CHAPTER V

CHINESE SOCIETY AND TRADITIONAL CHINESE CULTURE

The unity and cohesiveness of traditional Chinese elite culture is striking and significant. But the gentry class, after all, comprised only about two percent of China’s population in Ch’ing times. What about the other ninety-eight percent of society—including peasants, artisans, merchants, and service groups such as doctors, astrologers, and waiters? To what extent did they share the elite cultural vision we have been describing?

In many respects, a great cultural gulf separated elite from commoner in traditional China. Members of the gentry class were entitled to special terms of address, special clothing and badges of rank, favorable legal treatment (including immunity from corporal punishment and exemption from being called as witnesses by commoners), official exemption from the labor service tax, and easy access to officialdom, which resulted in further preferential treatment.\(^1\) Frederic Wakeman has demonstrated effectively by means of parable how elite cultural common denominators, and not simply wealth, provided the key to power-wielding and power-holding in traditional China.\(^2\)

But the cultural divide between elites and commoners in the Ch’ing period could be bridged in a number of ways. One way was the transmission of elite values to all sectors of society through the medium of vernacular literature—novels, dramas, short stories, *shan-shu* ("morality books"), *pao-chüan* ("precious scrolls"), and folk tales. All of these literary forms, like the orthodox classical literature and official historiography of the Chinese elite, were strongly didactic.\(^3\) In the main, the message was Confucian, even in such popular Buddhist and Religious Taoist tracts as the *T’ai-shang kan-ying p’ien* (Treatise of the Most Exalted One on Retribution), the *Pu-fei-ch’ien kung-te li* (Meritorious Deeds at No Cost), and the *Kuang-shan p’ien kung-kuo ko* (Ledger of Merit and Demerit for the Diffusion of Good Deeds).

Although based on the idea of divine retribution and buttressed by other religious ideas, these works used a great deal of elite symbolism, and
had a decidedly ethical, this-worldly cast. To be sure, they often contained admonitions to spare animal life, to show respect to sacred images, and “not to speak ill of Buddhist and Taoist monks”; but the importance in these tracts of family affairs, filial piety, loyalty to the ruler, obedience to the “principles of Heaven,” social harmony, the avoidance of lawsuits, and even respect for paper with characters written on it, indicates a decidedly Confucian point of view. Furthermore, although Tadao Sakai rightly indicates that works such as the *Pu-fei-ch’ien kung-te li* classify meritorious deeds according to social class and specific occupational groupings, the striking feature of these works is the acceptance of a Confucian social hierarchy and the fact that “there is virtually no class consciousness or awareness of class interests to be asserted or defended.”

One important reason for the relative lack of an awareness of “class interests” in late imperial China was the examination system. “The belief in the active possibility of social mobility—perhaps even more than the actual statistical incidence of it—kept the different levels of cultural life coherent and congruent, if not truly identical in quality and character, for each level of life was an active model to be imitated by the one below it.” Social mobility was, after all, no myth. In the Ming-Ch’ing period, for example, over forty percent of the upper degree holders (chin-shih and chi-jen) came from families that had not produced an office holder or upper degree holder in the preceding three generations.

The examinations were a special lure to the merchant class, which was traditionally disesteemed in Confucian thought and society. Stigmatized as unscrupulous and parasitic, merchants were chronically insecure. Institutionally, they lacked the power to command bureaucratic obedience; they had little protective commercial law, no political or organizational autonomy in urban areas, and no hope of operating large-scale business without official sponsorship. On the other hand, merchants could use their wealth to escape their status by investing in education. In Ming-Ch’ing times, merchants and their sons were allowed to take the examinations and to acquire official gentry rank. In the absence of effective barriers to elite status, they thus had no incentive to challenge the existing Confucian social order.

Nor, as Frederic Wakeman points out, did Chinese merchants adopt a distinct class manner or lifestyle of their own: “Emulating the gentry’s status manner on a colossal scale, they consumed their capital conspicuously, dissipating the possibility of more productive investments and reaffirming the hegemony of the literati’s high culture. There was a uniquely mad and millionarish quality to the ‘salt fools’ (yen tai-tzu) who lavished fortunes on mechanized toys, Lake T’ai rock decorations, and exotic pets, but this was still just a magnified perversion of gentry fashion. And for all the squander, families like the Ma clan of salt merchants not
only presided over one of the most famous literary salons of the eighteenth century and patronized many of the noted artists of the day, they also amassed private libraries of rare editions which were the envy of the Ch’ien-lung Emperor. 78

Even peasants and artisans were attracted by the carrot of social mobility offered by the examination system. The vast majority, of course, had no real possibility of attaining the necessary education, for formal education was overwhelmingly private in traditional China and beyond the financial reach of perhaps ninety percent of the population. Yet there were some educational opportunities for the poor and disadvantaged—most notably “charitable schools” (i-hsieh) established by clans. 79

Such schools might educate poor but promising clan members as a matter of Confucian altruism (and as an expression of the Confucian dictum that “in education there are no class distinctions”). But more often than not the motive was probably corporate self-interest. Success in the examinations brought prestige and perhaps wealth to the clan as a whole, making the investment in worthy candidates from any social class a wise one. Significantly, a number of clans expressly stipulated that educational priority be given to orphans and other poor clan members. It must be remembered, however, that the clan system was unevenly distributed in traditional China, being most highly developed in the southeast (especially Kwangtung and Fukien), well-organized and widely distributed in the lower and central Yangtze provinces, but rather underdeveloped and thinly distributed in the northern provinces. Educational opportunities for the poor thus varied from location to location. 80

Clans did more than provide educational opportunities. They were also an important means of transmitting elite values to all classes of society within the clan. The principal device was clan rules (tsung-kuei). These rules were compiled by the elite for the edification of all clan members. In the main they were Confucian in content, and included quotations from the classics, neo-Confucian writings, and other inspirational sources. They also often included imperial injunctions (sheng-yü) such as the K’ang-hsi emperor’s so-called Sacred Edict, and excerpts from the Yung-cheng emperor’s 10,000-word commentary to this work. Although district magistrates were supposed to give lectures on these imperial exhortations, most did so only occasionally and in a perfunctory manner. One suspects, therefore, that lectures on the clan rules in clan meetings provided a more effective channel for the communication of these ideas to commoners, at least within the clan itself. The basic concerns of the Sacred Edict, which were by and large those of the clan, included the encouragement of filial piety, respect for age, clan and community harmony, ritual and discipline, obedience to the law, avoidance of litigation, and avoidance of heretical sects.
Hui-chen Wang Liu has shown that orthodox Confucian concepts were adjusted somewhat in clan rules to conform to the realities of Chinese everyday life, especially to the outlook of commoners. She finds, for example, that many clan rules were an admixture of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religion. Some rules advised members to read the T'ai-shang kan-ying p'ien; others cited Buddhist authority for sanction; still others allowed Buddhist images to be placed next to ancestral tablets in the clan shrine. Through such forms of accommodation, the clan rules—like vernacular literature—provided a convenient meeting point between elite and popular culture.

Clan solidarity, and adherence to clan rules, were based in part on the clan’s ability to impose punishments on its members, ranging from reprimands and fines to corporal punishment and expulsion. But the practice of collective ancestor worship also provided a strong sense of group cohesiveness and conformity within the clan. The ancestral temple, which was usually the largest and most impressive clan building, was a powerful reminder of the link between the dead and the living, the past and the present. Tiered rows of spirit tablets, sometimes numbering over a thousand, were organized by generations on the clan ancestral altar. Around them were plaques of honorific titles bestowed by the government on the clan’s illustrious sons, and moral exhortations left by clan forefathers to inspire moral behavior and promote positive ambition among their posterity.

In this environment, many collective clan sacrifices took place every year on important occasions such as the birth or marriage of clan sons, and important festivals such as those of spring, autumn, and New Year’s. These rites, and the clan feasts that followed, “helped to perpetuate the memory of the traditions and historical sentiments of the group, sustain its moral beliefs, and revivify group consciousness. Through these rites and the presence of the group in its full numerical strength, the clan periodically renewed its sentiments of pride, loyalty, and unity.”

What ancestor worship did for the clan, it also did for the Chinese nuclear family. By late imperial times, family ancestor worship had become a cultural universal in China. Even kinship-renouncing Buddhist monks observed mourning rites for their parents. Enriched by Confucian, Buddhist, and Religious Taoist ideas, ancestor worship buttressed the Chinese family system and fostered a profound precedent-mindedness at all levels of society. Important decisions within the family required “consultation” with the ancestors, whose wishes or interests could not be ignored without risk. Peasants and emperors alike were acutely aware of their filial responsibilities to departed ancestors.

It is not surprising that the policies of the Ch’ing government were often closely linked to the practice of ancestor worship. On the one hand,
the state sought to maintain order through negative sanctions by addressing the most compelling concerns of the ancestral cult. Rebel leaders, for example, stood the chance of having their entire families wiped out and their ancestral tombs destroyed. Punishments such as mutilation of the body (a gift from one's ancestors) and banishment (detachment from the clan and natal community) were clearly designed as deterrents to the filial-minded. On the other hand, the state actively supported ancestor worship as a matter of Confucian conviction. Officials were required to withdraw from duty for up to three years of mourning upon the death of a parent, and the Ch'ing legal code (Ta-Ch'ing lü-li) even stipulated that criminals convicted of capital offenses might be allowed to receive a greatly reduced penalty and to remain at home in order to continue family sacrifices if they were the sole male heirs of deceased parents.13

Confucian values mitigated the law in other significant ways. Punishments, for example, were meted out within the family system according to the five official degrees of mourning relationships (wu-fu). These relationships were based on the superiority of the senior generation over the junior generation, and the male over the female. Thus, a son who struck or beat a parent (degree 1 relationship) was liable to decapitation, irrespective of whether or not injury resulted, but no penalty applied to a parent who beat a son (degree 2b), unless the son died. Likewise, a wife who struck her husband (degree 1) received a hundred blows of the heavy bamboo, but a husband who struck his wife (degree 2a) was punished only if he inflicted a significant injury—and then only if the wife personally lodged a complaint with the authorities. The penalty for beating a first cousin once removed (degree 4) was one year of penal servitude plus sixty blows of the heavy bamboo; it was one and one-half years plus seventy blows for beating a first cousin (degree 3). Perhaps the most astonishing feature of the Ch'ing code was its stipulation that accusations by subordinate members of a family against their superiors would entail legal punishment for the reporter, even if true. The false accusation of a father by his son was punished by strangulation, but a true report (except in the case of treason or rebellion) still brought a penalty of three years penal servitude plus one hundred blows of the heavy bamboo.14

In several respects, the Ch'ing government's policy toward religious life at the local level outside the family and the clan paralleled its policy toward ancestor worship. In each case, the state's ultimate aim was to ensure social harmony and control. To the extent, therefore, that religious sacrifices supported state authority or improved popular morale, officials actively encouraged them. As we have noted, the Ch'ing authorities periodically called upon Buddhist and Taoist priests to say prayers in times of trouble, and officials themselves undertook state religious sacrifices to various local deities, including Kuan-ti and the City God (ch'eng-huang).15
Emperors bestowed on local gods honorific titles, which were dutifully inscribed on temple plaques and tablets in the fashion of clan ancestral halls. Officials adopted deities from popular religion and bureaucratized them (the City God, for example, was the otherworldly [yin] equivalent of the district magistrate [yang] at the hsien level), while the common people, for their part, worshipped gods that were like "magic officials." Arthur Wolf goes so far as to say: "Assessed in terms of its long-range impact on the people, [the Chinese imperial government] appears to have been one of the most potent governments ever known, for it created a religion in its own image." The Ch'ing government did everything in its power to control Chinese religious life. This included not only close supervision over the regular Buddhist and Religious Taoist establishment, but also the prohibition of many diverse religious sects. Although ideologically willing to tolerate Buddhism and Religious Taoism as doctrines that "encourage what is good and reprove what is evil" (in the words of the Chia-ch'ing emperor), the state greatly feared the political power of organized religious movements. Thus, the Ch'ing code specified that leaders of "heretical" organizations (i.e., secret societies, broadly construed) were to be strangled, and their accomplices were to receive one hundred blows of the heavy bamboo and to be banished to a distance of three thousand li (about one thousand miles). Even religious societies such as the Lung Hua sect, which placed great emphasis on Confucian ethics, did not escape harsh persecution by the Ch'ing government. Like the clan system itself, popular religion was viewed by the state as a potential threat as well as a source of support.

The ideology of secret societies is a fascinating subject. We know, of course, that these organizations were condemned by the state as immoral (yin), perverse (yao), and heterodox (hsieh). Their social base consisted primarily of poor peasants and "marginal and destitute elements" of towns and villages, including monks, transport workers, and vagabonds. Yet, as Jean Chesneaux indicates, "no matter how badly oppressed the secret societies were and how strong their hostility to the established order, they always remained within that order. The yin of the underground forces represented by the secret societies opposed the Confucian yang, but was at the same time attached to it by bonds of mutual interdependence. In the last analysis, . . . secret societies were limited to fraternal action within the Confucian world." Frederic Wakeman provides apt illustration of this point, indicating, for example, that the transformation of Chu Yiian-chang from sectarian leader into founder and first emperor of the Ming dynasty may well have been "eased by certain ideological similarities between rebel heterodoxy and Confucian orthodoxy." Philip Kuhn's discussion of "orthodox" and "heterodox" models of social organizations in Ch'ing China not only assumes that "differences in political and ideological
orientation... did not necessarily involve differences in scales and modes of organization,” but also warns against the dangers of “differentiating too sharply between... [orthodox and heterodox organizations] on grounds of supposed ideological differences.”

Such organizational and ideological affinities between orthodox and unorthodox social groupings in traditional China may help explain the endurance of the dynastic system in the face of frequent peasant uprisings. But other cultural factors were also at work, limiting revolutionary change and undergirding the traditional social order. One of these was the close relationship between city and countryside in post-Sung times.

The cities of late imperial China were very much unlike their counterparts in medieval and early modern Europe. One difference was, of course, the preponderant role of the state in urban affairs in China. Another was the cosmological significance of the Chinese walled city, and the persistent yin-yang/five elements symbolism associated with it. Yet another was the absence in China of religious structures comparable in size and importance to those in Western cities. Also significant is that fact that no Chinese building was obviously datable by a particular period style: “Time did not challenge time in the eyes of a wanderer in a city street in traditional China... No traditional Chinese city ever had a Romanesque or a Gothic past to be overlaid in a burst of classical renascence, or a Victorian nightmare to be scorned in an age of aggressive functionalism.”

But the most significant difference of all was the lack of a sharp urban-rural distinction in traditional Chinese cultural life.

It would be a mistake to exaggerate urban-rural uniformities in China. The mingling of merchants and gentry in urban areas, for example, must have affected the cultural tone of city life, which was undoubtedly more intense and cosmopolitan than life in the countryside. Yet the outstanding feature of Chinese cultural life in late imperial times is its perceptible unity along an urban-rural continuum. In the Ch’ing period, only about twenty-five percent of the Chinese elite had permanent urban residences. Although in their capacity as officials, members of the elite necessarily resided in urban areas, the majority came from the countryside and returned to the countryside upon retirement. No significant differences existed between urban and rural elites regarding housing, dress, eating and drinking habits, transport, and general cultural style. Many famous centers of learning were located in rural areas, as were great libraries and art collections. Just as there was no major gulf between the capital and the provinces in the cultural life of the Chinese elite, so there was no glaring cultural distance between the city and the countryside.

What can be identified is a set of contrasting elite attitudes toward urban-rural relations that may be viewed as a reflection of yin-yang complementary thinking. In office, Chinese scholars tended to emphasize
the "civilizing" functions of the city; out of office they esteemed the purity of the rural sector. Institutionally, the elite served predominantly public interests in one capacity and primarily private interests in another. Thus a gentry member might well be an upright and incorruptible magistrate outside his native place, but return home to use his bureaucratic influence and social status to acquire private property, to obtain preferential treatment in taxation, and to protect kinship interests. As Frederic Wakeman says, "Local social organization ... embodied contrary principles: integration into the imperial system and autonomy from it. The dynamic oscillation between these poles created the unity of Chinese society, not by eliminating the contradictions but by balancing them in such a way as to favor overall order. The balance was expressed in ideal terms as a Confucian compromise between Legalist intervention and complete laissez-faire." 31

In all, then, the key to stability and cultural continuity in late imperial China was the homeostatic balance that existed between different types of thought, different forms of social and political organization, and even different areas of residence. In times of dynastic vigor, this balance was also evident in the rapport (kan-ch'ing) that existed between peasants and the elite, tenants and landlords. In the heyday of the dynasty, there was considerable geographic and social mobility as well as a substantial amount of elite-commoner interaction within the traditional village and especially the cellular market structure. The markets and fairs that brought merchants from dispersed places to a common center "fostered cultural exchange among local systems within the trading area in question," while the travels of successful scholars to far-flung places "increased their social and cultural versatility and enlarged the cultural repertoire from which they could draw on their return home." 32 Within their wider local community, peasants were exposed to "diverse customs, alien values, and exogenous norms—elements originating not only in other communities like their own but also in cities, elements drawn not only from other little traditions but also from the great tradition of the imperial elite." 33 In contrast to many other traditional peasant communities, local systems in rural China were wide open in the heyday of the dynasty. Social and cultural integration was substantial.

But in periods of dynastic decline, local communities in China began to close up. Resistance to exogenous cultural influences arose and economic closure ensued; local society became increasingly militarized, and tensions increased between elites and commoners. 34 At the same time, urban-rural and gentry-peasant friction developed as landlords fled the countryside for the relative security of the cities. 35 This was the situation which Westerners encountered and described in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China. It was not invariably so.
The decline of the Ch'ing dynasty, which has been described in detail many times, was hastened by unprecedented population growth. From 1650 to 1850, China's population quadrupled to over 400 million, creating an increasingly unfavorable population to land ratio, monumental economic and administrative problems, and severe social strain. These developments only exacerbated the deterioration of government that had already begun in the latter part of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's reign. Yet even so, the unique homeostatic feedback mechanisms of traditional China might have righted the imbalance—at least temporarily. But the Western impact in the mid-nineteenth century brought a combined political, economic, and cultural challenge to the Ch'ing dynasty that could not be met without revolutionary change. Nonetheless, the striking feature of China's response to the Western challenge throughout most of the nineteenth century was the continued strength of the old order, and its remarkable ability to coopt or rationalize new elements in time-honored style. The contrast with Japan is illuminating.

NOTES


19. For the Ch’ing government’s fears regarding clans, see Hsiao, *Rural China*, pp. 348-370.


27. Ibid., p. 117; Skinner, "Introduction," pp. 267-269.


34. Skinner, "Chinese Peasants," pp. 278-280; also Kuhn, Rebellion, passim.

35. See, for example, Wakeman, "Introduction," pp. 21-24 and passim.


