VOLTAIRE AND ROUSSEAU:
HUMANISTS AND HUMANITARIANS IN CONFLICT

by Virgil W. Topazio

Whether judged as men, philosophers, or writers, it would be difficult to imagine two persons more different than Voltaire and Rousseau, yet they were both literary giants of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment who believed they had devoted most of their adult lives to the cause of political and moral freedom and justice.

Voltaire was the beneficiary of a formal classical education that served as a solid base to his broad cultural background and wide reading. He unabashedly enjoyed the flourishing eighteenth-century salon life with its premium on wit, conversational skills, and intellect. And despite his capacities for strong emotions, his manner of coping with the overriding problem of injustice was through the exercise of reason and intellect. Theodore Besterman informs us in his recent biography of Voltaire: "The truth is that this most profound conviction (i.e., love of justice) was the fruit of Voltaire's reason, but it was expressed with all the deepest passions of his being... Indeed, Voltaire was utterly a man of the mind."1

Rousseau, on the other hand, possessed neither the classical education nor the broad systematic learning of Voltaire, though he was an unusually well-read autodidact in the eyes of Marguerite Reichenburg.² What is more important, Rousseau was by nature much more introverted than his extraverted contemporary, lacked Voltaire's conversational skills and sharp wit, and what is more, notwithstanding his protestations, was almost totally devoid of a sense of humor. He himself would probably have admitted that in his youth he had sold his soul to a Mephistophelian Paris. He might not have as readily admitted that once success clearly appeared unobtainable, he attempted to repurchase his soul at too high and exacting a price for his body to comply with impunity to the demands of his conscience and heart.

Notwithstanding the obvious contrasts in thought and life-style, each contributed dramatically to the struggle waged in behalf of the common man.

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Voltaire, though himself a victim of injustice and intolerance, was driven by a conscience which could not remain mute even when he personally no longer had much cause for fear. Indeed, the greatest efforts in his mighty crusade to eliminate intolerance and injustice were put forth while he was safely and luxuriously ensconced in Switzerland or near the Swiss border at Ferney. Rousseau was different; he dramatically and deliberately became one of the “deprived,” thereby creating a greater identification with the masses and giving greater authenticity to his exhortations to seek one’s importance and greatness within oneself instead of attaching undue importance to the externals of class or wealth. In appealing to man’s inner dignity and identity, he sounded a clarion call against all governmental and societal laws or conventions that demeaned man or placed unjust burdens upon him. In the words of Jean Lecercle, “la nourriture qu’il apporte à cette génération n’est pas seulement d’ordre moral. Il éveille l’humanitarisme qui est un sentiment pré-révolutionnaire. Il suscite le désir de venir en aide aux hommes, d’améliorer leur sort sur terre.”

On the same page we find him saying: “Voilà le fait décisif; la petite bourgeoisie reconnaît dans Rousseau l’un des siens. Elle admire Voltaire, mais elle aime Jean-Jacques tendrement.” The reason is obvious, he was appealing to the “have-nots” condemned to leading miserable lives who suddenly found a champion with whom they could identify at several levels, even that of illiteracy, since Rousseau decried the advantages of education, books, and culture. What is more, his insistence that “le coeur de l’homme juste” should replace wealth and social position as the proper criterion of a man’s worth enabled the average man to aspire to greater things socially and politically. Thus while Voltaire was waging war against specific inequities Rousseau was inspiring the masses with hope and pride in their dignity as human beings.

Basically their different outlooks stemmed from the fact that Rousseau was an idealistic moralist, whether in ethics, politics, or society, whereas Voltaire, the realist and pragmatist, was more prepared to compromise, as demonstrated in Babouc. It should be noted that before Rousseau had imprisoned himself into a fixed position through his well-publicized transformation, his admiration for Voltaire was boundless, as his letter to Vernes makes clear. He wrote his friend: “Quand vous négligez de voir ce premier écrivain de son siècle, vous ne connoissez pas tout le sacrifice que vous faites à la vertu; car il n’est pas seulement le plus bel esprit, mais le plus aimable des hommes en société, et si l’on pouvait commercer avec son esprit seulement, il faudrait passer la vie à ses genoux. Pour moi, quoi qu’on en puisse dire, je connais l’acharnement de la jalousie, et j’ai peine à céder aux funestes impressions qu’on cherche à nous donner de son caractère. On ne peut point comme il a fait les charmes de la vertu et les douceurs de l’amitié sans avoir un coeur propre à sentir l’une et l’autre.”

Unlike Rousseau, who believed that an individual is most truly himself
when he feels, Voltaire was convinced that thought and knowledge brought out the uniqueness of the individual. In a word, he preferred to the Socratic thesis that knowledge is virtue, the contention that knowledge is power, and throughout his life he utilized this aspect of his humanism to support his humanitarianism; that is, his innumerable humanitarian deeds were his humanism translated into action. Clearly for Voltaire, as much as for any other “philosophe,” humanism was, as Larousse defines it, “l’ensemble des tendances intellectuelles et philosophiques qui ont pour objet le développement des qualités essentielles de l’homme.” And both the humanist and humanitarian in Voltaire insisted upon man’s answerability to human conditions for his actions and ultimate perfectibility instead of seeking solutions in Divine powers. This was in keeping with the humanistic aspect of eighteenth-century thought that accepted the fact that the physiological oneness of man created a terrestrial kinship dependent on Man-man rather than God-man.

In short, Voltaire continuously preached a faith in social realism without necessarily trying to undermine the “bienséances” still prevalent during the eighteenth century. Jean-Jacques, on the other hand, found the “bienséances” which continued to rule society and determine men’s actions an obstacle to the acceptance of a psychological and moral realism. Voltaire’s greater receptivity for “bienséances” did not prevent him from being the better representative of the eighteenth-century emphasis upon “bienfaisance,” for he thought in terms of man as a unit of society, whereas Rousseau empathized more with the individual as an entity unto himself. Indeed, Rousseau criticized the “philosophes” in his “Second Discourse” for being more concerned with society than for the suffering of individuals. The quotation of Rousseau reads: “Il n’y a plus que les dangers de la société entière qui troublent le sommeil tranquille du Philosophe, et qui l’arrachent de son lit. On peut impunément égorger son semblable sous sa fenêtre, il n’a qu’à mettre ses mains sur ses oreilles et s’argumenter un peu, pour empêcher la Nature qui se révolte en lui, de l’identifier avec celui qu’on assassine. L’homme Sauvage n’a point cet admirable talent et faute de sagesse et de raison, on le voit toujours se livrer étourdissement au premier sentiment de l’Humanité.”

Rousseau did in truth later recognize that any amelioration of man’s “de-naturalized” state would have to be accomplished within and by the very social and political system that had corrupted and depraved “l’homme naturel.” That explains his many works on political systems and theories of government, but his primary interest remained the same, that is, a concern for the individual human being. Analogically, one could say that he had reached the position of the scientist who realized that the best way to combat a disease was to inoculate the patient with a better controlled specimen of the virus.

There is much truth in this basic distinction made between Voltaire and Rousseau, namely, that Voltaire was primarily concerned with the total social,
political, and religious atmosphere and intent on maintaining conditions which precluded or made improbable the existence of intolerance, injustice, and abuse. One can say, then, with some justice, that even in the vehement battles waged in the name of particular individuals, Voltaire's eye was always on the larger scene; Calas, Sirven, or Chevalier de La Barre served as examples and beacons as much as ends in themselves. In essence, Bertrand de Jouvenel echoed Voltaire's sentiment when he recently stated, "sans le groupe, point d'homme." By contrast, Rousseau's temperament and emotional sensitivity would have led him to become more involved with the individual victim of injustice or poverty, that is, if he had become involved actively. For the truth is that, as he himself so often recognized and admitted, he seldom if ever entered the lists to participate actively in the "philosophic" struggle against the forces of oppression. More specifically, on several occasions he confessed that he had performed few good actions in his life (see Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, I, 1059) and had refrained even when he not only was capable of such actions, but actually would have wished to perform them (ibid., I, 1051). The reason was rooted in selfishness; he did not wish to be placed in the position of feeling that he had to repeat such actions. At least, this was his rationalization.

What Voltaire, "the first great man of letters who used his fame and literary skill in the active promotion of his social convictions" (Bertserman, Voltaire, p. 539), condemned in Rousseau was the extension of this egotistical attitude of non-involvement, or non-participation in the philosophic cause, to a betrayal of the "philosophes" themselves. Rousseau represented more than a liability or a threat. He became a wasted asset, for Voltaire recognized Rousseau's appeal to the masses, a trait likewise acknowledged by d'Alembert when he warned Voltaire not to denounce Rousseau publicly, "surtout à Paris, car Jean Jacques y est un peu le roi des Halles."

When we compare the humanism of Rousseau with that of Voltaire, it is clear that the latter from both a classical as well as philosophical concept of humanism far exceeded that of his more egocentric and paranoid contemporary. True, humanism and humanitarianism, especially in Voltaire, were understandably intermingled. Still, if humanism, when contrasted with humanitarianism, does indeed imply culture, civilization, and intellectual interests, then Voltaire surpassed by far the more restricted humanism of a Rousseau, whose tirades against these aspects of humanism are too well known to bear repeating.

It is interesting to note their approach to and concern for the written word, without doubt one of the distinguishing attributes of man's superiority over beasts and an important indication of man's progress toward development of his uniqueness or qualities essentially associated with the human species. Voltaire, the classical humanist, deplored any deviation from the purity of the language, for this symbolized the supremacy of man and attested to the
degree with which man had achieved mastery of his thought processes. Rousseau, regardless of the importance which has since been accorded to his flowing style, did seem to attach more importance to the moral impact his work conveyed than the stylistic felicitousness or purity with which it was expressed. One need only recall two letters to his publisher, Marc-Michel Rey. In that of March 6, 1760, he insisted: "Que l'on corrige exactenlent les fautes de l'imprimeur, mais surtout qu'on laisse toutes les miennes. On doit croire que je sais assez de français pour avoir rendu l'ouvrage plus correct, si je l'avois voulu."9 On October 23, 1761, his injunction to the publisher was: "mais qu'on suive partout le manuscrit a la lettre, jusques dans les fautes."10

The style of Rousseau offended and outraged the classicist and humanist in Voltaire almost as much as his ideas did. For example, he devoted four entire letters to a rather detailed vitriolic and satiric attack upon the *Nouvelle Héloïse*, letters which Voltaire pretended had been written to him. He also condemned *Emile* for its "éternités et longueurs insoutenables," while still managing to acknowledge "de la force dans le stile."11 Finally, Voltaire, the master craftsman, could have only scorn for any writer who openly confessed that he could write only when moved by passion.

Literature, the highest expression of man's humanistic effort for Voltaire, notwithstanding his polemical and propagandistic bias, became meaningful for Rousseau only insofar as it carried a social and moral message. But one should add, of course, that all of Jean-Jacques's works were designed to bare his soul and to justify his positions on various matters. In the words of Jean Fabre: "Jamais, en effet, écrivain n'eut moins de considération pour ce qui n'est que littérature."12 This same view was upheld by Jean Guéhenno when he said of Rousseau's written works: "Il était bien question d'art ou de littérature! Il s'agissait de la vie même.... Il est le premier en Europe de ces écrivains laïques à qui, dans la décadence de la foi, les hommes aient demandé ce que jadis ils attendaient de leurs directeurs."13

The basic difference between Voltaire and Rousseau with regard to humanism's emphasis upon knowledge, progress, and refinement of man's life at all levels centered upon the relationship of these to man's genuine happiness. To Rousseau's mind nothing surpassed the simple and individualistic happiness and freedom of "l'homme naturel." Voltaire could not imagine himself happy without the benefits of the refinement and culture that represented the results of social progress. For example, if both suddenly emerged upon our twentieth-century scene, one can have little doubt that Voltaire would approve of the expenditures and dangers associated with the exploration of outer space, whereas Rousseau would, with equal fervor, oppose them. The primordial right and obligation of man, would have said Rousseau, the humanist-moralist, was to explore the universe within himself which society with its trappings was succeeding in destroying or obscuring.

Unlike Rousseau, Voltaire did not find it either desirable or expedient to
adopt the role of a Messiah, martyr, or moral touchstone in order to combat persecution, intolerance, and injustice. Nor did he find it necessary to apologize for his wealth, his love of luxury, or the wealthy friends whom he repeatedly utilized in waging his campaigns, the humanist on such occasions willingly yielding to the humanitarian.

Another definition of humanism holds it to be a philosophy that augments human values through man's efforts apart from God; that is, God is neither essential nor indispensable. Phrased differently, "the champion of man against cosmic absorption is Humanism. . . Humanism is that view which vindicates the integrity of man." Based on the religious aspect of the above definition, Voltaire would certainly qualify as the greater humanist, for few would deny that Rousseau was more religious than Voltaire, who according to Theodore Besterman "was all his life a mercilessly unremitting enemy not only of the church but of Christianity and of all religion" (Voltaire, p. 529). This does not mean that Voltaire was devoid of all religious experience, for virtually every humanist would agree that a "religious" experience is possible without a belief in God, just as most humanists would agree with Gabriel-Rey that for the humanist "morale et religion ne sont pas nécessairement liées." A divorce between ethics and religion was unquestionably more acceptable to Voltaire than to Rousseau, who fully expected to be rewarded by Providence for his life of virtue, as he clearly stipulated in his Lettre sur la Providence.

Humanism, Jacques Maritain also tells us, "tend essentiellement à rendre l'homme plus vraiment humain, et à manifester sa grandeur originelle en le faisant Participer à tout ce qui peut l'enrichir dans la nature et dans l'histoire." Here the stress is upon the integrity of man that combines the self-identity and dignity which Rousseau so deeply cherished and which he saw constantly subjected to erosion in a social setting. Voltaire shared Rousseau's condemnation of the corrosive and corruptive capabilities of social and political agencies, but unlike Rousseau, he was as dismayed by the religious prejudice and bigotry rampant in eighteenth-century France, as he was by the civil and political inequities. And because Voltaire rejected Divine intercession, accepted in large measure by Rousseau, he was more apt to reject the rationalism of absolutism and inflexibility.

Like his fellow "philosophes," Voltaire believed that all conclusions are provisional and therefore man must be prepared to reshape his life and beliefs to adjust to new situations and conditions. This type of philosophy, premised on a fundamental humanism, precluded any commitment to a metaphysical rooted in dogma. This accounts for Voltaire's contempt for all metaphysical solutions and speculations that inspired some of his most satiric thrusts, though of course his ever-questioning intellect never ceased to wonder about man and, as in Le Philosophe ignorant, to ask innumerable questions which have for all time plagued mankind.
Rousseau, by contrast, was more at ease with positions rooted in absolutes and dogmatism, particularly following his so-called transformation, after which he became even more convinced of the righteousness and correctness of his moral view. His intransient idealism and the certitude of his moral position impeded him from making the concessions every human being invariably is called upon to make in life. Rousseau thus overlooked one inescapable truth: "le plus idéaliste risque d'être le plus grand menteur. Les lunettes de l'idéal ne nous trompent jamais mieux que sur nous-mêmes." 17

However much Rousseau pretended to identify with the masses, the impression lingers that he was not personally preoccupied with the fate of either individuals (other than himself) or of society as a whole. More specifically, the humanitarian instinct was missing from the humanism that motivated every action and work of Rousseau. Contrast this with the humanitarian focus of Voltaire's life, so well proclaimed by Paul Valéry in his talk on Voltaire given at the Sorbonne in 1944, when he characterized Voltaire as "ami et défenseur du genre humain." 18 An outstanding example of the humanitarian impulse that underlay Voltaire's amelioristic philosophy can be seen in his significant contribution to the reform of the penal code, of which one recent critic said: "le plus original et l'essentiel de sa contribution à la réforme du droit pénal ce fut la façon dont il se passionna et dont il apprit aux autres à se passionner pour la justice, non pas cette justice idéale dont il était question dans les mercuriales de Daguesseau, mais la justice qui atteint ou protège les hommes, dans leur chair." 19

Nor should one be misled by Voltaire's often frivolous, light and satirical style. Nothing more accurately holds up the mirror to the written works of Rousseau and Voltaire than the latter's following short comment to Jacob Vernes: "Jean-Jacques n'écrirait que pour écrire et moy j'écris pour agir." 20 And in truth a virtual monomania drove his pen; his mask of frivolity concealed a deadly seriousness, as he explained to Moutou: "je me dis toujours, il faut tâcher qu'on te lise sans dégoût; c'est par le plaisir qu'on vient à bout des hommes; répands quelques poignées de sel et d'épices dans le ragoût que tu leur présentes, mède la ridicule aux raisons, tâche de faire naître l'indifférence, alors tu obtiendras sûrement la tolérance." 21

The constant goal in Voltaire's campaign, culminating in his famous "écrasez-l'infâme," was the welfare of mankind. The instruments to accomplish this goal were reason and conscience. Rousseau not only minimized the role of reason, he often actually considered it a liability. For example, in a letter to the Marquis de Mirabeau he attacked Saint-Pierre's support of the Moderns' position "que la raison humaine alloit toujours en se perfectionnant, attendu que chaque siècle ajoute ses lumières à celles des siècles précédens. Il ne voyoit pas [Rousseau insisted] que l'entendement humain n'a toujours qu'une même mesure et très étroite, qu'il perd d'un côté tout autant qu'il gagne de l'autre, et que des préjugés toujours renaissans nous ôtent
autant de lumières acquises que la raison cultivée ne peut remplacer.” As for conscience, Rousseau always thought in terms of his own conscience, which infallibly dictated whether something was right or wrong. Voltaire sometimes sounded as though he shared this view of Rousseau (see Poème sur la Loi Naturelle), but generally and more typically he appealed to the collective conscience of mankind.

Because of their diametrically opposed natures and philosophies, there could be little in common between Voltaire, the highly civilized, cultured, educated, and refined gentleman with a firm belief in the benefits of society and the idea of social progress, and Rousseau, the adamant defender of the pre-social man, or “l’homme naturel,” for whom self-interest and general interest were mutually exclusive. The morality of “l’homme naturel” would have been anathema to Voltaire, because it precluded not only “bienfaisance,” so dear to his humanitarian heart, but equally important the “bien-séance” cherished by the humanist.

Voltaire’s indispensable intellectual, moral, and philosophical interests were incompatible with the pre-social state of man. And he was convinced that human qualities could best be developed within social settings. To be sure, Rousseau did profess in his “Fragments politiques” that moral man could be achieved only within a social context: “En un mot, ce n’est qu’en devenant sociable qu’il devient un être moral, un animal raisonnable, le roi des autres animaux, et l’image de Dieu sur la terre” (Pléade III [1964], 477).

It is clear, however, that he was rationalizing the best possible arrangement he could find within the existing unacceptable social and political structure. Only in this sense was Ernst Cassirer correct in saying that Rousseau’s real originality and significance stemmed from his having devoted all his thinking to the problem of law and society.

Whenever some writing of Rousseau struck a common chord with the philosophical cause, Voltaire inserted some form of limited approval among his customary attacks. Typical is the following comment on Émile: “Sans doute il faut se réjouir que Jean Jacques ait osé dire ce que tous les honnêtes gens pensent et ce qu’ils devraient dire tous les jours. Mais ce misérable n’en est que plus coupable d’avoir insulté ses amis et ses bienfaiteurs. Sa conduite fait honte à la philosophie. . . . Pour une trentaine de pages qui se trouvent dans un livre inlisible qui sera oublié dans un mois, je ne vois pas qu’il nous ait fait grand bien” (Leigh ed., letter 1986 to D’Alembert, 12 July 1762, XII, 21).

Voltaire reluctantly had to acknowledge what Jean Guéhenno recently observed about Rousseau, that he was “le premier en Europe de ces écrivains laïques à qui, dans la décadence de la foi, les hommes aient demandé, ce que jadis ils attendaient de leurs ‘directeurs.’” Voltaire at least partially concurred when he wrote Damilaville: “Ne considérons point sa personne,
considérons sa cause. Jamais les droits de l’humanité n’ont été plus soutenus” (Best. 10556 [1960], 23 Aug. 1763, LII, 249).

Critics of Voltaire might justifiably argue that his attacks upon Rousseau and his denunciation of Rousseau’s moral posture as hypocritical and dishonest were subconsciously an attempt to disguise the extent to which his own defense of human rights were intellectual and depersonalized. He was painfully aware of the fact that Rousseau’s success resulted from the people’s conviction that Rousseau was really one of them and that their misery and concern were deeply shared by him. No doubt Voltaire would be more vitriolic if he were able to witness Rousseau’s even greater success in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The numbers are legion of Rousseau’s disciples who are convinced of the sincerity and efficacy of his struggles to achieve for individual man the integrity and dignity he ostensibly prized more than material wealth and public acclaim.

Today, in this seemingly anti-rationalistic age, the siren call of Rousseau continues to enchant more and more those listeners who remain oblivious to the discordant notes struck by “cet extravagant musicien,” while the universal genius of a great humanist and humanitarian like Voltaire temporarily suffers what may be termed a fashionable disparagement. In the long span of history, however, the very dissimilar Voltaire and Rousseau will both be judged to have made, each in his own way, a major contribution to humanistic progress and humanitarian achievements.

NOTES