Although migration has always been an important phenomenon in history, the twentieth century has witnessed distinctive population movements. Among the most important changes during the century has been the movement of millions of workers from developing countries to the industrial nations and the exodus from the countryside to the city. Consequently, migration has become a major subject of interest for social scientists as well as planners. Many have focused on the migratory process itself. In contrast to this approach, I would like to suggest that migration be viewed as symptom of basic regional differences in resources, broadly defined as employment, health, education, physical security, and social environment. Anthropologists should study not only the symptom, but more importantly the processes responsible for the character of the regions or localities. Migration then becomes one of the processes interacting with others in locality change and can be studied in the context of the social change from which it is generated and to which it contributes. One approach to this focus is to examine the systemic linkages between factors over a period of time. An advantage of this approach is that it helps the anthropologist examine variables responsible for the socioeconomic environment, instead of focusing exclusively on how people (especially the poor) cope or adapt. It may also contribute to the conceptually difficult task of relating different levels of analysis, ranging from family adaptation to regional social change.

With this in mind, I will outline a series of systemically linked macro-level changes which occurred in southern Bolivia and northwest Argentina, contributing to the development of a large labor force of temporarily employed Bolivians residing in Argentina. The Bolivian immigrants are

Scott Whiteford is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Michigan State University and a Research Associate at the Centro de Investigaciones Superiores del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Mexico.
part of a labor pool tapped seasonally by employers to harvest crops and to provide short-term, inexpensive labor in cities. Within the context of the structural changes described, the second part of the paper examines the effects of rural proletarianization and prolonged temporary migration between rural work sites on the nuclear family—a phenomenon I am calling breakdown before urbanization.

There were many differences between colonial Bolivia and colonial Argentina. Bolivia’s highland population provided labor for mines and for haciendas of Spanish landlords who dominated large parts of the country. A pattern of subordination and dependence of the large native population was established during this period. In contrast, colonial Argentina had neither vast quantities of precious metals nor a large aboriginal population which the Spaniards could utilize as laborers. Consequently, at the time of its independence in 1810, Argentina was still a vast, sparsely populated country.

In the years following independence, the Argentine elite felt that in order to modernize, Argentina had to increase its population. Between 1853 and 1885 migration policy focused on establishing European immigrants as independent farmers in Argentina (Castro, 1970:27). Efforts were made to recruit migrants from Europe at a time when great numbers of people were eager to go to the Americas. The government was interested in developing agricultural colonies that would increase agricultural production, serve as a bulwark against the warlike Indians, and occupy land tempting their neighbors, Brazil and Chile. But by the end of the nineteenth century a series of changes had taken place that altered this program and the subsequent pattern of development and migration. In the second half of the nineteenth century English industry expanded rapidly, resulting in an increased demand for agricultural produce. At the same time, technological changes, including the invention of refrigerated shipping, the reaper, the thresher, and barbed wire, made it possible for Argentina to increase production and to enter the expanding European market, especially that of Great Britain. Enjoying increased returns on the vast rich pampas, the elite no longer wanted to give up their land to migrants. By 1885 immigration policy was encouraging European migrants who would work as tenant farmers to plow the tough native pampas grass, plant wheat, and then convert the fields to alfalfa for the landowners’ cattle. When the conversion was completed, the immigrants were forced to move on to new land, repeating the process, or to work as seasonal laborers.

Between 1886 and 1890 more than 600,000 European immigrants were brought to Argentina to harvest crops. After 1890 there was a marked increase of seasonal workers from Spain and Italy. Braving the long and uncomfortable sea voyage, thousands of laborers crossed the Atlantic
each year in October and November to harvest Argentine wheat and corn, earning five to ten times what they could in their homelands (Scobie, 1964b:61). They began to leave Argentina in March, and continued to leave through June. These workers were called *golondrinas*, 'swallows,' because of their seasonal arrivals and departures. By the early twentieth century more than 100,000 annually migrated to Argentina. Many of the seasonal migrants remained in Argentina, sending for their families and settling in the cities, where they joined other migrant families. The massive immigration profoundly affected the demographic structure of the country: the population of Argentina would have been 46% smaller in 1914 but for the international migration (de Lattes, 1967:212); and the percentage of the national population living in towns of over 2,000 jumped from 28.6% to 52.7% by 1914 (de Lattes, 1963:869).

Between 1870 and 1914 Argentina experienced a period of exceptional economic growth. The population grew by three times, the foreign trade by almost twelve times, and the national budget by nineteen times (Merkx, 1968:45). Argentina captured 33% of the total foreign investment in Latin America between 1857 and 1914. By 1914 it was the world's leading exporter of beef and mutton and the third largest exporter of wheat.

During this period Argentina made no efforts to recruit workers from neighboring countries. Migration from Bolivia was scant. The rich heartland of Argentina was distant from the Bolivian border and transportation routes were poor. Furthermore, a large percentage of rural workers in southern Bolivia were tied to the land by an almost feudal landholding system. In 1902, a railroad connecting the potential sugar area of Jujuy (northwest Argentina) with Buenos Aires was completed, giving the area access to the growing domestic market for agricultural produce. With the construction of the railroad and the subsequent increase of agricultural productivity in the provinces of Salta and Jujuy, new work opportunities drew Bolivians to the region. Between the censuses of 1895 and 1914, the number of Bolivians in Argentina grew from 7,400 to 18,300. Most of the workers on plantations, however, were drawn from indigenous populations living in the sugar zone or were brought from the Argentine Chaco. Later, labor was recruited from peasant populations in the provinces of Jujuy, Catamarca, Santiago del Estero, and Salta.

During this period, Bolivia itself was undergoing change. Tin had become a major export, and the private sector of the economy expanded rapidly, including some growth of light industry. New roads and railroads made access from villages to cities easier, increasing individual mobility. Bolivian cities grew rapidly. La Paz had a population of 70,000...
in 1900, but was a city of 115,000 twenty years later (Klein, 1969:59). But these changes did not affect the dire conditions in the rural areas. Migrants moved to the cities or to Argentina to escape the poverty of being landless workers dependent on landowners, or in extreme cases on tenant farmers (Heyduk, 1974:78).

Despite an increase of Bolivian migrants in Argentina between 1895 and 1914, their proportion to the total immigrant population in Argentina changed only .1%, because of the tremendous influx of European migrants during the same period. In 1914, migrants to Argentina from neighboring Latin American countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) equaled only 9% of the total number of immigrants in Argentina. This proportion increased steadily during the following years, as the scale of European migration decreased. As the labor pool grew in Argentina, as agricultural mechanization increased, and as conditions changed in Europe, the massive seasonal migration of Europeans declined. With the beginning of World War I, the magnitude of international mobility decreased still further.

Between World War I and the Depression beginning in 1929, economic growth slowed in Argentina and foreign investment fell off drastically. The railroads were basically completed and were no longer opening new areas to overseas markets. Despite the Radical Party’s rise to power, liberal economic policies were followed, favoring exportation of agricultural produce and importation of industrial goods.

In 1930, as economic conditions deteriorated, President Yrigoyen was overthrown by a conservative army coup. Exports continued to decline as the purchasing power of the European market fell. After 1930, for the first time, the agricultural sector found it advantageous to have the industrial sector grow in order to provide a market for agricultural produce as well as necessities of the agricultural sector. Import duties were raised, a bilateral trade agreement with England was established, and income and excise tax reforms were implemented. Previous laissez-faire policies were replaced by a policy of greater government intervention (Merkx, 1968:339). As a result, the formerly small industrial sector grew rapidly during the 1930s and 1940s, concentrated almost entirely in Buenos Aires. Among other things, this growth increased the job market in the capital. Between 1935 and 1946 the industrial labor force grew at the rate of almost 12% a year. By 1946, more than one million people were working in industry, mainly in the Buenos Aires area (Merkx, 1968:190).

The tremendous industrial boom in Buenos Aires, coupled with the inability of the agricultural sector to absorb labor, led to massive rural-urban migration after 1930, much of it to Buenos Aires. Between 1934 and 1943 an average of 85,000 new migrants arrived annually in greater Buenos Aires. Of this total, approximately 72,000 were from the interior
of the country, a percentage that increased between 1943 and 1947 (Germani, 1955:74). Between 1936 and 1960 it is estimated that about 2,000,000 migrants from the interior were established in Buenos Aires (Mármora, 1973:68).

The impact of World War II was felt throughout the Argentine economy. First came a major decline of industrial imports as Europe and the United States focused their energies on the war effort. Although this stimulated Argentine industry, in many cases a lack of key materials or equipment was a serious bottleneck in production plans. Meanwhile, agricultural exports were maintained throughout most of the period. Foreign currency rapidly accumulated in London for Argentina, leading the agricultural elite to push for free trade. Conflict between the industrial elite and the agricultural elite intensified, with the conservative government supporting the latter (Merkx, 1968: 192-198). In 1943, when economic growth slowed and the probable election of archconservative Patron-Costa to the presidency loomed in the future, the unpopular conservative government was overthrown by the military. The military favored the industrial sector and pushed for its expansion.

When Juan Domingo Peron became president in 1946, he immediately set into action a policy of import substitution, nationalization of foreign firms, and industrial growth. During the first years of his government, Argentina experienced great prosperity and change. Foreign utilities and railroads were nationalized, national airlines and merchant fleets were established, major social legislation was passed, and labor became a powerful political force. The working man was one of the main beneficiaries of Peron’s programs.

For several years, at least until overwhelmed by the tide of inflation, the total increases in the working man’s real wages ranged from 10 to 50 per cent. Labor’s share of the national income rose from 45 per cent in 1945 to over 60 per cent by 1950. Working hours became shorter while retirement and medical benefits increased. Ceilings were placed on food and transportation prices and the government began building low-cost housing projects. (Scobie, 1964a:233-234)

Through government control of the press and radio as well as education, peronista propaganda reached large segments of the populace neglected by previous regimes. The lower classes became politicized and for the first time were made to feel important. Peron and his wife, Evita, made constant appeals to the *descamisados*, ‘shirtless ones.’ A massive state welfare agency was organized by Evita; its charities were further publicity for Peron’s concern for the lower classes. All of these factors contributed to the growing migration from the countryside to the city. The exodus from the interior to the coast and the cities received additional impetus from Peron’s favoring of industry over agriculture, as well as from improved living standards offered in urban centers.
The massive rural-urban migration in Argentina was accompanied by another type of migration—immigration from neighboring Latin American countries. Between 1914 and 1947, the number of Paraguayan migrants increased from 18,600 to 93,200; Chileans from 34,600 to 51,600; Brazilians from 36,000 to 47,000; and Bolivians from 18,300 to 47,800 (Boutell, as cited in Panettieri, 1970:139). Migrants from neighboring countries began to constitute a higher and higher percentage of the total number of foreigners in Argentina. In 1947 the census indicated that 13% of the migrants in Argentina were from neighboring countries, as compared to 9% in 1914 (Recursos Humanos, 1973:6).

At the time of the 1947 census almost 88% of the Bolivian migrants in Argentina were in the provinces of Salta and Jujuy (Recursos Humanos, 1973:Chart VII). Many found work on tobacco farms and sugar plantations. In the period between 1923 and 1940, sugar production in Salta and Jujuy had climbed from 15% to 27% of the total national output. Both in Salta and in Jujuy the developing sugar plantations were owned and controlled by a few powerful families. Plantation holdings included great tracts of land that were not used for cane, and control of most of the river water used for irrigation. Bolivians participated in the increased production strictly as laborers.

The 1940s saw considerable change in the sugar industry of Salta and Jujuy. Production fluctuated, falling in 1942, but rising again and holding during the rest of the decade. Some of the traditional seasonal labor was drawn to Buenos Aires by expanding industrialization, leaving the plantations increasingly in need of labor. In the 1940s unions were formed on the sugar plantations and strikes occurred as labor began to exercise its new power. During this period many plantation owners and administrators turned more and more to Bolivian labor. Labor recruiters were sent to Bolivia. Bolivian workers without work papers were much more vulnerable and subsequently more docile for management than Argentine workers. In some cases in the Northwest, Bolivians replaced Argentine labor that had moved south; in other cases they displaced Argentines by accepting lower wages. Increasingly, they found work, or a series of jobs, year around in Argentina. A growing number eventually migrated to Buenos Aires.

The tobacco farms in Salta and Jujuy were also important sources of employment for Bolivian migrants. In 1937 there was no record of tobacco cultivation in the province of Jujuy, but between 1937 and 1947, 3165.8 acres of tobacco were brought into production, equaling 5.7% of the national total. Tobacco production began at an earlier date in the province of Salta. By 1937 9.6% of the total national acreage of tobacco was planted in Salta; over the next ten years this percentage grew to 15.4.
Many Bolivians were willing to go to Argentina during this period because of the socioeconomic situation in Bolivia. Prior to the agrarian reform the departments of southern Bolivia were dominated by the haciendas. The *arrenderos*, ‘tenant renters,’ had to work a varying number of days for the *patrón*, ‘employer,’ as payment for a plot of land on the hacienda. In some cases they had to work up to 150 days a year. Erasmus states that *arrenderos* were afraid to leave one hacienda for another “with fewer obligations because their old *patrón* might do them bodily harm” (Erasmus, 1969:95-96). Some of these men found greater freedom by moving to Argentina. Another group of men exploited by the hacienda system were the *arrinzantes*—men who rented land from the *arrenderos* in exchange for performing most of the *arrenderos*’ obligations to the *patrón*, as well as working on the *arrendero*’s plot for free (Erasmus, 1969:2). It is not surprising that men would risk going to Argentina to do seasonal work.

As more and more Bolivians migrated to work on the plantations and on the developing tobacco farms during the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Argentine government was forced to re-examine its immigration regulations, which until that time had been directed at European immigrants. The government received further impetus from reports that Bolivians were competing with Argentines for jobs and that migrants without documents were being paid extremely low wages. In 1949 a law was passed establishing punishment for those who gave work or aid to illegal immigrants. Other decrees were passed during the next six years, but the most important were 24.104 and 24.666. The former, passed in 1949, permitted employers to hire foreign workers for a period not exceeding a year; the latter, passed in the same year, was intended to help migrants obtain Argentine residence papers for a limited period (Villar, 1972:34-39). Although these laws were not enforced on plantations in the Northwest, they indicate an effort to deal with the increasingly important problem of migration of nationals from neighboring countries.

Between 1947 and 1960 the sugar industry grew intermittently. After a slight decline in production during the early 1950s, the plantations of Salta and Jujuy experienced significant growth during the latter part of the decade, with production increasing almost 45%. During this expansion, large numbers of laborers, many Bolivian, were used to clear and prepare the land after the sugar harvest.

Although the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 and the subsequent Agrarian Reform brought about a major change, they did not bring increased prosperity to many *campesinos*, ‘peasants.’ According to Heyduk, “tenants gained in most cases only in the cancellation of their rent obligations” (Heyduk, 1974:78). He goes on to point out that
“subtenants and landless dependents were not affected by the reform and remained obligated to former tenants for the payment of rent. They also remained without secure possession of the land they worked” (ibid.). Furthermore, the post-reform period witnessed tremendous increases in the cost of living. Between 1955 and 1956 the cost of living rose 132% (Thorn, 1971:186). As a result of the conditions in Bolivia, Argentina continued to attract workers, both seasonal and permanent, who had hopes of improving their lives.³

During this period Argentina too was struggling with economic problems. The decline in national production in 1949 and 1952 began a cycle of decline that was to plague Argentina every four years (thereafter occurring in 1956, 1959, 1962-63; 1966, and 1969-70). When Peron was removed from office in the military coup of 1955, General Aramburu attempted to reestablish the economy by helping the agricultural sector. In 1957 Aramburu helped the plantation owners of the Norte (the sugar zone in Salta and Jujuy) by passing Law 3,958, allowing them to recruit Bolivian laborers directly. In 1958 followed the first Convenio Argentino-Boliviano, intended to give migrant workers greater legal protection (Villar, 1972:43). This was the first agreement between Bolivia and Argentina to deal with migration. The convenio stipulated that the government of Bolivia would permit healthy men to leave the country to work in Argentina. Upon entering Argentina they would be given a physical examination; if this was passed, they would receive identification cards to work in Argentina for six months. Giving work to foreigners without the proper documentation was declared illegal. The work and sanitary conditions of the workers on the plantations were to be inspected by the Ministry of Work and the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, respectively. The Bolivian consul was to help protect the braceros from irregularities in the work contract, and the Bolivian Ministry of Public Health was given the right to inspect the work sites in Argentina. Finally, it was stipulated that Bolivian braceros would be able to return to Bolivia with articles of necessity worth up to 5,000 Argentine pesos. Despite the importance of the agreement, many aspects were not enforced by either the Bolivian or the Argentine government. Its main effect was to facilitate bracero migration for employers.

When the United States curtailed its trade with Cuba after the revolution of 1960 and began purchasing sugar from other sources, including Argentina, sugar production in the Norte expanded (Villar, 1972:143). The expansion required more laborers working on the plantations, resulting in the recruitment of more Bolivian labor. Tobacco production had also expanded by this time. By 1960 the tobacco acreage in Jujuy had increased to represent almost 14% of the national total; in Salta it represented 23.9%. This expansion is significant because tobacco produc-
tion requires large numbers of seasonal laborers, many of whom come from Bolivia. Some Bolivians came directly to work in tobacco; others, already in Argentina working on the plantations, moved to the tobacco zone after the sugar harvest. By 1960 there were 89,000 Bolivians recorded in Argentina, more than twice the population of thirteen years earlier. Eighty per cent of these were located in the provinces of Salta and Jujuy. But these census figures are misleading. Immigration officials in the Northwest believe that the number of Bolivians living in Argentina without papers who were not reported in the census figure could be three to four times greater than the official figure.

In 1963 a second Convenio Argentino-Boliviano was signed, followed by agreements in 1964 and 1965 that helped workers get papers. At this point the plantations were forced to hire only workers with documents, a requirement acceptable to them because by this time there was an overabundance of potential seasonal workers in northwest Argentina. The labor problem was further aggravated by increasing mechanization of both the cultivation and the harvesting of cane. A large pool of underemployed, unskilled workers—an agricultural reserve army—evolved. Employers, both rural and urban, utilized the situation to hire workers for short periods. This was advantageous as they did not have to pay for workers’ indemnity or other types of social benefits. Furthermore, temporary workers have difficulty organizing and articulating their demands. The wage scale in both the countryside and the city remained low, in many cases below the legal minimum wage.

A brief account has been given of the factors that have contributed to the development of a large underemployed labor force in northwest Argentina. The remaining section of the paper focuses on another level of analysis: the individuals and families who constituted part of the labor reserve. Faced with great economic insecurity and geographic instability, most attempted to settle out of the migrant stream in either Argentina or Bolivia, a task which proved to be extremely difficult. Because of the inability of many workers to gain stable employment in the city or countryside or to obtain land of their own, they remained rural seasonal workers for extended periods.

In order to examine the effects of prolonged labor migration on Bolivian families that had first come to Argentina to work in agriculture and later moved to the city, I developed a sample (non random) of seventy in the provincial capital of Salta. Salta, whose population was 183,000 in 1970, dates back to the colonial period and has traditionally served as a trade center for the area, although it has relatively little industry.
All the migrants interviewed acknowledged that it is important to have help upon arriving in the city, and 94% felt that a family needed friends to survive in the city because of unavoidable periods of unemployment. Yet only 49% of the migrants in the sample actually had contacts (friends or relatives) who helped them upon their arrival in Salta with housing or in finding a job. This figure is low when compared with percentages given in studies describing urban migration in other parts of Latin America. For example, in a sample of over 200 migrants from the Mexican village of Tzintzuntzan, Kemper found more than 90% settled in Mexico City with the aid of friends or relatives (Kemper, 1973:84). Margulis reported that village migrants from the province of Catamarca, Argentina, received extensive support in their adjustment in Buenos Aires. Eighty-one per cent received some help; of these 77% stayed with friends and relatives upon arrival, and 72% had help in finding jobs (Margulis, 1968:150).

The comparatively low percentage of migrants receiving aid from friends and relatives is due to their having few contacts upon arrival in Salta. This phenomenon could be explained in two ways: that there was a small Bolivian population in the city, or that the migrants in the sample were the pioneer migrants from their home villages. But the Bolivian population in Salta is relatively large and migration from southern Bolivia has a long history. Two other processes are more important in the explanation.

Many of the migrants have lost contact with relatives or friends because of multiple moves from one work site to another within Bolivia and Argentina. In these cases the friends and relatives are often itinerant rural workers as well, compounding the difficulty of maintaining communication as addresses are unknown, mail service to work camps is nonexistent, and many of the workers are illiterate. Furthermore, the vast number of farms and the great distances between agricultural areas in Argentina reduces the migrants’ expectations of ever meeting acquaintances again. Although some families annually reunite in plantation work camps or return year after year to the same farm after the sugar harvest, they are constantly threatened by the possibility that this regularity will be disrupted, because they do not own the housing or the source of employment. In addition, it is common for families or children to take a job at a time when they would be expected back at the plantation. The above factors endanger communication, and as a result nuclear families may become socially atomistic units whose lack of contacts is a major disadvantage if they migrate to the city.

Although these factors are helpful in explaining why certain families interviewed in Salta had lost contact with children and extended kin in Argentina, they constitute only part of the explanation. Extended periods
of migration over great distances often do not result in permanent loss of contact with kin and friends. For example, Wiest (1970) shows the importance of remittances sent back to the home village by Mexican workers in the United States. Watson (1975) has shown the integration of Chinese migrants in London with life in their home villages. My own data contain ample evidence of Bolivians who return regularly to their home communities, often sending remittances while in Argentina. What seems to distinguish a significant number, twenty-eight, of the migrants without contacts in Salta is that they were itinerant rural workers without a home community in Bolivia. Most had been children of highly mobile rural workers, spending their formative years on a variety of farms and plantations in both Bolivia and Argentina, and therefore not identifying with any community. In three other cases, migrants had lost contact with their home community because of years of life in Argentina. 

In contrast to migrants lacking ties to communities of origin, it appears that migrants who come from a stable community and who migrate relatively directly to the city usually arrive with a network of potentially supportive contacts of earlier migrants from the same village—forming what Tilly calls a “non-territorial community network” (Tilly, 1971:3). Many village migrants who become established in a particular city have been preceded by pioneer migrants from the same village who arrived in the city with few contacts, later helping those who followed. In the sample, thirty-two of thirty-six migrants from villages received some help with housing or employment from friends or relatives. 

Because of the sample size upon which this discussion is based, no conclusive statement can be made, but it is possible to suggest that breakdown before urbanization may occur for migrant families that are continually forced to migrate in search of work. Individuals and families try various strategies to eliminate the uncertainty and insecurity of this life style and may be successful. But when they are unsuccessful, a breakdown can result in which families may make few enduring friendships and lose track of their own kin because of their erratic movement patterns, low income, and the short time spent in work camps. 

The manner in which an individual copes with constraints and takes advantage of resources, however minimal, depends to a considerable degree not only on his unique skills and resources but also on the social capital he brings with him or is able to develop in the city. Social capital here means ties with friends and relatives both in the city and in the rural areas. In order to cope with unstable, short-term job opportunities in a provincial city such as Salta, an individual needs a highly flexible social network in which a variety of people can help him learn about and possibly obtain various jobs over the year, thus reducing the periods of unemployment. But if social breakdown has occurred in the countryside,
successful utilization of urban resources is much more difficult since the individual begins working without social capital. In my sample, families who moved to the city without ties remained significantly more dependent on rural work, had longer periods of unemployment and higher initial urban costs than did those who had similar characteristics with respect to education, age, skills, resource base, and family size, but who had contacts. In these cases “individualization” is not caused by the city, but instead by the forces of capitalism and the resulting rural social structure, which have led to rural proletarianization and atomistic adaptations in the countryside.

SUMMARY

Migration as examined in this article is but one of a series of interconnected processes associated with a pattern of socioeconomic change. Migration patterns to and within Argentina reflect a series of interrelated developments on international, national, regional, and local levels at different times, which together create the socioeconomic environment within which individuals make decisions. As the conditions of the environment change, different types of migration become more or less viable as strategies for individuals and families.

The interaction of a series of related changes, including migration, led to rapid social change in Argentina during the late nineteenth and the twentieth century. The linkages between technological breakthroughs, new markets, changing demands for seasonal labor, conditions in areas of out-migration, a social structure in which an elite controlled the key resource of land, and government policy have been described. Coupled with other factors, the annual migration of thousands of seasonal workers, many of whom eventually remained, contributed to the development of the rich agricultural resources of the pampas without altering the position of the traditional elites of the country.

With the approach of World War I, the changing conditions in Europe and Argentina caused European migration to fall off sharply. The European migrant began to be replaced by the migrant from neighboring Latin American countries. I have focused on processes associated with Bolivian migration to northwest Argentina, where the large land owners were able to expand production of sugar and tobacco with increased foreign demand for produce and preferential governmental supports and credit. Many producers attempted to limit the power of labor and reduce wages by hiring Bolivian workers, often without work papers. Before the Bolivian Revolution landless rural workers migrated to Argentina to escape the dire conditions in rural southern Bolivia. Although the Bolivian Revolution did change some of these conditions, many families were still without sufficient land, credit, or irrigation water. Migration to
Argentina continued. Changing domestic policy within Argentina, combined with the industrial powers' preoccupation with events in other parts of the world, resulted in increased industrial growth in Buenos Aires. This expansion led to massive internal migration from the provinces of the interior to the coast, further stimulating Bolivian migration to fill vacancies in the agricultural work force.

After describing salient factors responsible for the development and character of the labor reserve in northwest Argentina, I have examined the effects on individual families of being a part of the labor reserve for a long period. The resulting socioeconomic environment makes it difficult for families with limited resources to settle for long periods in any place and subsequently to maintain contact with family or friends over extended periods. In turn, urban adjustments are more difficult for the rural worker who moves to a city.

In the case described in this article the feedback between migration and other processes is clear. Migration itself is a factor in a product of change. But examined in isolation, migration does not tell the whole story. Examined over a period of time within the context of other factors, migration can contribute to our understanding of the process of social change.

NOTES

The article is based on data gathered in Argentina and Bolivia between March 1970 and November 1971. I returned to Argentina for research in the summer of 1974. The research was supported by grants from the Institute of Mental Health, the Ford Foundation, and the National Science Foundation. I would like to thank Richard N. Adams, Anthony Leeds, Andrew Whiteford, and Richard P. Schaedel for helpful comments on the material discussed in this article.

1. Large scale migration is a reflection of peoples' perception of locality differences, real or imagined. Of course individuals define resources differently, and those resources available to some in one locality may not be available to others in the same locality. Furthermore, specific localities do not necessarily have a monopoly on all types of resources.

2. It is interesting to note that in the previous census of 1914, almost 93% of the Bolivian migrants in Argentina were in the provinces of Salta and Jujuy. The decrease in the percentage in 1947 indicates an increase of Bolivian migration into Argentine areas farther away from Bolivia (Recursos Humanos, 1973:Chart VII).

3. The agrarian reform and other policies of the new Bolivian government contributed to a major increase of migration within Bolivia. Between 1950 and 1960 the percentage of the Bolivian population living in rural regions fell from 74.4% to 62%. By 1965 it had fallen to 53.5%. Not all of the migration was rural to urban. For example, between 1952 and 1966, more than 60,000 people moved to the Department of Santa Cruz. While few of
these migrants came from the southern Departments of Tarija, Chuquisaca, or Potosi, it is clear that rural alternatives were developing in Bolivia.

4. Strategies for settling out of the migrant stream have been examined in my paper "Reflections on disguised unemployment" (Whiteford, 1974).

5. This is a sub-sample of a larger sample of migrants. It is restricted to Bolivian males without special urban skills.

6. It has been noted by Germani (1967:179) and Kemper (1972:3) that the help of fellow villagers may facilitate the early adjustment of new migrants, but not necessarily their assimilation into urban culture. Dependence upon fellow villagers seems to decline quickly in some situations, while in others the ties remain strong over a considerable period. Factors that could influence solidarity of migrants from the same village may include the opportunity structure of the specific city, the resources controlled by the village migrant population, and the cultural "fit" of the migrant population with the native population.

7. Three men had contacts in Salta whom they had met in the course of their travel and work, but they received minimal help from them.

8. A stable community does not necessarily have to be an independent peasant village. Permanent workers on plantations and large farms may be part of a stable, relatively cohesive community. However, the fluidity of farm labor is not conducive to developing lasting supportive ties between workers; even when a family spends considerable time as rural proletarians on one farm year around they may not be able to develop a useful network of contacts.

9. Obviously the presence or absence of friends or family in the city is not the only factor which influences migrants' ability to make social adaptations. Many migrants are gregarious and make friends quickly, especially if institutions such as fiesta complexes and ethnic bars are present. National ethnic identity of Bolivians may supersede the need of common village bonds. Bolivians are often inclined to offer friendship and possibly help to countrymen, especially if they are from the same region. Thus their status as foreigners may help individuals develop social ties. In some cases extended families may follow the original migrant to the city. Some migrants are less dependent on social ties than others. This is particularly true if they have marketable urban skills. For greater detail see Whiteford (1975).

REFERENCES CITED

Castro, Donald S.

Erasmus, Charles J.
Germani, Gino

Heyduk, Frederic

Kemper, Robert V.

Klein, Herbert S.

de Lattes, Zulma Recchini

Margulis, Mario

Mármora, Lelio

Merkx, Gilbert W.
Panettieri, Jose

Recursos Humanos: Oficina Sectoral de Desarrollo

Scobie, James R.

Thorn, Richard S.

Tilly, Charles

Villar, Juan

Watson, James L.

Wiest, Raymond E.

Whiteford, Scott