There have always existed in the breasts of philosophers, including our own breasts, two conflicting tempers. I nickname them the "Reductionist" and the "Duplicationist" tempers, or the "Deflationary" and the "Inflationary" tempers. The slogan of the first temper is "Nothing But . . ."; that of the other "Something Else as Well . . ."

I give five different illustrations:

1) Men, it is commonly declared, have in them Nothing But what they share in different degrees with animals. In opposition it is commonly declared that men have in them Something Else as Well that animals have not got in them at all, Soul or Reason or Spirit or the Divine Spark.

2) Animals, we all incline to think, have in them Nothing But what is material, physical, chemical, or mechanical. We all, however, incline instead to think that animals have an Additional Something in them, namely Life, Self-Motion, or Purposiveness, which machines, pendulums, and electrical discharges are without.

3) A social and political community is surely nothing over and above the several individuals who belong to it. They are its brass tacks. But on the other hand surely there is in a society some uniting agency or principle superadded to its members—the enveloping fabric behind and beneath those brass tacks.

4) A physical object, like a planet, pebble, or person, must reduce without residue to the sensations registered when an observer has sense-perception of it. Yet on the other hand there must exist in addition a substantial It or anyhow a substantial He to be the origin, the anchor or anyhow the recorder of these sensations.

5) Lastly, the mind, a Hume tells us, just is the multitudinous impressions, ideas, impulses, volitions, and feelings that constitute the phosphorescent cascade of consciousness. But a Descartes tells us, instead, that the mind is that which owns, monitors, controls, remembers, and forgets these snatches of cogitation. Or, to be up to date and tough, a person's mind is Nothing But the ways in which he visibly, palpably, and audibly behaves; unless our tender, anti-Behaviorist conscience is right to protest that his observable muscular movements and his audible utterances will be those of a Robot,
unless they are the outward manifestations of a privately thinking, feeling, and willing Self or Ego.

The specific notion of Thinking, which is our long-term concern, has been duly deflated by some philosophers into Nothing But such and such; and duly reinflated by others into Something Else as Well. On the one view, Le Penseur’s thinking is just the working of a non-man-made computing machine; or else, on the contrary view, his Thinking is something special which could not without logical absurdity be credited to a mere machine.

But long before nearing my quarry and arguing that Reductionist and Duplicationist theories about thinking are the heads and tails sides of one and the same mistake, I am going to analyze three or four trumped-up and emotion-free specimens of head-on collisions between Reductionism and Duplicationism, hoping that we may identify, near home and on a small scale, the kind of road-surface on which a Hobbes and a Descartes, an Occam and a Plato skid into their opposite ditches.

Suppose that of two boys one is engaged in writing a homesick letter to his mother, the other in mimicking the letter-writer to amuse spectators. If the mimicry is faithful, the two boys do exactly the same things—else the mimicry is not faithful. The ink marks made on his notepaper by the letter-writer are accurately repeated by the mimic on his notepaper. The frowns, grunts, and pen-drippings of the mimic are exact replicas of those of his victim.

"Since there was no witnessable difference, so," now says our Reductionist, "there was no difference of any sort between what the two boys were doing."

"Nonsense!" says our Duplicationist, "There was all the difference in the world, only it was a necessarily unwitnessable difference, between the activity of writing a homesick letter and that of entertaining spectators with a piece of malicious play-acting. Why else would you pick the one boy, but not the other, to act in your charades? Consequently, besides the scrawling, frowning, and pen-dipping that the mimic and the letter-writer were both seen doing, the mimic must have been doing some invisible Something Else as Well, namely his private and internal acts of simulating, which the letter-writer was not performing." "Rubbish!" rightly objects our Reductionist, "What could these supposed private and internal acts of simulating, say, the dipping of a pen in the inkpot, be like, that he executes in his mental camera obscura where there is no pen or inkpot? And what would be the point of the mimic trying to entertain spectators by performing, invisibly to them, your postulated private and internal histrionic acts, which, you agree, anyhow were not performed by the letter-writer?"

Already we have found one cardinal negative thing. Rather surprisingly our Reductionist and our Duplicationist had agreed on one central point, namely in assuming that the mimic’s lifelike histrionic actions could have differed from the actions of his victim only by his additionally performing extra actions (or part-actions) that the other had not performed. Since no
such extra actions were witnessed, therefore, on the one view, there was no
difference of any sort between the boys' actions. And since there were dif-
fferences between their actions, therefore, on the other view, the mimic must
have performed some extra actions, but internal, unobservable ones. This
central point on which they were agreed was the key point on which they
were both wrong. Action A can, by accident or, as here, by design, be mus-
cularly and photographically the perfect replica of action B, while conspic-
uously being a completely different sort of action. In our example two con-
spicuous differences between the boys' actions occur to us at once. 1) The
mimic scribbled with an entirely different intention from that of the letter-
writer, with the intention, namely, of diverting the spectators by visibly doing
just what the letter-writer was seen doing, who, for his part, intended only
to lament to his mother. Hence the mimic, but not the letter-writer, would
have stopped when the spectators lost interest. 2) Moreover, in his simulations
the mimic exercised skills that the other boy was not exercising. The spectators
could see for themselves how well or badly he was play-acting. Intentions
and skills are overlooked by the Reductionist since they are no part of the
photographable muscular movements to which he categorially mis-deflates
actions. By the Duplicationist they are not ignored but they are categorially
mis-inflated into extra, but nonmuscular Actions which, because Inner
Actions, transcend the spectators' observations.

Consider some analogies: a) The ambassador signing a treaty makes pen-
strokes exactly like those he had made after breakfast when trying out his
pen nib on an old envelope. Yet by the one bit of penmanship, and not by
the other, he commits his country to an alliance or a surrender. For he
inscribes his signature 1) on the treaty-document (and not on an old enve-
lope); 2) in his capacity as accredited representative of his country’s govern-
ment; 3) after consultation with his Foreign Office; 4) in the Chamber and
at the time officially appointed; 5) not under duress; 6) in the presence of
his co-signatories; 7) not in the dark; 8) with the accompaniment of certain
ceremonies, etc., etc.

Such conditions as these make his action the politically important action
that it is without, per impossibile, being additional actions that he is perform-
ing. They do qualify his actions, but not by qualifications that could be
expressed by simple active verbs or simple adjectives, Hobbist or Cartesian,
Carnapian or Hegelian, to which his name would be nominative. They pro-
vide what he does with its point, its credentials, and its force. But they import
neither visible nor invisible differences into his penmanship.

b) Whether the player scored a goal when he kicked the ball between the
goalposts depends. Was he offside? Was it during an interval? Was the game
itself a game of Hockey or Polo? Were the goalposts those of his own side?
Had the ball or the player strayed in from an adjacent game? Was the ball
a ping-pong ball? and so on. Scoring a goal is neither to be deflated into
just kicking a ball between some posts nor inflated into kicking a ball and performing an additional, though private and nonmuscular action of scoring as well. It is kicking a ball between posts when several complex antecedent and collateral conditions are satisfied—the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of which, incidentally, is ordinarily perfectly obvious to the unmetaphysical referee. Notice, *en passant*, that the stating of these very familiar conditions is going to require quite a chapter of subordinate clauses, beginning “When . . .,” “Unless . . .,” “Provided that . . .,” “Where . . .,” etc.

c) Until the English law was changed housebreaking differed from burglary only in the time of day at which it was committed. So the felon whose watch was unreliable might totally mistake the legal nature of his very own felonious act; introspection could not help him.

d) The novice, whose move with his Queen has put his opponent’s King in check, may recollect doing nothing else than moving his Queen. He had indeed made no additional move, but this one move he did make, with the pieces disposed on the board as they were and the rules of chess being what they are, had had a chess-consequence which he had not planned and did not perceive. The statement of what it is for a King to be put in check would have a fairly complicated syntax. A King, on being put into check, does not alter in colour, shape, size, weight, or position. Is getting into check, then, an unverifiable alteration? But what could be more conclusively verified than that a King is, or else is not, in check? Unobservable? Nonsense! Photographable? Well, in a solitary snapshot of him by himself, no. But in a sequence of photos of the whole board, and all its occupants, in their several successive positions, certainly yes.

Before leaving these mini-hurdles that I have set up in order revealingly to catch the feet of our Reductionist and Duplicationist, we should develop a point of epistemology that has so far been left in the background. Our Reductionist is *ex officio* a zealous empiricist, whose constant complaint is that his Platonic or Cartesian or Hegelian opponent always fetches in unverifiable or unobservables to provide him with his occupational Something Else as Well. We sympathize until we find that our empiricist’s own roster of observables is becoming disturbingly short, and his roster of unobservables disturbingly long. It appears that “strictly” the referee cannot see that the player, *qua* not being offside, has scored a goal, for a sharper-eyed Red Indian sees well the flight of the ball and the player’s muscular movements, but, in his ignorance of the rules of football, sees not at all that, since the player is not offside, he has scored a goal. How possibly then can the referee, with his inferior eyesight, “strictly” see what the Red Indian cannot see? We are told, to our surprise, that what is “strictly” observed is what could not be mistaken, requires no special schooling, incorporates no estimates, allowances, or inferences, and rests on no arguments. Hence the sergeant cannot “strictly” observe that the recruit is obeying his order to present arms, but
only that he is presenting arms the moment after being ordered to do so; and spectators cannot “strictly” observe differences between the mimic’s and the letter-writer’s actions, or between those of the ambassador in signing a treaty and in testing his pen nib. Nor can the illiterate “strictly” see a misprint. Nor, presumably, can the astronomer “strictly” observe the moon being eclipsed.

Our Reductionist had begun by assailing Cartesian and Platonic extravagances on the basis of what can be, in an ordinary way, observed. But now he reduces, in its turn, observation itself to Nothing But some oddly stingy minimum. He deflates his own deflator.

However, this stinginess of the empiricist must not soften us towards the lavishness of the transcendentalist. For though he properly acknowledges the differences between kicking and scoring, or between just presenting arms and obeying the order to present arms, yet he goes on to make these differences occult ones. For since they are not to be the earthly or muscular differences demanded in vain by the empiricist, they will have instead to be unearthly, nonmuscular differences that transcend the referee’s and the sergeant’s powers of perception.

Let us, however, without debating them, leave behind us these theories of knowledge.

Now, at rather long last, we can advance beyond our contrived stalking horses to punish the categorial maltreatments given by our Platonizers no less than by our Occamizers to that special notion of thinking which is our real concern. This notion of thinking is that of pondering or trying to solve a problem, not that of believing or feeling sure, which unfortunately goes by the same English name of “Thinking.” I am interested in cogitation, not credence; in perplexity, not unperplexity. Our specimen thinker is going to be the still baffled Penseur, not the man who, having reached conviction, has stopped struggling to reach it.

I shall very cursorily just remind you, before jettisoning it, of that old fairy-story about thinking that was the stock-in-trade of, among others, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, Reid, John Stuart Mill, and even Virginia Woolf—I mean the psychological fable about the introspectible ingredients of our private streams of consciousness, namely, the famous “simple ideas,” those dim traces and faint echoes of bygone impressions, the coagulations of these ideas into complex and fictional ideas, the couplings of them into true or false judgements, the distillations out of them of abstract ideas, and their inferential leap-froggings. If we did not know, we could now guess that there would have to arise a Hume to “reduce” thinking to mere processions of these faint and derivative introspectibles down channels shal-
lowly dug by Association; and how there would then have to arise a Kant or a Bradley to impose upon these processions some responsible controls that transcend the pryings of introspection.

Instead I shall concentrate on a contemporary substitute for this introspectionist fable. It is a genuine, though only partial improvement on its now friendless Lockean or Humean predecessor. One of its slogans, a portentous and predominantly silly one, is “Thought is Language,” a slogan which I expect you have met and, I hope winced at. However there are two meritorious points that are sometimes intended by the silly slogan, namely:

a) Whatever we think of the alleged private ingredients of our Humean streams of consciousness, at least we have to acknowledge that what a person concludes, surmises, calculates, proves, objects, decides, or forecasts must be something stated or statable in a public language. An unworded proof is no more a proof than an unworded poem is a poem, an unformulated verdict is a verdict, or an unworded repartee is a repartee. The result at which a thinker arrives (if he does arrive), is in some important classes of cases a printable truth or falsehood, e.g., an equation, an allegation, a theorem, or an hypothesis, etc. (It is often overlooked that even to this generalization there are plenty of exceptions. A Mozart’s thinking results in something playable, not statable. A symphony is not composed in English or German, it has no translation, there is no evidence for or against it. It is not grammatical or ungrammatical; neither in prose nor in verse. A Cezanne may make mistakes, but he is not in error. There is no contradicting the chessplayer’s carefully or carelessly thought-out move. A sonnet is not a report, a premise, or a conclusion; it can be a bad sonnet, but it cannot be a fallacious one.)

It is, then, an important improvement on the Locke-Hume fable, that we do now rightly insist that the products of at least some thinking are such things as published or publishable truths or falsehoods, and no longer only unsharable introspectibles. One place in which to look for the products of some thinking is a public library. I am going, for this occasion, to restrict myself to such thinkings as do result, if at all, in such things as worded propositions, since my chosen topic is “Thinking and Saying.”

b) A quite different and independent thing that is often intended by the silly slogan “Thought is Language” is this. It is declared with partial, but only partial truth, that in the pondering that Le Penseur is still engaged in before he solves or abandons his problem, he must be inwardly conducting, however intermittently and fragmentarily, worded monologues; he must be soliloquizing in his head or sotto voce. According to some “All Thinking is Thinking in Symbols,” “Thinking is Talking to Oneself,” or even “Thinking is Nothing But saying things to Oneself.” (This partially correct point also must not be universalized. If Mozart and Cezanne verbally soliloquize at all at their work, this cannot be part of their composing.)

Anyhow here, at last, we reach the two places on the road where occur
THINKING AND SAYING

all those skids into the vulgar Occamist ditch on the left, as well as all those skids into the genteel Platonist ditch on the right.

a) Our Duplicationist argues, with initial correctness, that the thinker’s result, when of the propositional kind, is not merely a string of words linked in a grammatically tolerable sentence, since his proof of the theorem, say, or his analysis of the general’s strategy is a contribution to geometry or to military history, not just to French or Russian prose. What he has found is, say, a new truth and not just a new locution, and a truth which is carried equally well by its original French and by its subsequent Spanish wordings. So the new geometrical or historical truth, say, that he has thought out is not just one of these many alternative locutions; it is their unitary burden or their objective, communicable Meaning. Bits of language may be necessary, but only as the interpersonal vehicles of objective Meanings that are thinkable, in principle, to any hearers or readers of any nationalities.

At this point, of course, our Quine-like Reductionist rudely asks what these Meanings are like, what they are made of, how they differ from the Lockean ideas that they had so promisingly replaced, and especially how you and I can decide whether we are crediting the same sentences with the same or even with similar objective Meanings, e.g., with the same or even with similar truth-cargoes.

b) Correspondingly, when our duplicationist moves on to consider, no longer the statable products, but the processes and toils of Le Penseur’s ponderings while he is still short of his goal, he unsuspectingly accepts these sweeping equations, “Thinking is Talking to Oneself in one’s head” and “All Thinking is Thinking in bits of Language,” though of course with his inevitable supplementation that Le Penseur’s thinking is not that deploying to himself in his head the words, phrases and sentences that he admittedly does; it is, rather, his cogitatively deploying, in orderly or disorderly processions, the objective, communicable Meanings of those soliloquized words, phrases, and sentences. These Meanings are for the Duplicationist those significance-cargoes that are carried indifferently by your French and my English internal locutions—though the challenge to exhibit to his Reductionist critic even one such cargo, prized off its French or English vehicle, is as usual unwelcome to him.

Well then, what do we do? We begin by jettisoning the vehicle-cargo model. A comprehended locution does indeed differ from that locution heard but uncomprehended; but not by being a couple of things apprehended. A thing said with a point and for its point does indeed differ from that thing said in delirium or by rote, but not by being a couple of things said. In owning a shilling I am indeed, despite the Reductionist, richer than when I own a
mere metal disc. Unlike the mere metal disc, my shilling has some purchasing power. Yet, despite the Duplicationist, owning a disc with purchasing power is not owning two articles, a metal vehicle and also a non-metallic, unpocketable yet marketable cargo. In owning a shilling I own a disc with which I am empowered by laws, regulations, conventions, market-practices, etc., to buy, rent, lend, tip, invest, repay, give change, etc., if and, roughly, whenever I choose. It is an institutionally qualified enabling-instrument. It is a disc that I can use in quite specific ways. It is not a disc and something else as well; and it is not just a disc; it is a disc that is complexly qualified for some quite specific sorts of transactions. The formulation of these qualifications would require not just some simple auxiliary nouns, simple adjectives, or simple verbs but a whole batch of syntactically variegated subordinate clauses. Imagine the shape that would be taken by your explanation to a schoolboy, how his Victorian shilling-piece has lost its purchasing power; or even by your explanation of what it is that it has lost.

In much the same way a word and its meaning are not two things that I acquire when I learn the word, for all that learning its meaning certainly is learning more than its pronunciation and spelling. I, in learning its meaning, am becoming more or less lastingly enabled to conduct with it, if and, roughly, whenever I choose, hosts of, inter alia, informative, calculative, recording, anagram-solving, and versifying transactions of quite specific kinds. The word is not a noise and something else as well; and it is not just a noise. It is a complexly qualified noise, a noise endowed with a quite specific saying-power, endowed sometimes by institutional regulations, generally by accumulating public custom, slightly rigorized by pedagogic disciplines; and so on. It is a semi-institutional enabling-instrument. It is something that we have learned how to use and how not to misuse.

If Tweedledum now characteristically grumbles that we cannot “strictly” see in the black marks on the printed page, or “strictly” hear in the syllables of the lecturer anything that demarcates a jumble of letters of the alphabet from a word, a jumble of syllables from a phrase, or, to generalize, what conveys from what does not convey a sense or one such meaning from another, we, remembering our referee and our Red Indian, can unanxiously reply as follows: “The very person who both can and does in daily life, with a few, but only a very few errors, confusions, or hesitations, make these disallowed discriminations of yours is just the ordinary reader or listener, like yourself (or in special cases, the expert reader or listener), who reads with his quite ordinary eyes the printed marks, or listens with his quite ordinary ears to the spoken syllables, given only that, like our referee, and unlike our Red Indian, his wits have been suitably trained and that he is here and now exercising these wits. You, having learned how, are now availing yourself of the printed marks or the spoken syllables, in your talking and your writing to others. Just so, too, you, in talking to yourself in your head, as well as in
talking to me aloud (unless you are just babbling deliriously), are here and now making actual use of words and phrases, grammatical constructions, etc., the mastery of which you have retained since you acquired it.”

But making what use? Precisely how is the still baffled Pythagoras employing the things that he is saying in his head or muttering sotto voce? This is our special crux. For making an entry in a diary is doing a very different kind of employing from reminding a colleague of a meeting, from ordering a taxi, from telling an anecdote, from cursing, or from willfully giving to the public a piece of misinformation. Our purposes in asking questions differ from our purposes in praying, scolding, play-acting, multiplying, and will-drafting. Sometimes philosophers speak as if behind all or most of our sayings there is the monolithic intention to induce beliefs in our interlocutor. But there is no such uniform intention. Sometimes we mean to amuse, reassure, or scandalize him, or to evoke sympathy from him; or to reprimand him; and sometimes it is to ourselves, and not to an interlocutor that we say things, and so on, and so on. But our special question is now this fairly definite one: With what particular intention or intentions, then, does Pythagoras “say” the particular things that he “says to himself” during those periods when he is tackling a still baffling problem? What is the point of the under-breath muttering which the thinker really is very often doing when thinking? What is the heuristic use of soliloquizing? There is no one-strand answer. The still baffled Pythagoras, in again and again muttering a geometrical phrase to himself, may be intending, by way of rehearsal, to fix it in his memory; or in discontent with its slack phrasing, he may be intending, if he can, to stiffen it; or he may be meaning to re-savour the thrill of a recent discovery; or he may be muttering with no intention at all, but involuntarily, like the jingles that run remorselessly in our heads. Yet a dictaphone recording of his mutterings might easily fail to betray which of these or other needs or automatisms explains the mutterings.

But we can do better than merely remind ourselves of these innumerable possible soliloquizing-intentions. A person who is trying to puzzle out by himself the solution to a problem, an anagram, perhaps, or a philosophical crux, or a statesman’s tangle, is, as Plato saw, plying himself with most of the same things as those that two people ply each other with when they are interestedly discussing with one another a problem of which neither has the solution. So let us consider some of the particular, easily avowable intentions with which you and I ordinarily say the things we say to each other in our live discussions. Neither of us is equipped didactically to impart to his companion bits of that wanted solution, corollaries of it, or premises from which it follows. Discussing is not telling and telling is not discussing. So what can be the heuristic use or point of the undogmatic things said by us in our discussion? What do we recognize as rendering this or that contribution to our discussion successful or unsuccessful? As we know, discussions do, some-
times, get issues settled or partly settled. Though neither of us participants
can pilot the other or himself, yet between us we may (though also we may
not), make steady or erratic, great or slight progress towards our hidden goal.
But how possibly can things that we say to each other in ignorance or perplex-
ity mend that ignorance or allay that perplexity?

Well, one answer is this: We can say things experimentally to each other.
Experiments do not necessarily succeed, but they do not necessarily fail. A,
without any conviction, makes to B a tentative suggestion that is new to B,
and this may (but of course may not) provoke an impromptu response from
him, which in its turn may elicit from A a new objection, a new parallel, or
a new followup; and this may promise, perhaps falsely but perhaps truly,
to prove fertile before long. Or B smells something funny in a thing impa-
tiently blurted out by A, who in his turn, now finds a trace of the same
ridiculousness in a point that they had both hitherto taken solemnly. Or
B flippantly half-draws from a hint hesitantly made by A a possible con-
sequence which suddenly looks like tying in surprisingly neatly with a
recently shelved surmise. Or A, having nothing to reply, frowns or wriggles
and so may induce in B an uncomplacency which may, but need not, make
him seek a previously unthought-of safeguard, or try a previously neglected
evasive action. Or B, bankrupt of ideas, tries just putting into different
words points of which both are getting tired, in the hope, sometimes realized,
that the fresh wording will suggest new developments, examples, or hazards.
And so on.

My focal point is this. The things that A and B say to each other, together
with their frowns and sighs, their chuckles and hesitations, their grimaces,
gestures and emphases, may all or nearly all be intended as experimental,
i.e., be things said and done just in case they may elicit fresh and even con-
structive responses, or flush old stagnancies away.

And now, what is for us of central importance, precisely the same can be
true of things that the still baffled Pythagoras unconfidently mutters in soli-
tude to himself, or dubiously scrawls and re-scrawls to himself in the sand.
These too can be heuristic experiments, moves made in the dark, in the faint
but not foolish hope that they may prove to be self-proddings forward. Our
question, “With what heuristic intention?” can have for its correct answer,
“In order to try out whether or not it has eye-opening, memory-flogging, or
clamp-easing potencies.”

In the children's classroom much of the teacher's saying has to be untenta-
tive and unexploratory because it is didactically-intended saying. The teacher
himself is in no darkness or twilight at all. But when he is interestingly discuss-
ing with colleagues or pupils issues the solutions of which, and even the
procedures of solving which, are still out of his own and their reach, then
he is exploring and not shepherding. Even his tones of voice are now unsure,
but questing. Philosophers all too often forget that not all saying is informing,
instructing, correcting, persuading, or reminding. In discussions, things said are said “on appro,” as things quite likely, but not certain to come to nothing; not told but experimentally mooted. They are like speculations, not investments.

In bad Whodunits the fictional sleuth’s mind is described as moving like a well oiled machine. Epistemologists are sometimes similarly guilty of describing Thought, or anyhow the Thought of Logical Thinkers, as moving in a clockwork-like goosestep via already certified premises that are already properly marshalled, to an unavoidable and true conclusion. What the logician’s blackboard displays in its symmetrical chalked columns is taken to depict the way in which something called “logical thinking” progresses. But this is another utter fable. Pathfinding is not and cannot be path-following. Pondering is precisely not knowing what steps to take, but taking tentative steps all the same in order to learn something from their fate.

Then is Thinking just talking to oneself? Or is it doing something Extra? Not the former, since Pythagoras might let his mind wander and just be reciting under his breath random and miscellaneous things like anecdotes, Spanish proverbs, lines from Shakespeare, jingles, and bits of the multiplication-table; and then he would not be thinking. But when Le Penseur is trying fairly hard to solve his problem, then what he says to himself, like what you and I say in our discussions of, perhaps, the same problem, is said, more often than not quite unsuccessfully, with the governing experimental purpose of trying by saying it to elicit some forward movement from himself. And this is not just saying things to himself, nor yet is it doing Something Else as Well. It is saying things to himself with a special governing purpose, with a specially directed vigilance, resolution, interest, readiness for failure, and so on.

Thinking, then, can be saying-things-tentatively-to-oneself with the specific heuristic intention of trying, by saying them, to open one’s own eyes, to consolidate one’s own grasp, or to get oneself out of a rut, etc.; and it is this very specific, experimental intention that is obliterated by the sweeping generic slogans “Thought is Language,” “All Thinking is in Bits of Language,” “Thinking is Saying Things to Oneself,” supplemented or not by “… and Something Else as Well.”

Consider for a moment what it is to do something experimentally. A boy experimentally turns a tap by turning the tap, and not by doing this and doing something else as well. Yet, it may be, though he successfully turns the tap, his experiment is a failure, since a power cut prevents him from seeing what happens when he turns the tap. Our adverb “experimentally” added not an extra action but the specific intention-to-find-out-what-happens-when-the-tap-is-turned. Notice that our adverb “experimentally” cannot reappear in this “when” clause, a fact for which our Reductionist as well as our Duplicatist cannot account. They had tried to tell us what pondering is, eliding that little knot of subordinate clauses, such as “… in order to …,” “what
happens . . .,” and “ . . . when . . .,” without which the notion of experimenting cannot be unpacked; no more than burglary, treaty-signing, or goal-scoring can deliberating be described in simple adjectives plus simple verbs, whether mundane or transcendent. What qualifies an undertaking as one of pondering or, not very differently, as one of discussing, is not any catalogue of simple qualities and simple relations, whether rude or refined, but some nexus of statable because statement-shaped conditions.