"Don’t you know the difference between right and wrong?" "Well I did learn it once, but I have forgotten it."

Professor Ryle finds, and I think we all do, something absurd about the reply "I have forgotten it," as an answer to the question above. However, it seems to me that Ryle has not managed to lay the issue to rest and has not managed it for several reasons. First, Ryle’s argument is ambiguous in that it allows of at least two interpretations, neither of which will clinch the argument, and that this ambiguity results from an equivocation on the term "appreciating-caring for." Second, there is a set of interesting cases in which "forgetting" and "remembering" are used in ways that Ryle’s own argument would appear to rule out. Third, the most important reason why Ryle has not “turned the trick” is that he seems to have overlooked at least one of the puzzles which likely vexed Socrates about the question “can virtue be taught?” This latter accusation might be thought somewhat unfair to Ryle since, at one point in his article, he seems to be precisely on the mark; however, he then slides off and obscures the force of what he has already mentioned. Admitting the possibility of unfairness, I will still try to pin this oversight on him, as exploring this problem seems the only route by which we may come to a resolution of several issues about which Ryle is, and we all ought to be, concerned. These issues are those raised by the question, “what is it to know the difference between right and wrong?”; by the old Socratic question, “can virtue be taught?”; and by the intriguing Ryle question, “is moral miseducation possible?” So much, then, for the easy job of hurling the accusations and writing the promissory notes.

As a preliminary to launching into the business of criticizing Ryle’s argument, it seems necessary to mention mostly in laudatory tones those tempting moves which Ryle does not fall for and which I should not wish to be thought of as trying to attribute to him. Since these arguments (five of them to be exact) are pretty familiar and since Ryle has done a pretty good job of answering them, I will only sketch their structure and subsequent dissolution.

Mr. McElvain is a Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at Rice University.
The first might be called the "account" argument and it goes like this: One doesn't know the difference between right and wrong until one has an account of what the difference is. Now "account" in this case means something very like an ethical theory of right and wrong, but need not be anything quite so strict. In fact, some might even allow that one could be said to have such an account even if he could not produce it. Ryle rightly points out that, regardless of what other appeals this move may have, it does not provide us with any explanation of our uneasiness with saying of "the difference between right and wrong," "I have forgotten it." Plainly, we all forget theories, accounts, explanations, etc., quite often, and qua theory, account, explanation, etc., there is no reason for us not to forget an account of the difference between right and wrong.

The second of the moves is somewhat different and has a far greater appeal (it caught Aristotle and still has its adherents): for lack of a better name we can call it the "skill" argument. The "skill" argument goes something like this: Knowing the difference between right and wrong is not a matter of knowing that something is the case, i.e., some account of the difference, etc.; rather, it is the knowing how to do something, namely, how to tell right from wrong and how to act upon what we discern. Skills are not matters of information and hence are not things we remember like facts. They are, instead, doings which we do not learn, at least primarily, by being told or by reading. We learn skills by demonstration, showing, coaching, training, prodding, goading, cajoling, and most importantly by practice. Skills come to peaks and fade away and in most cases they do not just start and suddenly stop in the way in which our knowing pieces of information does. However, as Ryle clearly sees, we do "forget" skills; e.g., "Don't you know how to ride a bicycle?" "Well, I learned how once, but I have forgotten," or "Don't you know how to do logic?" "Well, I once learned how but I have forgotten," and so on. There is nothing absurd about saying that I have forgotten a skill although there is something absurd about saying "I forgot it an hour ago" or "until yesterday I was the world's best tennis player and today I have forgotten how to play." This latter expression does have a use, of course, but its use should be spelled out as "today I'm playing so poorly that it is as if I did not know how to play." Thus, even though it would be easy to notice that skills seem to disappear or cease gradually and do not disappear or cease at some particular time and to conclude that "knowing the difference between right and wrong" is simply a knowing of this sort, the rejoinder is obvious—the "forgetting" in forgetting how to do logic is not a sham forgetting, i.e., it is not to be spelled out as just no longer being able to do logic. What the "forgetting" is in the case of logic might vary, but certainly does include forgetting techniques, procedures, and strategies, all of which are "knowings how." Further, and perhaps the stronger point is the obverse one, i.e., in the case of skills, "remembering how to" is clearly acceptable even for the most skillful of
individuals, let alone for those of us struggling along with our tennis serve, and when remembering is "in," so is forgetting. And thus, treating knowing the difference between right and wrong as a skill gives us no explanation of the oddity of "forgetting the difference between right and wrong."

Ryle's next three moves are actually of a quite different type from the first two and, although Ryle does not mention this, he orders his argument in such a way that it is clear he has seen this point. The type to which they all belong we could appropriately dub the "shoring-up type," i.e., they are designed simply to fill in the weaknesses we have noticed in the previous two arguments. The "account" argument gets a pair of "shorings" mainly because it needs a good deal more supporting than the "skill" argument. The first of the "shorings" for the "account" argument is familiar to all. Ryle calls it "special indelible knowledge" (perhaps innate) and we could easily identify it as a caricature of the "Form of the Good." The felicitous effect of the caricature is that it carries the absurdity of the argument straight home. It argues not that we cannot forget or remember "the difference between right and wrong," but simply that we cannot forget it because we always remember it (and always here is strong). The second "shoring" for the "account" argument is even less helpful because it turns out to be no more than an argument for why we probably will not forget "the difference between right and wrong." The argument briefly is that we are all reminded so often in our day-to-day life of "the difference" through our constant clashes, friendships, conversations, dealings, etc., that no one could be in a position to forget the difference. The problems with this argument are twofold: 1) aberrant cases are always imaginable in which one would not be in the required position—hermits, the absent-minded, etc.; 2) even if there were no aberrant cases, the point would simply be that we cannot forget because we are always reminded and hence do in fact remember "the difference."

The "shoring up" of the "skill" argument is similar to but not quite the same as the second prop for the "account" argument. Ryle identifies it as Aristotle's argument, and it amounts to something like the following. The knowing-how-to that we know in "knowing the difference between right and wrong" is not subject to the possible losses of competence to which other "knowings how" are, simply because it is not one skill among others, but the skill in terms of which all others are or can be exercised, and consequently it is exercised so often and in so many diverse actions that we cannot lose our competence in this skill. Leaving aside objections to "competence" here, we can see that what the argument aims at establishing is a necessary connection between exercising skills at all and exercising the skill of "knowing the difference between right and wrong." Whether it fails to do this and whether, as Ryle argues, it could only amount to an anthropological fact anyway, is not terribly important because it fails in another way as well? The further failure is quite simply that it, as the second prop of the "account" argument,
argues only that we are reminded (through constant exercise of the skill) of the "difference" all of the time and hence cannot forget it.

Having become clear about what Ryle claims not to be arguing for and at the same time about what I am not trying to throw at him, we can get on to the serious problems with Ryle's argument. To begin, I will give the overall formal structure of this argument and then start objecting to it as I develop it. Having argued that the reason why knowing and then forgetting the difference between right and wrong is logically absurd is not that we always do in fact remember the difference, Ryle goes on to argue against the view that what is absurd here is that one cannot strictly be said to know the difference between right and wrong. It might be thought that knowing is logically out of place here because forgetting is, and because—so it seems—forgetting must always be logically in place wherever knowing is. Ryle to the contrary argues that the logical propriety of knowing does not entail that of forgetting, and that knowing here is not at all out of place. For, when it is appropriate to use "forgetting" and "remembering" with "knowing," then "knowing" means "knowing-how" or "knowing-that"; but limiting "knowing" to "knowing-how" and "knowing-that" leaves out the range of cases of knowing involved in educated tastes and preferences (as well as the case of knowing the difference between right and wrong).

Ryle's strategy aside, his tactics are fairly obvious. What he has to do is establish 1) that matters of educated taste and preferences are among the things that we can be said to know, 2) that these cases of knowing will not allow the debility of "forgetting," 3) that this disallowal of "forgetting" is conceptually necessary and not a point of superficial grammar, and 4) that the "knowing" in "knowing the difference between right and wrong" is analogous to the "knowing" involved in matters of educated tastes and preferences at precisely those points which rule out forgetting and remembering. What Ryle need not and does not argue is that "knowing the difference between right and wrong" is the same as, or of the same class as, having educated tastes and preferences.

Now I want to quarrel with Ryle about several of these tactical arguments. The issue I want to start with concerns the "knowing" involved in educated tastes and preferences. Ryle argues that we learn to have educated tastes and preferences in the sense that we learn to appreciate superiorities for their own sake in things like wines, music, poetry, etc. What he has in mind seems to be that in the acquiring of tastes and preferences, we do not learn that some things are better than others, or learn how to tell the better from the worse, but that we do learn to admire, emulate, want, etc., and to avoid, disdain, reject, etc. Put another way: we do not learn to appreciate the difference between good and bad poetry by 1) learning the differences and then 2) coming to enjoy those which are good and disdain those which are poor. We do one thing, namely, learn to appreciate the difference between good and
WHY VIRTUE CANNOT BE TAUGHT

bad, and this appreciating involves both of these (knowing that, knowing how, and caring for them), but not as separate acquisitions or as leading from one to the other. In this case, the "knowing" is not separate from the feelings we have about what we know. They are both taught to us, and we learn them not from instruction or demonstration, but from these coupled with inculcation, inspiration, etc. We could not forget this "knowledge" because enjoying, seeking, desiring, caring for, admiring, etc., and avoiding, disdaining, rejecting, etc., are not things we forget to do; rather, they are things we either do not do or cease to do. One obvious implication here is that we could not learn the "appreciating", i.e., we could not come to acquire this knowledge, without the appropriate feelings. If the "knowing" here is not separable from the feelings we have about that which we know, there is no sense in talking about the one apart from the other—there simply is no one or other.

Ryle seems to me to be sliding in the above argument between various senses of the words "appreciate" and "care for," but the way in which he is sliding is quite complex. "Appreciate" can be used in sentences like "he appreciates the argument," "he appreciated what you were trying to say," "he appreciated the point which was being made," and "he appreciates the difference between valid and invalid proofs." In these sentences "appreciates" means: he distinguishes, can tell, does or can discern, etc. However, there is another sense of "appreciate" which occurs in sentences like "he appreciates kindness," "he appreciates love," "he appreciates concern," etc. The second group could be generally characterized as those in which "appreciate" means cares for, or cares greatly for, takes seriously, etc. It is in this second set of uses, "the cares-for uses," that "appreciating" takes on the logical character which makes it absurd to say that he forgot or remembered to "appreciate" (care for) something where forget or remember means something besides "did not appreciate (care for)" or "did appreciate (care for)." Whereas in the first group of uses there seems nothing absurd about saying that someone has forgotten or remembered how to distinguish, tell, or discern arguments, points of grammar, distinctions, etc.

Now Ryle's cases are what we might (after Aristotle) call "mixed." In each of Ryle's cases there seem to be some elements from each of the two uses distinguished above. What Ryle obviously aims at establishing is that in the "mixed" use of "appreciate," i.e., the use exemplified in sentences like "he appreciates poetry," "he appreciates wines," "he appreciates novels," "he appreciates music," etc., where "appreciate" cannot be replaced simply by care-for, take seriously, etc., one still finds the logical character associated with the uses where such replacement is possible. This move could always be objected to by saying that on ordinary occasions (ones described with a full context) "appreciate" is either being used in the distinguish, discern, etc., sense, or in the care-for, take seriously, etc., sense and not both. The apparent "mixed" sense would be no sense at all because it would disappear (be
replaced) as soon as we spelled out the full context in which sentences like “he appreciates poetry,” “he appreciates novels,” “he appreciates wines,” etc., occur. The force of this objection then would be: either the Ryle cases could be spelled out in detail and hence disappear, or they rest on illicitly associating the logical force of “care-for,” “take seriously,” etc., with “distinguishing,” “discerning,” etc. Ryle is aware of the possibility of this move and attempts to counter it by showing that in the use of “appreciate” in “he appreciates the difference between good and bad poetry,” “he appreciates the difference between good and bad novels,” etc., one could not discern the difference without caring for it. The move amounts to: one could not learn or know the difference between good and bad X (poetry, novels, wines, etc.) unless he cared for it.11

I think Ryle is mistaken here, but there seems no direct and simple way to demonstrate this. What I will do is discuss some cases, first an imaginary one and then some real ones, which seem to show that in the case of tastes and preferences there is nothing absurd about one’s “knowing the good and not caring for it” and further that there is a legitimate and non-trivial use of “forgetting” and “remembering” in such cases as well.

The imaginary case goes something like this: Imagine a child who was “trained” by his parents in music much as J. S. Mill was “trained” in everything. Now the upshot of this training is simply that the child is able from early years on not only to say which pieces of music are better than others, but also to give all the appropriate reasons for classifying some as good and some as poor, etc. We might even embellish the case a bit and make him into a musical prodigy who discerns even the subtlest gradation in music. The further fact is that he despises music, indeed, loathes it. What he does, he does through coercion, cajoling, fear, the desire to please, etc. When out on his own and subjected to listening to music (through no fault of his) he still can pick out all the subtleties, grade all the works, even give orations on the merits and demerits of the respective pieces; yet, if asked which he would prefer to listen to by an eager hostess, he might say, “It makes no difference to me. I care no more for the one than the other.” Now, it might be objected that he cares for neither, not just one no more than the other, but the point is that if asked to choose, he might well not care a whit which was played or ever care a whit.

My case is admittedly extreme; I deliberately made it so; however, in its slightly milder versions it is one which we are all acquainted with. It is the familiar case of over-training, over-coaching, and over-inspiring. And this seems to me to be exactly what is wrong with Ryle’s “inculcating,” “inspiring,” and “kindling.” The “inculcating,” “inspiring,” and “kindling” can always go wrong and can always go wrong in such a way as to leave one “knowing” the difference intended but not feeling for it or appreciating it in the sense of caring for it. The conclusion here is that either Ryle is mistaken
WHY VIRTUE CANNOT BE TAUGHT

about not being able to learn to know the difference between good and bad music (or whatever you like) without caring for the good and not caring for the bad, or else he is open to the earlier objection about equivocating on “appreciating,” i.e., if he means “appreciate” in the sense of appreciating a distinction, then one can appreciate the difference without caring for it, and if he means “appreciate” in the sense of “caring for it” his argument reduces to “you cannot care for something without caring for it.”

The non-imaginary cases which I want to bring up are, I think, familiar to most. It sometimes happens that poets and novelists go “sour”; someone who has in the past written good work begins to produce drivel. Now, when this happens, critics, and even sometimes we lesser folk, often say, “Jones (the poet) has forgotten the difference between good and bad poetry” or “Smith (the novelist) has forgotten the difference between good and bad writing.” We also sometimes say of critics of the arts who once seemed to make the right distinctions but have now for various reasons stopped doing so and only produce utter nonsense that “they have forgotten the difference between good and bad art (any art).”

The obvious objection to these uses is that they do not argue that one can forget the difference between good and bad X, since they really only say that some poet, novelist, or critic has forgotten how to do something, i.e., they are attributions of loss of skills, and of course skills can be forgotten. What is wrong with this “spell-out” is not that it misses all the situations in which we say of poets, novelists, or critics that they have forgotten “the difference,” but rather that it misses the crucial ones.

In some cases artists and critics begin to produce drivel, but the drivel they produce is far from artless. It just does sometimes happen that someone produces something which exhibits great skill but is nonetheless bad art. And it is just in this case that we say without deprecating the skill displayed in his work that some artist “has forgotten the difference between good and bad art (any art).” Now with a modicum of imagination, we could transfer this situation to the appreciator of poetry, novels, or in fact any of the objects of educated tastes and preferences. We can, it seems, well imagine the connoisseur of Jane Austen coming to select and prefer skillfully done spy novels (if there be any) and when questioned as to why, saying that they are better than Austen, i.e., better novels in that they are more skillfully done. Wouldn’t we want to say of him that “he has forgotten the difference between good and bad novels”? The conclusion here, then, should go something like this: there is in the case of tastes and preferences at least a third-person use for forgetting and hence remembering, but Ryle’s argument did not aim at just showing that first-person reports of forgetting and remembering were out of order in these cases. Instead, he claimed to establish a logical (conceptual) disallowal of using “forgetting” and “remembering” with tastes and preferences. 

12
The strategy of the criticism then is: either Ryle is equivocating on “appreciate,” i.e., running together something like “to discern” with “discernment,” or his analysis of tastes and preferences gives incorrect answers to the questions 1) of whether one needs to “appreciate” the good to know it, and 2) whether there is a non-absurd and non-trivial use of forgetting and remembering with tastes and preferences. The further moves are likely obvious. Ryle is arguing from an analogy or set of analogies between “knowing” in the case of “knowing the difference between good and bad art (etc.)” and “knowing” in the case of “knowing the difference between right and wrong.” However, if my analysis is correct, the analogies break down at crucial points because tastes and preferences are subject to knowing without appreciating and to forgetting in at least some cases, whereas knowing the difference between right and wrong does not seem to be so subject.

So far I have argued slightly unfairly in that I have acted as if Ryle himself did not see these puzzles, or at least some of them (especially the first, but probably also the second). To be sure, Ryle does see them and brings them up at the end of his argument as qualifiers. However, qualifiers will not do here because Ryle’s argument rests precisely on drawing an analogy between “knowing,” i.e., “appreciating” in the case of “educated tastes and preferences” and “knowing” in “knowing the difference between right and wrong.” The point then is that if Ryle were correct in assimilating these two “knowings” and if I have not made any serious errors about inculcating, forgetting, and remembering, then Ryle’s argument would demonstrate that “virtues can be taught” and that “moral miseducation” is possible.

My arguments against Ryle can then be summarized fairly briefly. “Appreciating” is too ambiguous a term to do the job Ryle has assigned to it. Thus, if we take “appreciating” in the sense of “being able to distinguish,” we let in forgetting and remembering and let out the necessity of “caring for the good” in order to know it. However, if we take “appreciating” in the sense of “caring” (one way of putting this would be: “to discern something we must have discernment”), then of course Ryle would be right about tastes and preferences, but the argument would not be interesting. Ryle has at least one way out of this dilemma, namely, to argue that “appreciating” cannot be “unpacked,” and at one point he seems to want to take it. The problem with this way out is that it runs counter to the way we do talk about tastes and preferences and especially counter to the cases which were raised involving inculcating and inspiring and the cases of “third-person” uses of “forgetting” and “remembering” in connection with tastes and preferences.

In the early part of this article, I hurled some accusations and wrote some promissory notes. So far, I have been trying to back up the accusations (whether successfully or not) and have not touched my other obligations. The obligations I undertook were two in number: first, to give an account of why Ryle was on the right track about “forgetting the difference between right
WHY VIRTUE CANNOT BE TAUGHT

and wrong” but got misled by the case of tastes and preferences, and to do
this in terms of what it seemed to me Socrates might have had at the back
of his mind when he argued “virtue cannot be taught.” Second, to use this
diagnosis to shed some light (probably not much) on the interesting problem
of “moral miseducation.”

Now, what I think Socrates had in mind might be put thus: to “know”
the difference between right and wrong is to have virtue, and to have virtue
is to be a moral man. Ryle’s analogy might be put thus: to know (appreciate)
the difference between good and bad X (poetry, novels, wine, etc.) is to have
educated tastes and preferences, and to have educated tastes and preferences
is to be a man of a certain sort (one is not sure here which word to use, but
Ryle might not be unhappy with “discernment” in a strong sense or perhaps
a list of similar terms). The analogy does look initially promising, and it is
clear that the crucial point in the analogy is the assimilation of “knowing”
in “knowing the difference between right and wrong” with “knowing” in
“knowing (cum appreciating) the difference between good and bad X.” The
problems with Ryle’s analysis of tastes and preferences have been pointed
out, but we have not yet come any closer to Socrates’ problems. I want to
suggest (with more than a little trepidation) that what Socrates had in mind
about “knowing the difference between right and wrong” was that the
“knowing” in “knowing the difference between right and wrong” involves
as Ryle suggested “appreciating or caring,” and as Ryle has not suggested,
“having the right reasons, motives and intentions in doing and saying what
we do and say.” And I want to suggest that it is the having of the latter and
not the former which makes it absurd to say “I once knew the difference
between right and wrong, but have since forgotten it.” It is also this which
made Socrates say, and I think rightly, that “virtue cannot be taught.”

What having the right reasons, motives, and intentions amounts to for
Socrates’ argument could be stated (doubtless inadequately) thus: having the
right reasons, motives, and intentions in doing something is not something
determinable before and/or apart from the particular circumstances in which
it takes place, the particular persons involved in it, the particular occasion
on which it takes place, and the particular effects which it has. There is no,
nor could there be a, list of right reasons, motives, and intentions which we
could put with our list of virtues in such a way that a man could look up
and then match up the appropriate items one with another. Further, there
is no skill of having the right reasons, intentions, and motives for acting in
particular circumstances because there is no method or no procedure for
coming to have such reasons, motives, and intentions.

One obvious point here that Socrates (perhaps) and Kant (certainly) saw
was that if either a list of the right reasons could be constructed, or a proce-
dure-method developed for finding the right reasons, then there would be
no point to moral censure or approbation because what is censured or
approved would be of a piece with being knowledgeable, skillful, or both. Ryle added to these two “knowings” a third, namely “appreciating-caring,” which he spelled out in terms of caring for, trying for, wanting, and seeking the good for its own sake and avoiding, disdaining and despising the bad for its own sake. However, it seems that a certain sort of man might “know” the difference between right and wrong where “knowing” is, or is like, “appreciating-caring” and yet be an immoral man and hence not “know the difference between right and wrong.”

The prime case of the seemingly contradictory man I have mentioned above is the man of “principle,” in one sense of the expression. Some men are said to be men of “principle” because they determine their actions entirely on the basis of rules (which seem to coincide with what Ryle calls virtues) which they set for themselves (usually learned from parents, teachers, etc.) and which they “appreciate-care for” in every sense that Ryle seems to adduce for “appreciate-care for.” Yet, it is the case that determining one’s actions in just this way and for these reasons, i.e., for the rules or virtues themselves, leads men to do very immoral things in particular circumstances and on particular occasions.

Another way of getting to Socrates’ point would be to notice that having the virtues (whatever list one might give) is not the same as having virtue, and that having virtue is considering, reflecting, weighing, and deliberating about actions in terms of the virtues, but upon particular occasions, in particular circumstances and with a constant view to modifying, changing, or rejecting those attitudes which one has learned to care for.

The point which I have been trying to make above can be seen in this way: “knowing the difference between right and wrong” is “appreciating or caring for the good as opposed to the bad for its own sake,” but it is also something else, namely, reflecting upon that which we appreciate and care for in the context of our ordinary and particular actions. It is the reflecting which we must be doing in order to “know the difference between right and wrong” which cannot be taught, because this reflecting is simply weighing, deliberating, choosing, deciding, etc. Now, we can sometimes get someone who has not reflected or is not reflecting about his moral life to come to do so. What we do here is enjoin, criticize, plead, heckle, and argue with him, and if he sees the point of our entreaties, then he may reflect and thus be on the road to “knowing the difference between right and wrong.” However, it would be inappropriate for us to say that we taught him “the difference” and for him to say that he “learned” it from us, although it would be appropriate for him to say that he learned the difference as a result of our effect upon him. The man who does entreat us does not deserve the title of teacher, instructor, guide, professor, moralist, or artist; he does deserve the title: friend.
If I have been on the right track or close to it, then a “moral miseducation” is at least in one sense absurd. It is absurd in the same sense in which “moral education” is absurd. We could not teach someone not to reflect any more than we could teach him to do so. However, we certainly could teach him that the wrong was the right, how to do the wrong instead of the right, and to “appreciate-care for” the wrong more than the right. But we could neither instruct him in nor prevent him from reflecting about the right and the wrong in conducting his life. If the idea of a man “appreciating-caring for” the wrong more than the right seems absurd, we should think not of Dickens’ Fagin and his charges, but of Antiphon the sophist and his charges.

One major objection which I would like to forestall at least in part comes readily to mind. It may be said that I have missed the point of Ryle’s “appreciating-caring” analysis of “knowing the difference between right and wrong” because I have acted as if saying of a man that he was honest, frank, sincere, loyal, etc., did not carry with it the implication that what was done was done for the right reasons and with the right motives and intentions. However, this objection runs counter to our ordinary way of talking. We simply do often say that a man was honest, frank, sincere, loyal, etc., on some occasions and that he was so for all the wrong reasons and hence does not deserve praise for what he did. The temptation to say that honest, frank, sincere, loyal, etc., deeds must be done for the right reasons and with the right motives and intentions stems from the fact that usually when we say of a man’s actions over a long period that they were honest, or say of him that he was an honest man, we give to be understood that what he did was done for the right reasons, and with the right motives and intentions. But I do not think that this should lead us to say that a man who “appreciates-cares for” honesty, frankness, sincerity, loyalty, etc., need “appreciate-care for” them for the right reasons and with the right motives and intentions.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 386.
3. Ibid., p. 381.
4. Ibid., p. 383.
5. Ibid., pp. 382-383.
6. Ibid., p. 383.
7. Ibid., p. 383.
8. Ibid., p. 388.
9. Ibid., pp. 385-386.
10. Ibid., p. 384.
11. Ibid., p. 385.
12. Ibid., p. 388.
15. Ibid., pp. 385, 386-388.