The history of theology is by no means the history of progress, not simply the transmitted results of what has already been achieved in previous periods. It is the history of the reconstruction and restatement of doctrines concerning the subject matter. This is so, first, because the formulation of doctrines is limited by the fundamental notions and formulae fashioned in each period. Secondly, theology is to be seen as an ever-renewed self-examination of faith in accordance with the shift of cultural environment. Faith has to understand itself as true to its ground (the grace of God), yet articulated in terms of the new modes of thinking.

Classical theology is heavily dependent upon that dimension of Greek philosophy which has developed the ontology of being qua being: the changeless idea beyond the contingent world. In such an understanding of reality a correspondence between God and man was established on the ground of natural being. Classical theology suggested that the proper category for understanding the relationship between God and man is reason (*lumen naturale*), corresponding to the understanding of God and man in terms of idea or logos and of rational animal respectively. In this context the relationship between God and man was formulated in terms of Being (*esse*) and entity (*ens*), and consequently *analogia entis* was considered to be the proper way to state the relationship between the two.

In Reformation theology, however, the correspondence between God and man was no longer formulated on the ground of natural being, but on the ground of the subjectivity of both God and man. Calvin understood that the order of nature and justice implanted in the human heart is recognized not by reason, but by the inner voice (i.e., the conscience), which distinguishes good from evil. Calvin modified the classical understanding of natural law from the perspective of the conscience, which is interpreted as a subjective
version of natural law. His doctrine breaks radically with the scholastic understanding of a correspondence among God, world, and man on the ground of natural reason and being. By making such a shift from natural reason to conscience, Calvin rejects both a substantialist view of reason, based on the divorce between the world of creation and the Creator, and also the Aristotelian concept of a universe which is governed and controlled by its own principles (taphyseion onta). Secondly, he emphasizes human conscience which operates in its immediate relationship to the continuous act of divine grace. If conscience is nothing but an existential response to the revealed God, Calvin's God is neither the absolute idea nor the purpose of the world, but the personal God. An analogical relationship between God and man is therefore to be established on the correspondence between the address of the divine subject and the response of the human subject. It is from this perspective that Calvin condemns pagan philosophers who are independent of and ungrateful for God, in spite of their sharp and penetrating investigations in the field of science.2

Just as classical theology was heavily dependent upon the ontology of nature, liberal theology has been influenced by Descartes, who was interested in a religion based on the modern world-view, and by Kant, whose second critique was preoccupied with the problems of human freedom and subjectivity. As far as its emphasis on human subjectivity is concerned, liberal theology stands in the Reformation tradition. The effort of liberal theology was to interpret traditional doctrines in terms of an understanding based on a modern world-view. Indeed, German idealism attempted to establish the reality of God on the ground of the transcendence of the human subject. The problem of liberal theology, however, is rooted in its inadequate understanding of human existence, an inadequacy inherent in the modern world-view.

Our modern world, governed by scientific and technological reason, stands under the influence of the tradition of the Cartesian ego. The Cartesian ego is the reality which cannot be doubted, occupying a central position as the principle of stability in the midst of change and mutability of experience. It is interpreted in terms of Aristotelian ontology as substance, and for this reason ego is understood as a mere entity (res cogitans). This ego, which takes itself as self-evident, grasps ego out of itself, closes in upon itself, resulting in nothing but solitary man. This approach ignores the fundamental problem of man, for it is in this very mode of human existence that the problems of loneliness, meaninglessness, and the loss of self in society arise.

In the nineteenth century an optimistic atheist could, on the basis of humanism, set up a system of values which might provide a priori norms for society, morality, and culture (Feuerbach). Today however, Sartre thinks that it is very frustrating that God does not exist, for it means that man cannot transcend human subjectivity. Sartre's existentialism reveals the natural conclusion which is to be drawn from the self-consciousness of the Cartesian
ego. The self is bound to itself in such a way that it cannot extricate itself. This would indicate that Sartre's freedom (being) is still bondage (nihil). In such an understanding of reality we cannot find an analogical relationship between God and man, and between Being and man, and for this reason our historical world is characterized in terms of contradiction and absurdity. In fact, an existentialist concept of decision does not provide an ontological foundation for human freedom, but merely describes the fact of experience. As long as man, therefore, remains an independent or a solitary man, he finds himself to be such a genuine question to himself that the alleged self-evident ego of Descartes becomes a self-deception and falsehood. Heidegger expresses this state of human existence as "thrown into the world" without having the means to transcend its condition out of itself.

It is from such a perspective of contemporary understanding of man and reality that the medieval Christian world-view has received the attention of thinkers who have seen the essence of man as both historical and personal. In the medieval world, reality was discovered to be personal (Anselm). Medieval theology, however, did not develop its own theology on the ground of the categories proper to the personal and historical world, but merely used the logic of Greek ontology (Thomas).

It is widely agreed that the task of both theology and philosophy is to demonstrate convincingly the intelligibility of ultimate reality by developing a way of thinking according to the categories proper to its subject-matter. The logic of Aristotle was not just a formal logic. Rather, it was inseparably related to his metaphysics of natural being. The historical world, however, is not the reality with which Aristotle was concerned. Thus the Greek concept of God and man based on the Aristotelian concept of substance hardly does justice to the Christian concept of God and man as historical and personal.

Our task of theology, therefore, is to develop theology on the ground of categories which are proper to both historical and personal realities. Indeed, the world in which Christians live is neither the object of understanding (Dilthey) nor the inner self, but the world of fellowship and acts unfolded between God and man and between man and man, on the ground of love and freedom. Christian community, however, exists within a complex world, which affords different perspectives on reality. Thus on the one hand theology as a cultural reality has to assimilate cultural elements in order to understand itself better, and on the other hand it must oppose alien philosophical perspectives in order to keep its integrity. Theological truth is constituted by this polarity.

I think, therefore, that one task of contemporary theology is to reflect on itself in the perspective of the ontology of act, which presupposes the personal and historical world (the world of I and Thou). In other words, our task is to construct theology on the ground of the historical world, whereas
orthodox and liberal theologies are based on the self-identity of natural being and on the freedom and subjectivity of the individual person respectively.

Since Barth and Heidegger both claim that their understanding of man and reality is based on the categories proper to the historical world, I will place primary emphasis in this paper on the ontological structures of human existence, which play a crucial role in the clarification of the structures of the historical world. The comparison between the two will result in the old theological tradition which took philosophy seriously. This does not imply, however, that Barth’s doctrine of man is identical with Heidegger’s anthropology. On the contrary, the study will first show what kinds of philosophical thinking Barth appropriates in his theology, and secondly it will reveal the limitations of Heidegger’s approach to reality.

As far as the correspondence between God and man is concerned, Barth rejects *analogia entis* through his *analogia relationis et fidei*, and Heidegger dismantles *analogia entis* through his ontological difference. The difference between Barth and Heidegger will be found in the fact that the former accepts a version of the Platonic two-worlds view, and thinks of the correspondence between God and man at the place *(topos)* of the Christ event and the church. The latter presupposes the collapse of the Platonic two-worlds view, and deals with the relationship between Being and man primarily at the place of the act of poetizing. It cannot be denied, however, that they share a common concern to the extent that the fundamental matrix in which both think of the relationship between God and man, and between Being and man, has shifted from the natural world to the historical world. That is to say, both thinkers discover reality neither in the matrix of nature qua fixed order, nor in the inner world of human subject opposed to nature, but in the historical events in which God and Being unveil themselves to man, and in which man transcends himself toward God and Being respectively. Both thinkers understand the natural world as an abstraction from the historical world. They further understand the *analogia entis*, which has its proper place in the static view of nature, as an abstraction of both the *analogia relationis* between God and man and the ontological difference between Being and entities, which unveil the innermost core of reality as historical.

Since Barth and Heidegger both think that the primordial reality or the deepest core of reality is event, they understand man, time, space, world, Being, and God from the perspective of concrete reality. Concrete reality for Barth is the fellowship and history unfolded within the trinitarian God, between God and man in Jesus Christ, and between man and man; for Heidegger it is the inseparable relatedness (identity) and tension (difference) between Being and entities. Through such new approaches to reality they offer a possibility for the reformulation of the traditional correspondences, and the establishment of a new correspondence, between God and man, and between Being and man.
The starting-point which is common both to theology and to philosophy in the contemporary perspective is the fact that man is a genuine question to himself and consequently he inescapably asks that question. Or perhaps it should be said that the sting of the anthropological question belongs to the very essence of man, for man is not self-understandable. This is in radical antithesis to an optimistic humanism which presupposes the essence (Wesen) of human existence as self-understandable. Barth obviously accepts this fundamental understanding of man when he affirms that "we cannot allow human self-knowledge to begin with that unlimited self-confidence..., because we are not able to see the essence and nature of man apart from the Word of God."

The philosophical and theological grounds for this widely held view concerning the essence of man are found in the fact that man exists in his transcendental relationship to ultimate reality, and yet he cannot really grasp his ontological ground owing either to his sin or to his inauthentic existence. The fact that man becomes a question to himself indicates that nothing emerges out of his own being, and for this reason he has been driven to the question of his own being. Heidegger describes this situation of human existence by stating that regarding human existence, "in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it," for it is distinguished from other entities in that it is ontological and transcendental. In the language of Barth, it may be said that man is in a relationship to another Being which transcends his natural and ethical life to such an extent that it is in this transcendent Being that man seeks himself. It is always in this act of self-transcendence that Barth's real man and Heidegger's authentic existence exist properly and correctly. Barth and Heidegger, therefore, understand the essence of man not in terms of a self-closed substance but in terms of his self-opening relationship to the ultimate reality which transcends man.

Heidegger understands the most immediate self-manifestation of human existence as being indifferent to itself as well as to ontological investigation. What is to become phenomenon is hidden, for the Being which is to be revealed in the self-transcendence of human existence remains vague and imprecise in our everyday life. According to Heidegger, the man in the world of science belongs to this stage of human existence, for in the realm of scientific investigation Being in itself is forgotten. Heidegger's concept of inauthentic existence may be compared to Barth's concept of shadow man to the extent that in the state of shadow man, human subject is regarded as natural being (Naturwesen) and the question of its real subject is not raised as yet. The human phenomena with which science and philosophical idealism concern themselves are mere abstractions from the con-
crete relationship between man and the transcendent Being, the concrete relationship which is the real meaning and significance of human existence.24

To exist as real man, according to Barth, is to step out of the sphere in which man is one natural phenomenon among others, and to step into the sphere where the phenomenon in question is man himself, not only as what he is, but also as the subject of an act which constitutes human life.25 Man is the projector of self-transcendence, first seeing and understanding himself as a natural being, then advancing from nature to freedom. Nevertheless, the ethical and the natural understandings of man both grasp man only in the perspective of a self-closed reality (eine in sich geschlossene Wirklichkeit).26 Since idealism and naturalism both confine themselves to the framework of mind and body respectively, they are in the strict sense immanentism. Unlike naturalism and idealism, existentialism emphasizes not so much the self-grounded, self-resting, and self-moving entity as the historicity of man and his basic openness to the other.27

In Barth’s view, however, existentialism does not disclose the fact that “the rent tearing human existence to its depth is healed in virtue of a historical relation to genuine transcendence.”28 In existentialism, therefore, the split and the opposition between existence and transcendece do not really exist, and for this reason there cannot be any historical relationship between the two. To this extent even existentialism is understood as immanentism, the immanentism which consists of the equation between transcendece and immanence. The shift from idealism to existentialism, however, implies that the thoughtful student now arrives at the limit or the horizon of human existence where he concerns himself with real subject and Being.29 Indeed, Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit is an analysis of the relationship between the transcendece of human existence and the disclosure of Being in terms of horizon, or the worldhood of the world. That is to say, Being as the horizon, or the significance of the world, which is hidden from inauthentic existence which exists idly within the world, emerges for authentic existence when the latter transcends itself and the world in order to construct the authentic world.30

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger describes the Umwelt (environment) which governs man’s ways of living as corrupted. Since a man involved in inauthentic existence is influenced by a common opinion of society and does not find his own self, he is a depraved person from whom Being is hidden. Heidegger places a great deal of emphasis upon the real situation of man. This emphasis betrays the influence of Nietzsche’s nihilism and transvaluation of Platonism.31 In Was ist Metaphysik? Heidegger locates the tendency to depravity in nihil, for man’s existence is stuck to nothingness. Heidegger’s problem, therefore, is to overcome nihilism. Barth’s problem of human freedom and divine grace may be seen in the same perspective. As has already been mentioned, Sartre’s freedom unveils itself as bondage to itself,
and consequently the problem of freedom involves both human volition (being) and the incapability of stepping out of the state of bondage (non-being).

The issue is how man, starting with his concrete freedom which involves both being and non-being, can establish God and Being as the ontological ground. Heidegger solves this problem through man’s finite freedom (geworfener Entwurf) which by definition implies both non-being (finitude) and being (freedom). Old metaphysical questions are raised when man is pushed to the limit of existence beyond which nothing can be expected any more: “Why are there entities rather than nothing? Why are we living?” Through the disclosure of nihil man finds his inauthentic dependence upon entities. The consciousness of loneliness, meaninglessness, and evil indicates that radical evil, or original sin (nihil), has its roots in the ground of conscious self (Kant), and in the ontological foundation of the ordinary man who forgets the problem of self and Being. A person cannot grasp this radical evil, for it is incomprehensible (nihilo and consequently it escapes the awareness of the ordinary man who lives inauthentically within the world of entities. As a reality manifested in the ground of the subject, however, radical evil belongs to the subject (being) and for this reason man is responsible for the radical evil which emerges out of the depth of his existence.

Through his awareness of original sin and evil (non-being), therefore, man is aware of his own self (being). More precisely, the revelation of the grace of Barth’s God and the disclosure of Heidegger’s Being enable man to realize his sin and his inauthentic existence (nihil) and to open himself to the grace of God and Being. In other words, the Cartesian ego can realize its own core of truth when the realm of consciousness is broken through and a realm of a still more primordial self is revealed. Human freedom may be influenced by the depravity of environment, but the former transcends the latter when man separates himself from the environment through the means of an authentic existence which dwells poetically in the disclosure of Being. In the early Heidegger, finite freedom corresponds to an empty disposition (Befindlichkeit). In the later Heidegger, however, it corresponds to man’s counter-project (Gegenwurf) which responds to the project of Being (Wurf des Geschicks). Authentic man exists only in his transcendental relatedness to, and dwelling in, the disclosure of Being. This is Heidegger’s concept of ontological difference between Being (authentic existence) and entities (inauthentic existence). Based on this statement by Heidegger, Barth’s understanding of existentialism in terms of immanence is not necessarily correct, for Heidegger’s ontological difference entails the event which happens to man through the disclosure of Being.

It is possible to find, therefore, a similarity between Barth and Heidegger. Both hold the historical and ontological understanding over against the substantialist and ontic understanding concerning man and reality. To in-
interpret human existence as an entity is to forget that its essence is in its Existenz, the analysis of which shows its essence as transcendence: the realization of its potentiality for Being. It is only in the act of self-realization and transcendence that Heidegger's authentic existence and Barth's real man exist. Apart from this transcendental relationship to ultimate reality, man is neither real man nor authentic existence any longer, and consequently he is not human at all. It is a well known fact that the modes of being of Aristotelian existence are rooted in the modes and ways in which an entity exists in the natural world. In a similar way, it is not without reason that the theme of Sein und Zeit, having to do with human existence, is not a philosophical anthropology but a fundamental ontology, an investigation of Being as such and in general. Barth also grasps the doctrine of creation in general in the human sphere, where the relationship between the Creator and the created is revealed. God's plan of creation is hidden in the non-human sphere of creation. The emphasis Heidegger and Barth put on the centrality of man in the understanding of Being in general entails the fact that they think of the historical world in terms of the real world and of the natural world as an abstract and deficient dimension of the historical world.

For Heidegger, the diverse scientific problems raised by man posit themselves inside of and in subordination to the fundamental problem of Being, whereas the fundamental ontological question is raised out of the existence of man characterized as questioner. For Barth, on the other hand, the phenomenon of man as the aspect of natural science and philosophical investigations can equally point away from as well as toward real man. As phenomenon, human existence is indifferent, neutral, and ambiguous in regard to real man, for it can point to the essential unity of man with surrounding reality as well as to his difference from it. It would appear, therefore, that Barth's analysis of the phenomenon of man is almost exactly the same as Heidegger's analysis of inauthentic existence in which what is to become phenomenon is hidden. Since science deals with the mere abstraction from the real man who exists in his historical relationship with God, it cannot unveil the real relationship between God and man. Indeed, science is concerned with Barth's phenomenal man, who is external to real man, and with Heidegger's inauthentic existence, which does not function as the phenomenon through which Being discloses itself. On the other hand, theological anthropology concerns itself with real man and phenomenological ontology concerns itself with authentic existence.

On first appearance, Barth's position is clear enough. Theological anthropology is carried out at the place of the Christ event. Consequently, even Heidegger's fundamental ontology is concerned with the phenomenon which is external to Barth's real man. A closer look at Barth's position, however, reveals a perspective which is quite ambiguous. In the first place, even Barth's phenomenal man has the potentiality to separate himself from the depraved
environment. Secondly, as will be discussed more fully in the next section, the trinitarian God and the Christ event are defined by Barth in terms of authentic existence "for others," whereas man is defined in terms of inauthentic existence "with others." For this reason there is a possibility of changing man from inauthentic being-with-others to authentic being-for-others, even though it is quite difficult to carry out such a shift apart from the Christ event. Certainly, Barth’s real man, who is open to the Christ event, is quite different from Heidegger’s authentic existence, which poetically dwells in the disclosure of Being. There is, however, a similarity in thought structure between Barth’s real man and Heidegger’s authentic existence. Here is a locus for establishing an analogy between God and man, and between Being and man, which Barth and Heidegger express in terms of *analogia relationis et fidei* and ontological difference respectively.

A difference between Barth and Heidegger is first found in the fact that Barth’s God as the ontological ground of man exists apart from man, whereas Heidegger’s ontological ground as Being is the authentic and primordial world which discloses itself solely in the self-transcendence of human existence. A second difference may be found in Barth’s statement that theological anthropology has not to do with the potentiality but with the reality of real man. According to Barth, man existing in tension is only a possibility for and never an actuality of Being. His existence is transformed from mere possibility to reality only when the transcendental Other comes to man in the midst of his distress. A person never discovers his potentiality for Being unless it is offered to him through the revelation of God. Indeed, God’s encounter with man is realized through the address of the Word by which the Creator breaks through to the creature, and in this way man is opened up for God. To hear the Word of God seriously is to respond to His call and consequently to transcend solitary ego and open the self-closed "I" to the divine "Thou.” Therefore, Barth finds a difference between his anthropology and existentialism. On the one hand, Barth’s anthropology presupposes the fact that concrete history (Geschichte) unfolds itself primordially between the address of God and the response of man. On the other hand, existentialism claims that man has primordially abstract historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) apart from real interaction between the two subjects.

Barth’s criticism of existentialism may not be applicable to Heidegger’s ontology. Heidegger implicitly mentions the possibility of transcendence as dependent on the disclosure of Being. Therefore, Heidegger’s differential ontology may also be called a relational ontology which is based on an *analogia relationis*. For the ways and modes in which man exists and in which he comports himself toward Being correspond to the ways and modes in which Being discloses itself to man.

In the fourth definition of the world in *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger explains
the mode in which man comports himself toward the horizon of the world, and he uses an enigmatic phrase like *was so aufleuchtet*. This somewhat intentionally ambiguous phrase may be translated into English in two ways: that which thus lightens up; and that which is thus lit up. Heidegger appears to refer to the reality which lurks in the reciprocal relationship between the revelation of Being and the transcendence of man. Apart from the disclosure of Being, man has no capacity for gaining access to Being, and, consequently, his capacity for transcendence is no longer a natural givenness innate to him (*lumen naturale*). This phrase may reveal that an event takes place for man through the disclosure of Being so that he is enabled to transcend himself toward Being. *Lumen naturale* (reason), which is the basis for the older natural theology, is the ontic expression of this event, which consists in the ontological-historical relationship between the disclosure of Being and the transcendence of man.

Furthermore, *Sein und Zeit* reveals that this event as the unity of the phenomenal environment is too primordial to be possessed. It vanishes as soon as it is recognized. It may therefore correspond to Barth’s concept of continual creation (*creatio continua*) as an event or a pure becoming, underlying and preceding all perception and being.48 Natural and intellectual laws only remind us that God’s faithfulness and constancy are the ontological foundation of creaturely activities and laws.49 This again corresponds to the fact that the orthodox doctrine of the Scripture in terms of literal inspiration is a static image of Barth’s *analogia relationis* between the Word of God and human language, and of Heidegger’s ontological difference between the disclosure of Being and human language.50 The event which sustains the world of creation corresponds to, and unites itself with, the event which establishes man’s transcendence as the response (*Gegenwurf*) to the call of Being (*Wurf*), the event which as destiny (*Geschick*) becomes the totality on which we embark and in which we find our vocation. Being as event indicates that our real freedom and transcendence are supposed to serve the grace of Being which sustains our freedom and transcendence. In the perspective of Christian theology, therefore, Heidegger’s Being as event corresponds both to creation and to reconciliation.

While Heidegger’s Being as event is the inseparable relatedness between the disclosure of Being and the transcendence of man, Barth’s God as event is *a se*, and consequently independent of the world. Barth’s strictly theological position therefore considers the doctrines of man and the world from the viewpoint of the doctrine of election, which is event and history of the trinitarian God.51 The doctrine of election, however, implies the fact that there is no way from the autonomous self-understanding of man to the awareness of the free act of God and to the realization of real man, who is solely established by the act of divine freedom. Indeed, this awareness is made possible only through the Christ event, which historically takes place
for man. This is to say that the being of man is not realized in his self-contemplation, which results in shutting himself up in himself, but by his hearing the Word of God.

For Barth, the Word is the form in which the divine person is communicated to the human person. Man can exist in the presence of God only because God addresses man in His freedom. Man does not have a kind of substance which is addressed by God. Man does not have “something different and earlier and more intrinsic, a deeper substratum or more original substance of being,” apart from, and prior to, his act of hearing the Word of God. On the contrary, man can exist only in the history unfolded between the address of God and the response of man. He is man as he is summoned by God.

Man is, as he hears this Word. He is, as he is awakened by this Word. He is, as he raises himself to this Word. He is, as he concentrates on this Word. He is, as, called by this word, he is ready, and already in the act of transcending himself. ... To be summoned is to be called out of oneself and beyond oneself.

According to Barth, therefore, analogy or correspondence between God and man is not grounded in natural being but in the Word. God speaks His “Yes” in His election, by which He creates relationship, and calls forth entities into relationship to Himself. God speaks and man responds. This reciprocal relationship or movement is man’s imago Dei. To this extent Barth’s analogy also includes in itself the orders both of creation and of reconciliation. In this analogy election and reconciliation are the archetype (Urbild) and creation is ectype (Abbildung). First, creation is grounded in election, and secondly, creation is supposed to conform to reconciliation by overcoming contradictions introduced by sin. Therefore, the Word of God concerns itself not only with the Christian world but with the entire world. Indeed, Barth’s christological approach to reality means to see the order of creation from the viewpoint of the Christ event and reconciliation. In such an understanding of Barth’s theology, we cannot deny the fact that within the realm of the Christ event and the Word event his understanding of man and reality corresponds to that of Heidegger, which is concerned with the world of poiesis.

Since creation and covenant, and nature and grace, are not identical, there is always a possibility that creation replaces covenant and nature usurps the role of grace. The old formula of analogia entis entails this perversion of the divine order, or at least an abstraction or a degradation from the real order. It is from such a perspective of understanding of reality that we can appreciate the efforts both of Söhngen and of Jüngel concerning the clarification of the thought structures of Barth’s theology. Gottlieb Söhngen tries to find analogia entis in Barth’s anthropology. Ens creatum (creation) as ens per participationem is dependent upon ens a se (God). This basic structure of man is applied to the doctrine of creatio per verbum Dei. Since God calls
forth entities into their existence by mentioning their names, analogia nominum is understood under the concept of analogia entis. Whenever creatures hear the Word of God, they step into existence. We have therefore analogia ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum creatoris. Man has therefore his created being not because he participates in the being of God, but because his being corresponds to the being of God by hearing His Word. According to Söhngen, this is the difference between analogia entis and analogia fidei.57

Söhngen’s ontological concern certainly contributes to the clarification of the ontological structures of Barth’s analogia fidei. for Barth unifies the order of grace with that of creation on the ground of the Word and history. Söhngen, however, ignores the ontological difference between reconciliation and creation, and between revelation and nature. This point is well taken by Eberhard Jiingel when he says that analogia entis et nominum results in the loss of revelation.58 Since in Barth’s theology creation and ontology are enclosed in election and reconciliation, ontology has to be discussed within the general framework of election and reconciliation. Analogia entis validates itself as ontically relevant to the relationship which is solely created by the revelation of God in the Christ event. Barth’s analogy, which is grounded in God’s election, is solely recognized in faith. If analogy is cut off from the event of the Word and Heilsgeschichte, it becomes an abstraction from the real order of grace and falls back to the order of nature, where analogia entis has its proper place.

It is in this context that Heidegger’s ontological difference provides a perspective in which a person can see a difference in ontological structures between analogia relationis et fidei and analogia entis. Heidegger’s ontological difference consists in the shift in the understanding of man from entity (inauthentic existence) to the EK-stenz (authentic existence), which poetically dwells in the openness and revelation of Being. Just as man loses his faith and historicity and degrades himself in the order of entities, analogia relationis et fidei falls back into analogia entis. From the purely philosophical perspective, therefore, Barth’s analogia relationis and Heidegger’s ontological difference may point to a similar phenomenon of man, to the extent that both real man and authentic existence are in process of transcending themselves toward ultimate reality. According to Hegel, this is the essence of religion.

III

In the previous section, a discussion was given of the possibility of gaining access to the ontological ground both of real man and of authentic existence through the phenomenological approach. Since real man can exist solely in fellowship and historical interaction both with Jesus Christ (the Word) and with God, Barth can appropriate phenomenological method at the place of the Christ event in order to discover man’s ontological ground. For, first of
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all, the phenomenological approach is an effort to gain access to our primordial experience (zu den Sachen selbst). And secondly, Barth’s primordial reality is the I-Thou fellowship between God and man as unveiled at the place of the Christ event, even though its archetype is found in the trinitarian fellowship of God, the God who exists apart from our world. Just as Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of human existence based on the disclosure of Being rejects both positivism and idealism, Barth’s doctrine of man concerns itself with the refutation of the understanding of man from the viewpoints of naturalism, idealism, and existentialism, on the ground of the primordial experience which is unveiled at the place of the Christ event through the revelation of God. We may say, therefore, that Husserl’s concept of intentionality is transposed by Heidegger and Barth into the concepts of the disclosure of Being (event) and the establishment of the I-Thou fellowship between God and man, and man and man at the place of the Christ event, respectively. To this extent it may be said that for both Heidegger and Barth immanent phenomenology does not contradict transcendentontal ontology. Indeed, phenomenology points to ontology, and ontology provides the ground for the phenomenological approach to ultimate reality. This is the essence of the ontology of history, which consists in the unification between contingent phenomenon and its ontological ground. Barth’s christological approach to reality structurally resembles Heidegger’s ontology of history. For Jesus Christ, a historically contingent man, is at the same time the God who is the ontological ground of history. This is the theological and philosophical ground for Barth’s equation between the being, the essence (concept), the name, and the revelation of God. In the case of Heidegger, the disclosure of Being as event enables man to realize his authentic existence, and consequently to unify historical phenomenon with its ontological ground.\(^5\) The ontological ground is for both thinkers no longer the unmoved highest entity, but the event which creates authentic history by changing man from inauthentic existence to authentic existence.\(^6\) As has been mentioned already, this is the essence of Barth’s *anologia relationis* and Heidegger’s ontological difference.

Barth attempts to show this event, a unity or a complete merger between phenomenology and ontology, from the perspective of salvation history. The phenomenological study of the history of Israel inevitably points to its ontological ground, whereas God’s election, the ontological ground of history, realizes itself within the history both of Israel and of the church.

On the one hand, Barth’s careful study of the Scriptures from the perspective of faith proves Jesus Christ to be the meaning and purpose of the existence of Israel. It is in the name and existence of Jesus Christ that we find the decision of God as an event in human history (menschlich-geschichtliches Ereignis).\(^6\) If faith proves itself as a temporal form of reconciliation,\(^6\) the church vindicates itself as a historical form of the work of the Holy Spirit.
and faith. On the other hand, Barth's ontological approach to the doctrine of election shows that predestination is an eternal happening (Geschehen). Consequently, the reality of election is neither a being which is static and isolated [from human history] (eines abgeschlossene und unbewegte Sein). nor the schema and program of history, but history itself and event itself. Barth's God certainly exists beyond this world, and for this reason He is aseitas. His God, however, contains in Himself decision, event, and history, for His essence consists in His trinitarian fellowship and history. Further, God's decision, event, history, and fellowship are the archetypes for authentic decision, event, history, and fellowship within the world to the extent that the former creates the latter by transforming man from inauthentic to authentic existence, and from the sinner to the reconciled.

Barth grasps history as event in terms of primordial reality or of the innermost core of reality. Therefore, history is not concerned with contingent changes within the unchanging framework of the phenomenal and natural world, corresponding to the accidental changes of properties which belong to the unchanging substance of man. On the contrary, history is concerned with the change which underlies the phenomenal world, corresponding to the very change of the ontological status of human existence. This moving character of the ontological status of human existence is expressed in Heidegger's statement that human existence is ontically different from other entities in that it is ontological. Needless to say, this is the essence of the definition of man, who exists in the process of transcending himself toward ultimate reality.

In the realm of the natural world, history as event is concerned with the occurrences on the frontier between the nonexistence and existence of nature (die Grenze zwischen der nicht-Existenz und der Existenz der Natur). The natural world, which appears to be governed by the fixed laws, is really sustained by the event which is the essence of historical reality. Heidegger expresses the same understanding of reality by saying that history is the ever-changing reality and the very change of substance which negates the self-identity of its essence. In fact, Heidegger's Being (Seyn) is the event which produces the natural world out of its bosom. Since event produces natural entities out of the struggle and unity between Being and Non-Being, it corresponds to, and unifies itself with, the event which produces an authentic world out of a chaotic and inauthentic world through the reconciliation which entails the transformation of man from inauthentic to authentic existence. Barth expresses this correspondence between creation and reconciliation by referring to the fact that creation history, and the incarnation, the resurrection, and the second coming of Jesus Christ all belong to the primordial history (Urgeschichte).

In comparison with the ontology of history thus far clarified, the western metaphysics as well as science is a static type of thinking which forgets the
fact that the world of entities is a dimension of Being as event, the event which also enables man to respond to the call of Being. In his autonomous manipulation of all entities, which characterizes the western metaphysics and science, man refuses to respond to the call of Being and consequently prevents truth (the disclosure of Being) from its realization. This produces the world of technology (secularization) which is characteristic of western society. The will to control has hardened everything into the unhistorical (the loss of relatedness to the transcendental Being). Technology, metaphysics, science, and Historie are unhistorical. Man always dominates things. In all realms of human life, even in ethics, man's relatedness to the transcendent Being is lost. From the Barthian perspective, this is the necessary consequence of natural man and religion. Thus religion is lost in the subjectivity of man. The result is contemporary humanism and atheism. Being ceases to be event, and for this reason it is impossible for truth to be realized in man.

This inadequacy of modern science and metaphysics corresponds to the fact that the older understanding of man in terms of substance is not adequate for a real understanding of man. The situation concerning reality just described further indicates that the understanding of God and Being in terms of the highest and static entity and absolute substance cannot provide an adequate ontological ground for the historical world which is characterized by change and development. If authentic existence and real man exist solely in their transcendental relatedness and comportment to ultimate reality, this reality is no longer the unmovable and highest entity, but the act of creating this relationship between itself and man. As already mentioned, the act of creating a relationship between ultimate reality and man is the event which produces authentic history. Therefore, the ontological ground of historical man is the Urgeschichte, which is for Heidegger the grace, openness, and disclosure of Being, and for Barth the grace, election, revelation, and reconciliation of God. Barth could well claim that the openness and revelation of his God should be the archetype for the disclosure of Heidegger's Being. This is the reason why it is possible to locate Heidegger's Being at the locus of Barth's doctrine of creatio continua.

The theological method of Barth is characterized by his christological approach to reality. This characterization implies that Barth attempts to understand man, world, and history from the perspective of the Christ event. In fact, the thought structures of Barth's anthropology as unveiled in terms of the thinking of relationship (Beziehungsdenken) and of the thinking of language (Sprachdenken) in the previous section are those which are proper to the Christ event. It is Jesus Christ who as the Word establishes the real relatedness between God and man. In a similar way, Heidegger also understands the essence of language in terms of creating relationship (Verhältnis or Beziehung).

It is from the perspective of the Christ event that Barth further develops
his doctrine of man. Man is certainly constituted by the transcendent God, but God is now seen as concretely becoming the man Jesus. This suggests that the ontological ground of man is now shifted from the vertical to the horizontal relationship. Accordingly, the ontological definition of man is formulated in such a way that in the midst of men the man Jesus exists. To be real man is to be with Jesus Christ just as the essence of man is a genuine togetherness with God. Man is what he is in relationship to the movement of the man Jesus Christ, who is the ontological ground of man, toward him. The being (Wesen) of man is not to be sought behind or apart from this movement, as if it were something (ein Etwas) in itself, which is then caught up in this movement. On the contrary, man finds his reality and consequently exists when he is brought into direct encounter with, and moves toward, the man Jesus Christ as the witness to election and reconciliation. The act of a man who responds to the call of God is at the same time the event which happens to him from the side of God, who is the real event, in order to take man into the fellowship both with the man Jesus and with God. This is the essence of analogia relationis et fidei, which is in turn grounded in the fellowship and history unfolded between the divinity and the humanity of Jesus Christ.

For Barth, the divinity of Jesus Christ consists in the fact that He is man “for God,” whereas His humanity consists in the fact that He is man “for His fellow-man.” There is a divine and essential correspondence and similarity (eine göttlich-wesentliche Entsprechung und Ähnlichkeit) between His being “for God” and His being “for His fellow-man (Mitmensch).” The being of the man Jesus is therefore not accidental but ontological. This is to say that the correspondence consists in the fact that the man Jesus in His being “for man” repeats (wiederholt) and reflects (nachbildet) the inner being and essence of God, and confirms His being “for God.” The divinity and the humanity of Jesus Christ, however, are united, not in terms of noumenon and phenomenon, but in terms of the history unfolded in their mutual act based on the address of God and the response of man. In other words, the act of the humanity of Jesus Christ is at the same time the event which happens to him from the side of His divinity, which is a real event, and consequently historical. The relationship between God and man, and between Jesus Christ and man, is enclosed and grounded in this history unfolded between the divinity and the humanity of Jesus Christ. The relationship between the man Jesus Christ and His disciples therefore is not original, but the exact copy (Nachbild) of the trinitarian fellowship and history (Urbild) which consists in perfect being “for others.”

Certainly, christology is not anthropology. Jesus Christ is the man strictly “for His fellow-man,” whereas we are men “with others.” Jesus Christ is strictly authentic existence always responding to the call both of God and of His neighbors, whereas man as sinner does not respond to the call both of
God and of his neighbors. Here we find the mystery of man. To deny this mystery is to deny the continuity of human subject in the forms of a creature (being-with-others), a sinner (being-against-others), and a sinner saved by grace (being-for-others). The same man who is created to live with his fellow-man, can become a solitary man (sinner) apart from God and his fellow-man, but he can also become a being “for God” and “for his fellow-man” by realizing his authentic existence.

The definitions of the humanity of Jesus Christ in terms of being “for others,” and of man in terms of being “with others,” correspond to Barth’s classical definitions of the relationship between covenant and creation: covenant is the inner ground of creation, whereas creation is the outer ground of covenant. A being “with others” (creation) is supposed to become a being “for others” (reconciliation), whereas the external form of a being “for others” is not solitary man but fellow-man. Barth’s image of God is neither reason, nor conscience, but the fellowship between 1 and Thou, and between husband and wife.

Therefore, for Barth, the reconciliation between God and man (analogia relationis et fidei) is realized only through the medium of the community both of Israel and of the church (being-with-others). Apart from the community both of Israel and of the church, which is the historical and social ground of man, both Jesus Christ and individual Christians cannot exist.

Community is not therefore something extraneous to man as solitary existence, but it forms his innermost essence. Every solitary man presupposes the I-Thou fellowship which is for Barth another form of the ontological impossibility of sin. The fact that “I” is “I” in the relationship to “Thou” within the world is grounded in the I-Thou fellowship in the trinitarian God and between Jesus Christ and His fellow-man. This is the ontological structure of Barth’s man.

It is more than certain that Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of human existence does not start with man as fellow-man. Heidegger’s man is primordially defined not in terms of being-with-others, but in terms of being-in-the-world. Certainly, Heidegger modified the traditional understanding of entities by making it clear that things do not exist by themselves (Vorhandensein), but have a particular mode of existence, namely, that of “equipments” (Zuhandensein), which are dependent upon the act of human existence. It is in their “being-in-order-to” (serviceability to man), and their relatedness to the destination and horizon (Being) that the essence of entities (the traditional definition of essence) is found. Heidegger grasps the essence of natural entities from the viewpoint of historical world where man plays a crucial role.

In this context, however, man is always understood as a solitary man. Furthermore, Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein (mutual existence) never implies the primordial relationship of communication which presupposes
human community and direct confrontation between I and Thou. Since “I” as being-in-the-world in its dealings with “equipments” shares the same world with “Thou” as being-in-the-world, “Thou” is defined neither as Zuhandensein nor as Vorhandensein, but as Mitsein, and our historical world is determined as Mitwelt (mutual world). Even in the later period of his development of thought when he introduces the concept of neighborhood (Nachbarschaft), Heidegger does not grasp the concept of community on the ground of the confrontation and fellowship between I and Thou, but on the ground of the event as gathering together between heaven and earth and between Gods and men. In the early Heidegger, therefore, Mitwelt is understood as the totality of the atomistic and individual human existence, which is not created out of the fellowship between I and Thou. In the later Heidegger, however, it is on the ground of the event (Da-sein), which is not a mere individual “I” but establishes the selfhood and authenticity of man, that the true I-Thou fellowship is created and considered.

Heidegger is to be commended in that he does not seek to understand “Thou” out of “I,” following the model of idealism. But neither is “I” understood by Heidegger in terms of being in fellowship with “Thou.” Just as Jemeinigkeit (my-self-hood) designates “I” as the subject which transcends the realm of nature, “Thou” always emerges as the subject which transcends the subject-object (I-It) relationship. Therefore, Heidegger’s man is not characterized by love but by care (Sorge). In such a structure of thought, it is somewhat difficult to develop an ontology of love which provides the ground for our response to the demand and address of our neighbors. The ontology of love and fellowship is characterized not by dialectic but by dialogue. The ontological ground of love is God in Christ, who comes to, suffers with, and moves together with individual Christians without abolishing their freedom. Love not only forgives and accepts, but directs a sinful will so as to make it respond to the address of God and neighbors. In fact, love has its proper place in the doctrine of sanctification, which is another expression of human transcendence. Furthermore, the doctrine of substitution puts an end to the concept of solitary man. Substitution is Christ’s encroachment into the “my-self.” Jesus Christ puts an end to the reservation of “I” toward God by breaking the “my-self.” He delivers a person out of the “I”-solitariness when “I” looks away from the “my-self” to Him.

Even for Heidegger, however, logos as the power for observation and articulation gains a communal character, corresponding to his definition of man as Mitsein. Heidegger certainly grasps logos as communication (Mitteilung), and listening as man’s openness to others. Heidegger, however, cannot develop fully this structure of language, because he grasps the ontological ground of history not in terms of fellowship but in terms of Being as event. Therefore, language is defined in a primordial way as the articulation of “Da,” the disclosure of Being. The origin of language is the echo of
the grace of Being. Language is the lighting and unveiling arrival of Being, where authentic utterance takes place and human existence achieves its authenticity. Human language agrees with (homologein) the utterance of Being. If the utterance of God encourages and calls forth man to respond (entsprechen) to the original utterance, the utterance of man is in correspondence to the utterance of Being, and for this reason it is hearing. The authentic utterance of man, however, does not need a historical object which confronts him, for it is in the most profound sense historical (geschichtlich). To this extent, validity may be granted for Barth’s differentiation between Christian anthropology and existential anthropology. As already mentioned, Barth claims that Christian anthropology is grounded in the history (Geschichte) unfolding itself between God and man, whereas existential anthropology is rooted in its primordial historicity (Geschichtlichkeit).

It is therefore evident that the limitation of Heidegger’s philosophy is due to his inadequate understanding of the ontological ground of Mitsein. Since Being as event may not entail the concrete fellowship, communication, and history unfolded between two persons, but merely the impersonal ground of the historicity of man, it may not have an audible voice but merely voiceless voice (lautlose Stimme). On the other hand, the Christian God is a God who speaks. Jesus Christ is God with us, speaking to us in His person in order to break into our monologue and turn it into dialogue. The trinitarian fellowship in God is the ontological ground of this dialogical and communal character of our existence and language. Indeed, there is no language apart from community and society. Objectivity of truth requires that “I” thinks as “Thou” has to think. Authentic language, on the other hand, which has been created out of the communal character of truth, is supposed to express the world of significance which can be seen as Heidegger’s disclosure of Being and Barth’s reconciled world. Heidegger’s Mitsein is not the ontological ground on which authentic language and existence are to be established. On the contrary, authentic language and existence are established for Heidegger in man’s correspondence to the disclosure of Being, and also when the Mitsein of two subjects becomes possible, on the ground of each authentic existence which has been thus established. Community and society are grasped by the early Heidegger as depraved, so that for him they cannot become the ontological ground of human existence.

Since Heidegger’s Being consists in freedom and transcendence (Freiheit zum Grunde), it may be said that for him faith has priority over love. The man who realizes his authenticity and transcendence through faith can truly love his neighbors and establish the genuine I-Thou fellowship. If, however, Being is not understood as a person who confronts man, there is a possibility that man forgets Being and closes in upon himself. Heidegger’s position, therefore, is open to the possibility of lapsing into a Pelagianism.
The same issue is made clearer when Heidegger talks about conscience. The issue is “who does the calling?” Heidegger answers that in conscience “the call comes from me and yet from beyond me.”109 Buber’s understanding of Heidegger suggests that Heidegger’s original responsibility is found in man himself (Bei-sich-bleiben).110

Even though Buber’s criticism may not be accurate, at least one thing is certain. Reconciliation, justification, and sanctification are for Heidegger a matter related to the individual person. In the case of Barth, however, authenticity is produced out of the experience of conflict and enmity, forgiveness and love between God and man, and between man and man. Therefore, faith is to be understood in the perspective of our faithfulness to our God and neighbors within the context of our Christian fellowship and love. This corresponds to Barth’s definition of God in terms of love and freedom. The reconciliation between God and man is based on the fellowship between I and Thou. Our justification and sanctification are not possible apart from our fellow-men in our community. This means that these doctrines are related to the community of Christians and not to the individual believer. Through our faithfulness to our fellow-men, we realize our true self, which is to be identified with the revelation of God (truth). In the historical world, truth is understood as self-identity (integrity). This self-identification is realized in our being-open-to-others, responding to the demand and address of our neighbors. This is the essence of reconciliation and sanctification.

In this connection, Barth’s assessment of the relationship between agapē and erōs is most original and interesting. According to Barth, agapē and erōs are not rooted in an intrinsic possibility of human nature. Rather they are events and consequently they determine human nature through the historical and contingent event, which extrinsically happens to man when he loves in either way.111 Here we come to grips with a proposed ontology of love and act. Human nature is capable of taking either form of love on the ground of a contingent act of historical existence, and for this reason it can create history in either way. A person’s ontological status changes in accordance to his way and mode of life. Consequently, the real change of the course of history is not due to a potentiality inherent in human nature qua ens creatum, but to man’s contingent and historical decision and act in his existential relationship to God and his neighbors.112 Nevertheless, the proposed ontology of history is quite different from existentialism, for agapē takes place in correspondence (Entsprechung) and erōs in contradiction (Widerspruch) to human nature, which is willed, posited, and ordered by God.113

On the one hand, erōs certainly consists in a new thing which is created by the fact that man closes in upon himself, and in this way it has a tendency to make God the origin of the self-closed entity. In erōs, therefore, God becomes the reflection of the ontic existence of a solitary man, for whom the subject
and the object of love are the same self. On the other hand, agapē means self-giving within the fellowship between I and Thou. It does not mean the loss of the self of the subject in the object, for this brings a person back to the sphere of erōs in which the subject and the object of love are the same self. Agapē is essential and natural in relation to fellow-men. Agapē, however, is not rooted in human nature, but is a contingent occurrence to man as ens creatum. For it is in the quickening power of the Holy Spirit and in a new act of God that agapē becomes an event to man. To this extent, agapē has a proper place in the doctrine of reconciliation, and undergirds the Barthian position which claims the priority of reconciliation (archetype) over creation (ectype).

Certainly, erōs entails the self-transcendence of man. To this extent, love is a link between the inside and the outside of man, as well as between God above in heaven and man below on earth. It is in love that man, existing on earth, can establish God as the ontological ground of history, for love is human transcendence toward God. Erōs has a tendency to keep and to maintain the human ego in itself, whereas agapē consists in the giving of one’s self, which corresponds to the essence of God as defined in terms of love and freedom. Erōs entails merely human transcendence and freedom, and consequently is deficient in comparison to agapē, which consists of both freedom and fellowship. This comparison between the two is analogous to that between a solitary man and a real man. It can be said that agapē corresponds to analogia relationis et fidei, whereas erōs corresponds to analogia entis.

Even though a Buberian perspective may imply that agapē and erōs characterize the essence of man in Barth and Heidegger respectively, a Heideggerian position can claim that Heidegger presents a third reality which cuts across a strict dichotomy between the I-It relationship and the I-Thou relationship and provides a ground for both an I-Thou relationship and an I-It relationship. For Heidegger has clarified the event-character of both authentic existence and authentic language. Man is not a mere subject, but the Ek-sistenz which dwells in the disclosure of Being. Self-understanding is not self-consciousness, but authentic existence which is true and faithful to itself. Authentic thinking is not produced by a free and empty potentiality for thinking, but by its openness and response to the demand and address of Being. Thinking is not merely an act, for which man is qualified as animal rationale, but man is forced to think, because the world lights itself up to him.

In such a perspective of the understanding of reality, the work of Martin Buber can best be evaluated. Certainly Buber made a great contribution in his clarification of the dialogical principle which constitutes human existence. Buber grants that communication between I and Thou is made possible on the ground of the original relationship between God and man. It appears, however, that Buber does not fully articulate the ontological difference
between creation and reconciliation. When he talks about an innate Thou (eingeborenes Du), Buber refers to the capacity of saying “Thou” implanted in the structure of human existence as a gift of creation. In the language of Barth, Buber does not distinguish between being-with-others (creation) and being-for-others (reconciliation). For Buber expressly states that an experienced fellowship between I and Thou is a relationship of an innate Thou. Therefore Balthasar may be right when he criticizes Buber by pointing out that dialogue has to be determined primarily not by its form in terms of a mere conversation carried out between two parties, but by its content which shows the limitation of human existence. For even in the structure of the dialogical relationship between I and Thou, both I and Thou can easily degrade themselves into “It.” When Barth states that altruistic activity is inhuman if it does not derive from the summons of the one to the other, his concept of the neutral attitude of man is essentially the same as that of Heidegger’s inauthentic existence, which responds to the demand of the others in its neutral and inhuman attitude only by following a conventional way. In a depraved society fellow-man easily becomes indefinite man, and ceases to carry on a dialogue. True dialogue takes place, however, when the transcendent Other comes to the helpless and depraved man, and when “I” suffers from the embarrassment caused by “Thou.” This shift of reality within the dialogical structure of human existence corresponds to the continuity of human subject in the forms of a creature, a sinner and a sinner saved by grace. Barth and Heidegger differ in that for Barth Jesus Christ never fails to greet man, whereas for Heidegger the disclosure of Being is still partially dependent upon man’s realization of his potentiality for Being.

Buber’s concept of an innate Thou can be compared to Emil Brunner’s concept of the point of contact. From the perspectives of Barth and Heidegger, Brunner’s concept of responsibility as imago Dei is abstract. For Brunner fails to see that human responsibility presupposes human capacity for decision, whereas human decision corresponds to the decision of God which takes place prior to the human decision. Buber and Brunner deal with a mere possibility, potentiality, and capacity abstracted from the reality which is solely actualized through the act of God’s grace. An ontological difference between creation and reconciliation can be further clarified by Barth’s concept of gladness. Barth states that man is to be found in his essence only when he is joyful, and that “to belong to another” as his property is man’s bondage, in which he is no longer with his fellow-man gladly. Man’s existence in gladness is the essence of the writer’s proposed ontology of history. Such an existence witnesses to the trinitarian fellowship of God characterized by joy and gladness as the ontological ground both of man and of history, starting with man’s concrete situation within history.

Man is essentially determined to be with his fellow-man gladly, in the indicated freedom of the heart. Openness, and speech and hearing, and mutual assistance can be real
only when there is also this discovery between man and man, and necessity of this “gladly,” this freedom, rules in their seeing and being seen, their speech and hearing, their reciprocal help. This is not merely the crown of humanity, but its root.

Unless we act and live authentically, we are not real men, and for this reason we have nothing to do with our ontological ground. Only our existence in joy can establish an authentic world, for the realization of which God continues to work. On the other hand, our existence in joy and gladness is at once the direct manifestation of our ontological ground within the historical world.

This paper compares Barth and Heidegger in order to demonstrate that theology which is based on a logic which is proper to the Christ event can claim its validity even within the secular world. The old tradition of analogia entis has been an effort to show the same issue from the perspective of philosophy. If theology attempts to vindicate itself within the secular world, its task is related to the effort to establish God as the ontological ground of man and history here and now, starting with concrete and historical phenomenon, and consequently to show a correspondence between God and man, and between the ontological ground of history and its manifestation as historical phenomenon. From the perspective of Barth’s theology, this task is accomplished by creating a community of love and freedom, which corresponds to the trinitarian fellowship of God. Since our act of creating authentic community is always dependent upon the grace of God, our act of love and freedom unifies transcendental ontology with immanent phenomenology. In this perspective, true apologetic is not merely concerned with vindicating the structures of Christian faith over against other philosophical positions, but is also related to the acts of Christians who seek to construct the historical community as communio sanctorum. It is my contention that the logic which is proper to authentic community established by the Christ event can also claim its validity within the secular world.

NOTES

1. Calvin, Institutes, I, 2, 22; II, 8, 1.
2. Ibid., I, 2, 15.
8. *CD*, 1/2, 774-776.
16. *CD*, 111/1, 5; 111/2, 111.
17. *CD*, 111/2, 110.
18. SZ, p. 43.
19. Heidegger uses the word *phenomenon* as a technical term which entails the unification between appearance and reality.
20. SZ, p. 6.
22. KD, 111/2, 109.
23. Barth uses the word *phenomenon* in terms of a Kantian sense of appearance.
24. KD, 111/2, 133.
30. SZ, p. 152.
34. SZ, p. 183; *CD*, 111/2, 21.
35. *CD*, 111/2, 47 and 68-69.
37. SZ, p. 6; *Nietzsche*, 1, 225.
40. CD, III/2, 25.
41. CD, III/2, 111.
42. CD, III/2, 112.
43. CD, III/2, 165.
44. CD, III/2, 128.


46. SZ, p. 137.
47. SZ, pp. 65 and 75-76.
48. CD, III/1, 340.
49. CD, III/3, 129.
50. UzS, p. 259.
51. KD, III/1, 378.
52. KD, I/1, 139.
53. CD, III/2, 150.
54. CD, III/2, 164.
55. CD, III/2, 165-166.

56. We find a similar understanding concerning the relationship between entities and their names in Heidegger (UzS, p. 164).


60. Cf. Nietzsche, I, 278.
61. CD, II/2, 53.
62. CD, II/1, 159.
63. CD, II/1, 160.
64. CD, II/2, 184.
65. CD, III/3, 22.
66. CD, II/1, 459.
67. CD, III/2, 111, 158, and 165.
68. KD, III/1, 89.


70. Ibid., pp. 35-62.

72. Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1954), p. 88; hereafter cited as VA.
73. Ibid., p. 80.
74. UzS, p. 264.
75. CD, II/1, 86-88.
76. CD, II/1, 68.
77. UzS, pp. 170 and 188.
78. CD, III/2, 140.
79. CD, III/2, 162.
80. CD, III/2, 160-162.
81. CD, III/2, 208.
82. KD, III/2, 261.
84. CD, III/2, 219.
85. CD, III/2, 243-274.
87. CD, III/2, 160.
88. SZ, pp. 68, 83.
89. Heidegger's *Mitsein* is not based on fellowship, so it may also be translated in terms of "correlational existence."
90. UzS, p. 211.
92. Nietzsche, I, 310.
94. CD, IV/2, 304.
95. CD, IV/2, 285.
96. SZ, p. 120.
97. SZ, p. 163.
98. SZ, pp. 160-161.
99. VA, p. 44.
100. PL, p. 70.
101. VA, pp. 214-216.
102. UzS, p. 79.
103. UzS, pp. 33-34.
104. UzS, p. 80.
105. UzS, pp. 255, 260, and 262; Nietzsche, I, 471.
106. Haroutunian, *God with Us*, pp. 150ff. and 188.
109. SZ, p. 275.
111. *CD*, IV/2, 741.
112. *CD*, IV/2, 742.
113. *CD*, IV/2, 743.
114. *CD*, IV/2, 744.
115. *CD*, IV/2, 745.
118. *CD*, IV/2, 745.
121. *CD*, III/2, 247-249.
122. *CD*, III/2, 128.