CHAPTER V
TOWARD A "SOCIALIST MAN"

1. Formal Education and Indoctrination

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Education has been given much attention by North Korean leaders in their efforts to carry out the "socialist revolution." Reorganization of the educational system established by the Japanese colonial administration was necessary to meet an urgent need for trained leaders to carry out Communist programs and to educate the young in Communist ideology. After a series of changes in 1946, 1953, 1959, 1966, and 1972, North Korea in 1972 had a comprehensive general educational system called "universal compulsory ten-year senior middle school education." At the end of the Japanese occupation, primary education consisted of six years of school, called kugmin haggyo, or national school. Under Communism, the name "national school" was soon changed to inmin haggyo, or people's school. In 1946 elementary education was reduced by one year, and in 1953, after the Korean War, further reduced by one year to a period of four years. The old five-year middle school system of Japanese colonial times was divided in 1946 into two levels, three years of middle school (chung haggyo) and three years of high school (kodung haggyo). This system continued through the 1950s. Meanwhile, the four years of people's school education became compulsory in 1956. The reform in 1959, which was actually put into effect in September 1960, changed the three-year high schools into two-year technical schools (kisul haggyo) and two-year senior technical schools (kodung kisul haggyo). No change was made at that time in the middle schools. These changes in secondary education should be understood in relation to the mobilization of manpower for economic development during the early 1960s, when agricultural cooperativization had been completed, and implementation of the first five-year economic development plan (1957-1961) was under way. Skilled laborers, junior technicians, and technical specialists were urgently needed to carry out the various economic development programs, and in 1959 the technical and senior technical schools were given the task of training them. Thus, out of the pre-Communist secondary school, only the first three years of middle school remained as an extension of general education. Another educational change
in 1959 established a “seven-year compulsory education system” that covers four years of elementary school and three years of middle school.

In the 1966 reform, which was put into effect in April 1967, the three-year middle schools were merged with the two-year technical schools to form five-year middle schools. Compulsory education was now extended by two years to make a “nine-year compulsory technical education system,” covering four years of elementary education and five years of middle school. Thus, technical education became an integral part of compulsory education. At this time the two-year senior technical school was renamed “high school” without significant change in its curricula.

Until the latest reform in 1972, to be described later, admission to high school involved more than a continuation of education. In most cases, graduation from middle school marked the turning point in the lives of the young generation. They were then formally eligible to work and earn an income, and many received no additional formal education. High school served as a preparatory institution for college education, and those who were admitted to high school were almost assured a college education. Unless they were regarded as unqualified for advanced education, high school graduates were admitted to college.

High school graduates were not allowed to continue their higher education immediately. Instead, they were required to work on the farms or in factories and other industrial enterprises for two years and to experience for themselves the farmers' and workers' life. There is no doubt that this policy was aimed primarily at integrating formal education with economic activities of production. From an economic standpoint no particular advantage is evident in the practical training that preceded college education. The experience did, however, help the young people to identify with the working people.

The 1966 reform had also created two kinds of institutions of technical education on the same level as the high school. These were three-or-four-year senior technical schools called *kodung kisul haggyo*, the old name for high school, and two-year vocational schools (*chigop haggyo*). The entrance requirement for either of the two kinds of technical schools was graduation from a five-year middle school. Both schools were designed to train middle school graduates as junior technicians or junior specialists in a shorter time than the regular six to seven years of advanced education combining high school and college.

At the end of 1972, North Korea carried out a fifth reform in its educational system, which extended the period of compulsory education by one year to a total of ten years. Children now enter elementary school one year earlier, at age six rather than seven, and remain for four years. The five years of middle school have now become six years of “senior middle school” (*kodung chunghaggyo*), which is divided into two stages of three years, called
junior course (chunghagban) and senior course (kodungban). The old two-year high school was abolished. Those who are selected for higher education now go from the senior course to college after two years of practical work experience. Thus, education before entering college has been reduced by one year to a total of ten years.

The revised system of primary and secondary education appears structurally identical with that existing during the period 1953-1959, except that the children now begin primary school one year earlier. Through a series of reforms in content, however, technical education has been firmly institutionalized as a major part of secondary education, which is no longer merely an extension of primary education.

The latest educational reform brings substantial advantages to economic development, and eases the problem of labor shortage, since the newly-adopted educational system makes it possible for the young to complete their secondary education at age sixteen, two years earlier than under the old system. According to the North Korean Constitution as revised at the end of 1972 (Article 29), the minimum working age is set at sixteen, the age at which secondary education is completed. The system allows the mobilization at a youthful age of a substantial number of fairly well educated citizens for activities of production and provides a supply of young people, the graduates of the senior middle schools, with technological knowledge.

In rural areas the compulsory educational system is run by the local authorities of the cooperative farms and, although called "free" education, is financed by the farms. Among the expenses, teachers' salaries take the major share. For about ten years beginning in the late 1950s, three types of teachers were distinguishable on the basis of the sources of their support: those solely dependent on the cooperative farm funds, those who received their food rations from the cooperative farms' funds and salaries from state funds, and recipients of state funds alone. Toward the latter part of the 1960s, however, financial and other responsibility for the operation of the primary and secondary educational system was transferred from the central government to local authorities, except for the assignment of teachers and the fixing of teachers' salaries, which are still handled by the central government. In other words, each cooperative farm absorbs the entire cost of its primary and secondary schools, including expenses for teachers' salaries and grain rations and for management costs of school facilities. Although the duration of universal compulsory education has been substantially expanded since 1956, the expansion has cost the central government little in rural areas.

In the past the majority of peasant families had seldom been able to afford education for their children beyond primary school. Parents now bear no direct financial burden for their children's education. The fact that every child of school age is entitled to ten years of education seems to be responsible in large measure for convincing the farmers that the central
government is working for them. Paying little attention to the fact that they themselves pay for the universal compulsory education, the farmers appear to be very proud of the "benevolence" of their own socialist system of government and, in particular, of their leadership. Such confidence in the merits of their system has been an important factor in the integration of the entire population.

College education covers either four or five years, depending upon the field of study. The present system still requires the taking of an entrance examination for admission to college, but this examination seems to be a mere formality. Recommendations submitted by the heads of the workshops where the candidates work are the most important factor in the selection of students. In general, these recommendations include evaluation of personality, political behavior, political thought, and work records. Family background is also important. Descendants of the former well-to-do families of "reactionary" backgrounds are usually not permitted access to advanced education unless they have proven themselves to have been completely rehabilitated. Since all candidates are required to have at least two years of practical work experience before they apply for admission to college, this period allows careful examination of their loyalty toward the state and their revolutionary zeal.

In addition to the general education system described above, there are two supplementary systems, the special education and the adult education systems. The special education system is run entirely by the state government, that is, by the Communist Party. Its largest division consists of schools to train specialists in the arts and foreign languages. These specialized schools include in their curricula such fields as painting, music, and dance, and certain foreign languages. The students of the specialized schools are selected while in kindergarten on the basis of judgments that they have "exceptional talent." Once admitted to the special schools, they are trained in their fields for eleven years, corresponding with the elementary and secondary education of the general education system. Upon graduation, they serve the state government, unless they are selected for advanced education at the colleges or universities. Also included in the special education system are schools for the bereaved children of deceased revolutionaries (hyongmyong yujanyo hagwon) who rendered distinguished service. The Communist regime regards these children as valuable assets for the future, and their special schools are designed to train them to become core elements to carry out the revolutionary cause.

Education for illegitimate children who have been abandoned by their parents draws our special attention. Although sexual intercourse outside marriage is strictly prohibited, North Korea has a problem of illegitimate children. It may be attributed partly to changes in social relationships between sexes; social contact between the sexes in daily life had never
previously been so close, particularly among farmers and industrial workers. The traditional image of the young Korean woman as being shy, submissive, and faithful to her husband no longer appears to be accurate. As I have earlier noted, there is no question about a rise in the status of women. The campaign for women’s rights, in which considerable effort was expended under the Communist regime, appears to have been influential in raising their status, but, as we have seen, the primary factor appears to have been their economic importance under the new conditions of life.

Children born outside wedlock, particularly to widows or unmarried women, were traditionally looked down upon, as were their mothers. In contemporary North Korea, the same attitude toward illegitimacy appears to remain in somewhat weakened form, although overt expression of the attitude is restrained. Unmarried mothers frequently give up their children and let the governmental agencies raise them, and such children are welcomed by the government. According to one of my informants, such illegitimate children are given fairly good care. At the provincial level, special institutions take care of orphans and illegitimate children whose mothers do not wish to raise them. When an unmarried pregnant woman decides not to raise her child, she is advised to tell her superior at work of her decision well before the time of delivery. The latter arranges for her to “take a vacation” at the time of the birth, keeping the matter secret. (The same informant, however, concedes that this is only a standard procedure for such a delivery of an illegitimate child, but most of the villagers know what is going on.) The delivery usually takes place at the clinic of a state orphanage (jugawon). The clinic does not inquire into the identity of the child’s father, and the clinic takes full responsibility for the mother’s well-being while an obstetrical patient. After a period of post-natal care she goes back to work, leaving her child behind at the orphanage for four years. Then, after three years at a special kindergarten known as aeyugwon, the child is transferred to an institution called yuanyo hagwon, a boarding school, for formal education up to the secondary level. Children brought up in this way are regarded by Communist authorities as a special and desirable kind of “socialist men and women,” one of the most trusted classes of people. Illegitimate children and those abandoned in infancy by their parents have no sense of biological bonds with their parents, whom they do not even know, and orphans lack parents. It is quite conceivable that these children have complete faith in and loyalty to the state, which has raised and educated them. Upon graduation from the boarding school, their future is favored in comparison with that of other children. They form a core element in any unit of social and political organization to which they are assigned.

A “campaign against illiteracy” has been vigorously pursued. Within a few years after liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the North Korean Communists organized a national anti-illiteracy campaign. First, simple
courses in reading, writing, and other subjects were set up in every town, village, factory, mine, and other production and residential community in North Korea. School teachers of various educational levels and local government functionaries were mobilized as teachers, as were the village intellectuals and students. The schools, which were called “Korean language schools,” were designed primarily to wipe out illiteracy among the working people who had failed to receive formal education under Japanese rule. No less than one-half of the entire working force in North Korea is believed to have been illiterate at the time Communism took over. These people were taught to read and write the Korean language, other basic knowledge, and some politics in courses of instruction of two or three hours daily that were held after work hours, especially during the slack season of winter (Chang Sok-hun 1973:37).

These “language schools” soon evolved into a well-organized system of adult education consisting of “adult school” on the elementary level and “adult middle school” on the secondary level. An intensive program of additional primary education was conducted for a large number of graduates of these schools. This was a one-year program, divided into three classes, junior, middle, and senior, of four months each. As early as 1949, 160,000 working people reportedly had gone through the adult education program (ibid.).

In the 1958 educational reform, adult education was reorganized and further developed by setting up “workers’ schools” (kulloja haggyo) and “workers’ middle schools” (kulloja chunghaggyo), each of which took two years to complete. These schools provided general education on the primary and junior middle school levels for those who lacked formal education, without requiring that they leave their jobs. Thus adult education in North Korea has gone beyond providing elementary literacy. Within a decade of actual operation, the workers’ schools on the elementary level reportedly became unnecessary and were subsequently abolished in 1967 (ibid.:38). Today, workers’ middle schools remain as institutions of adult education. Every village or residential cluster in the countryside has such a school. In addition to providing secondary education, these schools appear to be important in ironing out ideological problems through political lessons.

Whatever its content, adult education in North Korea during the past quarter-century appears to have made marked progress in removing illiteracy. Today, except for a small portion of the elderly, the population of North Korea is literate and has managed to raise its general knowledge at least up to that of primary school graduates.

INDOCTRINATION

Education is perceived as the most important avenue toward revitalization of the socio-cultural system. According to the view of the North
Korean leadership, people can be taught to create a satisfactory society in which to live, and man is conceived as the independent and willful creator of his own history. This anthropocentric view of culture prevails in every aspect of North Korean education.

The major theme of public education appears to be "how to serve the people and the state." Education is no longer a prestige symbol for the individual or his family. Acceptance in programs of advanced education is interpreted as being "called" by the state. The furthering of personal interests is entirely irrelevant to the educational system, which is systematically planned on a national scale to meet the demands of the economy. The skilled workers, technicians, and scientists who are trained under the modern educational institutions are placed where needed and where they can perform to the best of their abilities. There can be no waste in the educational investment of the state.

For more than five hundred years, Koreans had been captives of Chinese culture, particularly Chinese Neo-Confucianism. Although political leaders made effective use of the protection afforded by China, the average Korean was shackled by Confucianism, knowledge of which was the only avenue toward high position. Confucian education in Korea consisted largely of texts in Chinese. Although a Korean alphabet had been invented in 1443, it was never popularly used among the Korean people during the Yi Dynasty. Almost all literary works by Korean scholars were written in Chinese script, which was adapted to the Korean language. A common scene in traditional Korea was the group of young pupils sitting in front of their teacher in a sodang, private school, loudly reciting the Confucian texts from memory. When a pupil failed to make progress, the teacher often used physical punishment in an effort to stimulate him. There was no alternative to the established Chinese interpretation of the Confucian classics.

Under Japanese colonial rule, these circumstances changed little. Teachers remained authoritative figures or disciplinarians. "Cramming" continued to prevail. The Japanese colonialists had no interest in promoting literacy among Koreans other than to train them to be "practical people" capable of performing their assignments well. Article II of the Educational Ordinance in Korea enacted and promulgated by the Japanese colonial government in August 1911 includes the following statement: "The first principle of education is to cultivate loyal subjects in accordance with the Imperial Rescript on Education" (quoted in Abe 1971:175). The task of remolding Koreans into loyal subjects of the emperor and of the Japanese Empire was something that could not be done easily. Coercive and cramming education proved to be the only way to educate the Koreans under the oppressive military rule. In order to carry out a policy of assimilation through education, students at all levels were forced to adopt Japanese cultural elements unquestioningly while Korean counterparts, notably the Korean
language, were set aside or eliminated. With the goal of gaining quick reimbursement for educational investments, educational institutions of the Japanese were merely training agencies for producing people with practical skills.

As I have noted, under Communism heavy emphasis is placed on education aimed at transforming the young into patriotic socialists responsible for carrying out the socialist reconstruction. Schools are regarded by the Communist authorities as the very basis of the "cultural revolution." The principles underlying education at all levels are the integration of "theory with practice" and "education with productive labor," and these principles are expressed in slogans such as "learn while working" and "work while learning." All students above the primary school level are required to participate in productive labor as a part of their regular school curricula.

One of the sharp distinctions from the past is found in teaching methods. Unlike the one-sided, passive, cramming education of the past, modern practices highly encourage students to participate actively. Classes are no longer simply a matter of lectures; the value of learning is seen to come in part through class discussion and participation. Classes are frequently divided into small groups so that students can help each other, and to promote feelings of group responsibility and collectivism. Every indication leads us to believe that the North Korean educational system is designed to raise the level of knowledge collectively rather than to strive for excellence of a few.

Nationalism prevails in every aspect of North Korean education. Korean language and history are highly stressed. Chinese writings were completely banned at the outset of Communist rule. Young people brought up under Communism do not know Chinese characters and use only the native syllabary. In order to fill the gap left by the ban of Chinese characters, a number of Korean words have been invented by state linguists to replace the Chinese words formerly in use. It is noteworthy that a number of these words are quite unintelligible to South Koreans.

As noted earlier, the teaching of Korean history, particularly recent history, appears to be of vital importance in North Korean education, and every episode of class conflict and historical misery is exploited. Korea's history texts have been rewritten with a strong emphasis on the "negative aspects" of her cultural history and on "newly discovered" positive and nationalistic aspects. How landlords exploited their tenants, how powerholders abused their positions at the expense of the people, and how miserable the life of the poor had been—these and similar topics appearing in the rewritten history books come up at practically every political and study meeting.

Comparison of present conditions with those of the pre-Communist years is the most common theme of education in class consciousness. But the
darkness of the past is not the sole matter of concern. As I have also noted earlier, efforts have been made to use native elements of culture as symbols of cultural identity, such as the native syllabary. Girls and women are encouraged to dress in native costumes of chogori (long-sleeved, high-waisted jacket) and ch’im’a (long skirt, somewhat shorter than in former times) in everyday life. (Because of its inconvenience, native clothing of chogori, a long-sleeved coat reaching to a little below waist-line, and paji, baggy trousers tied at the ankles, is not recommended for men except on special occasions outside working hours.) A notable example of “cultural reconstruction” is the previously mentioned effort to “restore” traditional group dancing, which in the past had been limited to certain regions of the country. Ethnographers were assigned to reconstruct traditional dances and modify them to fit contemporary life in such a way as to stimulate collectivism. Kunjung muyong, group dancing, is an example. Males and females of any age form a circle holding hands, and dance while singing a song. This form of group dancing is taught in “cultural activity” sessions at schools of all levels, and is now institutionalized as a social and political activity throughout North Korea for people of all ages. The establishment of group dancing was important in fostering increased socializing between the sexes and in reducing the generation gap.

Teaching is highly practice-oriented. Rather than placing heavy dependence upon the teacher’s lecture alone, methods of teaching require that students give lectures in class and participate in supplementary group study sessions. In science and technology classes, heavy emphasis is placed on experiments and practical training at factories. Sessions on social and political education often deal with actual events of history, calling attention to the shortcomings of the past and presenting sympathetically the side of the proletariat.

The most powerful technique of indoctrination of the young and the entire population in general appears to be what I have earlier called “positive use of hatred of the enemy.” It opposes entirely the Christian concept of loving one’s enemies, which North Koreans find unacceptable, regarding it as an institutionalized means by which superiors, either individuals or groups, exploit their inferiors. Instead they try to teach the young how to retaliate effectively. The new ideology may be paraphrased as “whoever strikes you on the right cheek, strike him back on both.” It is hoped that burning hatred for one’s enemies will generate socialist patriotism and confidence in the existing system. Certain enemies, such as “Japanese militarism” and “U. S. imperialism” may be regarded as scapegoats or fictive enemies since they pose no direct threats. The following incident shows how “hatred for one’s enemies” is used as a teaching tool in North Korean schools:
A woman teacher from the Tongch'ang People's School in P'anmun County encountered the same difficulty in carrying out the task of revolutionary education as is experienced by all other teachers in North Korea, where the new generation has grown up free of "exploitation" and "suppression." The school is located just north of the southern border, where tensions between North and South Korea have existed since the division of Korea. Although this location helped to maintain a feeling of hostility toward "enemies," the teacher found that the absence on the part of the young of actual experience in the "negative aspects" of the cultural history caused her difficulty in educating them in Communist ideology. She had tried lectures on such subjects as "How badly the landlords had exploited the peasants" and "U. S. imperialism: the unpardonable enemy of the Korean people." But her students did not seem to get the point. At last, she found that her teaching was more effective when she made use of specially prepared paintings as references. One which proved to be most effective was a series of paintings entitled "Uncle Shin Chong-ch'ol's Yesterday and Today." It depicts a poor boy named Shin Chong-ch'ol who was made to slave for a landlord and who was often physically abused by his master. In addition, as part of the regular school curriculum, she often organized "meetings to curse the enemy, U. S. imperialism." At times, sham battles between two groups of students proved to be an effective way of developing a sense of hatred for external enemies and of promoting comradeship among the students. *(Rodong Sinmun, 3/27/71, p. 6)*

Not even mathematics classes are free of hostility toward one's enemies. Students are asked to work out their mathematics lessons "in the same spirit as they curse their enemies," and are given questions such as the following:

> After two hours of pursuit of a runaway spy, a member of Young Pioneers Corps who runs four kilometers per hour and a security agent who runs eight kilometers per hour arrested him. How far did the boy and the security agent run to catch the spy? *(Ibid.)*

We find abundant evidence of hostility toward foreign powers, especially the United States. The most graphic is an eyewitness report of a twenty-eight-year-old South Korean Christian missionary who was among the passengers of a South Korean airplane hijacked in December 1969 by a North Korean sympathizer who was reportedly a Communist agent, and who sixty-five days later was released in North Korea. The missionary reported that "Everywhere we went, we saw effigies of Uncle Sam with legs torn away. On the effigies were signs, 'Let's tear off the legs of U. S. imperialists!' At one time, I saw children bayoneting an effigy of an American GI.'" He went on to say, "It was a fearful society. Death to Americans! Death to South Koreans! That was the North Korea I visited." *(quoted in Shim 1970:17).* A similar observation is reported by H. Edward Kim (1974:271), a *National Geographic* staff member, who, on a visit to North Korea for twenty days in the fall of 1973, saw at a day-care center in Songnim a grim poster that depicted patriotic tots shooting a "U. S. imperialist monster."
According to the North Korean publication Kulloja (Workers) (October 1964, p. 6), the spirit of "hatred of class enemies" is inseparable from the passionate love for one's own people (comradeship) and the two together form the essence of "Communist humanism." The idea that people's awareness of their enemies, both within and outside their nation, can promote effective organization appears to pervade programs of education and indoctrination. It seems reasonable to say that criticism of alleged enemies has been firmly institutionalized as an essential part of the North Korean way of life as a way of validating the nation's path of revolution.

One of the most difficult tasks of indoctrinating the younger generation in Communist ideology has already been noted in another context. Almost three decades have passed since the establishment of the Communist regime, and the new generation has had no actual experience with the conditions of pre-Communist years and of the period of the Korean War. Efforts have been made to preserve the wounds of the past and to use them in educating the young. Numerous museums and memorials have been established for this purpose, and these are an essential part of educational programs. Visitors to North Korea have been impressed by the efforts of this kind to preserve the past, often in exaggerated form. Examples include the Museum of the Korean Revolution (Hyongmyong Pangmulgwan), Ethnological Museum (Minsok Pangmulgwan), Museum of Fine Arts (Misul Pangmulgwan), Museum of History (Yoksa Pangmulgwan), Memorial of the Foundation of the Korean Workers' Party (Tang Ch'anggon Kinyomgwan), and Memorial of the War of the Liberation of the Fatherland (Chogug Haebang-jonjaeng Kinyomgwan).

The Ethnological Museum serves as an illustration of the nature of these institutions (extracted from Choson chungang nyong'gam, or Korean Central Yearbook, 1973:264-266). This museum was founded in early 1956 and was reorganized in 1970 as a museum to record the "revolutionary and Communist way of life during the years of struggle for independence under Japanese colonial rule." Its exhibition rooms are divided into three parts, the first of which concerns the life of soldiers (guerillas). Detailed exhibits show the life of the guerillas, their quarters, military training, and other organized activities, and their ethical code. These exhibits use models, actual objects, photographs, and paintings. Another room exhibits foods eaten by the guerillas and illustrates their problems of health. The third room consists of exhibits about the lives of boys and girls during that period.

In addition to the museums and memorials on the national level, numerous small institutions of similar kind have been set up throughout the country. Student tours are arranged to these places as part of the regular school curriculum. Each year, especially during summer vacation, the Young Pioneers Corps, which includes all children between nine and thirteen years of age, organizes camping trips to historical sites such as old battlefields and
sites related to anti-Japanese guerilla activities. At these places, campers and other visitors are conducted on tours by professional guides, usually women, who explain the historic events in rather detailed and often highly dramatized ways. A night meeting called *udungbul-moim*, or bonfire meeting, is often held during the camping trips, which consists of a politically oriented educational program conducted while campers sit around a bonfire. Usually the program consists of readings from an official text called “Memoirs of the Anti-Japanese Guerillas” and of patriotic poems, the singing of revolutionary songs, and listening to a lecture by an invited guest who relates experiences in opposing the Japanese. North Korean leaders appear to regard such education carried on outside the classrooms as making a great contribution to the campaign of indoctrination.

Efforts have been made to root out all possible sources of factionalism, which is regarded as one of the worst of the “enemies.” It had been common in traditional Korea for graduates of the same school or persons from the same locality to form factions within larger groups. Seniors and juniors in schools then often formed factions, and under Japanese rule these conditions continued to exist. In secondary schools, juniors were expected to obey their seniors. When they passed on the street, they exchanged military salutes, initiated by the juniors. Failure to salute often led to informal disciplinary action by the seniors.

Under the modern system of compulsory education all young people attend school and there is no difference among students based upon seniority. Graduation from a specific school does not have any prestigious meaning, and dominance based upon seniority of age and class in school is discouraged. Students are to refer to each other as *tongmu*, comrade, and are to treat each other as equals. Students still wear badges identifying their school and their class; now, however, the student who first sees another student, his junior or senior, is supposed to initiate a salute, which has become a gesture of comradely greeting. Students in junior middle school formally belong to the Young Pioneers Corps and have a distinctive salute, a raising of the right hand above the left side of the head while exchanging greetings with such phrases as “Be prepared (*Chunbi-haja*)” or “Be prepared at all times (*Hangsang-junbi*),” phrases that are reminiscent of the Boy Scouts. The phrases are taken from the Young Pioneers’ oath of “Let’s be prepared at all times to serve as the Communist second reservists.” All students of senior middle school are members of the Socialist Working Youth League. Unlike the Young Pioneers, they use a military salute which is often accompanied by comradely verbal greetings such as *Annyong-hasimnika* (How are you?) or *Tangyol-haja* (Let us unite!).

As the preceding descriptions suggest, one of the underlying principles of North Korean education seems to be the fostering of interdependence or comradeship. From an early age, the young are brought up under *chojik-*
saenghwal, or "organizational life." Beyond the family, a child is a member of a school, the Young Pioneers Corps or the Socialist Working Youth League, study groups, and other special activity groups. As a member of these groups, he is asked to strive toward the best interests of the group and the society as a whole. An individual's efforts in behalf of society are not simply respected but are glorified. North Korean school texts of the primary and secondary schools are filled with stories of revolutionary heroes and heroines, the self-sacrifices of patriots, and brave resistance to the Japanese colonialists.

2. Religion under Communism

Since the Communists assumed control in North Korea, they have carried out systematically and vigorously a campaign against religion that is not consistent with officially declared policy regarding religion. Freedom of religion is supposedly guaranteed by the North Korean Constitution, but numerous examples of anti-religious activities appear in official North Korean documents. Article 14 of the old Constitution, which was adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly at its first session on September 8, 1948, states: "Citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall have the freedom of religious belief and of conducting religious services." Despite this constitutional provision, strong opposition to organized religion has existed. As we saw earlier, for example, property owned by religious organizations was confiscated during the land reform.

An official interpretation of the Constitution delivered at the Kim Il-sung University (Kim Il-sung Chonghap Taehak 1960:55; also quoted in Cho 1965:11) puts the circumstances in this way: "The freedom of religion is the freedom to believe or not to believe in any religious creed or to conduct any religious ceremony. It also includes the freedom to disseminate anti-religious propaganda" (my translation; emphasis added). Another excerpt from this text states: "At present, various religious groups engage freely in their activities without any interference. Members of the groups (chonggyoin), like other ordinary people, participate in various fields such as government, politics, economy, and social life without discrimination" (my translation; emphasis added). Again, declaration and actual practice do not agree.

This de facto trend of opposition to religion was later formally incorporated in the Constitution. Article 54 of the "Socialist Constitution" revised and adopted on December 17, 1972, reads: "Citizens have religious liberty and the freedom to oppose religion." (The latter was phrased as "the freedom of anti-religious propaganda" in its official translation. See Foreign Broadcast Service 1972: D4-D20, for an English text of the Constitution.) The right to perform religious services of one's choice was in fact completely denied by governmental authority. Church facilities were made into public nurseries and kindergartens, and in some cases were used as quarters to house local administrative bodies and political organizations.
The North Korean policy of opposing Christianity can be better understood if the history of Christianity in northern Korea is reviewed. Until the end of Japanese colonial rule, Christianity had grown more rapidly in northern Korea than in the southern half of the nation, where Confucianism had been much stronger. Wealth and power were concentrated in the south. There were numerous Confucian strongholds in the south, but only a few in the north. Thus, Christianity met strong resistance in the south but a relatively easy acceptance in the north. During pre-Communist years, P'yongyang, now the capital of North Korea, had been the most prominent center of Christianity in Korea. One-sixth of the city's population of 300,000 were Christians when northern Korea became a Communist state. The Christian churches had also been important in efforts to gain independence from Japan. Ironically, when Korea won independence from Japan, the Christians of the North had to face a much stronger struggle for survival. Some organized attempts were made by Christian groups to protest against Communist persecution, but these activities were ruthlessly suppressed.

Christian missionaries introduced much Western culture to Korea, including innovations in formal education and in medicine. Since the missionaries had approached the Korean people largely by means of roles connected with education, many Korean intellectuals became Christians, especially in northern Korea. When northern Korea became Communist, its Christians became social outcasts. Since the majority were of the middle or upper class, their survival was immediately threatened because of their relative wealth and additionally threatened because of their religious identification. A great exodus of Christians to South Korea occurred during the first five years of independence, until the outbreak of the Korean War. This trend rose to a climax when the Allied Forces reached their most northerly point. Millions of northerners then fled to the south. Today in South Korea most of the prominent figures of the Christian churches are of northern origin and the refugees form the core of the Christian groups.

The exodus of Christians from 1945 to 1953 appears to have been advantageous to the new regime. Christians soon became so few that organized resistance by them to Communist policies was not possible. Although numerous incidents of resistance from Christians did take place at the time of land reform before the war, the later cooperativization of agriculture was carried out with no notable signs of resistance from the remaining Christian population. How the Christians remaining in North Korea might have fared under Communist rule is unclear for lack of information. It is certain that the Christian population was very substantially reduced by movement to South Korea, but it is hard to believe that there are no longer any Christians in North Korea, as the North Korean propaganda repeatedly claims. According to my informants, hardly any signs of the existence of Christianity are evident in North Korea. Group activities of
Christians are strictly forbidden. The informants do think it possible that Christianity may survive secretly, however. When a Japanese visitor asked one of his hosts in North Korea about the fate of Christianity in North Korea, he received the following reply:

Certainly there is no Christian church in the city of P'yongyang. One can find not a single church anywhere in the country. There remain some Buddhist temples in the mountains, but they are expected to be gone soon. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, neither Christianity nor Buddhism is prohibited. The freedom of religious belief is guaranteed. However, no matter how faithfully one prays to God, one cannot get food to eat and a dwelling to live in from him. When one works hard under the Guidance of Premier Kim Il-sung, there is not the slightest fear of scarcity of food, clothing and housing. For this reason, it is quite natural to see the decrease of Christians. (Wada 1963:22; my translation)

North Korean Communism has had little trouble with Buddhism. Under the shadow of the more powerful Confucianism during the era of the Yi Dynasty, Buddhism in Korea never recovered the strength it had once held, particularly during the Koryo (935-1392) era. Unlike the circumstances in other east Asian countries, Buddhism had never become deeply entrenched in Korean life. Pushed to positions of obscurity by the dominant Confucianism, most of the Buddhist temples in Korea are located in the mountains, a sign of isolation from the daily life of the people. Except for some faithful Buddhists who paid occasional visits to the temples to pray, it was difficult to find any notable Buddhist cultural elements in community life before the Communist era. Unlike Christianity, Buddhist identification has not always been clear. Villagers, mostly women, did often attend special ceremonies in the temples and contribute a handful of grain to Buddhist monks making pilgrimages. They did not maintain close relationships with Buddhist temples in their daily lives, however, and Buddhism did not concern the important events of their lifespans.

Weakened Korean Buddhism caused little stir when northern Korea came under Communist rule. The Buddhist temples were put to secular public use, except some famous temples that were designated as “cultural treasures.” In many cases, the monks are allowed to remain at their temples as caretakers. The weakness of Korean Buddhism was also evident in the absence of Buddhist reaction when the temples were taken over. Except for information on the confiscation of landholdings of the temples, the North Korean documents have not recorded much information on the fate of Buddhism itself. It appears to have placed few social obstacles in the path of Communism.

Since the end of the Korean War, the North Korean government has given considerable effort to rooting out traditional religious elements from everyday life, beliefs and acts that might be called folk religion. Traditionally
the majority of Koreans had believed in many gods, to whom they appealed for aid in solving life’s problems, and scientific interpretations of the universe were little known by the average person. Although suppression of the organized religions was carried out with relative ease, the task of “getting rid of the remnants of backward ideology” inherited from the old society has been more difficult. Accomplishing this task has been a target of the “ideological revolution,” through the education system and propaganda networks. Indoctrination in the new view was conducted through publications, movies, plays, circle activities, and series of lectures.

The anti-religious campaign dealt a heavy blow to religious practitioners of all kinds, including fortune-tellers (chomjaeng’i) and sorceresses (mu-dang), who were formerly numerous. Members of the Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm, for example, were reported to include several former fortune-tellers and sorceresses who had left their old profession entirely (Hwang et al. 1960:209). The campaign against religion is carried out principally by the young, particularly through the organizational networks of the Socialist Working Youth League and the Women’s League. According to one of my informants, some religious practitioners were earnestly requested to abandon their old profession by young members of their own families. During the early stage of the campaign, young people often destroyed the facilities and paraphernalia of the practitioners of supernaturalism in their villages.

Despite the energetic campaign, deep-rooted beliefs in supernaturalism were not erased as easily as the Communist leaders had expected. Documentary sources describe many instances in which elements of supernaturalism survived more than a decade of Communism. According to Chong Ha-ch’ol (1959:28-31), in localities which suffered prolonged drought some people performed rain ceremonies. Although dispensaries and hospitals were available, some people still had recourse to supernaturalism, performing traditional rites of curing that involved offerings. Such people were publicly criticized for wasting their property, and held to blame because their illnesses became worse or even fatal without the aid of scientific therapy. Chong (ibid.) states that a few people continue to believe in the “divine favor of God.”

Traditionally, the cause of illness was often thought to be evil forces. Modern scientific theories of pathogenesis appear not to have been readily accepted by the aged. According to one informant who observed the circumstances he describes, until the early 1960s some elderly people who had suffered misfortunes such as illness among their children prayed and made offerings to supernatural beings. The same informant, who had served as an intelligence officer on a farm, was once told that a sterile woman had secretly gone into the mountains and prayed to the “mountain god” for a child. Under Communist rule such magico-religious practices of medicine
now appear to have been almost wiped out. The presence of specialists in modern medicine on each farm has brought to everyone modern medical knowledge, which, together with the activities of the campaign against supernaturalism, has seriously weakened if not entirely obliterated the traditional beliefs.

In the past, rituals related to death were highly elaborate and complex, and were drawn chiefly from Confucianism. As might be expected, the degree of elaboration correlated with the socio-economic statuses of the families concerned. Today, these customs have been greatly simplified and changed in other ways that accord with modern conditions of life. Funerals were traditionally a matter of concern chiefly to the kin of the deceased. Various rites were performed exclusively by lineage members, and unrelated neighbors only contributed labor to aid the bereaved family for a fixed period of a few days and attended the funeral to pay their respects to the deceased. Kinsmen tended to reside in the same village or neighboring villages, and funerals and later commemorative rites were important in bringing them together, thus promoting solidarity among lineage members. Today, kinsmen are spread widely over the country, and elaborate funerals are discouraged by many other circumstances that have already been described.

As we have observed, the new work organizations have taken over many of the traditional functions of kinship including observances at death. When one of its members dies, a work team performs such necessary tasks as transporting the coffin and making a grave. Close relatives living in the same village are, of course, more actively involved in funeral activities than other people. Relatives in other localities are not usually informed of the death and they are discouraged from attending the simple rites. In general, the traditional spirit of giving mutual assistance at times of death appears to remain intact and some of the old ceremonial events continue to be observed. Neighbors contribute to the household of mourning certain amounts of food, including cooked rice and rice-gruel mixed with red beans (pp’atchuk), to be consumed by those who give aid in the funeral. Representatives of each family of the village make a visit of condolence to the bereaved family. The funeral is usually held on the second day after the death, as in the past. Many old ritual elements of the funeral have been either dropped or simplified. Traditionally, the funeral procession included a small sedan-chair, supposedly housing the soul of the dead, which was carried by two men proceeding ahead of the hearse. Today, no sedan-chair is used; instead a man walks ahead of the hearse carrying a framed photograph of the deceased; if no photograph is available, this part of the rite is omitted. The traditional funeral procession was headed by a man bearing a pennant on which the dead man’s name was written. This pennant was followed by a number of others contributed by relatives and friends as expressions of condolence. Traditionally the number of pennants was an index of the power and prestige
of the family of the deceased. Only the pennant identifying the deceased is used today. Other deletions include funeral songs, which were formerly sung by the bearers of the hearse.

It is interesting to note, however, that the custom of consulting a geomancer to determine a lucky location for a grave is still followed if a geomancer is available. There are no professional geomancers in North Korea today, but an elderly amateur who has some knowledge of geomancy may be consulted. How much credence is given to this geomancy is uncertain, but following the old custom clearly appears to provide some kind of psychological satisfaction.

Traditionally, the period of mourning was two years, during which the bereaved relatives should live austerely. During this period relatives of the deceased, usually the household of the eldest son, maintained an elaborate memorial room called pinso specially set up to house the soul of the dead, which was ritually brought back to the house after the burial of the corpse. The pinso has survived but in a very simple form. A framed photograph of the dead and two candles placed on the table are the only noteworthy items in the room, and elaborate offerings of food are no longer made. The memorial room is usually dismantled on the second day after the funeral. Thereafter, the family returns to normal life.

During the early part of the Communist rule, a campaign was waged against ancestral worship, primarily directed toward Confucianism. The campaign seemingly met strong opposition, and subsequently, in 1966, efforts to denounce ancestral worship ended. No efforts were made to encourage this practice, however. The Communist regime seems to have taken the position that it will allow the people to cling to the tradition of ancestor worship, so long as it does not interfere with efforts toward economic development.

Various additional remnants of the elaborate ceremonial complex of traditional Korea also survive. The custom of holding commemorative services is still observed by many people. On the first and second anniversaries of a death, a mourning ceremony is held in the house of the eldest son, where villagers, friends, and close relatives pay their last respects to the dead. Those who attend the ceremony bring gifts, usually a bottle of a non-alcoholic drink made of fruits. Close relatives who live far away may not attend the first anniversary ceremony, but they generally try to join their relatives in the second, when the mourning period formally comes to an end. The traditional wailing of mourners is still heard at funerals and also during the mourning ceremonies.

After the mourning period of two years, descendants of the deceased perform a memorial ceremony each year. Unlike mourning ceremonies, the annual memorial ceremonies are performed exclusively by kin, as in the past. Most families perform the ceremonies only for the parents of the male head
of the family, but a few people continue to conduct rites for ancestors of the household head as far back as great-great-grandparents. Still other families perform no memorial ceremonies. It is doubtful that the memorial ceremonies still function effectively to promote unity among large groups of kin since participation by many relatives is now difficult or impossible. Some people arrange to take their annual vacation of fourteen days (in addition to the national holidays) at times that allow them to attend family memorial ceremonies as well as to see their relatives. Generally, however, memorial ceremonies are performed by only small groups of kin who live near each other.

No basic changes are evident in the procedures of the ceremonies. Foods are still offered and the rites usually take place after midnight, the traditional time. The ways in which ceremonial foods are placed on the table and the use of incense and candles are also basically the same as in the past. No incense is especially made for ceremonial use in North Korea today. The wood of the Chinese juniper has long been burned as incense, however, and one of my informants states that since this wood is used in making pencils, obtaining it for ceremonial use is not a problem.

In the past the center of ritual observances of mourning and memorial ceremonies was an ancestral tablet, a piece of wood on which was inscribed information about the deceased including name, official title, and the date of death. During the first two years after death, the tablet was placed on a ceremonial table in the memorial room (pinso). Afterwards, the tablet was placed either in a closet in the living room or in the ancestor hall, a special room that was usually in the rear of the main building of the residence. Among prominent lineages, the ancestor hall was the symbol of power and prestige. At each memorial ceremony, the tablets of ancestors were brought to the ceremonial hall by the members of the family concerned. The average family did not have an ancestor hall, and the tablets for their ancestors were made of paper, prepared for each ceremonial occasion and burned after the ceremony. According to one informant, some people still use the paper tablets during the rites for ancestors. The inscription on the tablet is the traditional one, written in Chinese and in the Confucian manner. The survival of this custom is surprising since, as I have noted, both Chinese writing and Confucianism have been banned. Young people cannot write Chinese characters and the elderly prepare the tablets. So far as my informant knows, no ancestral tablets are inscribed with the Korean syllabary.

It seems evident that even ancestor worship has been put to Communist use. As noted earlier, memorial ceremonies were exclusively kinsmen’s affairs. (It should be observed in passing that priests had no roles in funerals and memorial services.) The trend under Communism, which is still incipient, however, seems to put ancestor worship into a different mold.
Village leaders and cadre members may attend the ceremonies, and, although the actual ceremonial acts are performed by kin of the deceased, these non-kin who attend participate in eating ceremonial foods after the formalized rites have ended. The gathering is then made into an opportunity for giving political education and ideological indoctrination. Of course, the subject of the meeting is reminiscences of the deceased; talk is said often to move to the topics of “the difficult life under the Japanese colonial rule,” and “happiness under the present Communist rule.” Anyone, kin or non-kin, who knew the deceased well presents eulogies. In the eulogies, an attempt is made to teach the young what went wrong in the past and what should be done in order not to repeat the “evils of the past.” People whose ancestors have been classified as enemies of the people or the exploiting class do not conduct memorial rites, since they have been made to feel ashamed of what their ancestors have done. Instead, as I have noted, many of these people try publicly to denounce and dissociate themselves from their ancestors. The new trend of participation in the memorial rites by non-kinsmen may be summed up as a syncretic blend of the traditional ancestral worship and Communist ideological indoctrination that contributes toward the weakening of the importance of kin relationships and of solidarity among kinsmen.

The intrusion of non-kin into what had formerly been exclusively kin affairs is seen also in mourning customs. Mourning dress was worn by all tangnae members, that is, the common descendants of the great-great-grandparents, although there were distinctions in the elaboration of mourning costumes according to the degree of consanguineal relationship with the deceased. Today, my informants advise, mourning dresses are worn only by lineal descendants, that is, children and grandchildren, and not by collateral or affinal relatives, who wear a mourning hat only. Close friends of the deceased also wear mourning hats at the funeral, a new custom. Since the local descent group is no longer an effective unit of social organization and relatives tend to be scattered geographically, bonds with the deceased are weak or do not exist among many of his kin. This circumstance may have made the nuclear family more important than formerly to any individual and also may have made important the social networks among the non-kinsmen in daily life.

The traditional custom of songmyo, or visiting ancestral tombs, remains an annual event. On Moon Festival Day (August 15th of the lunar calendar), relatives gather and pay homage at their ancestral graves, cutting the grass in the graveyard and performing a simple ceremony. Since the visits take place on a fixed day, the government often provides transportation for the visitors, mobilizing all the vehicles available (Kawagoe 1970:152). There seems to be no intention on the part of the government to discourage or prohibit this traditional custom. Like Moon Festival Day, various other traditional ceremonies continue to follow the ancient lunar calendar. All other time reckoning follows the Gregorian calendar.
The efforts of the Communist government to sort out and preserve native cultural elements extend to customs relating to the dead. In the past, the dead were usually buried. Cremation, a custom that apparently came with Buddhism, was not widely accepted until the era of Japanese rule, when numerous crematories were built. The Communists closed all the crematories and required interment of the bodies of the dead in cemeteries. Each local administrative unit has its own public cemetery. In some areas where no public cemetery is readily available the families of people who have died may choose sites for interment in the old ancestral graveyards. Unless they obstruct governmental plans for use of land, the old lineage graveyards are not disturbed without the approval of the descendants of those whose remains are buried there.

If all of the policies of the Communist government regarding religion are examined, a strong trend toward suppression of supernaturalism and organized religion is evident. This trend has strong bearing on values and customs concerning kinship, and these traditional ways have also been strongly discouraged insofar as they apply to large kin groups. Certain of the old customs associated with ancestors continue to be observed, with at least tacit official approval, apparently because they appear to be emotionally important to the people and do not oppose governmental aims. Other old customs have been used or modified to suit the ideology of Communism.

3. Integration: A Family-State

In totalitarian societies, people who do not accept leadership are generally subjected to ruthless persecution, and a power struggle continues until a pecking order is established and one leader comes to absolute power. The political process in North Korea was not an exception. After more than a quarter of a century of Communist rule, President Kim Il-sung rose to the position of “superstar” (Munthe-Kaas 1972:26-27). A Japanese visitor to North Korea (Wada 1963:23) stated, somewhat jokingly, that there is no need for other gods in North Korea, since they have their own god, Kim Il-sung. Economist Joan Robinson (1965:548), who visited North Korea in October 1964, similarly stated that Kim Il-sung functioned as a “messiah rather than a dictator.” Scholars of North Korea generally share this impression, seeing Kim as the center of a cult. To outside observers, the cult is often seen as a fanatic, conscious attempt to create strong leadership that is generated by a small inner circle of people holding political power. The extent to which the cult has effectively permeated people’s lives in North Korea, however, leads me to believe that this interpretation is too simple, and that additional factors are involved.

It appears that the cult has evolved to the point where President Kim is literally worshipped by the people of North Korea. From the time a baby first begins to talk it is indoctrinated with the image of the “Great Leader
Comrade Kim.” Children are told by their teachers that the food they receive in the nursery is provided by him, and are explicitly taught to be thankful for his grace. At mealtimes, nursery teachers demand that each child say “Thank you, Great Leader” before food is given to him. Reinforcement of this image-building continues throughout the years of schooling. All tangible things that supposedly related to Kim in the past are revered and are well preserved as historical objects. His birthplace, for example, has become a national shrine, and numerous statues of him have been erected throughout the nation.

An examination of North Korean documentary materials, particularly Rodong Sinmun (Workers’ Daily), the organ of the North Korean Workers’ Party, shows that during the second half of the 1960s the Kim cult was gradually intensified. Idolatrous descriptions of Kim Il-sung began to appear at this time, of which the following are examples: “the sun of the nation ... whom revolutionary people of the world adore so ardently as ‘the hero of the 20th century produced by Korea,’” and “the greatest, most respected and beloved leader produced by the whole world” (Munthe-Kaas 1972:27). In the 1960s, after the completion of agricultural cooperativization, Kim is reported to have made numerous personal, “on-the-spot” inspections of rural enterprises. One of the most publicized personal tours by Kim was made to Ch’ongsalli Cooperative Farm in February 1960. This visit resulted in a new socialist system of economic management known as the “Chongsanri [Ch’ongsalli] method” and the “Chongsanri spirit.” In Kim’s own words (1971:95; official English text published in P’yongyang), “The essence of the Chongsanri [Ch’ongsalli] method lies in the facts that the upper organs help the lower, superiors help their inferiors, priority is given to political work and the masses are roused to carry out their revolutionary tasks.” The frequent contact between Kim and the farmers through his visits of inspection has doubtless been important in the development of the Kim cult. It is most likely that the events of any on-the-spot inspection by the President have been well planned so that the actual visit is only to play them out. These inspections have made a tremendous impact on the workers’ morale, since personal contact with a supreme leader is a privilege of which they had never dreamed. If their farm operates well, the farmers undoubtedly develop a sense of loyalty to their leader and give him their support.

It is interesting to compare these modern circumstances with certain Confucian ideas of pre-Communist Korea. Among the five cardinal human relationships which form the core of Confucianism, the father-son relationship and the ruler-subject relationship are especially relevant. We have seen that the father-son relationship had become the principal one and that the ruler-subject relationship was not a strongly integrative factor in Korean society. Considerable emphasis was placed on the relationship among kin who were united in lines of descent from common ancestors. Among the
members of the privileged class, identification with powerful lineages was often the key to success in life. Although Korea had been a country of a single race and language for a millenium, it had long been socially divided into numerous nuclei of lineages, and no means of penetrating the walls of kinship existed that would integrate the entire population into a single, tight national network.

Under Communism, the father-son relationship continues to be important. Filial piety remains a virtue and those who fail to serve their parents or parents-in-law properly are subjected to public criticism. The father-son relationship and other bonds of kinship have nevertheless been substantially weakened in line with economic and sociological changes, as earlier discussion of such subjects as property, inheritance, marital relationships, lineages, and economic activities has brought out. The weakening of kinship alone implies changes in the social order which are revolutionary.

The formerly weak relationship between ruler and subject, however, has gained considerable strength under Communist rule in the form of the cult of personality centered around Kim Il-sung. How was such a transformation possible in such a short period of time? This question may be answered if we consider the strengthening of the ruler-subject relationship as an extension of the father-son relationship. I suggest that the weakening of the importance of kinship, particularly the father-son relationship, would have caused serious social disturbance unless a strongly integrative mechanism were developed as a substitute. The use of the old as a model for the new has served effectively. The socio-political chaos and the sense of personal deprivation that came as an aftermath of the war, and the many subsequent changes in ways of life, paved the way for the rise of a messianic figure to unite the people. Since the Korean War, North Korean society has been a closed system, sealed off from foreign cultural influences. (With regard to cultural contacts with other socialist countries, Russia and China in particular, North Korea may not be regarded as a completely "closed system." Complete control by the central government over mass communications and any other possible channel of transmission of cultural traits, however, keeps ordinary people from foreign cultural influences, even from Russian and Chinese cultures, except only segments which are regarded as of positive value to North Korea's own socio-cultural system.) The people were left with no feasible alternative than to adjust to changed conditions; and for most people, the changes represented an improvement in living conditions, a circumstance which led them to give credit for the improvement to their leader.

Two of the most celebrated achievements under Communist rule are noteworthy in connection with the Kim cult. These are the abolition of the agricultural tax-in-kind, and the establishment of the ten-year program of compulsory education, which occurred in 1966 and 1972, respectively. The
agricultural tax-in-kind was first imposed in 1946, as one of the major sources of internal revenue. With the abolition of this tax, farmers were freed of taxes. Profit from the industrial sector then supposedly became the sole source of internal revenue of the national government. Of course, there is no doubt that the government does indirectly collect revenue from the rural sector in the process of exchanging industrial goods for agricultural produce, but the formal abolition of tax-in-kind itself had great impact on the farmers' morale. The policy regarding purchase and supply of rice has also been a factor in boosting the morale of both farmers and workers. According to Kim Il-sung, who was interviewed at P'ongyang by Governor Minobe of Tokyo (1972:50), the government procurement agency purchases rice from farmers at sixty-five chon (about fifty cents) per kilogram and supplies it to urban residents at eight chon per kilogram. These figures were confirmed by my informants. There is no doubt that this policy brings about a sense of confidence in their government and its leaders among both producers and consumers. Similarly, the establishment of the ten-year system of universal compulsory education, which is far beyond what the peasant class could afford for its children in the past, has won for President Kim the popular support of the working people.

All the progress made under Communist rule has been interpreted as the result of President Kim's "wise leadership," an interpretation that resembles the pre-Communist custom of attributing personal success in life to one's ancestors. Any kind of state assistance is called a gift from the "respected and beloved leader" Kim, and it is common practice to speak of his deeds in terms of paternal love. The new strength of the ruler-subject relationship appears to be a projection of the old father-son relationship in a new social context. Without a long history of social arrangements in which kinship was vitally important, it seems unlikely that the modern conditions of integration based upon a sense of paternalism could have been achieved.

Kim Il-sung has in fact become a cultural hero who is referred to by the people as "father." The Confucian conception of filial piety referred to paternal love in terms of "indebtedness as high as a mountain and deep as an ocean." It is interesting to note that recently the expression "indebtedness to the President Kim Il-sung as high as a mountain and deep as an ocean" is frequently seen in contemporary North Korean publications (Rodong Sinmun, 11/25/66, p. 3; 3/10/68, p. 2; 1/28/69, p. 2; 6/1/69, p. 2; 2/25/70, p. 5; and 2/12/71, p. 4). Young people increasingly tend to identify themselves as "sons and daughters of the Korean Workers' Party and Marshal Kim Il-sung." The celebrated woman track athlete Shin Kom-dan publicly stated "how proud and happy she was to be a daughter of the Korean Workers' Party and Marshal Kim Il-sung" at the time she won the 400 and 800 meter competitions of the International Track and Field Competition in Moscow (Choson Nyosong, August 1961:30). Her real father
lives in South Korea, where he fled during the Korean War, but she is regarded by North Koreans as a folk heroine because she has proved her loyalty to the regime through hard work.

What is important here is the fact that loyalty to the supreme leader supersedes the traditional concept of filial piety to biological parents. Farmers and other workers work harder today. Of course, material gain should not be disregarded as a motivating factor; however, it is noteworthy that participation in the socialist construction is interpreted as repayment of the indebtedness people owe to their "respected and beloved leader." In recent years, the North Korean mass media have carried an increasing number of accounts of exemplary activities of young people arising from their sense of duty to the state and the supreme leader. Feelings of loyalty to the modern leader seem, in fact, to be considerably stronger than the traditional virtue of filial piety. The very mode of integration through deification of the supreme leader leads us to believe that Confucianism, strongly denounced by the North Korean Communists, has survived in transmuted form. The change is a shift in the principle of social organization from familism based on the father-son relationship to primacy of the ruler-subject relationship, so that integration extends beyond the boundaries of kinship. The nature of the relationship between the people and the head of state is so kin-like, however, that it seems appropriate to refer to modern Communist North Korea as a family-state.

Despite vigorous dissemination and practical implementation of Communist ideology, North Korean culture under Communism is thus distinctive and bears a strong imprint of Confucianism. The national goal is "creation of an ideal society based upon Marxist-Leninist ideology," and the nation has an "ever-victorious, iron-willed, brilliant commander" (Korea Today, 1972, No. 195:11), whose role is much like that of the head of a household in the traditional society. He is the absolute authority and the source of all wisdom about national affairs, and his management of the state resembles the management of a household. Material prosperity achieved under Communist rule is believed to be the result of his leadership. So far as I can discern, the present integration of North Korean society appears to be stronger than it has ever been before in the long Korean history. Principles underlying the operation of the family and the lineage in traditional Korea are now extended and applied on the national level, and traditional ancestor worship has survived in the Kim cult.

This pattern of transformation under Communism reminds us of the famous Confucian reformist Chu Hsi's dream of a new Confucian society "in which the ruler would act out of paternal love, as a father would, at the head of the centralized government and at the center of the nation, in which the people, his loyal subjects, would act, in turn, with an inborn [imperative—by personal correspondence] sense of duty. A person could thereby be a father to
the family and at the same time a loyal subject of the ruler" (Kang 1971:277). What has happened in North Korea for the last quarter of a century may be summarized as a transformation into a new Confucian society or family-state that is well integrated as an extension of filial piety, expressed through strong loyalty to its leader. To some extent, then, it may be said that the society that Chu Hsi had dreamed about has materialized in Communist North Korea.

General improvement in the standard of living has helped to win a higher degree of confidence in the socialist system. People have seen that none of their leaders is working for his own interests and that their own efforts are not wasted. Administrative corruption has not been reported as occurring in any sector of North Korea under Communism, other than misdemeanors related to the heated competition in campaigns to boost production. A notable example of such misdemeanors is "percentage pyong," or the percentage syndrome, which refers to the practice of emphasizing the quantity of work over the quality, that is, overstating the amount of work done (Choson Nyosong, February 1962:24). Since farmers manage their farms, there is no room today for personal grievance regarding payments for work. An example of how today's farmers feel about their changed lives is provided by a North Korean reporter after a trip to the Red Flag Cooperative Farm, near Hamhung City. The reporter describes the life of a member of Work Team No. 3 of the farm, who had been a farmhand in pre-Communist years:

Bitterly recalling his past life, hard pressed by the Japanese swine and the landlord, he related with deep emotion stories about free distribution of the land by the leader [Kim Il-sung], formation of the cooperative farm, and about his present happy life in the tax-free village. Now he lives in a cozy house provided by the state free of charge and does farming with the help of machines. He said with emphasis that his share of rice last year would be enough to last his whole family for three years. (Korea Today, 1972, No. 194:21)

Recent North Korean propaganda is loaded with such expressions as "the happiness of today." When the improved conditions of people's lives are repeatedly compared with those of the past, the comparison undoubtedly generates a sense of indebtedness to the socio-political system in which they live. The strong human tendency toward anthropocentrism, however, leads people to interpret the improvements in their conditions of life as the acts of a human leader.

The sense of indebtedness and loyalty to the leader, in turn, fosters unselfish devotion to the society. This seems to be what has happened in North Korea, where devotion is measured in part by occupations. Jobs involving manual labor are valued over clerical positions, according to my informants. Graduates of high school are assigned positions by the government, and those who are assigned to clerical positions are said to be ashamed of themselves. This circumstance seems to indicate change in the attitude toward work. Material rewards may have contributed to the change,
since manual labor is generally better paid than clerical or white-collar jobs; the spirit of self-sacrifice and a desire for identification with working people seem to be more important factors, however. Innovative achievement and production that exceeds quotas are also viewed as demonstrations of loyalty to the leader. The unit of integration is not the family or lineage based upon biological relationship but North Korean society as a whole. The traditional virtue of filial piety has been replaced by loyalty on the national level. Workers are called upon to fulfill their production quotas as given by the nation's leader, and to prove their loyalty to him. Public meetings of almost any kind of group have at some time passed resolutions that they should repay their indebtedness to the leader by hard work. The major slogan of the summer campaigns to increase agricultural production is “Let's repay the great indebtedness to the Party and the Leader by increased production" (Rodong Sinmun, 11/25/66, p. 3, and 11/26/66, p. 1).

The unification of North Korea was additionally favored by the exodus of anti-Communists that I have described. Those who left were mostly Christians, intellectuals, and members of well-to-do families, and such people of these backgrounds who remain in North Korea are social outcasts who, more than other people, must give evidence of dedication to the interests of the state. The modern population of North Korea is much more homogeneous in social background than the population of former times, a factor which also fostered the development of a unified state. Other circumstances that particularly favored Communism were the conditions of life of the majority of the people, who had little to lose under Communism and quickly saw that Communism bettered their lots.

Still other conditions were involved in the development of a tightly unified state. Among these has been the effective use of mass media of communication, which are under the firm control of the government. The news media consist principally of newspapers, magazines, radio, and, in recent years, television. Television sets are not yet available for every household, but they are well distributed throughout the nation so that every citizen sees broadcasts. Each work team or residential cluster has a television receiver, for viewing educational and political broadcasts. Whenever some important program is broadcast, all villagers are summoned to their neighborhood receivers. Television broadcasts by President Kim are watched by most of the nation. According to my informants, the audience behaves as if it were actually meeting the leader personally. These broadcasts appear to be an important element in the development of the cult-like attitude toward him.

The state monopoly of media of communication appears to have served as the major boundary-maintaining mechanism in the integration of the sociocultural system. Foreign cultural traits are closely screened; strong emphasis is given to native cultural elements, and the communication
networks carry little information other than some political news about the ways of living of other societies, so that the people live in cultural isolation. This isolation is strengthened by a campaign of opposition to foreign nations, as described earlier. Every effort has been made to create imaginary enemies. The attacks on alleged “foreign evils” have been important in generating ethnocentrism, nationalism, and unity in meeting the threats seemingly imposed by the enemies. As social scientists interested in the study of conflict have often contended, joint hostility toward a common foe may be seen as a powerful unifying force.

A chief function of the media of communication is educational, providing people with the latest scientific innovations and indoctrinating them in Communist ideology that has been synthesized with national goals. The impact of the propaganda campaign seems to be very powerful. Newspapers and periodicals are available everywhere, and farmers and industrial workers hold news-reading gatherings during lunch hours and rest periods while at work or during study periods in the evening, when one member summarizes the important news of the day, at home and abroad, or reads aloud important items. Papers and magazines are full of stories about outstanding achievements of individuals or groups, and technological innovations that boost production are well publicized through every medium of propaganda. Each agricultural production unit operates like an independent experiment station. Whenever and whatever innovations are made by one unit become nationally known through the news media. Innovations are not always successful, of course. Judgment of their value has been practical, and practicality has meant congruence with other aspects of Korean culture. The establishment of mass dining halls serves as an example. The halls, it was claimed, reduced the work of women, who were traditionally responsible for preparing meals, and saved a good deal of labor by the use of centralized kitchens and small kitchen staffs of full-time personnel. The campaign to establish the halls throughout the nation lauded their effectiveness and advantages. Despite the intensive propaganda, however, within a couple of years of active operation the halls were found to cause inconvenience to farmers and to result in confusion. Once mass dining proved to be inefficient, no time was wasted in abolishing it.

The effective use of media of communication has resulted in a high degree of conformity in attitudes. In a sense, every North Korean is a spokesman for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Foreign visitors usually get the same answers to questions when these are asked of people in different localities. Through the various political activities in which they engage, the people, especially the young, are well trained in debating and they are “free” to express their own views at meetings. Once a resolution is adopted at the end of a debate, however, all who are involved are obliged to live up to it, regardless of what their own views might be. Otherwise, they
would be regarded as deviants or reactionaries. It is worthy of note that views expressed in the meetings are not allowed to become the cause of blame after the meeting has ended or outside the meeting place. The same rule is applied to cases of personal verbal attack during meetings. At political meetings in which criticism of individuals and self-criticism take place, one person may criticize another for failure to be candid. The person criticized may defend his position, but the argument must not extend beyond the meeting. Later arguing or quarreling constitutes a serious offense.