BOKO HARAM: A PROGNOSIS

By

DAVID COOK, PH.D.

RICE SCHOLAR, JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES, RICE UNIVERSITY

DECEMBER 16, 2011
Boko Haram: A Prognosis

I. Introduction

Boko Haram is a Salafi-jihadi Muslim group that has operated in northeastern Nigeria since 2002. After a violent suppression in 2009, Boko Haram resurfaced in the fall of 2010 with a high profile campaign of assassinations and attacks throughout northern Nigeria. Starting in the summer of 2011, Boko Haram began to use suicide attacks, and have manifested the signs of transitioning into a globalist Salafi-jihadi group that might be of some importance in Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria, which is a major oil producer. The pattern of Boko Haram’s attacks, and threats of attacks, focuses more and more on interests that touch U.S. economic concerns in the region; the group has not avoided both contact with globalists (in Somalia, presumably) and citing the United States specifically as an eventual target.

II. Radical Islam in Nigeria

Nigeria is a microcosm of Africa as a whole. It is almost evenly split between Muslims and Christians, possessed of vast resources—which have been mostly unevenly distributed and lost to corruption—and yet has a vibrant and upbeat population. However, while a pattern of Christian-Muslim violence, especially in the volatile “Middle Belt” (in the central region of the country), is not new, the appearance of the radical Islamic group Boko Haram, which burst into prominence in 2009, threatens to inject an element of dogmatic violence into Nigeria not hitherto seen. Boko Haram’s operations, which have been mostly directed from its base in northeastern Nigeria (Borno and Yobe states), have during the past year increasingly spread throughout the country as a whole. That such a radical Islamic group has demonstrated the willingness, if not yet the ability, to establish connections with the wider field of African and international radical Islamic groups presents for the Nigerian government and the international community a particular challenge. If radical Muslim violence on a systematic level were to take hold in Nigeria, Africa’s largest country, it could eventually drive the country into a civil war, and have repercussions throughout the region.

Islam in Nigeria has deep historical roots. By the 10th and 11th centuries, major cities such as Kano (the largest city of northern Nigeria) were already Muslim or had a significant or dominant
Muslim presence. The ethnicity of the Muslim community during that early period was Hausa, and the entire region was divided into some 14 Hausa city-states. However, Muslims who visited the region, such as the traveler Ibn Battuta\(^3\) (in 1349-53) and the great theologian al-Maghili (d. 1503-4),\(^4\) were usually less impressed by the fact of the Hausa being Muslim and more impressed by their syncretistic and, in some cases, non-Muslim habits.

These habits, called pejoratively bida` (innovations), were challenged by the rise of the Fulani pastoralists in the 18th century, and most especially by the major reformer Shehu Uthman (also spelled Usuman) Dan Fodio (d. 1817), who led a jihad against the Hausa and ultimately forced them to adopt a normative form of Islam. It is this author’s contention that the example of Dan Fodio, whose name and example is revered throughout Islamic West Africa, and even beyond, is crucial to the understanding of Boko Haram.

Dan Fodio’s career can be divided into two major sections: the teaching phase and the active phase. During the first phase of Dan Fodio’s career, he was closely linked with the Hausa rulers, especially in a preaching and hortatory capacity, calling for the suppression of innovations.\(^5\) But after some 20 years of this ministry, in 1804 he performed hijra (immigration) to the small town of Gudu, where he began to call for actual jihad against the Hausa rulers. Similar to the example of the Prophet Muhammad’s followers in Medina (in 622-32), Dan Fodio’s followers flocked to Gudu, and he began to use it as a base to attack the Hausa—who he overcame in a series of jihads that lasted between 1804 and 1812—and created the Muslim culture of northern Nigeria, southern Niger, and to some extent, western Chad.\(^6\) It is important to note that Dan Fodio almost never attacked non-Muslims; his primary enemies were nominal or syncretistic Muslims.

Although Dan Fodio’s jihad eventually broke down, ironically while fighting the ancient Muslim sultanate of Borno (today the heartland of Boko Haram), his example of fighting to promote Islam and to suppress innovations has remained a constant one for northern Nigerian Muslims.\(^7\) Muslims I have interviewed in northern Nigeria have frequently mentioned the desirability of a new jihad to remove those innovations from the society. With the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate (Dan Fodio’s seat of power) to the British in 1904, and especially with the independence of Nigeria in 1960, the purificationist movement of Dan Fodio became just a cherished memory.
III. Imposition of Shari`a and Its Discontents

Even before independence from the British, northern Muslims under their charismatic leader Ahmadu Bello (d. 1966) had aspired to return to shari`a as the legal basis for Muslim, and even Nigerian, society. However, the desire to revive the shari`a did not reflect the realities of Nigeria as they were in 1960, as the previous 60 years of British rule had seen a massive growth in the number of Christians, especially in the South. Moreover, at independence most of the economic and cultural nodes of Nigeria were either located in the South or were in the hands of Christians (as their exposure to Western education was much greater than that of Muslims). While the British agonized over the question of whether the country should be split into two parts—a Christian South and a Muslim North—Nigerian nationalists pressed for full union of what the British had ruled as a federation. In any case, it was difficult for the British (and others since their time) to see what would be the economic basis of a putative Northern state.

Northern Muslims were divided between the traditional Sufi elites, the Qadiriyya associated with the conservative caliphal capital of Sokoto, the much more modernist Tijaniyya centered in Kano, and the newer radical Muslim groups centered around Ahmadu Bello in Kaduna. Bello recruited a firebrand preacher, Abubakar Gummi (d. 1992), whose charismatic radio preaching and funding from wealthy Gulf Arabs won him a large following. His organization, Yan Izala, was dedicated to the suppression of innovations just as the followers of Dan Fodio had been, with the exception of the fact that Gummi identified all Sufis as innovators. In fact, Dan Fodio, while a reformer and a fighter against innovations, had been a devout Sufi Qadiri, and most of northern Nigerian history was closely connected with Sufism.

It is important to realize that during the period of internecine Muslim dogmatic disputation (i.e., Gummi vs. his Sufi opponents) throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Christians had been very active in proselytizing throughout the Middle Belt of Nigeria, and had gained numerous converts. This religious transformation was accompanied by a number of religious riots throughout the 1980s and 1990s, that were brought about partly by evangelistic crusades (especially those of Reinhard Bonnke in Kano in 1991), and partly by a series of culturally based riots, such as those concerning Miss World in 2002 and the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in
2006. (The cartoon-related riots were centered in Maiduguri, where Boko Haram developed).\textsuperscript{17} The factors that caused these riots are in dispute, with Nigerian authorities usually emphasizing the economic and ethnic divides that plague the country. However, after such riots begin, they often take on a religious aspect fairly quickly and the dead are usually numbered in terms of their religious affiliation rather than as unidentified fatalities.

Frustrations on the part of the Muslim population were not merely channeled during this period into Yan Izala or one of the two major Sufi orders, but fostered the appearance of a messianic sect—that of the Yan Tatsine (better known as the Maitatsine), under its charismatic leader Muhammad Marwa. It is interesting to compare the Maitatsine with Boko Haram, as Marwa was originally from northern Cameroon, just a short distance from Boko Haram’s base of Maiduguri, and, like Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf, Marwa preached a form of messianic revivalism focusing on the Muslim establishment as the enemy.\textsuperscript{18} It seems that the Maitatsine rose in revolt in the northern city of Kano in 1979-80 as a fulfillment of apocalyptic prophecy, as that year—which also saw the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran—was the hijri year 1400.\textsuperscript{19} Like Boko Haram, the Maitatsine were not suppressed by the death of their charismatic leader, and continued to have an active presence into the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{20}

The move to impose shari`a following the death of Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha in 1998 appears to have been triggered by an almost messianic fervor and belief in the efficaciousness of shari`a as a panacea for Nigeria’s problems, and most especially for the country’s growing corruption and lawlessness. Probably the election (although disputed) of Olusegun Obasanjo, an obvious Christian and a southerner, in 1999 and 2003, and the consequent perception that the Muslim North was losing power to the South, were also contributing factors. Adoption of shari`a was meant to establish an Islamic society once and for all in at least part of Nigeria.
In his research study on the implementation of the shari`a in northern Nigeria (on behalf of the European Union), Ruud Peters pointed out a number of structural problems. He comments:

The introduction of Shari`a Penal Codes may in some areas be in conflict with the federal [Nigerian] constitution. They infringe on federal legislative prerogatives … finally it is a moot point whether the introduction of Shari`a codes is a violation of section 10 of the Constitution, which prohibits the adoption by the Federation or the states of a state religion.\textsuperscript{21}

Peters further and accurately notes that because the police are a federal institution, there is no body in northern Nigeria that is capable of enforcing shari`a penalties, nor any mechanism by which a Muslim who did not wish to be judged by shari`a could opt out of it. These problems inevitably led to the rise of the hisba (or vigilante groups), which would operate primarily in the cities against individuals or groups who were, or were perceived to be, violating shari`a norms.\textsuperscript{22} It is self-evident that the issues for which Nigerians were being punished in such situations were not against Nigerian law. Eventually, the police had to move against the hisba groups.

Shari`a in northern Nigeria is still, in principle, the basis for the law but in fact has ceased since 2006 to be a major factor in the North. This is due to the publicity caused by a number of cases associated with adultery; for the women involved, the punishment was death by stoning (because the resultant pregnancies had made their guilt transparent, according to Maliki law). The most
prominent of these cases was that of Amina Lawal, a cause célèbre for feminists and human rights groups during 2002 and 2003, until the case against her was overturned.\textsuperscript{23} With the failure of essentially any possibility of enforcing the adultery laws, and the very obvious failure of most northern Nigerian states to enforce bans on alcohol and other non-shari`a activities, 10 years after the initial implementation of shari`a it is clear that no ideal Muslim society has resulted.\textsuperscript{24} Most probably the frustration felt by the Muslims as a result of that fact has led to the rise of Boko Haram, first in Maiduguri (the capital of Borno) and then throughout the Northeast.

IV. Boko Haram: Phase 1

It is problematic to even establish the correct name of Boko Haram. Most probably its true name is Jama`at ahl al-sunna li-da`wa wa-l-jihad, which if it could be verified, would place Boko Haram squarely within the context of a larger number of radical Muslim jama`a groups that include the Jama`a Islamiyya of Egypt and the Jemaa Islamiya of southeast Asia (Indonesia). Again, on that basis it would be possible to deduce indications of the group’s methodology from the behavior of these types of jama`a groups: establishment of small groups of a diffuse nature, which then infiltrate the parent non-Muslim or pseudo-Muslim society, with the ultimate aim of establishing the Muslim shari`a state through a final violent stage.\textsuperscript{25} However, it is clear, just as with the other two jama`a organizations, that if Boko Haram were indeed based on these premises, that it was revealed prematurely and went from its quiet propagating stage to its activist violent stage rather too quickly.

As it stands, the evidence concerning Boko Haram’s ideology comes from interviews with its founder, Muhammad Yusuf, who stated to the BBC that:

There are prominent Islamic preachers who have seen and understood that the present Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam. Like rain. We believe it is a creation of God rather than an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain. Like saying the world is a sphere. If it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject the theory of Darwinism.\textsuperscript{26}
According to these statements, Yusuf should be associated with Salafism of the Wahhabi variety, as his cosmological beliefs can be traced to Wahhabi fatwas. The veracity of these statements is backed up by the popular name for Boko Haram, (“Western education is forbidden”), indicating its opposition to secular education. The first manifestation of Boko Haram in 2002, however, came from a report that Muhammad Yusuf sought to emulate the experience of the Taliban in Afghanistan (in 1996-2001) and establish an “Afghanistan” in northeastern Nigeria. It is interesting that Yusuf would choose this period in which to begin his propagation, as it was the same period the rest of Muslim northern Nigeria was embracing the messianic wave of shari`a adoption (as discussed above). According to the reports, Yusuf and his group after 2003 lived near Kanamma (also spelled Kanama, in the state of Yobe)—which is very isolated and close to the Niger border—and only spoke Arabic. (Although northern Nigeria is Arabophile, and Arabic is widely spoken, it is not common for the Muslims to speak exclusively Arabic.) It seems clear that this site was chosen because of its distance from major centers and was probably viewed by the group as a location for hijra.

The first signs of militant activity on the part of Boko Haram came in its attack on the village of Kanamma, which was located about a mile from its camp. Boko Haram attacked local government installations and killed about 30 people on Dec. 29-30, 2003. It is interesting that they are said to have kidnapped a number of villagers to induce them to join the group, and to force those who would not to dig a ditch around their camp (just as Muhammad did at the Battle of the Khandaq in 627). At the time, government forces estimated that Boko Haram consisted of some 60 members, and that all but seven were captured, excepting those on the Hajj in Saudi Arabia and in Afghanistan (with the Taliban). However, the nugget about training with the Taliban in Afghanistan seems unlikely, and is probably just an attempt to link Boko Haram with the war on terror at that time. Most probably, the purpose of the Boko Haram raid on Kanamma, which happened together with a raid on a police station in nearby Geldam, was to obtain weapons.

Boko Haram appears to have widened its activities after this initial seeming defeat, and on January 7, 2004, were apprehended attempting to attack a police station with AK-47 assault rifles.
in Damboa (to the southwest of Maiduguri); seven were killed and three were arrested. During June 2004, there was an attempted prison break at Damaturu (the capital of Yobe), presumably involving Boko Haram members captured in the Kanamma raid, which failed. On September 23, 2004, Boko Haram attacked police stations in Gwoza and Bama (in Borno state), killing four policemen. Boko Haram took refuge in the Mandara mountains, between Nigeria and Cameroon, where it was attacked by Nigerian gunships. Over the course of two days of fighting, 27 Boko Haram members were killed, but many disappeared, and five were arrested by the Cameroon authorities. Finally, in this initial period of violence, Boko Haram on October 10, 2004, attacked a convoy of 60 policemen at Kala-Balge on Lake Chad, taking 12 of them hostage and presumably executing them (or forcing them to join the group).

The 2004 period of violence associated with Boko Haram reveals a group with a primary geographical focus on the region around Maiduguri (all the major operations are to the south, east, or north of Maiduguri), and a secondary focus in the region next to the Niger border. All these operations, if we are to take the numbers seriously, indicate a total group of around 800-1000 members. It is clear that Boko Haram was, at this stage, merely starting its armed struggle, as most of its operations were designed to obtain weapons. As to why the group was activated at the end of 2003, perhaps the answer lies in the paranoid atmosphere felt at that time by northern Nigerian Muslims in the immediate wake of Obasanjo’s second election in 2003 (widely believed to have been rigged), and the idea that Muslims must arm in order to protect themselves.

However, it is more intriguing to speculate on the activities of Boko Haram during the next five years, when they seem to have acquired their name. Yusuf established a mosque and a school inside Maiduguri, and appears to have enjoyed something of a double life. The group’s methodology appears to have focused during this period on al-amr bi-l-ma’ruf wa-l-nahi ‘an al-munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding the evil), and more or less preaching openly throughout Borno and Yobe states. It would be interesting to know how this period of truce was negotiated, in view of Boko Haram’s later intransigence.

On July 26, 2009, that period of truce ended, and Boko Haram began a series of operations in Maiduguri, as well as Bauchi (the state bordering Yobe to the west). Most of the targets were
police. According to estimates, approximately 800 members of the group were killed by police and security forces, who attacked the mosque associated with Boko Haram in Maiduguri. There was a brief standoff and a siege before security forces managed to arrest Muhammad Yusuf, and take him to the police station. At that point, he was beaten, made to beg for his life (all of which was videotaped), and then summarily shot. During the course of the interrogation, Yusuf was made to answer for his lavish lifestyle, the fact that he did not stay and suffer the Nigerian police attacks together with his followers, and other inconsistencies in his teachings. Probably the most interesting exchange is the following:

Q: So why do you think the law enforcement agencies are fighting you?
Muhammad Yusuf (MY): I don't know, but it may be to do with my belief in Islam.
Q: But I am also a Muslim.
MY: That is why I don't know why you are fighting me.
Q: Is it true that you believe Western education is a sin?
MY: Of course it is a sin.
Q: How can you say it is a sin, the trousers you are wearing ...
[MY interrupts the question.]
MY: These are made from cotton, which is one of Allah’s materials.
Q: But Allah said we should seek knowledge, it is in the Koran, even the surah Iqra [96] ...
[MY interrupts]
MY: Yes, but not the sort of knowledge that goes contrary to the teachings of Islam, any knowledge that contradicts the Islam is not allowed by Allah .... [unintelligible]. Astronomy is a kind of knowledge, but Allah has forbidden it.
Q: But when we went to your house we found several things, including computers and some medical equipment, are these not all fruits of education?
MY: What you saw are materials used by blacksmiths, not Western education, which is a different thing entirely.
Q: So why come you eat good food, look at you looking very healthy, drive a decent car, dress well, you eat well but you do not allow your followers to do the
same, instead you encourage them to sell all their things and survive on dates and water, well?

MY: It is not true. Everybody lives according to their means. Even amongst all of you, things are not the same among you. If you see someone in a nice car, he can afford it. Others can't afford it.  

Although the situation was one of coercion, this group of statements is most likely the closest that we will come to an ideology during Phase 1 of Boko Haram. One should notice that Yusuf during the course of the interrogation does not appear to be very intimidated by the authorities, as he interrupts them on a number of occasions.

Probably the most important question that could be raised concerning the July 26-31, 2009, uprising of Boko Haram is whether it was initiated by the group—and if so, for what purpose—or initiated by the Nigerian security forces. Accounts according to both exist, and both are plausible (unfortunately). If Boko Haram initiated the July attacks, then most likely its timing was keyed to the holiness of the month of Sha`ban (as the attacks happened during the initial 15 days of the Muslim month Sha`ban, which are said to be holy). Whatever the circumstances, if the Nigerian authorities thought that this would be the end of Boko Haram, they were quite mistaken.

V. Boko Haram: Phase 2

Following the extrajudicial murder of Yusuf on July 31, 2009, Boko Haram went into hibernation for a year. On September 7, 2010, Boko Haram members attacked the prison at Bauchi (adjacent to their primary region of operations) and liberated 721 prisoners, including approximately 100 members of their group. It is worth speculating at this point on the number of Boko Haram members. If one assumes the numbers given by the Nigerian military of some 800 sect members killed in the July 2009 uprising and aftermath, then Boko Haram’s core militant group must have numbered in the low thousands at the very least by this period, especially given the fact that its operations were hampered for only a short period. Most probably the passive members of the group are at least several thousand more, giving a rough estimate of around 5,000-8,000 for this period. However, the fact that Boko Haram was still feeling
something of a crunch as far as its numbers go is revealed by its October 14, 2010, demand to the Nigerian government that 175 members of the group still in jail be released—which would have been an amnesty similar to the one accorded to the militants in the Niger Delta shortly beforehand. It is interesting that Boko Haram was willing at this stage to negotiate with the Nigerian government; negotiations since that period have been rejected.

Boko Haram did not manage to replace Yusuf with a charismatic figure. His successor was Abubakar Shekau, apparently a local Maiduguri businessman, whose spokesmen have been Abu Zayd and Abul Qaqa (Abu al-Qa`qa`). While Abul Qaqa is by far the more visible of the two, especially during the spring and summer of 2011, and statements issued by him should be considered authentic, available material does not seem to indicate a central authoritative leadership, but rather one that is local and made up of cells. It is interesting that while the group had Yusuf, the charismatic leader, it does not seem to have indulged in individual assassinations of its political or religious opponents. Perhaps lacking Yusuf, the new leaders feel frustrated that they are unable to answer allegations or critiques of Boko Haram, and have to use more strong-arm methods. Or perhaps they merely feel more confident.

On August 9, 2009, about a week after Yusuf’s death, a temporary leader of Boko Haram, Sani Umar, issued an ideological statement that can be seen as the basis for the group’s Phase 2:

WE SPEAK AS BOKO HARAM

For the first time since the Killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, our leader, we hereby make the following statements.

1) First of all that Boko Haram does not in any way mean “Western Education is a sin” as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means “Western Civilization” is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of
Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education.

In this case we are talking of Western Ways of life which include: constitutional provision as if relates to, for instance the rights and privileges of Women, the idea of homosexuality [sic], lesbianism, sanctions in cases of terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape of infants, multi-party democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like Nigeria, blue films, prostitution, drinking beer and alcohol and many others that are opposed to Islamic civilization.

2) That Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah.

3) That Mallam Yusuf has not died in vain and he is a martyr. His ideas will live forever.

4) That Boko Haram lost over 1000 of our Martyr members killed by the wicked Nigerian army and police mostly of Southern Nigeria extraction. That the Southern states, especially the infidel Yoruba, Igbon and Ijaw infidels will be our immediate target.

5) That the killing of our leaders in a callous, wicked and malicious manner will not in any way deter us. They have lost their lives in the struggle for Allah.

Having made the following statement we hereby reinstate our demands:
1) That we have started a Jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can stop. The aim is to Islamize Nigeria and [to] ensure the rule of the majority Muslims in the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one.

2) That from the Month of August, we shall carry out series of bombing in Southern and Northern Nigerian cities, beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port Harcourt. The bombing will not stop until Shari’a and Western Civilization is wiped off [sic] from Nigeria. We will not stop until these evil cities are turned into ashes.

3) That we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of Shari’a in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not go unpunished.

4) We promise the West and Southern Nigeria, a horrible pastime. We shall focus on these areas which is the devil empire and has been the one encouraging and sponsoring Western Civilization into the shores of Nigeria.

5) We call on all Northerners in the Islamic States to quit the fellowship of the wicked political parties leading the country, the corrupt, irresponsible, criminal, murderous political leadership, and join the struggle for Islamic Society that will be corruption free, Sodom free, where security will be guaranteed and there will be peace under Islam.

6) That very soon, we shall stir Lagos, the evil city and Nigeria’s South West and South East, in a way no one has ever done before. Al Hakubarah [Allahu Akbar]

IT’S EITHER YOU ARE FOR US OR AGAINST US43

Shekau, Yusuf’s successor, began Boko Haram Phase 2 with a major statement on July 14, 2010,44 stating: “Do not think jihad is over. Rather jihad has just begun. O America, die with
your fury” (paraphrase of Q. 3:119). This statement was apparently directed toward jihadist groups in the Middle East and Central Asia, and was posted on a jihadi website, most probably to mark Boko Haram as the equal of these groups both in stature and in goals. In an earlier interview on March 29, 2010, Musa Tanko, a spokesman for the group, stated:

Islam doesn’t recognize international boundaries, we will carry out our operations anywhere in the world if we can have the chance. The United States is the number one target for its oppression and aggression against Muslim nations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan and its blind support to Israel in its killings of our Palestinian brethren … We will launch fiercer attacks than Iraqi or Afghan Mujahedeen [Islamic fighters] against our enemies throughout the world, particularly the U.S., if the chance avails itself within the confines of what Islam prescribes, but for now our attention is focused on Nigeria, which is our starting point.

Operations associated with Boko Haram commenced almost immediately after the September 2010 prison break, which most probably liberated some of the group’s most dynamic and effective members. The period under study, September 2010 to November 20, 2011, has seen at least 45 major operations carried out by Boko Haram, or ascribed to it (again, using the responsibility claimed by either Abu Zayd or Abul Qaqa as a bellwether). Included in this number are three suicide attacks (and a further foiled one). Of the 45 major operations, there were at least 10 major operations directed against the police and military; 19 using amr bi-l-ma`ruf principles against markets, educational targets, and activities that were perceived to be against Islam (like elections); nine against Christian targets; and at least seven major targeted assassinations. However, 45 operations is very probably an incomplete number, and does not take into account all the various drive-by shootings and minor intimidations associated with Boko Haram that may very well push the true number of its operations into the low hundreds.

On December 6, 2010, at least five people were killed when security forces in Maiduguri attacked the reconstituted Boko Haram. This clash was followed by a series of attacks claimed by Boko Haram in Maiduguri, where a candidate for the All Nigeria People’s Party was assassinated; in Jos and Maiduguri, where at least 86 people were killed; and in Bauchi, where
30 were killed. This latter attack occurred after some congregants challenged a Muslim preacher who spoke out against Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{48} And presaging the attacks in Abuja during the summer of 2011, an attack on a police bar killed at least four.\textsuperscript{49}

Throughout the spring of 2011, Boko Haram operations can be largely grouped into two themes: anti-election assassinations, and intimidation and assassinations of Islamic clerics who oppose the group. For instance, on January 28, 2011, Boko Haram assassinated local Borno state gubernatorial candidate Modu Fannami Gubio, as well as his brother and police officers.\textsuperscript{50} Shortly thereafter, Boko Haram demanded that the Borno governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, relinquish office and return the group’s mosque in Maiduguri (seized from them in the July 2009 suppression).\textsuperscript{51}

One of the hallmarks of a Salafi-jihadi group is the opposition to democratic elections, which are usually seen as a Western-style “innovation” as well as (in some extreme circles) a “religion” imposed by the West. In the 2011 Nigerian elections there was the additional factor: Many Muslims disliked the fact that President Goodluck Jonathan, a Southern Christian, was the nominee and likely victor, as Northern Muslims viewed the period following Obasanjo’s retirement in 2007 as being their time for power. There were at least five major bombings of election events during this period: March 3, April 8 and 9, and two on April 16 in places as varied as Kaduna, Abuja, Maiduguri, and others.

Boko Haram’s targeted assassinations are most interesting, involving, first, political figures—such as the May 30, 2011, death of Abba Anas bin `Umar, the brother of the Shehu of Borno, and secular opposition figures such as Modu Fannami Godio (above); and second, prominent clerics such as Bashir Kashara, a well-known Wahhabi figure killed on October 9, 2010; Ibrahim Ahmad Abdullahi Bolori, a nonviolent preacher, killed on March 13, 2011;\textsuperscript{52} and Ibrahim Birkuti, a well-known popular preacher who challenged Boko Haram, on June 7, 2011. On September 4, 2011, Malam Dalu, a well-known cleric in Maiduguri, was shot dead outside his home. Even a member of the group, such as Babakura Fugu—who was a brother-in-law to Muhammad Yusuf, the former leader of Boko Haram—was assassinated on September 17, 2011, after attending peace talks with former president Obasanjo.
The diversity of the religious opponents of Boko Haram is quite interesting, because with these targeted assassinations one can see the literal ideology of the group in play. During the July 2009 suppression, reporter Ahmed Silkida—taken hostage by Boko Haram in the police station of Maiduguri on July 28—reported that he was being punished for not being willing “to wage a jihad against the state government and the [Yan] Izala group.” Since Yan Izala is basically a Wahhabi group, but one that is today identified with the Muslim religious establishment, it is clear that Boko Haram sees any cleric who does not follow its teachings, even those from closely related movements, to be a legitimate target.

By the middle of April 2011, it was clear that Boko Haram was basically in control of Maiduguri. On April 25, there were three bomb blasts in a hotel and a motor park in Maiduguri, and on May 9, Boko Haram refused the offer of amnesty made by the governor-elect of Borno, Kashim Shettima (interestingly, more or less the same one that the group had asked for a year previously). On May 26, Boko Haram attacked the Damboa police station in Maiduguri, killing at least five people. On May 29, there was a bomb blast at the market located next to the barracks in Bauchi that killed 13, and another bomb blast in Maiduguri on May 31. Still another blast on June 3 was directed against a warehouse containing polio and measles vaccines, which is quite interesting given the long history of opposition to vaccination in the North. By the beginning of July 2011, the situation was so critical that the Nigerian military forbade the use of motorcycles (the primary means of locomotion for many Nigerians) in Maiduguri because they were often used as the means of assassination.

But all that was merely the prelude to the audacious operations that Boko Haram was planning for Abuja, the capital of the country, and the center of unity. This operation was preceded by a statement on June 13, 2011, in which Boko Haram announced: “Very soon, we will wage jihad ... We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable.” On June 16, it carried out a suicide attack at the police general headquarters (Louis Edet House), killing two people. As follow-up, Boko Haram carried out raids on police stations and beer gardens on June 20 and 27, and then launched a series of attacks on police stations and banks on August 25, killing at least 16 people.
Once again, as during the previous year, Boko Haram issued a major ideological warning to the people of Nigeria on the anniversary of the murder of Yusuf, in which Abu Zayd stated:

The only dialogue in this crisis is as follows: Stop abiding by the constitution in our land (Dualan Usmaniyya), and government must be sincere and stop terrorizing Muslims in Maiduguri and parts of the North, then there should be a time limit for ceasing fire to gauge Government commitment in keeping to its promise, which cannot be more than ten years … What is holding us back is the innocent civilian population, but as soon as people stay clear from security agents we will launch a full-scale attack. Unarmed Muslims were picked up from their homes and from their hospital beds and summarily executed; the world saw it on Al-Jazeera. Yet the same Government wants to forgive us for the wrongs they meted on us. In actual sense, we are the ones that should give amnesty to the Borno State Government … We as a group don't kill people who are innocent. What we are trying to tell people is that, in regaining the pride of the people in Islam, people have to endure in losing their properties and sometimes lives are also involved and this can fall on everyone, including us.

This is a government that is not Islamic. Therefore, all its employees, Muslims and non-Muslims, are Infidels. This is a Government which naturally fights Islam because Muslims were killed in Zagon Kataf [near Kaduna], in Jos and Southern Kaduna but the perpetrators have never been prosecuted by the so-called existing laws of the land. Mosques were destroyed and punishment for this is death. Therefore, we have the right to kill them all. But if there are people who profess Islam and do not take part in Government or Western Education, their blood and wealth are sacred unless otherwise [sic].

The culmination of all Boko Haram’s previous attacks, however, was the suicide attack carried out by Muhammad Abu al-Barra (probably a pseudonym) on the United Nations (UN) compound in Abuja on August 26, 2011, killing 23 people. This attack was a boundary-creating attack, designed to expel foreigners and the foreign influence epitomized by the UN in
Nigeria. It was also clearly designed to demonstrate to Nigeria and the world that Boko Haram’s goals were no longer local in nature, but that it had the means by which to instigate violence anywhere in Nigeria, and perhaps even beyond. It is once again interesting that the date chosen for the bombing (August 26, or 26 Ramadan) corresponds to the Laylat al-Qadr, the holy night on which the Qur’an is said to have been revealed, indicating yet again the importance felt by Boko Haram for dates.60

About two weeks after the suicide attack at the UN, a video purportedly recorded by the martyr of the attack was released to the press. In it, the bomber stated that the bombing was meant to be a warning to U.S. President Barack “Obama and other infidels.”61 It is clear that this video, taken together with the attack on the UN as the representative of world organizations in Nigeria—especially the World Health Organization (WHO), which for many Northern Muslims is an organization committed to genocide through the administration of the polio vaccine—demonstrates the marriage of local Nigerian Muslim concerns to the technology of globalist Salafi-jihadism.

After the suicide attack in Abuja, there was no let-up in the violence, with a gun battle in Song, Adamawa state, between Boko Haram and soldiers on September 1, 2011; a series of ambushes in Maiduguri against the military on September 15; a series of drive-by shootings at the market in Maiduguri on October 1, killing at least five; and another attack on the market on October 3, killing three. More and more, however, Boko Haram has turned its attentions toward the Christian population, especially in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and Niger states, and has had a hand in fomenting violence in Plateau (especially in Jos). Following the bombings at the end of December 2010 in Jos, there had been attempts at a large-scale bombing of a church in Bauchi on January 31, 2011, and a number of other attacks on churches or on pastors.

Clearly, a November 4, 2011, Damaturu operation—in which some 150 people, mainly Christians, were killed—was intended to clear out the Christian population in northeast Nigeria. In a complicated operation, which was preceded by a series of suicide attacks at various police stations, Boko Haram went through the Christian quarter of Damaturu (the state capital of Yobe) and massacred anybody who did not know the Islamic creed.62 The use of suicide attacks as part
of multifaceted operations, or especially as an initial shock attack (for example, to break open a gate or an entrance or to cause panic among the targets), appears to be based upon Afghani and Haqqani networks, and is not indigenous to Nigeria. Therefore, the use of such tactics in Damaturu is particularly worrying.

After reading this litany of violence, it is worth asking basic questions of whether Boko Haram is at this time a unified group, or as some Nigerians have speculated, it is divided between the leadership of Shekau and his supposed second-in-command, Mamman Nur. The diffuse nature of the operations—without a single master plan, for example—strongly suggests that Boko Haram has farmed out its operations into various sections of the country, since most probably Nigeria is simply too big for any one figure to control. Frequent operations against banks suggest that Boko Haram cannot as yet rely upon raising support funds from the areas that it dominates, and has to generate money through robbery. And although Boko Haram appears to have moved away from its original goal of opposition to Western-style education in pursuit of establishing a shari`a state in Nigeria, it has completely paralyzed all forms of education in Maiduguri, where on July 12, 2011, the University of Maiduguri announced that it was shutting down indefinitely.

It is also interesting to note the sections of the country where Boko Haram has been able to project power. Clearly the base of the group is in northeast Nigeria, and it effectively controls the cities of Maiduguri and Damaturu already, and may have substantial control in Bauchi as well. It has been able to project power through operations in Abuja and Jos, and appears to have a branch in Niger state (in the far West). However, it should be emphasized that thus far it has not carried out operations in the Central Northern Muslim region, especially in the important and volatile cities of Kano or Zaria, let alone in the far Northwestern region dominated by Sokoto. In other words, the regions in which Boko Haram has gained predominance are those historically outside of Fulani control, and where the dominance of Muslim power elites—either descending from Fulani emirs, Sufi clerics, or Yan Izala radicals—has been weak. And in spite of many threats and much paranoia on the part of Nigerians, Boko Haram has yet to carry out a successful operation in Lagos, or demonstrate any ability to operate in the Muslim sections of Yorubaland (in the Southwest).
VI. Connections and Prospects

What are Boko Haram’s connections, and where will it now turn its attention? If the above analysis is correct, then Boko Haram is a Salafi-jihadi organization that has been activated, but is lacking a single direction-supplying leader. Most likely it is due to this fact that there has not been a coherent goal behind Boko Haram’s operations. To the outside observer they seem to be attacking a number of disparate targets without an obvious methodology. However, to the group it may appear that all of its targets—the government, military and police, the Muslim elite, Christians, and the UN—represent manifestations of a non-Islamic outer world. By attacking all of them, the group demonstrates its rejection of any perceived non-Islamic values. However, it is equally important to note that in contradistinction to other dogmatic Salafi organizations, such as the Shabab, there are no documented cases of Boko Haram attacking Sufi shrines or mosques or Sufism specifically as a creed. All these types of attacks would be present if Boko Haram were indeed ideologically dependent upon Middle Eastern Salafi-jihadi groups, although perhaps the reason for that absence is the mitigating factor of Shehu Usaman Dan Fodio (whose prestige and whose Sufi attachments are above question).

In the short term, the most likely goal of Boko Haram is to clear out the region of Yobe and Borno states of Christians and any government presence in order to establish an Islamic state where Muslims from other regions of Nigeria can make hijra and use as a base. In some ways this goal has been largely accomplished, as many Christians have fled Maiduguri and Damaturu. However, this fact has hardened the opposition to Boko Haram throughout the country—not only among Christians and government elements, but among Northern Muslim elites as well.

Looking beyond Nigeria, it is probable that the interval between the murder of Muhammad Yusuf and the Bauchi prison break in September 2010 saw the establishment of connections between Boko Haram and another African Salafi group, most probably the Shabab in Somalia (but possibly others as well). The identity of the Salafi group cannot be ascertained at this point; all that exists concerning this linkage are rumors. However, when one considers the change in methodology between Phase 1 and Phase 2, above, it is apparent that suicide attacks and video
recordings of the martyr are now hallmarks of Boko Haram. These are pervasive among the Shabab. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the connection to Arabic-speaking Salafi radicalism was a direct one (i.e., through Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or other groups),68 if only because of the prevalence of Arab racism toward the Nigerians. No Salafi materials during the period 2000-2010 known to me, including Abu Musab al-Suri’s great 2004 manual, Da’wa li-Muqawama Islamiyya `Alamiyya (A Call to Worldwide Islamic Revolution), mention Nigeria at all. Looking through jihadi websites, there is even at the present time virtually no cognizance of the country.69

On the other hand, with the onset of suicide attacks among Boko Haram, one can be certain that if the group was not previously on the radar of globalist Salafi-jihadi organizations, it is now. Since Boko Haram may be on the verge of establishing the ephemeral base that globalist radical Muslims have sought, it might become attractive to them. And given the close relations between the Arabic-speaking Middle East and Kano (because of the Hajj pilgrimage and because of the Nigerian students that go to Saudi Arabia and Egypt for study), it might be easy enough for them to get there.

VII. Policy Suggestions

Is there a policy solution for the issue of Boko Haram? Although there are reports that Boko Haram is, in fact, split into several different organizations, and that its policies are not unified, one cannot be certain that such reports are accurate. Divisions of radical groups into “moderate” and “extremist” camps are all too common in Western analyses of these groups, and just as frequently represent wishful thinking or realities that are not useful to the policymaker or intelligence analyst.70

What can be stated absolutely about Boko Haram is that it represents an element of northern Nigerian Muslim dominationism (note the number of times in their statements that Nigeria is characterized as a “Muslim nation”) that has not been satisfied with the current state of the imposition of shari`a since 2000. Its beliefs hold considerable appeal to dissatisfied elements throughout northern Nigeria.71 This fact can be seen both by Boko Haram’s success as well as
the religious response by a number of Northern governors—i.e., renewing emphasis on the imposition of shari’a in its totality. However, goals listed by Boko Haram, such as the complete imposition of shari’a throughout the country of Nigeria, are fundamentally unacceptable in both the South and the Middle Belt, as well as in parts of the North (where enthusiasm for shari’a has diminished considerably). And it is clear that negotiation—or the abject and embarrassing process of apologizing, in which a number of Northern governors indulged during spring 2011 toward Boko Haram—has not been efficacious.

Probably for Nigeria, the only solution at present for dealing with Boko Haram is to utilize force, although it should be recognized that extrajudicial force, exemplified by the murder of Muhammad Yusuf, has fueled the rise of Boko Haram since 2010. Therefore, this force should be seen as judicial in nature, and with the possibility of amnesty (which has worked to a large extent in the Delta region since 2009). This will be a tall order in Nigeria, where no doubt the anger toward Boko Haram in the police and military, as a result of the constant attacks against them, is at a peak. However, on a basic level, just like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Salafis elsewhere (Iraq and Yemen, for example), the growth of Boko Haram is fed by the instability and chaos that the group creates. As more and more territories become ungovernable, such as Maiduguri, then Muslims more and more will want to join Boko Haram, if only because it represents the one group that can actually project power and hold out the illusion of eventual security to the people. It is important, therefore, to reestablish some modicum of stability within Borno and Yobe—if only because if that does not occur, then functionally, those territories will be lost to Nigeria.

For the United States, Boko Haram at the present does not constitute a danger, in spite of its threats against President Obama and other American interests. However, it does constitute a very real danger in the area of western Africa, where there is every chance that if Boko Haram manages to establish a quasi-state in northeastern Nigeria, it will move toward other states in the region that have a long history of Muslim grievance and instability (such as Cameroon, Niger, and Chad). The free flow of weapons from Libya, and a stream of mercenaries toughened by combat in that country throughout the region, is a combination that could be volatile in the near future. Although the U.S. presence in the region is weak, there are a number of oil interests in
Chad and Cameroon, in addition to the obvious oil interests in southern Nigeria and the uranium interests in northern Niger, that should be of concern. Therefore, it is clear that the United States should lend all possible aid, military, and intelligence to the defeat of Boko Haram.

Probably the best way to deal with Boko Haram after it has been militarily defeated, or at least checked, would be to co-opt it into the northern Nigerian Muslim structure. This is undoubtedly the desire of Muhammad Sa`adu Abubakar, the caliph of Sokoto, whose attempts to negotiate with Boko Haram thus far have failed. However, as with other internecine Muslim conflicts in the past, the path of joining the elite allows for the possibility of amnesty and reintegration. This is a process, though, that can only take place after Boko Haram is no longer in its current state of exaltation of victory.
Notes


7. But not so much for Southern Nigerian Muslims, especially those in the West who are ethnically Yoruba, who have tended to remember that the jihad was also closely associated with slave raiding toward the south. Julius Adekunle, Politics and Society in Nigeria’s Middle Belt: Borgu and the Emergence of a Political Identity (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2004), 111, 197-99.

8. Shari’a is the moral code and religious law of Islam.


10. In Arabic, Jama’a li-izalat al-bida’ wa-iqamat al-sunna (taken almost exactly from several of Dan Fodio’s books).


12. See Roman Lomeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), Chapters 4-5; and Ousmane Kane, Muslim
Boko Haram: A Prognosis


Boko Haram: A Prognosis


29. It would seem that the “manifesto” for Boko Haram circulated on the Internet is spurious. See “The Nigerian Taliban ‘Boko Haram’ Manifesto,” Islamization Watch, July 30, 2009, accessed October 31, 2011, http://islamizationwatch.blogspot.com/2009/07/nigerian-taliban-boko-haram-manifesto.html. The analysis of various observers (Sahel reporters, etc.) is accurate: It does not seem at all credible that Yusuf would cite al-Ghazali, who is detested by both Maliki and Salafi authorities, and is not widely known or respected in northern Nigeria, let alone in the Deobandi School or Harun Yahya. A much more plausible manifesto would mention Dan Fodio, at least, given his importance within northern Nigeria.

Boko Haram: A Prognosis


31. See note 27.
32. Other reports said 200 attackers, of whom 18 were killed, and 7 captured.
34. A BBC report cites Nigerian reporters saying that he lived a lavish lifestyle and drove a late-model Mercedes-Benz.
35. See Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) for a full discussion of this critical concept.
37. Boyle, “Nigeria’s ‘Taliban’ enigma.”
42. On August 3, 2009, the security forces found a formal training camp at Biu, approximately 140 miles to the south of Maiduguri. But apparently there have been others since that time.
44. Again, it is interesting that he appears to be keyed to the Muslim calendar for anniversaries.


55. “Bombs Hit Vaccine Centre, Government in Northern Nigeria,” *Agence France-Presse*, June 2, 2011, [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ira2PcpZcOPolETfm6OucXhmMjg?docId=CNGi.10e99239f49dff34cf3398bdc730cb91_01](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ira2PcpZcOPolETfm6OucXhmMjg?docId=CNGi.10e99239f49dff34cf3398bdc730cb91_01). For the issue of polio vaccination as a contentious one in northern Nigeria, see Polio Vaccine: How Potent? (Kaduna: New Era Institute for Islamic Thought and Heritage, 2003). It was commonly believed that polio vaccination by WHO was a cover-up for genocide.


57. “Nigerian Islamists Vow 'Fiercer' Attacks,” *Agence France-Presse*, June 15, 2011, [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hvNBLQti-6QLphVdW7gU24qGfCVA?docId=CNG.7c89daaf6598520ace67ee7e41be9139.9a1](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hvNBLQti-6QLphVdW7gU24qGfCVA?docId=CNG.7c89daaf6598520ace67ee7e41be9139.9a1).


59. A large-scale suicide attack was thwarted August 16 at the police station in Maiduguri by the attacker being shot.


This is an action that is unknown to me from Muslim radicals other than in Algeria.

68. There does not seem to be any indication that Boko Haram has connections with its closest Salafi-jihadi neighbor, which is Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). However, perhaps this is not so strange considering the focus of AQIM is to its north, primarily Algeria and Mauretania, and it is largely based in northern Mali. Given the lack of Internet communications, the linkage between the two groups might be more difficult than one would suspect.


