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Authoritatively Democratic: The Functioning of Elections in Botswana’s Dominant Party System

by

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ABSTRACT

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Since 1991, multiparty elections have been held in almost every country in sub-Saharan Africa. These elections, however, have returned the same “dominant” political parties to office time and again. While dominant party rule is often associated with authoritarianism and its variants, many of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are operating under dominant party rule are by most other indicators considered to be democratic (freedom and fairness of elections, independent press, protection of civil liberties and rights, etc.). Regardless, many researchers argue that lack of party alternation at the national level precludes dominant party systems from being considered democratic. I contend that previous analyses focused on elections at the national level only and, thus, are unable to accurately comment on the democratic quality of elections in dominant party systems. Further complicating matters, the logic of electoral behavior under these types of systems is not well understood. It is not clear how, if at all, electoral outcomes under dominant party systems affect individual-level democratic satisfaction—something that is intimately related to a country’s democratic stability. Finally, we do not know what factors affect individual-level vote choice under dominant party systems and how these compare with more mature, consolidated democracies.

This project contributes to our understanding of electoral behavior under dominant party systems by systematically examining several facets of elections in Botswana, sub-Saharan Africa’s longest tenured dominant party system. I conduct both within country analysis using data from the constituency level and between country comparisons to examine the relationship between partisan competition and electoral behavior in Botswana and several of its continental counterparts. I use a combination of electoral data and survey data draw a more complete picture of the voting landscape under a dominant party system.

My main findings indicate that dominant party systems where truly democratic elections (free and fair) are held exhibit significant levels of electoral competition; exert a negligible effect on democratic satisfaction; and that some citizens, conditional on educational attainment, do engage in ideological voting. Together, this project depicts a more complex and nuanced electoral environment under a dominant party system than previous research has acknowledged.
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Chapter 1: Elections, Dominant Party Systems, and the African Sub-Continent

Introduction

The history of Benin exemplifies the nature of post-colonial political development in sub-Saharan Africa. After declaring independence from French colonial rule in 1958, the country experienced several military coups until Mathieu Kerekou came to power in 1972—his ascension itself the result of a military coup. For the next two decades, Benin operated as a single party state directed by Kerekou. It held elections but competition for office was strictly regulated. Voters were presented with a slate of candidates nominated by the People’s Revolutionary Party of Benin—the only political party legally allowed to field candidates—and it was up to voters to either approve or reject candidates. In 1989, Beninese voters “approved” approximately 90 percent of candidates nominated (Nohlen et al. 1999).

In 1990, with the country’s economy in disarray and opposition to the regime mounting, Mathieu Kerekou assembled a national conference to address civilian unrest. Members of the 1990 National Conference initiated Benin’s transition to democracy by calling for multiparty elections to be held in 1991. The past 20 years has seen Benin hold six successful multiparty elections that have produced three different presidents and five different majority coalitions in the National Assembly.

Since the beginning of decolonization in the late 1950s, most African countries have experienced at least one, if not more of the following: civil war, military coup, personal and/or military dictatorship, single party rule, and domestic strife. After decades of authoritarian rule, the “Third Wave of Democracy” swept across Africa’s shores
during the 1990s. The introduction (in some cases re-introduction) of multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa came about in the early 1990s after 40 or more years of extreme political instability. Benin was the first in a long list of countries to introduce multiparty elections in the 1990s.

Elections—a stalwart of democracy and an important indication of democratic development—have now been held in more than 40 African countries. According to Lindberg (2006), the quality of elections over this period has been gradually increasing. Between 1999 and 2003, approximately 63 percent of elections were considered free and fair, up slightly from 58 per cent during the period between 1990 and 1993 (63). He concludes that elections, regardless of how flawed, have a 'strong positive effect on the expansion of civil liberties,' over time and often lead to a deepening of democracy (140).

Lindberg's analysis offers reason to be optimistic about democracy's chances in Africa; however, there are still some puzzling trends. For example, very few elections have produced executive turnover. Maltz (2007) estimates that between 1992 and 2006, incumbents won 96 percent of presidential contests in sub-Saharan Africa (137). Cheeseman (2010) reports that since 1989 only 12 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced executive turnover, Benin being one of them. Furthermore, since 1989 approximately 75 percent of legislative elections in Africa have produced dominant party rule (Erdmann and Basedau 2007). Many authors have previously noted this trend toward dominant party rule in Africa's democracies (Van de Walle 2003; Manning 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005). Bogaards (2004), specifically in questioning the methods that other researchers have used to count and categorize party systems in sub-Saharan Africa, argues that dominant party systems are rapidly becoming the norm.
While dominant party rule is often associated with authoritarianism and its variants, many of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are currently operating under dominant party rule are by many other indicators considered to be democratic. Based on Freedom House’s designation of a country as an “electoral democracy”, currently 9 of sub-Saharan Africa’s 43 countries can be considered democratic for at least the past 10 years. Of these more “stable” democracies, three (Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa) can be considered to have dominant party systems based on Sartori’s (1976) criteria of three successive legislative majorities. Other countries such as Lesotho and Senegal may be headed toward dominant party status but have not held three successive democratic elections (two each) and thus do not (yet) qualify. Botswana best exemplifies dominant party rule in sub-Saharan Africa: since independence in 1966, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) is the only party to have governed Botswana. The BDP’s share of legislative seats has ranged from 90 percent in the 1970s and 1980s to a “low” of 67 percent in the 1990s.

Many researchers argue that lack of party alternation at the national level—the standard indicator of a dominant party system—precludes dominant party systems from being considered democratic. Additionally, it is not clear how voters in dominant party systems interpret electoral outcomes and what, if any, affect they have on individual level satisfaction with democracy—something many researchers agree is important in assessing democratic quality and forecasting democratic stability. Further complicating matters, the logic of electoral behavior under these types of systems is not well understood. Specifically, we do not know what factors affect individual-level vote choice
under dominant party systems and how these factors compare with more mature, consolidated democracies.

This project contributes to our understanding of electoral behavior under dominant party systems by systematically examining several facets of elections in Botswana, sub-Saharan Africa’s longest tenured dominant party system. I conduct both within country analysis using data from the constituency level and between country comparisons to examine the relationship between partisan competition and electoral behavior in Botswana and several of its continental counterparts. I use electoral data and survey data to draw a more complete picture of the voting landscape under Botswana’s dominant party system.

Dominant Party Systems

Sartori (1976), one of the preeminent theorists on parties and party systems, defines a dominant party system (although he prefers the term predominant party system) as “a more-than-one-party system in which rotation does not occur,” (195). His definition also includes a specific threshold of seats (absolute majority) that he relaxes in order to account for countries that do not operate under the absolute majority principle. Additionally, he incorporates a temporal component (three consecutive elections) in order to add precision and utility to the concept. Classic examples of dominant party rule produced by free and fair elections include the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, which ruled almost exclusively from 1955 to 2007; the Social Democratic Party in Sweden, which controlled the Swedish government from the mid-1930s until 1976; the Labour Party and its predecessor in Israel, which dominated elections from 1948 until the late
1970s; and the Christian Democrats in Italy who ruled for close to 50 years from 1944 until the early 1990s.

According to Giliomee and Simkins (1999), the initial formation and assumption of power by dominant parties often follows a traumatic event such as a revolution or war, of which there are no shortage in Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, for example, came to power as a result of a negotiated transition to democracy after nearly 50 years of apartheid, or racially segregated, rule. The ANC has gone on to win solid legislative majorities in each of the three electoral contests held since. South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia came to power in 1990 after a lengthy struggle for independence from South Africa and has, much like the ANC, dominated post-independence elections in Namibia. In Botswana, the BDP came to power following its independence from British colonial rule. Related to this, Friedman (1999) argues that dominant parties rely on the following tools to ensure their continued electoral success: symbolism and broad appeal and the blurring of the line between state and party. Political parties that formed first as political movements in order to advocate for independence or regime change, such as the ANC and SWAPO, have a significant advantage in convincing voters that the party is the state. In addition, as the first political party under a new regime, the ruling party does wield influence over the choosing of symbols for the new state which helps to reinforce the party/state conflation.

Other authors have examined how electoral institutions affect the creation and maintenance of dominant party systems. Giliomee and Simkins (1999) contend that the electoral system is very important in creating and maintaining dominant party systems; however, they detail how three very different systems (closed list proportional
representation in South Africa, simple plurality in Mexico and Malaysia, and the single non-transferable vote in Taiwan) produce the same result—partisan dominance. Pempel (1990) argues that electoral systems that encourage multipartism (generally, some version of proportional representation) are a necessary precondition for partisan dominance.

However, a brief survey of the electoral system undergirding dominant party systems in Africa undermines this conclusion. Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa all use closed-list proportional representation systems; Botswana and Zambia both use first-past-the-post plurality systems; Lesotho uses a mixed electoral system in which both first-past-the-post and closed list proportional representation are used; and Mali uses a two-round majority electoral system.

Recent theorists have focused on other mechanisms that may account for the perpetuation of dominant party rule. Books by Scheiner (2006), Greene (2007), and Spiess (2009) each offer a different explanation for long-term dominant party rule. Briefly, their collective arguments can be summed as such: clientelism and fiscal centralization (Scheiner); ideological centrism and resource imbalances at the party level (Greene); and elite-level electoral strategies (Spiess). The divergent causal mechanisms each author emphasizes is most likely due to the variation found in each author's case selection: Japan in the case of Schiener, Mexico in the case of Greene, and South Africa and India in the case of Spiess. It should be noted that while Greene is largely discussing autocratic dominant party rule in the case of Mexico, he extends his argument to dominant party rule in Botswana and argues that the causal mechanisms operate similarly in both cases.
Moving away from causation, and looking more broadly at regime transitions, some have argued that dominant party systems may be a phase countries experience on the road to democratic consolidation. Pempel (1990), citing the above examples of Israel, Italy, Japan, and Sweden, argues that dominant parties may smooth the transition from autocracy to consolidated democracy. In addition, he cautions that extreme fragmentation and fierce competition can destabilize fragile, newly democratizing countries; thus, in some cases dominant parties may be desirable. However, Du Toit (1999) argues that the conditions that encouraged the transition to full-fledged democracy under dominant party systems in Israel, Italy, Japan, and Sweden, are lacking in most African states. Namely, extreme ethnic/linguistic/religious heterogeneity coupled with economic underdevelopment and generally weak state structures make most African states unlikely candidates for the more benign assessment of dominant party systems as a phase in the transition to liberal democracy.

For comparative purposes, it is instructive to briefly examine what elections that produce dominant party rule look like. The PRI in Mexico between 1960 and 1980, for example, received anywhere from 70 percent to 90 percent of the vote (Greene, 2007, 2). The Social Democrats in Sweden between the 1930s and 1970s, however, rarely received more than 50 percent of the popular vote and yet managed to form governments for an uninterrupted period of almost 50 years (Social Democratic Party of Sweden, 2010). It should be noted that during PRI dominance, Mexico employed the single member plurality electoral system while Sweden employed a version of proportional representation during Social Democrat dominance. Both types of electoral systems can produce dominant party rule, but dominant party rule under proportional representation is
considered a form of “natural” dominance whereas dominant party systems that are the product of plurality systems are considered “manufactured” due to the extreme disproportionality associated with the types of electoral rules.

Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest that the logic of voting, candidate decision-making, and party behavior is markedly different under dominant party systems and multiparty systems. Greene (2007) explores the development, maintenance, and decline of the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in Mexico, which exclusively governed Mexico for almost 80 years. According to Greene, in dominant party systems the ruling party has a resource advantage in terms of campaign funding and patronage that reinforces incumbency. The ruling party can also increase the costs of opposition party formation by denying them access to existing party network and through less “democratic” means such as coercion and intimidation. Based on the logic of the median voter and Downs’ (1957) theory of party electoral strategy, the only types of individuals/groups that would be sufficiently motivated to form an opposition party under conditions found in dominant party systems would be those considered to be ideologically extreme. Moderates with electoral ambitions are better served by aligning with the dominant party or are discouraged from entering into the electoral arena altogether.

While Greene’s analysis does provide us with a new perspective and some key insights into the inner workings of dominant party systems, when extended to the African continent, his analysis is left wanting. Often times opposition parties are non-ideological and centered on a prominent personality (Manning 2005). Rakner and Svasand (2004), who examined the platforms of Zambia’s political parties, argue that there is little
difference between opposition party and the governing party platforms. It may also be the case that an opposition leader knowingly establishes a weak party as a way of leveraging himself/herself into a governing coalition (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).

The History of Dominant Party Systems in Africa

Africa has a significant history of single party rule in non-democratic settings. During the decades following independence from colonial rule, countries including Ghana (under Kwame Nkrumah), Tanzania (under Julius Nyerere) Senegal (under Leopold Senghor), and Kenya (under Joma Kenyatta) all instituted single party states in which only one party was, either by law or by extra-judicial means (i.e., opposition co-optation, manipulation, intimidation, excessive registration fees and regulations, etc.) allowed to form and participate in the electoral process. Africa’s single party systems—while decidedly non-democratic as various restrictions on competition were in place—may provide us with some insight into the functioning of today’s dominant party systems. Throup (1993) argues that there were significant levels of competition, turnover, and responsiveness of the single-party state in Kenya under KANU rule and perhaps higher levels of all three after the resumption of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. Gertzel, Baylies and Szefiel (1984) report similar findings under Zambia’s single party state of the 1970s and 1980s.

Much of the competitiveness noted in single party states is related to factionalism. According to Panebianco (1988), political parties can be divided into factions (which he defines as “strongly organized groups”) or tendencies (“loosely organized groups”). The types of divisions found within parties determine their internal cohesion with highly
factionalized parties being considerably less cohesive than those with tendencies. In Zambia, extreme factionalism was cited by the ruling party (UNIP) as one of the main contributing factors in the introduction of a single party state in the 1970s; the single party state was argued to be the solution to factional fighting within UNIP (Gertzel et al. 1984). Bienen (1974) also noted significant factions within Kenya’s ruling party (KANU); however, he argued that the factions within KANU provided Kenya’s single party state with a semblance of competitiveness. Further, because opposition parties were of little threat to the single party state, factions within KANU felt free to openly oppose and vote against government-sponsored legislation (84). Thus, in single party states, competition in the form of factionalism often emerges, but this type of competition can be considered to occur at elite-levels and, when elections are neither free nor fair, does not offer citizens much in the way of accountability or input.

Turning to countries considered to have dominant party systems in Africa, Table 1 reports election results for five countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania. SWAPO in Namibia received 75 percent of the national level vote in the 2009 election while the BDP in Botswana received 53 percent of the national vote in the 2009 election and the Lesotho Congress Party (LCD) received 55 percent of the popular vote in 2002. However, due to the disproportionality commonly associated with first-past-the-post systems, there is a huge discrepancy between the percentage of vote the dominant party received at the national level and their percentage of seats won in the legislature in countries such as Botswana and Tanzania. This table should also make it clear that there is no obvious relationship between electoral system and party system in
sub-Saharan Africa as dominant parties are found in countries using first-past-the-post, mixed, and proportional representation systems.

Table 1: Electoral Results under Dominant Party Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY (Dominant Party)</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PERCENT SEATS HELD BY DP</th>
<th>PERCENT VOTE RECEIVED BY DP</th>
<th>ELECTORAL SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (BDP)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (BDP)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>82.50%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (BDP)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>77.19%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (BDP)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>78.94%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho (LCD)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>60.70%</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho (LCD)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>64.16%</td>
<td>54.89%</td>
<td>MMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho (LCD)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>50.83%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>MMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia (SWAPO)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>76.30%</td>
<td>76.15%</td>
<td>PR Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia (SWAPO)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>76.30%</td>
<td>76.11%</td>
<td>PR Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia (SWAPO)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>74.29%</td>
<td>PR Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (ANC)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>62.65%</td>
<td>PR Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (ANC)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>66.50%</td>
<td>66.35%</td>
<td>PR Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (ANC)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>69.75%</td>
<td>69.69%</td>
<td>PR Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (ANC)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>65.90%</td>
<td>PR Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (CCM)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>80.17%</td>
<td>59.22%</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (CCM)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>87.44%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (CCM)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>88.79%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: African Elections Database

In sum, when we are discussing and classifying dominant party systems, we are broadly grouping divergent electoral outcomes based solely on which party controls government—specifically, if a single party controls government without alternation or rotation to another party. We are not directly speaking to the competitiveness of
elections, the magnitude of electoral victories, whether or not turnover at the micro-level is occurring, or how voters assess the quality of electoral outcomes. We are explicitly not taking into account whether electoral pressures are placed upon dominant parties or whether or not accountability and/or responsiveness are occurring. We are not speaking to the reasons voters return parties to office and we are not speaking to how satisfied or dissatisfied voters are with electoral outcomes. We are simply noting who controls the national government apparatus.

*Democratic Dominant Party Systems?*

Due to the lack of alternation between parties, theorists such as Huntington (1991), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that dominant party systems cannot and should not be considered democratic. The logic behind this argument is that in the absence of a peaceful turnover of political power from one party to another, there is no evidence that the party in power will not resort to force or undemocratic means to stay in power. Without evidence of a turnover of power from political rivals, none are willing to label dominant party systems as democracies.

I argue that the term “dominant party system” has been used to describe party configurations in both autocratic and democratic party systems. Under authoritarian systems, dominant party rule is a common occurrence as elections are often times used for demonstrative purposes (to signify the legitimacy of the regime to either a domestic or foreign audience) and the outcome is a foregone conclusion. This is especially true as the current global push for democratization has come as a sort of precondition for donor funding and aid from sources such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and
the United States Government. Under autocratic dominant party systems, elections are held but competition is extremely limited and/or opposition parties can be outright banned. On the other hand, dominant party rule can just as easily be produced by competitive elections held in otherwise democratic systems. It may be the case that a particular party has performed exceptionally well over the years and thus legitimately has the support of a majority of voters. It may be the case that dominant party rule is the true expression of voter desire. If democratic procedures and protections are in place, how can the aggregate results of free and fair elections be deemed undemocratic?

The debate over whether a dominant party system should be considered democratic reflects whether one adopts a procedural or substantive definition of democracy. The procedural definition includes only the presence of democratic institutions (namely, elections) whereas the substantive approach incorporates the outcomes produced by democratic institutions (namely, party alternation) as part of the definition. By looking at electoral outcomes from a different perspective, this paper offers an approach that might help shed light on this debate. Examining electoral outcomes at the micro-level combines the procedural and substantive approaches by describing in detail the nature of elections under dominant party systems but does not place proscriptions on aggregate outcomes that can be affected by factors outside the control of voters such as national-level economic performance, the electoral system and geographic concentration of partisans.

Previous research has largely focused on national level electoral outcomes and, thus, is unable to accurately comment on the democratic quality of elections in dominant party systems. If we conceive of national level outcomes as the aggregation of numerous
simultaneous sub-national elections, then only by focusing on electoral outcomes from this micro-level, are we able to assess the true nature of electoral outcomes. In sum, dominant party rule can and is produced by elections in which competition is heavily restricted and elections that are widely deemed as free and fair. In order to differentiate these types of elections and systems, we must take a different approach to examining electoral outcomes if we want to speak to the democratic quality of elections.

Focus on Botswana

Botswana is a stable and relatively successful anomaly hidden amongst sub-Saharan Africa’s notoriously tempestuous post-colonial histories. Unlike many of its geographic counterparts, in its more than 40 years of independent rule, Botswana has never experienced civil war, regime change, military rule, or any manner of “hostile takeover” of government. One of the poorest countries in the world in the 1960s, until recently, Botswana has seen significant positive economic growth almost every year. According to Acemoglu et al. (2003), Botswana’s consistent economic growth over the past 35 years has outpaced not only every other African country, but also every other country in the world (80). This is due in no small part to the discovery of diamonds in the 1970s.

Botswana also has a solid record of political freedom and respect for political and civil rights. Freedom House, which releases scores tabulating a country’s protection of political rights and civil rights, has classified Botswana as “Free” since 1974 (Freedom House 2011). According to Transparency International’s County Study Report, Botswana is considered the least corrupt African country (Transparency International 2008).
While Botswana’s political stability and economic successes are not in question, there is a lack of scholarly consensus regarding its regime type and, hence, the quality of its democracy. It has been classified at various points along the democracy/autocracy spectrum. Przeworski et al. (2000) consider it a dictatorship. Levitsky and Way (2010) describe it as a competitive autocracy. According to others, it is an imperfect democracy—a pseudo-democracy (Greene 2007). Goode (1996) classifies it as an “elite democracy” with limited mass-level participation. Still others contend that it is a competitive democracy (Molutsi 2005; Leith 2005).

The confusion over how to classify Botswana stems from the fact that only one party—the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)—has ever won a majority of legislative seats and, hence, ruled the country. Further causing problems is the fact that there have been few, if any, reports of electoral irregularities over the years and international observers have repeatedly deemed elections in Botswana to be free and fair (US State Department 2011). In fact, there is not one electoral observer that has ever called into question the integrity of elections in Botswana. The procedural component of democracy—free and fair elections—is not in question; rather, it is the substantive feature of democracy where alternation is absent that causes consternation. It is the invariable nature of the outcome of elections that causes researchers to disagree about how to classify Botswana.

Botswana, long been considered Africa’s most stable and perhaps successful country, has thus far held ten successive elections—all deemed “free and fair” by international observers—with varying levels of multiparty competition. Due to both the exceptionality of Botswana in terms of political stability and its commonality due to the
dominance of the BDP, it is the ideal starting point for an analysis of dominant party systems in Africa.

In order to better understand the functioning of a dominant party system, I examine Botswana in great detail and compare its electoral outcomes to several other African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Tanzania, and Zambia). There are advantages to focusing my analysis on Botswana. Namely, its 45-year tenure as a dominant party system allows for longitudinal analysis and its relative homogeneity allows for a natural control for social heterogeneity that many researchers argue complicates political outcomes, particularly with respect to Africa. Understanding the long-term trends in elections and electoral behavior in Botswana may inform our understanding of the prospects for political development in other newly democratizing countries.

In order to get a more comprehensive understanding of elections in Botswana’s dominant party system, I deconstruct national-level election returns to the component parts and treat national level outcomes as what they are: the product of numerous simultaneous elections. I focus on the competitiveness of elections at the constituent level and the ways in which this competition is interpreted by voters. I also examine the voting calculus of Botswana’s voters in an attempt to understand why the BDP has been returned to office every five years for the past 46 years.

Conclusion

There are several ways to tease out the exact mechanisms and processes that occur in elections under dominant party rule. In order to assess the possibility of democracy in a dominant party system, I examine several different facets of elections and
electoral behavior in Botswana. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the development of Botswana’s party system over time. In Chapter 3, I examine the competitiveness of elections at the sub-national level and incumbency/turnover rates over time in Botswana and several other African countries. In Chapter 4, I examine the effects of electoral outcomes on individual level democratic satisfaction and political efficacy. Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the voting patterns and the factors that influence vote choice in Botswana. Examining all of these provides us with a much clearer picture of the way in which dominant party systems affect and are, in turn, affected by electoral behavior.

This project contributes to several different strands of literature in the political science discipline: electoral behavior; party and party system development; and democratic development, to name a few. As dominant party systems are appearing with increased frequency in Africa, it is of the utmost importance that we better understand the attitudes, perceptions, and behavior of the electorate under these types of systems. Electoral and party systems, both of which affect electoral outcomes, ultimately affect individual level responses towards democracy by conveying key information regarding democratic processes and outcomes to the electorate. Understanding better the link between political institutions and behaviors and attitudes in dominant party systems can significantly enhance our understanding of democratic development, not just in Africa, but in other developing areas as well.

As elections are the key mechanism through which democracy is sustained, in order to understand democratic development in Africa, it is imperative that we ask and answer the following questions: Are elections under dominant party systems competitive?
What are the effects, if any, of partisan dominance on individual assessments of democracy? Under relatively free and fair elections, why do voters routinely return a single party to power?

My main findings indicate that dominant party systems where truly democratic elections (free and fair) are held exhibit significant levels of electoral competition, and this competition appears to increase over time. These levels are comparable to multiparty systems, and in some cases, elections are more competitive under dominant party systems than under other types of party systems. In addition, electoral outcomes in a dominant party system have a negligible effect on individuals' assessments of democracy suggesting that dominant party systems do not foster anti-democratic attitudes nor do they adversely affect individuals' beliefs about the democratic quality of their country. Finally, parties in dominant party systems do make ideological appeals to voters and voters under dominant party systems—much like voters in two party and multiparty systems—engage in ideological voting. This, however, is conditional on voters having sufficient cognitive skills to decipher ideological messages and the ability to match their own ideological positions to those of electorally relevant parties. Taken together, this project depicts a more complex and nuanced electoral environment under dominant party systems than previous research has acknowledged.

My central argument is this: dominant party systems may or may not be democratic; however, we cannot assess this simply by looking at elections from one perspective. It takes much more work. It requires a closer look at the functioning of democratic procedures from multiple levels and more in-depth analysis before we can make any conclusions on the presence/absence or quality of democracy in a given
country. National-level electoral outcomes provide us with a single piece of information from which we are to draw grand conclusions about regime type. This type of approach overlooks all the additional information at our disposal that would facilitate a more complete and accurate assessment of the functioning of elections under dominant party systems. National-level electoral outcomes are the product of numerous simultaneous elections taking place at the constituent level. When we approach elections from this perspective, then we are able to examine the relationship between elections and democracy. When we understand how the electorate interprets electoral outcomes, then we can assess how elections affect citizens’ views of democracy. When we understand the motivations driving voters to cast their ballots for a dominant party, then we can speak to the democratic or autocratic quality of a given regime.
Chapter 2: Elections and Electoral Behavior in Botswana

Introduction

Botswana is a land-locked country in the heart of southern Africa. It is bordered by Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Despite being roughly the size of Texas, it is one of the most sparsely populated countries in Africa, sharing this title with the likes of Namibia. Upon independence, Botswana had slightly less than 1 million inhabitants (World Bank 2009). Current census estimates place this number at slightly more than 2 million inhabitants (US State Department 2011). On average, there are 3 people per square kilometer in Botswana (World Bank 2009). The average for the rest of Africa is approximately 3,261 people per square kilometer (ibid.). Future population projections promise to be affected by the current state of HIV/AIDS rates in Botswana, which has one of the highest infection and prevalence rates in the world. It is estimated that 25% of the country’s population is infected with HIV (World Health Organization 2009). Consequently, it is a very young country, with approximately 35% of its population under the age of 15 (US State Department 2011). Ethnically and linguistically speaking, Botswana is very homogenous as approximately 80% of the population are and speak Setswana (Tswana).

Botswana is unique in the African context both in terms of post-independence governance and economic development. On a continent in which both have historically been hard to come by, Botswana can be viewed as an overachiever. One of the poorest countries in the world in the 1960s, Botswana has seen significant positive economic growth since independence. This is, of course, due in no small part to the discovery of
diamonds in the late 1960s. Table 2 reports information on GDP per capita since 1960.

Prior to independence, GDP per capita in Botswana was approximately $US 294 in 1960 (African Development Indicators 2011). In 1975, this figure had increased to $822. By 1985, this number had doubled to $1,657. In 1995, GDP per capita was approximately $2643. The most current estimate (for 2010) is $4188 per capita. Put in perspective, the average GDP per capita in 2010 for the rest of Africa was $913. According to Acemoglu et al. (2003), Botswana's consistent economic growth over the past 35 years has outpaced not only every other African country, but also every other country in the world (80).

Although poverty and unemployment are considered significant problems, Botswana is still one of the wealthiest countries in Africa.

Table 2: Botswana's Economic Development in Perspective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita: Botswana</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita: Lesotho</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita: South Africa</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita: Zambia</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita: Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita: Africa</th>
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<td>$180</td>
<td>$2690</td>
<td>$608</td>
<td>$494</td>
<td>$571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$426</td>
<td>$186</td>
<td>$3104</td>
<td>$559</td>
<td>$546</td>
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<td>$373</td>
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<td>$305</td>
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<td>$432</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Africa Development Indicators, 2011
The major export commodities of Botswana include: diamonds, copper, nickel, meat, and textiles. Botswana’s economy is heavily reliant on diamond exports—slightly more than one-third of the country’s GDP comes from diamond exports. Botswana produces much of the world’s diamonds. In 2009 alone, Botswana produced approximately US$1.7 billion worth of diamonds (Newman 2010). Diamond production is a state-private corporation venture, exploiting largely kimberlite mines in central and southern Botswana. Debswana, an equal partnership between De Beers and the government of Botswana was formed in 1975. “Since Debswana’s formation, Botswana has profited handsomely. Diamond production was the key factor in making Botswana one of the world’s fastest growing economies from 1975-1985” (Kempton and Du Preez, 1997, 600). Some believe that this arrangement of equal joint partnership has been one of the post powerful contributing factors to Botswana’s economic success. Tsie (1996) attributes the joint partnership between De Beers and Botswana as giving the country “substantial economic and financial muscle, so that it could engage in some form of peripheral welfare capitalism” and further economic development (613). While it is true that diamonds have played a significant role in Botswana’s economic development, its heavy reliance on a single commodity makes its economy especially vulnerable. In 2009, due to a larger global recession, Botswana recorded significant negative GDP growth (-5%) for the first time in the country’s history (African Development Indicators 2011).

Botswana also has a solid record of political freedom and respect for political and civil rights. Freedom House, which releases scores tabulating a country’s protection of political rights and civil rights, has classified Botswana as “Free” since it began releasing its results in 1974 (Freedom House 2011). According to Transparency International’s
County Study Report, Botswana is considered the least corrupt African country (Transparency International 2008). Thus far, Botswana has had four presidents and no incidents in the transfer of power from one to another.

Many authors have examined the “exceptionalism” of Botswana (Good 1992; Hope 1998; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). Some attribute its political success to its economic success. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), for example, attribute Botswana’s success to its unique set of institutions—especially those concerning the protection of property rights—as enabling the country to pursue and implement good and sound economic policy. Others argue that its social and geographic situation have contributed to its stability through the lack of major social cleavages. According to Young (1994), only a handful of independent African states, Botswana included, resemble their pre-colonial and colonial territories. Engelbert (2000) argues that this fact plays a large role in Botswana’s success as its post-colonial boundaries resemble almost perfectly its pre-colonial boundaries. Other countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Somalia have suffered from conflict related to irredentism.

**Political History**

The history of Botswana is intimately tied to that of South Africa. The majority of Batswana (the term used to refer to the people of Botswana) came to the territory in the 1800s to escape the Zulu wars in South Africa. Prior to colonialism, Botswana was ruled internally by tribal leaders and indigenous chiefs. Researchers have noted the democratic nature of chieftain rule in Botswana (Crowder et al. 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Maundeni 2005). Chiefs were required to consult with a council of
advisors prior to major decisions and to hold kgotla meetings in which subjects were allowed to discuss various issues with the chiefs. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) attribute Botswana’s political stability and economic success, in part, to the democratic traditions practiced by chiefs prior to independence that carry on to this day.

Botswana, then known as Bechuanaland, was declared a British protectorate in 1885 due to the difficulties the Batswana were having with the Boers from the Transvaal in South Africa. Unlike other British colonies such as Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria, Botswana was never a settler colony, but rather a “protectorate” governed remotely. Several researchers have noted the “light” form of colonialism practiced by the British in Botswana (Nengwekatse 1979; Parson 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). Botswana did hold strategic interest for the British due to its proximity to South Africa and Namibia, but because valuable minerals had not yet been discovered, Britain was rather hands off in terms of administering her protectorate. In fact, it was administered from Mafikeng, South Africa (Somolekae, 1989, 4).

At one point, it was believed that Botswana was to become a province of South Africa or a part of a larger Union of South Africa; however, due to the repressive racial apartheid regime, and the Sharpesville Massacre of 1960, the Batswana were not interested in any sort of political relationship with government of South Africa (Polhemus 1983). This is not to say that there was not relationship. Many of the first political parties in Botswana were influenced South Africa’s two major revolutionary parties, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) (ibid).

Stirrings for independence began in earnest in the late 1950s, but there was never much conflict between the Batswana and the colonial regime. It had a relatively peaceful
transfer of power from the British in 1966, towards the early period of decolonization in Africa, when it established itself as the independent republic of Botswana. Prior to independence, the British established a committee to make recommendations regarding the most appropriate post-independence institutions (ibid). The 1960 Constitution created an Executive Council, Legislative Council and African Council, the latter which served only in an advisory capacity (ibid 399). The next few years were spent amending the original constitution and produced the 1965 and 1966 versions (ibid).

Organization of Government

Botswana is a parliamentary democracy, with three separate but unequal branches of government: the executive (president); the legislative (National Assembly); and judiciary. The president wields the vast majority of power in Botswana. His/her role and powers will be discussed more fully below. While Botswana is considered to have a parliamentary system, and the legislature does elect the president, the president does not serve at the leisure of the legislature and there is no provision for the legislature to remove the president. It is technically bicameral but is functionally unicameral with the National Assembly wholly responsible for approving legislation. The House of Chiefs, Ntlo ya Dikgosi, is the upper chamber of parliament but has been vested with no real power. The judicial branch is comprised of the High Court, the Court of Appeals and several Magistrates’ Courts and customary courts located in the districts. Justices are appointed by the President but he/she may only choose from a list of approved justices prepared by the Judicial Service Commission and justices may only be removed with just cause.
The executive (President) in Botswana has tremendous power. He/she is able to appoint—with no process for advice or consent form the legislature—the vice president, all ministerial positions, all ambassadors and high commissioners, and what are termed “specially-elected members of parliament.” The vice president and all cabinet ministers must come from the president’s party (Molomo 2000). The President also appoints the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court, but is constrained by the Judicial Service Commission’s recommendations. The provision for the appointment of “specially-elected” MPs has, in the past, been used to appoint former President Masire, former Vice President Mmusi, and former cabinet ministers Monswe and Butale to Parliament (Othogile 1991).

The president is also the head of the Army, Police, Broadcasting and Information Service and Printing and Publishing and also serves as the Directorate of Public Service Management and Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (Molomo 2000). As Commander in Chief of Botswana, only the president can officially declare war. He/she is also an ex-officio member of parliament and, as such, has voting privileges and veto power. The vast majority of legislation originates from the President and all bills need the approval of the president before they can be enacted into law (ibid). Finally, the President of Botswana dissolves parliament in anticipation of coming elections, sets the date for candidate nominations, and selects the date for general elections (ibid). The opposition has complained that the presidents’ ability to issue the writ of elections—hence, he/she knows exactly when elections are to take place—give the BDP an unfair advantage in preparing for elections (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005).
To date, Botswana has had four presidents: Seretse Khama, Quett Masire, Festus Mogae and Seretse Khama Ian Khama, son of former President Seretse Khama. Seretse Khama served as president from 1966 until his death in 1980. Quett Masire, vice president from 1966 until 1980, took over after the death of Khama. He served as president until 1998. After Masire’s presidency, Botswana adopted term limits for the presidency. The president is now limited to two five-year terms of office. Masire’s vice president, Festus Mogae, was elected by the party to take Masire’s place. Mogae was known for his fiscal austerity and discipline when managing the economy (ibid). Mogae served two terms and, in 2008, stepped aside so that Ian Khama could take assume the presidency. Ian Khama, as had become custom, served as vice president from 1998 until 2008. Ian Khama has come under criticism from the media and the opposition for his “dictatorial” tendencies (“Ian Khama is a Flop”; “Botswana Splinter Group Forms New Party”; BCP/BAM Manifesto 2009). It should be noted, however, that when the issue of amending the president’s term limit and extending his/her possible time in office to a total of three terms has arisen, Ian Khama has repeatedly come out against such a measure (Owino 2008).

According to the Constitution, the National Assembly holds supreme lawmaking authority in Botswana. It is responsible for introducing legislation, passing laws, and amending the Constitution. The National Assembly also has significant budgetary power as it must approve the annual budget. However, given how expansive the powers of the president are, it is necessary to examine legislative strength in Botswana. Fish and Kroenig (2009) have created an index of executive-legislative relations. Their Parliamentary Power Index (PPI) uses 32 different indicators to create a score that ranges
from 0 (very weak) to 1 (very strong) for over 150 countries across the world. Botswana has received a score of 0.44. While established democracies such as the United States (0.68) and the United Kingdom (0.73) have considerably higher scores, Botswana’s score approximates the mean for the dataset (0.49) and, in comparison to the other African countries included in the dataset, is slightly higher than the average as approximately 60% of African countries scored lower on the index (Poteete forthcoming).

Botswana is a unitary system with most government power localized in the central government; there are, however, provisions for local government. Elections to local government are held concurrently with national elections. The district councils, established by the Local Government Act of 1965, are responsible for: “primary education, primary health care, rural village water supply, social and community development, and construction and maintenance of tertiary roads” (Lekorwe 2000 26). The Minister of Local Government is charged with overseeing district councils. He/she can suspend councilors and appoint special councilors (similar to specially elected MPs). Lekorwe (2000) contends that national and local elections are intimately tied to together, or rather, national elections direct local elections as MP candidates speak at rallies for local government councilors (27).

**Elections**

Members of the National Assembly are elected from single member districts according to simple plurality rules. By law, the Delimitation Commission must convene a minimum of once every ten years to redraw constituencies based on changes in population reported by the Census Bureau (Section 64, Constitution of Botswana). In
1965, there were 31 constituencies. In 1974, there was a marginal increase to 32 constituencies. This number increased to 34 in 1984 and 40 in 1994. The 2002 Delimitation Commission increased the number of constituencies to 57 in time for the 2004 election. There are also specially elected MPs who are selected by the Parliament from a list provided to them by the President. As of 2009, there were 4 specially elected MPs. The President and the Attorney-General both serve as ex-officio members of Parliament.

The President is selected by the parliament after the general election. He/she is the head of the party and the intended vote of MP’s is known well in advance of general elections, thus, voters “indirectly” elect their president. While not mandatory, it has become customary for the Vice-President to assume the Presidency after the term of the President has expired or he/she has left office.

Until 1999, the Supervisor of Elections—a position that was appointed directly by the president—was in charge of conducting elections. In 1998, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was established to conduct all subsequent elections, including the 1999 contest. The IEC is comprised of seven commissioners, appointed by the Judicial Service Commission from a list of candidates approved at the All Party Conference, a meeting in which all parties in Botswana are invited to attend. The IEC, although largely a welcome development in the administration of elections in Botswana, is not without its issues. The appointment of the second IEC in 2004 was problematic as the major opposition parties boycotted the All Party Conference; only the BDP and some smaller parties (MELS and BLP) attended (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). Additionally, as
the president appoints the secretary of the IEC, the opposition questions the impartiality of the IEC in general (ibid).

Voter registration in Botswana is voluntary. Beginning with the 1994 election, voters had to produce a voter registration card along with their identification in order to cast their ballots. Ink thumbprints are also used to prevent fraudulent voting. Currently, voting is open to all Motswana ages 18 and older. Until 1997, the voting age was 21. In the 1990s, the opposition parties lobbied to have it reduced, thinking that they would pull support from younger voters and that lowering the voting age might result in an increase in opposition vote totals. The government argued that 18 to 21 year olds were too immature to vote (Othogile 1991). However, prior to the 1999 elections, major changes were adopted as a result of a 1997 referendum on electioneering. The referendum established the IEC; lowered the voting age from 21 to 18; introduced absentee ballots; and replaced colored disks with paper ballots. Prior to the referendum, voters cast their ballot by choosing from different colored stones, each representing a different party. It is interesting to note that voter turnout for the referendum was abysmally low—only 17% of registered voters participated (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005).

The official campaigning period—lasting approximately one month—begins after the president has dissolved Parliament and prior to the date of new elections. Civil servants—who comprise a large segment of the population—are prevented from running for office. Molomo (2000) argues that this results in the better educated and better qualified not being allowed to run for office.
Political Parties and Elections in Botswana

Formation of First Political Parties

While political parties began to form much earlier in other African countries (the ANC in South Africa dates back to the 1920s), political parties in Botswana were rather late to form. Some have argued that Botswana’s late entry into politics was due to the less brutal form of colonialism practiced by the British in Botswana. Simply, there was little to rally against and/or organize against (Nengwekhulu 1979). When parties did emerge, they were mainly concerned with the following issues: dissatisfaction with colonial rule; decolonization in other areas around Africa and how that would affect Botswana; opposition to the creation of a pre-independence Legislative Council to help Botswana transition to independence; and to some extent, as a reaction to apartheid in neighboring South Africa (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000 4).

Political parties began to form during the few years leading up to independence, and to a large extent, in anticipation of independence from British colonial rule. Stevens and Speed (1977) have argued that the main cleavage underpinning the formation of parties in the 1960s was the divide between the chiefs and traditional politics in Botswana and newly emerging modern politicians. A brief review of Botswana’s political parties and their founding principles supports this assertion. The first party to form in Botswana was the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party (FP) in 1959. The FP, led by L.D. Raditaldi, was created out of concern that the chiefs and older politicians would oppose democracy in Botswana (Polhemus 1983). The FP faded quickly from the political landscape due to organizational weakness (Nengwekhulu 1979). The Bechuanaland People’s Party (BPP) was the next to form in 1960 and was the first serious political party
to contest elections in Botswana. It was created by K. T. Motsetse (president), P. G. Matante (vice president), and Motsama Mpho (secretary general). Each came from a different tribe and a different part of the country (Polhemus 1983). All had spent time in South Africa and were influenced by the anti-regime parties found there. None had participated in the Legislative Council. The goals of the BPP were to obtain independence and to foster a national identity (ibid). The BPP “was bitterly opposed to the dictatorial disposition of diKgosi (chiefs), as well as the proposed constitution of the Legislative Council, which they viewed as a design to perpetuate colonial exploitation,” (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000 4-5).

In the early years of the BPP, there was a lot of friction between the three founding members. Mpho, a former member of the ANC in South Africa, was expelled by the party. According to Mpho, it was because he questioned the use of party funds by Matante, a former member of the PAC, the ANC’s rival in South Africa (Polhemus 1983). Mpho offered to take this issue to party’s National Congress but Matante refused and so Mpho formed his own wing of the party in 1963 (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000). Both the BPP-Mpho faction and BPP-Matante faction attended the Constitutional Convention at Lobatse. In 1964, Motsetse split and formed the BPP-Motsetse faction. The BPP-Motsetse faction contested the 1965 elections, but after winning only 377 total votes, it folded (Polhemus 1983). The BPP-Mpho faction formally became the Botswana/Bechuanaland Independence Party (BIP) in 1964 (Nengwekhulu 1979).

In 1961, against the backdrop of the BPP/BIP factionalism, the Bechaunaland/Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) formed. It was led by Seretse Khama, a former hereditary chief of the Bamangwato tribe. While pursing his studies at Oxford
University, Khama met and married a white woman. Because of this and due to pressure from the South Africa's apartheid government, he was exiled by the British colonial administration during the 1950s. He was allowed to return in 1956, but only after he renounced his chieftainship. He then became very active in Botswana politics: he was a member of the African Advisory Council, the Executive Council, and the Legislative Council. Quett Masire, another founding member of the BDP, also served on the Legislative Council with Seretse Khama.

**Parties and Elections—1960s & 1970s**

Botswana’s first elections, held in 1965 as a means of peacefully transferring power, gave the BDP a resounding victory; it won 28 out of 31 seats. The BPP won the remaining 3 seats. Turnout was approximately 75%, but this figure is based only on registered voters, not on all possible voters (African Elections Database). Seretse Khama was elected as Botswana’s first president by Parliament. The BDP, it has been reported, enjoyed the tacit support of the British colonial administration (Nengwekhulu 1979; Molutsi 1991; Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000). In fact, some believe that the British colonial government expressly wanted the BDP to win Botswana’s first election. Molutsi (1991) argues that the British found the BPP too radical and undemocratic to rule Botswana.

After the elections of 1965 but prior to full independence in 1966, the Botswana National Front (BNF) was formed by Dr. Kenneth Koma, who had recently returned from Russia after completing his doctorate in political studies (Polhemus 1983 402). The intention of forming the BNF was to “reconcile warring elements of BPP to create a progressive block to bring down the neo-colonial BDP,” (Mokopakgosi and Molomo
Initially, it was envisioned as an umbrella organization for the opposition to present a unified voice against the ruling party (ibid 7). Historically though, the BNF was centered largely on one figure: the president of the party, Kenneth Koma (ibid 14).

The first few years of independence were tumultuous. Botswana’s second elections were scheduled for 1970, but Khama called elections early for 1969 as his government was taking a lot of heat for the economic problems and development issues that had emerged over the past few years, including those associated with a prolonged drought that had adversely affected the country’s economy (Maudeni 2005 6). Criticism was especially intense from the opposition and the traditional chiefs.

During the 1969 elections, in which the BDP again won a resounding majority (24 out of 31 seats), there was some evidence of discontent as Vice President Quett Masire lost his seat to a rival BNF candidate and former chief. The 1969 elections were viewed as a failure by the BDP as the opposition was able to increase its share of seats in Parliament, winning seven seats out of 31 constituencies (Danevad 1995). Parsons (1977) attributed the BDP’s relative failure in the election of 1969 to several factors, including: animosity between chiefs and the BDP and the lack of appreciable change in living standards between 1965 and 1969.

Maudeni (2005) is quick to point out that while the BDP could have abandoned elections altogether after its perceived defeat in 1969, it instead responded by making some small changes to the country’s electoral laws—disallowing chiefs from immediately entering politics after retiring from their position and rescinding the provision that the president must stand for elections (7).
While Botswana could have gone the route of many of its continental neighbors, the country continued holding multiparty elections that placed few, if any, restrictions on opposition formation or the contestation of elections. This is in contrast to many other countries in Africa which explicitly or implicitly adopted single-party states (i.e., Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Ghana). In these states, opposition parties were either constitutionally banned or intimidation and electoral manipulation were used to create a de facto single party state. Bates (2008) estimates that between the 1970s and 1980s, more than 80% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa were either no-party or single-party states.

In 1974, with voter turnout at a still historic low of 31.2% of registered voters, the BDP regained most of the ground it lost in the 1969 contest. The BDP won 27 out of 31 seats. The BNF and BPP each won 2 seats. The BIP won a single seat. The 1979 election saw the BDP win 29 out of 32 seats, receiving approximately 75% of the total vote. The BNF took 2 seats with 13% of the total vote. The BPP won a single seat with 7.5% of the total vote. Turnout improved in 1979 as 58.4% of registered voters cast their ballots. It is argued that the BDP saw service provision as the key to retaining its majority status in Parliament. Prior to the 1973 election, the BDP initiated the 1973 Rural Development Program to sway voters (Danevad 1995).

**Parties and Elections—1980s**

Until 1982, there were only the above four active political parties—the BDP, BNF, BPP and BIP. The BDP enjoyed relative harmony and cohesion during the early years of independence. The BNF, as well, enjoyed relative stability until the early 1980s when infighting began to cause serious problems for party unity. The BPP remained
largely a regional party, drawing most of its support from the Kalanga (Charlton 1993). The BIP drew most of its support from the North West regions and from non-Tswana tribes.

The Botswana Progress Union (BPU) was formed in early the 1980s by Daniel Kwele, a former member of the BNF. He quit the BNF in 1979 after he lost party elections for the position of vice president to Kgosi Bathoen II. He had briefly joined the BDP before establishing the BPU. The BPU was not ideologically distinct from the BDP, but rather focused on issues related to the marginalization of non-Tswana peoples (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000 7).

During the 1984 election, economic issues, apartheid in South Africa, and the wars in Angola and Mozambique were noted to be the most important issues to parties and voters (Mpabanga 2000). Voter interest was also piqued by the prospect of electing a new president. During 1980, Seretse Khama, aged 60, died in office. His vice president, Quett Masire, took over the office of the president. The 1984 contest would be the first election since 1965 to produce a new president. Turnout increased dramatically to 77.6% of registered voters in 1984. The BDP held steady, winning 29 out of 34 seats, but its total vote percentage dropped some from 75.4% to 68%. The BNF doubled its previous number of seats, winning 4 with 20.4% of the total vote. The BPP, the only other party to win a seat, won one seat with 6.6% of the vote. The BIP and BPU, respectively, received 3.2% and 1.3% of the total vote and no seats.

Prior to the 1989 election, no party had been able to field more than 15 national candidates in a given election. The 1989 election, then, represents a watershed in multiparty competition in Botswana. The BDP ran candidates in all 34 constituencies; the
BNF ran in 33 constituencies; the BPP in 12; the BIP in 4. The results of the 1989 election, however, were unremarkable. The BDP, yet again, increased its total seats in 1989 while losing some vote support. It won 31 out of 34 seats with 65% of the total vote. The BNF won 3 seats with almost 27% of the total vote. Smaller parties such as the BPP, BIP, BPU, BFP, and BLP each received a small percentage of the vote but won no seats. Voter turnout of those registered was estimated at approximately 68%. The BNF had controlled the constituencies of Kanye and Ngwaketse South since 1969. In 1989, due in large part the addition of candidates from the BFP, the BDP recaptured these seats. The BDP victory was short-lived as the BNF was able to win these seats back in 1994. The results of the Democracy Research Project's election survey suggested that employment, drought relief, and schooling fees were all important factors affecting vote choice in the 1989 election (Somolekae 1989).

**Parties and Elections—1990s**

The BNF grew substantially over the years, and by 1990, it was considered the main opposition party (Charlton 1993). Its base of support was primarily urban voters. Despite the small splinter parties that formed as off-shoots of the BNF, it wasn't until 1989 that the party experienced its first major split after the party’s congress in Francistown. Tlhomelang, saying he believed the BNF to be a party and not a mass movement, broke away and formed the Botswana Freedom Party (BFP) (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000). The BFP was a sign of things to come. Between April 1993 and September 1994 alone, five new parties formed—four of which were splinter groups from the BNF. The Independence Freedom Party (IFP), a merger of the BFP and BIP, was established in April 1993. In May, Shawn Nthaile, a former member of the BNF,
created the Botswana Workers Front (BWF). Initially, he believed that the BWF would form an alliance with the BNF but Koma refused (ibid). In June, Lesedi La Botswana (Botswana’s Light, LLB) was formed, although it received very little support and was rendered inactive shortly thereafter. In April 1994, Nehemiah Modubule formed the United Socialist Party (USP or PUSO). Modubule, a former BNF member, believed the party had become too centrist and had lost the purity of its socialist convictions, and thus established the USP\(^1\) (ibid). Finally, in July 1994, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) formed after several members, upset at their respective primary losses, decided to break away and create their own party.

Despite the turmoil and factionalism besieging the BNF, the opposition performed exceptionally well in the 1994 election. The BDP won “only” 27 out of 40 possible seats while the BNF won 13 seats. The 1994 election also marked the lowest percent of that national vote the BDP had ever won: 53.1 percent. The BNF received 37.7 percent of the national vote. In addition to the BDP and BNF fielding candidates, at least five splinter parties (broken off of the BNF) also participated in the election but did not between them win a single parliamentary seat.

Several things account for the opposition’s ability to make significant gains in the 1994 election. First, financial scandals of the early 1990s rocked Botswana and the BDP (Osei-Hwedie 2001). Some have argued that much of the support the BNF received in the 1990s was a product, not of support or like for the party itself, but an expression of dislike and disapproval of the BDP, due in part to the financial scandals and perceptions

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\(^{1}\) In 1999, the USP rejoined the BNF after the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) broke away from the BNF. The BCP, a much more centrist party than either the BNF or the USP, took a large swatch of the moderate BNF members away and Modubule felt the BNF could return to its socialist roots (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000).
of corruption (Danevad 1995). Furthermore, rising unemployment precipitated the 1994 election and may have contributed to the oppositions’ successes (Wiseman and Charlton 1995). The BDP seemed to concede urban areas to BNF and focused on rural areas (ibid). Consequently, BDP support fell by about 10% across the board from 1989 to 1994.

The gains made by the BNF in the 1994 elections were lost quite suddenly in 1998 when the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) formed. The break away of the BCP was precipitate by the 1997 party Congress held at Ledumang in Gaborone. Two factions emerged: veteran party members who had lost Central Committee elections aka “the concerned group” (supported by party president Kenneth Koma) and the elected Central Committee/parliamentary caucus group. The Central Committee expelled “the concerned group”. A Special Congress was called for April 11, 1998 to attempt to resolve the differences; however, intense fighting broke out at the Congress. After all was said and done, 11 (out of 13) BNF MPs left and formed the BCP (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000).

The 1999 election had its own issues. Due to problems with voter registration before the 1999 election, President Festus Mogae became the only Botswana president to declare a state of emergency (Molomo 2000). He did this so that he could reconstitute parliament to amend electoral law to allow 60,000 plus irregularly registered voters to be allowed to vote (ibid). The main campaign issues important to the 1999 election were: employment, AIDS, poverty, minority rights, ethnic diversity, crime, and human rights (Mpabanga 2000 48).

All 11 BCP members (defectors from BNF, former MPs) lost their seats in the 1999 election when they ran under the BCP banner. Turning to local elections, the BNF
had also made some significant inroads in the 1994 district elections, winning majorities in Gaborone and Jwaneng. However, approximately 64 councilors defected to the newly-formed BCP prior to the 1999 election (Lekorwe 2000 29). Directly after the 1999 election, Lekorwe (2000) called Botswana a two-party system, with competition focused between the BDP and BNF.

**Parties and Elections—2000s**

Main parties participating in the 2004 election were: the BDP, BCP, BNF, BAM, BPP, and NDF. The primary season was particularly contentions after the introduction of the BDP’s new primary system, *Bulela Ditswe* (literally, open to it all) in 2003 which allowed all party members to participate (Sebudubudu 2004). Several sitting BDP MPs were defeated in the primary (ibid). The BDP had some factional difficulties prior to the election. Vice President Ian Khama contested Party Chairman Ponatshego Kedikilwe for Party Chairmanship at National Congress in 2003. Khama won but there were hard feelings. The BNF held its own primaries which also saw a few sitting MP’s defeated as well (ibid).

The main issues important to the voters for the 2004 election included several economic issues such as high levels of poverty and unemployment (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). In the year prior to the election, the Afrobarometer survey reported that approximately 40 percent of Batswana believed that unemployment was the single most important issue the government needed to address (Afrobarometer 2004). Basarwa rights also featured prominently in this election due to the forced removal of the San from the Kalakgadi Game Reserve (ibid).
The National Democratic Front (NDF), another BNF splinter group, formed in 2003 to contest the elections. It won no seats. The Pact, an electoral alliance comprising of the BNF, BPP, and BAM as its primary members, formed prior to the election. It lasted only a short time before the BNF pulled out. The BNF and BCP had an especially antagonistic relationship during this election due to their acrimonious split in 1998.

The BDP fielded candidates in all 57 constituencies; the Pact had candidates in 54 out of 57 constituencies; the BCP had candidates in 50 constituencies. Smaller opposition parties such as the NDF and MELS ran candidates in 12 and 4 constituencies, respectively. As this was a presidential contest as well, there were four indirect presidential contenders: incumbent president Festus Mogae (BDP); O Kootsaeletse (BCP); O Moupo (BNF); and D Bayford (NDF).

The BDP’s 2004 campaign slogan, “There is still no alternative,” suggests that the party was content to run on its past achievements. Additionally, its manifesto highlighted the accomplishments of the government over the previous five years, including high economic growth and high GDP per capita and the decreases in unemployment, inflation, and the number of people living below the poverty line (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). Conversely, the opposition party manifestos all emphasized the failures of the ruling party such as the continuing HIV/AIDS epidemic, stagnating economic growth, and a growing divide between the wealthy and poor (BCP 2004 Manifesto; Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). The 2004 election demonstrated the growing strength of the opposition. The BNF won four seats from traditionally BDP safe seats in Kgalagadi North, Letlhakeng East, Letlhakeng North, and Ngwaketse West.
In October 2009, Batswana went to the polls for the 10th time. In addition to legislative elections, the contest was also an indirect presidential contest with a new candidate as the previous President Mogae, who was to be termed out of office, resigned in April 2008 and handed power to his vice-president, Ian Khama. The BDP, BNF, and BCP all fielded presidential candidates—Ian Khama, Otsweletse Moupo, and Gilson Saleshando, respectively. The economy, which for the first time in nearly 40 years experienced negative growth in 2008, was a major campaign issue. In addition, the opposition focused on Ian Khama's qualifications as president and made harsh criticisms related to a closing of democracy in Botswana (BCP and BNF 2009 Election Manifestos).

The BDP marginally increased its seat share, winning 45 out of 57 seats with slightly more than 50 percent of the total vote. The BNF saw its electoral fortunes halved, winning only 6 seats. The BCP increased its seats share to 4 seats, 5 including the seat by its electoral partner, Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM). Former BNF member and UPS founder Nehemiah Modubule ran as an independent candidate and became the first independent elected to parliament. The 2009 election is notable due to the significant growth of the BCP, presumably at the expense of the BNF.

On April 27, 2010, the Barata-phati faction formally split from the BDP and formed the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD). Sydney Pilane, spokesperson for the BMD, stated that the aim of the new party was to protect democracy in Botswana from the autocratic leanings of Ian Khama (“Botswana Splinter Group”). While not a newly “elected” party, the BMD does represent a significant change in Botswana’s politics and one that will be monitored closely over the coming months and years prior to the scheduled 2014 election.
Table 3: Botswana's National Assembly Election Results, 1965 to 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>BDP Seats</th>
<th>BPP Seats</th>
<th>BNF Seats</th>
<th>BCP Seats</th>
<th>Other Seats</th>
<th>Percentage of Seats Won by BDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>29 (75%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (13%)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>29 (68%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>4 (20%)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>31 (65%)</td>
<td>0 (8%)</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>27 (53%)</td>
<td>0 (5%)</td>
<td>13 (38%)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>33 (57%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (26%)</td>
<td>1 (12%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>44 (52%)</td>
<td>0 (2%)</td>
<td>12 (26%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>45 (53%)</td>
<td>0 (1%)</td>
<td>6 (22%)</td>
<td>4 (17%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Botswana Electoral Commission; African Elections Database

Table 3 reports the results of Botswana’s National Assembly elections from 1965 to 2009. To broadly characterize partisan competition in the post-independence period in Botswana, the BDP is most certainly the dominant feature of every election; however, according to Charlton (1993), elections became truly competitive in the mid-1980s. In addition, there has been significant growth in the number of opposition parties in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1989, there were six opposition parties; nine in 1994; and 15 in 1999—although only five contested elections (Mpaganga 2000 55). Directly after the 1999 election, Lekorwe (2000) called Botswana a two-party system, with competition focused between the BDP and BNF. Subsequent elections in the 2000s call this conclusion into question, as voter support increased for the Botswana Congress Party (a former faction of the BNF which broke away in 1998) and decreased for the BNF. By the election of 2009, the BCP and BNF were almost equal in the amount of support that they received (19 and 21 percent respectively).
Party Pacts and Alliances

Over the years, there have been numerous attempts at alliances between various opposition parties. In 1989, the BNF and BPU made an electoral pact to prevent splitting the vote in some constituencies that had previously allowed the BDP to win in previous elections. The BNF agreed to not run a candidate in Nkange and the BPU agreed to run a candidate in Francistown to hopefully take advantage of the split the vote between the BDP and the BPP (Molomo 1991). The BDP won in both constituencies.

In 1991, the BNF, BPP, and BPU joined the People’s Progressive Front. It failed shortly thereafter (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000). In 1994, the United Democratic Front—comprised of the BNF, SDP, BWF, MELS, and a few others—was created to contest BDP. It fell apart before the election (ibid).

The Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) was created prior to the 1999 election. The BNF, BPP, BPU, UAP, and IFP joined together to contest the election as a unified front. Their slogan was “Time for Change”. Koma, of the BNF, was appointed president of BAM and a power struggle ensued as the smaller parties accused BAM of being nothing more than the BNF (Osei-Hwedie 2001). Much like previous attempts at opposition unity, the BNF and then BPU pulled out before the election, leaving BAM impotent. This alliance lasted approximately three months. Prior to the 2004 election, a fragile electoral alliance between BNF, BAM, and BPP but it fell apart. The BCP refused to join as party leaders reasoned that it stood a chance to defeat the BDP on its own (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). BAM, however, has remained a small party/movement and prior to the 2009 election, it joined with the BCP to form an electoral pact. Although a small alliance (it won only 1 seat in 2009), it has remained
largely in tact. During Fall 2011, leadership from the BMD, BNF and BCP had met several times in private to discuss the possibility of forming a new electoral pact in order to contest the BDP in 2014. Thus far, no agreement has been reached.

Campaigning

All of Botswana’s political parties have been criticized for their rudimentary approaches to electioneering (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000 7). Prior to and including the 1989 campaign, the use of freedom squares—discussions held in open-air markets—was the predominant method of campaigning (Nengwekhulu 1991). Face to face campaigning was also used, but a 1984 survey revealed that only 12% of respondents had been visited (Nengwekhulu 1991). During the 1989 election, the BDP mailed election materials to voters in Francistown (ibid). The BPP opposed this, claiming it amounted to bribery (ibid). The BNF almost exclusively used face-to-face campaign tactics until the 1980s when other parties, the BDP included, began to adopt this practice (Wiseman and Charlton 1995). A 1989 survey of campaigning in Botswana by the Democracy Research Project at the University of Botswana found that parties generally did not target specific groups for membership/voting, nor did they utilize available campaign strategies. In 1999, parties began to use billboards, calendars with photos of party leaders, ads on private radio Yarona FM (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000 11-12). It has also been alleged that the BDP allows elections to shape party in government behavior for approximately 2 years prior to elections as the government increases its public expenditures and the president and other politicians tour the country in anticipation of elections (Wiseman and Charlton 1995 326).
**Electoral Trends and Bases of Partisan Support over Time**

Some authors believe that vote choice is almost exclusively determined by party identification (Holm 1988; Nengwekhulu 1991; Mpabanga 2000). According to Charlton (1993), party loyalties have hardened to such an extent that campaigning has little to no effect on electoral outcomes (352). Molutsi and Tsie (1990) agree that campaigning does little to change vote intent, however they argue that most Batswana engage in retrospective voting, basing their vote choice on government’s previous record. Molomo (2000) seems to indirectly agree with this assessment, as he believes one of the major barriers to opposition success is their lack of a government record to campaign on. Others present a more nuanced picture of the voting calculus in Botswana: “it is a combination of rationality, party identification and loyalty which determine voting preferences of the electorate,” (Osei-Hwedie 2001 65).

There is a significant geographic split between BDP supporters and opposition supporters. Opposition parties tend to perform better in urban areas such as Gaborone and Francistown and in the constituencies of the North East such Okavango, Ngami, Maun, and Chobe (Polhemus 1983). The BDP has typically performed very well with rural voters (Molomo 1991; Osei-Hwedie 2001). Tables 4a through 4d support this assertion. Across all four waves of surveys, the BDP enjoys significantly more support from rural voters than urban voters while the opposite is true for opposition parties.

According to a survey conducted in the late 1990s, the following socio-economic factors were considered to be the most important in determining support for the BDP: age, gender, urban/rural setting, and education (Mpabanga 2000). Both the young (18-24) and the elderly (50 +) were more likely to support the BDP than opposition parties. Those
living in rural areas were more likely to support the BDP—64.9% of rural respondents versus 54.8% of urban respondents preferred the BDP (ibid). The less educated were less likely to support the BDP; however, as level of education increased so did support for the BCP. Levels of support for the BNF were fairly consistent across education levels. Finally, women (who make up a majority of the voting population) were overwhelmingly more likely than men to support the BDP than opposition parties (65.8% versus 51.9%) (ibid). Mpabanga (2000) attributes women's conservatism as an indicator that they are less frequently taking their voting cues from their fathers and husbands and more often voting their own preferences (62-63). She also argues that education is highly correlated with opposition party support as "these parties are usually associated with complex ideologies that make sense only to a few, highly educated and relatively young, people," (64). She concludes that that SES model of voting is most appropriate to explain Batswana voting behavior as social characteristics heavily influence voting decisions.

Survey data from the early 2000s supports much of what Mpabanga asserts. Tables 4a through 4d report the results from four waves of Afrobarometer surveys conducted from 1999 to 2008 in Botswana.² Significant difference in partisan support can be found between men and women, age groups, and level of education. The average BDP supporter is female, in her 40's, and less educated than opposition supporters and non-partisans. This is a trend that generally holds across four waves of surveys across almost 10 years. Interestingly, the average BDP supporter is not necessarily more likely have a

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² The Afrobarometer survey is a large-scale survey of public attitudes and opinions from citizens of 21 different African countries. It is conducted every two to four years. The number of respondents from each country varies based on population but each round includes responses from 1200 Batswana.
favorable assessment of the economy than opposition supporters and non-partisans across the four waves. This relationship varies from year to year.

The distribution of partisans as a percentage of the survey mirrors the ultimate partisan breakdown of national level election results. Approximately 45% of respondents report feeling close to the BDP through Rounds 1, 2 and 3. Support for the opposition parties increases and decreases in roughly the same patterns found in the general electorate. The 2008 survey reports the following breakdown of partisan supporters: BDP (55%); BNF (13%); BCP (8%); other (3%); non-partisan (22%).

Tables 4a through 4d: Bases of Partisan Support in Botswana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4a. 1999</th>
<th>BDP Supporters</th>
<th>Opposition Supporters</th>
<th>Non partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (average)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Secondary or higher)</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with the Economy (S or VS)</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n 532 (44.3%) 266 (22.1%) 55 (4.6%) 55 (4.6%) 277 (23.1%)

Source: Afrobarometer Round 1, 1999

3 In Afrobarometer Round 1, the questionnaire asked: “At the moment, are you dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, or satisfied with economic conditions in [Botswana]? In Rounds 2, 3 and 4, the question was worded differently. “In general, how would you describe: the present economic conditions of the country? 1. Very bad, 2. Fairly bad, 3. Neither good nor bad, 4. Fairly good, 5. Very good.”
### 4b. 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BDP Supporters</th>
<th>Opposition Supporters</th>
<th>Non partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>BCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (average)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Secondary or higher)</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe Current Economy (FG or VG)</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>522 (43.5%)</td>
<td>110 (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2, 2003

### 4c. 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BDP Supporters</th>
<th>Opposition Supporters</th>
<th>Non partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>BCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>44.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (average)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Secondary or higher)</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe Current Economy (FG or VG)</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>550 (45.8%)</td>
<td>256 (21.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3, 2005
4d. 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BDP Supporters</th>
<th>Opposition Supporters</th>
<th>Non partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (average)</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>40.67</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Secondary or higher)</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe Current Economy (S or VS)</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>660 (55.0%)</td>
<td>155 (12.9%)</td>
<td>85 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Round 4, 2008

Party elites also emphasize the role of age and education as factors determining partisan support. Taolo Lucas (Secretary General of the BCP), Dumelang Saleshando (President of the BCP; MP for Gaborone Central) and Gibson Nshimwe (MP for Chobe—BCP) all emphasized the role of young, educated voters in accounting for recent BCP electoral successes (Personal Interviews, December 2009). Saleshando, specifically noted the importance of new/first time voters in his 2004 victory over BDP incumbent Margaret Nasha (Personal Interview, December 2009). The president of the BNF, Otsewetse Moupo, however, focuses on the role of class divisions in determining Botswana partisan attachments. He believes that the BNF draws significant support from the lower classes while the BDP appeals to upper class voters (Personal Interview, December 2009).
Turnout

Voter turnout in Botswana has been, historically, very low. During the first election in 1965, turnout was estimated at approximately 75% of the voting age population; this decreased to 54.9% in 1969, and a paltry 32% in 1974 (Parsons 1977 642). Turnout tends to increase when a new president is to be elected as in 1965 and 1984 (Charlton 1993). Mpabanga (2000) estimates that between 1965 and 1999, turnout of the entire voting age population was close to 45%, ranging from a high of 54.6% in 1984 to a low of 30.7% in 1974. She identifies the following factors as contributing to the low levels of voter participation in Botswana: a weak civil society; the use of mandatory National Identity Cards (O Mang) in order to cast a ballot at a polling station; party fragmentation; disinterest of young voters; and long lines at polling stations.

A study conducted by the Democracy Research Project at the University of Botswana and commissioned by the IEC found four major reasons for voter apathy, and subsequently, low voter turnout: the disproportionality of the electoral system; the lack of funding of opposition parties; the lack of term limits for politicians; and the exclusion of civil servants from holding elected office (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). As a result, the IEC has spent significant resources to increase voter education as a means of combating voter apathy. Between April 1998 and November 1999—the period just prior to the election—the IEC spent approximately P19 million on various voter education programs (ibid 15).
Explanations for Dominance

There are several different explanations that have been put forth to explain the dominance of the BDP in Botswana's elections. Some focus on the resource advantages of the incumbent BDP to explain its 47 years in office. Others believe that the fragmentation and lack of cooperation amongst opposition parties contribute to the BDP's successes. To some, the BDP's 10 electoral victories are a product of the party's significant economic successes over the years. Still others argue that the electoral system plays a significant role in explaining why opposition parties have failed to win an electoral majority.

According to Polhemus (1983), the success of the BDP can be attributed to several factors including: the backing of important chiefs and the British prior to the 1965 election; its initial victory in 1965 which allowed it to be seen as the party that led Botswana to independence; and its resources due to incumbency which gives the BDP access to the media and a proven record to run on. His argument is path dependent and begins with the BDP's success in 1965 which afforded the party the resources and the organs of government to perpetuate its rule.

In Botswana, there is no provision for public financing of political parties. This has resulted in an extreme imbalance in party resources and campaign spending between the ruling party and the opposition parties. The opposition has, for years, been lobbying for the government to fund elections, but thus far there has been no sign that the BDP is inclined to support this (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). Additionally, financial support for the BDP has come from outside donors (Othogile 1991:26). In 1988, during the corruption trial of a former deputy executive secretary of the BDP, it was revealed
that the Friedrich Erbert Foundations from West Germany had donated to the BDP (Molomo 1991). Prior to the 1999 election, the BPD received P 2.4 million from undisclosed international source (Molomo 2000b 78). This money was reportedly used to purchase vehicles for use in campaigning across the country (Osei-Hwedie 2001). To be fair, the Botswana Guardian reported that the BNF received approximately P3 million from external sources for the 1999 campaign, and prior to the 1994 campaign, was given several cars to help with their transportation issues (ibid.).

Furthermore, the BDP has, over the years, proved itself flexible in responding to the demands of the electorate. Osei-Hwedie (ibid.) believes that the BDP has taken into account much of what the opposition suggests—especially suggestions from the BNF—and this has helped them to maintain power. She cites as evidence the reduction in voting age from 21 to 18 (long advocated by the BNF) and the introduction of absentee ballots as evidence that the BDP has listened to the BNF. Charlton (1993) believes the BDP has been able to maintain the majority support of the electorate by adopting a primary system and by focusing on various development plans. The BDP also increases government expenditures in the period before elections (Wiseman and Charlton 1995). The government of Botswana has been intensely focused on development. Its development budget increased from R 3.7 million in 1966/67 to R 33.1 million in 1975/76; however, much of this budget was allocated to urban areas to the neglect of rural areas that suggests that the party was not using its resources to reward its rural party supporters (Parsons 1977 641-642).

The disorganization of the opposition and its collective lack of resources have also played a role in reinforcing the dominance of the BDP. Until 1979, no opposition
party had the resources to print its own manifesto (Polhemus 1983). Prior to the 1989 election, the BNF solicited funds from those attending freedom squares (Molutsi 1991). The use of freedom squares, borrowed from the same South African practice, was first used by the BPP prior to independence (Charlton 1993). As of 2001, the BDP was the only party with branches in all constituencies; the only party that has had the resources to print new manifestos prior to each election; and has, in the past, provided transportation to the polls for its supporters (Osei-Hwedie 2001 60). Until 2001, the BCP had no party headquarters (ibid 62).

According to Osei-Hwedie (2001), due to the freeness and fairness of elections and the lack of restrictions placed upon opposition parties, the collective failures of the opposition parties are largely their own. (59). the situation had improved somewhat by 2004. According to Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie (2005), the sheer number of billboards and poster printed by the opposition suggested that the opposition parties had significantly more funding in 2004 than in previous elections (19). Additionally, the BDP, BCP, the Pact, and the NDF were all able to print manifestos for the election (ibid 19). To put this in perspective, prior to 1999 no opposition party had the resources to print its own manifesto (ibid 19).

To Mokopakgosi and Molomo (2000), the BDP’s dominance can be understood as a product of incumbency as the government has control of state-run media, vast appointment powers. The opposition has alleged over the years that the state-owned media either negatively reports on them or does not report on them at all (Molomo 1991). There is also evidence that the government of Botswana has “punished” the independent
media by refusing to advertise with them due to previous criticisms of the government (Molutsi 2005).

In order to examine if there is a media bias in reporting on Botswana’s election, I analyzed all news stories in Botswana’s largest newspaper, the Daily News. It is one of Botswana’s two daily newspapers (Mmegi is the other daily newspaper). It has the highest circulation in Botswana (Thapisa & Megwa, 2002). As it is owned by the state, if there is a media bias present in Botswana, it would be evident in Daily News coverage.

I examined all news stories in the Daily News from the period beginning September 14th and ending November 16th. This time period roughly covers one month prior to the 2009 election (held on October 16, 2009) and one month after the election. I recorded the percentage of news stories that mentioned the words “government,” “BDP,” “BCP,” “BNF,” and “opposition.” These categories were not mutually exclusive and some stories mentioned all of these words while some mentioned none of these words.

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. While it is true that the newspaper reported significantly more stories on the government, in general, in terms of election stories, there is no difference in the frequency with which the Daily News reported on the BDP (10.9%) and on the opposition parties (10.8%) in the month prior to the election. If the BDP was, in fact, pushing for a bias in reporting during this period, I can find no evidence of this. Additionally, during the period after the election, there is also evidence that the government-owned newspaper favors the BDP over the opposition parties in its frequency of reporting on the activities of the ruling and opposition parties.
Table 5: Newspaper Analysis—Percentage of Stories that Mention the Government, BDP, and Opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent News Stories that Mention the Government</th>
<th>Percent News Stories that Mention the BDP</th>
<th>Percent News Stories that Mention the Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month Prior to Election</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month After Election</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Daily News articles, September 2009 through November 2009

Finally, some authors such as Maudeni (2005) have argued that Botswana’s electoral system contributes heavily to the BDP’s dominance. Plurality electoral systems are notoriously disproportionate (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). For example, the BDP won 79% of seats in the National Assembly while receiving 53% of the national vote. The BNF won 10% of the seats in the National Assembly while receiving 22% of the national vote. As such, the first-past-the-post electoral system is very unpopular with the opposition. There have been calls for years from opposition parties to reform the electoral system and to adopt either proportional representation or a hybrid system due to the inherent unfairness of plurality rules (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005).

Conclusion

Botswana is an anomalous case in many respects. It has experienced peace and stability during an era where both were exceptional in sub-Saharan Africa. It has also enjoyed consistent economic growth since the late 1960s and is now one of the wealthiest
countries in terms of per capita income in Africa. It has held 10 multiparty elections that observers have deemed free and fair. Each election has returned the BDP to office with a supra-majority of legislative seats. Additionally, there are significant protections in place for civil and political liberties. In sum, it is a thriving democracy with one caveat—there has been no alternation in power between the ruling party and any opposition parties. In order to better understand elections that produce dominant party rule in an otherwise democratic system, it is necessary that we take a closer look at the functioning of these elections.
Chapter 3: You Have to Know Where to Look in Order to Find It: Competition in a Dominant Party System

Introduction

Given that many of sub-Saharan Africa’s democracies are currently operating under or on the verge of dominant party rule, it is of the utmost importance that we fully understand the functioning of elections under these types of systems. Dominant party rule may mean a lack of competition at all stages and phases of the electoral process; it may mean limited or restricted competition; it may be that vibrant competition can be found at micro-levels; or it may be that competition and deliberation in dominant party systems are found in other stages of the electoral process—the primary phase or in nomination decisions, for example. The fact that we do not know with any measure of certainty which of the above is the case suggests further research on this topic is warranted.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to examine in detail the nature of elections under Botswana’s dominant party system. A closer look at the competitiveness of Botswana’s elections reveals a more complex picture than previous research has been able to acknowledge. When one looks at elections at the micro-level—examining the competitiveness of elections across constituencies and rates of legislator turnover—one finds significant levels of competition in Botswana and these levels have been increasing over time.

The reasons we care about the quality of democracy and the competitiveness of elections have much to do with the theoretical implications of competition. Many researchers believe that competition forces politicians and political parties to act responsively to the electorate (Downs 1957; Dahl 1971; Strom 1990; Powell 2000).
Furthermore, when government fails to respond effectively, elections provide the citizenry with a mechanism to hold elected officials accountable and turn them out of office. In and of itself, turnover does not signify competitiveness but it does represent voter displeasure and may induce responsiveness from new legislators in much the same way that a highly competitive contest that returns an incumbent to office would. For these two specific reasons—responsiveness and accountability—we care about the quality of elections and the outcomes they produce. It has been argued that dominant party systems lack accountability (Bogaards 2000) and responsiveness (Stasavage 2005) thus it is with these two features of competitive elections in mind that I will undertake to scrutinize elections in Botswana.

This type of analysis is limited to countries that use first-past-the-post, or plurality, electoral rules for two reasons: one theoretical and one methodological. First, the nature of competition differs significantly between plurality and proportional electoral systems. Under plurality rules, there is a winner-take-all mentality as there is only one winner per constituency. The top vote getter is awarded the seat. The second top vote getter receives nothing. Under proportional representation, however, parties are awarded seats based on the percent of the vote they receive and the number of seats available in a given district or constituency. There is not a single “winner” and “loser” per se, as all parties that receive a minimum threshold of votes will be awarded legislative seats based on the proportion of votes that they have received. Second, there are immeasurable facets of competition under proportional representation systems. According to Blais and Lago (2009), there are no studies that have measured competitiveness at the constituency level in proportional representation systems. In addition, with regards to closed-list
proportional representation systems (the only type of PR system found in sub-Saharan Africa), turnover is determined by the party when compiling their list and is removed from the voter's hands. This means that there is no obvious way to calculate turnover and incumbency under closed-list proportional representation systems. It also means that the accountability mechanism differs substantially between the two types of systems.

This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I outline the nature of the debate over the compatibility of democracy and dominant party systems. I then turn to the political history of Botswana in order to demonstrate the nature of elections over time under a dominant party system. After looking at the broad, national-level trends with regards to both interparty and intraparty competition, I disaggregate electoral outcomes to exploit the variation at the sub-national level by calculating the margin of victory between the first and second top vote getters and averaging this across constituencies to get a clearer picture of the electoral environment in Botswana. I am able to calculate the number of constituencies that can be considered competitive and examine this trend over time. I am also able to address the accountability of elections by examining rates of incumbency and turnover across several elections. Finally, I am able to place electoral outcomes in a comparative perspective by looking at elections in other African democracies. By doing so, I am able to demonstrate the diversity of micro-level electoral outcomes under both dominant and multiparty systems. The findings of this paper have significant implications for the ways in which researchers examine electoral outcomes across different party systems.
Dominant Party Systems and Democracy: The Disagreement

Due to the lack of alternation between parties, some theorists argue that dominant party systems, regardless of the quality of elections, cannot and should not be considered democratic. (Huntington 1991; Przeworski et al. 2000; Levitsky and Way 2010). Przeworski (1991) defines democracy as “a system in which parties lose elections,” (10). To him, in the absence of a gracious defeat and a peaceful turnover of political power as the result of an electoral loss, there is no evidence that parties in power will accept defeat. It may be the case that when faced with a serious electoral defeat, the party in power will resort to extra-judicial and decidedly undemocratic means to stay in office. However, once a ruling party does concede power at least once, then we have sufficient evidence of the acceptance of democratic norms and can thus determine if a country is democratic.

In sum, when discussing and classifying dominant party systems, the above authors are broadly grouping divergent electoral outcomes based solely on which party controls government—specifically, if a single party controls government without alternation or rotation to another party. They are not directly speaking to the competitiveness of elections or the magnitude of electoral victories, something that Przeworski et al. (2000) argue is a key component of democracy. They are explicitly not taking into account whether electoral pressures are placed upon dominant parties or whether or not accountability and/or responsiveness are occurring. They are simply noting who controls the national government apparatus.

Others argue that it is not the party system that determines whether a regime is democratic or autocratic but rather the presence of democratic procedures and individual protections. Dahl (1989) outlines seven characteristics of a polyarchy—his alternative, all
encompassing term for democracy. Dahl's definition of polyarchy incorporates both
democratic procedures (free and fair elections) and the protection of civil liberties
including the freedoms of expression, press, and association. In a previous work, Dahl
and Lindblom (1953) specifically address whether electoral alternation is a requirement
for a country to be considered democratic. They conclude that frequent party alternation
may, in fact, lead to political instability and that many polyarchies follow the US model
of extended majority party rule until a seismic shift in voting behavior occurs in the
electorate and the minority party takes over control of government (301). Arian and
Barnes (1974) argue that dominant party systems produced by free and fair elections
should be considered democratic as they “mobiliz[e] the modal citizens of a society,” and
can provide considerable political stability in both newly democratizing countries and in
more mature democracies such as Italy and Israel (593).

The debate over whether a dominant party system can or should be considered
democratic centers on whether one adopts a procedural or substantive definition of
democracy. The procedural definition includes only the presence of democratic
institutions (namely, elections) whereas the substantive approach incorporates the
outcomes produced by democratic institutions (namely, party alternation) as part of the
definition. By looking at electoral outcomes from a different perspective, this chapter
offers an approach that might help shed light on this debate. Examining electoral
competitiveness and turnover combines the procedural and substantive approaches by
describing in detail the nature of elections but does not place proscriptions on aggregate
outcomes that can be affected by factors such as electoral system and geographic
concentration of partisans. Dominant party rule can be produced by elections in which
competition is heavily restricted and elections which are widely deemed as free and fair thus by looking at constituency-level competitiveness we are better able to speak to the democratic quality of elections than if we were to focus solely on party alternation at the national level.

_Elections in Botswana: A Closer Look_

It is true that Botswana’s political landscape has been dominated by the BDP, but the dominance of BDP seat share in parliament only tells part of the story. Electoral outcomes in Botswana are considerably more complicated. An examination of the percentage of the vote each party receives demonstrates this. There has been a steady decline in percent of vote the BDP has received since 1979 (See Figure 1). The BDP received over 75 percent of all votes cast in 1979, 68 percent in 1984 and 65 percent in 1989. In 1994, BDP support dropped precipitously to 53 percent. Vote support for the BDP has remained close to 50 per cent since. However, due to the disproportionality associated with first-past-the-post electoral rules, the BDP has won anywhere from 68 to 83 percent of the seats in the National Assembly while polling the support of approximately 50 percent of the voters.
While demonstrating the declining support for the BDP in terms of national vote totals, the above analysis, however, is still focusing on macro-level electoral trends. National level election returns—the product of several simultaneous constituency-level elections—do not speak to the competitiveness of elections at the constituency level. Furthermore, since the 1980s the major parties in Botswana have used primaries in order to determine candidate nominations, which introduces a new manner of competition in Botswana’s elections. Primaries—internal elections held within a party—provide another opportunity to create competition within a political system. Additionally, both the BDP and BNF have disparate groups, or factions, which vie for control of the party and further complicate the picture. Molomo (2000) argues that the majority of partisan competition
in Botswana is, in fact, intraparty competition. Therefore, the following sections examine competition from multiple angles—intraparty, interparty, and across constituencies.

**Intraparty Competition and Factionalism**

Primaries were instituted in the 1980s for the BDP and the BNF (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). The BDP held its first primaries prior to the 1984 election, while the BNF adopted primaries in anticipation of the 1989 election. According to Charlton (1995), anticipating increased competition from opposition parties, the BDP instituted a primary system in order to ensure that candidates “would remain responsive to their increasingly demanding electorates.” (358). Both the BDP and BNF have argued that the introduction of primaries has been a primary contributor to the factionalism that each party has experienced (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000).

Until changes implemented prior to the 2004 election, the primary process in the BDP was non-binding. The Central Committee retained the exclusive right to select candidates and used the primary results as merely a guideline (ibid. 15). The primary season was particularly contentious after the introduction of the BDP’s new primary system, *Bulela Ditswe* (literally, open to it all) in 2003 which allowed all party members to participate. Several sitting BDP MPs were defeated in the primary (Sebudubudu 2004). The BNF held its own primaries which also saw a few sitting MP’s defeated as well (ibid.).

Related to the primary system (and perhaps a product of it as well), factionalism within political parties represents yet another form of informal competitiveness. In the early 1980s significant problems associated with factionalism in the BDP began to
emerge. A new faction of the party led by Daniel K. Kwelagobe argued that the BDP should more aggressively court the electorate through grassroots campaigning and an increased focus on constituency service (Charlton 1993 358). The older, more traditional faction (known as the Merafthe faction) believed that the Party could easily campaign on previous accomplishments. Two explosive reports released by the government contributed greatly to this division. The Kgabo Report, released in 1991, exposed land allocation irregularities in Mogoditshane and led to resignation of two ministers including Kwelagobe. The Christie Report, released one year later in 1992, implicated another two ministers from the Kwelagobe faction. Consequently, the Kwelagobe faction believed that the Merafthe faction was behind both investigations and the findings of corruption. According to Mokopakgosi & Molomo, the primaries held before the 1994 general elections were between candidates “sponsored along this great divide,” (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000 12).

It has been alleged that party elites manipulated the 1997 elections to the party's Central Committee in order to accommodate the warring factions within the party (Molomo 2000). The 1997 Schlemmer Report argued that factionalism caused the electoral decline of 1994 and that the party should bring in a new leader to unify the party (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000). The BDP selected Ian Khama to lead the party. Again in 2003, the BDP experienced intense factionalism and accusations by members that the BDP Secretariat was favoring some candidates over others (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005).

There are currently two distinct factions within the BDP borne out of the previous factions: the A-Team, of which Ian Khama is a member, and the Barata-phati, of which
Daniel Kwelagobe and current acting Secretary General Wynter Mmolotsi are members. Numerous news reports in the days leading up to and after the 2009 election discussed the politicking that was occurring between the two factions. Members of the Barata-phati faction had accused the President of campaigning on behalf of A-Team candidates and neglecting their candidates (Ganetsang 2009). President Ian Khama’s appointment of Pono Moatlhodi as deputy speaker of parliament after the election was considered a politically shrewd move to address some of the concerns of the Barata-phati as Moatlhodi is a particularly outspoken member of the Barata-phati faction (Owino 2009). His appointment may have also been motivated by the fact that the Barata-phati won control of Francistown, Botswana’s second largest city behind the capitol Gaborone (‘Elections are Over’ 2009). In April 2010, the Barata-phati faction formally announced its split from the BDP and formed the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD).

As is evidenced by the tremendous number of splinter parties formed as offshoots of the BNF (at least seven splinter parties including the BCP), it should be obvious that the BNF has struggled over the years with factionalism. There has been a long standing schism in the BNF between true socialist and social democrats which came to a head in 1997. Ideological divisions between the socialists and traditionalists are to blame for much of the fracturing that the BNF has experienced (Osei-Hwedie 2001). The departure and subsequent formation of the BCP has, to some extent, abated the extreme factionalism the BNF experienced in the 1990s. There are, however, still some antagonisms between the current president of the BNF, Otsweletse Moupo, and various members. He has, in fact, expelled several members in recent years.
**Interparty Competition**

Thus far the discussion of elections has focused still on trends at the national level. When the national election returns are disaggregated, we can examine the competitiveness of parties within and across Botswana’s constituencies. As Table 6 reports, the average margin of victory between the first and second top vote-getters has been decreasing over time: from 38.6 percent in 1989 to 20.2 percent in this most recent election in 2009. In some constituencies, the BDP wins by a huge and dominant margin of victory—upwards of 85 percent in Tswapong South (a notorious strong-hold of the BDP located in Central Botswana) in 1989. In other constituencies, the races are much closer. During the same election, the BDP won the constituencies of Tati East and Tati West by less than five percent. Turning to the 2009 election, the BDP won the constituencies of Serowe North East and Serowe North West by margins of 72 percent and 67 percent, respectively. Other constituencies such as Ngami, Gaborone North, and South East North were won by margins of less than three percent.

The number of competitive constituencies has also been increasing over time. For the purposes of this paper, I consider constituencies with a margin of victory equal to or less than 10 per cent to be competitive. A margin of victory in this range represents an election that is difficult to predict with any certainty prior to the election and one in which a future electoral victory is by no means guaranteed. Researchers who study American politics typically use a 10 per cent or 20 per cent threshold, or one that is comparable (i.e., 55 per cent of the total vote or less, 60 per cent of the total vote or less) to denote a competitive election (Ray and Havick 1981; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991; Hirsch 2003).
Over time, the number of competitive constituencies in Botswana has dramatically increased. Whereas in 1989, only 17.5 per cent of constituencies could be considered competitive (i.e., winning by a margin of equal to or less than 10 per cent), in 2009 roughly 42 per cent of constituencies were won by a competitive margin. When we compare the number of competitive elections in Botswana to those typically found in more developed and consolidated democracies such as the United States (typically 10 to 20 per cent of constituencies are competitive), Botswana appears to have better-than-average levels of competitive elections.\(^4\)

**Table 6: Competitiveness of Legislative Elections in Botswana by Constituency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Percent Constituencies Won By BDP</th>
<th>National Margin of Victory</th>
<th>Constituency Avg. Margin of Victory</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Percent Competitive Constituencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>.97% to 85%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2.6% to 75%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>.13% to 87%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>.95% to 76%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>.05% to 72%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data taken from election reports issued by the Botswana Independent Electoral Commission.

\(^4\) The competitiveness of elections at the constituency level may also be mirrored at the local council level. The Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) released an analysis of the 2004 elections in Botswana in which the authors state that opposition parties generally fare well at the local council level and, in fact, often win more seats in urban areas than does the BDP, but more data analysis is required before any conclusions can be made with authority.
In order to place the competitiveness of Botswana’s elections in a broader context, it is necessary to examine micro-level competitiveness across several other countries. As discussed above, due to the nature of competition and the measures used, I am only able to compare across countries with similar electoral systems; namely, those that use plurality rules or first-past-the-post electoral systems. There were a few criteria used in selecting the cases for analysis including the freeness and fairness of elections and the use of plurality electoral rules. Several countries (Benin, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal) all use some version of proportional representation. Small island countries with small populations (Cape Verde; Seychelles) were also excluded from the sample. Finally, data availability precluded Madagascar and Malawi. I also opted to not focus only on those countries designated as “free” by Freedom House but also included the results from countries designated as “partly free”. The purpose of examining these cases is to get a fuller understanding of how competitive elections are in different types of regimes.

Tanzania, which holds elections in which opposition parties are legally allowed to run but have no reasonable expectation of electoral success—has an average margin of victory of approximately 50 percent compared to Botswana’s 20.2 percent average margin of victory (see Table 7). Looking at the percentage of competitive constituencies, it also has significantly fewer competitive constituencies (3.1 percent) than Botswana (42.1 percent). Botswana also outperforms Lesotho, another country considered to have a dominant party system.

Ghana, a two-party system which has experienced party alternation at the national level between the National Democratic Conference (NDC) and the National People’s Party (NPP) as a result of the 2000 election, experienced a similar average margin of
victory to Botswana but almost half as many competitive constituencies. Zambia, which experienced alternation in power from UNIP to MMD rule as a result of its first democratic elections in 1991, exhibits a slightly higher average margin of victory (30.8 percent) and fewer competitive constituencies (26 percent).

Table 7: Competitiveness of Elections across Six sub-Saharan African Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20.20%</td>
<td>54.15%</td>
<td>42.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1.56%</td>
<td>24.52%</td>
<td>57.71%</td>
<td>35.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>36.87%</td>
<td>62.15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>26.38%</td>
<td>50.89%</td>
<td>32.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>53.99%</td>
<td>67.92%</td>
<td>21.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>49.03%</td>
<td>72.42%</td>
<td>3.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>30.81%</td>
<td>59.27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1: During the country's tenure of democracy, has alternation occurred at the national level?  
2: Calculated by subtracting the percent of vote the top vote-getter received minus the percent of vote the second top-voter getter received. This is the average across all constituencies of a given country.  
3: Percent of vote the winning candidate received averaged across all constituencies of a given country.  
4: Percent of all constituencies that can be considered competitive where competitive is operationalized as a margin of victory that is less than or equal to 10 per cent.  
5: Kenya's 2007 election was marred by significant violence and allegations of vote rigging.  
6: Lesotho adopted a mixed member electoral system after the 1999 election. These figures are based on data from the constituencies that used the plurality electoral system.
Kenya, rated as partly free, is an interesting case. The 2002 elections were considered relatively free and fair with an average margin of victory across constituencies of 36.9 percent and approximately half (20 percent) the competitive constituencies as Botswana. However, the 2007 elections, which were marred by significant post-electoral violence and allegations of vote rigging (and, ultimately resulted in the adoption of a new constitution and new electoral laws) were seemingly more competitive judging by the percentage of competitive constituencies (32.9%). However, it is possible that this number would have been even higher had vote rigging and electoral violence not occurred. Nonetheless, at the very least, we can observe that competitiveness of elections increased from 2002 to 2007.

According to average Polity IV scores, one of the most frequently cited measures of democracy, Tanzania is reported to be an autocratic regime, Kenya and Zambia are considered to be marginal cases which may or may not be moving toward democracy while Botswana, Lesotho and Ghana are all considered to be democratic. Freedom House scores also support this assessment: Botswana has been consistently rated Free since 1974; Ghana since 2000. Tanzania has been rated Partly Free during this entire time period. Lesotho, Kenya, and Zambia have gone back and forth between Free and Party Free since 2000. Thus, there appears to be no obvious connection between regime type, competitiveness and party system. The only tentative conclusion that could be drawn is based on the stability or regime tenure competitiveness appears to be a trend that increases over time, regardless of party system type.
Incumbency and Turnover

Moreover, it remains to be seen the way in which incumbency advantage plays out in Botswana. For example, there was considerable legislator turnover between Botswana's 1994 and 1999 elections. In slightly more than 50 percent of the constituencies, elections produced a new legislator. In only sixteen of the forty constituencies, did a legislator win both the 1994 and 1999 elections. After the introduction of 17 new constituencies for the 2004 election, of the 16 previous incumbents, 7 retained their seats in the 2004 election, 3 lost outright, and 6 legislative incumbents chose not to run again. So in a dominant party system, only 7 members out of 57 had served since at least 1994. In the 2009 election, approximately 46 percent of constituencies experienced legislator turnover. There is some evidence that incumbency was also low in earlier elections. As of 1993, MPs had served an average of 11.7 years (or slightly more than two terms) in office (Charlton 1993). These figures indicate high levels of turnover and a lower rate of incumbency than is seen in the more established two party and multiparty democracies (Mayhew 1974; Cox and Katz 1996).

Figure 2 shows the percentage of incumbents returned to office during each election from 1974 to 2009. There is significantly more turnover and a lower rate of incumbency than is typically seen in the more established two party and multiparty democracies (Cox and Katz 1996). In the United States, for example, incumbents win, on average, anywhere from 80 to 90 percent of elections (Abramowitz and Gunning 2006). Compare this to the approximately 56 percent incumbency rate found in the Botswana's 2009 election. Furthermore, there has been a marked decline in the number of BDP and opposition party incumbents that have served in the National Assembly since 1974. This
runs counter to much of the findings on incumbency advantage in US elections, which has been steadily increasing over the years (Cox and Katz 1996).

**Figure 2: Turnover and Incumbency in Botswana**

Composition of Botswana National Assembly by Incumbents and New Legislators, 1974 - 2009

One can also point out significant defeats of incumbent candidates in Botswana’s elections. During the 1994 election, three senior cabinet members were defeated: Archie Mogwe (Mineral Resources and Water Affairs); Kebathlamang Morake (Agriculture); and Ray Molomo (Education) (Wiseman and Charlton 1995). In the 2009 election, roughly 20 per cent of constituencies (11) saw an incumbent legislator defeated in the election. This includes both BDP and opposition party legislators.
These figures for Botswana can be compared to incumbency and turnover levels in Ghana, a country considered to be democratic in the procedural sense of the definition due to the turnover of political power from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) as a result of the 2000 election. The levels of incumbent re-election and defeat produced by each respective country’s most recent election are virtually the same (see Table 8). The percentage of new legislators elected to office is also virtually the same. Thus, the accountability mechanism in Botswana’s appears to be operating much the same as the accountability mechanism in a more “traditionally” defined democracy.

Table 8: Incumbency and Turnover in Botswana and Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Incumbents Re-Elected</th>
<th>Incumbents Defeated</th>
<th>New Legislators*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana—2009</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana—2008</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Meaning no incumbents ran for office

There is a difference, however, in the number and percentage of competitive elections in Botswana and Ghana based on which party (ruling or opposition) the ultimate victor came from. Table 9 reports the percentage of competitive victories for ruling parties and opposition parties in Botswana and Ghana. Ruling parties in both countries experienced virtually the same percentage of competitive elections, 39% in the case of Ghana and 38% in the case of Botswana. But in Botswana, 83% of opposition victories in 2009 were competitive compared to 32% in Ghana’s 2008 election. This suggests that
opposition parties in Botswana have far fewer “safe” constituencies and must work considerably harder to win elections.

**Table 9: Percentage of Competitive Victories by Ruling Party/Opposition Party in Botswana and Ghana***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ruling Party</th>
<th>Opposition Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competitive Victories</strong></td>
<td>39% (NDC—GHANA)</td>
<td>38% (BDP—BOTSWANA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&lt;10%)</td>
<td>32% (NPP—GHANA)</td>
<td>83% (Opp—BOTSWANA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non Competitive Victories</strong></td>
<td>61% (NDC—GHANA)</td>
<td>62% (BDP—BOTSWANA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&gt;10%)</td>
<td>68% (NPP—GHANA)</td>
<td>17% (Opp—BOTSWANA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In Ghana, the NDC won the 2004 election making them the ruling party going into the 2008 election. The NPP subsequently won the 2008 election.

Party-level incumbency in Botswana adheres to more traditional understandings of electoral behavior. In legislative elections held in 1994 and 1999, in 32 of the 40 constituencies, the same party won both elections. Due to the increase in constituencies, it is difficult to apply with any certainty the party level incumbency to the 2004 elections. Roughly speaking, 13 of the 40 constituencies experienced party alternation from election to election. The majority, however, saw one party—that is not to say one individual legislator—win all three successive elections. Between the 2004 and 2009 elections, 22 per cent of constituencies (or 13 out of 57) experienced party alternation.

I was able to calculate incumbency advantage rates using Gelman & King’s (1990) formula in which they define incumbency advantage as “the vote proportion gained by a party due to running an incumbent candidate in a district election,” (1153). Their formula incorporates both the effect of the personal advantage afforded an incumbent candidate and the effect of the partisan advantage due to incumbent candidates generally being of higher quality than open seat candidates. Their equation is as follows:
\[ E(v2) = a + B_1V_1 + B_2V_2 + B_3R_2*P_2 \]

where \( V_1 \) = the per cent of vote received by one party (in this case the BDP) in time \( t_1 \),
\( V_2 \) = the per cent of vote received by one party (in this case the BDP) in time \( t_2 \),
\( P_2 \) = 1 if the BDP wins election 1, and -1 if an opposition party wins,
and \( R_2 \) = 1 if a BDP incumbent runs for election, 0 if no incumbent runs, and -1 if an opposition party incumbent runs.

The regression results for the above equation can be found in Table 10 for each election year from 1974 until 2009. In some years (1979, 1989, and 1999) there were no significant incumbency advantages. In the years that incumbency was found to be significant, it demonstrates a noticeable decreasing trend over time. In the most recent election, the incumbency advantage associated with the BDP was approximately 2.8 percentage points, down from 10.5 per cent in 1974. Again, the US literature on incumbency advantage reports the opposite finding—that incumbency advantage has been increasing over time (Cox and Katz 2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Effect of BDP</th>
<th>Effect of Individual Legislator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>10.55</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>-9.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Results based on linear regression estimates.
**Cells with -- indicate insignificant findings.
Conclusion

The above examination of Botswana’s elections demonstrates that there is more competition and turnover produced by a dominant party system than might otherwise be expected. There is evidence of significant interparty and intraparty competition. Furthermore, the competitiveness of elections has been steadily increasing overtime and the number of incumbent legislators has been decreasing. Both of these are desirable trends and both suggest a deepening of democracy in Botswana. When compared to other sub-Saharan African democracies, elections in Botswana are substantially more competitive than those of its dominant party counterparts (Lesotho, Zambia and Tanzania) and marginally more competitive than a two-party democratic system (Ghana). Additionally, the level of legislator turnover in Botswana is roughly equivalent to that found in Ghana.

There are two main reasons why we care about competitiveness and turnover produced by democratic elections: responsiveness and accountability. As of the most recent election in 2009, almost one-half of Botswana’s constituencies experienced competitive elections where the margin of victory was within a relatively tight range that suggests a relatively tight race. The competitiveness of elections at the constituency level should induce responsiveness of legislators. As the editor of the Botswana Gazette noted shortly after the election: “For those who won with narrow margins maybe it’s a big signal of ‘displeasure’ by the people and you have to harness your modus operandi to win the trust of the electorate for 2014!” (“Elections are Over” 2009).

With regards to turnover, there are signs that this is also occurring. In the most recent election, incumbent legislators were defeated approximately 20 per cent of the
time. Turnover as the result of incumbent defeat represents, in its purest form, the accountability mechanism of elections. This turnover is in addition to the turnover that is produced by the primary system. Thus, it seems that a “dominant party system” is approximating the kinds of democratic outcomes that, theoretically, signify substantive democracy.

There are two conclusions of the above analysis that have implications for how we approach the study of elections and democracy. First, the dominant party label may not be as useful as previous research has suggested. It is an ambiguous label that masks important levels of competition and turnover. Second, looking at sub-national variation in electoral outcomes provides us with a more refined measure of electoral competitiveness than aggregate-level election returns and is able to reveal more information about the nature and quality of elections.

Perhaps the focus for scholars should be examining the causes of sub-national electoral competitiveness and finding ways to induce more competitiveness. In Botswana—a country with a dominant party system, fragmented opposition, and disproportional electoral results—competition is still occurring and increasing. We need to be looking at ways to account for and encourage these trends.

There are also democratic implications related to how we analyze elections and at which level(s) we measure and observe electoral outcomes. If we focus on national level outcomes only, are we are making assessments based on incomplete information? If we incorporate sub-national electoral trends when analyzing and assessing elections, does a different picture may emerge? In the case of Botswana, this is certainly the case.
Furthermore, is competition an indicator of democracy or its byproduct? If the number of competitive constituencies in a given country was low or declining, would this affect our assessment the country’s regime type? Should it? Finally, is one alternation in power sufficient evidence that future elections producing electoral defeats will be respected? The argument that this is a necessary precondition for democratic consideration suggests that once one party accepts defeat, all other parties in the system will behave in the same manner in perpetuity. It also suggests that if a country experiences a single alternation in political power (regardless of when during its history) and then years of unfettered dominant party rule (regardless of how long this lasts and how competitive elections are), it should be considered a democracy. Is either one of these conclusions valid?

Having established that elections in Botswana’s dominant party system are seemingly democratic from the outside, it is now time to turn to the view from the inside. How do voters in Botswana interpret the competitiveness of elections? Does the competitiveness of elections affect individual-level assessments of democracy? These are the questions I seek to answer in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4: Electoral Outcomes and Satisfaction with Democracy in Botswana

Introduction

As a manner of further examining Botswana's political stability and the democratic quality of Botswana's elections, I now turn to the attitudes of the voters and the ways in which electoral competition affects their assessments of democracy. Democracy is sustained, in large part, due to the acceptance and support of the citizenry. Linz and Stepan (1996), who examine democratic transitions and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Europe, argue that attitudinal support of the majority of the citizenry is one of the key factors in determining the success of democratic consolidation. To them, a democracy can be considered consolidated when "a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern..." (6). Diamond (1999) also includes a similar attitudinal component in his understanding of the process of democratic consolidation.

Support for democracy comes from multiple sources including satisfaction with democratic performance. Sarsfield and Echegaray (2005), after examining survey data from eight Latin American countries, conclude that satisfaction with democracy is one of the most important factors underpinning individual-level support for democracy. Several researchers have examined the socioeconomic determinants of satisfaction with democracy. Others have examined the ways in which political outputs (economic policy, civil rights and liberties, etc.) affect democratic satisfaction. Few, if any, have examined the electoral environment and its impact on individual attitudes toward democracy. As electoral alternation has frequently been used as a requirement for democracy, it is
necessary to understand how this procedural component of the definition of democracy affects individuals’ evaluations of democracy.

Offhand, it seems logical to assume that non-competitive elections would have a negative effect on democratic satisfaction. Individuals who cast their ballot do so believing that they will have some impact, however small, on electoral outcomes. If a significant pattern of noncompetitive elections emerges in a given country, one could reasonably expect that citizens would become disillusioned from the electoral process, resulting in lower levels of satisfaction with democracy in general. However, we would expect that level of satisfaction would differ based on individual level ties to political parties. The relationship between electoral competition and democratic satisfaction must take into account, then, how the desirability of electoral outcomes varies by partisanship.

This chapter uses the disaggregated electoral data from Chapter 3 to test the way in which electoral competition affects democratic satisfaction. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the fact that the BDP has handily won the majority of seats at the national level obscures the fact that the level of competition between the BDP and various opposition parties varies across constituencies and regions. This fact provides us with rich variation to examine the way in which competition under a dominant party system affects democratic attitudes. Given that we can hold partisan dominance at the national level constant, the question then becomes: does competition, even at marginal levels, affect satisfaction with democracy under a dominant party system?

The contribution of this chapter is two-fold: to examine the ways in which electoral competition affects democratic satisfaction and to utilize subnational variation across constituencies and regions to tease out these effects. Very few, if any, studies on
African politics use subnational data. This is most certainly related to the paucity of disaggregated data and the difficulty in obtaining what little is available. The findings of this chapter, while admittedly are specific to the Botswana case, may be applicable to other countries and regions. Specifically, this chapter may provide insight into the long-term effects of partisan dominance on public opinion, something of interest to those who study Africa's emergent democracies.

Electoral Competition and Satisfaction with Democracy

Several studies have examined the relationship between various political institutions and satisfaction with democracy. Anderson (1998), for example, tests the relationship between electoral systems, party systems, and satisfaction with democracy. Using data from approximately 20 European countries, he finds that electoral system proportionality, party fragmentation, and electoral volatility are all significantly related to satisfaction with democracy. He concludes that institutional factors, specifically the proportionality of elections—a product of electoral institutions—have a more significant impact on individual level satisfaction with democracy than do more fleeting political events and outcomes. In a more recent study, Wagner et al (2008) analyze satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe. They find several institutional variables (corruption, checks and balances, and overall quality of institutions) significantly related to democratic satisfaction. Aarts and Thomassan (2008) focus on the effects of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems on satisfaction with democracy. Using data from almost 40 countries, and including both established and developing democracies, the authors are able to test the effects of electoral systems on democratic satisfaction across
countries with differing “ages” or years of experience with democracy. Surprisingly, they find that proportional systems are negatively related to satisfaction with democracy.

Waldron-Moore (1999) argues that economic performance and socio-demographic factors (age, education, gender, etc.) strongly predict democratic satisfaction. She examines only Eastern European countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania). Waldron-Moore does not control for any political institutions. Anderson (1998) does not control for any socioeconomic factors. Interestingly, both authors cite Clarke et al (1993) who explicitly incorporate both economic factors and political factors in their analysis of the determinants of democratic satisfaction.

Turning to attitudes toward democracy in Africa more specifically, several studies have been conducted probing support for and satisfaction with democracy across several different countries. Bratton and Mattes (2001) examine the sources of support for democracy in Ghana, Zambia, and South Africa. They find differences in how respondents define democracy in each country. They argue that in each case the definition of democracy can be viewed as a reaction to the deficits of the previous regime—repression of civil liberties, vote choice, etc. Democratic satisfaction is generally lower than support for democracy. After examining several different aspects of attitudes toward democracy, they conclude that support for democracy is intrinsic (desire democracy for democracy’s sake) but that satisfaction with democracy is performance-based. However, they are careful to point out that individual’s assessments of government performance include both economic performance and the provision of political goods or rights.
In another study, Bratton (2004) examines how electoral alternation affects support for democracy in Africa. He finds that support for democracy is generally high in the immediate aftermath of democratization but wanes over time. However, in the event that democratic elections produce alternation in party control of government, support for democracy increases. Additionally, he demonstrates how democratic satisfaction is related to support for winning party and is different for so-called winners and losers. Focusing solely on the case of Lesotho which moved from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system, Cho and Bratton (2006) find that this specific institutional change was significantly related to individuals' reports of their satisfaction with democracy. The direction of the impact, interestingly enough, was mediated by whether one aligned oneself with the winning or losing party. Supporters of opposition parties were twice as satisfied with democracy after the change of electoral systems (from 23% to 46%) while those who supporting the governing party (also the winning party) were slightly less satisfied after the change (from 75% to 67%).

Much has been written on the effects of electoral competition on various political outcomes, specifically with reference to the American states (VO Key 1949; Jennings 1979; Powell 1986; Gerber and Lupia 1995; Barrilleaux et al 2002). Voter turnout and policy responsiveness are two of the key variables found to be significantly related to electoral competition. Only a handful of studies have examined the impact of electoral competition outside of the United States. Stasavage (2005), for one, found that multiparty competition was positively related to increases in education spending in Africa as electoral competition forces politicians to focus on service provision to a wider
audience in order to secure votes. However, the ways in which electoral competition affects satisfaction with democracy has not yet been examined in the literature.

*Competition in Botswana*

As reported in Chapter 3, there is significant electoral competition occurring at the constituency level (see Table 11). The percentage of competitive constituencies increased from 25% of constituencies in 1999 to 33% in 2004. Thus, there is substantial variation in partisan competition at the constituency level facilitating hypothesis testing. We can take advantage of the variation in competitiveness at the constituent level in order to examine the ways in which competition affects democratic satisfaction in Botswana.

**Table 11: Competitiveness of Legislative Elections in Botswana by Constituency***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>% Constituencies Won by BDP</th>
<th>Average Margin of Victory</th>
<th>Range (Minimum to Maximum)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Percentage of Competitive Constituencies (Margin of Victory &lt;11%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>82.5% (33 out of 40)</td>
<td>31.52%</td>
<td>.13% to 87.28%</td>
<td>22.81</td>
<td>25% (10 out of 40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>77.19% (44 out of 57)</td>
<td>21.74%</td>
<td>.95% to 75.99%</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>33% (19 out of 57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data taken from the 1999 and 2004 election reports issued by the Botswana Independent Electoral Commission*

**Hypotheses**

The following hypotheses rely on some rather simple assumptions about voter awareness in Botswana; namely, that voters are aware of the most recent electoral outcomes. This can be established with some level of confidence by looking at average levels of political knowledge in Botswana. According to survey responses in Botswana from the second wave of the Afrobarometer, 82% of those interviewed reported getting
news from the radio either everyday (59%) or a few times a week (23%); and 84% reported that they are either very interested in public affairs (46%) or somewhat interested (38%). According to responses from the third wave of the Afrobarometer, 77% of respondents were able to correctly identify their member of parliament. These hypotheses are based on the ways in which competition affects different subsets of the population: winners, losers, and the indifferent. Cho and Bratton (2006) present convincing evidence that support for democracy is significantly different for supporters of winning parties and supporters of losing parties. Electoral competition can be measured in several different ways: absolute margin of victory, relative margin of victory, percentage of seats won, etc. For the purposes of this paper, I have elected to use relative margin of victory for the BDP and percentage of seats won by the BDP. These two measures seem most appropriate for probing the way that competition affects attitudes under a dominant party system.

H1a: Under a dominant party system, supporters of the ruling party will report lower levels of democratic satisfaction as electoral competitiveness increases, ceteris paribus.

H1b: Under a dominant party system, opposition party supporters will report higher levels of democratic satisfaction as electoral competitiveness increases, ceteris paribus.

H1c: Under a dominant party system, electoral competitiveness has no effect on the level of satisfaction of nonpartisans, ceteris paribus.

H2a: Under a dominant party system, as percentage of seats won by the ruling party decreases, democratic satisfaction of supporters of the ruling party will decrease, ceteris paribus.

H2b: Under a dominant party system, as percentage of seats won by the ruling party decreases, democratic satisfaction of opposition party supporters will increase, ceteris paribus.
H2c: Under a dominant party system, percentage of seats won by the ruling party has no effect on the level of satisfaction of nonpartisans, ceteris paribus.

Data and Measurement

Satisfaction with democracy is a subjective concept. As such, individual level survey data is the best method of measuring this concept. Afrobarometer has conducted three waves of surveys across the African continent. The fourth is currently under way. The first wave surveyed citizens in twelve countries from 1999 to 2001. The second wave surveyed citizens in fifteen countries from 2002 to 2004. The third wave surveyed citizens in eighteen countries in 2005. Residents in Botswana have been surveyed in all waves. The focus of these surveys is generally on issues related to democracy and governance.

There are some problems associated with using the satisfaction with democracy survey question to gauge public sentiments toward democracy (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Norris 1999; Canache et al. 2001). According to Canache et al. (2001), this specific survey instrument is an ambiguous measure of democratic satisfaction—satisfaction with democracy has different meanings to different people in different contexts. To some, it represents satisfaction with the governing party. To others it measures support for democracy as a regime type. In many cases, they argue, it may be a summary indicator of both government and regime satisfaction. Additionally, individual level characteristics (age, gender, education) affect how this question is interpreted. Lagos (2003) agrees that regional events and histories help to shape how individuals in a given country define democracy.
Because the above criticisms bear some valid points, they must be attended to. First, the issue of differing political histories affecting the definition of democracy can easily be avoided by focusing solely on one country’s respondents. Second, controlling for individual level characteristics such as age, gender, and education indirectly addresses and corrects for individual interpretations of the survey question. The more important issue of the conflation of government and regime satisfaction seems less problematic when both are the same and have been for some forty years, as is the case of Botswana. In sum, while the above criticisms with this measure of democratic satisfaction warrant closer examination, in this study they are marginally applicable. Furthermore, the ways in which the functioning of democracy affects individual’s attitudes toward democracy seems too crucial of a question to ignore in the face of these issues. Even the most rudimentary survey instrument taps into sentiments that can and should be explained.

Variables

The dependent variable used in this paper is a binary coded response (1= satisfied, 0=not satisfied) to the following question: overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Botswana? This question has five possible responses: my country is not a democracy; not at all satisfied; not very satisfied; fairly satisfied; and very satisfied. Fairly satisfied and very satisfied comprise the satisfied category; my country is not a democracy, not at all satisfied, and not very satisfied are grouped together in the not satisfied category. The distribution of this variable is as follows: 65% of respondents fall in the satisfied category while 35% fall into the not satisfied category. This variable is measured at the individual level.
The two key independent variables used in this paper are relative margin of victory in relation to the BDP (% vote the BDP candidate received minus the % vote the leading opposition candidate received) and percent of seats won by the BDP. Margin of victory ranges from -0.13 to 0.56. A negative value represents a victory for an opposition party. Positive values represent BDP victories. This variable was coded in order to capture the direction of the margin of victory, making sure to differentiate opposition and BDP margins of victory. These variables are measured at the district or regional level. Ideally, this variable would be measured at the constituent level. However, as Afrobarometer survey data only reports the region or district that an individual lives in, it is not possible to use constituency level data. Margin of victory is an average measure at the district level of the constituencies included in a given district. Percent of seats won by BDP is the percent of constituent seats won within a given district. It is not too far of a stretch to believe that individuals are aware of the broader configuration of electoral outcomes around them.

Although both these variables are indicators of electoral competition, they measure slightly different concepts. Margin of victory represents the competitiveness in a given election, while number of seats represents the outcome of voting decision and whether an opposition candidate is able to win a seat. These variables are highly correlated and cannot be used in the same model so I am running separate models for each.

As much of the extant literature on democratic satisfaction focuses on demographic and/or government performance issues, the following controls are included in this analysis: age, gender, education level, level of satisfaction with economy over past
12 months. I also control for year of survey (2003, 2005) as there could be differences specific to each election that affected democratic satisfaction. For instance, the expectations could have been higher for the 1999 election and the BNF made significant strides in the 1994 election and it could be imagined that individuals may be less satisfied overall with election returns that did not continue the trend toward true multiparty competition. Separate dummy variables for BDP supporter and opposition party supporter are also used in this analysis.

This study combines data from multiple years. Margin of victory and percent of seats won are from the 1999 and 2004 elections. Attitudinal and demographic data comes from the second and third waves of the Afrobarometer survey. The second wave of the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 2003 and has 1200 respondents. The third wave of the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 2005 and also has 1200 respondents. The key independent variables of interest are taken from the most recent previous election. Data from both surveys is combined but a control variable for year is included. Combining survey data from two waves of the survey simply provides us with more data to analyze and gives us more confidence in the models’ estimates.

Because I have hypothesized that democratic satisfaction is a function of both individual level attributes and district or regional level attributes, the data is structured so that individual level survey responses are nested in region or district. As I have combined individual level data from two waves of surveys, each district may appear more than once in the data (i.e., for 2003 and 2005). However, there was a significant change in the number of constituencies between the 1999 and 2004 surveys: an increase from 40 to 57 constituencies. Due to this change, it is reasonable to assume that the composition of the
districts has changed sufficiently so that they may be treated as distinct from year to year. Tables 12 and 13 describe the constituency-level contribution for each district. This type of data structure lends itself well to a multilevel logit model.

Table 12: Structure of District-Level Electoral Data, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Constituencies</th>
<th>Average Margin of BDP Victory</th>
<th>% Seats Won By BDP</th>
<th>% Survey Sample</th>
<th>% BDP Supporter (in Survey)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53.44%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>48.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francistown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30.10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.67%</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-3.47%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11.33%</td>
<td>28.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanzi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.65%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jwaneng</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kgagolagadi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.49%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kgatleng</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.59%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.67%</td>
<td>23.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweneng</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.23%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td>43.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobatse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-9.43%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46.44%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>68.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.63%</td>
<td>66.66%</td>
<td>8.67%</td>
<td>50.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orapa</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selibe-Phikwe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>28.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>45.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.68%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>45.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13: Structure of District-Level Electoral Data, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Constituencies</th>
<th>Average Margin of BDP Victory</th>
<th>% Seats Won by BDP</th>
<th>% Survey Sample</th>
<th>% BDP Supporter (in Survey)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40.38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>30.67%</td>
<td>52.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chobe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francistown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22.12%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.67%</td>
<td>48.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-6.21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11.33%</td>
<td>41.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanzi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.41%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jwaneng</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kgalagdi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.86%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>34.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kgateng</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-5.55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4.67%</td>
<td>44.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweneng</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.02%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>47.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobatse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-13.22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>20.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngamiland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.01%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>56.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55.60%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7.33%</td>
<td>43.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selibe-Phikwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21.82%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>34.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-.11%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.19%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>40.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Models

A random intercepts logit model allows intercept for each district to vary.

Specifically, each \( a_{ij} \) estimated includes the alpha plus some random error associated with the district. In order to be able to test this model using my dataset, I need to create variables for the BDP margin of victory and percent of seats won that within district, not just between districts. I was able to create three variables that do vary by multiplying my category dummies (BDP supporter, Opposition supporter, and Nonpartisan) by the margin of victory and percent of seats won, respectively. I am testing the following models using the above data:
Satisfaction with Democracy\_ji = a\_ji + (b1\* BDP supporters dummy\_j * BDP weighted Margin of Victory\_j) + (b2\* Opposition supporters dummy\_j * BDP weighted Margin of Victory\_j) + (b3\* Nonpartisans dummy\_j * BDP weighted Margin of Victory\_j) (b4\* BDP weighted Margin of Victory\_j) + (b5\* gender\_j) + (b6\* level of education attainment\_j) + (b7\* age\_j) + (b8\* Satisfaction with Economy\_j) + u\_j + e\_ji ,

where \( j \) represent the district and \( i \) represents an individual in a given district

Satisfaction with Democracy\_ji = a\_ji + (b1\* BDP supporters dummy\_j * Percentage of Seats Won by BDP\_j) + (b2\* Opposition supporters dummy\_j * Percentage of Seats Won by BDP\_j) + (b3\* Nonpartisans dummy\_j * Percentage of Seats Won by BDP\_j) (b4\* Percentage of Seats Won by BDP\_j) + (b5\* gender\_j) + (b6\* level of education attainment\_j) + (b7\* age\_j) + (b8\* Satisfaction with Economy\_j) + u\_j + e\_ji

where \( j \) represent the district and \( i \) represents an individual in a given district

I am also using a logit model to test the following models using the above data. The logit model specification differs slightly from the random intercept logit model due to the way in which the key independent variables must be coded and the inclusion of a year control variable. As the random intercepts model allows each district to have its own alpha and error term, it already has a built-in control for year.

Satisfaction with Democracy = a + (b1\* BDP supporters dummy) + (b2\* BDP supporters dummy * BDP weighted Margin of Victory) + (b3\* Opposition supporters dummy) + (b4\* Opposition supporters dummy * BDP weighted Margin of Victory) + (b5\* BDP weighted Margin of Victory) + (b6\* gender) + (b7\* level of education attainment) + (b8\* age) + (b9\* Satisfaction with Economy) + (b10*year) + e\_i

Satisfaction with Democracy = a + (b1\* BDP supporters dummy) + (b2\* BDP supporters dummy * Percentage of Seats Won by BDP) + (b3\* Opposition supporters dummy) + (b4\* Opposition supporters dummy * Percentage of Seats Won by BDP) + (b5\* Percentage of Seats Won by BDP) + (b6\* gender) + (b7\* level of education attainment) + (b8\* age) + (b9\* Satisfaction with Economy) + (b10*year) + e\_i
Results

The results of random effects and standard logit models are reported in Tables 14 and 15, respectively. Unfortunately, the results reported in Table 14 suggest that the random coefficients model is not appropriate for this data. Although, there is variation in level of satisfaction by district (ranging from 56% to 83%), according to the model, the district level intercepts do not vary significantly. Due to this fact, the results from these models will not be discussed at length. The results of the standard logit models do warrant discussion.

Table 14: Democratic Satisfaction and Electoral Competition in Botswana (Random Effects Models)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1—BDP margin of victory</th>
<th>Model 2—Percentage of Seats Won by BDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP supporters*BPD competitiveness</td>
<td>1.89*** (.30)</td>
<td>.73*** (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition supporters * BDP competitiveness</td>
<td>-.85** (.29)</td>
<td>-.37** (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonpartisans * BDP*competitiveness</td>
<td>-.31 (.36)</td>
<td>-.09 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.003 (.003)</td>
<td>-.002 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.01 (.09)</td>
<td>-.044 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.09 (.07)</td>
<td>.065 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Satisfaction</td>
<td>.16** (.05)</td>
<td>.14** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level variance</td>
<td>6.75e-11 (.06)</td>
<td>4.08e-07 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-1331.18 2118</td>
<td>-1087.8035 1743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15: Democratic Satisfaction and Electoral Competition in Botswana
(Standard Logit Models)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1—BDP margin of victory</th>
<th>Model 2—Percentage of Seats Won by BDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP supporters dummy</td>
<td>.48** (.22)</td>
<td>-.10 (.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP dummy * BDP</td>
<td>1.00 (.65)</td>
<td>.89* (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition supporters dummy</td>
<td>-.28 (.22)</td>
<td>-.54 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition dummy*BDP</td>
<td>.044 (.62)</td>
<td>.24 (.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP competitiveness</td>
<td>-.077 (.52)</td>
<td>-.36 (.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.016 (.096)</td>
<td>-.053 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.10 (.07)</td>
<td>.068 (.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Satisfaction</td>
<td>.17** (.05)</td>
<td>.14** (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>.03 (.06)</td>
<td>.04 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-63.64</td>
<td>-72.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-1259.1338</td>
<td>-1086.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2036</td>
<td>1743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are a few striking results of the standard logit models. First, H1a and H2a are supported by the data analysis. As the BDP's margin of victory increases, BDP supporters are significantly more satisfied with democracy. This finding is intuitive. The relationship between electoral competition and satisfaction for opposition supporters and nonpartisans is not as clear-cut. There appears to be no relationship between BDP margin of victory and satisfaction with democracy for these two groups. The standard errors on the logit estimates are very large, resulting in the wide bands around the lines for opposition supporters and nonpartisans found in each graph. Additionally, the coefficients are small and insignificant. These findings hold for both 2003 and 2005 as reported in Figures 3 through 7.

**Figure 3: BDP Margin of Victory and Satisfaction with Democracy, 2003**

*Margin of Victory in Previous Election (1999). All other variables held at mean or median value.*

*(Predictions Estimated using Clarify Software; Confidence Intervals are the Blue Bands around the Predicted Line)*
When we turn to percent of seats won by BDP, the findings are similar. The impact of BDP seats won on democratic satisfaction is significant and positive for BDP supporters. The relationship between seats won and democratic satisfaction for opposition supporters and nonpartisans is marginally negative. Again the standard errors are rather large and the coefficients are small.

Interestingly, the socioeconomic variables appear to have no impact in these models. Age, gender, and education level are not even remotely significant. Economic satisfaction is highly significant and in the expected direction in both standard logit models. This finding confirms Bratton and Mattes (2001) earlier argument that democratic assessments are intimately tied to economic performance.
Figure 5: Seats Won by BDP and Satisfaction with Democracy, 2003

Satisfaction with Democracy, 2003

BDP Supporters  Opposition Supporters  Nonpartisans

*Percent Seats from previous election (1999). All other variables held at mean or median value.

(Predictions Estimated using Clarify Software; Confidence Intervals are the Blue Bands around the Predicted Line)

Figure 6: Seats Won by BDP and Satisfaction with Democracy, 2005

Satisfaction with Democracy, 2005

BDP Supporters  Opposition Supporters  Nonpartisans

*Percent Seats from previous election (2004). All other variables held at mean or median values.

(Predictions Estimated using Clarify Software; Confidence Intervals are the Blue Bands around the Predicted Line)
Based on the results of the standard logit model, we can estimate the average tradeoff between competition and satisfaction in Botswana by partisanship category:

*A Five Percent Increase in Margin of Victory for BDP equals:*

- 0.9 Percent Increase in Probability of Satisfaction of BDP Supporters
- 0.01 Percent Decrease in Probability of Satisfaction of Opposition Supporters
- 0.08 Percent Decrease in Probability of Satisfaction of Nonpartisans

*A Ten Percent Increase in Seats Held by BDP equals:*

- 1.69 Percent Increase in Probability of Satisfaction of BDP Supporters
- 0.28 Percent Decrease in Probability of Satisfaction of Opposition Supporters
- 0.78 Percent Decrease in Probability of Satisfaction of Nonpartisans

In order to place the attitudes of Batswana citizens in context, it is instructive to look at the attitudes and assessments of citizens from other sub-Saharan Africa countries (see Table 16.) Citizens from Botswana and Ghana—where elections can be considered highly competitive—report significantly higher levels of democratic satisfaction and belief in the democratic nature of their respective countries than do citizens from Lesotho, Tanzania, and Zambia, three countries that exhibit much lower levels of electoral competition.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country is a Democracy</th>
<th>Satisfied with Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Rounds 1 and 3

---

5 In Lesotho (2007), 21.25 % of constituencies were competitive. In Tanzania (2005), 3.11 % of constituencies were competitive. In Zambia (2006), 26 % of constituencies were competitive. Compare this to Botswana (2009) in which 42.1 % of constituencies were competitive and in Ghana (2008) where 35.93 % of constituencies were competitive.
Conclusion

These findings suggest that there is, indeed, differing relationship between competition and democratic satisfaction for winner, losers, and the indifferent. However, it is interesting that electoral competition seems to have little impact on democratic satisfaction for opposition supporters and nonpartisans. In the case of nonpartisans, who have reported not feeling close to any political party, it makes sense that level of competition would have no effect on their levels of democratic satisfaction. For whatever reason, they have no strong investment in electoral outcomes. The relationship between level of competition and democratic satisfaction for opposition supporters, on the other hand, is puzzling. While the direction of the relationship is negative, it appears to not be significant and is smaller than the estimated impact on nonpartisans. One plausible explanation could be the nature of the policy differences between the BDP and opposition parties. Some have characterized parties in Botswana as non-ideological and centered on personalities, not platforms. If this is the case, then this finding may make sense. If not, it has significant implications for the ways in which electoral outcomes do and do not affect a country’s prospects for democratic stability.

Another plausible explanation is that democracy is so firmly entrenched in Botswana that electoral outcomes exert a negligible effect on democratic satisfaction. Regardless of the competitiveness of elections, Batswana seem to view their country as a mature and consolidating democracy. This bodes well for the future of democracy in Botswana.
Chapter 5: Selling Voters Short: Ideology and Vote Choice in Botswana’s Dominant Party System

Introduction

Theoretically, under democratic systems with true competition—as is believed to be the case in Botswana—DPS’s must be maintained through broad support of the voters; however, we do not yet have an accurate understanding of the nature of the voting calculus under these types of systems. Most analyses rely on simplistic models relating partisanship and vote choice to some type of post-conflict nation building exercise or as simply a conflation of national identity, regime identity, social identity, and/or party identity. Furthermore, many theorists have explained vote choice in terms of social cleavages (ethnicity, linguistic, religious identities, etc.) or as a product of clientelism. Very little systematic work has been done to examine the role of economic ideology in vote choice in Africa, a factor that many argue influences vote choice under a variety of circumstances in many countries. As a method of examining the nature of partisan attachments under a DPS, I examine if/how ideology affects vote choice.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of ideological voting by examining party platforms and voter attitudes in Botswana. Botswana provides a unique setting to test theories of voter behavior as they apply to the African context. First, Botswana is considered Africa’s most mature democracy so that if ideological voting does exist in Africa, it most certainly should be detected in the Batswana electorate. Second, unlike many of its geographic counterparts, Botswana is considered to be very socially homogeneous therefore ethnic voting is not much (if at all) a consideration for the electorate. Finally, because clientelism, patronage and corruption are believed to be
relatively low in Botswana, clientelistic voting patterns should exert a negligible effect on voter behavior. This paper proceeds as follows: I examine the theoretical role of ideology in elections in general; I examine what if any ideological appeals are presented by Botswana’s political parties; and finally I examine if and how these ideological appeals are consumed by the electorate.

*Ideology and Vote Choice in Africa*

Models of voter behavior in Africa have historically focused on the role of social cleavages and/or clientelism to explain voter behavior (Lemarchand 1972; Barkan & Holmquist 1989; Van de Walle 2003; Erdmann 2004). Posner (2005) argues that voters in African democracies base their vote choice in large part on some form of primordial identity (ethnic, tribal, linguistic, religious, etc). Posner’s approach is a refinement of previous research which suggested that primordial or fixed cleavages determined partisan support in African societies. Posner does not treat identity as fixed but rather makes a rather compelling argument that political elites strategically target specific populations based on their size and geographic concentration in order to create minimum winning coalitions for the purposes of winning elections. Nonetheless, his analysis focuses on the role that social cleavages play in determining vote choice.

Clientelism/patronage is another factor researchers have emphasized in explaining voter behavior in African countries. It is argued that patronage is distributed to voters as a means of incurring political support. Authors such as van de Walle (2003) and Wantchekon (2003) believe that voters are less concerned with programmatic appeals and ideological positioning of parties (when and if this occurs is also subject to debate), but rather are swayed by the selective distribution of goods and services.
Recent research has found support for a more sophisticated or nuanced view of voter behavior in the African context that incorporates issues and candidate evaluations as part of the vote calculus. Lindberg and Morrison (2008) argue that Ghanaian voters engage in “evaluative” voting as opposed to using clientelistic or ethnic rationales for voting. Using survey data they find that the majority of those polled report using candidate and party evaluations to inform their vote choice. Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) find that both ethnic and policy considerations affect vote choice in Kenya. They speculate that economic development at the individual level encourages voters to transition from ethnic voting to policy based or evaluative voting. Looking more broadly at “developing” countries in general, Aguilar and Pacek (2000) find that lower levels of socioeconomic development at the country level are related to more leftist ideological voting.

Ideology is believed to play a significant role in vote choice across the world but it has rarely been examined in the African context (Duch et al. 2008). Ideology provides citizens with a heuristic shortcut that facilitates vote choice. In the simplest model relating ideology to vote choice, voters assess the ideological positions of parties (generally with respect to the ideal role of government in economic affairs) and vote based on the party that is in closest proximity to their own ideological position (Downs 1957). This model is intentionally broad but provides a significant amount of leverage in explaining vote choice in many countries including the United States and many European countries. Ideological voting also enhances democracy by providing distinct policy alternatives and can be used as a means of holding politicians accountable for their policy
decisions while in office. It is also a more stable and rational motivation for voting than simply relying on ethnic cues or clientelism.

Its application to vote choice in the developing world—and Africa specifically—is limited and the results are mixed. Some authors argue that ideological voting is virtually absent in African elections (Van de Walle 2003; Rakner and Svasand 2004; Manning 2005) while others argue that ideology does affect a host of political outcomes in Africa including vote choice, vote turnout and party system (Greene 2007).

Despite the lack of attention to the role of ideology in African elections, economic ideology has played a large role in African politics since independence from colonialism beginning in the 1950s. Upon independence, many African countries adopted socialist ideologies or what was termed “African socialism” which combined indigenous notions of community and brotherhood and a large role for the state in planning and development. Examples include Tanzania under Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta, Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, and Senegal under Leopold Senghor. According to Young (2004), socialism appealed to many independent post-colonial states as USSR and Chinese models were posting tremendous growth levels in the 1960s and socialism seemed the answer for the massive development projects that most states were faced with at the end of colonial rule.

Even in cases where socialism was not embraced (such as Cote d’Ivoire), a strong role for the state was still adopted and “capitalist” states engaged in many types of interventionist policies including but not limited to the creation of agricultural marketing boards to fix prices and the establishment of parastatal corporations to manage natural resources (i.e., petroleum in Nigeria and minerals in Zaire/Congo DRC). For the most
part, African socialism was accompanied by autocratic rule under the guise of single party rule. African socialism fell out of favor in the 1980s due to a host of factors including the collapse of communism in the USSR and global financial institutions pushing neo-liberal economic policies as preconditions for aid (Young 2004; Pitcher and Askew 2006). During the 1990s, large scale economic reorganization was accompanied by the “Third Wave of Democracy” in which many Africa countries transitioned to from autocracy to democracy, although the quality of democracy in Africa then and now varies widely.

In direct contrast to the political history of many other African states, Botswana and the BDP from the very beginning identified with capitalism and pursued private industrial development. One of the poorest countries in the world in the 1960s, until recently, Botswana has seen significant positive economic growth almost every year. Also, unlike many of its continental neighbors, in its more than 40 years of independent rule, Botswana has never experienced civil war, regime change, military rule, or any manner of “hostile takeover” of government. Furthermore, every election that has been held since 1965 has been deemed “free and fair” by international observers.

Botswana also has a solid record of political freedom and respect for political and civil rights. Freedom House, which releases scores tabulating a country’s protection of political rights and civil rights, has classified Botswana as “Free” since 1974 (Freedom House, 2010). Nonetheless, only one party—the BDP—has ever won a majority of legislative seats and occupied the Presidency. Otherwise democratic elections have produced Botswana’s DPS.
Kenneth Greene (2007) explores the development, maintenance, and decline of dominant party systems by examining the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in Mexico. According to Greene, in DPSs the ruling party has a resource advantage in terms of campaign funding and patronage that reinforces incumbency. Furthermore, the ruling party can increase the costs of opposition party formation by denying them access to existing party network and through less “democratic” means such as coercion and intimidation. Based on the logic of the median voter and Downs’ (1957) theory of party electoral strategy, the only types of individuals/groups that would be sufficiently motivated to form an opposition party under conditions found in dominant party systems would be those considered to be ideologically extreme. Moderates with electoral ambitions are better served by aligning with the dominant party or are discouraged from entering into the electoral arena altogether.

While the majority of his research is on Mexican politics, Greene extends his argument to Botswana specifically and argues that the same mechanisms found in Mexico explain party dominance in Botswana. Greene believes the reason for the continued success of the BDP has to do with the party’s ideological centralism. In addition to having significant resources at their disposal, the BDP also created a catch-all ideology which appeals to the average voter and leaves potential politicians with two options: join the BDP or form a niche party that appeals to extremist ideological views.

Contrary to this opinion, several other researchers have argued that ideology plays a limited, if any, role in African politics. According to Manning (2005), often times opposition parties are non-ideological and centered around a prominent personality). Rakner and Svasand (2004), who examined the platforms of Zambia’s political parties,
argue that there is little difference between opposition party and the governing party platforms. It may also be the case that an opposition leader knowingly establishes a weak party as a way of leveraging himself/herself into a governing coalition (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).

The Role of Political Ideology in Botswana

Political Parties

Several authors argue that early political parties in Botswana lacked true ideological divisions (Nengwekhu 1979; Polhemus 1983). According to Nengwekhu (1979), the parties “were formed for the sole purpose of mobilizing nationalist feelings and the creation of an independent state,” (75). Polhemus (1983) believed one could not place the main parties on a left-right ideological spectrum, although he does agree that there were some key differences between the parties. In the context of the rest of Africa which was at that time embracing different styles of socialism, the BDP would have been considered a rather conservative party (403).

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing in the 1990s, more and more researchers began to detect ideological divisions between the parties (Molutsi 1991; Danevad 1995). Prior to the 1990s, Danevad (1995) argues, all parties were concerned with development, but once conditions had improved, they became more interested in the nature of economic and social development. Molomo (2000) disagrees with this assessment. To him, “a defining characteristic of political parties in Botswana is that they do not present clear ideological differences,” (69). After having said that, he acknowledges that the BDP has long attempted to portray the BNF as a radical, left-wing party intent on adopting
communism in Botswana and to nationalize all property although he does not seem to agree that this is the case (71). Mokopakgosi and Molomo (2000) argue that until the 1990s, the BNF was seen as too radically left to be taken seriously.

Molomo (2000) states that the BDP can be considered a neo-liberal party as it advocates very little state intervention in the economy. This is the stance that the BDP has taken on economic development since independence. It has pursued a pragmatic approach to development and the economy that focuses on privatization and the role of the private sector in inducing development. One of the major themes in 1989 BDP manifesto was attracting private investment in the economy (Molutsi 1991). Its economic policies are located decidedly on the right side of the ideological spectrum. The Database of Political Institutions confirms this is the case as they classify the BDP as a rightist party.

In contrast, the BNF was founded in 1966 by Kenneth Koma who had been educated under the Soviet Union’s communist regime. According to Polhemus (1983), after completing his studies, Koma returned from Russia with many socialist-inspired ideas for how to grow the economy. In what can be considered a very shrewd political move, early in its history the BNF aligned itself with many of the traditional Chiefs who felt marginalized by the BDP. By incorporating the Chiefs and their more conservative beliefs, the party’s ties to communism and Marxism were considerably diluted. It can be classified as a leftist political party.

An examination of the BNF’s recent policy platforms reinforces this assessment. As stated in its 2004 party manifesto:
The current political economy of Botswana has nothing to offer the majority of the poor both in the rural and urban areas but merely encourages excessive profit-making instincts and trends, thus making the maximization of individual profit the final end. (Botswana Daily News, 21 October 2004)

Furthermore, in its 2009 party manifesto it claims to be “true Party of the masses, especially the poor, the working class, the peasants and sections of the middle class” (The Key to a Quality Life for All, BNF 2009 Party Manifesto). In 2009, Mr. Otseweletse Moupo, current President of the BNF stated that the major difference between the BNF and the BDP was the fact that the BNF “does not believe privatization is necessary” for economic development (Personal Interview, 11 December 2009).

The BCP, after splitting from the BNF for both ideological and leadership reasons, has attempted to position itself in between the Leftist BNF and the Rightist BDP. It can be considered a Centre-Left party. In its 2004 party manifesto it states that the BCP promotes a “socially oriented economic paradigm” that focuses on economic diversification in order to grow small and medium sized businesses outside of the minerals sector including increased assistance to the tourism and information technology sectors (2004 BCP Party Manifesto; Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005). According to Thato Osupile, executive secretary of the BCP, the BNF is a leftist party, the BCP is a centre-left party and the BDP is perceived as a rightist party, although he argues that their ideological platform is intentionally broad and vague (Personal Interview, 3 December 2009).

The three major parties (BNF, BCP, and BDP) can be arrayed from Left to Right across the ideological spectrum. At least according to the parties themselves, ideology plays some role in Botswana’s elections; however, in order to more accurately assess the
role of ideology, we must now turn to the voter and examine if ideology plays any role in his or her vote choice. The next section examines political ideology at the individual level using survey data from the first round of the Afrobarometer Survey.

**Voters**

Using survey responses from Afrobarometer Round 1, which was conducted in the period immediately before Botswana’s 1999 election, I was able to construct a measure of ideology combining the following four questions into an additive score:

1) Would you prefer a variety of goods but high prices or fewer goods but lower prices?
2) Should individuals be free to earn as much income as they can or should there be limits on income?
3) Do you prefer government ownership of business and agriculture or privatization?
4) Are people responsible for their own economic success or is it the government’s responsibility?

Each respondent was given the option to Strongly Agree, Agree, Have No Opinion, Disagree or Strongly Disagree to the above questions. This ideological scale ranges from 0 (Far Left) to 16 (Far Right). Table 1 reports the distribution of ideological preferences amongst Batswana based on their stated partisan attachment. Because both the BNF and BCP are left of center and because of issues related to a small sample size, I combine the responses of both BCP and BNF supporters into one category called “Opposition”.


As Figure 7 demonstrates, ideology in Botswana has slightly left-skewed distribution for each category of respondent. The majority of respondents can be considered center-right. When we compare across the three categories of respondents, we see that there is virtually no difference between the ideological preferences of each type of voter (Non-Partisans mean value: 9.06; Opposition Supporters mean value: 9.36; BDP/Ruling Party Supporters mean value: 9.06)

These preliminary findings suggest there is no relationship between ideology (economic) and partisanship in Botswana. This begs the question: does ideology need to be "activated" in order to affect partisan ties? Perhaps it is the case that voters must be sufficiently educated and have the cognitive skills necessary in order to differentiate
partisan appeals and engage in strategic voting in the Downsian sense. It is my contention that in order for ideological voting to take place not only must parties articulate ideological positions but they must be received by the electorate in order to be relevant in the vote choice. Furthermore, individuals must have the cognitive ability to discern between competing political ideologies in order to use them as a voting cue. As such, the relationship between ideology and partisanship is mediated by an individual’s level of education. Using a multinomial logit model (the most appropriate for a categorical dependent variable), I am able to test whether ideology is related to vote choice. I believe that for individuals that are “educated”, ideology will play an important role in their vote choice/partisan attachment. For those that are “uneducated” ideology will play no role. I test the following hypotheses:

H1a: *For those with limited education*: As an individual’s ideological position has no impact on their partisanship.

H1b: *For those who are educated*: as an individual’s ideological position becomes more leftist, the probably that they will support the opposition increases; conversely, as their ideological position becomes more rightist, the probability that they support the BDP increases.

My dependent variable is the probability that an individual reports being Non-Partisan, an Opposition Supporter, or a BDP supporter. My key independent variable is ideology. I include an interaction term between ideology and level of education as I have hypothesized that ideology only plays a factor in partisanship when an individual has a certain level of advanced education. I also include controls for media exposure, age, gender, and economic satisfaction to examine what role these factors play in vote choice. Table 17 reports the results from the multinomial logit analysis.
Table 17: Ideology and Partisanship, Botswana 1999  
(Results of Multinomial Logit Model)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Beta Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Partisans</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology X Education</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Exposure (Newspaper)</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Satisfaction</td>
<td>-.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition Supporters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology X Education</td>
<td>-.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Exposure (Newspaper)</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Satisfaction</td>
<td>-.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-789.60135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Standard Errors reported in parenthesis below Beta coefficients.  
**Categories compared to BDP supporters (baseline category)
According to this analysis, age exerts a significant impact on vote choice across the three categories. Older persons are more likely to support the BDP while younger voters tend to align with either an opposition party or no party at all. Many other researchers have argued that age has a significant impact on vote choice in Botswana. Political elites in Botswana also hold this opinion (see Chapter 2). There may be a generational affectation for the BDP as it was the party that helped negotiate independence for Botswana in the 1960s. Older voters may remember this time period and it may positively affect their feelings towards the BDP. Younger voters, having not directly lived through this transitional period, may be too far removed for it to affect their assessment of the BDP.

Economic satisfaction is negatively related to opposition support (less satisfied individuals tend to vote more frequently for opposition parties) while it does not significantly affect non-partisans. This relationship supports recent research in Ghana (Lindberg and Morrison 2008) and Kenya (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008) that also finds evidence of evaluative voting on the African sub-continent.

Because of the interaction term and the complicated nature of multinomial logit results, I used Clarify in order to tease out the relationship between education, ideology, and vote choice in Botswana. Figures 8 through 11 report these relationships by four categories of educational attainment: no formal schooling; primary schooling only; secondary education; and post-secondary education. These figures report the predicted probability that an individual will respond being in one of the following categories: Non-Partisan, Opposition Supporter, BDP Supporters). Predictions sum to 1.
Figure 8: Ideology and Partisanship (No Formal Education)

Ideology and Partisanship:  
No Formal Education

Figure 9: Ideology and Partisanship (Primary Education)

Ideology and Partisanship:  
Primary Education
Figure 10: Ideology and Partisanship (Secondary Education)

Idea and Partisanship:
Secondary Education

- Non-Partisans
- Opposition Supporters
- BDP Supporters

Figure 11: Ideology and Partisanship (Post-Secondary Education)

Idea and Partisanship:
Post-Secondary Education

- Non-Partisans
- Opposition Supporters
- BDP Supporters
These graphs provide evidence that the relationship between economic ideology and partisanship is mediated by level of education. For those with no formal education or primary school education only, the relationship between ideology and vote choice is counter-intuitive: as individual report being more Leftist, their probability of supporting the opposition decreases and when they report being more Rightest, their probability of supporting the BDP decreases. For those with secondary education, there appears no relationship between ideology and partisanship.

For individuals who have post-secondary education, the model fits and ideology affects vote choice in the expected direction: more leftist individuals have a higher probability of supporting Opposition Parties and more rightest individuals have a higher probability of supporting the BDP. These two categories—both on the higher end of educational achievement—are the only two categories in which the relationship between ideology and partisanship follows what the traditional literature would suggest.

The above analysis provides evidence that evaluation and ideology do play a role in vote choice in Botswana. However, in order for ideology to affect vote choice, voters must have a higher level of education (and presumably cognitive skills). This may be due to the fact that understanding ideological appeals, discerning party differences in terms of ideology, and then using this information in order to inform one’s vote choice is not an easy task; it is a rather complicated process. It requires an individual to be open or receptive to ideological messages, have the cognitive skills to recognize such appeals, and have formed their own opinion on the proper role of government in the economy in order to match party ideology to their own ideology. It is not an intuitive process, as some have previously, albeit implicitly, assumed.
Because of the unique nature of Botswana in terms of social homogeneity and economic development, it would be impossible to generalize this analysis to most other African countries. And it may also be the case that voters in new democracies need time to “learn” how to behave democratically. Voters in Botswana have now had 10 successive elections in which to acquire this information whereas many countries in Africa have had three or fewer elections since the Third Wave.

Nonetheless, it is instructive to examine what factors do and do not affect vote choice in Botswana and it is encouraging to find that rational voting models, which many scholars believe facilitate democratic development and consolidation, apply to the Batswana electorate. This also suggests that research should begin to incorporate rational vote models in order to better understand the Africa voter. Failure to do so sells the African voter short.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Imagine a brand new car is delivered to your house straight from the manufacturer. You open the front door and sit in the driver’s seat. You are about to start the car when you realize you do not have the keys. You look and see that the odometer reports a line of zeroes. You realize that this car has not been driven, not even for a fraction of a mile. Based on the information that you have (you have not seen or experienced the car starting and there are no miles on the odometer), you conclude that this is not a car. It may look like a car from the outside, but you decide that because you have no evidence that when the key is in the ignition it will indeed start, you decide that it will not start. Because, to you, the definition of a car is a motorized vehicle and you have no proof that what sits in front of you is motorized, this item cannot be a car.

Just because you have no evidence at this point in time (one way or the other) that the item delivered to your front door is a car, you determine that it is not a car. However, there are several other ways of determining if the item in your possession is a car. If you were to take a look under the hood, for example, you could assess whether all the component parts necessary for the car to start were in place. You could test the different parts (transmission, battery, etc.) to see if/how they function. You could ask the person who delivered the car if they had any evidence that it was or was not a car.

Much like the analogy of the car, the conclusion that Botswana is not a democracy because of a lack of party alternation is based on a lack of information. We can look under the hood, so to speak. We can examine electoral outcomes from multiple levels. We can examine what the actors in Botswana have to say about the quality of
democracy in their country and we can examine how citizens interpret electoral outcomes. We can examine what information voters in Botswana use to cast their ballot. Based on all of this, we can then make a more informed assessment about the nature of democracy in Botswana. What we cannot do is base our conclusion about the nature of democracy in Botswana on what we do not see.

The preceding chapters have demonstrated that Botswana’s dominant party system, where truly free and fair elections are held, exhibits significant levels of electoral competition. Furthermore, this competition has been continually increasing over time. These levels are comparable to multi-party systems, and in some cases, Botswana’s elections are more competitive. In addition, the competitiveness of elections under Botswana’s dominant party system seems to have a negligible effect on individuals’ assessments of democracy suggesting that dominant party systems may not foster anti-democratic attitudes or undermine a country’s prospects for continued democratic stability. Additionally, voters in Botswana utilize economic evaluations and/or ideological considerations when choosing which political party to support. Parties in Botswana do make distinct ideological appeals to voters and under this dominant party system—much like voters in two party and multiparty systems—voters engage in ideological voting. This, however, is conditional on voters having sufficient cognitive skills to decipher ideological messages and the ability to match their own ideological positions to those of electorally relevant parties.

Taken together, this project depicts a more complex and nuanced electoral environment under a dominant party system than previous research has acknowledged. To reiterate, several desirable indicators of democracy (competitiveness both within
parties and between parties; turnover; democratic satisfaction; evaluative and ideological voting) are found in Botswana’s dominant party system. The one factor it truly lacks is national-level party alternation.

This one factor—lack of party alternation—has led many to classify Botswana as either a quasi-democracy or a non-democracy. I argue that previous research has not taken a close enough look at functioning of elections under dominant party systems—specifically Botswana’s dominant party system—to support this conclusion. The product of numerous free and fair elections at the constituency level cannot be considered undemocratic in the aggregate. This is especially the case when, at the constituent or micro-level, elections are producing the desired outcomes of competition and turnover and these micro-level outcomes are accepted by the defeated parties. Just as there is no evidence that the ruling party would turnover power in the event of an electoral defeat, there is no evidence that it would refuse to concede defeat either.

What are implications of this analysis for other sub-Saharan countries? Zambia, for instance, just experienced executive and legislative turnover as a result of its September 2011 elections. Does this automatically qualify it as a democracy? Is it now more democratic than Botswana? If we look at the competitiveness of the election, where preliminary analysis indicates that only 17 percent of constituencies were won by a margin of victory of 10 percent or less, this suggests that Zambia is not yet a democracy. Combine this with extremely low levels of democratic satisfaction (26 percent of Zambians reported being satisfied with democracy in 2005) and a picture of a country struggling to democratize emerges.
Botswana, however, is authoritatively democratic. In all likelihood, the BDP’s many electoral successes are due in large part to a combination of its disproportional electoral system (plurality), low levels of education, and the consistent economic success of the country with the BDP at the helm. Because Botswana has not yet experienced a significant economic recession, it is impossible to predict how voters would respond to an economic downturn but it could be possible that such an exogenous shock would drastically shift ideological and partisan preferences.

It is impressive that given the resource imbalances between the ruling party and the opposition parties, that the opposition parties have been able to create such a competitive political environment. Nearly one-half of electoral constituencies in the 2009 election were competitive. This trend of increasingly competitive elections has been steadily rising since the 1980s. There is no reason to believe that it will not continue into the future, especially given increasing levels of educational attainment and the willingness of opposition parties to work together for the 2014 election. It is very likely that 2014 will bring Botswana its most competitive elections to date. If, however, elections were to become significantly less competitive or if evidence of voting irregularities were to emerge in 2014, this would dramatically change our assessment of democracy in Botswana.

Because dominant party systems give researchers no information one way or the other on what would happen if the ruling party were to lose an election, we must expand our analysis and incorporate new information so that we may properly ascertain the nature of a regime operating under such a system. In order to understand the functioning of elections under a dominant party system, we must approach electoral outcomes from
multiple angles: from the constituent level, from the perspective of the party, and from the perspective of the voter. In doing so, we base our conclusions on a more complete set of information than a cursory look at national level electoral returns is able to provide.

In order to improve the generalizability of these findings, future research should extend this type of micro-level analysis to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as Ghana, Lesotho, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. This is especially important due to the repeated emphasis of researchers on Botswana’s exceptionalism. The same analysis that was undertaken in Botswana should be undertaken across the continent. Researchers should ask if the factors that affect voters in democratic dominant party systems are similar to those that affect vote choice in autocratic dominant party systems? What factors affect voters in democratic multiparty systems and do these factors differ from those found in the different types of dominant party systems? Do these factors change over time? Do the factors that affect vote choice also affect party system type or does causation run in the other direction? Do the findings relating to democratic satisfaction and vote choice apply to these countries as well? Answering these questions will provide us with both a better understanding of the functioning of elections in Africa and allow us to more accurately speak to the quality of democracy across Africa.

Future research could also examine the competitiveness of elections in other dominant party systems outside of Africa. Mexico and India both have long histories with dominant parties but the quality of democracy varies between the two countries. Mexico under PRI dominance experienced significant corruption and frequent allegations of electoral fraud. India, on the other hand, held relatively free and fair elections during the Congress Party’s tenure of dominance. The analysis of Botswana’s elections implies that
constituency-level electoral competition should be lower in Mexico and higher in India during dominant party rule. Is this the case? Or is it the case that elections in Africa reflect conditions unique to the continent and that these findings apply only to Africa?

Additionally, examining what factors affect electoral competition would help researchers better understand how to encourage electoral competition. Furthermore, uncovering the factors that drive electoral competition would allow researchers to determine if and how ruling parties induce dominance and provide observers with more leverage in assessing the quality of elections.

Finally, there are implications of this work for how we define and examine democracy. Focusing on the big picture (i.e., national level elections) obscures what is actually occurring within a given country and may cause us to misinterpret electoral outcomes. This is not to say that all dominant party systems are democratic, just that they can be. When we lack sufficient information to conclude one way or another, we must take a closer look. Some have argued that measuring democracy based solely on the presence of elections creates an electoral fallacy; that this one piece of information is not sufficient to determine if a country is democratic or not. But we are making another type of electoral fallacy by equating dominant party systems with authoritarianism without taking a closer look; one that is just as detrimental to understanding democracy.
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