CHAPTER III

LIFE ON A FARM

1. Daily Life

In pre-Communist years, residences in rural Korea were commonly scattered widely in the fields in many small clusters. Under Communist rule, considerable effort has been made to reduce the number of residential clusters in order to put all aspects of farm life under direct control. Rural housing projects carried out by the government concentrate housing. The scale of these projects is not clear. It is illustrative, however, that in 1969 Kim Il-sung (1970 III:449) called for a campaign to build 150,000 new houses in rural North Korea each year for the next three to four years. Many cooperative farms include several residential clusters because of the large area of land under cultivation. In such cases, each hamlet serves as a production work team or chagoppan. In the past, there had been little relationship between neighboring hamlets unless they shared the same irrigation system or cultivated adjoining fields. Relations of kinship involving matrimonial alliances were one of the major ties among neighboring hamlets, but they were all nevertheless socially discrete in matters of everyday life.

The center of a farm is the Cooperative Farm Management Committee. Its office is usually located in the heart of the farm. Each farm also has various cultural, educational, and service facilities. The clubhouse serves as a center of non-agricultural activities. It is equipped with various recreational facilities and also provides a place for socio-political meetings. The Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm, with a population in 1959 of 3,045 persons including 1,227 working members, had a clubhouse with a seating capacity of 700 people (Hwang et al. 1960:221). Unless there are scheduled events, farmers often spend their evening hours at the clubhouse engaging in recreational activities or at the “democratic propaganda room” reading books, newspapers, or magazines.

Each farm has at least an elementary school (first to fourth grades) and a middle school (fifth to tenth grades), so that children do not have to go outside the farm to receive the ten years of compulsory education (extended, in 1973, from nine years). Other educational programs include the Workers’ Middle School (Kulloja Chunghaggyo), Mothers’ School (Omoni Haggyo), Cooking Lesson Circle (Yoli Circle), Children’s Study Room (Adong Kyoyangsil), and Youths’ Night School (Ch’ongnyon Yagan Haggyo). The
farm dispensary is staffed with at least one doctor and two nurses. Other service facilities include a barbershop, bathhouse, sewing room, shop, and grain mill. Thus, for ordinary people on a farm, activities are virtually confined within the farm’s boundary, and there are few chances to extend relationships outside the farm. Farmers sometimes go outside their farms on private business, however, which principally concerns the farmers’ market, or nongmin sijang. Generally, each county has a farmers’ market, held about three times a month. The dates of market are chosen by the county authorities and are usually holidays. Each farming household retains a small private kitchen plot of about a hundred square meters, and may raise a small number of livestock, chiefly pigs and chickens, as private property. Surplus products so raised may be sold or bartered at the farmers’ market. The purchase of good strains of such private livestock as pigs and chickens is one of the important transactions that take place in this market. Farmers may also sell or barter some of their share of the products of the cooperative farms. According to our informants, however, products at the market are chiefly those obtained from private endeavors. The farmers’ market is not the same as the traditional rural market. Prices are fixed by the central government, and the market is not a gathering place for meeting friends from neighboring farms. Often markets are open only during the morning, and those who attend are said to be chiefly the aged or the other inactive members of the cooperative farms.

The tight regimentation of a farmer’s daily life is effected in part by various security and intelligence networks. The term anjonmang, literally meaning “security network,” refers to surveillance networks as a whole. I have been able to discern three kinds of “security networks” that directly affect the farmer’s life. These are the “intelligence network” (chongbomang) conducted by the “social security agents” (sahoe anjonwon), “party member surveillance network” (tangwon kamsimang) among the party members, and “mass surveillance network” (kunjung kamsimang). The first two types are carried out covertly, the last overtly.

The state’s internal security is taken care of through the administrative channels of the Sahoe Anjonguk, or Bureau of Social Security, which is approximately the equivalent of a police department elsewhere. The Bureau has branches at each administrative unit of every level. On each farm is a Social Security Agents’ Room staffed with a “security agent in charge,” or ch’ae/gin anjonwon, and a few additional “security agents,” or anjonwon, who are, in fact, military men in active service. Except on special occasions, they wear civilian clothes like those of other farmers. The “intelligence network” is operated by these agents, who secretly use ordinary farmers as operational aides. Even an aide does not know who the other aides are. Each aide reports directly to his agents the information he has gathered. The intelligence network is chiefly concerned with supporting the government’s political and ideological lines and in handling dissidents.
Every effort is made by the agents to establish rapport with the farmers. Even though they are not ordinary farmers, they often join the farmers in working the fields in an effort to maintain a close relationship with them. Sometimes they make a present of wine to elders on their birthdays. They have free access to all meetings and gatherings on the farm. In addition to this surveillance, the security agents play another important role that seems to have substantially reduced tension between agents and farmers. According to an informant who had served as a “security agent in charge” with the army rank of captain in a cooperative farm until he fled to South Korea in 1967, the agents are responsible not only for intelligence gathering but also for supervising the implementation of various government policies and ordinances, including the introduction of advanced agricultural technology. For this reason, those who serve as security agents on the farm are in fact well-trained agricultural specialists, a circumstance that aids them in establishing rapport with the farmers and in maintaining active participation in farm affairs. The security agents may be described as “marginal men” who integrate the rural population with the nation.

The “party member surveillance network” is organized and operated by the head of the farm’s Party Committee. Selecting agents from the core Party members, the head directs surveillance, giving each agent a specific task. Information gathered by this network is reported upward through the channels of Party organization. Since the Party members form the nucleus of all social and political activities on the farm, close surveillance of their activities is regarded as necessary to establish and maintain the revolutionary cause.

The “mass surveillance network” includes the organizations of the Worker-Farmer Red Guards (Ronong Chogwidae) and the People’s Associations (Inminban). In both cases, surveillance is an important part of its operations. The Worker-Farmer Red Guards were first organized in early 1959 in order to consolidate the national defense system, which was supposedly weakened by the withdrawal of the Chinese Army in 1958, which had been stationed in North Korea since the Korean War (1950-1953). At the outset, the organizations were concentrated in cities, the vicinity of the Truce Line, and coastal areas. Today the Worker-Farmer Red Guards are organized in every sector of North Korean society and have become an integral part of the national defense system. Men of eighteen to forty-five years of age and women of eighteen to thirty-five years qualify for the Red Guards, provided they are not regarded as politically “impure” or reactionary. A female Red Guard may be either married or single. When she gives birth to a child, however, she automatically retires from the Red Guards. On the cooperative farm level, the Red Guards are organized in line with the production organization: a farm becomes the unit of a company of the Red Guards, a work team a platoon, and the secretary of the Li Workers’
Party Committee serves as the company commander. The Red Guards attend regular military training sessions held in the farm fields, particularly during the agricultural slack season. Although their primary objective is to prepare a stronger national defense, the Red Guards also serve as an important mechanism for controlling people’s lives. For instance, any information concerning “reactionary” activities taking place on the farm is reported to the higher authorities through the organizational channels of Red Guards.

Each farm has several neighborhood associations called *Inminban* or “People’s Association,” which have no direct reference to the farm’s production organization. Membership is based upon residential proximity. These associations are further divided into smaller groups, each composed of an average of five households, which are called *ogajo*, or “five-household teams.” The *ogajo* began in late 1958 as an organization by means of which a responsible and loyal cadre member of either sex takes charge of a number of neighboring households and serves as their counselor (*Rodong Sinmun*, 9/13/67; also quoted in Pak Kwan-su 1972:60). Until 1971, when its name was changed, the *ogajo* system was known as *oho tamdangje*, or “five-household-in-charge system,” and the leader of the group was called *oho tandang sonjonwon*, “propagator in charge of five households” (*Rodong Sinmun*, 5/19/71:6). Despite its name, the “five-household team” is not necessarily composed of five households; dependent upon circumstances, it may be six, seven, or more households. The team’s leader oversees the daily activities of other members. Each day the leader is required to call on each member household and to give a team report to the head of the *Inminban*, who, in turn, reports information so obtained to the *Li* People’s Committee chairman. The team members frequently hold meetings to discuss matters such as the prevention of accidents, contribution of “voluntary labor,” and adjustment to socio-political circumstances. According to a case study reported in *Rodong Sinmun* (5/19/71:6), however, the leaders of these groups attempt to “revolutionize the family life” by urging people to replace selfishness with the spirit of collectivism. In this case, the team’s leader, a female middle school teacher, gave reading assignments to each member of a household of her team and asked them to hold a family meeting on every fifth day in which family members were to discuss the contents of their assignments in connection with their family life.

Under this systematic network of surveillance, personal problems are revealed to the farm authorities if they have any bearing on the affairs of the group as a whole.

Daily activities on the farm vary considerably in keeping with the agricultural seasons. The daily round of work always begins early in the morning, and during the busy agricultural seasons it begins very early. Performing necessary tasks with a limited labor force requires a long workday. Before breakfast, work consists of tasks connected with the kitchen
garden, private livestock including pigs and chickens, and other domestic matters. After breakfast, around 8:30 A.M., farmers of both sexes gather at specified places into work teams. Members of specialized teams may gather at their workshops. The team’s head issues instructions to sub-teams regarding the day’s tasks and schedule, and the sub-team leader then leads the members to the field, like marching soldiers. Rest periods of ten to twenty minutes alternate with work periods of fifty minutes. Mothers of infants are allowed about one-half hour to breast-feed their children once in the morning and once in the afternoon. When mothers are engaged in field labor some distance from their residences, the children are brought to the field for feeding by nursery workers. Sometimes colored flags are set up in the fields to indicate where the mothers work so that the nursery workers may easily find them.

At noon, farmers may go to their houses for lunch. If their work is some distance from their homes, they usually take lunches with them. In pre-Communist Korea, it was common practice for the peasants participating in joint agricultural labor, or pumasi, to be supplied with food and drink three times a day by the house for which they were working at the time. A full meal with rice wine was provided for lunch, and food and rice wine in smaller amounts for the other two meals. Since cooperativization, each farmer must arrange for his own lunch. Farmers today take no food during their breaks, and rice wine has been completely dropped from the farmers’ menu during the working day, probably for economic reasons.

In most cooperative farms, several “field propaganda houses,” or p’ojon sonjonsil, are set up here and there in the fields to give shade from the hot summer sun and for shelter during heavy rains. One of their most important functions is to provide a place for various propaganda purposes. Young farmers may form groups there to sing and dance. During the busy agricultural seasons when total mobilization of labor is needed, the County Cooperative Farm Management Committee organizes mobile entertainment groups selected from the members of the county’s cooperative farms. Each of several groups makes a tour of the farms, giving daytime performances in the field and evening performances at the farm centers. Farmers may find time for a short nap during the lunch hour, but breaks and the lunch hour are usually used for purposes of propaganda and education. Newspapers, magazines, or books are read aloud by the “agitators,” or sondongwon. Domestic and international developments are discussed, and advanced agricultural techniques introduced by experts. Loudspeakers, set up in the farm center or on hills, broadcast music, drama, and work instructions. Daily activities begin and end at the signal of a bell in the farm center. The bell rings at the beginning of work, at the beginning and end of the lunch hour, and at the end of the work day. The bell is often used to awaken the farmers in the morning, especially during the busy seasons when they must arise especially early.
Women take part in all kinds of work done by men. They still hold their traditional roles in family life, however, which affect their farm work. Unless a grandmother or some other family member can take care of housework, particularly kitchen tasks, housewives are allowed to begin farm work a half-hour later and to return home one hour earlier than others.

Unless they are assigned to such positions as nursery or kindergarten teachers, all members of the farm participate in the farm work during the busy season. The daily routine of the chairman of a Cooperative Farm Management Committee as observed by a group of Japanese reporters (Ho-Cho Kishadan 1960:204-205) is illustrative. Around nine o'clock each morning the chairman presides at a meeting of members of the standing committee, conducted in his office. The members are then assigned to the work units to supervise the day's work. The chairman spends some time inspecting conditions of health, the state of household facilities, the welfare of elders who remain at home, and the supply of fuel. He then joins the farmers in field work for a couple of hours. At the end of the working day, members of the standing committee hold an evening get-together to exchange opinions and observations on the day's work, and to discuss work to be done by each production unit. After reviewing the next day's production plan, the chairman and committee members go home around 6:30 in the evening.

Immediately after the end of the day's work, members of each sub-team hold a meeting called chagop ch'onghwa, "settlement of work," to evaluate the members' work. Each sub-team has a Work Evaluation Committee composed of three to five of its members. As judged by the committee on the basis of the quantity and quality of the work performed during the day, work points for each member are read aloud by the sub-team's head, and recorded in the Labor Notebook. This is the final stage of a day's work. Farmers then return home by sub-teams, again marching in line.

Evenings are filled with socio-political activities of indoctrination and education, and also are times for recreation. Political organizations such as the Socialist Working Youth League, Workers' Party Committee, Agricultural Workers' Union, Worker-Farmer Red Guards, and Democratic Women's League are the major organizers of the people's activities that are not directly related to farm production. Almost every evening at least one of these organizations holds a meeting. Occasionally, meetings are called by the people's associations or work teams to discuss administrative or work affairs.

The clubhouse is the center of all evening political, cultural, and recreational activities. It usually contains a study room, library, music room, technology propagation (education) room, public health (sanitation) propagation room, broadcasting room, recreational facilities, and a hall for mass meetings and cultural activities. Unless meetings are scheduled, the farmers gather at the clubhouse on a holiday or any evening to take part in
whatever group activities they like. Among the young, meetings of art circles in drama, music, and dancing are popular. The study room in the farm’s clubhouse is called either “Revolutionary Activities Study Room” or “(Workers’) Party History Study Room.” Although there is only one clubhouse, a large farm maintains several “study rooms” so that each residential cluster or work team has one.

The Mothers’ School, organized by the Democratic Women’s League, often holds sessions during the winter and, to a lesser extent, during other seasons. It provides housewives with general knowledge of such subjects as child care, public health, cooking, and proper attitude toward the elders.

Almost every farm is equipped with a wire broadcasting system, which usually covers the entire farm and includes an amplifier for each dwelling. During the dinner hour, the farm headquarters broadcasts a daily report of the progress of the farm work, including statistics on the production of each work unit and the points earned by each person. Except for these reports on farm affairs, the system simply relays programs from Radio P’yongyang, in the capital. This broadcasting and the governmental control over publications give complete political control over news media.

2. Production Stimulation Campaign

Unless agricultural production could be increased, the “socialist transformation” of the rural economy would, of course, have been meaningless to the people, and the Communist regime seems to have been particularly intent upon producing evidence of such transformation. During late 1956 and early 1957, workers in the industrial sector were urged to forge ahead at the speed of the “Ch’ollima,” a legendary horse that could run one thousand li a day (Kim Byong-sik 1970:155). As the completion of cooperativization approached, a “production stimulation campaign,” better known as the Ch’ollima movement, gradually extended from the urban centers to rural areas.

The movement entailed a total mobilization of labor forces and the use of all other available means of production with the aim of reaching the goals of the Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) of national industrialization ahead of schedule. Under the banner of a goal called “production increase and austerity,” farmers were called upon to join in the building of socialism. After the formation of the cooperative farms, the Ch’ollima movement was further accelerated in the rural sections. Numerous rural construction projects, especially irrigation systems, reclamation works, and projects of housing and land readjustment, were carried out during the early stages of the Ch’ollima movement. Since 1959, the campaign has moved to a new stage, under the name “Ch’ollima work team movement,” which uses the work teams as operational units in a drive for increased production. At the time that my field research was conducted, the movement was still active.
In rural areas, the Ch'ollima work team movement was organized by the Agricultural Workers’ Union. In order to be a participant competitor, a work team needed to set an extraordinary production target described in detail by plans concerning production, procurement of necessary machines and materials, the organization of work, and political and ideological education. A work team submitted its proposal to the Agricultural Workers’ Union, which examined the plan and decided whether or not the team should be accepted as a participant in the Ch'ollima work team movement. At the end of harvest each year, the achievement of each participant work team was carefully examined by the Agricultural Workers’ Union and compared with the original plan.

When a work team received an exemplary rating for its yearly performance, it was given the honorific title of “Ch'ollima Work Team.” There are at least four or five work teams on each cooperative farm, and when a team wins the title of Ch'ollima Work Team, the honor applies only to the individual team. The honorific title of “Ch'ollima Cooperative Farm” is awarded when all work teams of a cooperative farm have won the title of Ch'ollima Work Team. This title means that the team members receive material benefits in the form of an increased share of production, but the main importance of the award seems to be the recognition of their achievements by others and associated emotional gratification, which appears to be deep. Records of excellent performances are effectively utilized by propaganda channels, which urge others to emulate the exemplary teams. As the Ch'ollima movement became full-fledged, every cooperative farm throughout North Korea was turned into a “laboratory” in search of better ways to increase production. Through administrative channels, innovations at individual farms were quickly picked up and experimented with by other farms. New and seemingly advanced techniques appear always to be welcomed by the contemporary farmers.

As the North Korean Communists admit, the agricultural sector has always trailed the urban sector in speed and degree of socialist transformation. The Ch'ollima work team movement has also been relatively slow to develop among cooperative farms. One year (March 1959 to February 1960) after the actual launching of the movement, the number of work teams in the nation participating in the Ch'ollima movement totalled 3,481, and 69,978 workers and 173 work teams had achieved the title of “Ch'ollima Work Team” (Sakurai, trans., 1963b:34-35). The majority of these were industrial work teams. Only 188 were agricultural and these are believed to have been in the state-owned farms, ranches, agricultural machine stations, and other agencies related to agriculture. It was not until the mid-1960s that the cooperative farms generally entered the Ch'ollima work team movement, beginning with the well-publicized Ch'ongsan Cooperative Farm of Kangso County in June 1960. By the end of 1960, eighty-three work teams from
numerous cooperative farms throughout North Korea had joined the movement. During the following year, the movement spread with tremendous rapidity, and by the end of the year the number of its work units, including those in grocery shops, dispensaries, kindergartens, and nurseries, as well as basic production work teams, had grown to 14,343, of which 374 units had won the title “Ch’ollima Work Team” (Hong Tal-son 1971:128-131). At the end of March 1962, 39.4% of the work units (of the total of 3,704 cooperative farms) had joined the movement (ibid.:130-131).

The Ch’ollima movement led to a rapid increase in the quantity of work done by farmers, who are given credits called noryogil, “work-day,” according to the quality and quantity of their work. The work-days may be more or less than the actual number of days worked, and these are determined by a five-grade scale. One day of average farm work is 1.00 work-day; a day of heavy work is 1.50 work-days; and a day of very light work constitutes 0.5 work-day. Two intermediate grades are rated 1.25 and 0.75. Since the amount of labor required to earn a work-day is determined by piece-work, the number of work-days a farmer can earn in a day by working harder than the standard, or overtime, may exceed the number of calendrical days. This procedure, of course, encourages farmers to work harder so they can earn greater income. According to Hong (ibid.:132), an average farmer in North Korea earned a rating of 301 work-days during the year 1959, the first year of the Ch’ollima work team movement, but cooperative farms had not yet joined the movement. The number of work-days increased during the following two years as the campaign swept through the cooperative farms. The average farmer contributed 345 work-days in 1960 and 359 in 1961. This means that in 1961 the average farmer accomplished as much work as he had previously done in about fourteen months.

Besides the honorific title of “Ch’ollima Cooperative Farm,” another stimulus helps keep the farmers’ zeal alive. This is an award called Sunhoe Usunggi or “Circuit Winner Flag,” a flag that is awarded on a yearly basis to cooperative farms and counties that have made outstanding achievements. Rodong Sinmun reports in its issue of January 24, 1971 (p. 2), that in 1970 six County Cooperative Farm Management Committees and fifty-five cooperative farms throughout North Korea were awarded flags. Winners are not allowed to keep the flags permanently; if they do not win the award the following year, the flag is lost.

As an additional part of the campaign to stimulate revolutionary zeal for increased production, the regime has adopted a series of resolutions concerning a prize system by which workers and farmers who have demonstrated exemplary merit or made innovative contributions are awarded the title “Labor Hero” or a medal of merit. “Collective innovations” are also encouraged through honoring counties and cooperative farms for outstanding achievements of this kind (Kim Han-ju 1958:53). Even before
cooperativization was completed, production stimulation campaigns were
general. According to Kim Han-ju (1959:31), the regime had at this time
conducted the mobom nonghyop ch'angio undong or “campaign for building
an exemplary agricultural cooperative.” Moreover, when organizational
units of the cooperative farms exceeded their production quotas, members of
the units had been rewarded by preferential treatment in the distribution of
crops. If quotas were not met, members were punished by a reduction of their
work-days.

The North Korean production stimulation campaign may be compared
in many ways with a campaign of battle. Many of the terms used in the
campaign are drawn from military vocabularies, for example, koch'i (heights,
meaning planned goals), koch'i chomryong (capture of heights), tolygoktae
(shock troops or task forces), chont'u kyehoek (combat plan, meaning
production plan), and sommyoljon (annihilation operations, meaning to
carry out the production tasks one by one). The term chont'u or “combat” is
often used to denote short tasks for which intensified labor is required; for
instance, paegil chont'u or “100-day combat” is a campaign to push back in
time the beginning of farming in the early spring and to complete the rice
seeding by April 10th (Rodong Sinmun, 1/5/71, 1/10/71). Other terms have
similar meanings, such as monaegi chont'u, “combat to carry out rice
transplanting,” and nongch'onjüwon sasibil chont'u, “40-day combat to
support farmers,” in which urban industrial and office workers and students
assist farmers during the busy season of rice transplanting (ibid., 5/10/69,
5/11/70). Among these campaigns, the “40-day combat to support farmers”
appears to be an extension of an earlier campaign of “25-day combat”
isiboil chont'u) reported in Rodong Sinmun (3/25/64:3-4). This campaign
called for a contribution of twenty-five days of work in support of farmers
during the busy seasons by all able-bodied men and women not in
agriculture.

The atmosphere under which farmers carry out their daily work tasks
suggests the battlefield in other ways. Especially during the busy seasons, the
fields are bright with numerous propaganda slogans calling for patriotic
enthusiasm for work. Some of the slogans read: “Let’s increase grain
production from 0.5 to 1 ton per chonhgo in the spirit of saving our brothers
in the south (South Korea)” (Rodong Sinmun, 1/17/66:2); “Let’s recompense
our beloved leader (Premier Kim Il-sung) for his benevolence and respond to
his wishes by capturing once again the glory of winning the battle of
weeding” (ibid., 7/15/68:3); “Let’s each carry out the work of two or three
men in weeding, in the spirit of fixing bayonets through the chests of the
enemy American imperialists” (ibid.); and “Let’s accelerate vigorously the
task of rice transplanting in the spirit of destroying our enemy, American
imperialism” (ibid., 5/12/69:3).
As the above examples show, the production stimulation campaign vigorously makes use of hatred against alleged enemies in order to foster enthusiasm. The Communist regime seems to be careful in choosing symbols of the campaign from incidents that have occurred in South Korea. According to an account of *Rodong Sinmun* (1/23/66), farmers of Naejung Cooperative Farm of Yomju County during 1965 engaged in a popular, patriotic campaign of production stimulation to “save the farmers of Sangnam-myon of Ch'angwon County, Kyongnam Province” in South Korea, who reportedly were suffering from poverty. The campaign led to the production of an unprecedented yield, and the farmers' hard work was interpreted as saving the “poor South Korean farmers.” Well-known South Koreans who have opposed their own government have often been used in North Korean propaganda as symbols of the revolutionary cause, their names being utilized to bring about hatred-of-the-enemy converted into zeal-for-production. A North Korean electric locomotive plant, for instance, was named “Kim Chong-t'ae Electric Locomotive Plant” after a man who had been executed on a charge of anti-government activities in South Korea in July 1969. The workers of the plant were reported to have enthusiastically adopted a resolution to build an electric locomotive, to be named “Hero Kim Chong-t'ae,” with materials saved and “socialist labor” (meaning extra work contributed) (*Rodong Sinmun*, 7/30/69:1).

The name *t'ongil p'ojon* (unification fields) is another example of the techniques that have been frequently employed to promote incentives to work. This is a campaign to increase the productivity of poor land through increased labor. The cooperative farm chooses a piece of land with low productivity, naming it *t'ongil p'ojon* with the meaning that the improvement of its productivity will aid in the early unification of all of Korea. An example from P'younghwa-li Cooperative Farm of Kapsan County illustrates how this technique has been employed (*Rodong Sinmun*, 6/15/66:2). This cooperative farm set aside a hundred *chongbo* of arable land as “unification fields.” The farmers organized a labor intensification campaign to carry out “my own task of daily work in the morning and the same amount of work in behalf of our brothers in the south (South Korea) in the afternoon.” Naejung Cooperative Farm of Yomju County reportedly set aside 290 *chongbo* of arable land as “unification fields” and its farmers adopted a resolution calling for an increase of more than one ton of grain per *chongbo* (ibid., 1/23/66:2). Since the “increase of 500 kg. of grain output per *chongbo*” has been the most commonly used slogan in production stimulation campaigns throughout rural North Korea (ibid., 7/15/68:3; Pak Kwan-su 1971:72), the target of production set forth by the Naejung Farm may be quite unreasonable.

It appears clear that appeals to the farmers' patriotism through political and ideological indoctrination alone proved insufficient to maintain their
enthusiasm. As earlier discussion has indirectly shown, measures to cope with this problem have been worked out. The reward system is one of these measures. Two additional inter-related and complementary types of systems of reward are currently employed: chagoppan udaeje (work team preferential treatment system) and punjo kwalliye (work sub-team management system). Both reward production in excess of quotas. From the year's gross proceeds of the farm in cash and kind, production costs are deducted, including the cost of fertilizer, irrigation, and farm machinery, and contributions to social welfare funds. The remainder, called "distribution funds," is distributed to the members of the farm in proportion to the work-days that each has earned. The funds are divided into two parts: "basic distribution fund" and "work team reward fund." First, each work team sets aside as a "reward fund" the amount in excess of 90% of the production quota. Then the "basic distribution fund" is computed for the cooperative farm as a whole; this consists of proceeds for 90% of the production quota minus total production costs and contributions to the communal funds. If a work team fails to meet 90% of its quota, the team has no "reward fund" to distribute and its "basic distribution fund" is reduced by 5% to 15% of its deficit. Thus, under the "work team preferential treatment system," a farmer's income is drawn from both "basic" and "reward" funds according to the number of work-days he has earned during the year.

This procedure, which has been in effect since 1960, makes work teams into the basic units of production, with their own production goals, and the work sub-teams are only operational units for the daily tasks. Since the large work team consists of fifty to a hundred farmers, it turned out to be too large a production unit to hold the team members collectively responsible for a production quota. Under the rules of the "work team preferential treatment system," one's hard work would be fruitless unless all other members of the team also strove for a good crop. Stimulus for all to strive hard came through the creation of the "work sub-team management system," by which sub-teams became responsible for meeting production quotas. This system, originally known as punjo togupche, or "work sub-team piece-work (contract) system," swept North Korea after 1966, following two years of experimentation on a small number of cooperative farms. Under this system, each sub-team is assigned a certain amount of arable land, draft animals, and agricultural instruments. The sub-team assumes responsibility for the entire procedure of cultivation, receiving its instruction from the farm authorities. At the end of each year, the sum of work-days earned by each member of the sub-team is re-evaluated on the basis of accomplishment of the sub-team's production quota. Thus farmers lose some of their work-days earned during the course of production if their sub-teams failed to meet their quotas, and they are rewarded for exceeding the quotas. This system is not an alternative to the "work team preferential treatment system" but supple-
ments it. Thus, as an individual farmer, a sub-team member, and a team member, each farmer bears a responsibility to perform well. If his own sub-team does well but other sub-teams of his work team fail to meet their goals, he receives no "reward" payment, and if other teams perform poorly he receives little from the "basic distribution fund." In order to increase his income, each farmer obviously must strive hard and cooperate fully with others.

The "honor system" is still another measure utilized to stimulate production. We have already dealt with part of the honor system in describing the "Labor Hero," "Ch'ollima Work Team," and "Ch'ollima Cooperative Farm." Various additional titles of honor are given to counties and farms with high production. A resolution (No. 116) adopted on July 20, 1961, by the North Korean Cabinet created seven titles of honor: Kaegwan (Crown of Laurel) First Class, Kaegwan Second Class, Kunwi (Royal Guards) First Class, Kunwi Second Class, Sonbong (Vanguard) First Class, Sonbong Second Class, and Pulgungi (Red Flag), listed in descending order of merit. These titles are awarded yearly. On the Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm, Hwang et al. (1960:225) observed that the farmers are very proud of having a chairman of the farm management committee who won the title of "Labor Hero," and of the more than ten farmers who have won official commendations for meritorious service from the central government. The members have even called their farm "Hero Farm." The farm initiated its own honor system, giving public recognition to those cited as "model farmers." In 1959, the number of "model farmers" exceeded seventy. The farm also set up an "Honor Bulletin Board" on which accounts of the merits of the "model farmers" are posted.

All of these production stimulation campaigns have a common underlying theme: all reflect an anthropocentric philosophy of free will expressed in the goal of building a model world. The farmers are told, and seem to believe, that they can control their destiny. They believe that the future of their society is determined by their own will. Achievements are always attributed to those who carried them out. So far as I can discern from the North Korean publications available, the philosophy of free will seems to have been effectively utilized as a major ideological weapon. It has been of vital importance in leading the people to participate in socialist construction as "creators of history." An explicit expression of this philosophy of free will is given in a widely distributed Communist writing:

As Marxism-Leninism teaches us, the masses of the people are the creators of history. Socialism and communism can be built only by the conscious, creative labor of the toiling millions. Therefore, in socialist construction it is most important to arouse to the utmost the creative power of the masses and bring their enthusiasm, initiative and talent into full play. (Kim Il-sung 1971:46; official English text published in P'yongyang.)
One might note that the philosophy of free will is entirely incongruent with the materialistic determinism of Marxist philosophy. The contradictory mixture of materialistic determinism and mentalistic-idealism is "characteristic of Marxism," however, as Service (1971:17-18; emphasis added) succinctly puts it in the following two paragraphs with quotations from Engels:

A similar blend of determinism and free-will is characteristic of Marxism. Technology and the related socio-economic functions of it have determined the course of evolution in the past, but "with the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the producer are abolished." As man, armed with the proper revolutionary understanding of history, consciously begins to make his own history, he ascends "from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom." (Engels 1961:80-81.)

This theory-that-sets-us-free is, of course, most evident in modern times in the religious fervor with which Russian and Chinese Communists argue about "revisionism" and "Mao's thoughts," and so on, with respect to the sacred texts of Marx and Engels. As in the case of the Enlightenment theorists, all this is related to the implicit but basic assumption that evolution is determined by external forces when people are unaware and is made free, undetermined, with their awareness.

3. Social Welfare

Although the central government gives some direct material support to cooperative farms, each farm is encouraged to solve its own economic problems. Unlike the industrial and urban enterprises in which earnings are standardized on a national level, a cooperative farm may be regarded as relatively independent in its financial operation. The greater part of the expense of social welfare programs is borne by the farm itself. The Code of Cooperative Farms, promulgated in January 1959, provides for three kinds of "common reserves" for social welfare on each cooperative farm (Articles 44 and 47; Ko Sung-hyo 1971:225-226). These are the Common Savings Fund (Kongdong Ch’ukchok Pondu), Social-Cultural Fund (Sahoe Munhwa Pondu), and Relief Fund (Wonho Pondu).

Of the year’s gross proceeds in kind and cash, all expenses for farm operations are deducted, including fees for the use of machinery, irrigation facilities, and the cost of fertilizer, seeds, and feed for livestock. (The fund for rewarding work teams is not counted in the year’s gross proceeds.) A portion of the remainder is set aside for the “common reserve”; 15% to 30% for the Common Savings Fund, 3% to 7% for the Social-Cultural Fund, and some portion for the Relief Fund. Each year, the exact proportion of common reserve is decided by the Plenary Session or the Delegates’ Conference of the farm. If the farm has substantially increased its production and if increased funds are needed for its public services, the proportion of the common reserve may be high.
The Common Savings Fund is used for the purchase of items needed for agriculture and for construction projects related to agriculture and daily life. The fund may also be used for expenses in joint projects involving neighboring cooperative farms, such as irrigation works, waterways, roads, bridges, power plants, and agricultural processing plants. The Social-Cultural Fund is set for training of cadres; educational and cultural programs; management of nurseries, kindergartens, and public welfare facilities; recreational programs; and health and sanitation programs. The Relief Fund provides support in the form of supplementary subsistence allowances and sums for the educational expenses of children to families that are in need, such as the bereaved families of the patriotic war dead lacking able-bodied workers, families of men in the People's Army (enlisted men), families of the aged, disabled, and the physically weak, and those who have suffered from natural disasters. The Code of Cooperative Farms (Articles 45 through 47) also specifies that the average living standard of the farm be guaranteed for families of the patriotic war dead and of men enlisted in the People's Army.

The existence of the Relief Fund leads to a question of the existence of inequalities in incomes among the families of a farm. The abolishment of private ownership of means of production does not mean that all the families have wholly uniform standards of living, although no wide gulf exists between high and low. Differences may be attributed primarily to the differences in the number of able-bodied workers among the households. Some households have a number of children and a shortage of working members, whereas others have more working members than children. Some differences in income reflect differences in the quality of performances at work, of course, and consequent but relatively small variations in shares of proceeds. The Relief Fund is available to families who lack productive members for any reason, provided that the members have not neglected their duties in farm activities. As one of our informants puts it, "The cooperative farm does not force its members to work with an empty stomach."

In urban areas individuals who have reached the age of retirement receive pensions, but there is no compulsory retirement for the aged. A man may retire from active work at age sixty and a woman at age fifty-five, but few people in fact do so. Monthly retirement pensions range between 50\% and 80\% of the average monthly wage of the last three working months. If people continue to work, they receive regular wages and also the pension (Terao 1961:161). Under this policy, the aged of both sexes tend to keep working well past the age of retirement as long as their health allows. This pension policy does not apply on the farms, however, where responsibility for the elders' livelihood is left solely to their descendants. If the dependency of elders causes financial hardship, some financial support is available from the Relief Fund on an individual basis. Numerous nursing homes throughout
North Korea are operated by the state free of charge, but these homes are available only to those who have no children or immediate relatives to support them. Thus it appears that ancient Korean values still exist, that it is still unethical to put aged parents in nursing homes. The same situation is found in South Korea.

Since pensions for retirement do not exist among farmers, rural elders generally continue to work as long as they are able. When they can no longer work, they simply retire and remain at home, where they can be of help in the household in several ways. They then usually take charge of certain domestic affairs. Grandfather feeds the livestock and works in the kitchen garden; grandmother’s work includes house cleaning and kitchen tasks. Traditionally, it would be unthinkable for the elderly woman to take charge of the kitchen, which is now the daughter-in-law’s responsibility, and this custom appears still to be followed. If a grandmother is available, it is she who cares for the infants during much of the day. Although each work team (chagoppan) of a cooperative farm has a nursery, parents still prefer to leave their infants with grandmother, and placing children in the nursery is not compulsory. Otherwise, the elders spend their days visiting other elders of their neighborhood.

Thus, compared with their lives in traditional Korea, the daily life of the aged has become a bit harder, since they have taken over the greater portion of the domestic work previously done by their children and daughters-in-law and sometimes also work at communal tasks part-time. Today, it is the duty of the elders to support the able-bodied breadwinners so that the latter can concentrate on their work on the cooperative farm. The grandmother’s help in the kitchen, for example, obviously reduces the daughter-in-law’s workload and it also reduces the loss of the daughter-in-law’s earnings by freeing her from some of the domestic work. It is quite common in contemporary rural North Korea for a housewife to prepare breakfast, after which her mother-in-law cleans up; then the mother-in-law fixes dinner and the daughter-in-law does the washing up. If the retired elders find time to do some farm work besides their household chores, the farm authorities give them light assignments so that they may earn supplementary incomes.

Marked progress has apparently been made in the field of public health. In pre-Communist years modern medicine had not been readily available to the rural population of Korea. A vast majority relied upon traditional folk medicine, including herbs, acupuncture, and the services of folk healers. Under Communist rule, medical practitioners relying upon presumed supernatural power have been prohibited from practicing. Traditional folk medicine has been well preserved, however, and considerable effort has been expended toward the further development of traditional medicine, known in North Korea as Tonguihak (Eastern Medicine), in combination with modern medicine. Today, every hospital in North Korea is staffed with specialists in both fields.
As we have already noted, each cooperative farm has at least one dispensary, which is staffed with at least one doctor and two nurses. In a large cooperative farm, a dispensary reaches almost the size of a general hospital. Circumstances at Yongsong Cooperative Farm of South P'yongan Province serve as an example. In August 1969 the farm's population was approximately 5,000, including about 2,400 working members. There were two dispensaries with five branches. The farm's medical team of eleven doctors included specialists in internal medicine, surgery, obstetrics, gynecology, pediatrics, otorhinolaryngology, and radiology (Kawagoe 1970:123; Asahi Shim bun 11/17—12/6/73, reprinted in Ch'oe Yong-dok 1972:82-83). Although this medical team is perhaps small in ratio to the population, it may safely be said that substantial progress has been made in the fields of public health and medicine under Communist rule.

A farm's dispensary is primarily responsible for every aspect of the health of its residents. "People's Hospitals" with larger staffs and more elaborate facilities are maintained on county and provincial levels. Let us take an example from South P'yongan Province, which has a combined total of twenty-three counties and cities, excluding P'yongyang, the capital city. Each city or county has a hospital with one to two hundred beds. Large factories also have hospitals. The farm dispensaries in this province number about 700. Patients for whom the dispensary is unable to provide appropriate treatment are sent to the County People's Hospital with which the dispensary is affiliated. If the county hospital is unable to solve the problem, it sends the patient to the Provincial People's Hospital or to a specialized hospital. The South P'yongan Province Central Hospital (P'yongan namdo Chungang P'yongwon), in the city of P'yongyang, is the general hospital of this province. Divided into twenty-three specialized departments, it has 600 beds, 136 physicians, about 150 nurses and nurses' aides, and over a hundred management staff members (Kawagoe 1970:146). According to Yamaguchi's account (1972:116), seventy hospitals in the province have more than 200 beds; these include University Hospitals, a Red Cross Hospital, City or Workers' District Hospitals, and industrial hospitals (factory hospitals).

In medical policy, it appears that emphasis is given to preventive medicine, although medical treatment for ailments certainly is not overlooked. The procedure known as "doctor's round system," or uisa kuyok tamdangiae, merits special attention. According to this system, one physician takes charge of problems of health of the residents within a specific zone, which is called ch'oso or "post" by the physicians in charge (Kawagoe 1970:145). This system reportedly covers the entire population, urban and rural (Yamaguchi 1972:116-121; Kawagoe 1970:143-147; and Ch'oe Yong-dok 1972:83 and 108-109), and emphasizes prevention of illness. The "doctor's round system" is carried out by doctors of the People's Hospitals on the county or city level, factory hospitals, and farm dispensaries. On the
average, each doctor is responsible for about 600 residents (Ch’oe Yong-dok, ibid.:83). Physicians specializing chiefly in internal medicine, pediatrics, and obstetrics and gynecology take part, making rounds three or more times weekly to check on the problems of health of the residents of their post, give medical advice, and carry out various programs to improve public health and sanitation. A “medical examination troupe” (komjindae), organized by the medical specialists of the Provincial People’s Hospitals, also tours the province twice yearly to examine conditions of health of the residents (ibid.:108).

Each farm dispensary keeps “health cards” on every resident, on which information related to the individual’s health from birth is recorded. Pediatricians regularly examine children under fifteen years of age and specialists in obstetrics and gynecology conduct regular checkups of pregnant women within their rounds. Theoretically, each household has a family doctor. When the household includes children and a pregnant woman, however, it turns out that three doctors give service to the same household. One of the interesting features of the North Korean system of public health is that patients do not look for a doctor, as in most other countries; the physicians look for patients, visiting the people in their workshops. This policy is, of course, another instance of the general attempt to operate the social and economic system as rationally as possible. The doctor’s round of visits to his clients tends to minimize loss of working hours due to medical examinations and treatment. As a Japanese visitor (Yamaguchi 1972:117) describes it, physicians with medical kits making their rounds by walking the footpaths between fields are a common part of the scene in the North Korean countryside, especially during the busy agricultural seasons. Colored flags are often used to help the doctor find people who need medical attention.

All medical and public health services are free. Of course, a nationwide free medical service entails great costs, which are described as being “paid by the government.” Whether payment is interpreted as being made by the people or by the government, the people do not directly pay for medical service, and it is available to everyone equally. This “free medical service” has not only contributed toward the improvement of conditions of public health, but has also played a vital role in promoting patriotic enthusiasm and in building confidence in national leadership. The medical service has been one of the chief prides of the country, and the expensive medical service of non-Communist societies is often compared with the North Korean system as evidence of the superiority of their Communist society. As we have noted, every negative aspect of capitalist societies is exploited in an effort to enhance national unity. Premier Kim (now President Kim) of North Korea has stated that “in a capitalist society, the doctor treats the patient with a stethoscope, not listening to his heart but to his pockets” (Yamaguchi 1972:118).
 Obviously a medical service that covers the entire population requires a tremendous number of specialists, well beyond the number a country like North Korea with no long tradition of modern medicine could possibly produce. Under the Communist regime, North Korea seems to have made much progress in training medical specialists and in establishing modern medical facilities. A glimpse at medical statistics illustrates the circumstances. During the first seventeen years under Communism, from 1946 to 1963, the number of hospitals increased from 85 to 585; the number of medical specialists from 1,009 to 18,241; and the average number of medical specialists per 10,000 persons from 1.1 to 15.8 (Central Bureau of Statistics 1965:36). The term “medical specialists” refers to both doctors and “associate doctors,” or chunui. Associate doctors are trained for two years in medical high schools after finishing middle school.

It has been twenty years since free medical service was introduced in 1953, and during this period the incidence of diseases has declined markedly. The emphasis upon preventive medicine has contributed to the eradication of such epidemic diseases as cholera, encephalitis, and typhus. Venereal disease was reportedly eradicated in 1958. Today, cancer is the major cause of death, constituting about 50% of the fatal illnesses, followed by heart disease and high blood-pressure. The most interesting indicator of achievement in the field of public health seems to be the fact that in 1971 the average span of life was claimed to have been lengthened about twenty-six years beyond that of pre-Communist years (Asahi Shimbun, 11/17—12/6/71; reprinted in Ch’oe Yong-dok 1972:84). Infant mortality in 1959 was reported to have decreased 57% since 1944, the year before the Communists gained power (Terao 1961:160). No information is provided in these reports, however, on the total years of the lifespan or the actual rate of infant mortality.

Programs of physical exercise are today firmly institutionalized in the daily life of North Koreans as a means of promoting good health. The daily routine of physical exercise is illustrated by an example from Siksong-li Farm of Sangwon County, as reported in Rodong Sinmun (2/19/64:6). Early in the morning, at the sound of a bell, all able-bodied adults and schoolchildren of both sexes come out to take part in the morning physical exercises. Then the young adult farmers carry manure to the fields, and the elders and schoolchildren sweep the village streets and paths. These activities take place before breakfast. During the lunch hour, farmers take part in such recreational activities as running 100, 400, or 800 meters, Korean seesaw (noltiwigi), volleyball, skating, and exercises on exercise bars. Physical exercises known as opkan ch’ejo, rest-time physical exercise, are also a part of the daily work schedule, wherever manual labor is involved. They are a conscious effort to relieve farmers and workers from exhaustion caused by ordinary labor. The intent of the exercise program is clearly evident in athletic contests, which are often conducted and are called saengsan ch’eyuk
"production athletic contests." The kinds of contests also indicate the reasons for their establishment; for example, several production units compete in rice transplanting or in harvesting tasks. All of these activities may be included in the general category of "mass athletic activities," as Yamaguchi (1972:136) terms it.

According to official North Korean statistics (Central Bureau of Statistics 1965:37), in 1963 there were 410 "rest houses" (hyuyangso) and "rehabilitation stations" (chongyangso) capable of providing service to 25,984 persons. Rehabilitation stations are for patients recovering from illness, and rest houses are primarily to relieve urban workers and farmers from the tedium of their work. Both services are operated on a year-round basis, and they are ordinarily used exclusively by farmers after the fall harvest until the beginning of spring plowing. Rest houses are not available to everyone. Guests are carefully selected from each production unit on the basis of performance, and the model farmers are awarded vacations in the rest houses. Since the entire expense of the vacation is paid by the central government, the vacation is, in fact, a compensation for physical hardship and a reward for excellence in work. To be awarded a vacation in the rest houses is one of the highest honors among the farmers. During their stay at the rest houses, which is generally for a couple of weeks, the vacationers undergo intensive indoctrination programs to prepare their minds and bodies for the tasks ahead. Since the guests tend to be zealous farmers with a variety of experience in the field of agricultural production, the exchange of knowledge during the vacation period appears to have made a contribution toward the development of various agricultural innovations.