to the other regions has the smallest proportion of Hispanics. Specifically, the Hispanic mayor cities in the Midwest have a 20 percent Hispanic voting-age population. What makes this region interesting is that Hispanics rarely compose a majority of the population, whereby potentially affecting the electoral strategies of Hispanic candidates.

Figure 2.4 also shows the average city size for places represented by Hispanic mayors. Cities with Hispanic mayors located in the West region are likely to have less
than 6,000 inhabitants. In the Southwest, cities with Hispanic mayors are substantially larger in population size, where the average city is nearly 44,000. The region where Hispanic mayors represent larger cities (i.e., cities with a population over 73,000) is the Northeast in places like Patterson, NJ and Hartford, CT. Hispanic mayor cities in the Southern region have the second highest average in terms of population size.

**Searching For Possible Hispanic Mayor Cities**

The figures above clearly indicate that the average Hispanic population is relatively high in Hispanic mayor cities. However, exactly how many Hispanic mayor cities have majority Hispanic populations? Figure 2.5 below shows all Hispanic mayor cities in 2009 as per the 2009 NALEO directory of Latino elected officials. In addition to showing the geographic distribution of the Hispanic mayor cities, the map denotes whether these cities are majority Hispanic or not. Specifically, all Hispanic mayor cities with a majority
Hispanic voting-age population (+50.1 percent) are represented by the light-colored circles. The dark-colored circles indicate Hispanic mayor cities with Hispanic voting-age populations less than 50.1 percent. Approximately 184 Hispanic mayor cities (75 percent) have a majority Hispanic voting-age population. On the other hand, 63 Hispanic mayor cities (25 percent) have less than a 50.1 percent Hispanic voting-age population. Thus, there is substantial variation in the demographic composition of Hispanic mayor cities in 2009. Given this variation, it begs the question: Are there other majority Hispanic populated cities – locations where Hispanic mayors could potentially be elected – not in Figure 2.5? If not, how many more majority Hispanic populated cities do not have Hispanic representation in the mayoralty?

Figure 2.5 Cities with Latino Mayors in 2009
Source: National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials (NALEO)

Legend
- Majority Hispanic Population N= 184 or 75%
- Minority Hispanic Population N= 63 or 25%
To examine this question, I employ population data from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey estimates. I specifically use this data to account for all incorporated municipalities in the U.S. with majority Hispanic voting age populations. The data point to 439 cities in the U.S. that fit this demographic categorization. The light-colored circles in Figure 2.6 denote where these majority Hispanic cities are geographically located. The light-colored circles with black dots at their centroid are majority Hispanic populated cities with Latino mayors. According to the 2005-2009 American Community Survey population estimates, 42 percent of all majority Hispanic cities have a Latino mayor. However, 58 percent of all majority Hispanic cities do not have Latino representation in the city’s top executive office.
This is a notable finding from the descriptive statistics primarily because of the unexpected number of majority Hispanic populated cities without Hispanic mayors. In fact, there are approximately 255 incorporated municipalities in the U.S. where the Latino population is large enough (i.e., a majority) to have coethnic representation in the mayoralty but do not. Despite the fact that Hispanic mayor cities tend to have high levels of Hispanic populations, the evidence in Figure 2.6 suggests that the determinants of Latino descriptive representation must go beyond sheer numbers. Thus, another reason why the findings in Figure 2.6 are so notable is because they help justify the further investigation of Latino descriptive representation in municipal government. That is, one obvious empirical question that has not been studied to date is: What contributes to this variation in Latino representation in municipal government? As I will describe in the chapters below, the theoretical expectations for representation go beyond the size of the Latino population, and include racial demographics, city institutions, and electoral rules among other things. However, to further explore the racial and ethnic demographic context of cities where Latinos do not comprise a majority and have Latino mayors, in the following sections I describe the racial population of Hispanic mayor cities as well as their governing institutions.

**Exploring the Racial Context of Hispanic Mayor Cities**

Table 2.2 describes the proportion of the population for each racial/ethnic category in the American Community Survey’s 2005-2009 population estimates. In the Southwest region, cities that are not majority-Hispanic, but have Hispanic mayors, are on average 33 percent Hispanic (voting age population), 51 percent non-Hispanic white population, 7 percent black, and 6 percent Asian. In other words, the racial/ethnic minority voting-age
population is close to 46 percent and the non-Hispanic white population is 51 percent. The Southern region’s cities with Hispanic mayors also tend to have an interesting demographic makeup. Specifically, the average Hispanic and black voting-age population combined make up 50 percent of the city (see Table 2.2). The anomaly seems to be cities in the West region, which includes only 1 city (Port Townsend, WA). It has a 95 percent non-Hispanic white voting age population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table describes the racial/ethnic context in cities that are not majority-Hispanic, but also with Hispanic mayors.
Sources: National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials (NALEO)
U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2005-2009 Population Estimates

The fact that there are Hispanic mayors in non-majority Hispanic cities raises the question about whether coalitions form along racial/ethnic lines. Some studies suggest that they have indeed formed in the past (see Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003). However, there is no systematic evidence that goes beyond a single election or city. In the next dissertation chapter, I examine to see whether there is any evidence of minority coalitions.
Exploring the Institutional Characteristics of Hispanic Mayor Cities

To also examine how cities (with Hispanic mayors) are politically structured, I rely on the International City and County Manager Association’s (ICMA) Form of Government Surveys conducted in five year survey waves from 1981-2006. The surveys ask city clerks/secretaries to describe the institutions of their city government such as whether the form of government is mayor-council or council-manager, whether the political party affiliation of municipal officials appears on the ballot, and how many council positions there are on the city council, among many other things.

Because the survey instruments do not have a 100 percent response rate among all cities, I merged data on Hispanic mayors in 2009 with the ICMA data from all survey waves to have the most comprehensive dataset on municipal institutions as possible. To be more specific, I used data from the 2006 ICMA to include institutional information for 74 cities, the 2001 ICMA for 35 cities, the 1996 ICMA for 31 cities, and the 1986 ICMA for 7 cities. Relying on the ICMA surveys provided institutional information for a total of 163 cities or 66 percent of the cities with Hispanic mayors in 2009. To increase the coverage of institutional arrangements for cities with Hispanic mayors, I searched through city websites of the remaining 84 cities. Cities with Hispanic mayors and populations under 6,000 do not often have websites. This allowed me to obtain institutional information for 31 additional cities not covered by the ICMA surveys.

Table 2.3 describes the institutional characteristics for 194 cities with Hispanic mayors in the United States in 2009. Approximately 64 percent of cities with Hispanic

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8 Granted, using the ICMA surveys from various waves other than the latest (2006) to more closely match the 2009 year of the NALEO data may not be the most accurate because some cities may have changed their governing institutions. Further analysis may require investigating whether and when the 247 Hispanic mayor cities in 2009 changed their institutions.
mayors have Council-Manager form of governments. In addition, about 4 percent of cities have Commission form of governments. These reform-types of institutional structures are similar in that the mayor is institutionally weak compared to the city council (or city commission). Although these types of governments are more typical of Southwestern cities, 30 percent of the cities with Hispanic mayors have Mayor-Council governments. These cities, on the other hand, typically allow mayors to have the power to appoint city bureaucrats (i.e., police chiefs, city attorney) and veto legislation that is produced by the city council. Although the specific powers of mayors vary widely among cities with Mayor-Council governments (see Svara 1995), these cities’ mayors are considered to be more than just another member of the city council and are rather seen as major policy entrepreneurs.

Table 2.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Num. Cities</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Population</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>56,293</td>
<td>279,076</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>3,796,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-Council Government</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council-Manager Government</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission Government</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Size</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Large Districts</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Member Districts</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed (at-large, SMDs)</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Elections</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit on Num. of Terms Served</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table describes institutional characteristics of cities with Hispanic representation in the mayoralty
Source: International City & County Management Association (ICMA) Form of Government Surveys

Table 2.4 describes the geographic location of cities with Hispanic mayors with specific forms of government. 115 cities (93 percent) with Hispanic mayors have Council-Manager governments that are particularly located in the Southwest region. This confirms
that this region’s municipal governments have power concentrated in the legislative body. The Commission form of government is also typical in the Southwest. However, among cities with Hispanic mayors in the Southwest, only Texas has these types of governments.

The institutional arrangements of the city also include how city council members are elected. Although they could be elected several different ways, they are most commonly elected either at-large, in single-member districts, or by both methods. City council members elected at-large are elected by the entire city. Those in single-member districts are elected by a designated geographical area within the city. Table 2.3 (above) shows that approximately 70 percent of cities with Hispanic mayors in 2009 elected their city council members at-large. Close to 13 percent of cities with Hispanic mayors elect city council members by district. However, only 9 percent of cities with Hispanic mayors have part of their council members elected at-large or in single-member districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Cities with Latino Mayors</th>
<th>Mayor-Council</th>
<th>Council-Manager</th>
<th>Commission</th>
<th>Missing Institutional Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>247</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4
States with Hispanic Mayors & Their Institutions

Table describes the institutions of cities across the U.S. that have Hispanics mayors

Sources: National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials (NALEO)
International City & County Management Association (ICMA) Form of Government Surveys
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.5 show that 4 cities with Hispanic mayors have elections where the partisan affiliation is listed on the ballot during an election. The ICMA *Form of Government Surveys* show that these cities are located outside of Texas and California (two states with the most Hispanic mayors) such as Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, and Washington. In fact, according to the previous literature it is rare for cities to have partisan municipal elections (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002). Moreover, this institution is rarer in the Southwest because most local governments in this area responded to Progressive Era government reforms to reduce the impact of political parties (see Davidson and Fraga 1988).9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.5</th>
<th>Cities with Hispanic Mayors &amp; Partisan Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Tucson</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Chicago</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wapato</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:*  
National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials (NALEO)  
International City & County Management Association (ICMA)

9 The one city in Arizona with a Hispanic mayor, South Tucson, eliminated partisan elections in 2008 via a local initiative. Tucson (not South Tucson) is the only city in Arizona that continues to designate municipal candidates’ partisan affiliation on the electoral ballot (O’Dell 2008).
Conclusion

The descriptive statistics provided in this chapter reveal a few notable patterns of cities with Latino representation in the mayoralty. For example, nearly 85 percent of Hispanic mayor cities are located in the Southwest. This seems to correspond with conventional wisdom that suggests that Latinos are more likely to be represented in places where the Latino population is most concentrated. This includes states such as Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, and Florida. Additionally, 75 percent of cities with Latino mayors have a majority Latino population or above. However, Figure 2.5 indicates that a quarter of Hispanic mayor cities have a Hispanic voting-age population less than 50 percent. Further investigation reveals that only 42 percent of cities with majority Hispanic voting age populations have Latino representation in the mayoralty. That is, 58% of all majority Hispanic cities do not have Hispanic mayors. This unexpected, yet revealing finding indicates that Hispanic population size may not be the sole factor contributing to Hispanic representation in municipal government. Thus, the next obvious question that has not been studied to date is: What explains this variation in Latino mayoral representation? That is, what do some cities have Latino mayors and why others do not? Other factors may contribute to Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty beyond Hispanic population size, such as the presence of potential racial/ethnic coalition partners and various city-level institutions. The descriptive statistics in this chapter reveal a few patterns of Latino represented cities. For example, in non-majority cities, where no racial/ethnic group composes a majority of the voting age population, the combined Hispanic, black, and Asian population is rather sizeable - suggesting that possible minority led coalitions form to help elect Latino mayors. Also, most cities with Latino
mayors are council manager cities. Does this governing arrangement facilitate not only the formation of coalitions, but the ultimate election of racial/ethnic minority mayors, because less prestigious offices reduce the barrier to elective offices? As I will explain below, the previous literature suggests that council-manager governments are more conducive to minority representation. However, this has not been systematically examined beyond single cities or elections. Also, approximately 14 percent of Hispanic mayor cities have term limits. Does the presence of this electoral rule increase the probability of seeing Latino mayors? Does the impact of this rule further depend on the size of the Latino population? The previous research on Latino representation, in other levels of government, suggests that it does. Unfortunately, we do not know whether and when it influences Latino representation in the mayoralty. Therefore, in Chapter 3, I rely on a large sample of cities constructed from the ICMA Form of Government Surveys conducted from 1981-2006 to examine the causal determinants of Latino representation in the mayoralty. That is, I analyze the demographic, institutional, and political factors that are associated with Latino mayoral descriptive representation.
Natural disasters, economic downturns, and demands for various social services\(^\text{10}\) place a tremendous amount of pressure on municipal governments – particularly its leaders – to get things done. Often this pressure is compounded not only by federal and state laws requiring local governments to provide certain services, but also by rising operating budget expenditures as well as limited sources of revenue. Whether it is balancing social/cultural integration policies with economic demands for labor or having to decide where to implement economic development policies within the city limits, local governments are largely responsible for addressing everyday issues that people face (see Benavides 2008; Trounstine 2009).

At the head of the table, often sits a city executive that is responsible for making these tough decisions. In some cases, city executives are elected (mayors); and in others they are appointed (city managers). Where mayors are part of the governing structure, they are known to be the major actors in the political system (Stein 2003). Although mayors’ specific impact on policy outcomes partly depends on the political structure of municipal government, they often have the freedom “to negotiate and compromise with key players…in order to implement an agenda” (Stein 2003, 150). In other words, mayors are typically seen as leaders in their communities regardless of their administrative authority and often play a role in the policymaking process by acting as entrepreneurs to

\(^{10}\)Social services provided by local governments include: parks, pools, libraries, schools, garbage disposal, public transit, and police/fire protection.
define problems, offer solutions, and broker deals (see Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Mintrom 1997; Marschall and Shah 2005).

In addition to federal, state, and local laws (as well demographic changes) impacting mayors’ political behavior, some of the literature in political science shows that the racial and ethnic background of the mayor can have an independent effect on policy outcomes (Mladenka 1989; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003). In fact, minority descriptive representation in municipal government has been shown to produce substantive benefits for coethnic populations including hiring more minorities in city government and city boards, contracting more with minority-owned businesses, and implementing criminal justice policies that are sensitive to racial/ethnic populations (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003; see also Hero 1992, 124; Geron 2005, 172-6). However, Browning et al. (2003) suggest that in places where racial and ethnic groups have gained representation in municipal government, their powers and resources are limited to make policy change to adequately improve their social, economic, and political status. Thus, a debate continues about whether and to what extent the gains made as a result of representation have been largely symbolic (Browning et al. 2003, 7).

Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty has not been systematically studied by anyone. Thus, before the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation can be explored, we first need to explore the conditions under which Latino mayoralties rise. Beyond single-city case studies and small-N analyses, we do not know the extent to which Hispanic mayors have been successful in elections. Moreover, much of the research on descriptive representation in municipal government focuses on African American mayors (see Marschall 2010; Marschall and Ruhil 2006). Thus, the
questions that have yet to be answered in the contemporary research include: Does Latino representation in the mayor’s office simply depend on the strength of the Latino population in a city? If not, are there certain socioeconomic and political conditions that increase the likelihood of Latino representation? How do these conditions differ in contexts where no racial/ethnic group has a majority of the population? Also, do various demographic and institutional factors (i.e., term limits; partisan elections) impact whether we see Hispanics serving at the helm of municipal government?

In this chapter, I specifically build on Marschall and Ruhil’s (2006) study of black mayors to explore the determinants of Latino mayoralities by combining data from the International City/County Management Association’s (ICMA) *Form of Government* surveys, the NALEO Latino elected official rosters, and data from the U.S. Census. The data is a pooled cross-section of cities that responded to the ICMA surveys in 1981, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2001, and 2006. Below, I review the literature to build an appropriate theoretical model of Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty.

**Building a Theoretical Model of Latino Mayoral Representation**

To construct a theoretical model that examines the incidence of Latino mayors, I build on research that has examined Latino descriptive representation in legislative settings (Shah 2009; Casellas 2009; Casellas 2011), case studies of mayoral elections with Latino candidates (Hero 1987; Hero 1992; Hero and Clarke 2003) as well as the research on African American and female descriptive representation in the mayoralty (Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Smith, Reingold, & Owens 2011). For example, conventional wisdom as well as early explanations of racial and ethnic minority political influence (within the
context of elections) suggests that the voting strength of a group is a necessary condition for representation (Hero 1992). In places where Latinos do not constitute a majority of the population, they will have to create bi- or multi-racial alliances in politics to gain political representation (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). However, more recent studies of minority representation reveal that influence and representation is also a function of various political structures and institutions that can serve as either obstacles or opportunities for minority representation (Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Casellas 2009; Casellas 2011). Additionally, the research that goes beyond voting strength suggests that the capacity of the minorities to gain higher office depends on their representation in lower-level government (Marschall and Ruhil 2006). In sum, there are four general concepts that I expect to influence the incidence of Latino mayoralities: voting strength, the racial context of a city, political structures/institutions, and Latino political capacity. Below, I describe these concepts in more detail and outline how I expect each to influence the representation of Latinos in the city’s chief executive office.

**Latino Voting Strength**

To begin, a model of Latino descriptive representation depends on Latinos’ political strength within the context of elections. The foundational explanation for why Latinos do not enjoy parity in the government decision making process (and representation) is, as Hero (1992) explains, because: 1) Latinos constitute a small proportion of the population and 2) they are largely in the lower-end of the socioeconomic spectrum. Having limited socioeconomic resources is strongly associated with reduced levels of political participation (see Verba and Nie 1972). Given that most Latinos do not belong to the
middle and upper social strata of society, their role is primarily reduced to being recipients of policy rather than being involved in agenda-setting (Hero 1992, 196). When political outcomes in American politics are determined by majoritarian rules, Latinos generally have diminished political power and influence in the decision-making process. In other words, Latinos’ political clout in electoral contexts hinges upon their strength in numbers and their socioeconomic status.

Current research has shown that the size of the minority population is a critical determinant of descriptive representation (see Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Lublin 1997b; Casellas 2009). In local government, higher proportions of minorities increases the chances that a minority candidate will win office (Karnig and Welch 1980); and that a minority group’s mobilization efforts will be more effective (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003). Without a sizeable middle-class Latino population, representation is also less likely to occur because there is simply a limited supply of qualified Hispanic candidates to run for elected office.

The literature examining the representation (and political incorporation) of African Americans has further found that the socioeconomic resources available to that community are particularly important for the election of black mayors (Karnig and Welch 1980; Marschall and Ruhil 2006). For example, Robinson and Dye (1978) found that higher levels of education among the black population lead to more coethnic representation on the city council. In places where racial/ethnic minorities have achieved a higher social status are also presumed to be better able to not only field quality minority candidates (Meier and Stewart 1991), but sustain high levels of political and interest-group activities among minorities. Given that these findings impact African American
descriptive representation, I expect that Latinos will also be more likely to be represented in the mayoralty the stronger they are numerically and socioeconomically.

**Racial Context**

The release of the 2010 Census data reveals that the Latino population is growing rapidly across the U.S. (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011). Additionally, not only are more cities becoming multi-racial because of these demographic changes, they are also becoming more Latino-dominant (Marschall and Shah 2011). These developments have implications for Latino representation – particularly in that the success of Latino candidates can hinge upon the presence of potential coalition partners. In other words, even though demographic trends suggest that Latino populations are becoming more dominant, the Latino population is still younger than whites (and blacks) – as well as having a larger segment of that demographic being ineligible to vote due to their citizenship status. Thus, Latinos may have to continue to form political coalitions to overcome barriers to access power within municipal government. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (2003) explain that in order for racial/ethnic groups to be effectively represented in the policymaking process they can undertake an electoral strategy that involves the formation of these biracial or multiracial coalitions.

Marschall and Ruhil (2006) provide real-world examples where coalitions between liberal whites and African American formed to elect Black mayors in New York, New Haven, New Orleans, and Los Angeles (Marschall and Ruhil 2006, 835). Browning et al. (1984) suggest that in ten cities in California, minorities formed liberal coalitions that included racial and ethnic minorities, poor whites, and white liberal Democrats –
usually from the middle- to upper-class. Hero (1992) describes that a black, Latino, and liberal Democrat coalition successfully elected Denver’s first Latino mayor in 1983. Although coalitions between Latinos and African Americans are most expected to form, due to their shared levels of socioeconomic and political circumstances, research has found that black-Latino coalitions are unlikely to form because of perceptions of competition or social distance between blacks and Latinos. Given these barriers to coalition formation between Latinos and African Americans, other research has shown that coalitions are more likely to form between Latinos and Anglos (see McClain and Karnig 1990; Meier and Stewart 1991b) and African Americans and Anglos (see Rocha 2007).

During the 1996 Miami-Dade County mayoral elections, Latinos and African Americans voted based on race rather than political party affiliation (see Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001). Kaufmann (2003) suggests that in Denver during the election of a Latino candidate (Federico Peña) and an African American candidate (Wellington Webb) blacks and Latinos did not mobilize equally for one another’s coethnic candidates. In Los Angeles, during the 2001 mayoral election, a Latino-Black coalition failed to form – which was largely to blame for Antonio Villaraigosa’s losing his first bid to become Los Angeles’s first Latino mayor (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002). In fact, nearly 71 percent of African Americans supported the incumbent Anglo, James Hahn, while 62 percent of Latinos supported Villaraigosa (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002, 69). Mollenkopf et al. (2006) find that Villaraigosa had much more wide-spread support among African Americans in the 2005 mayoral election, when Villaraigosa won his second bid to be mayor. Given the debate in the literature about whether biracial or multiracial coalitions
form during mayoral where Latinos bid for the mayoralty, further analysis is required to determine whether the presence of African Americans or liberal Anglos influence the incidence of a Latino mayoralities in the US.

**Institutions**

The evidence in the previous chapter found that 58 percent of majority-Hispanic cities in 2009 did not have Hispanic mayors. Thus, in addition to sheer voting strength and multiracial coalitions potentially contributing to the incidence of Latino mayors, there are other factors that could either help or hinder the likelihood of Latino representation in the city’s top executive office. The research on black and Latino representation in subnational legislative settings (school boards, city councils, and state legislatures) suggests that institutions and political structures affect minority political empowerment in different ways. The institutions that have been found to influence minority representation include various Progressive Era reform such as, weak-mayor forms of government, non-partisan elections, and term limits. However, a debate exists in the literature about which of these institutions influence minority representation, how they influence representation (positively or negatively), and whether they affect black, Hispanic, and women’s representation equally. Given this debate and lack of systematic analysis examining whether and how these factors influence the incidence of Latino mayors, the question remains: Which of these institutions can help or hinder Latino representation in the mayoralty?

The research reveals that Progressive Era reforms weakened the influence of political parties and ultimately limited the influence of racial and ethnic minorities in
politics (Marschall and Ruhil 2006, 831; see also Davidson and Fraga 1988). However, the empirical evidence is mixed as to whether the institutions associated with Progressive Era reforms serve as obstacles or opportunities for minority representation. Specifically, Marschall and Ruhil’s (2006) research find that cities are more likely to have black mayors if they have council-manager or commission forms of government than cities with mayor-council governments. On the other hand, partisan elections decrease the likelihood of black (Marschall and Ruhil 2006) and female mayoralties (Smith, Reingold, and Owens 2011). Although Marschall and Ruhil (2006) find that partisan elections have a negative effect on black mayoralties in non-majority cities, these findings are surprising given that researchers have argued that political parties – particularly the Democratic Party – have historically incorporated racial/ethnic minorities and other low-income voters into the political arena.11

However, because council-manager governments emphasize the professionalization of service delivery via independently appointed bureaucrats, the political environment is substantially less competitive. This may facilitate the inclusion of minorities in municipal government not only because minority candidates experience less resistance from other groups in the voting booth, but also because multiracial coalitions are more likely to form (Sonenshein 2003; Hero and Clarke 2003; Welch and Karnig 1979). Researchers suggest that minority candidates can expect less resistance in cities with these institutional structures (see Sonenshein 2003; Hero and Clarke 2003).

11 Davidson and Fraga (1988) write that the Democratic Party has been the “primary organization that educates and mobilizes lower-income voters” and removing this cuing mechanism for minorities has had deleterious effects on their representation (Davidson and Fraga 1988, 374). Moreover, reformed structures have been found to suppress minority political participation, therefore reducing levels of minority political incorporation (Hajnal and Lewis 2003).
Beyond these studies, Casellas (2009) further theorizes that Latinos seeking higher office are not likely to be as successful when seeking office in more prestigious legislatures because these are more financially desirable offices. Thus, underrepresented groups, such as Latinos, are more likely to experience an electoral obstacle if cities have prestigious executive office because the electoral context is potentially more competitive. Although Casellas (2009) does not find a statistically significant relationship between legislative professionalization and descriptive representation, it is important to consider whether the prestige of the mayoralty will serve as an obstacle to Latino representation.

Rather than institutions serving as obstacles to minority representation, the research has outlined that they can create opportunities for underrepresented groups. One example is as term limits. However, a debate exists about whether and to what extent this electoral rule positively influences Latino representation – particularly in the mayoralty. First, term limits has not been systematically studied for their effects on black or Latino mayoralities. But Trounstine and Valdini (2008), who examine minority representation (blacks, Latinos, and women) in city councils, have mixed findings. Specifically, they shows that term limits have no impact on the proportion of black and Latino representation in city council, but that it has a positive and significant effect on the proportion of female city council members. Smith, Reingold, and Owns (2011) find no statistical relationship between term limits and the incidence of female mayors. Casellas (2009) also finds that the enactment of term limits is not statistically associated with the representation of Latino state legislators, but that the implementation of term limits has an independent and negative effect on Latino representation. Limiting the number of consecutive terms that incumbents can serve can, in theory, provide opportunities for
racial and ethnic minorities. Moreover, it is exponentially more difficult to unseat an incumbent – who like members of Congress tend to not only win more often, but win by larger margins (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Alford and Hibbing 1981; Krehbiel and Wright 1983; Cox and Morgenstern 1993; Cox and Katz 1996; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002).

Thompson and Moncrief (1993) suggest that term limits do not negatively affect female retention rates in state legislatures. However, the implementation of term limits may have unintended consequences. Thompson and Moncrief (1993) point out that term limits might negatively affect African American representation by ousting black incumbents. Although Thompson and Moncrief (1993) suggest that if coethnic incumbents might be negatively affected by term-limits, “it is improbable that nonminority candidates would be elected from predominantly minority districts” (Thompson and Moncrief 1993, 308). This finding points to the importance of the numerical strength of the minority population in that it works in conjunction with term-limits. An analysis by Caress et al. (2003) examines the impact of term limits on minority representation in California and Michigan. The authors reveal that term limits and demographic shifts in the minority population impact levels of representation in state legislatures. In particular, they find that Hispanic representation increased in the California legislature following the implementation term limits in 1996 and because the Latino population grew rapidly over the previous decade. For African Americans in Michigan, a gain in representation was very modest after the implementation of term limits because blacks had already achieved overrepresentation in the state House of Representatives. Moreover, during this time period the African American population did
not grow (Caress et al. 2003; except see Carey et al. 2006 for a negligible effect of term limits on minority representation in state legislatures). Therefore, the relationship between numerical strength and term limits needs to be explored in terms of whether it influences Latino representation in the mayoralty.

**Latino Political Capacity**

In addition to Latino voting strength, the potential formation of multiracial coalitions, and institutional structures, previous research has pointed to the political capacity of minority leadership to increase the likelihood of representation in the city’s chief executive office. Specifically, when racial and ethnic groups have a supply of qualified minority elites with previous political experience, name recognition, political networks, and financial resources, they are more likely to run and serve in higher-level office. For example, Marschall and Ruhil (2006) find that cities with more African American city council members are more likely to have black mayors than cities with fewer descriptive representatives in the city legislature. Smith et al. (2011) also find that more women city legislators have a positive impact on the presence of female mayors. There is ample anecdotal evidence that successful mayoral candidates have previous experience serving in the city legislature. Thus, to see Latino mayoral candidates such as Julian Castro in San Antonio, Texas and Gus Garcia in Austin, Texas Latinos may require sufficient levels of descriptive representation in the city council.

Given that mayoral candidates often have to be strategic in terms of when they decide to run, it is conceivable that Latino candidates must consider whether they can win based on the strength of the Latino population and the institutional context of the city. For
example, although prestigious institutions, in theory, detract minority candidates because of the ferocity of the electoral competition, it is possible that Latino candidates may have the capacity to win in those contexts if Latinos are strong enough within the context of city politics. In other words, Latino candidates may rely on the coethnic Latino population to help them win elections, and might be more likely to run for a more desirable office in contexts where Latinos are numerically (and socioeconomically) stronger. The interactive relationships between institutions and Latino voting strength have never been examined in terms of their effects on Latino political representation in the mayoralty. Thus, in this study, I analyze whether these conditions influence this political outcome.

**Modeling Latino Representation in the Mayoralty**

The conceptual model, outlined above, suggests that Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty is a function of Latinos’ voting strength, the racial context of a city, city institutions, and the political capacity of Latino leadership. In this section, I will describe the measures used to operationalize the concepts of the following model:

\[ \text{Latino Representation in the Mayoralty} = \text{Latino Voting Strength} + \text{Racial Context} + \text{Institutions} + \text{Political Capacity of Latino Leadership} + \text{Controls} \]

The data used to examine Latino descriptive representation in the mayor’s office (i.e., the presence of Latino mayors in U.S. cities) are drawn from the 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006 *Form of Government Surveys* conducted by the International City/County...
Management Association (ICMA). The combined survey waves provide information on the institutional structures (i.e., partisan elections, form of government, term limits, etc.) of 7,779 unique municipalities. All of the survey waves (conducted every five years) are combined in this study, thus making the unit of analysis the city-year. Combining the survey waves allows for election outcomes, occurring some time within the five year period, to be studied as a cross-section and over time. This is particularly useful when studying a large sample of cities that not only schedule elections at different times, but have terms that vary in length. Thus, with each survey wave we can assume that at least one election (and term) took place. Moreover, this method is particularly effective for exploring Latino representation in a large and representative sample of cities in the U.S. in that it provides substantial leverage to examine varying demographic, institutional, and political factors in municipalities.

To match the ICMA sample cities with city-level demographic characteristics, I specifically use U.S. Census data from 1980 for the 1981 observations; the 1990 Census for the 1991 observations; the 2000 Census data for the 2001 observations; and the 2005-2009 American Community Survey five-year estimates for the 2006 observations. Demographic data was linearly interpolated for the years in-between these observations (1986, 1996).

The dependent variable examined here is whether a city has a Latino mayor. This measure is coded as 0 if a city does not have a Latino mayor and 1 if the city does have a Latino mayor. To identify cities that had Latino mayors, I relied on the directories of Latino elected officials provided by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO). The NALEO data from 1984 were used for the 1981
observations in the dataset, the 1986 NALEO data for the 1986 observations, the 1991
NALEO data for the 1991 observations, the 1996 NALEO data for the 1996 observations,
the 2001 NALEO data for the 2001 observations, and the 2006 NALEO data for the 2006
observations.

**Latino Voting Strength**

The conventional wisdom and numerous empirical investigations indicate that the voting
strength of the Latino population is a major factor influencing whether Latinos are
represented in government. I specifically rely on two variables to measure the concept of
Latino voting strength: 1) a binary variable indicating whether a city voting-age
population\(^{12}\) is majority Latino and 2) the percent of the college educated Latinos in a
city. I expect that cities that have a majority Latino voting-age population are more likely
to have Latino mayors than cities where Latinos are less than 50.1 percent of the voting-
age population. Given that the political strength of a racial/ethnic group depends
socioeconomic status of the due to the relationship between status and political
participation rates, I expect that cities with a larger college educated Latino population to
have a higher likelihood of having Latino mayors than cities with a smaller proportion of
college educated Latinos. These demographic characteristics were gathered from the U.S.
Census and the 2005-2009 American Community Survey (ACS).

\(^{12}\) Although, I would ideally like to rely on the proportion of the citizen voting-age Latino population to get
the most accurate account of the voting strength of the Latino population, the 1990 Census data does not
account for the citizen voting-age population by ethnicity. So, the next best measure of the proportion of
eligible Latinos in a city is the proportion of Latinos voting-age to generate the majority Latino city dummy
variable.
Racial Context

In places where Latinos do not constitute a majority, there may be instances where multiracial coalitions form to help elect Latino candidates to the mayoralty. Thus, I include a binary measure for non-majority cities – where no racial or ethnic group constitutes more than 50.1 percent of the voting age population (1=yes; 0=no). However, the question remains as to whether the presence of African Americans or liberal Anglos influences the incidence of Latino mayoralties in non-majority cities. To examine whether the presence of African Americans in non-majority cities influences the incidence of Latino mayoralties, I include an interaction term for Non-majority City*Percent Black Voting-age Population. A statistically significant interaction term will point to the specific likelihood of observing a Latino mayoralty, given the specific black population size. For example, do Latino mayors rise when Blacks constitute 10 percent of the population, 20 percent, or 40 percent? Perhaps, the size of the black population in a non-majority city is not statistically related to the probability of observing a Latino mayor. This indeed has to be further studied. In addition, I include an interaction term for Non-majority City*Percent College Educated Anglos to examine whether Latino mayoralties are more likely to occur as educated Anglo population varies. Given that previous research has established that college educated Anglos have liberal views toward race (see Glaser 2001; Jacoby 1991), I expect to see Latino mayoralties where no racial/ethnic group constitutes a majority and where the Anglo college educated population is numerically sizeable.
Institutions

To examine whether and how various city-level institutions affect Latino representation in city government, I include binary measures indicating whether cities have Mayor-Council Form of Governments, (1=yes; 0=no) and whether municipal elections have Partisan labels on the ballot to identify candidates’ political affiliation (1=yes; 0=no). These measures test the hypotheses regarding the influence of Progressive Era reforms. Additionally, as outlined above, the previous research further suggests that the desirability of the office may hinder minority candidates’ chances at success because the competition is more severe (Casellas 2009). To examine for the effect of prestige on the incidence of Latino mayoralities I include a binary measure for whether the city mayoralty is a full-time job. Full-time mayors may not only be compensated more than part-time mayors, but they may also have more responsibilities over city departments and policy.

Although the literature suggests that reformed institutions such as council-manager governments and non-partisan elections may be less competitive and increase minority representation, the effect of these institutions may vary based on the racial and ethnic composition the city. For example, the electoral context can be more competitive if no group has a majority of the population (Non-majority City*Mayor-Council Government). On the other hand, cities with majority Latino populations and mayor-council governments or partisan elections may be less competitive – particularly because of established (and amicable) race relations. In other words, Latinos in majority Latino cities may experience less resistance to Latino leadership (in the mayoralty) even in contexts where the elective offices are more desirable because Latinos have already established some level of political incorporation. However, these relationships, in terms
of their effects on the incidence of Latino mayors have not been fully explored and in this chapter I fill this gap in the research by including various interaction terms, such as Non-majority City*Mayor-Council Government, Non-majority City*Full-time Mayor, Non-majority City*Partisan Elections, Majority Latino City*Mayor-Council Government, Majority-Latino City*Full-time Mayor, Majority Latino City*Partisan Elections.

Moreover, to examine the claim about whether and when term limits creates opportunities for Latino representation, I include a binary variable indicating whether a city has Mayoral Term-limits (1=yes;0=no). That is, I account for whether the city limits the total number of terms that mayors can serve consecutively using the ICMA Form of Government Surveys. I expect that this variable (alone) has a positive effect on the incidence of Latino mayoralities. Given that Latinos are generally underrepresented in government, limiting the number of terms a mayor can serve should open up doors for Latino candidates seeking the mayoralty. However, as Thompson and Moncrief (1993) and Casellas (2009) have found, term limits may have a negative effect on minority group representation if they constitute a significant proportion of the population. In other words, cities with a large Latino population may be negatively impacted by term limits since they may be more likely to already have descriptive representation in government.

Although Latinos may have sufficient numbers to replace a term limited Latino mayor with another Latino mayor, having a majority of the population does not guarantee that a majority of voters will be Latinos. In local elections, where voter registration (and turnout) is low, electoral outcomes may depend on a small group of pivotal voter. Thus, to examine the variation of demographic context in term limited cities, I include an interaction for Majority Latino City*Mayoral Term Limits and Non-Majority
City\textsuperscript{*} Mayoral Term Limits. This will help determine whether and when Latinos may benefit from term limits.

\textit{Latino Political Capacity}

Given that the previous research on black (Marschall and Ruhil 2006) and female (Smith et al. 2011) representation in the mayoralty has found that minority representation on the city council is positively associated with minority representation in the city’s top executive office, I include a measure that accounts for the percent of Latinos that serve on the city council. This specifically tests the claim about whether Latinos have the political capacity to be successful in higher-level offices if they not only have a substantial supply of qualified candidates, but if they have been sufficiently politically incorporated in lower-level government. This measure will help determine the level of influence Latinos need to have in the city legislature (e.g., 50 percent of seats in the city council) to have a sufficient supply of quality candidates to gain the mayoralty. To gather this data I relied on the NALEO directories of Latino elected officials from 1984-2006. For the total number of seats in the city legislature I rely on the ICMA \textit{Form of Government} Surveys.

\textit{Controls}

Finally, I control for a variety of factors, such as whether the mayor is directly elected, whether a city is located in a Southwest state such as Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Texas, and the city size – which is measured as the natural log of a city’s total population.
Statistical Methodology

Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, I employ a logistic regression to examine the incidence of Latino mayoralities. To model the dependence between “elections” (or panels) for the same city, I specifically use a random effects logistic regression because it provides robust standard errors clustered by city and year (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005, 42). A standard pooled model provides estimates that average across and within each city.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, to accurately determine whether most of the variation in the model occurs across cities or within each city (i.e., over time), I provide estimates for both a pooled model and a random effects model. As I will describe in more detail below, the estimates for both models are quite similar, thus indicating that the variation really lies between each city. In other words, the random effects model suggests that the data behave as a cross-section, rather than a time-series because there is little variation within each city. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 3.1.

\textsuperscript{13} To examine any intracity variation, that is, to “fix” the average effect of the independent variables across cities and see what impacts Latino mayoral representation over time (within each city), I would ideally use a fixed-effects model. However, fixed-effects models cannot estimate a fixed-effects parameter when a city is not in the sample at least twice and when there is no variation of the independent variables over time. Therefore, in this analysis I’ll focus on describing the estimates for the random-effects model.
Table 3.1

Descriptive Statistics of Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Mayor in City</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Latino City</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. College Ed. Latinos</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. Black VAP</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. College Ed. Whites</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Elections</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-Council Gov.</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time Mayor</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limits</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Population (log)</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>15.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Directly Elected</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. Latinos on Council</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest City</td>
<td>18,307</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings

Table 3.2 presents the results that examine the determinants of Latino mayoralties across the US. However, the results in Table 3.2 specifically show three distinct models: a standard pooled model, a random effects model (to compare with the standard pooled model’s results) and a random effects model that includes an interaction term of Non-majority City*Mayor-Council Government. The latter model, with the interaction terms, is the fully specified model and is included to help interpret the impact of each variable on the outcome. To prevent any misinterpretation of the effect of the independent variables on the outcome, all non-statistically significant interaction terms are not included in the analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modeling Latino Descriptive Representation in U.S. Mayoralties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Var.</strong> Latino Mayor in City (0,1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1)</strong> Pooled Logistic Regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(2)</strong> Random Effects Logistic Regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3)</strong> Random Effects Logistic Regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latino Voting Strength</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Latino City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Racial Context</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. Black VAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City*Pct Black VAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City*Pct College Whites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-Council Gov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City*Mayor-Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latino Political Capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Population (log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Directly Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs. (city-year/cities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* p &lt; 0.10, ** p &lt; 0.05, *** p &lt; 0.01 (Standard errors in parentheses)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The three models in Table 3.2 are very similar to one another where all the variables that are statistically significant remain in the same direction in each model. The only major difference between the standard pooled results (Model 1) and the random effects results (Model 2) is that the latter provides robust standard errors clustered by the panel variable. Model 3 in Table 3.2 is very similar to the results in Model 2, however, the impact of the independent variables on the outcome vary in degree. The estimates in Model 3 in Table 3.2 show that Latino representation in the mayoralty is primarily a function of Latino voting strength. Not only are majority Latino cities positively associated with the incidence of Latino mayoralities, but the larger the college educated Latino population in a city the higher the probability that a Latino/a will serve at the head of municipal government.

Figure 3.1 shows this relationship in graphic form. Latino political clout measured as a proportion of college educated Latinos increases the likelihood of observing a Latino mayor. Additionally, the figure shows that this effect is much larger in cities that have a Latino voting age population greater than 50 percent. To give an example just how much the voting strength of the Latino population, in terms of population size and education levels, matters for Latino mayoral representation, the figure suggests that, all else equal, a city with a relatively well educated Latino population (about 28 percent) in a majority Latino city, the probability of observing a Latino mayor is nearly 50 percent. However, in a city with an equally educated Latino population, but where Latinos are a minority of the population, the probability of observing a Latino mayor is nearly 15 percent. Therefore, the voting strength of Latinos, in terms of their socioeconomic status and sheer population size, seems to play a substantial role in helping Latinos achieve
representation in the city mayoralty. In other words, without a sizeable, well educated population, Latinos’ political strength (within the context of elections) is severely limited.

In addition to Latinos’ voting strength having a prominent impact on the rise of Latino mayors, the results in Model 3 of Table 3.2 indicate that Latino political capacity has a noteworthy role. Specifically, the greater Latinos’ political capacity, measured as the percent of Latino city council members, the greater the likelihood that cities will have Latino mayors. Figure 3.2 shows this relationship in graphic form. It is evident that cities with more Latinos on city council are statistically more likely to have Latino mayors. However, the effect of Latino political capacity is more pronounced in cities where

\[ \text{In Figure 3.2 the percent college educated Latino pop. is 20 percent. Other variables are held at the mean.} \]
Latinos are a majority of the population. The probability of observing a Latino mayor in a majority Latino city tops the 50 percent probability threshold where Latinos make-up at least 45 percent of the city legislature. Thus, this shows how critical it is to have descriptive representation in lower level government to observe Latino mayoralities.

The estimates in Model 3 of Table 3.2 show that the racial context of the city, in terms of the strength of the Black population and the presence of college educated Anglos, has a negative effect on Latino representation. This suggests that overall levels of non-Latino groups’ political clout vis-à-vis Latinos’ could preclude Latino representation in the mayoralty. Given that the interaction terms examining whether multiracial coalitions form in non-majority cities were not statistically significant, they were ultimately dropped from the final model. The only measure of racial context that has an impact on
Latino mayoralities is the indicator of a non-majority city. That is, if no racial/ethnic group has a majority of the population, then they are statistically more likely to have Latino mayors than cities where one group (other than Latinos) makes up a majority. Table 3.3 shows the predicted probabilities for cities having Latino mayors under non-majority and majority cities. This variable has a minimal effect on the probability of observing a Latino mayor unless the Latino college educated population reaches 30 percent. This further suggests that to see a Latino mayor serve as the city’s chief executive, Latinos cannot be a trivial proportion of the (educated) population in non-majority cities.

As for any institutions that can serve as either obstacles or opportunities for Latino mayoralities, the results in Model 3 of Table 3.2 show that there are no notable obstacles. However, the implementation of mayoral term limits does increase the probability of observing a Latino mayor. Again, Table 3.3 shows that the substantive impact on Latino mayoral representation heavily depends on a non-trivial educated Latino population. In other words, in cities where Latinos are relatively well educated the probability of observing a Latino increases by 13 percentage points, particularly in cities with term limits compared to cities with a similar demographic makeup without term limits. Mayor council forms of government also seem to influence the probability of observing a Latino mayor, however, under certain demographic conditions. The model estimates in Table 3.2 show that the interaction term, Non-majority city*Mayor-Council Government has a positive association with Latino mayoralities. This finding points to the impact of mayor-council governments on Latino representation in cities where no racial/ethnic group composes a majority of the population. Table 3.3 shows that this
interaction has a very limited impact on the outcome (representation), unless the Latino college educated population reaches 30 percent. In other words, for institutions to have a notable impact on descriptive representation, the Latino (educated) population must be sizeable. Since Latinos are not a trivial proportion of the population in these demographic contexts, particularly where no group composes a majority of the population, mayor-council governments seem to attract rather than deter Latino candidates from running and winning for more desirable elective offices.

### Table 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Probability of Observing Latino Mayors</th>
<th>15 Pct. Latino College Ed Pop. (other vars. at mean)</th>
<th>30 Pct. Latino College Ed Pop. (other vars. at mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority Latino City=0</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Latino City=1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City=0</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City=1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limits=0</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limit=1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City*Mayor-Council=0</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Majority City*Mayor-Council=1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest City=0</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest City=1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, the results in Table 3.2 reveal three major factors that contribute to the descriptive representation of Latinos in the mayoralty. First, Latinos’ voting strength, in terms of population size and – especially education levels, is a necessary for observing Latino mayors. Second, institutions such as term limits and mayor-council governments seem to offer opportunities for Latino candidates vying for the mayoralty. Alone,
however, these factors seem to play a minimal role in helping Latinos gain access to municipal government. In other words, without Latinos being sufficiently strong (and well educated), these institutions are not very likely to help Latino candidates break barriers. Third, Latino descriptive representation in lower-level government has a strong and association with Latino descriptive representation in the mayor’s office. This highlights how important it is to see Latino candidates run for and be successful in city council elections to ultimately see Latinos more fully incorporated in municipal government. This third point is nearly moot if it not were for the first point (Latino voting strength) being so critical. That is, the substantive impact on the predicted probability of observing a Latino mayor, as a function of the proportion of Latinos on the city council, is minimal unless Latinos are sizeable and relatively well educated.

**Conclusion**

At the outset, I asked the following question: What explains Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty? Having examined the various demographic, institutional, and political factors associated with representation using a large database constructed from six ICMA *Form of Government Survey* waves spanning from 1981 to 2006, the results from the statistical analyses yield several interesting results. First, the rise of Latino mayors is largely a function of the voting strength of the Latino population in terms of comprising a majority of the population and being substantially well educated. The conventional wisdom as well as previous research identifying the political behavior of racial and ethnic minorities suggests that Latinos tend not to vote in proportion to their population size, thus limiting their political clout. If we assume that coethnic voting
occurs (see Barreto 2007) in elections with Latino candidates, then Latinos need to compose a substantial proportion of the population in order to see Latinos serve in the mayoralty.

The empirical results also show that beyond the mere demographic context, two institutions impact the incidence of Latino mayors, namely term limits and mayor-council governments. Granted, these institutions only impact the probability of observing Latino mayors within specific demographic settings that allow Latinos to be relevant in electoral contexts – particularly in settings where Latinos sizeable and well educated. Thus, under the right demographic context, cities that limit the number of consecutive terms that incumbents can serve may be necessary for Latinos to gain representation. Additionally, mayor-council governments do not pose a barrier to Latino mayoral representation, unlike previously expected, due to the prestige associated with this governing arrangement. In fact, in non-majority cities with mayor-council governments, Latinos are more likely to be represented in the mayoralty. Granted, that the effect of this institution depends on the demographic composition of the city. So, there may be something unique about non-majority cities with mayor-council governments that is suitable for Latinos to gain representation. For example, minority led coalitions may be more likely to form in these contexts. Also, minority voters may be more likely to be mobilized in elections with minority candidates in these types of cities. There is no empirical evidence here that suggests that the size of the black or liberal Anglo population influences Latino mayoral representation in non-majority settings. Thus, further research is needed to explain city politics and elections when Latino candidates vie for the mayoralty (see Barreto 2007).
Finally, what seems to play a very substantial role in increasing the representation of Latinos in the mayoralty is the extent to which Latinos are represented in the city council – or the capacity of Latinos to supply a pool of qualified mayoral candidates. Latino representation in the city legislature influences the rise of Latino mayors, particularly where Latinos are sizeable and well educated. Therefore, when modeling the representation of underrepresented groups it is important to take into account the extent to which they have previous experience serving in lower-level government.

Given that the findings in this chapter seek explain Latino representation in the mayoralty, they also point to the conditions under which we can expect that Latino candidates will not only emerge, but also win elections. The fact that the strength of Latino population as well Latino political incorporation in lower-level government is positively associated with Latino representation also indicates that these factors should influence the emergence and success of Latino candidates. However, there is limited research that systematically studies Latino candidate emergence and success in elections beyond a single city or small sample of cities. Furthermore, we do not know whether the factors that are associated with Latino descriptive representation (studied in this chapter) will hold once taking into account various factors related to the election, per se (e.g., turnout, incumbency, and the number of competitive candidates vying office). Thus, it is essential to continue to unravel the complex relationships between demographic contexts, institutions, and political factors to understand the conditions that not only lead to Latinos emerging in mayoral elections but winning these political contests. In the next chapter, I employ an original dataset of 657 mayoral elections in 113 cities in 6 Southwestern states to examine the various conditions under which Latino mayoral candidates run and win.
When the Pew Hispanic Center asked U.S. Hispanics in a 2010 survey who the most important Hispanic leader was, almost two-thirds of the respondents said that they didn’t know (Taylor and Lopez 2010). Respondents – in the single digits – mentioned U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor while others mentioned Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and Univision’s Jorge Ramos. In fact, there is no single prominent Hispanic political leader comparable to Jesse Jackson or Al Sharpton – both nationally recognized black leaders known to actively pursue a “black” agenda in political campaigns and elections. The media does however, herald several politicians including recently elected mayor of San Antonio, Julian Castro, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis, California Assembly Speaker John Perez (D-CA), and Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval (R-NV) as future Hispanic leaders who will fill the national leadership void (see Chafets 2010; MSNBC.COM15). In other words, these are politicians with the chops much like new-era African American politicians that have strong (or growing) national name recognition and broad racial appeal similar to that of Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, Newark, New Jersey Mayor Cory Booker, and President Barack Obama.

Given the diversity of the Latino population in terms of socioeconomic status, immigration status, regional concentration, and national origin, there may never be a single prominent leader that emerges to represent the entire Latino community in the

15 http://powerwall.msnbc.msn.com/politics/10-latino-politicians-to-watch-9701.gallery
national political arena. However, recently noted changes in the U.S.’s demographic profile will certainly lead to the rise of many Hispanic leaders in the near future. With more than 80 percent of Latino elected officials serving as either school-board members, city council members, or county commissioners (NALEO 2009), future leaders are most likely to have political experience in state and local elective offices. So, what contributes to the rise of Latino candidates in subnational elective offices?

More specifically, why are Hispanic mayoral candidates such as Angel Taveras (Providence, Rhode Island’s first Hispanic mayor), Ron Gonzales (first Hispanic Mayor of San Jose, California), Julian Castro (Mayor of San Antonio, Texas), and William Lantigua (First Hispanic Mayor of Lawrence, Massachusetts) not only more likely to run for the mayor’s office, but more likely to win? Also, why have others, including Orlando Sanchez (Houston, TX), Feliciano "Felix" Ramirez (Lake County City, FL), and Matt Gonzales (San Francisco, CA), not been successful in mayoral elections? Is there something about the demographic profile of the city that creates opportunities for Latino mayoral candidates to be successful? That is, does electoral emergence and success merely hinge upon the numerical strength of the Hispanic population? Or are these political outcomes conditioned on the context of the election (i.e., mobilization, candidate qualifications, incumbency, and campaign strategies)? Beyond newspaper accounts, a few case studies, and small-N analyses (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003; Hero 1992; see also Marschall 2010), we really do not have generalizable answers to these questions about Latino candidate emergence and success in municipal elections.

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16 For example, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) was once school board member, mayor of Union City, NJ, and state legislator before becoming U.S. Senator (http://menendez senate.gov/biography/).
Focusing on candidate success in U.S. mayoralities is important because, in many instances, mayors serve as city executives with the authority (and visibility) to influence public policy outcomes (see Marschall and Shah 2005). Additionally, mayors – under most institutional arrangements – have the gravitas to garner strong name recognition, executive experience, and political savvy to win higher-level elective offices. In other words, mayoralities can serve as ideal stepping-stones for state- and national-level elective offices. Thus, it becomes important to know why Latino candidates run and win in these contexts. Also, since there are so few gubernatorial seats and four successful Hispanic governors in recent history,\(^{17}\) mayoralities are ideal venues to examine both successful and unsuccessful Hispanic candidates seeking to gain executive office experience. That is not to say that school boards, city councils, and state legislatures do not merit study, because they too play an important role in Hispanic political incorporation (Shah 2010; Marshall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010; Casellas 2009). But because Latino descriptive representation in U.S. mayoralities is understudied (see Marschall 2010) and because mayoralities provide candidates with enough resources to advance the political incorporation of Latinos, in this chapter, I focus on understanding key questions about Latino representation in municipal government. I specifically test models that examine candidate emergence and candidate success. Understanding why Latino candidates run for mayor and why they win elections will further help to inform future studies that examine representation in gubernatorial, state legislative, and Congressional elections.

The dataset used in this study contains information that goes beyond city-level context variables that can, in theory, impact the supply of Latino candidates. Because

election results provide information-rich data on the context of the election, I examine the strategic concerns that may face Latino candidates when deciding to run for elective office. These factors may include information about the competitiveness of an election, the degree of voter mobilization, and the quality of the candidates seeking the office. The nature of the data used in the Large-N analysis of the previous chapter does not allow for these types of campaign-specific details to be examined in order to address the question of why Latino candidates emerge and why they win. In the sections below, I outline theoretical models that describe the determinants of Hispanic candidate emergence and success. Following that, I describe the data, the operationalization of the variables, and the methodology used.

**Building a Theoretical Model of Latino Candidate Emergence & Success**

The previous research suggests that minority candidate emergence posits two major conditions: 1) an adequate supply of qualified minority candidates available to make a bid for an elective office and 2) on strategic factors that inform candidates about whether they can win. The supply of qualified minority candidates vying for the mayoralty stems from demographic, political, and institutional factors surrounding city politics. These are factors that influence minority representation in the candidate pool in the aggregate. The strategic costs and benefits that candidates weigh when deciding to run for office hinge upon the context surrounding the election. The previous research has not specifically examined how and whether these conditions apply to the emergence and success of Latino mayoral candidates, per se. Below, I provide further details about the factors that
influence the supply of Latino candidates vying the for mayoralty as well as the strategic factors that candidates weigh when considering to enter a political race.

**Latino Candidate Supply**

The supply of Latino candidates in mayoral elections primarily depends on a pipeline of qualified Latino candidates who are willing and able to run. This in turn depends on the political strength of the Latino population. Specifically, scholars have argued that the numerical strength of the minority population is directly related to having descriptive representation in local and state government (Bullock and MacManus 1990; Shah 2010; Casellas 2009). Branton (2009) confirms that the larger the minority population, the higher the probability of observing black and Latino candidates in Congressional primary elections. The research in the previous chapter reveals that cities with majority Latino voting-age populations are more likely to have Latino mayors. Without a sizeable Latino population, the city would lack a supply of potential Latino candidates – which reduces the likelihood that Latino candidates will emerge in mayoral elections. Given that the numerical strength of the Latino population is a key component of Latino descriptive representation, I also expect it to be a key component of Latino mayoral candidate success.

In addition to Latino demographic characteristics playing a substantial role in the representation of Latinos in the candidate pool and in city government, the research outlined in the previous chapter suggests that Latino political incorporation in lower-level government provides a pathway for representation in the city’s top executive office. Therefore, the more Latinos there are in lower-level government the higher the pool of
qualified candidates with political networks, financial resources, and name recognition to run and serve in higher-level office (see Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Smith et al. 2011). Anecdotal evidence suggests that many mayoral candidates perceived to have a good chance of winning have served in the city legislature. This is true for candidates such as Henry Cisneros to Julian Castro who both served in San Antonio municipal government as members of the city council prior to their successful bids as city mayors. Therefore, I expect to see Latino candidates more likely to emerge in mayoral elections as well as win elections the more Latinos are represented in lower-level government.

Another factor that may influence the supply of Latino candidates is whether cities have history of Latino leadership in the mayoralty. Although Marschall and Ruhil (2006) and Smith et al. (2011) do not find a relationship between prior black and female mayoral representation and subsequent minority mayoralities, they suggest that previous experience under minority leadership should pave the path for subsequent representation. This may be as a result of voters from various racial/ethnic groups learning about how life under the leadership of black mayors is not as threatening as initially expected (Hajnal 2007). Moreover, having a Latino mayor in the past gives the Latinos sufficient political strength to gain control of the city’s top executive office in the future. Thus, cities with previous experience under a Latino mayoralty may positively influence the supply of Latino mayoral candidates vying for that office as well as increase the odds of winning it.

While the supply of Latino candidates may greatly depend on various demographic and political factors, previous research on minority representation also suggests that cities’ institutional arrangements can influence the costs associated with
running for office for minority candidates. Specifically, Oxley and Fox (2004) find that more desirable/prestigious offices reduce the likelihood of observing female representation. This outcome stems from the expectation that more prestigious elective offices create a contentious political atmosphere that is not conducive to historically excluded and generally under-resourced racial, and ethnic minorities, or women more generally. Alternatively, there are institutions that can be conducive to the formation of political alliances across racial/ethnic groups in city politics, such as in reformed governments (see Hero 1992). Since reformed governments generally reduce political patronage, as intended from the Progressive Era reforms, cities with reformed institutions are thought to have less competitive contexts. If the context is less competitive, then racial and ethnic minorities should have a greater opportunity to be part of the governing coalition and are more likely to be represented in the candidate pool and win elections.

Alone, the institutions mentioned above may create more or less competitive contexts – which may further impact the presence of Latinos in candidate pool as well as their probability of winning. However, the impact of these institutions may vary based on the size of the Latino population. Specifically, it is possible that costs decline for Latino candidates if the office sought-after is prestigious in a city with a large Latino voting-age population because a strong contingent of Latinos will, in effect, help Latino candidates be more competitive. In other words, the level of prestige associated with the office is no longer a barrier to entry (or success) if the size of the Latino population is sufficiently large to help coethnic candidates win. In fact, Latino candidates may be even more attracted to run in cities with more prestigious elective offices located in cities with numerically strong Latino populations. Given the expected variation of the impact of the
city’s governing arrangements, this relationship needs to be further explored in varying demographic contexts.

In addition to city governing institutions, electoral rules are other mechanisms that can increase the costs of running – which may negatively impact the supply of Latino candidates – and reduce the likelihood of Latino candidates running and winning. For example, the institution of the runoff provision (i.e., a second-round election)\textsuperscript{18} increases the costs for minority candidates to have to either 1) avoid a runoff election or 2) raise money and other resources to succeed in two elections (see Bullock and Johnson 1992). Given the scarcity of the research on this institutional mechanism and its impact on Latino representation, in this chapter I explore how it impacts Latino representation in the mayoral candidate pool as well as Latino candidates’ success in mayoral elections.

Another electoral rule that has the potential to influence the supply of underrepresented groups in the candidate pool is term limits. This institution is also related to reducing the costs of running. Although the previous research suggests that the evidence is mixed in terms of the effects on minority candidate emergence (see Oxley and Fox 2004; Trounstine and Valdini 2008), term limits, in theory give opportunities for minority candidates to emerge because they do not have to face entrenched Anglo incumbents (Schlesinger 1966; for more on incumbency advantage see Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Alford and Hibbing 1981; Krehbiel and Wright 1983; Cox and Morgenstern 1993; Cox and Katz 1996; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002). Further analysis

\textsuperscript{18} There are various ways in which winners are declared in mayoral elections including, two-round elections and one-round elections. Two-round elections are those that require a second election to be held between the top two candidates if one candidate does not meet a threshold of votes, typically a majority. One-round elections are either plurality elections – where candidates win if they have the most votes (no threshold) – or instant-runoff elections – where voters rank the candidates. In the latter election systems, if no candidate receives a majority of votes the votes from lower-ranked candidates get redistributed until one candidate receives a majority.
is needed to determine whether and when the implementation of term limits influences the supply of Latino candidates emerging in the candidate pool as well as their probability of winning.

Similarly, the supply of Latino candidates and their prospective chances of winning can also be influenced by the magnitude of the political jurisdiction in question, particularly because larger contexts require more resources to raise money, mobilize voters, and wage a competitive political campaign. Thus, running in larger jurisdictions should increase the costs for candidates, while running in smaller jurisdictions should reduce the costs of running. Black (1972) and Hogan (2004) agree that larger jurisdictions are less conducive to candidate emergence because of the inhibited costs involved. For Latino candidates, this factor can also weigh on their decisions to seek office because these contexts may be more competitive.

Mechanisms that increase the supply of minority candidates beyond mitigating the costs of running in elections are not limited to institutions that affect the competitiveness of the political office. For example, there are institutions designed to encourage political participation generally by fixing the timing of municipal elections to be held concurrently with federal elections. Hajnal (2010) explains that municipal elections are often low information and low salience elections. This occurs not only because local candidates do not receive media attention similar to that of presidential elections, but also because the elections are held at different times (see also Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Thus, elections held during presidential election years may have lower costs to entry because it is less costly to have to mobilize voters. For Latino candidates, the positive effect of election timing on entering the race and winning may be conditioned by the size of the Latino
population. So, this conditional relationship needs to be examined to determine when Latino candidates are more likely to be represented in the candidate pool and win mayoral elections.

**Latino Candidate Strategy**

In addition to looking at how contextual factors shape Latino representation, I will consider how *election specific factors* influence the representation of Latinos in the candidate pool as well as their success in mayoral elections.

The seminal research examining candidate emergence indicates that candidates consider whether or not they can *win* before they decide to seek political office (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972). Moreover, there is information about the electoral context that can help candidates determine whether or not they can win. For Latinos, information about their prospective chances of winning could depend on whether any Latino candidates have emerged in the past. The mere emergence of Latinos in prior elections (as incumbents or challengers) should signal that the political context has been conducive to the emergence of Latino candidates. In other words, if the conditions have been right for Latinos to run in the past, then they might continue to be right for them to run in the future. Specifically, I expect to see Latino candidates represented in the candidate pool and win elections if Latinos candidates have emerged in the past.

Information about the electoral context, such as the presence of an incumbent, also affects the decision calculus of potential candidates. Congressional scholars point to an increasing advantage among incumbents because not only do incumbents win more often, but they also win by larger margins (see Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972; Maisel and
Stone 1997; Cox and Katz 1996). Open seats have been found to positively impact candidate emergence in city council elections (Krebs 1999), and particularly minority candidate emergence (see Branton 2009). Thus, I expect that Latino candidates are more likely to emerge and win in mayoral elections when there is an open seat than when an incumbent is on the ballot. It is also important to further examine whether an open seat election in contexts with a more sizeable Latino population further increases the possibility of Latino candidates running and winning. Strategically speaking, Latino candidates are more likely to win in open seat elections held in cities where Latinos are numerically stronger because larger coethnic populations will help propel Latino candidates to victory. Therefore, I expect that Latinos are more likely to be represented when incumbents are absent from mayoral elections, particularly in cities with large Latino populations.

Besides the presence or absence of an incumbent, the literature examining individual attitudes of potential contenders in political races indicates that information about the candidate pool influences candidates’ strategic considerations about whether to enter a political race (Maisel et al. 2004). For example, a crowded field of viable or competitive candidates may detract other candidates from seeking office. So, on the one hand, Latino candidates may not be represented in the candidate pool (and in government) because the competition is too fierce. And for minority candidates, competitive contexts may not prove to be the most conducive environment for success. On the other hand, in elections with more competitive candidates, the election outcome may be more uncertain. Therefore, information about their chances of success can be more positive because uncertainty can indicate that a seat is up for grabs. My expectation
is that the information about the candidate pool sends signals to potential candidates, and it is up for debate about how this influences the emergence and success of Latino candidates.

So far, I have outlined various supply and strategic factors that apply to both candidate emergence and success. However, the research on minority descriptive representation reveals that there are two factors that are critical for candidate success, perse: 1) previous political experience and 2) voter mobilization. Therefore, the model of Latino candidate success slightly deviates from Latino candidate emergence – which is one reason why these two electoral outcomes are studied in separate empirical models.

Having experience serving in government, in any capacity, makes individual candidates more competitive because they have developed political networks, financial resources, and name recognition to succeed in an election (see Marschall and Ruhil 2006). Unlike Latino representation in lower-level government that seemingly influences the overall supply of Latino candidates via an institutional pipeline, previous political experience is germane to the individual candidate. There are examples of Latino mayoral candidates serving in various levels of government. Specifically, Antonio Villaraigosa the current mayor of Los Angeles and Federico Peña the mayor of Denver in 1983 both had leadership positions within the state legislature. Although previous political experience may influence whether candidates win, for Latino candidates, previous political experience may be conditioned by the size of the Latino population. The demographic context can be particularly relevant for Latino candidates with previous political experience – especially if Latino candidates rely on fellow Latinos for electoral support.
Although previous political experience is considered to be a key factor driving candidate success, scholars point to the role of political participation in helping minority candidates win elections (see Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). The importance of voter mobilization was documented in Hero’s (1992) account of Federico Peña’s mayoral bid in 1983. As he explains, one strategy the campaign actively pursued was to ratchet-up turnout – particularly among a certain demographic (Latinos and African Americans). The research also points to Hispanic candidates’ effectiveness at mobilizing coethnic voters (see Barreto 2007). Hajnal (2010) and Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) assert that increasing voter mobilization – among minority groups – can indeed change the outcome of local elections. They claim that minority candidates are more likely to win in contexts where minorities are not only more numerous but also in contexts where voter mobilization is higher. Therefore, the effect of voter mobilization on Latino representation can be conditioned by the size of the Latino population. Additionally, quality Latino challengers may benefit more from higher levels of mobilization and thus be more likely to win elections – as described by Hero (1992) in the case of Federico Peña. However, because mobilization is theoretically related to candidates’ probability of success, I also look at whether this is related to the emergence of Latino candidates. That is, I examine whether elections with high voter participation are more likely to have Latinos represented in the candidate pool than elections with lower participation levels. In the following sections I will outline the data used to examine whether and how these aforementioned factors influence Latino candidate emergence and success. Additionally, I will describe how I operationalize candidate supply candidate strategy.
The data used to examine Latino candidate emergence and Latino candidate success are based from election results gathered from city, county, and state websites as well as from city and county clerks in a large and representative sample (by size and geographic location) of cities within the six southwestern U.S. states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas). In addition, I include demographic data from the U.S. Census; and local institutional arrangements from International City and County Management Association’s (ICMA) *Form of Government Surveys* – as well as from city charters, websites, and personally contacting city clerks. The sample used to examine candidate emergence includes 105 cities and 437 elections (first-round or general) spanning various years. I examine first round elections for Latino candidate emergence because emergence in the second round is conditional upon success in the first round – or at least finishing with the second most votes in case no candidate received at least 50 percent of the votes. So, including second round elections in the analysis would not necessarily constitute an analysis of Latino candidate emergence, rather it would resemble an analysis of Latino candidate success. For a detailed discussion of the core sample used in this chapter please refer to Appendix A.

To specifically examine Latino candidate success, I rely on a sample of 189 first and second-round elections in 69 cities with Latino candidates on the ballot. The fact that this sample only includes elections with Latino candidates on the ballot reduces the sample size from the previous analysis of candidate emergence. Additionally, each

19 For example, I have gathered elections for Houston, TX from 1993-2009 (9 cycles), San Antonio, TX from 1991-2009 (10 cycles), Los Angeles, CA from 1997-2009 (4 cycles), Denver, CO from 1991-2007 (3 cycles).
election has at least two challengers. In other words, no elections are unopposed. Because I analyze Latino candidate emergence and Latino candidate success separately, the analysis below will describe the supply and strategic factors that influence these outcomes in two separate tables. Although the supply and strategic factors are expected to work similarly for emergence and success, the models are not completely identical. This is one key reason for studying these political outcomes in separate models.

Variables

The election results provide information not only on the outcome of the election (e.g., the winner, margin of victory, total number of votes cast), but also information on all the candidates who participated in the election (e.g., the vote shares, surname, and incumbency). The candidate information is the basis for the dependent variables used in this chapter. However, in this analysis I use two sets of dependent variables – one for emergence and the other for success. For candidate emergence, I specifically examine three binary dependent variables: 1) the emergence of a Latino candidate on the ballot, 2) the emergence of a Latino incumbent, and 3) the emergence of a quality (non-incumbent) Latino challenger. Specifically, for the first dependent variable 1=the presence of at least one candidate that is of Latino descent and 0=otherwise. For the second dependent variable 1=the presence of a Latino mayoral incumbent and 0=otherwise. For the third dependent variable 1=the presence of at least one Latino non-incumbent challenger with previous political experience and 0=otherwise. These dependent variables are included in this study to see how the various supply and strategic factors influence the emergence of different types of Latino candidates (any candidate of Latino descent, Latino candidates
that have previously served as mayors, and Latino candidates with previous political experience). To determine the racial/ethnic background of the candidates, I relied on the directories of Latino elected officials provided by the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) from 1984-2009 as well as the U.S. Census Spanish Surname Lists (Word & Perkins 1996).\(^{20}\) For candidates’ previous political experience (or qualifications), I relied on newspaper and website searches as well as NALEO directories to determine whether candidates have held previous office such as in the school board, city council, county government, and state legislature (1=yes, 0=no). To determine incumbency, I simply accounted for whether a candidate on the ballot was running for reelection. This information was based on the previous election results (\(time T-I\)).

For **candidate success**, I analyze two dependent variables: 1) a binary variable indicating whether a Latino candidate won the election (1=yes, 0=no) and 2) the percent of the votes received in the mayoral election – or vote share – of the Latino candidate. The vote share is based on the sum of the votes cast for all mayoral candidates on the ballot. Although my main interest is to examine why candidates win, success does depend on candidates reaching a minimum threshold of votes – usually 50.1 percent of the votes cast – which is why I examine vote share in this study. To examine the determinants of both candidate emergence, success, and vote share, I include a variety of independent variables that I categorize as either the *supply* or *strategy* of Latino candidates.

\(^{20}\) Admittedly, this is not the most accurate method to identify Latinos especially since women married to Latinos may take-on their surname or in other cases Latinos who do not have Spanish surnames would be overlooked. However, it is the best method available.
Modeling Latino Candidate Emergence & Success

Before I outline the specific details regarding how I operationalize the strategy and supply variables used to examine Latino candidate emergence and success, I first present a summary of the empirical models:

Latino Emergence = Supply \( \text{(Latino Voting Strength} + \text{Latino Political Incorporation in City Government} + \text{Institutional & Demographic Costs}) \) + Strategy \( \text{(Latino Candidate Emergence in } t-1 + \text{Election Competitiveness}) \) + Supply*Strategy

Latino Success = Supply \( \text{(Latino Voting Strength} + \text{Latino Political Incorporation in City Government} + \text{Institutional & Demographic Costs}) \) + Strategy \( \text{(Previous Political Experience} + \text{Mobilization} + \text{Election Competitiveness}) \) + Supply*Strategy

The models reveal that the emergence and success of Latino candidates, particularly in mayoral elections is expected to be a function of supply and strategic factors. Supply factors include the strength of the Latino population, the degree of Latinos’ political incorporation in city government, and the costs for potential candidates influenced by the institutional arrangements and the demographic context of the city. Strategic factors are specifically related to the context of the election. For running, strategic factors include the emergence of Latino candidates in time \( t-1 \) and other factors (in the election) that influence the level of competitiveness. For winning, strategic factors include the previous
political experience of Latino candidates, voter mobilization, and other factors that influence the level of competitiveness in elections. In the next section, I will provide more detail about how the various supply and strategic factors are operationalized.

Operationalizing Supply Factors

Latino voting strength is operationalized as the percent Latino voting-age population in a city. This data was gathered using the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Censuses to match the appropriate election dates. For data on elections in cities after the year 2000, I relied on the 2005-2009 American Community Survey population estimates. I expect that the supply of Latino candidates will grow given the numerical strength of the Latino population\(^{21}\) in a city – therefore, increasing the likelihood of a Latino candidate not only emerging, but also winning elections.

To measure the level of Latino political incorporation in municipal government, I rely on NALEO directories of Latino elected officials to account for the city’s history of having a Latino mayor at any point from 1984 up to the election date in question (1=at least one mayor during this period; 0=no Latino mayors); and the number of Latino city council members in office in a city at time \(T\). These variables are independent measures of this concept of incorporation and I expect the more Latinos are politically incorporated in city government, either via city council or historically in the mayoralty, the more likely Latino candidates will be represented in the candidate pool and also more likely to win.

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\(^{21}\) Ideally, I would include a measure for the citizen voting-age Latino population in a city to get a more accurate measure of the Latino population’s voting strength, however the 1990 Census does not account for citizenship status by ethnicity.
Increased costs for potential Latino candidates are linked to a city’s institutional profile – particularly the governing arrangements and electoral rules. To measure the level of prestige of city governments, I include a binary measure for whether the city is a mayor-council government \(1=\text{yes}, 0=\text{no})\). To test whether the strength of the Latino population conditions the influence of prestigious elective offices, I include an interaction term for mayor-council government*Percent Latino VAP. Other city-level institutions that in theory impact the emergence of Latino candidacies via influencing the costs of potential candidates to emerge include electoral rules that establish whether incumbents can serve a maximum number of consecutive terms (term limits), whether elections require a minimum threshold of votes – usually 50.1 percent – to avoid a 2\(^{nd}\) round election (runoff provision), and whether municipal elections are held concurrently with presidential election years (concurrent elections). For all these variables \(1=\text{yes}, \text{and} 0=\text{otherwise}\). Given that term limits and the timing of the election can be influenced by the strength of the Latino population in a city, I include interaction terms in the analysis: term limits*percent Latino VAP and concurrent election*percent Latino VAP.

Finally, I use U.S. Census data to generate a measure of the natural log of the city population during the year the election was held. This measure of the city’s demographic context is an indicator of the general costs involved in running a campaign in larger cities (versus smaller cities). Given that the Census data is available for 1980, 1990, 2000, I imputed the data for the election years held in-between those dates. For election years later than 2000, I relied on the 2005-2009 American Community Survey Estimates. This

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22 Although there is much variation in terms of the power of the mayor (see Svara 1995), generally municipal governments have mayors that serve as independent executives of the city’s bureaucracy or city managers that are appointed by the mayor at the consent of the city council.
measure will test the notion that larger, more populated cities suppress minority candidate emergence given how costly it is to have to mobilize more voters in a larger city to win.

Operationalizing Strategic Factors

In addition to the factors associated with the supply of Latino candidacies, a model of Latino descriptive representation must account for the strategic factors that influence a potential candidate’s decisions about whether they can win the election in question. These factors are specifically related to the context of the election. For candidate emergence, this includes information about who is running, particularly whether a Latino ran in time T-1. Given that I have three dependent variables for candidate emergence I include lagged dependent variables for 1) any Latino candidate, 2) a Latino incumbent, and 3) a Latino non-incumbent challenger with previous political experience. I operationalize each of these concepts as binary variables where 1=yes, 0= otherwise. For candidate success, two major strategic factors include whether the top vote earning Latino candidate is a quality candidate and whether the top vote earning Latino is an incumbent. Latino candidate quality=1 if the candidate has held any previous political office; 0=otherwise. Latino incumbent=1 if the winner in time T is Latino and won in time T-1; 0=otherwise. To gather information on the Latino candidate’s previous political experience, I relied on NALEO directories to investigate whether they had served in school board, the city legislature, county government, or in state government. I also searched campaign websites, online and print media accounts of elections to determine whether a Latino candidate had previous political experience. I do not include a lagged dependent variable for candidate success because it reduces the number of observations.
in the analysis. However, having a binary variable for whether Latino incumbent on the ballot (where 1=yes and 0=no) essentially functions as a lagged dependent variable because it denotes whether a Latino candidate won in time T-1. In addition, I include a lagged variable for the presence of Latino incumbents in time T-1 to examine the emergence of quality Latino challengers. That is, since previous success should in theory pave a path for future Latino candidates (with previous experience in other offices besides the mayoralty), the lagged Latino incumbent variable should test for whether this indeed occurs. Finally, I test for whether Latino candidates with previous political experience are more likely to run and win in cities with strong Latino populations by including an interaction term for Latino Candidate Quality*Percent Latino VAP.

To operationalize the competitiveness of an election, I include a variable accounting for the number of number of viable or competitive candidates, which is measured as a fractionalization score: 1/(sum of the squared vote share of each candidate). Because this formula determines which candidates had the larger share of votes out of the entire pool of candidates, it provides an estimate of the number of competitive or viable candidates.23 For both candidate emergence and success, information about whether a non-Latino incumbent is on the ballot is critical to examine. Incumbency was determined by accounting for whether a non-Latino candidate in time T won in time T-1. Based on this information, the measure of incumbency used in this analysis accounts for whether the election has an open seat (1=yes, 0=no). I also include a measure of turnout as a proportion of the votes cast for mayor to the total voting-age

23 To illustrate the measure that accounts for the number of competitive candidates, take a hypothetical election with three candidates: Candidate A received 50% of votes, Candidate B 40%, and Candidate C 10%. (1/0.50^2+.40^2+.10^2=2.38 competitive candidates).
population in a city at time $T$. This information is obtained from the mayoral election results. However, to test for whether the influence of open seat elections and the level of political mobilization (turnout) on candidate emergence and success is conditioned by the size of the Latino population I include interaction terms for open seat*percent Latino VAP and turnout*percent Latino VAP. As described in the theory section, it is possible that quality Latino candidates may increase their chances of success in contexts with high levels of political mobilization. To test this hypothesis I include an interaction term for quality Latino candidate*turnout.

**Methodology**

The first round elections are of main interest, when examining Latino candidate emergence, because emergence in the runoff is conditional upon either winning or being the candidate with the second highest vote share – that is, in case no candidate wins a minimum threshold of votes (usually 50.1 percent). Additionally, there are no partisan elections, and thus no party primaries, in the elections data that I have gathered.\(^{24}\) Therefore they cannot be included in this analysis of candidate emergence. Additionally, to study candidate emergence, I include elections where candidates are opposed and unopposed. Although there may be many reasons for why elections are unopposed, I am still interested in seeing what factors contribute to at least one Latino candidate being represented in the candidate pool.

To empirically examine Latino candidate emergence, I employ a random effects logistic regression for all first-round elections. The cross-sectional, time-series structure

\(^{24}\) There is a lack of data on party primaries since partisan elections are rare in the Southwestern U.S., the geographical area where the data used in this study was collected.
of the data as well as the binary nature of three dependent variables: 1) emergence of at least one Latino candidate, 2) the emergence of a Latino mayoral incumbent, and 3) the emergence of a quality Latino challenger, requires implementing such a method. The random effects model provides robust standard errors clustered by city and year (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005) and describes the average effect of the impact that independent variables have between each city.

I also employ a similar methodology to examine Latino candidate success. However, in this analysis I do include both first and second round elections where at least two candidates (i.e., an opposed election) are on the ballot. Latino candidate success is measured as a simple binary variable where “1” indicates that a Latino candidate won and “0” indicates otherwise. To examine this dependent variable, I also employ a random-effects logistic regression. However, to examine the vote share of the top Latino candidate on the ballot, I implement a random-effects OLS regression.

**Findings**

The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis of Latino candidate emergence are presented in Table 4.1. The table indicates that in 36 percent of the 437 elections, there is at least one Latino candidate on the ballot. Among these 437 elections (in 105 cities) 13 percent have a Latino incumbent on the ballot and 12 percent have at least one Latino candidate with previous political experience that is not an incumbent. Nearly 35 percent of the 437 elections have open seats, where no incumbent is running for reelection. This indicates that in the mayoral elections have a high proportion of
incumbents running for reelection. Although in this dataset only a small proportion of the incumbents are Latinos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(elecs/cities)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Candidate</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Incumbent</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Latino Challenger</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections w/ Unopposed Candidates</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Round Election</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pet. Latino VAP</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-Council Government</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limits</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff Provision</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Muni/Fed Elections</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Election</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. of Competitive Candidates</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Population</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>39,340</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>3,836,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. Latinos on Council</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Latino Mayoralty</td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The estimates in Model 1 in Table 4.2 show that the emergence of at least one Latino candidate in a mayoral election depends on both supply and strategic factors. The estimates indicate that the strength of the Latino population in the city has an independent and positive effect on the emergence of Latino candidates. No institutional arrangements or electoral rules have an independent effect on the representation of Latinos in the mayoral candidate pool. However, the interaction between Latino voting strength and the institutional arrangement of city government (Mayor-Council Gov*Pct. Latino VAP) has a positive effect on the emergence of Latino candidates. However, Figure 4.1 shows that the effect of mayor-council governments on Latino candidate emergence is conditional
on the size of the Latino voting age population. As the size of the Latino population increases, the effect of mayor-council government on the Latino candidate emergence is stronger. However the effects are only statistically significant for a range of values – that is, when Latinos are between 40 and 80 percent of the population. For example, in a city that is 40 percent Latino and has a less prestigious mayoralty (council-manager or commission form of government), the probability of observing a Latino mayoral candidate is about 40 percent. However, in a similar sized city with a more prestigious mayoralty (mayor-council government) the probability of observing a Latino mayoral candidate increases to nearly 80 percent. To get that same probability of observing a Latino candidate in non-mayor-council cities, the city has to have a nearly 80 percent Latino voting age population. What these findings essentially illustrate is that once you take demographic context into account, higher prestige offices are no longer a barrier to Latino descriptive representation in the candidate pool when the Latino population is sufficiently large.

\[\text{To estimate these predicted probabilities the values of all other variables are set at their mean.}\]
The estimates in Model 1 of Table 4.2 also reveal that Latino political incorporation in lower-level government increases the probability of observing at least one Latino mayoral candidate on the ballot. Figure 4.2 shows the predicted probability for Latinos emerging in mayoral elections as the number of Latino city council members in a city varies from 0-8. To get over the 50 percent probability threshold of observing a Latino mayoral candidate, the city should have at least 3 Latino city council members. Having at least 5 Latino city council members increases the probability of observing a Latino candidate to nearly 80 percent. The positive association between Latino representation on the city council and the probability of observing a Latino candidate running for mayor suggests that political incorporation in lower-level government is key to providing supply of Latino candidates to achieve representation in the mayoralty.
Model 1 in Table 4.2 shows that in addition to the supply factors associated with a Latino candidate emerging in a mayoral election, a few strategic concerns impact Latino representation in the candidate pool. Specifically, the lagged dependent variable, an indicator of Latino candidates emerging in the previous mayoral election \((\text{time } T-1)\), is associated with Latino candidates emerging in the contemporary mayoral election \((\text{time } T)\). The predicted probabilities of Latino candidate emergence indicates that if no Latino candidate was present in the previous mayoral election, the probability that a Latino candidate will emerge is 27 percent.\(^{26}\)

\(^{26}\) To estimate this predicted probability all other variables are held at the mean values.
Interestingly, the results in Table 4.2 also show that elections where there are more viable or competitive candidates vying for the mayoralty, measured as the fractionalization score described above, the more likely that at least one Latino candidate will be represented in the mayoral candidate pool. All else equal, an election with three competitive candidates the probability of observing a Latino candidate rises to nearly 80 percent. This factor seems to play a particularly substantial role in the emergence of Latino candidates. Given the debate about whether and when Latino candidates will emerge given the competitiveness of the candidate pool – particularly as it comes to the uncertainty about who will win, the data in this analysis suggest that the stronger the candidate pool overall the more likely Latino candidates will emerge. Strategically speaking, Latino candidates may find elections more accessible if there are more viable candidates vying for the mayoralty overall – which is why we see a positive relationship between the number of competitive candidates on the ballot and the emergence of at least one Latino candidate on the ballot.

The results in Model 2 in Table 4.2 estimate influence that supply and strategic factors have on the likelihood of observing a Latino incumbent emerge in a mayoral election. Given that I include a lagged dependent variable for Latino incumbent, the sample size is reduced from the analysis of the emergence of a Latino candidate. Among the largest contributors to the emergence of Latino incumbents include the size of the Latino voting age population. Turnout (in time T) also has a positive relationship to the emergence of Latino incumbents, but the effect is not as strong. Figure 4.3 shows

\[\text{measure of competitiveness accounts for the vote share of each candidate. The candidates with a non-trivial vote share (based on total votes cast) are considered viable or competitive candidates.}\]

\[\text{I coded incumbency based on the election results of time T-1. If I could not determine who the incumbent was, then this variable was coded as missing. This leaves some gaps in the data.}\]
these relationships. The graphs indicate that the Latino voting age population has to be over 80 percent to have a 50 percent probability that a Latino incumbent will emerge for reelection. Similarly, the turnout rate has to reach 65 percent – a very high rate relative to typical turnout rates in municipal elections – to have a 50 percent probability of having a Latino mayoral incumbent run for reelection. Additionally, the estimates reveals that there is a 39 percent probability of observing a Latino incumbent emerge in time $T$ if there is a Latino incumbent in time $T-1$.

![Figure 4.3 Predicting Latino Incumbent Emergence](image)

*Note: all variables held at mean*
### Table 4.2
Examining Latino Candidate Emergence in Mayoral Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Supply</th>
<th>(1) Emergence of a Latino Candidate</th>
<th>(2) Emergence of a Latino Incumbent</th>
<th>(3) Emergence of a Quality Latino Challenger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pct. Latino VAP</strong></td>
<td>3.93*** (1.26)</td>
<td>5.13*** (1.30)</td>
<td>2.10 (1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>History of Latino Mayoralty (0,1)</strong></td>
<td>0.17 (0.51)</td>
<td>-0.40 (0.54)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Num. Latinos on Council</strong></td>
<td>0.49** (0.20)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.52** (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mayor-Council Government</strong></td>
<td>-1.22 (1.22)</td>
<td>0.41 (0.51)</td>
<td>1.14* (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mayoral Term Limits</strong></td>
<td>-0.17 (0.40)</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.78 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Runoff Provision</strong></td>
<td>-0.06 (0.43)</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.51)</td>
<td>-0.51 (0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Muni/Fed Elections</strong></td>
<td>0.07 (0.52)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.61)</td>
<td>0.71 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Population (Log)</strong></td>
<td>0.17 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.33** (0.15)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mayor-Council*Pct. Latino VAP</strong></td>
<td>6.93* (4.32)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Candidate Strategy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latino Candidate (time T-1)</strong></td>
<td>0.76** (0.38)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latino Incumbent (time T-1)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.47*** (0.44)</td>
<td>-2.23*** (0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quality Latino Challenger (time T-1)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.04 (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Open Seat Election</strong></td>
<td>-0.07 (0.33)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.76*** (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Num. of Competitive Candidates</strong></td>
<td>0.86*** (0.23)</td>
<td>-0.51* (0.27)</td>
<td>0.71** (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnout (time T)</strong></td>
<td>3.05* (1.64)</td>
<td>5.61*** (2.00)</td>
<td>4.59* (2.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-6.81*** (1.67)</td>
<td>-7.87*** (1.88)</td>
<td>-7.50*** (2.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obs (elections/cities)</strong></td>
<td>437/105</td>
<td>390/105</td>
<td>390/105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01
There are a few things that make Model 1 different from Model 2 in Table 4.2. The latter model, examining the factors that determine the emergence of Latino incumbents, shows that the number of Latinos on the city council is not significant and neither is the interaction between mayor-council government and percent Latino population (\(\text{mayor-council*pct. Latino VAP}\)). City population size is associated with Latino incumbent emergence, but not with any Latino candidate regardless of incumbency. Also the number of competitive candidates in the election has a positive relationship to the emergence of a quality Latino challenger, while a negative effect on the emergence of a Latino incumbent.

The results examining the likelihood of a quality Latino challenger (non-incumbent) emerging (Model 3) are quite distinct from the results examining the emergence of a Latino incumbent in Table 4.2. For example, the effect of the size of the Latino voting age population on the emergence of quality Latino candidates is not statistically significant. Also, quality Latino challengers are more likely to emerge in mayor-council governments regardless of the size of the Latino population in a city. The emergence of quality Latino candidates does seem to be influenced by the supply of Latinos in the city legislature. However, what is most evident in the data regarding the emergence of quality Latino challengers is the fact that they are most likely to emerge as a result of strategic factors regarding the electoral context. For example, if there was a Latino incumbent in \(\text{time T-1}\) election, quality Latino challengers are less likely to emerge. So, the results indicate that if Latino candidates were successful in the previous election (\(\text{time T-1}\)), quality Latino challengers are less likely to emerge in \(\text{time T}\). You would think that success in \(\text{time T-1}\) should beget success in \(\text{time T}\) for other Latinos, but
the data does not indicate that this is the case. In fact, these data suggest that quality Latino challengers will wait to run if a Latino incumbent has recently been in office. On another note, there is no evidence that if a quality Latino challenger in time $T-1$ emerged (lagged dependent variable) a quality Latino challenger will emerge in time $T$. The findings further suggest that quality Latino challengers are strategic in that they are more likely to emerge in open seat elections. Furthermore, quality Latino challengers are not only more likely to emerge if there are more competitive candidates on the ballot, but if the turnout rate is higher. It must be noted that the substantive impact of the number of viable candidates is quite limited on the outcome. Figure 4.4 shows that as the number of Latinos in the city council increases to 3, the probability of observing any Latino candidate emerge is nearly 60 percent; and when compared to a model predicting the emergence of a quality Latino challenger the probability is only 10 percent.

**Figure 4.4 Latino Candidate Emergence: A Comparison of Two Models**
It is clear from the results in Table 4.2 that there are different mechanisms at work that influence the emergence of different types of Latino candidates. The thing to consider is that nearly 36 percent of elections with Latino candidates on the ballot the Latino also have Latino incumbents on the ballot and nearly 1/3 of Latino candidates are quality challengers. Thus, there is good reason to examine the factors that determine the emergence of these two types of Latino candidates separately. For the Latino incumbents, it seems that both supply and strategic factors equally influence their emergence, while for quality Latino candidates it seems to be mostly driven by strategic factors. So the next question is: Why do Latino candidates win? It is important to next investigate whether supply and strategic factors influence the success of Latino candidates and their proportion of votes received in an election. In the following section, I will discuss the results of the empirical analysis conducted on a subsample of elections and cities where 1) a Latino candidate was on the ballot, 2) candidates were opposed by at least one other candidate, and 3) the election was a 1st round (General) or 2nd round (Runoff) election.

**Examining Latino Candidate Success & Vote Share**

Table 4.3 shows the empirical model estimates for Latino candidate success and Latino candidate vote share. For each dependent variable there are two sets of models, one that does not include any interaction terms and the other that is the fully specified model. This is simply included for making comparisons of the independent variables that form the interaction terms. Given that I am primarily interested in the results of the fully specified models, I will be reporting the results of Model 2 and Model 4. Moreover, in these models I solely investigate elections where Latino candidates were on the ballot; and also
including first and second round elections. That said, Model 2 (Table 4.3) shows Latino candidate success is not independently influenced by the size of the Latino population. In fact, the effect of the size of the Latino population on Latino candidate success is not statistically significant.

However, the results indicate that two city-level institutions seem to suppress the likelihood that Latino candidates will win, particularly mayoral term limits and runoff provisions. All else equal, Latino candidates running in cities that do not have mayoral term limits have a 64 percent probability of winning, whereas Latino candidates running in cities that do have term limits have only a 30 percent probability of winning. The interaction of the size of the Latino population and the term limit rule \( \text{Percent Latino VAP} \times \text{Mayor Term Limits} \) is not statistically significant. In addition, Latino candidates running in cities that do not have a runoff provision that requires the top two vote-receiving candidates to run in a second election in case one candidates does not receive a minimum number of voters, has 67 percent probability of winning – all else equal. Despite these electoral institutions, the results show that the supply of Latino candidates in terms of the number of Latinos serving in city council has a positive effect on the likelihood that Latino candidates will win. Figure 4.5 shows that, all else equal, having three sitting Latino city council members increases the probability that a Latino candidate will win to nearly 55 percent. Thus, the more Latinos are politically incorporated in lower-level government the more likely they will be represented in the city’s top executive office.
The results in Table 4.3 (Model 2) also show that Latino incumbents are more likely to win than Latino candidates who are not incumbents. Specifically, there is a 93 percent predicted probability that a Latino incumbent will be successful in the election (all else equal) compared to a 30 percent probability that a non-incumbent Latino candidate will win. That is, a 210 percent change in the expected outcome of success in the mayoral election. Therefore, it seems that Latino mayoral incumbents enjoy a comfortable advantage in municipal government.
### Table 4.3
Examining Latino Candidate Success & Vote Share

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Supply</th>
<th>Latino Success (0,1)</th>
<th>Latino Cand. Vote Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Random Effects Logistic Model</td>
<td>(2) Random Effects Logistic Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. Latino VAP</td>
<td>1.97 (1.43)</td>
<td>0.22 (1.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-Council Government</td>
<td>-0.76* (0.46)</td>
<td>-0.62 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limits</td>
<td>-1.29** (0.54)</td>
<td>-1.42** (0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff Provision</td>
<td>-0.99* (0.52)</td>
<td>-1.19** (0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. Latinos on Council</td>
<td>0.25* (0.15)</td>
<td>0.28* (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Latino Mayoralty (0,1)</td>
<td>-0.55 (0.55)</td>
<td>-0.52 (0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Muni/Fed Elections</td>
<td>0.39 (0.68)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Population (Log)</td>
<td>0.28* (0.16)</td>
<td>0.28* (0.17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Candidate Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latino Incumbent (time T)</th>
<th>Quality Latino Challenger (time T)</th>
<th>Open Seat Election (time T)</th>
<th>Num. of Competitive Cands (time T)</th>
<th>Turnout (time T)</th>
<th>Quality Latino Challenger*Turnout</th>
<th>Pet. Latino VAP*Open Seat Election</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.44*** (0.63)</td>
<td>1.22** (0.48)</td>
<td>1.05** (0.49)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.66 (2.19)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-5.83*** (2.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.83*** (0.69)</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.77)</td>
<td>-0.43 (0.91)</td>
<td>0.32 (0.22)</td>
<td>-2.67 (2.59)</td>
<td>8.40*** (3.10)</td>
<td>3.56* (1.94)</td>
<td>-4.85** (2.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.17*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.07*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.37** (1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00** (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.07*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.21** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations include all 1st & 2nd elections with opposed candidates.**
In Model 2, I test the hypothesis that Latino challengers with previous political experience are more likely to be successful in elections with higher turnout than in elections with lower turnout. The statistical evidence shows a positive relationship for the interaction term (*Latino Political Experience*Turnout). Figure 4.6 shows that Latino candidates having previous political experience running in an election where turnout is .20 percent of the voting age population have nearly a 70 percent probability of winning—all else equal, of course. What this indicates is that not only is experience important for Latino challengers, but so is the level of mobilization among the electorate to increase their chances of winning in mayoral elections.

The results in Table 4.3 (Model 1) corroborate the story that Latino candidates are strategic in that they not only emerge when they think they can win, such as when an
incumbent is not on the ballot, (see the results in Model 3 in Table 4.2) but that they are actually more likely to win if they do run in open seat elections.

Model 2 in Table 4.3 shows that there is an additional relationship that needs to be considered when determining why Latino candidates are more likely to win. Specifically, Latino candidates are more likely to win if they run in open seat elections and when the Latino population is sizeable. Figure 4.7 shows that, all else equal, Latino candidates running in a city that has a 45 percent Latino voting age population and run in an open seat the probability of success is about 60 percent. However, if a Latino candidate runs in a city that is 65 percent Latino (VAP), particularly in an open seat election, their probability of winning increases to 80 percent – which is about a 20 percentage point difference.
Given that Latino candidates are more likely to win based on both supply and strategic factors, it is important to further explore whether and which of these factors influence their share of votes in mayoral elections. Specifically, the interaction term \((\text{Pct. Latino VAP} \times \text{Open Seat Election})\) in Model 4 of Table 4.3 is statistically significant, meaning that Latino candidates running in open seat elections are more likely to receive more votes. However, this relationship is conditioned by the size of the Latino population. So, the larger the city’s Latino population the more votes Latino candidates will receive in open seat elections. Figure 4.8 shows that this relationship is statistically significant for a set of values (e.g., when the Latino population varies from 35 to 95 percent of the population). Moreover, the graph specifically shows that Latino candidates running in open seat elections – in contexts where Latinos make up 65 percent of the voting age population – are likely to reach the typical minimum threshold of votes (50.1%) to win.\(^{29}\) Figure 4.7 (above) corroborates this relationship in that Latino candidates in the exact same demographic and electoral context are nearly 80 percent likely to win the election.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{29}\) The predicted probabilities are estimated with all other variables held at their mean.

\(^{30}\) This is based on the model examining a binary variable for Latino candidate success rather than the percent of votes received in the mayoral election.
What also corroborates the results from the model (Model 2 in Table 4.3) of Latino candidates success is the interaction between a Latino candidate’s previous political experience and the level of mobilization in an election (*Quality Latino Challenger* *Turnout*). As Figure 4.9 shows, Latino candidates with previous political experience running in electoral contexts where the turnout rate is between 20 and 25% of the voting age population are more likely to reach the threshold for winning (50.1%) than Latino candidates running in similar contexts but without previous political experience. This indeed shows how critical it can be for Latino candidates to not only have previous political experience but to implement effective voter mobilization strategies. All else equal (including turnout), however, Latino candidates with previous political experience are expected to receive 47 percent of the votes compared to 37 percent for Latino candidates who do not have previous political experience.
Other results worth noting include Latino incumbents on the ballot (in time $T$) are expected to receive more votes than non-incumbents Latinos by a wide margin. Specifically, holding all variables at their mean, the predicted share of votes for a Latino incumbent is 62 percent while the expected votes for the non-incumbent Latinos is 31 percent. Clearly, Latino incumbents are expected to win and have a larger share of the votes in mayoral elections. However, in all, the Latino candidate’s vote share is largely determined by the factors in the election ranging from the candidate’s previous political experience to whether the seat is vacated by an incumbent. Factors such as mayor-council governments, term limits, and runoff provisions are not statistically associated with Latino candidates’ vote share. Surprisingly, Latinos’ political incorporation in city government, particularly in city council, was not statistically significant. Whereas, this
variable had been consistently significant in determining the emergence of Latino candidates and their success (measured as a binary variable in the previous model). Perhaps in the grand scheme of things Latino representation on the city council does contribute to the ultimate success of Latino candidates, but the results reveal that it does not necessarily help Latino candidates increase their share of votes in mayoral elections.

Conclusion

At the outset, I raised various questions as to why Latino candidates are likely to emerge and succeed in mayoral elections. Moving beyond traditional studies of candidate emergence that focus primarily on non-minority candidates and also focusing on the systematic analysis of Latino candidate success, this chapter reveals a great deal about Latino representation. The analyses point to a few major findings about why Latino candidates win. First, Latino candidate emergence is largely a result of the political strength of Latinos in the population and in local government. Without a sizeable share of the population or a sizeable share of representation in lower-level government Latino candidates are not very likely to emerge. The institutional arrangements of a city together with the size of the Latino population seem to play a particularly influential role for the rise of Latino candidates – as is evident by the form of government and Latino population interaction term. Second, it seems that the context of the election, in terms of the level of voter mobilization, consistently influences whether a Latino candidate emerges and wins. We cannot underestimate the effect of turnout on Latino descriptive representation and further research is needed to understand the various mobilization strategies implemented in campaigns to increase turnout. Another strategic factor that is associated with the
emergence of quality Latino challengers is whether the seat is open. That is, the strategic behavior of quality Latino candidates seems to occur in mayoral elections where incumbents are absent from the ballot. The results estimating Latino candidate success also indicate that Latino candidates are more likely to win if they run in open seat elections – particularly if the Latino population is at least 35 percent. In fact, what is so compelling about the results examining Latino candidate success is that strategic factors play a large role in the process of representation. For example, Latino candidates are more likely to win if they have previous political experience and if they run in elections with markedly higher levels of voter turnout.

One point of disjuncture between Latino candidate emergence and success is Latinos’ political incorporation in lower-level government. Although having more Latinos serving in city council is associated with Latino candidates being represented in the candidate pool, it is not statistically associated to the success of Latino candidates or to their vote share. But, this is a minor point of contention between the two analyses because despite the level of political incorporation in city council (as measured in this study), a more influential determinant of representation is the previous political experience of the individual candidate. Thus, the body of work in this chapter points to the importance of Latino representation in other levels of government – which allows Latinos to climb the political ladder and improve their overall political clout. In other words, if Latinos want to gain representation in proportion to their large and expanding size, Latinos need to continue to run for office in other levels government.
In the previous chapter, I examined the determinants of Latino candidate emergence and success. In this chapter, I further explore the consequences of Latino representation by examining whether the presence of Latino candidates influences election outcomes such as turnout and margin of victory. Prior research reveals that a candidate’s race/ethnicity can be an important heuristic for voters in municipal contexts because local elections are typically low-information, low-salience events. In these contexts voters may rely on racial/ethnic cues to vote rather than partisanship or the media – which are more typical cues used in national elections (see Campbell et al. 1960). To adequately examine the impact of race/ethnicity on turnout and margin of victory, I use data assembled and combined from multiple sources, including state, county, and city election departments, the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), the U.S. Census of Population and Housing, and the International City/County Management Association (ICMA). More specifically, the unique dataset used here examines 575 elections in 112 cities located across six southwestern states. To date, no study has included a sample this large or over so many time points to examine these election outcomes. Before delving into the theoretical model of the determinants of turnout and margin of victory, in the following section, I describe a few anecdotes of recent elections where Latino candidates

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31 Previous research has found that turnout in local elections is typically “half of that of national elections” or less than “one-quarter of the voting-age population” (Morlan1984; Bridges 1997 in Hajnal 2010, 1-2)
ran for mayor. These accounts will illustrate how and why race and ethnicity might influence election outcomes.

To begin, it is important to note that cities that have experienced demographic shifts over the past decade have seen an emergence of Latino candidates in mayoral elections such as Jose Tosado in Springfield, Massachusetts (2011) and William Lantigua in Lawrence, Massachusetts (2009). These cities are not only different in terms of overall population size, but also in terms of the voting strength of the Latino population. According to the 2010 Census, Latinos make up 40 percent of the population in Springfield and 75 percent in Lawrence. These candidates were seeking to be each city’s first Latino mayor.

In the weeks running up to these elections, newspaper reports had investigated the electoral prospects and strategies for these candidates. The following four major points were made in the news coverage: 1) the candidate’s Latino ethnicity was a prominent issue in the campaign 2) the demographic makeup of the city influenced the formation of potential electoral coalitions and ultimately the election outcome 3) elections were expected to be won by a narrow margin and 4) elections were expected to have high levels of political participation. In sum, the demographic makeup of the city made it newsworthy that one of the mayoral candidates was a viable Latino candidate; and this led to speculations about election outcomes.

The outcome in Lawrence, Massachusetts revealed that Latino candidate, William Lantigua, won the 2010 election by 1,038 votes (Russell 2011). In fact, Lawrence, MA has a history of close elections when a viable Latino candidate was on the ballot. In 2001, the Latina mayoral candidate lost the election by less than 1,000 votes (Russell 2011). On
the other hand, in Springfield, Massachusetts, the Latino candidate, Jose Tosado, lost the election by 8,900 votes. Despite having a competitive Latino candidate on the ballot, the election was not as close in Springfield as it was in Lawrence, Massachusetts. So the outcome, according to newspaper coverage, varied based on the demographic makeup of the city as well as the strategies used by the candidates to court voters from specific racial/ethnic groups.

Looking at what some of the voters had to say about these elections further reveals how race/ethnicity can shape voter attitudes, political behavior, and ultimately election outcomes. In the case of Springfield, newspaper reports asked individuals of different races to comment on Jose Tosado’s mayoral bid. An African American resident said, “If [Tosado] gets in, he’ll look out for his people, where the current mayor is looking out for everybody” (Russell 2011). On the other hand, an elderly woman of Latino descent says, “The Time Has Come [for a Latino mayor]...He’s my race – he’s Puerto Rican like me...He’s very good - I’ve known him since he was a boy – and we need it. There are a lot of people who don’t care about us” (Russell 2011).

Granted, that these quotes do not reveal aggregate public opinion in the city. But, they highlight that race/ethnicity can be a very real issue in the minds of voters. And, in local elections where political party platforms and partisan issues are not front-and-center, race can be an influential motivator for voters’ decisions at the polls. Additionally, in contexts where voters have to choose the city’s top executive (the mayor), stakes could be high and feelings about race can further influence election outcomes.

Another case study in San Jose, California reveals how campaigns have dealt with the issue of Latino ethnicity. Specifically, Jude Berry, a lead strategist for Latino
candidate, Ron Gonzales’s mayoral campaign in 1998 explained that the campaign suspected that race could be an important factor in the election. The campaign had to quickly determine whether and how big of an issue it was because this was the first time a competitive Latino candidate was seeking to become the city’s first Latino mayor. Therefore, the campaign decided to poll San Jose residents by asking them the following: Do you agree or disagree with this statement - ‘to tell you the truth, San Jose is not quite ready for a Latino mayor.’ The poll results revealed that 25 percent of San Jose residents agreed that the city was not ready for a Latino mayor (Barry 2005). Despite the substantial portion of residents having negative views of a potential Latino mayoralty, Ron Gonzales did become San Jose’s first Latino mayor. Gonzales won by only 4,293 votes (or 51.7 percent of the votes cast). This anecdotal evidence from the vantage point of political campaigns reveals that elections can be close when viable Latino candidates are on the ballot.

Beyond these case studies, the previous literature has studied whether turnout and the margin of victory varies as a result of minority candidates being on the ballot. However, these studies almost entirely focus on African Americans rather than on Latinos (see Lublin and Tate 1995; except see Hajnal et al. 2002). Admittedly, turnout has been studied at the local level by many scholars, however, none has adequately examined the impact of Latino candidacies on this outcome, either as incumbents or challengers, over time, and in various demographic contexts. Current research has primarily examined the impact of African American candidates and has relied on case studies or small-N examinations of turnout in limited socio-economic contexts (Hajnal 2007; Kaufmann 2004). Studies have examined a limited number of election cycles with
Latino candidates (Caren 2005; Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002) or black or Latino behavior independently rather than examining overall turnout when Latinos are on the ballot (Lublin and Tate 1995; Barreto 2007). Additionally, there is merely a descriptive analysis of the effect of incumbent black candidates on turnout (Hajnal 2007; Kaufmann 2004), rather than a full empirical analysis of overall turnout over time with variation in the racial/ethnic makeup of the mayoral candidate pool.

**Theoretical Development of Turnout & Margin of Victory in Local Elections**

In the following sections, I outline a conceptual model that places the various correlates of turnout and margin of victory into one of three specific categories including *Race/Ethnicity*, *Institutions*, and *Electoral Context*.

**Race & Ethnicity**

From the Civil War to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, race has played a prominent role in politics and society (McClain and Stewart 2002; Garcia and Sanchez 2007; Garcia-Bedolla 2011). Race and ethnicity continue to shape various political debates today – which is evident from instances where pundits and scholars alike considered whether Barack Obama could win the presidency without a black majority in several key states; whether the controversial Arizona “self-deportation” immigration law is disproportionately discriminatory towards Latinos; and whether the large and expanding Latino population in key swing states will help determine the winner in the 2012 presidential elections.
Additionally, the 2010 Census revealed that Latinos are nearly 50.5 million strong and make up 16 percent of the population. The reported 43 percent growth over the past decade also suggests that Latinos are also increasingly becoming part of the social and political fabric of society – which further indicates that more and more Latinos could be vying for elective offices. The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) reveals that a supermajority of Latino elected officials serve in city, county or school board government. Since these elective offices are primarily non-partisan and low salience elections and the (implicit and explicit) persistence of race and ethnicity in contemporary American politics, it is necessary to consider whether the presence of Latino candidates increases the competitiveness in mayoral elections.

The previous research reveals that candidates can elicit emotions among people, which can range from positive to negative, and everything in between. Specifically, Marcus and MacKuen (1993) suggest that emotions elicited by race can further impact individuals’ vote choice, candidate evaluations, interest in politics, attentiveness to campaigns, and decision to participate (Marcus and MacKuen 1993, 673). What this indicates is that ascriptive characteristics (like race and ethnicity) can provide information cues to voters about a candidate’s policy preferences, priorities, and leadership style. The response from voters as a result may be to not only participate in the election, but to have a specific candidate preference as well. Therefore, turnout rates and the margin of victory – which is one indicator of the competitiveness of elections – can vary based on the presence of a minority candidate on the ballot.

The previous research including Lublin and Tate (1995), Caren (2005), and Hajnal (2007), finds that overall turnout does increase when there are minority candidates
on the ballot. However, Lublin and Tate (1995) and Hajnal (2007) focus on African American mayoral candidacies. More specifically, Lublin and Tate’s (1995) analysis of 315 mayoral elections in 26 cities (+100,000) from 1969-1991 shows that turnout increased by 4 percent when black candidates were on the ballot. Another work that explicitly examines the impact of race on turnout is Caren’s (2005) analysis of mayoral elections in 38 large cities (+500,000) over time (1979-3003). The author finds that the presence of a multi-racial mayoral election (i.e., Anglo vs. black, Anglo vs. Latino) increases turnout by about 2 percent. However, a cross-sectional analysis of overall turnout in both mayoral and city council elections in California, Hajnal, et al. (2002) do not find that turnout is impacted by race, while controlling for a wide variety of institutional factors (e.g., election timing).

Case studies in Kaufmann (1998; 2004) and Hero (1992) have confirmed that turnout, under certain circumstances, is higher when minority candidates are on the ballot. For example, Federico Peña’s successful mayoral candidacy in 1983 had 10% higher turnout than the previous election (Hero 1992). Kaufmann (2004) describes the 1969 Los Angeles mayoral primary election between a black candidate (Tom Bradley) and the white incumbent (Sam Yorty) and shows that turnout was 6% higher than the previous election; and 11% higher in the runoff (Kaufmann 2004, 69). In the Los Angeles case, Kaufmann (2004) attributes this outcome to the racialized context in the city, particularly that results from the Watts riots.

Other research has shown that political behavior (e.g., participation) of specific racial/ethnic groups varies depending on whether minority candidates are on the ballot. For example, research reveals that the presence of African American candidates in local
elections increases turnout and reduces voter roll-off (non-voting for races down the ballot) among African American voters (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998; Vanderleeuw and Liu 2002). Barreto (2007) examines the effect of Latino candidacies on Latino turnout in mayoral races in five large cities and finds that turnout increases among coethnics when Latinos are on the ballot (see also Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004). This indicates that, for coethnic voters, the presence of a Latino could increase their levels of political participation. Reuters reported that when Antonio Villaraigosa ran for mayor in 2001 and 2005, he captured over 80 percent of the Latino vote; and in 2005 exit polling data indicated that Latinos made up a record 25 percent of the overall vote in that election (Krolicki 2005). The symbolic benefits, or affective feelings that someone who shares the same racial/ethnic background as a leader within government, seems to partly explain why coethnic candidates are more likely to not only get more coethnics to participate in the election, but to also win their vote. This may stem from greater trust placed on representatives who share their racial or ethnic background (Mansbridge 1999). Additionally, the increased levels of coethnic support may stem from the prospective benefits from public policies that may be implemented to directly impact minority communities (i.e., substantive representation).

On the other hand, Hajnal’s (2007) research reveals that Anglo participation increases when black challengers are vying for the mayoralty. This indicates that Anglos are initially concerned about the potential consequences of minority leadership in that resources could be redistributed or that they could lose their political status. Over time, however, Anglos’ levels of threat subside from learning that life under a black mayor does not have a negative impact on their social and political status. Despite the
aforementioned research we still don’t know whether the presence of Latino candidates affects overall turnout as well as the margin of victory in mayoral elections. In fact, Lublin and Tate (1995) are among the only scholars that examine whether the margin of victory is impacted by the presence of quality black candidates (i.e., one with previous political experience). They do find that the presence of black candidates reduces the margin of victory – which suggests that these elections are more competitive.

Thus, in addition to the race/ethnicity of the candidate, one important factor that could raise the stakes, so to speak, in elections and increase the turnout rates make elections closer is whether the minority candidate is a viable candidate. If any Latino decides to run, regardless of previous political experience, the local media, challengers, and even voters (of all racial/ethnic backgrounds) may not take him or her seriously. In this situation, the race/ethnicity of a candidate may not be salient. Thus, the viability of the candidate should play a substantial role in these election outcomes.

In sum, race/ethnicity is expected to play a role in the outcome of elections by influencing the perceptions of individuals who belong to different groups. There is evidence in the previous literature that suggests that voters could be more interested in participating to protect (or enhance) their interests. Regardless of whether members of some groups are encouraged to participate based on feelings of empowerment or feelings of threat, the previous research as well as the case studies outlined in the introduction suggest that elections with quality Latino candidates on the ballot will be closer between the winner and the loser and experience markedly higher levels of turnout.
In addition to race and ethnicity, the electoral outcomes of turnout and the margin of victory can be influenced by city institutions and the context of the election. A few institutional factors including the timing of an election, term limits, and the form of government can influence these factors because they are associated with individuals’ costs and benefits for participating in an election. Specifically, if elections are held concurrently with presidential elections, then voters are more likely to go to the polls because they are more likely to be aware of who the candidates are and when to vote. Interest in participating can also stem from having more knowledge about the election (Caren 2007; see also Geys 2006). Many scholars studying turnout at the local level have found that this is a major factor explaining levels of turnout (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Caren 2007). Thus, I would expect that when mayoral elections are held concurrently with presidential elections turnout is likely to be higher than when mayoral elections are held during any other time. Because interest is likely to increase when local elections are held together with presidential elections, I would also expect that elections are closer, and thus the margin of victory should decline.

In addition to election timing, the form of government conveys information about whether elections matter in terms of the distribution of political values/resources. Previous literature suggests that council-manager forms of government substantially reduce turnout compared to cities with mayor-council forms (Caren 2007; Alford and Lee 1968). Reform-type governments (i.e., council-manager systems) were implemented to redirect political power from the local party bosses to appointed bureaucrats in order to reduce corruption (progressive era reforms). In these contexts, the incentive to ask for
votes in return for “pork” in council-manager systems is substantially reduced. Therefore, I expect that cities with mayor-council governments are more likely to have higher turnout than cities with council-manager governments. The fact that mayor-council governments give more political authority to mayors than council-manager governments, may also indicate that more is at stake for candidates and voters alike. Therefore, I expect that, all else equal, elections held in cities with mayor-council governments to have a closer margin of victory than elections in cities with council-manager governments.

While the form of government may play a role in the costs associated with voting, another institution that might influence election outcomes is whether there are limits for the number of consecutive terms that elected officials can serve. I expect that, in general, cities with term limits have higher turnout rates and closer elections on average than cities without term limits because there are likely to be periodic instances where the seats are vacated by incumbents than cities where incumbents can run for reelection an unlimited number of times.

**Electoral Context**

Rather than simply relying on city-level factors to model turnout and margin of victory, the previous literature suggests that the context of the election is highly influential. For example, studies of U.S. Congress reveal that incumbents have been winning elections more often and by larger margins of victory (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Alford and Hibbing 1981; Krehbiel and Wright 1983). Thus *incumbency* must be accounted for when modeling margin of victory. I expect that when incumbents are on the ballot elections will not be as close as when the seats are open.
Additionally, because voters may be aware that incumbents are the likely winners, they be less inclined to vote. Downs (1957) suggests that voters are less inclined to participate if they are less likely to determine the outcome (by casting a vote). Granted, there may be instances where incumbents face serious challengers and therefore influence the outcome of elections regarding turnout and the margin of victory. However, I expect that incumbents usually have the upper hand and when they are on the ballot turnout will be down while the margin of victory up.

Another set of factors about the election that should be taken into account when analyzing the determinants of turnout and margin of victory include whether the election has one candidate that is unopposed and whether the election is a runoff or second-round election. In the instances where no candidate in the general election received more than 50.1 percent, and a runoff was needed to break the “tie,” I would expect that they would be more competitive and experience higher levels of turnout than first-round elections. Downs (1957) also suggests that when voters expect elections to be close they are more likely to participate because they are more likely to influence the outcome of the election. Therefore, another factor to take into account is the number of competitive candidates vying for office. I expect that elections will be closer when more competitive candidates are on the ballot because this may generate enthusiasm among the media and different groups of voters. Also, when more competitive candidates are vying for office there may be more residents that vote, and thus overall levels of participation should increase.
Demographic Context

While race/ethnicity, institutions, and the electoral context can impact the overall levels of political participation and the margin of victory, it is necessary to control for the demographic context of the city. For example, Oliver (2000) finds that the size of the city plays an important role in aggregate-level political behavior, because smaller cities tend to have residents who are more socially connected. Voters tend to be more informed in more intimate social settings and therefore increases their propensity to participate (except see Kelleher and Lowery 2009). In larger cities, residents are not as likely to be involved because the lack of social connectedness increases the costs of acquiring information – and subsequently of voting.

Given the discussion of race and ethnicity in American politics and the fact that this chapter specifically examines the impact of Latino candidacies on turnout and the margin of victory, it is important to control for the size of the Latino population. Specifically, the racial composition of a city, such as the size of the Latino population, can condition the impact of the presence of a quality Latino candidate on the mayoral ballot. That is, when quality Latino candidates are vying for mayor in cities with a strong Latino population, elections can be closer and experience higher levels of political participation than in cities where quality Latino candidates run where the Latino population is trivial. Caren (2005) suggest that when minority populations are stronger vis-à-vis the dominant Anglo population, elections are closer because larger size indicates losses in social, economic, and political status (see Caren 2005, 89). Additionally, the larger size of the Latino population in a city the higher the turnout because the group’s chances of success are higher at the polls (see Lublin and Tate 1995 for their study of
African American mayors). In other words, it is an argument suggesting that minorities feel more efficacious in politics (and more likely mobilized) if they are less likely to be defeated in elections – that is, if a quality Latino candidate emerges in the election. Without a quality Latino candidate turnout rates may be lower since Latinos tend to participate at lower rates than Anglos. In the following section, I describe the data used to examine turnout and margin of victory in mayoral elections.

Data
Although the data used in this chapter is constructed from multiple sources, the major source includes mayoral election results for a large sample of cities located in the six southwestern U.S. states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas) spanning various years\(^{32}\) (for more details on the sample see Appendix A). In addition, I include demographic data from the U.S. Census; and local institutional arrangements from International City and County Management Association’s (ICMA) *Form of Government Surveys* – as well as from city charters, websites, and personally contacting city clerks. The analytic sample used to examine turnout and margin of victory includes 575 elections in 112 cities. This includes elections where candidates are both opposed and unopposed, general elections, and runoff elections.

\(^{32}\) For example, I have gathered elections for Houston, TX from 1993-2009 (9 cycles), San Antonio, TX from 1991-2009 (10 cycles), Los Angeles, CA from 1997-2009 (4 cycles), Denver, CO from 1991-2007 (3 cycles). The analysis also includes elections with unopposed candidates.
Variables

The election results provide information on the outcome of the election, such as the winner, the loser, the total number of votes cast, and the share of votes that each candidate received. This information is the basis for the two dependent variables: turnout and margin of victory. Turnout has been measured several different ways in the previous literature (see Geys 2006) however, here I measure turnout by taking the ratio of total votes cast for all mayoral candidates (including write-ins) in each election to the total number of eligible voters (citizens over 18 years old) in the respective city. The denominator in this equation was constructed using the U.S. Census on Population and Housing’s statistics on the citizen voting-age population (people +18yrs). To calculate the voting-eligible population for the years in-between Census cycles, I imputed the data based a linear rate of change. The other dependent variable examined here that is based on electoral information is the margin of victory. This measure is a calculation of the difference between the winner’s vote share and the second place candidate’s vote share.33

Modeling Turnout and Margin of Victory

The turnout rate and the margin of victory, is based on the following conceptual model:

$$\text{Turnout & Margin of Victory} = \text{Latino Ethnicity} + \text{Institutions} + \text{Electoral Context} + \text{Demographic Context} + \text{Demographic Context} \times \text{Latino Ethnicity}$$

33 For example, in an election where Candidate A received 60% of votes and Candidate B received 40% the margin of victory in the election is 20 percentage points.
As outlined above, turnout and margin of victory are expected to be a function of Latino ethnicity, city-level institutions, the context of the election, the demographic context of the city, and the interaction of city demographics and Latino ethnicity. In this section, I will outline the various operational measures used to examine these electoral outcomes.

**Operationalizing Candidate Latino Origin**

To examine the impact of the presence of quality Latino challengers on the ballot on turnout and margin of victory, I determined whether 1) a candidate was of Latino descent 2) whether the Latino candidate had previous political experience and 3) whether the Latino candidate was a non-incumbent. So, if the election had at least one candidate that fit this description it would be coded as “1” and “0” otherwise.

To determine the ethnic origin of the candidates, I relied on the directories of Latino elected officials provided by the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) from 1984-2009 as well as the U.S. Census Spanish Surname Lists (Word & Perkins 1996). Using the election results collected for the cities in my sample, I searched through the NALEO directories to see whether the successful candidates were listed. I also checked to see whether unsuccessful Latino candidates had been successful in other local offices (i.e., city council, county commission, school board, and state legislative government) and thus checked the rosters for their names. Among those who were on the ballot but not in the NALEO directories[^34] I used U.S. Census Spanish Surname Lists (Word & Perkins 1996).

[^34]: Although the methodology used by NALEO has changed over the years in terms of how they include elected officials in the directories, the most recent method relies on contacting candidates and asking them to self-identify as Latinos. So, some Latino elected officials without Latino surnames are included in the
In addition, I determined whether Latino candidates are quality candidates. That is, I determined whether Latino candidates in my dataset have previous political experience in the school board, city council, state legislature. Candidate backgrounds were obtained from NALEO rosters – to see whether they have held previous office in another level of government – and from newspaper accounts and campaign websites.

Finally, I determined whether each Latino candidate was a non-incumbent challenger by noting whether they had won the election in \( \text{time } T-1 \). Outside of California, the election results do not indicate whether candidates were sitting incumbents. So, I relied on the elections data that I gathered. If it could not be determined whether Latino candidates were present in \( \text{time } T-1 \), then it was coded as a missing.

Given that the previous research suggests that elections should have lower levels of political participation and higher margins of victory after they have experienced leadership under a minority mayor (see research in Hajnal 2007), I also include a binary variable that indicates whether a city has a history of electing a Latino mayor from 1984 up to the point of the election. Here, if the city has elected a Latino mayor at some point between 1984 and the election (in \( \text{time } T \)) it was coded as “1” and “0” if otherwise. To code this variable, I relied on NALEO directories that go as far back as 1984. Granted, with the data collected here, it is not possible to determine when exactly cities elected their first Latino mayor. Rather information on every mayor spanning the time when cities were first incorporated would be needed. However, this is an ongoing project where I am continually investigating the backgrounds of each city/election in more detail. So,

directory. Additionally, NALEO relies on previous list of Latino candidates to update current lists and in the past they may not have surveyed all U.S. cities and elections. Given these factors, there are some candidates coded as Latinos in my sample that are not in the NALEO directories.
the best information available to measure Latino representation in the Latino mayoralty stems from 1984-2009.

**Operationalizing City Institutions**

Part of the rules governing elections include when the elections are held. In this dataset I use a binary variable to specify whether the election was held *concurrently* with presidential election years where 1=yes and 0=no. City government institutional data was partly provided by the *Form of Governments Surveys* conducted by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA).\(^{35}\) To measure the prestige of the mayoral office, I include a binary measure for a *mayor-council government*, where 1=yes and 0=no. I also include a binary variable indicating whether municipal elections were held on cycle in November of presidential election and mid-term election years to measure whether cities have *concurrent elections*, where 1=yes and 0=no. Finally, to operationalize whether cities have electoral rules that limit the maximum number of terms for incumbents, I include a binary measure for *term limits*, where 1=yes and 0=no.

**Operationalizing the Electoral Context**

To operationalize the context of each election, I account for whether the election has an *open seat* using a binary measure to determine whether an incumbent is on the ballot or not (1=yes, 0=no). Additionally, I included a variable for whether the election had an *unopposed candidate* (1=yes, 0=no) vying for the mayoralty and whether the election was

\(^{35}\) Given that the surveys are conducted every five years and not all participants (city officials) choose to respond every time, there was a lot of missing and inconsistent data. Therefore, I took the time to verify whether there were term limits, partisan elections, and any changes in forms of government by reviewing city charters (posted online) or contacting city clerks.
a runoff – or a second-round election that took place in case no one candidate received more than a minimum threshold of votes (usually 50.1 percent of the votes). All these variables are coded “1” if yes and “0” otherwise. I also include a variable accounting for the number of number of competitive candidates, which is measured as a fractionalization score: 1/(sum of the squared vote share of each candidate). In the analysis of turnout rates, I control for the margin of victory. As for the analysis of margin of victory, I also control for the turnout rate. This will help determine whether elections that are closer also have higher participation rates and vice versa.

**Operationalizing the Demographic Context**

I also rely on the U.S. Census of Population and Housing to include indicators for the demographic context of a city such as, the size of the Latino population, measured as the percent of the Latino voting age population in a city and the city's total voting age population (logged). To measure the interactive effect of Latino ethnicity and demographic context I include the interaction term of Quality Latino Candidate*Percent Latino Population.

The descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 show that average turnout across all observations is 25 percent (as a proportion of citizen, voting-age population). Additionally, candidates win by an average of 41 percentage points. These data reveal not only that turnout is quite low compared to presidential elections that usually have nearly 50 percent turnout, but that mayoral candidates win by very large margins. Also, only

---

36 To illustrate the measure that accounts for the number of competitive candidates, take a hypothetical election with three candidates: Candidate A received 50% of votes, Candidate B 40%, and Candidate C 10%. (1/.50^2+.40^2+.10^2=2.38 competitive candidates).
about 37 percent of the mayoral elections in the dataset have open seats where no incumbent is on the ballot. Among those candidates that run unopposed, the margin of victory is also quite high. Specifically, when the write-in candidates are taken into account they win by a margin of 98 percentage points. However, candidates that do run opposed win by an average of 30 percentage points. As for the independent variable of primary interest, Latino ethnicity, the descriptive data shows that 13 percent of the 575 elections in 112 cities a quality Latino challenger on the ballot.

### Table 5.1

Descriptive Data for Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs (elecs/cities)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnout (CVAP)</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of Victory</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Latino Challenger</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Latino Mayor</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-Council Government</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Election</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff Election</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limits</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Election</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. of Competitive Candidates</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unopposed Election</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size (logged)</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>10.65</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>15.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Latino Population</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Findings From the Turnout Model**

To estimate the impact of race/ethnicity, institutions, electoral context, and demographic context on turnout and margin of victory, I employ random & fixed effects OLS regression models. These methods are commonly used to examine time-series, cross-sectional data because they provide robust standard errors clustered by city and year (see
In other words, the estimates describe the average effect of the impact that independent variables have between cities and within cities, respectively.

The estimates of turnout in Model 1 of Table 5.2 show that Latino ethnicity, measured in terms of the presence of a quality Latino challenger, is not statistically associated with city-wide levels of political participation. Additionally, the election of a Latino mayor in the recent history of the city (from 1984-2009) does not explain the variation in aggregate turnout rates across cities. Given that the interaction between \textit{Latino voting age population*Quality Latino Challenger} was not statistically significant, it was dropped from the final model. These null results hold in Model 2 examining turnout within cities (using a Fixed Effects model).

As for the influence of cities’ institutional mechanisms on turnout rates across cities, only one factor seems to play a major role: the timing of elections. The estimates in Model 1 of Table 5.2 show that cities that have municipal elections held during presidential election years are predicted to have a turnout rate that is 14 percentage points higher than cities without concurrent elections. In other words, all else equal, the average turnout rate in cities with concurrent elections is 39 percent of the citizen voting-age population, while the turnout rate for cities without concurrent elections is 25 percent. This seems to make a great difference in aggregate levels of electoral participation.
Table 5.2
Examining Turnout in Mayoral Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Between Cities (1)</th>
<th>Within Cities (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV: Turnout (CVAP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Latino Challenger</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Latino Mayor</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-Council Government</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.04* (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Election</td>
<td>0.14*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.12*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Context</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unopposed Election</td>
<td>-0.05*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.05*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. of Competitive Candidates</td>
<td>0.01** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Election</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff Election</td>
<td>0.05*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.05*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of Victory</td>
<td>-0.04** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.03** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Context</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Latino (VAP)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size (logged)</td>
<td>-0.01** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.05* (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino VAP*Qlty Latino Challenger</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.40*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>575/112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
The estimates in Model 2 in Table 5.2 show that this relationship is very similar within cities (over time). That is, when city elections are held on-cycle in November turnout is higher by 13 percentage points than when city elections are held off-cycle. This does not necessarily indicate that cities change the timing of elections. Rather, the data indicate that some cities have elections every two years (on even years) in September. If there is a runoff election, then it is might be held in November of the same (even-numbered) year – which is now on-cycle with either presidential elections or mid-term elections. Also, when cities implement term limits turnout is likely to be reduced by 5 percentage points. Competitiveness seems to be reduced when incumbents are required to serve a limited number of consecutive terms. Even though the estimates in Model 2 of Table 5.2 show that cities that adopt term limits is statistically associated with reduced levels of turnout, there are only five cities in the dataset that have implemented term limits – that is, within the timeframe of the elections gathered here.\(^{37}\) Thus, this result should be interpreted cautiously.

In addition to examining the impact of institutions Model 1 of Table 5.2 examines the impact of electoral context on turnout. The results indicate that it is a critical determinant of aggregate levels of political participation in elections. For example, all else equal, turnout is likely to be 5 percentage points lower in elections with \textit{unopposed candidates} vying for the mayoralty than in elections where there are at least two – if not more – candidates on the ballot. In fact, as more competitive candidates vie for the mayoralty the higher the turnout rate is expected to be. Figure 5.2 shows that, all else

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\(^{37}\) These cities include Fresno, CA; Carson City, NV; Henderson, NV; Las Vegas, NV; Austin, TX.
equal,\textsuperscript{38} for every additional candidate that runs, turnout increases by 1 percent. The results also show that when runoff elections are held (across and within cities) turnout increases by 5 percentage points.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Fig. 5.2 Predicting Turnout Rates in Mayoral Elections}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\hspace{1cm}
\end{center}

In summary, aggregate political participation (turnout) seems to be primarily impacted by the timing of the election. The context of the election in terms of whether candidates are unopposed or whether the election is a runoff between the top two candidates also help explain turnout rates across and within cities – but are not as influential as the election timing. The empirical model also reveals that Latino ethnicity is not statistically associated with city-level turnout rates.

\textsuperscript{38} To estimate predicted probabilities all variables were held at their mean.
Findings from the Margin of Victory Model

In this section, I specifically test to see whether elections with Latino candidates have smaller margins of victory.\textsuperscript{39} The estimates in Model 1 of Table 5.3 show that although the presence of a quality Latino candidate has a negative effect on the margin of victory, the relationship is not quite statistically significant. The Fixed Effects model (Model 2) in Table 5.3 also indicates that Latino ethnicity does not influence the closeness of elections over time (within cities). Unlike previously expected, the effect of Latino ethnicity is not conditioned by the size of the Latino voting age population. Because the interaction term $\text{Latino VAP} \times \text{Quality Latino Candidate}$ was not statistically significant it was ultimately omitted from the analysis.

Despite the null effect of Latino ethnicity, the results in Model 1 of Table 5.3 reveal that various institutions influence election closeness. However, the impact of mayor-council government and term limits are opposite of the hypothesized direction. I expected that mayoral elections held in cities with mayor-council governments to be closer than council-manager governments because mayor-council governments are institutions that carry a higher level of prestige that would generally make for competitive elections. Specifically, the results show that, all else equal, cities with mayor-council governments are likely to have winners win elections by an average of 47 percentage points; while elections in cities without mayor-council governments winners are expected to win by 39 percentage points. Winning by 39 percentage points is still quite a large margin of victory, and the predicted probabilities (where all variables are held to their mean) indicate that the form of government would not make elections less competitive in

\textsuperscript{39} Margin of victory is measured as the difference between the vote share of the top two candidates.
realistic terms. That is, unless differences between cities with mayor-council governments and council-manager varied from the single digits to the mid double-digits, then it really would not make mayoral campaigns take a closer look at the competitive nature of the governing arrangements. In Model 2 of Table 5.3 the governing arrangement was omitted from the model because there was no variation over time within cities. In other words, the cities in the sample did not change their governing arrangements from council-manager to mayor-council (and vice versa); and a Fixed Effects Model could not be estimated using that independent variable.

So, in addition to the form of government, the other institutional variable that influences election closeness is term limits. On average, cities with term limits have margins of victory that are 4 percentage higher than elections without term limits. Perhaps the notion that seats are systematically up for grabs due to incumbents being forced to step down (after serving a series of consecutive terms) reduces the closeness of elections rather than increases it. In Model 2 of Table 5.3, the impact of the adoption of term limits within cities does not impact the average margin of victory over time. But, given the limited variation of changes in term limits within cities, this result is expected.
Table 5.3  
Examining Margin of Victory in Mayoral Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Margin of Victory</th>
<th>Between Cities</th>
<th>Within Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Random Effects OLS</td>
<td>(2) Fixed Effects OLS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Latino Ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Between Cities</th>
<th>Within Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality Latino Challenger</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Latino Mayor</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Between Cities</th>
<th>Within Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor-Council Government</td>
<td>0.08*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Term Limits</td>
<td>0.04** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Election</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Electoral Context**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Between Cities</th>
<th>Within Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unopposed Election</td>
<td>0.48*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.46*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. of Competitive Candidates</td>
<td>-0.16*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.17*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Election</td>
<td>-0.11*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.11*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff Election</td>
<td>-0.18*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.22*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout (CVAP)</td>
<td>-0.18** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.33** (0.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Demographic Context**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Between Cities</th>
<th>Within Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Latino (VAP)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size (logged)</td>
<td>0.02*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino VAP*Qlty Latino Challenger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Between Cities</th>
<th>Within Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.52*** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Between Cities</th>
<th>Within Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>575/112</td>
<td>575/112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
The estimates in Table 5.3 show that in both Random and Fixed Effects models, the context of the election is really what is driving the margin of victory. Table 5.4 provides the predicted\textsuperscript{40} margin of victory for elections that are unopposed, elections with incumbents on the ballot, and in runoff elections. Elections are closer (within and across cities) when incumbents are not vying for reelection and in the second-round runoff election between the top two candidates. Finally, Figure 5.4 shows the impact that turnout rates have on the margin of victory. Despite the positive impact of turnout on the margin of victory, the model estimates indicate that turnout needs to be particularly high to make elections quite competitive between the first and second-place candidates.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Predicting Margin of Victory}
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
 & Predicted Probability \\
\hline
Council-Manager Government & .39 \\
Mayor-Council Government & .47 \\
No Term Limits & .39 \\
Term Limits & .44 \\
Unopposed Election & .80 \\
Opposed Election & .33 \\
Incumbent on Ballot & .45 \\
Open Seat Election & .34 \\
General Election & .43 \\
Runoff Election & .24 \\
\hline
Note: all vars. held at mean \\
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{40} The predicted probabilities are estimated by holding all other variables at their mean.
Conclusion

The principal aim of this chapter was to examine the impact of Latino ethnicity on electoral outcomes, namely turnout and margin of victory. The expectation, based on anecdotal evidence and academic research, is that Latino ethnicity is not only a relevant (and non-trivial) factor in elections, but that it has the potential to determine election outcomes by increasing political participation and making elections closer. Granted, increased political participation could result from coethnics being enthused, interested, and ultimately mobilized; or from non-coethnics – in this case Anglos and Blacks – being encouraged to participate to avoid relinquishing their social and political status. Since the impact of Latino ethnicity has not been examined to date, this study fills the gap in the literature by specifically studying whether and when the presence of quality Latino challengers influences aggregate political participation and the margin of victory.
Moreover, I focus on studying the impact of Latino ethnicity on mayoral election outcomes because this is the optimal setting to determine whether race and ethnicity have a role to play in political outcomes. Due to the frequency of non-partisans elections and off-cycle election timing, media effects are expected to be minimal in determining election outcomes – which is not expected in high profile congressional and presidential elections.

The results provided in the analyses of turnout and margin of victory find that Latino ethnicity, measured by the presence of quality Latino challengers, is not statistically associated to aggregate measures of political participation and election closeness. That is not to say that Latino ethnicity is not relevant in mayoral elections. In fact, local elections are complex and this analysis is just the tip of the iceberg. The limitations in the data do not allow me to fully examine the historical experience of Latinos in these cities. The measure for whether Latinos have ever served as mayors does not indicate the first time a viable Latino candidate sought the mayoralty. Additionally, further investigation should test whether the same Latino candidate ran for mayor multiple times – and more importantly, whether the fact that Latinos candidates won or lost had any impact on turnout rates and the margin of victory. Controversial issues that were raised during the campaign between could also influence the election outcomes discussed - which needs to be further explored. Finally, the impact of Latino ethnicity on election outcomes could depend on whether the mayoral election was contested between a Latino and an African American candidate, or a Latino and an Anglo candidate. In the dataset used here, I have only coded for whether a candidate was Latino or not. Thus,
race could play a significant role in elections and more research is needed to determine the conditions under which it influences election outcomes.

Although Latino ethnicity is a major interest in this chapter, it is merely one variable among many that is examined to understand the determinants of election outcomes. The virtual non-existence of a centralized database on municipal election results (until recent developments made by the Local Elections in America Project by Marschall, Shah, and Ruhil 2011), has prohibited scholars from systematically studying a variety of political phenomena that are frequently studied by congressional, presidential, or state legislative scholars alike. Among these rarely studied phenomena beyond a single state, single city, or single time period is city-wide turnout and margin of victory. As many scholars rely on single city studies, they cannot examine the impact of the electoral context on these election outcomes more systematically. My results confirm previous studies of California elections in that the timing of elections is critical for determining aggregate participation rates (see Hajnal et al. 2002; Wood 2002). But, the margin of victory or the closeness of elections (as studied by Lublin and Tate 1995) is heavily influenced by the context of the election. Not only does it matter whether incumbents are on the ballot, but how many viable candidates are running, and whether the election is held to break a previous “tie” between the top two candidates. I challenge scholars interested in examining everything from incumbency advantage to the representation of women to take the research presented here much further.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Having dedicated this dissertation to studying Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty, I have shed light on the following questions: Where are Latino mayors currently serving? Why do some cities have Latino representation in the mayoralty and other do not? What are the conditions under which Latinos emerge as mayoral candidates, and why do they win? Finally, are election outcomes such as turnout and margin of victory influenced by the presence of Latino candidates?

By studying the causes and consequences of Latino descriptive representation, the research here has essentially explored the lifecycle of a key component of Latino political incorporation in municipal government – that is, descriptive representation. Knowing the causal determinants of Latinos’ representation in municipal government and elections is a fundamental contribution to American politics because it allows us to further understand the political consequences of an increasingly diverse body politic at a level of government that is severely understudied.

Furthermore, because local government has a tremendous impact on the lives of individuals of different racial and ethnic backgrounds given the services provided for police protection, education, healthcare services, among other things, then it is critical to explore how these groups fare in gaining access to decision-making bodies (via representation). Thus, this concluding chapter not only highlights key findings from the previous chapters, but also discusses some of the anomalous results that examine different aspects of representation. Finally, this chapter points to new directions for future research regarding Latino descriptive representation in subnational government.
**Discussion of Key Results**

One of the most revealing findings in Chapter 2 is that despite most Latino mayor cities having a very large Latino population, 58 percent of majority Latino populated cities do not have representation in the city’s top executive office. That is, there are approximately 255 incorporated cities (according to the 2005-2009 American Community Survey) that could have Latino mayors, due to the numerical strength of the Latino population, but simply do not. There is no question that the numerical strength of the Latino population is an influential factor for Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty. However, the findings in Chapter 2 indicate that representation in the mayoralty may extend beyond the numerical voting strength of the Latino population. For example, representation could depend on the demographic context of the city, its governing institutions, and electoral rules, among other things. The descriptive analysis of cities with Latino mayors – which has never been done before up to now – provides insight as to where Latino mayors are elected and describes the demographic and institutional characteristics of Latino mayor cities. Additionally, the descriptive statistics in Chapter 2 also justifies the subsequent chapters of the dissertation that inquire about the causal determinants of Latino mayoral representation in cities and in elections.

To study Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty beyond descriptive statistics and to further examine the various demographic, institutional, and political determinants of this political phenomenon, I relied on a large sample of cities constructed from six ICMA *Form of Government Survey* waves spanning from 1981 to 2006. The empirical results confirm that Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty is largely a function of the voting strength of the Latino population in terms of not only being a
large proportion of the population, but also being relatively well educated. Thus, on the one hand, Latinos are projected to increase their political clout given their large and expanding population size in both traditional and non-traditional immigrant destinations. On the other hand, these demographic trends may not necessarily yield to the expected political consequences if Latinos continue to lag behind in education. That is, for Latinos to realize their full potential in domestic political affairs, they need to work towards encouraging Latino youths to stay in school, go to college, and graduate. The seminal research in American political behavior reveals how important education levels are for political participation and ultimately political incorporation (see Verba and Nie 1975; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984).

The results in Chapter 3 also reveal that Latino descriptive representation goes beyond the sheer numerical strength of the Latino population. In fact, institutions seem to matter for achieving representation in the mayoralty. For example, when examining a large sample of cities across the U.S., cities with term limits are more likely to have Latino mayors than cities without term limits. Moreover, the results indicate that to have any substantive effect on the probability of observing a city with a Latino mayor, term limits should be implemented in cities with a non-trivial Latino population (approximately 30 percent of the voting age population). This finding, in one way, confirms the notion that term limits provides opportunities to underrepresented racial/ethnic minority groups where they make up a substantial portion of the population.

Another institution that seems to have a positive influence on the representation of Latinos in the mayoralty is mayor-council governing arrangements. This institution was expected to negatively impact Latino representation due to the competitiveness largely
associated with prestigious offices that often expects to shut out underrepresented minorities from gaining leadership positions in government. However, the results show that in cities where no racial/ethnic group comprises a majority of the population and have mayor-council governments, Latinos are more likely to be represented in the mayoralty than in cities that do not meet these two requirements. In short, the combination of demographic context and institutions should influence whether or not Latinos are able to gain access to decision-making bodies in municipal contexts. This finding further attests to the notion that Latino representation goes beyond the mere numerical strength of Latinos in a given city.

In fact, one of the most prominent findings of Chapter 3 besides Latinos’ mere numerical strength is the percent of Latinos serving on city council. The more Latinos are represented in the city legislature, the higher the likelihood that cities will have Latino mayors. This relationship is, however, clearly impacted by the numerical strength of the Latino population in the city. For example, cities with majority Latino populations with a majority of the seats in the city legislature are nearly 60 percent likely to have Latino mayors. That probability is reduced to 20 percent if Latinos have the same political clout in the city council but have less than a majority of the voting age population in the city. Again, this finding reveals that representation in the city’s top executive office goes beyond Latinos’ mere numerical strength. And in this case, the combined institutional-demographic and political-demographic factors are key to Latino mayoral representation.

Although these findings confirm the theoretical expectations as to why Latinos are more likely to be represented in the mayoralty across the U.S., they only reveal one piece of the puzzle on descriptive representation. That is, the analysis in Chapter 3 does
not examine why Latino candidates emerge and win the mayoralty. To fully understand the conditions that contribute to this process of descriptive representation in the mayoralty, in Chapter 4, I examine unprecedented original data on 648 mayoral elections in 113 cities in six southwestern states (AZ, CA, CO, NV, NM, and TX).

One major message extracted from the findings examining Latino candidate emergence in Chapter 4 is that representation in the election (i.e., observing at least one Latino running for mayor) is a function of the combination of Latinos’ numerical voting strength and a city’s governing institutions. This essentially extends the findings from Chapter 3. More specifically, the findings in Chapter 4 indicate that when Latinos make up 40 percent of the population in cities with mayor-council governments, the probability of observing at least one Latino on the ballot is over 80 percent. On the other hand, in a similar Latino-sized city where the governing arrangements are council-manager or commission forms of government, the probability of observing a Latino candidate is reduced to about 40 percent. Unlike previously expected, mayor-council governments do not seem to detract Latino mayoral candidates, particularly if the Latino population is large enough. This indicates that Latino candidates are more likely to run in city contexts that are not only worth pursuing (i.e., a prestigious elective office), but also when they have the capacity to win due to the numerical strength of potential supporters in the Latino community.

Also, as in Chapter 3, the results of the model examining candidate emergence indicate that the more Latinos are incorporated in the city council, the more likely at least one Latino candidate will run. So, this confirms the expectation that when the ranks of
city council are swelled with Latinos the more likely they will percolate into mayoral elections.

Relying on election results further helps to determine the extent to which quality Latino candidates (i.e., those with previous political experience) exhibit strategic behavior when deciding to run. The statistical results suggest that quality Latino candidates are more likely to emerge when more candidates run for mayor, when more people participate in politics, and when an incumbent is not vying for reelection. Thus, beyond Latinos’ numerical strength and city institutions, the findings in Chapter 4 indicate that there are conditions that make it particularly suitable for quality Latino candidates to emerge. Because quality Latino candidates are more likely to win (as I will elaborate more below), it is important to know why they are more likely to enter the political race. In short, it seems that the greater the competitiveness of the electoral context the greater the level of uncertainty in the outcome (in that the election is up-for-grabs), and thus the higher the likelihood that Latino candidates will emerge to contest the mayoralty.

Given these findings, the next obvious question is: Why are Latino mayoral candidates more likely to win? In Chapter 4, I examine a subset of elections where Latino candidates emerged to determine the conditions for their electoral success as well as their vote shares. The results point to electoral factors that create strategic opportunities for Latino candidates. For example, if Latino candidates have previous political experience and run in contexts with high political participation rates, the more likely Latino candidates will not only win, but receive a higher share of the votes cast. This finding dovetails quite nicely with the results on candidate emergence because the emergence
model suggests that quality Latino candidates are more likely to emerge when political participation is higher. The uncertainty of the expected political outcome in high-turnout elections does indeed improve the quality Latino candidate’s chances of success. So, the strategic considerations for running in these contexts are borne out in the data – thus, making it advisable to potential Latino candidates to not only get previous political experience but to run when they expect turnout to be high. Granted, the measure of political participation is considered after-the-fact. However, there are reasons for expecting high turnout rates, such as an incumbent was recently vacated, there was a political scandal in municipal government, or perhaps a hot-button issue was raised during the campaign.

On a similar note, Latino candidates are more likely to win in contexts where Latinos are sizeable and when the seat is not being contested by an incumbent. Thus, Latino candidates considering whether to run should pay attention to whether an incumbent is running for reelection and the numerical strength of potential supporters in the Latino community. Potential Latino candidates should not be wary of the level of competitiveness of an election. The data in Chapter 4 reveal that a more competitive context actually improves the chances for quality Latino challengers to be successful. Also, Latino candidates should not shy away from running for school board or some lower-level government office where the risks of losing might be low given the scarcity of voters and money needed to win in those contexts. The more Latinos serve in city council, or have previous political experience elsewhere, the more Latino candidates are likely to win – as shown in the southwestern election results studied here. So, one major implication of the research here is that to see Latinos run and serve in the city’s top
executive office they need to run and serve in lower-level government. To extend Latinos’ representation beyond the municipality perhaps this same trend should carry, that is: get more Latinos to run and serve in local governments.

Beyond these findings, the statistical results in Chapter 4 do not completely correspond to the findings in Chapter 3. Although both chapters examine the causal determinants of Latino descriptive representation, they do so in distinct contexts. Chapter 3 looks at aggregate (city-level) factors that contribute to the presence or absence of Latino mayors in a sample of cities across the United States. On the other hand, Chapter 4 examines Latino descriptive representation in the Southwest – particularly in elections. Chapter 4 also narrows down the analytic sample to cities in the Southwest with Latino candidates already on the ballot to examine candidate success. Thus, in Chapter 3, mayoral term limits and mayor-council forms of government have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of observing a city with a Latino mayor in government. In Chapter 4, mayor-council government is not statistically associated with the success of Latino candidates (only with emergence). Additionally, contrary to the findings in Chapter 3, mayoral term limits has a negative effect on Latino candidate success. There are a few possible explanations for this. For example, it is possible that the limited scope of the data in Chapter 4 alters the electoral environment in which Latino success is examined. Recall that in Chapter 4 the analytic sample only includes elections in the Southwest U.S. – particularly where Latino candidates are on the ballot. These are cities with abnormally high proportions of Latinos. In fact, the average Latino population is 40 percent of the voting age population in the analytic sample. These are places where Latinos have substantial numerical strength and possibly have already achieved a level of
political incorporation (representation) that could be negatively affected by term limits. That is, if Latinos have already gained access to municipal government’s top executive office, then term limits might reverse the gains that Latinos have made – as suggested by Thompson and Moncrief (1993). Another factor that might contribute to this outcome is that in Chapter 4 various electoral factors are included in the model to estimate Latinos candidate success which could alter the impact of the city-level factors. More research is needed to further explore the long-term impact of term limits. Perhaps the analysis needs to expand beyond the Southwest and include a longer time-frame to fully examine the effect of term limits on Latino representation in subnational government.

In addition to examining the causes of Latino descriptive representation in cities and in mayoral elections, Chapter 5 examines the consequences of Latino representation in elections on electoral outcomes. I particularly focus on analyzing the impact of Latino ethnicity on turnout and the margin of victory using the elections data gathered to study Latino candidate emergence and success in the Southwest. Mayoral elections are optimal settings to determine whether ethnicity has a role to play in political outcomes due to the frequency of non-partisans elections and the off-cycle election timing. In other words, political parties do not usually have a formal role in organizing elections and influencing political behavior in local elections. Thus, unlike in high profile congressional and presidential elections where partisanship is often the focus for voters and campaigns, voters in local elections may rely on other cues such as race and ethnicity to influence their voting decisions. The results in Chapter 5 show that Latino ethnicity, measured by the presence of quality Latino challengers running for mayor, is not statistically associated to aggregate measures of political participation and election closeness. Despite
the null findings regarding the main hypothesis, the study reveals a great deal about the causal determinants of local election outcomes. For example, Chapter 5 reveals that the timing of mayoral elections – particularly when held during month and year of presidential elections – is among the most influential determinant of turnout rates. Besides this electoral rule, turnout seems to be primarily driven by the context of the election such as whether the election is unopposed or whether the election is a runoff between the top two candidates. These findings point to the consequences of competitive electoral contexts. Specifically, more residents are expected to participate in politics when the stakes are raised – either when the top two candidates are competing for the mayoralty or when more candidates contest the mayoralty.

To further explore the closeness of elections, I examined the causal determinants of the margin of victory in mayoral elections. The presence of quality Latino challengers does not seem to impact the margin of victory. However, both institutions and the context of elections influence this outcome. Specifically, the institutions of mayoral-term limits mayor-council governments are positively associated with closer mayoral elections. As for the context of the election, it has the largest and most comprehensive effect on the margin of victory in mayoral elections than institutions or city demographics. For example, when more candidates vie for the mayoralty, when the seat is not being challenged by a sitting incumbent, and when turnout is high, mayoral elections are expected to be closer. Chapter 5 essentially fills the gap in the literature that has remained unfilled by previous research due to the lack of a sufficiently large sample that expands beyond a handful of cities and a specific point in time. Now, we can say with more
certainty what the causal determinants of turnout and the margin of victory are – particularly in the Southwest context.

To briefly reconcile the research in Chapters 4 & 5 it is important to note that competitive city and electoral contexts do not seem to detract Latino candidates. Factors such as mayor-council governments, turnout, open-seat elections, and the number of candidates vying for the mayoralty, increase the likelihood that quality Latino candidates will emerge. With the exception of term-limits, a similar pattern occurs with regard to Latino candidate electoral success. So, one message from the research conducted here is that competition is an opportunity – especially for Latino candidates. Potential Latino candidates should not shy away from competitive contexts (i.e., when outcomes are expected to be uncertain or close) – especially if Latinos are sizeable.

**Future Research**

Although the systematic analysis of Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty in this dissertation has provided key insights about how Latinos fare in American subnational politics, there are many more questions that can be further explored. In this section, I will outline three major avenues for future research that extend what has already been done for this dissertation.

Given that the research in Chapter 4 specifically studied elections, it provides us with aggregate-level measures of strategy and competition with regard to their impact on the emergence and success of Latino mayoral candidates. The positive aspect of this methodological approach is that it provides general patterns of Latino representation across a wide array of contexts. On the other hand, it lacks a precise understanding about
the strategic concerns of candidates and voters from various racial and ethnic groups. In other words, although the data used in Chapter 4 describe many aspects about the election such as the number of candidates, their Latino ethnicity, and their previous political experience, we do not know about the specific challenges and advantages that candidates perceived before and after entering the political race. We also do not know who the Latino leaders are in the city that could have run for mayor but chose to not to – or why. Therefore, there is great potential in not only investigating more details about the mayoral candidates and their strategic decisions to run for mayor, but also inquiring about potential candidates who could have run but did not. Additionally, it is imperative to study city leaders and organizations who hold the levers of power in terms of providing votes and money to different mayoral candidates. In depth case studies could reveal a great deal about how Latino candidates were chosen and supported among the city elites. This could also reveal how specific coalitions form and the conditions under which Latino candidates were able to overcome various obstacles to win the mayoralty. This is particularly interesting because it could further determine whether and how political parties are involved in recruiting and supporting Latino candidates. In the advent of a recent Republican primary to replace Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, where Latino candidate and Tea Party favorite, Ted Cruz, beat the establishment Republican candidate, David Dewhurst, in a conservative state where the Latino population is 37.6 percent, it is clear that more research is needed to further understand how these dynamics play out at the local level. That is, are there conservative mayoral candidates like Houston’s Orlando Sanchez and Roy Morales that have been recruited by conservative city leaders and
organizations precisely because of their ethnicity to target conservative Anglos and undecided Latinos?

The headlines in various newspapers and findings in political surveys reveal that Latinos, although historically lean Democratic, can very well support the Republican Party because neither party has solidified their support. So, how does this work in municipal contexts where political parties do not have a formal role? Also, previous research has suggested that minority candidates benefit from the support of non-profit organizations that have a minority or low-income focus. Understanding how these groups unite in support of candidates of various racial and ethnic backgrounds will require more in-depth case studies. In short, this is one avenue of future research that needs to be pursued to improve our knowledge about the dynamics of Latino political incorporation in municipal government.

In addition to in-depth case studies, future research needs to expand the election data collected for this project beyond the Southwest US. Moving beyond this region can answer questions about how Latinos fare politically outside traditional immigrant destinations. Additionally, once expanding the Southwest data, other racial and ethnic groups become more prominent. So, collecting data on race rather than solely Latino ethnicity could allow scholars to compare and contrast models of Asian, Black, and Latino descriptive representation for the first time ever. The typical approach, such as in this dissertation, is to focus on one underrepresented group at a time. Thus, the research could greatly benefit from modeling representation across race and ethnicity.

Minority representation in the mayoralty also varies by gender – which is information that further limits the data used in this dissertation. The intersectionality of
race, ethnicity, and gender should inspire future studies of descriptive representation in subnational government because women of color have a unique experience in politics that can place them at a great advantage. Previous studies of women in politics reveal that women may have unique leadership styles that embrace cooperation over conflict – which in part makes them quite successful in politics and elections. For scholars deeply interested in understanding how and why Latinos (in general) could improve their status in politics, female leadership could be a key component to solving the problem of underrepresentation. I say this because female Latina candidates are considered to be less threatening to non-minority populations when they run and thus more successful in state legislative elections than their male counterparts (see Garcia et al. 2008). Additionally,Latinas are in a unique position to influence the political socialization of Latino youths. It is amazing to hear anecdotes about mothers participating in their children’s schools and volunteering in local organizations because they understand that active community involvement is a key mechanism that may not only improve their personal circumstances, but also improve their community. Beyond key case studies of prominent Latinas in Texas (see Garcia et al. 2008), we simply do not know enough about why they decide to run and why they win in municipal government settings. Concentrating on a data collection project that analyzes representation of different racial/ethnic groups in municipal executive office can shape future studies that explore the relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation. With the list of minority office holders generated in this study, scholars could focus on what these office holder do while in office. That is, inquiries can be made about the types of policies that minority mayors propose, pass, and implement in city government to solve problems in minority
communities. These policies can range from policing to healthcare, and scholars can focus on how these policies diffuse and adapt as minority leaders assert their preferences. In sum, there is a lot to be gained from comparing and contrasting models of representation that expand beyond the Southwest and beyond Latinos, per se.

Because one of the key findings in this dissertation points to the influence of Latino descriptive representation in lower-level government on the representation of Latinos in higher-level offices, the third avenue for further research needs to determine where Latino mayors serve once they leave office. That is, do former Latino mayors eventually run for county executive office or the state legislature? There is some anecdotal evidence that this is true, particularly in the case of the Robert Menendez, U.S Senator from New Jersey, who is the former mayor of Union City, NJ. But, no study has systematically explored the progressive ambition of Latino mayors. Therefore, such a study would help bridge the gap between studies that focus on urban politics with those that focus on state and Congressional politics. Collaborative efforts such as these would surely help to accurately portray the current state of the Latino political condition – which in an era of increased diversity (dominated by Latinos) – would essentially help with understanding the state of American politics.
REFERENCES


Preuhs, Robert. 2007. “Descriptive Representation as a Mechanism to Mitigate Backlash.” Political Research Quarterly. 60(2)


Appendix A: Discussion of Data & Sample

Sample size

The data used in this chapter is constructed from multiple sources. However, the main source comes from mayoral election results procured from city, county, and state websites and city/county clerks. I first began collecting election data on the cities with the most available data. Typically larger-sized cities have sufficient resources in terms of staff and money to make their election results available online. After scouring the web for all Southwestern cities above 50,000 population, I was able to collect election results for 39 cities. Using this as my starting point, I based the sample selection on two major criteria: 1) population size 2) and geographic location across the Southwest. As for population size, the sample of cities selected for analysis had to fit within a certain category among all central southwestern cities (above 1,000) including: large (50,000 - 300,000 or more), medium (5,000 - 49,999), and small (1,000 - 4,999) cities.

Each state in the Southwest used in this data collection project (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas) has a certain number of cities that fall within these categories. The population categories listed in Table 1 of Appendix A shows that there are 17% large-sized cities, 47% medium-sized cities, and 36% small-sized cities, in six southwestern states: Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Texas. Thus, any additional city elections that I collect will have to be distributed similarly to Table 1 of Appendix A. For example, of the 221 cities above 50,000 in six southwestern states 5% of those cities are in Arizona, 64% in California,
6% in Colorado, 4% in Nevada, 2% in New Mexico, and 21% in Texas. This indicates that Texas and California have the majority of large-sized cities in the Southwest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>city size</th>
<th>universe of cities N1</th>
<th>Arizona N2</th>
<th>California N3</th>
<th>Colorado N4</th>
<th>Nevada N5</th>
<th>New Mexico N6</th>
<th>Texas N7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50,000 - 300,000 or more (large)</td>
<td>221 17%</td>
<td>10 5%</td>
<td>142 64%</td>
<td>13 6%</td>
<td>6 3%</td>
<td>4 2%</td>
<td>46 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 - 49,999 (medium)</td>
<td>596 47%</td>
<td>26 4%</td>
<td>251 42%</td>
<td>40 7%</td>
<td>5 1%</td>
<td>22 4%</td>
<td>252 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 4,999 (small)</td>
<td>450 36%</td>
<td>8 2%</td>
<td>44 10%</td>
<td>16 4%</td>
<td>7 2%</td>
<td>8 2%</td>
<td>367 82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,267 100%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To determine the size of my sample (i.e., the number of cities I needed to collect elections data) based on the universe of cities in the six southwestern states, I first divided 39 by .17 to get a sample of 229 total cities (see Table 2 of Appendix A). After determining the distribution of the cities by category group (39 large, 108 medium, 82 small), I halved the total medium and small cities to have a manageable set of cities to analyze. The final distribution for the proposed sample includes 39 large-sized cities, 54 medium-sized cities, and 41 small-sized cities for a total of 134 cities in the Southwest.
Criteria for Proposed Representative Sample

Once stratifying the population by city size, I calculated the proportion of cities in each state within each size strata to determine the number of cities to select (see Table 2 of Appendix A). The percentages for each state, within each size strata add up to approximately 100 percent\(^41\).

Selecting the Sample

To select my sample of cities, I organized a list of all the central cities in the six southwestern states acquired by the 2000 U.S. Census into the three size categories mentioned above. Because the list of cities was originally in alphabetical order, I assigned a random identification number to each city – within each size category. This provided a “master” list of cities that fit each category in Table 2 of Appendix A. I then searched for elections information using city, state, and county websites as well as personally contacting city and county clerks for each city on this list. If I was successful at acquiring election information for more than one election cycle in the appropriately sized city in each state, I eliminated it from the “master” list. If not, then I went to the next city on the “master” list to try and find election information. I repeated this process until I acquired a sizeable sample of cities that closely resembled Table 2 of Appendix A. I was able to gather election information for at least three electoral cycles in 113 cities in six SW states. Table 3 of Appendix A describes my analytical sample. Specifically, there are 4 cities in my analytical sample from Arizona, 43 from California, 6 from Colorado, 7 from Nevada, and 48 from Texas.

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\(^{41}\) In Appendix Table 1 adding \((N2/N1)+(N3/N1)+(N4/N1)+(N5/N1)+(N6/N1)+(N7/N1) = 100\%\)
Comparing Appendix Tables 2 & 3, there is a slight underrepresentation of cities in California, in terms of the proportion of large-sized cities. Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas have a slight overrepresentation of large-sized cities. In terms of medium-sized cities in my sample, Texas is slightly underrepresented in this category. The largest discrepancy between the proposed sample (Table 2 in Appendix A) and the analytical sample (Table 3 in Appendix A) is in the small-sized city category. In fact, cities with fewer than 4,000 inhabitants are less likely to have websites and full time staff, thus making it difficult to acquire election results. The only state that is fully representative in terms of size and location in the SW are cities in California. The data I have collected for Texas, on the other hand, is under-representing the small-sized cities. Overall, however, the sample is largely representative of the cities in six southwestern states according to the size and location of cities within the Southwest.