Peirce's ambition to construct a philosophical architectonic makes it difficult to isolate any component of it for independent discussion. This is true about his notions of person and community. These concepts have a place within Peirce's epistemological and metaphysical framework, and their discussion could be preceded by an examination of such topics as individuation, discreteness, tychism, synechism, and evolutionary cosmology. A good deal has been written on these topics, and the conclusions of these discussions are by no means uniform. One cannot avoid taking a stand on these conclusions while discussing Peirce's view of the relation between person and community.

Several commentators—Bernstein, Boler, DiMarco, and Weiss—claimed either that Peirce's system lacks the principle of individuation or that the notion of the individual was for him at least a serious embarrassment. A related, and more inclusive, criticism, voiced by Hartshorne, is that Peirce's doctrine of continuity and synechism fails to give proper due to the element of discreteness in all experience.¹ In my opinion, these criticisms have been effectively challenged, and I am inclined to side with the conclusions of two articles—by Gresham Riley² and by Ilona Kemp-Pritchard³—that Peirce is not guilty of the glaring onedimensionality he is accused of and that he does indeed have a defensible, albeit not always consistently articulated, principle of individuation.

I hope that what I have to say will further support Riley's and Kemp-Pritchard's conclusions, but it seems to me more useful to press forward to some conceptual connections that have not been sufficiently explored and that can throw light on the relation between person and community, not only as it was conceived by Peirce but also independently of his philosophy.

Konstantin Kolenda is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University.
To indicate the conceptual territory within which this paper will be moving, it seems desirable to lay out at least a part of Peirce’s architectonic scheme, reproduced below. My objective is to bring out distinctive characteristics of the human reality, both personal and communal, as they emerge from Peirce’s philosophy. These characteristics can be summarized in the notion of Thirdness as Thirdness, which encompasses topics bracketed under this heading. As the diagram indicates, the human reality for Peirce is governed, like the rest of reality, by the general phenomenological categorial scheme, but it also manifests a special kind of Thirdness, which for its full articulation requires a discussion of the way the normative and religious elements enter human experience.

**PEIRCE’S ARCHITECTONIC**

**Phenomenology (Phaneroscopy)**

- Firstness
- Secondness
- Thirdness

**Metaphysics**

Cosmology: Evolutionism

**Nature**

- Non-Human
  - Habits
  - Laws
  - Instincts
- Human
  - Habits
  - Laws
  - Instincts ("Merely Vital" Interests, Hedonism)
  - Sign Use (Semiotics)
    - Logic
    - Ethics
    - Aesthetics
    - Concrete Reasonableness
    - Evolutionary Love
    - Religion (Musement)

Thirdness as Thirdness
The conceptual framework on which I will lean heavily is articulated in Peirce's doctrines of phenomenology and of normative sciences, both of which became central in his later philosophy. When Peirce claimed that Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness characterize all our experience, he implied that an analysis of such concepts as persons or community will need to take into account phenomena characterizable by each of the three categories. These categories are rendered by Peirce in many different ways, and he draws on many different notions to characterize them. Of the multitude of explananda, three seem most conspicuous: quality, fact, and relation. Starting with the middle one, we may say that every experience 1) as taking place has a factual aspect, i.e., has Secondness, 2) has a certain quality unique to it, i.e., Firstness, and 3) is related to its context, i.e., has Thirdness. Let these abbreviations suffice to get us started.

When we examine the behavior of human beings, we notice that it cannot be described adequately without the category of Thirdness. Man is a being who is governed by signs. To emphasize the importance of this feature of being human, Peirce even says that man is sign, and if by language we mean the variety of sign-using activities, we may conclude, as Peirce does, that "my language is the sum total of myself." However, if we say that human beings are governed by signs, we imply that the sign-using activity is governed by some rules or norms. When Peirce examines the nature of these norms, he comes up with his hierarchical classification of normative sciences, with logic on the lowest rung, ethics above it, and aesthetics above ethics. These sciences can help us determine what kind of sign man is, or how the dimension of Thirdness enters human experience.

Since normative sciences are subordinate to phenomenology, the norms and ideals themselves may be examined in terms of all three categories. Although norms and ideals are Thirds, the category of Secondness is applicable to them. That there is nothing incongruous about the Secondness of Thirdness becomes evident when we remember that while for Peirce a law in itself is a Third, its instance or manifestation is a Second, a fact of experience. This is true of all habits, including natural laws and also laws, patterns, or standards governing human behavior. Peirce makes this point effectively when he draws a distinction between existence and reality. A law is real but it does not exist, only its manifestations do. The distinction is not meant as a contrast; one should not conclude that either something is real or it exists. Rather, what exists is real, but its reality is not exhausted in its existence. This, as can be seen, is the cornerstone of Peirce's Scottist realism: no collection of
particulars exhausts a universal. No son of Adam can exhaust the possibilities of humanity.\textsuperscript{5}

The distinction between existence and reality can alert us to something very important about human beings, both individually and collectively. Without necessarily adopting Peirce’s metaphysical view that matter is petrified mind, we can agree with his claim that physiological phenomena are, in his vocabulary, enduring habits; or, as we may prefer to say, they obey certain physical, chemical, and biological laws. Every cell in a human body, and every body as a collection of cells, is governed by determinate laws discoverable by natural sciences. Consequently, every person is characterizable by certain specific factual descriptions—concerning height, weight, complexion, physiognomy, etc. Among the factual features we should also include the person’s psychological and temperamental characteristics, such as dispositions and character traits. We should note that the existentialist notion of facticity acknowledges what Peirce calls Secondness. Pragmatists, existentialists, and philosophers of almost any persuasion agree that a person, among other things, is an enduring physical and psychological entity. Peirce refers to this dynamic aspect of persons rather dramatically at times, when he says, for example, that Secondness is the fact “that fights its way into existence.”\textsuperscript{6}

But to fight one’s way into existence is to emerge within natural surroundings. Personal careers have their biographical settings. We can speak here, with Sartre, of our situationality—persons are born into and are active within particular situations, geographical and historical. Things around us endure and obey various scientifically determinable laws as our bodies do. Our facticity or individuality must come to terms with the facticity of our environment. This is what Peirce’s category of Secondness was intended to call attention to.

In addition to biological life and personal psychological dispositions, we also exhibit habits, patterns of behavior acquired from our society through training and learning. Our mode of life also manifests Secondness inasmuch as our behavior is in fact governed by common norms in their entire spectrum—from etiquette to ethics, from toilet training to always voting the Democratic ticket. Sociological surveys can determine that we as a matter of fact follow certain rules, regulations, and practices. Here we can be said to be in the presence of the Secondness of Thirdness, constituted by customary, habitual, and predictable behavior in accordance with rules, even though the rules themselves, as Thirds, transcend their actual applications. The nature of that transcendence in human experience, however, calls for further discussion, and we shall return to it.

What has been said so far about persons can also be said about communities. Like persons, communities have their geographical and
historical locations. Each has a habitation and usually a name, sometimes more than one name. Communities, too, are born and die, although not in the literal sense. From Gibbon and Spengler, we have learned that civilizations decline and fall, and from Toynbee that they fail to meet challenges thrown by circumstances into their paths. Like human individuals, they reach their peaks and zeniths, and like persons they are commemorated in burial stones or tombs, be these tombs in the shape of Egyptian pyramids or of Doric columns of the Acropolis. Communities come in all shapes and sizes, from families to nations, or groups of nations, as exemplified by the NATO Alliance or in the emerging so-called Third World. What binds a group of people into a community may be no more than an accident of birth in a territory that is covered by some de facto laws that bestow on persons the status of citizens or taxpayers of a given country. The notion of community has a wider and a narrower meaning, and we indicate their scope and limits by proper adjectives. Internal ties of a national community differ from those of a local community. Although we sometimes speak of a global community (especially when we think about the increasing accessibility of remote parts of the world or about the threat of global extinction through nuclear wars), we realistically question whether such a community in fact exists, that is, whether it enters effectively into our mode of life. Similarly, we may distinguish between a social community and a moral community, indicating thereby that people who are literally neighbors may nevertheless be tied by only minimal (if any) moral bonds.

II

The remarks about person and community so far were meant to indicate in what sense Peirce’s phenomenological category of Secondness is applicable to them. It is time to turn our attention to Thirdness. Starting with the lowest rung of normative sciences, logic as a theory of inquiry, we should note that the Pragmatic Maxim itself is an instance of Thirdness. It tells us what we ought to do if we are to gain knowledge, i.e., reliable cognitive results. That Peirce thought of the Pragmatic Maxim as a norm is evident from his vigorous criticism of other methods of conducting inquiry or fixing beliefs. His famous essay “The Fixation of Belief” lists three other procedures or methods, that of tenacity, that of authority, and the a priori method, which have been and still are being relied upon in deciding what is to be believed. Peirce’s aim in that essay is to show what is wrong with these methods or why they ought not to be used, but he voices his criticisms precisely because they are all too frequently relied upon. What he proposes in their place will have an appeal only to those who respect logic and who are committed to a search for
objective truth. The Pragmatic Maxim is preferable as a norm for inquiry because in following it we are more likely to avoid subjective bias. In insisting that our findings be checked by others and that they must be in agreement with those of others, we introduce into our experience an element of stability and security, thus reducing unwelcome surprises.

As Manley Thompson has noted, Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim has a certain affinity to Kant’s Categorical Imperative. The Maxim is a cognitive imperative for those who are not indifferent to the pursuit of truth. As a moral person cannot regard an action as permissible unless it is acceptable to other rational beings confronting a similar situation, so a person seeking factual truth will not accept a finding that is not publicly confirmable by a community of investigators. It is possible to sin against the scientific spirit as it is possible to sin against the spirit of morality. The enlargement of objective knowledge and of moral action is a norm for a rational being; both contribute to what Peirce called concrete reasonableness. Peirce believed there was an intimate connection between logical and moral virtues. His views on this issue may strike us as extreme; he was unwilling to grant, for instance, that a person whose moral character was faulty could make a real contribution to logic or science. But if we do not push this connection too far and limit ourselves to regarding intellectual integrity as a moral virtue, the connection does not appear implausible. After all, think of the Piltdown Man hoax.

The pursuit of scientific truth is not the only humanly desirable objective. There are explicitly moral or ethical norms that govern much of civilized life. Peirce takes note of them primarily when he is deploring what he calls the Gospel of Greed, a tendency to pursue selfish ends at the expense of one’s group. He often sounds as if the pursuit of the goals of the community were everything and as if the individual counted for nothing. Frequently, he is quoted with that interpretation in mind. But these passages can be understood as justifiable criticisms of attitudes unworthy of individuals presumed to be capable of being guided by considerations of the common good. Peirce is criticizing de facto moralities and individual actions that fail to take into account applicable ethical norms. A good example of such criticism is the paper entitled “Vitally Important Topics” delivered at Harvard in 1903. In it Peirce chastises the Harvard community for neglecting pursuits to which it ought to be devoted, namely, the unselfish dedication to long-range scholarly and scientific goals, in favor of objectives that are merely vital, that is, do not require rational, scientific method and could be left to sentiment or instinct. In this paper, Peirce speaks as an explicit moralist, even moralizer, but such addresses have no point unless one presupposes the speaker’s conviction that his audience knows better and ought to mend its ways.
A person concerned about ethical norms can be expected to be responsive to situations in which either criticism or self-criticism is in order. Peirce frequently invokes the notion of self-control in order to characterize rational action. In doing so he elucidates the grammar of normativeness. A norm has a *prima facie* claim on the behavior it is supposed to guide, and this presupposes the existence of individuals who can be expected to understand the purport of the norm. Moral criticism is addressed to whom it may concern, and if no one is concerned, the criticism is pointless. The whole tenor of what Peirce has to say is strongly moralistic, starting with the injunction to adopt proper norms in the pursuit of truth.

III

Responsiveness to the existing and unproblematic logical and ethical norms, and the desire to make them prevail where they in fact do not, is only a part of the normative quest. We are also called upon to reflect on the way the norms we follow create an admirable way of life. This reflection on the norms themselves, on how they affect our personal and communal lives, and on how they contribute to the character of the world we live in, Peirce calls aesthetics. He uses this term in a very general sense, which includes but also transcends a concern for beauty and art. Aesthetics for Peirce deals with what is admirable in itself, apart from any pre-existing ulterior motives, utilitarian motives in particular. Peirce has not much to say in favor of pleasure, especially if it is construed in narrowly hedonistic terms. In his view, the satisfaction produced by aesthetic considerations reaches in the direction reminiscent of Aristotle's contemplation. As we shall see, Peirce connects contemplation with his theology, which grows out of a generously conceived aesthetic quest. That this quest is continuous with ethical concerns is evident from Peirce’s use of another term intended to call attention to the insufficiency of ethics if it is conceived only in terms of unreflective obedience to social norms, that is, when we stop at the level of mere Secondness of Thirdness. On one occasion he introduced the term antethics, to register etymologically the possibility of a reflection that has hierarchical precedence over ethics. The context also shows that antethics and aesthetics are really equivalent in meaning.

How does Thirdness as Thirdness enter human experience? To answer this question we must bring into discussion another famous Peircean notion, namely, abduction or hypothesis. Hypothesis is for him a moment in inferential reasoning. Every new insight into the way things are involves a creative leap of the mind. Induction and deduction can do their work only after abduction has done its. Abduction explains
phenomena. If actual entities behave in the way the hypothesis predicts, then we have in the hypothesis a true explanatory principle, and having adopted it, we can make deductive inferences about how these entities will behave. Peirce’s theory of abduction is general enough to embrace even perception, but we need not be detained by explaining the scope of this theory, especially since at its limits it involves Peirce’s debatable metaphysical views about the connection between conscious and unconscious inferences. Our interest really lies at the other end of the spectrum covered by hypothetical thinking, the extreme limit of it being the hypothesis of God’s reality, Peirce’s supreme guess at the riddle.

If we acknowledge the essentially active, creative role of hypothesis formation, we will have no difficulty in understanding why Peirce regards aesthetics as governing other norms. He tells us that aesthetics is the study of what is admirable in itself. States of affairs that are admirable in themselves are fully harmonious; they lack discord, strife, and inner conflict. They are also intelligible in the fullest sense of the word; no doubts and no questions arise about their components, about the way they fit into one another, and about how the whole complex fits into its surroundings. All-around fittingness and mutual suitability characterize such states of affairs. At the logical level they are not infected with internal contradictions, and together they form a consistent explanatory whole. This is why the aesthetic analogy, with its emphasis on simplicity and elegance, is so often invoked in mathematical and scientific thinking. At the level of ethics as it governs interpersonal relations there is first of all no conflict among individuals; their interests and pursuits do not clash with one another. Selfish motives are not allowed to assert themselves against the common good—the Gospel of Greed is overcome and left behind. Each member of the community is respected as an active contributor to common projects, such as the pursuit of truth and knowledge, or the satisfaction of justifiable needs and interests. Ethical reformers who seek to reduce the clash of de facto followed rules do so by divining a way to reconcile and harmonize them or so reinterpret them as to do away with the obstacles obstructing mutual understanding. In other words, they enlist Peircean hypothetico-aesthetic reasoning with the objective of advancing the cause of concrete reasonableness.

Where does one find an inspiration to advance this cause? Like many philosophers before him, Peirce finds clues in already existing and experienced harmonies, namely those provided by nature and human nature. He has often been criticized for his optimism about the growing edge of scientific knowledge. At times he sounds like a prophet of in-
evitable linear progression toward total understanding of the world. In fact, his prophecies are less sanguine and more guarded than they may seem. He does cite scientific successes as a proof that there is something about the human mind that makes possible its successful attunement to the secrets of nature. Although he has high hopes for scientific inquiry, his prognostications and predictions are not absolute but conditional. Further progress of science will depend on whether the human community will follow sound methods and adequate norms. Whether it will or not is an open question. In part, it depends on whether the members of that community will be able to make right guesses at the solution, that is, produce hypothetico-aesthetic explanatory judgments that will show how things really are and how they ought to be. In this quest, Peirce is willing to enlist even theology. Essentially, it is a natural theology. He notes that a contemplation of the harmonies of the physical universe alone can produce a sense of wonder about the marvelous connectedness of things. The state of mind in which this connectedness is discovered he calls *musement*, and he describes its character in an almost poetic language:

Let the Muser, for example, after well appreciating, in its breadth and depth, the unspeakable variety of each Universe, turn to those phenomena that are of the nature of homogeneities of connectedness in each; and what spectacle will unroll itself! As a mere hint of them I may point out that every small part of space, however remote, is bounded by just such neighboring parts as every other, without a single exception throughout immensity.

... in the Pure Play of Musement the idea of God’s Reality will be sure sooner or later to be found an attractive fancy, which the Muser will develop in various ways. The more he ponders it, the more it will find response in every part of his mind, for its beauty, for its supplying an ideal of life, and for its thoroughly satisfactory explanation of his whole threefold environment.

The sense of wonder produced by aesthetically tinged moods of contemplation leads us in the direction of religion, but, true to his phenomenological scheme, Peirce is defending the reality, not the existence of God. God is that limit of Thirdness as Thirdness that is sometimes glimpsed by a person who is impressed both by some existing harmonies and by the dimly felt impetus in his own soul to work toward their further extension and development. Peirce is not reluctant to admit a connection between poetry and religion—both yearn for the ideal. “The complete generalization, the complete regeneration of sentiment is religion, which is poetry, but poetry completed.”

Already in his definition of truth as a beckoning “would-be,” Peirce firmly planted the pursuit of scientific knowledge in the ideal realm. His definition of truth as a “would-be,” as a contrary-to-fact conditional, under-
standably aroused a good deal of controversy. Was Peirce suggesting that the state of affairs in which the final truth is realized and crystallized *will be* attained some day? A temptation so to interpret it founders on Peirce's claim that as far as we know, the total extinction of our entire planet is not only a possibility but also a likelihood. Since the achievement of final truth calls for an indefinite pursuit of it, it is not likely that when the earth grows cold and lifeless the final truth will be reached. But if so, should we interpret the "would-be" in some other way? I suggest that if we consider all the features of Peirce's phenomenology, we should not interpret the "would-be" as a "will be."

Remember, that besides Secondness and Thirdness there is also Firstness, the immediately felt quality of anything. We are told that Firstness is to be found not only in simple entities such as particular colors and sounds, but also in composite and complex entities such as mathematical formulas or artistic creations. Everything has Firstness, including all-embracing hypotheses, such as the hypothesis of God. This means that what is discovered in various forms of musing, contemplation, or theoretical vision also manifests Firstness. The aesthetic apprehension of what is admirable in itself is another name for the apprehension of a special type of Firstness that is, so to speak, caught on the wing by a muser, a beholder, or a theoretician. Since that which is thus apprehended, provided it is a genuine insight, has a higher degree of generality than the instance in which it is realized, we must conceive of the new explanatory holistic hypothesis as manifesting Thirdness. Firstness has its own type of generality, according to Peirce, and we can suspect the doctrine of Realism to be at work here as well. The Secondness of the act of apprehending explanatory hypotheses has a qualitative feel about it that is cashed in by the beholder's consciousness at the moment that act occurs. This is when we, to use a down-to-earth metaphor, hit pay dirt. We get in touch with at least a part of *sum-mum bonum*, with what Santayana's Autologos proclaimed to be good in itself.

Although Peirce claims to be Aristotle's follower in this connection, the kind of contemplation Peirce's musers experiences contains not only a theoretical component of the experience but also its aesthetically felt quality. The truth reached is beautiful and at the same time justifies everything that helped to prepare for it. One is almost inclined to borrow Kierkegaard's notion of being *in* the truth to characterize this sort of experience. Of course, it is never the total truth, for every muser is finite, and because of his own special facticity and situationality sees that truth only from his point of view. Nevertheless, if what he contemplates is supportable by rational argument and objective knowledge, he is entitled to feel that he *is* in the truth. If we are inclined to regard Peirce's musement as a mild form of mystical experience, then we should note that for him there is no gap be-
tween musement and the rest of experience. Indeed, one of the functions of musement is to initiate a more adequate integration of ordinary experience in terms of the unifying contribution musement initiates. Again, the Firstness of the experience, if it is in tune with reality, has in it a generalizing tendency, which can be translated into practical consequences in normal perception; in other words, it must lead to pragmatic effects.  

When Peirce says that man’s task is to be a co-worker in bringing about concrete reasonableness in the universe, he acknowledges the self-justifying character of experiences in which the growth of this reasonableness is apprehended and celebrated. In that sense, the Firstness of such experiences is helping to bring about the realization of the potentialities of what is admirable in itself. This is the way in which God is present in the world; his reality is essentially ideal and shows forth the world’s possibilities. For that reason, every single experience of the world’s intelligibility, both theoretical and practical, may be perceived aesthetically in Peirce’s broad sense of the term. If so, the admirable in itself does not require the postulation of a final stage. Such a stage is not even desirable, because it would mean an end of Thirdness as Thirdness, an indefinite creative surge, which, because of the inexhaustible potentialities of Firstness, has new worlds to envision and to realize. Peirce’s theology has no use for a fully crystallized Roycean Absolute. Such an Absolute would be contrary to the spirit of evolutionary love and to concrete reasonableness, the reality of which consists in indefinite growth.  

How does this general phenomenologico-metaphysical vision affect our conception of persons and communities? First of all, it implies a very positive picture of human personality. Peirce meant to pay man a compliment by saying that in addition to manifesting Firstness and Secondness, as does every entity in the world, man is essentially a sign, a manifestation of Thirdness. It would be wrong to accuse Peirce of traditional Western rationalistic bias and to interpret him as assigning primacy to the logical-theoretical side of human beings. Although Peirce sees a certain analogy between ideas and persons, he does not push this analogy too far. Persons, for him, are particular factual entities, embodying indurated habits of their physical bodies, governed by laws of nature, and displaying instinctive characteristics common to all mankind. But they also manifest personal dispositions, which vary from person to person. Unpredictable individual variations testify to the presence of chance, of the tychistic element in the universe. In addition, being a person means being a sign blessed with the opportunity and charged with the task of interpreting itself. That interpretation does not take place in
the vacuum of a Cartesian soul (or the Rylean "Ghost in the Machine") but has to make sense of itself amidst a world shared with other beings and other persons. This sense of oneself in a common world is what Peirce calls inquiry, a process to which each of us is called upon to make a contribution.

"Do not block the road to inquiry!" is an ethical injunction addressed to all human beings. To the extent that one succeeds in understanding one’s position in the world, that is, organizes one’s life in accordance with findings made available through scientific method, one is doing one’s bit toward making the world more concretely reasonable. Thus a successful cognitive relationship to the world is an achievement to be welcomed and celebrated. Ignorance is not bliss because knowledge is a virtue. For Peirce, cognition is a full-blooded experience involving practical consequences for one’s entire embodied being. To fill out the conception of that experience, we need to supplement the rationalistic conception of a Plato with the Baconian dictum “knowledge is power,” whereby power means effectiveness in practical affairs. If we recall that the capacity for thought also involves the possibility of entertaining hypothetico-aesthetic-religious thoughts, then Peirce has room also for the Pascalian view that “all our dignity is in our thought” without embracing the mystico-existentialist connotation Pascal’s position tended to encourage. To be an active participant in a public pursuit of truth was, for Peirce, a distinctly human privilege. He was never in danger of falling into despair engendered by the alienation stemming from interpreting human thought solipsistically and thus generating a requirement for salvation by a transcendent power. The rewards of musements, when a person feels attuned to the actual and possible beauties of the universe, seem to him ample enough.

The role of the community in the life of persons is fundamental. In a most insistent way, Peirce re-emphasizes Aristotle’s conviction that man is a social animal. Without public confirmation in a cooperative enterprise, there is no objective truth, and hence a community of inquirers and musers is indispensable for its attainment. Inasmuch as Peirce perceived the scientific endeavor as a joint effort establishing moral bonds between individuals and generations, the community of inquirers becomes a practical and practicable version of what Kant called the Kingdom of Ends. This, I believe, is responsible for almost preachy declarations in Peirce’s writings of the insufficiency of the individual to attain what is humanly desirable. The sternness of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, enjoining us to disregard our personal inclinations when they conflict with what is morally acceptable to all, finds its counterpart in Peirce’s repeated reminders that we are but cells in a social organism.
When we ask what forms the ongoing process of inquiry will take in the course of time and to what theoretical structures the use of scientific method will lead, we do not get from Peirce a clear answer. To be sure, he was confident, on the basis of past experience, that we can expect a convergence of scientific findings in a commonly agreed-upon framework. But how soon this convergence will appear and what detours it may require before it is reached he does not venture to predict. There is no way of telling how often seemingly stable scientific hypotheses will be thrown into doubt by surprises forced on our calculations by the workings of nature. There is also no reason to think that in pursuing their particular tracks of inquiry scientists will not come up with hypotheses that in some respects seem incompatible or are merely complementary in an ad hoc sort of way, the way the corpuscular and the wave theory of light seem to be. To the extent that a reliance on several different theoretical frameworks may be necessary to account for the observed phenomena, there will be a lack of unity and harmony in our explanation, which from the point of view of Peirce’s aesthetics, of the admirable in itself, will appear undesirable and worth remedying. As we know, Einstein would not accept the quantum theory because to him it implied that God is playing dice—a rationally unacceptable state of affairs. But on Peircean premises there is nothing to prevent us from finding out that that is the case; i.e., that God is a gambler.

In fact, by granting that the nature of things exhibits a tychistic element, Peirce was prepared to deal with the possibility dreaded by Einstein. For, after all, if God does play with dice, unloaded ones we hope, then perhaps we can initiate at least a statistical study of what the outcome of his playing is likely to be. We may need a lot of time to find out, but we do have an indefinite time at our disposal. All along we can celebrate our successes when our knowledge eliminates internal tensions and incompatibilities. Conversely, we will be chagrined when our paradigms break down and fail to converge. The history of science may not exhibit a linear progress, as Peirce seemed to believe, but science is a rather young enterprise in the cosmic evolution, and we should not be impatient. To rush to Kuhnian or Feyerabendian conclusions and to rail against method may be a premature surrender to irrationality.

VI

Since Peirce’s time we have become less enamored of the idea that the admirable in itself, the sumnum bonum, is to be achieved by concentrating on natural science. In part because of the growth of social sciences and in part because of the discovery of the surprising variety of
past and of co-existing human cultures, we are less intent on bringing about a uniform form of life. We are more impressed by the difficulty of evaluating the course of human history, on both the global and the local levels. At times we may be disturbed by the fact that historians are constantly engaged in rewriting history and put before us conflicting versions of it.35

But there is also an encouraging explanation why we see historiography in a new light. The rewriting of history may be a result of reflecting on the norms by which we judge our past. Different norms bring different facts into prominence. The ability to revise historical accounts may be a sign of a community’s moral vitality. That American history texts now have a place for blacks or Hispanics is a sign of a growing social conscience. Our concern with the changing ethical standards may reflect the ongoing review of their meaning and scope. What America as a community means to her citizens is undergoing a revision in the light of rising expectations and of changing values. Some revisions are results of changing conceptions of what is admirable in itself, and thus call for a reinterpretation of what America stands for, both within itself and for the world. To what extent the conflicting or divergent interpretations will converge toward a generally accepted picture depends on our ability to harmonize them into a single vision. It is to be hoped that hypothetico-aesthetic musements out of which such a vision may arise will embody both a respect for truth and a sensitivity to ethical standards, and that therefore the best qualified persons will be allowed to act as leaders. If the guidance of our public affairs falls into the hands of people who have no respect either for rational standards of inquiry or for ethical norms, our vision of the *summum bonum* for our community is not likely to be inspiring.

In his own day, Peirce was disturbed by religious sectarianism and wanted to see it replaced by a church universal.36 Since religion for him was an extension of the scientific spirit, he may have been too eager to establish a direct connection between the universal scientific method and culture as a whole. Today, we are paying more attention to the varieties of moral experience and to the differences between aesthetic norms governing particular cultures. We are not so sure that there is only one path to the *summum bonum*, and we are inclined to think that there may be many versions of the admirable in itself.

To the extent that a human community on the global scale is emerging, we must consider, as Peirce prescribed, the indispensable requirements for finding a common set of ethical norms for that global community. In the absence of some such norms, corresponding perhaps to what is now referred to in the political arena as human rights agreed upon in the Helsinki agreement, we can expect situations to arise that are
clearly far from being admirable in themselves. In a world that is trying to be both many and one, serious conflicts among and within nations can arise, thus generating a burning need for accommodation, compromise, and consensus.\footnote{It is important to note that consensus, however, need not obliterate all distinctions, and need not destroy positive cultural differences among peoples and cultures. To the extent that natural science, through technical applications, helps to satisfy universal human needs, the resolution of conflicts requires a respect for scientific method shared by the entire global community. Just how the findings of science are to be brought into harmony with what each culture regards as admirable in itself is not an easy question to answer; nevertheless, such a harmony must be sought if mutual destruction is to be avoided and the good life to be achieved. In this respect, it is impossible to disagree with Peirce that a universal community is a worthy goal.}

We should not forget, however, that the forging of such a community is in the hands of persons who are so placed as to be responsible for devising hypotheses, guesses at riddles, which would envision solutions for the conflicts and disagreements that block the way to mutual understanding and harmony. In this task, there is endless room for individual initiative and improvisation. Whenever such reconciling and bridge-building solutions are found, the persons who bring them about and the new communities that thus come into being have reason to celebrate their contributions to the growth of concrete reasonableness in the universe. They can rightly regard themselves as participants in what Peirce called evolutionary love.

Evolutionary love has no single goal toward which it aims, contrary to what Peirce at times seems to suggest. If we get away from the idea that the \textit{summum bonum} is to be found only in the final fully crystallized achievement at the end of this cosmic process, then we will be more likely to appreciate and celebrate occasions on which problems are resolved and good realized. The achievement of the good is desirable even when it is partial and not the highest good. As in matters of belief, we may learn to be satisfied with demi-cadences. Such demi-cadences, however, can be accompanied by corresponding Musements contemplating their intrinsic value. Besides the rare occasions on which we glimpse something like the total harmoniousness of the things, we may also indulge, more frequently, in mini-Musement, when harmonies achieved or perceived are partial and limited, but when things nevertheless fall into place and present us with a welcome spectacle. Such mini-Musement may accompany a resolution of a particular conflict, a solution to a theoretical or a practical problem, or the enlargement of our ties and sympathies with other persons. Whatever our field of activity, all of us have occasions to perceive and to bring about what is admirable in itself. Such
occasions may give us a glimmer of understanding of what Peirce meant by Thirdness as Thirdness and may enable us to recognize the abiding reality of what he called the evolutionary love.

NOTES


2. Gresham Riley, "Peirce's Theory of Individuals," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Summer 1974, No. 3: "Peirce is not negating individuality per se. He is denying that individuals are the final determiners of truth and reality" (p. 150).

3. Ilona Kemp-Pritchard, "Peirce on Individuation," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Spring 1978, No. 2: "Continuity does not function adequately in his system without the (implicit or explicit) functioning of discontinuity" (p. 90).

4. "... the word or sign which man uses is the man himself. ... Thus, my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought." Collected Papers, hereinafter referred to as CP, 5.314.

5. "Yet in all his life long no son of Adam has ever fully manifested what there was in him." CP, 1.615.

6. CP, 1.432.

7. "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." CP, 5.402.


10. I agree with Ilona Kemp-Pritchard when she says that in Peirce's writings "individualism is vilified not because of its ontological significance, but rather because of a specific moral aim." "Peirce on Individuation," p. 95.

11. "... vital importance seems to be a very low kind of importance, indeed." CP, 1.647.

12. "It would amount to saying that the one ultimately admirable object is the unrestrained gratification of a desire, regardless of what the nature of that desire may be. Now that is too shocking." CP, 1.614.
13. CP, 1.618.

14. "... antethics should be the theory of the conformity of action to an ideal," while "ethics studies the conformity of conduct to an ideal... a sort of composite photograph of the conscience of the members of the community." CP, 1.573.

15. CP, 1.574. See also 1.611 for an account of the difference between the moralist and the aesthetician.

16. It is of interest to note that in his last published paper Gilbert Ryle claimed that all thinking involves a novel response. "To a partly novel situation the response is necessarily partly novel, else it is not a response... Although the drawing of a conclusion from premises is our very paradigm of that step-after-step or leapfrogging progression which we have hankered to impute to all thinking, yet this very leapfrogging process itself presupposes the presence of thoughts that are not themselves made up of leapfroggings." Mind, January 1976, reprinted in On Thinking, ed. K. Kolenda (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), pp. 125-127.


18. In his article, "Value and the Peircean Categories," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Summer 1979, No. 3, Carl R. Hausman makes a similar point by claiming that the notion of value functions "in much the same way in which categories function in Peirce's thought" (p. 203). He says that "thirdness requires completion," that aesthetic value is "a condition of the final end of Thirdness" (p. 214), that the direction of evolution "requires a vision of harmony" (p. 215), and that "aesthetic value functions as a lure relevant to the ideal completion of Thirdness as embodied" (p. 216).

19. For a further elaboration of this theme, see my Freedom of Reason (San Antonio: Principia Press, 1964), particularly pp. 49-50 and 66.


22. CP, 6.465. The three Universes and the threefold environment referred to in these passages are aspects of experience disclosed by the categorial scheme.

23. CP, 6.495.

24. CP, 1.676. See also 1.383.

25. "The existence of the human race, we may be as good as sure, will come to an end at last." CP, 5.587.

26. To capture some additional features of this kind of apprehension I have introduced the notion of "compensation" in my Religion without God (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1976).

27. CP, 6.135 ff., 6.268.


29. CP, 6.480.

30. CP, 1.615.

31. To interpret Peirce as postulating the actual end to the evolutionary process is to create for him a difficulty analogous to Aristotle's difficulty when he, while embracing the principle that there is no matter without form, and vice versa, also wanted to speak of uniformed matter on one end of the cosmic scale, and of Pure Form on the other.

32. CP, 6.155, 6.270.

33. Similar considerations apply to philosophy as such. "A philosophical tradition which would add up to one great consistent logical system would not constitute a triumph of reason." The Freedom of Reason, p. 130.

35. In her book, America Revised (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), Frances Fitzgerald shows how the constant rewriting of American history in school textbooks raises some fundamental questions. “Was the United States really like Yugoslavia—a country held together by a delicate balance among ethnic and cultural groups? Or was there some integration of these groups? Was there a dominant culture—and was that a good thing?” (p. 98).

36. CP, 6.443.

37. For a discussion of this issue, see my “Globalism v. consensual Pluralism,” in Humanist Ethics, ed. Morris B. Storer (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1980).