The aim of this essay is to show that the picaresque relied for at least one of its strains on the main tradition of satire—that is, on conventional relationships that can be traced back to the satires of Horace and Juvenal. It is likely, judging by the times in which the early picaresque novelists wrote, that they deliberately adapted Roman conventions to contemporary needs. A classical debt is only too obvious in their imitators. It will be simpler at this time, however, to limit ourselves to noticing a general similarity; certainly there are but few basic fictions available to satire under any circumstances.

1. The Fool and the Knave. Satire broaches three general areas of subject matter: the degeneration of an ideal, the behavior of a fool, and the behavior of a knave. They sometimes operate separately, but more often in combination. While the degeneration of an ideal is almost always at least implicit, it only rarely appears as the sole subject of a satire. When it does appear alone, the degeneration is conveyed by a static image, usually related to the Theophrastan “character.” The woman who has become a gladiator is juxtaposed with the feminine ideal to show what a falling away has taken place (as in Juvenal’s Satire VI), or the rake-hell is measured against the statues of his heroic ancestors (Juvenal VIII).

The basic polarity of an ideal past and a degenerate present provides a useful frame for the argument of a satire. But while it is almost always at least implicit, it only rarely appears as the sole subject. The reason for this is not far to seek: the only comment it has to offer is, “Alas, what a falling away!” A merely static contrast cannot demonstrate folly or knavery on the part of the degenerate. In order to portray either of these subjects the satirist must present (or at least imply) an act of some kind, and the act must be followed by consequences.

Satire is characteristically concerned with results rather than motives.

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Motives are too slippery: the final standard is invariably an objective one like success or failure. The satirist is, in fact, fond of showing up the subjective standard of motive or intention by the concrete fact of its consequence. The consequence can be either the effects of one's actions on other people, or the repercussions one's actions bring back upon himself. Satire involving transitive effects shows the agent a knave—an exploiter or aggressor—and satire involving reflexive consequences shows him a fool. A knave is only finally a knave by virtue of his impingement on the lives of others; a fool's actions are not foolish unless they are ineffectual or bring down upon him unpleasant consequences. The satirist even goes so far as to suggest that the knave is less a knave when his villainy fails or back-fires, or when he is punished; these consequences turn his knavery into folly.

It is possible for a fool to appear alone in a satire: a single glutton, his health worn away, his character undermined, his money gone, can exemplify folly. But a knave can never appear without a victim in sight. There must be a fool or an innocent for him to prey upon, or he becomes himself a fool, expending his energy on the air. An Iago can be evil in soliloquy because tragedy looks at the inner life as an independent world. But a satiric Iago, without an Othello, would be a fool spinning bootless plots. (He could still be an image of potential evil, but the possibility of a victim must be implied.) In his sixth satire Juvenal writes primarily about women, not about marriage, but he can define their evil only in terms of marriage or some similar relationship. He has to supply the women with husbands, slaves, or even neighbors in order to prove their cruelty and destructiveness. In the central part of the satire, where the women are without an object of aggression, he exposes only their folly: here they are drunken Venuses unable to control themselves, the prey of eastern superstitions, oracles, and charlatans. But once their husbands and step-sons are back in the picture, their folly again turns to evil, progressing from infidelity toward murder.

The commonplace is inadequate that distinguishes satire as Horatian or Juvenalian according to its gentle or savage tone. There is indeed a difference in the degree of severity: Horace's sons hate their fathers, Juvenal's kill them. Horace would have considered Juvenal's villains melodramatic and unreal. But the important fact is that Horace focuses on the fathers who are hated, while Juvenal focuses on the sons who kill. The fictions they employ are therefore basically different.

Horace gives his attention almost exclusively to fools. There is no real knave in his world because one of his assumptions is that deviant behavior brings its own punishment, that those who give the appearance of being knaves are in fact fools. Punishment, the most frequent consequence of
action in Horace’s satires, turns crime into folly, apparent knaves into fools. Anyone (says Horace) is a fool who fails to see his own best course of action, who mistakes a false for a real good.

Accordingly Horace shows the miser the unpleasantness that results from burying one’s money in the ground and spending sleepless nights worrying about it, when, in spite of all his care, the money that has been hoarded will be run through in no time by his heirs (Satire I.1). When the miser drives away his son, it is he and not the son who suffers; he is an exploiter not of others but of himself. The adulterer in Satire I.2 is not a wicked man, but a foolish one, and his foolishness is proved by his fate at the hands of irate husbands and loyal servants.

Even such a monster as the witch Canidia is shown to be a fool rather than a knave. In Epode V she buries an innocent boy up to his neck and starves him to death (food is placed just beyond his lips), her aim being to transfer his longing to the man who is not returning her love. Although she destroys the boy, we are given ample evidence that she will not get her man; her witchcraft has not worked in the past and probably will not work now. The boy’s curses point to an ironic similarity between the hopeless passivity of his position and that of his tormenter’s. Though immediately destructive, and in that sense evil, Canidia is in the long run ineffectual, as she was earlier in Satire I.8 when Priapus routed her and dispelled all her factitious incantations by a single vulgar, and natural gesture. Even the worst knaves, Horace shows, finally turn out to be fools. The detection of folly at the heart of apparent knavery, as much as the light carefree tone, explains the difference between the satire of Horace and Juvenal. As Plato phrased it, “ignorance in the powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.”

For Juvenal evil is a potent and destructive force, and it lacks the comic element that accompanies impotence. He is much more concerned with the effects of aggressive behavior than with its repercussions on the foolish agent. The story of the patron who sends away his dependents, gorges himself on a huge banquet alone, and after his meal has a stroke in his bath (Satire I), is an exceptional situation in Juvenal. In his later satires, as he adjusts himself to the benevolence of the Emperor Hadrian, he does deal (though by no means frequently) with retribution for the wicked. In Satire XIII punishment is shown to be an inevitable accompaniment of crime, whether it is imposed by a judge or by the criminal himself. But in most cases—in those satires which we think of as characteristic—Juvenal is concerned with a relationship between two people, and so with the effect of one on the other. One is the evil man, who, unlike
Horace’s harried characters, is unfazed as he pursues his merry wicked way. The other is either a fool or an innocent.

To understand Juvenal’s kind of satire it is necessary to relate his use of the fool-knave relationship to his use of the static contrast of an ideal and its corruption. Discussing Juvenal’s rhetorical structure, W. S. Anderson has shown that his satire ordinarily moves from a statement of a paradox (Rome no longer Roman, or sexual perverts with pious faces) to the splitting of the paradox into polar opposites of good and evil (Roman values vs. the corrupted city, or piety vs. perversion). The truth of the paradox lies in the fact that the society of the present does not repudiate the old forms but rather conceals its own perversion behind them, paying virtue the compliment of hypocrisy. Juvenal begins with amazement or fierce indignation at the paradoxical situation he sees before him, and then shows why it is paradoxical by separating the ideal from the corruption of the ideal. As Anderson suggests, Juvenal’s practice is the reverse of Horace’s typical method, which is dialectical: Horace begins with a thesis (wild spending), follows with an antithesis (stinginess), and then resolves his extremes with a synthesis (the ideal of moderate spending). Moderation is not ordinarily a Juvenalian ideal. He opposes black to white instead of settling for Horace’s intermediate resolution. Roman values, and the past in which they were effective, are Juvenal’s positive pole; the foreigner-infested present, with its mercenary values, is his negative pole. All that lies between must fall either to one side or the other.

My description might seem to suggest that Juvenal’s satires are simpler than Horace’s; they are not. In order to see their complexity and originality we must regard them as fictional rather than rhetorical structures. Juvenal only displays his positive pole from time to time as a sort of obbligato; he achieves his complexity not in his contrast of good with evil but in his portrayal of the various aspects of evil contained in the negative pole.

The series of metonymies Juvenal uses to represent un-Roman Rome consists of social relationships between two individuals. The relationships between husband and wife, father and child, friend and friend, emperor and adviser, patron and dependent—all of these serve Juvenal as paradigms for the degeneracy he attacks. Each of these relationships was once an ideal, involving reciprocal respect, duty, and responsibility, and was associated with the traditional coherence and solidarity of Roman society; by showing the breakdown of the relationship Juvenal suggests the general breakdown of all social conventions. In Satire III the failure of the relationship between the patron and his dependent is generalized to the ultimate case of the man who is beaten up by rowdies or crushed to nothing.
beneath a load of marble. The breakdown extends to crumbling or burning buildings and (for Codrus) sheer starvation.

The relationship Juvenal uses most tellingly is the typically Roman one between a patron and the poet or scholar who is his dependent (or client). The ideal behind the patron-dependent relationship stood ready to hand for Juvenal in the satire of Horace, where the solidarity of the Maecenas clique—the ideal relationship between the patron and his dependent—served as the norm by which the deviant behavior of bores and misfits was measured. In Satire I.9 Horace presents the basic situation of his kind of satire: a bore, attaching himself to the poet, tries to break into the charmed circle of Maecenas' patronage. The outsider makes a fool of himself, and solid Roman society shakes its head. In the antithetical satire of Juvenal the situation of Roman society has become reversed: the satirist, the upholder of standards, is himself outside society as it now exists. In Horace the deviate is threatened with punishment, warned of the consequences of his actions (ridicule, self-torment, mauling by outraged husbands), and so coaxed back to the fold of sensible, accepted behavior. In Juvenal the forces of chaos and vice are in control, and so they exclude the deviant satirist, the maintainer of old values.

In the patron-dependent relationship, then, the good dependent, who upholds the old standards, is simply driven out. There is no room for him. In Satire I, where the patron and his dependent are introduced to illustrate Juvenal's attack on avarice, the old relationship has deteriorated to the point that money is all that holds the two parties together, and financial support is merely a dole. In Satire III the old dependent is thrown out of the patron's house and his place is taken by the pliant foreigner or the "foreign" Roman. He therefore becomes the positive ideal of the satire, and the negative pole becomes both the corrupt patron and the corruptible dependent who has filled the gap.

Juvenal's fiction thus enables him to portray two kinds of satiric subject matter at once: the folly of one party and the knavery of the other (with a third, the degeneration of the ideal relationship, implicit in the background). The dependent who accepts the false values of his corrupt patron is a fool (as is proved by the brutal treatment he receives for his trouble), and the patron who imposes them, exploiting his dependent, is a knave. Satire V demonstrates the reciprocal quality of the guilt Juvenal exposes. The speaker is addressing a poor dependent, Trebius, who has accepted the corrupt values of his patron, and for whom the *summum bonum* is now a good meal. Trebius deserves the humiliations he receives from his patron, for he has allowed wealth to enslave him; and Juvenal points relentlessly to the consequences—stinking eel from the sewers of Rome and undrinkable wine, as opposed to the exquisite repast served to
the host. But the satire also catches the patron. If Trebius has sacrificed his self-respect and his freedom, Virro has set himself up for a tyrannous exploiter of his fellow Romans. The standards of Trebius and Virro are precisely the same, the only difference being that Virro has the money. In a digression Juvenal remarks that if only Trebius happened to become rich the tables would be turned—then Virro would become his dependent. Both members of the relationship must adhere to the perversion to make it flourish in its full degeneracy. Without a toadying dependent the corrupt patron would cease to exist.

Satire IX picks up Virro again and offers a savage parody or reductio ad absurdum of the patron-dependent relationship in the association of the homosexual with his pathic. Again the dependent, Naevolus, is essentially the fool in the relationship: he is not strictly speaking a homosexual himself (as we gather from his relations with Virro’s wife) but allows himself to fall in with Virro’s desires simply for the money involved, just as Trebius did in Satire V. Like Trebius he is mistreated and discarded in favor of more alluring rivals. But Virro too is something of a fool. In a sense Naevolus is exploiting his unnatural desires, both by taking his money and by doing Virro’s sexual duty to his wife (all Virro’s children are in fact Naevolus’). Virro is driven by perverted lust, Naevolus by avarice—and so they interact as fool and knave, knave and fool.

Another manifestation of the interplay of fool and knave in Juvenal’s satires is the husband-wife relationship. Only in Satire I does the husband maintain anything like his normal dominance over his wife: here he is shown pimping for her (however, there is no suggestion that she is a victim). In Satire II, as a parodic anticipation of Satire VI, Juvenal shows the perversion of the male-female relationship in the sterile conjunction of male and male (as again in IX). In the well-known sixth satire husbands (the fools, whose effeminacy Juvenal has already investigated) allow their wives to become dominant—to assume the masculine qualities that should be their own. They pay with their self-respect, their sanity, and finally their lives.

The fool-knave relationship appears at its most generalized in Satire III (“Rome”), in which the ideal is the true Roman Umbricius, who is fleeing from an un-Roman Rome to the provinces, where there may still be something of the genuine Roman values left. Opposite Umbricius is a fool-knave relationship between the present money-mad Romans and the foreigners who are exploiting them. Like the dependents in Satires V and IX, these Romans, because they accept the false values of the foreigners, are fools rather than innocent victims.

The rest of Juvenal’s satires use variations on the basic relationships I have discussed. In Satire IV he shows a council concerned with the prob-
lem of cooking an enormous turbot; implicitly contrasted with this is its proper concern with the threat of the Germanic barbarians. Within the negative pole of the satire the council-emperor relationship is itself explored to show the servility of the council and the tyranny of the emperor. The councilors are either fools or knaves in themselves (we are given a character of each), but in relation to Domitian they are all fools. In Satire XII Juvenal deals with the relationship between friends, contrasting the ideal of disinterested friendship to the false friendship of the legacy-hunter, and in Satire XIII the relationship between cheater and cheated (knave and fool at their most specific). In Satire XIV he examines parents and children, with the parents knaves and the children fools; but this knave-fool relationship, Juvenal shows, is capable of being reversed. The children can become knaves themselves, exploiting the parents who taught them how to exploit. In this satire, as in other late ones, Juvenal’s subject turns out to be Horatian: the consequences of bad conduct on the agent himself. His increasing emphasis on the positive values, on true friendship (Satire XII) and forgiveness (Satire XIII), also reminds one of Horace.

But even in those satires of Juvenal that focus on the bitter consequences of folly, the fool’s behavior is used as a reflector of knavery. To wish for wealth or power, he says in Satire X (“The Vanity of Human Wishes”), is folly: look at the consequences to yourself. Now in Horace’s satire a consequence would be to grow fatter and fatter, or perhaps to become a tyrant and therefore be hated by one’s sons. But in Juvenal what begins as the repercussions of folly ends as the effects of a knave’s evil. The avaricious man can expect to be murdered by scheming relatives or wiped out (his fortune confiscated) by a jealous king. While admonishing fools, the satire also attacks the knaves who batten on human follies. Juvenal’s emphasis is on the folly (and this emphasis distinguishes Satire X from Juvenal’s earlier satires), but the evil is always present—the fool is never without his knave.

2. The Servant-Master Relation. “Picaro” can mean a number of things. In its most general signification it is a series of episodes strung on the travels of a single protagonist. But as the story evolving from a particular ethos it can be contrasted with other episodic narratives. It presents a rogue (a picaro) who lives by his wits, usually writing in the first-person, and the satire’s distinctive tone is largely determined by this point of view. Lazarillo de Tormes (1554), the first and in many ways the epitome of picaresque novels, gives us one version of the characteristic tone, mingling naïveté and awareness, simplicity and cunning, moral obtuseness and prudential awareness. As an ironic structure embodied in a character, Lazaro does not see the truth, but his peasant cunning makes him see something close to it, and so his observations betray himself and his surroundings simultaneously.
For example, he dislikes the blackamoor who takes to visiting his mother: "But when I saw that our eating improved with his visits, I began to like him right well." And when the inevitable follows, he simply observes that "my mother presented me with a very cute and dark little brother." Then, as matter-of-factly, he recounts an incident when his little brother noticed the difference in color and ran to his mother, pointing to the blackamoor and crying, "Bogieman!" Lazaro concludes: "I, even though just a boy, caught my brother's expression, 'bogieman,' and said to myself, 'How many people there must be in the world who run away from others because they can't see themselves!'" He has apparently taken in the situation of his mother and the blackamoor, which has for him only a prudential significance concerned with having enough food to eat; but when he sees somebody who is black pointing in terror at somebody else who is black, his sense of fitness makes him draw a moral conclusion.

The discrepancy between prudential and moral knowledge becomes greater in the story of the blind beggar who, Lazaro says, "second only to God, . . . gave me life; and although he was blind, he guided me and lighted the way in my passage through life," which we can read as the primrose path (pp. 8-9). In the subsequent episodes the relationship between the prudential and moral becomes somewhat more complex, but the general gist of Lazaro's ironic role remains the same. There is no exaggeration of word or scene, only the repetition of incidents as if they were commonplaces, and the resultant impression of hopelessness is due to the discrepancy between the cold telling of the story and the ugliness of the facts.

The picaro's point of view is, however, only one aspect of the picaresque fiction, which was that of a man recalling his misspent life. The action began with the protagonist's family background, early childhood, and homelife before his connection with his first master. As Lazaro explains, "it seems proper for me to take up, not in the middle, but at the beginning, so that you may have the entire picture of my character" (p. 4). The middle was the series of relationships with masters as he moved up or down, backward or forward, in the world. The picaresque novelist most often stopped with the middle, as his protagonist sailed for a new life in South America or departed for a stint in the galleys. This abrupt end allowed for a sequel, but it also supported the illusion of formal realism, implying that life has no pat denouement. What appears to be a man's life, however, is in fact a series of discrete relationships. The most common idea of the picaresque is summed up by Edwin Muir when he explains its purpose as "to take a central figure through a succession of scenes, introduce a great number of characters, and thus build up a picture of society." And Ian Watt, even more to the point, sees the picaresque as a convention "for the presentation of a variety of satiric observations and comic epi-
sodes." While the form need not be more satirically inclined than any other episodic structure, it does serve as a convenient frame for a rogue's gallery of types encountered along the road.

The fiction of picaresque satire invariably involves, as in Juvenal's satire, the relationship between two people. The picaresque is constructed on the perpetual interaction of a fool and a knave or an innocent and a knave. The helpless, naïve, innocent picaro travels the road and meets men whose knavery is exposed for the reader by their treatment of him. Or he meets men whose folly he can himself exploit, thereby demonstrating both his own knavery and their folly. Or he is corruptible, a willing pupil for the scoundrel he meets, and so a fool to the other's knave.

The relationships Juvenal employed, all essentially that of a servant to his master, were based on the subordination of one party and the benevolence and authority of the other. The most significant people the picaro encounters on his journey are his masters. With them he engages in a sort of compact which involves a reciprocal responsibility that is lacking in his more casual encounters along the road. The master is responsible for his servant's education and welfare, and the servant owes loyalty and duty to his master. Every such relationship in the picaresque begins with the assumption of this norm and then deviates from it in various ways. One or both of the parties fail to live up to the contract (and the ideal).

The earliest form of the picaresque, in sixteenth-century Spain, focuses its attention on the master's obligations to his servant—on the servant's wages, so to speak. Lazarillo de Tormes presents a violent clash of personalities in which the master oppresses his servant until he is forced to rebel. The source of the conflict is partly mere cruelty, as in the blind beggar's brutal treatment of Lazaro. More often, however, the conflict arises out of the master's unwillingness to feed his servant enough to keep body and soul together; and so the satire centers around a desperate battle for survival.

The blind beggar is appropriate as Lazaro's first master because he embodies the world Lazaro is going to have to cope with: avaricious, cunning, mean, but vulnerable to a nimble thief. The beggar is a cruel exploiter but he is also blind. He has the advantage of strength and experience over Lazaro, but the boy has the advantage of his eyes. And so they go through a series of skirmishes that demonstrate the impossibility of the servant's surviving without cheating and eventually almost killing his master.

The satiric effect of the relationship with the blind beggar comes from the changes we observe in the servant Lazaro, who reacts like a chameleon, or better, a thermometer, to his environment. It is significant that, unlike Juvenal's dependents, the servant cannot withdraw from the relationship
in which he finds himself. If he flees one master, the next is invariably worse. He must either assume the role of fool to his master’s knave or die. In this sense, the picaro is anything but a rebel; he is, in fact, aspiring to become part of the social order with its security, comfort, and privileges. But this is not enough: in the conflict over food he must, if he is to survive, become himself the aggressor, exchanging roles with his master. He has to use against his master the very techniques of cheating and bullying that this same master has taught him. Lazaro finally repays his master for his stinginess by sending him flying into a stone post. He has learned his lesson, that in order to live he must become a knave.

Because the picaro makes common cause with his corrupt master, the ideal that is often physically present in Juvenal’s outcast protagonist is only glimpsed here in the picaro’s innocence as he enters into the relationship; once he is entangled with a master the ideal recedes into the past with the ideal master-servant relationship itself.

If the blind beggar represents the predatory aspect of life to which Lazaro adjusts, the canon, his second master (and predictably worse than the first), represents the Church that tries to feed men’s stomachs on purely spiritual food while hoarding all the material wealth for itself. An element of hypocrisy, lacking in the blind beggar, is present in the canon: the master now claims that by feeding Lazaro with good words he is nourishing him. In order to keep from starving, Lazaro has to steal communion bread from the miserly priest’s locked chest. He unconsciously reveals the ineffectual quality of the Church in his confusion between religion and reality: “God and my wits,” he says, are all that can save him from starvation; he calls the tinker who gives him a key to the food chest an angel sent by God; and he eats a loaf of filched bread “in less time than it takes to say a couple of credos” (p. 25).7 Again the relationship keeps pointing up how, in order to survive in a world where the Church does not let flesh and spirit mingle, Lazaro must cheat priests, violate religious precepts, and even wish sick men dead.

Lazaro’s third master, the indigent hidalgo, introduces yet another relationship, one in which there is no conflict between master and servant. But with the hidalgo the master-servant relation has completely collapsed, and the servant is forced to take all duties and responsibilities, including the payment of wages, upon himself. The hidalgo represents the gentleman class which through false pride refuses to lift a finger to work. Lazaro was never fooled by the canon’s hypocritical talk, but in this case he is overcome by his master’s gentility, his kind manner, his “misfortune,” and, never saying a word against him, earns food for both of them. The hidalgo’s character is gradually exposed through Lazaro’s growing awareness of his pecuniary limitations, and through the irony of his respect and
willingness to serve kind gentility. Only through the eyes of Lazaro, with his awareness of hunger, can we see the real arrogance, the preposterous pride, and the sadness of the hidalgo.

The object satirized is a folly rather than a vice, a foolish class that has cut itself off from reality; but the hidalgo’s exploitation of Lazaro is no less real because the master is passive and allows the glamor of a class to replace the canon’s and beggar’s physical coercion. Finally, although Lazaro is not unhappy with the hidalgo, the reader sees that in a sense he has allowed himself to become the same fool he was with the blind beggar. He has accepted the hidalgo’s values, though of his own volition this time, and so has allowed himself to be exploited. If the beggar and the canon are obvious social evils, the hidalgo, because of his fair appearance, his capacity for self-deception, and his ability to make others deceive themselves, is perhaps more subtly dangerous than Lazaro’s earlier masters.

The last chapter of the book, in which Lazaro becomes a knavish priest’s fool by marrying his whore in return for security, picks up and fulfills the earlier tone: he once again accepts the values of his immediate milieu, and exchanges a wife-husband for a master-servant relation. But in the fifth chapter (the fourth, seventh, and eighth are so sketchy as to add little or nothing) we are presented with an altogether different and simpler use of the picaresque.

Lazaro’s fifth master is a seller of indulgences, a charlatan going through his routine with Lazaro as his assistant. The servant merely observes his master’s behavior (his professional activity) and describes it: “And although I was just a boy, it amused me; I thought, ‘I wonder how often these swindlers defraud innocent people with tricks like this’” (p. 64). There is no friction between master and servant (Lazaro adds at the end of the chapter that this master fed him well) and no real interaction: while the servant reports, our attention is wholly on the master’s chicanery. He is a bad master not because he beats his servant or does not feed him but because he is a bad example, a corrupting instructor.

The emphasis, to the extent that it is on the servant at all, is on his service. Since the picaro is never quite so corrupt as the society he enters, he has to be taught the tricks of the trade, and in the process much that is underhanded is exposed and analyzed for the reader. The degeneration portrayed is not so much in the master-servant relation itself as in the occupation of the master into which the servant is drawn and initiated; far from useful or beneficial it is criminal and perhaps murderous.

Lazarillo de Tormes (in particular the first three episodes) is a remarkable and original performance which created a new vehicle for satire based on the old Juvenalian relationship between a fool and a knave. Its origi-
nality becomes apparent on a perusal of the 1555 continuation. This work (obviously by another writer) is also a satire, but it has returned to fantasy, to animal fable, and in particular to the Apuleian metamorphosis. Lazaro, taking part in Charles V's expedition against the Barbary Turks, goes down with his ship, but, praying hard to the Virgin, he is transformed by a miracle into a tunafish. Thereupon he becomes involved in the politics of this underwater world, which of course corresponds to the world above water. What sets off the original Lazarillo de Tormes from previous satires is its use of the careful reporting of contemporary life as its satiric method—the making of satiric symbols out of everyday objects and scenes; the ironic neutrality of its tone; and, perhaps most important, the involvement of the protagonist in the scene through a profession (he must eat), and so the interaction of character, profession, and milieu.

A second continuation, by Juan de Luna (1620), captures the intention of the original although it drops both the relationship between innocence and corruptibility and that between servant and master (except for Lazaro's enforced service for some fishermen who make money showing him as a "sea monster"). De Luna picks up his hero after the last episode of his marriage to the priest's whore and makes this the keystone to his character: his complete self-abasement in order to survive. Although Lazaro's wife marries again while he is off with the fishermen, the relationship between wife and husband, or rather cuckold, informs the whole work. When he returns Lazaro is still willing to have her back.

Picaresque satire, at least in its early stages, is aimed at professional, social, or even domestic relationships rather than at individuals. This basic relationship had been used in narrative satire by Apuleius in the central part of his *Metamorphoses*, but of course with little sense of professionalism between the master and his servant. In *Lazarillo* the interaction is based on the most probable of motives and the most inevitable of situations: the servant's hunger and the master's refusal or inability to feed him. The discursive structure and thematic connectives between episodes and characters, as in the *Satyricon* and the *Metamorphoses*, have entirely disappeared; and with them the fantasy of presentation has also been abandoned. Stylization appears only in the orderly survey of society as Lazaro moves up from beggar to clergyman to impoverished nobleman—from type to type; and the progression is merely one of increasing complexity as he advances from crude to subtle exploitation and from obvious to less obtrusive evil.

3. The Punisher-Punished Relation. As the servant-master relation is modified in later picaresque novels to include more and varied areas of experience, the most general and characteristic relationship becomes that
between a person punished and his punisher. Here is a passage that is monotonously characteristic:

... raising his fist high above his head, he came down with so fearful a blow on the gaunt jaws of the enamored knight as to fill the poor man's mouth with blood. Not satisfied with this, the mule driver jumped on his ribs and at a pace somewhat faster than a trot gave them a thorough going-over from one end to the other.8

The purgings and pummellings meted out to Don Quixote are tastes of reality opposed to his romantic illusion. His ribs are cracked, his grinders knocked out, his fingers mashed as physical reminders that herds of sheep are not armies of giants. In the passage quoted above, Quixote is being punished by the mule driver for seizing and manhandling his whore Maritornes, whom the deluded knight-errant took for a fair maiden come to test his chastity. Quixote's folly tries to make Maritornes into something she is not. The discrepancy emphasizes the squalor of the real Maritornes; but her squalor is nevertheless real, and Quixote's embraces would violate that reality, and so nature punishes him. The mule driver's blows say: "Look, this is real, you can feel it."

The serious practitioners of narrative satire, from Apuleius to Cervantes, to Fielding and Smollett, make violence, often in the form of punishment, the center of their satiric strategy. Even in the most abject hack writing that capitalized on the popularity and flexibility of the picaresque form, one detects in the flaying fingernails and the stones that shatter teeth a crude means of exposing vice and a general comment on a brutal world. A beating is a reminder of the supremacy of the real world over madmen's dreams and villains' attempts to confuse meum and tuum.

With Quixote the punishment corresponds to the desert of the individual, and is just—we agree with its conclusion; but with an innocent man it does not correspond, and we are appalled by the discrepancy. This is our reaction in Quevedo's Don Pablos the Sharper (1626) when the hero goes to the University of Alcalá and suffers an initiation. The students crowd around him—almost a hundred of them—and begin to spit on him. "Some seemed to be throwing their intestines at me—such was the length of their missiles; others, when they had exhausted their saliva, resorted to the contents of their noses..." They completely cover his cloak with mucous, and finally one, coaxing him to lower his cloak, spits squarely in his eye. Pablos concludes:

The hellish mob raised such an outcry that it stupefied me, and I, seeing how they had emptied their stomachs on me, thought that to save themselves the money usually spent on doctors and medicines, these fellows apparently were in the habit of lying in wait for new students to purge themselves on. After all this they would have liked to give me a beating, but there was no
place for them to hit me without carrying away on their hands a goodly portion of the slime that plastered my cloak, which, alas! was no longer black but utterly white.9

Pablos' reaction, typical of a picaro, is stoic, and our attention, sliding off this smooth surface, fastens on the frenzied attackers. Pablos' sober attempt to assign a reasonable explanation to the students' behavior (that they are saving doctors' bills) underlines the sheer pointlessness of their gesture. The fact that the condition of his cloak insulates him from a normal attack reminds us that their punishment lacks even the decency of a beating. And the description of the slimy cloak produces an image of the hazing students who have "emptied their stomachs" on it.

The satirist who wishes to convey his indictment by a narrative rather than a discursive structure must (if his indictment is very severe) employ a physical encounter of some kind, which ends in violence. He can show the consequences of folly in the punishment of the guilty, or he can show the guilty in the process of punishing the innocent. The latter topsy-turvy situation is ordinarily the more popular one with a satirist: its attack is less direct and less optimistic than the straightforward administration of justice. The picaresque satirist, however, places a heavy responsibility on all his characters for their actions; he delights in the punishment of individuals who are guiltier as well as more innocent than Quixote; the knave as well as the fool are elaborately and painfully punished in one picaresque narrative after another. The point is that punishment of the innocent produces a striking momentary effect and an appropriate atmosphere, but it tells us nothing about the victim and relatively little about the punisher (as even the passage from Don Pablos shows). Punishment of people with varying degrees of guilt can permit elaborate analysis and exposition of the public (professional) as well as the private aspects of a man.

Not too remote from Quixote is the dwarf Ragotin in Scarron's Roman comique (1651), who, aspiring to the life of an actor and the love of a prima donna is in consequence beaten, humiliated, tortured, and finally drowned. But whereas in Don Quixote the beatings point out the supremacy of hard reality over the hero's dream, in the Roman comique they represent an externalization of Ragotin's essentially mean and unheroic being.

Toward the end of Part II (1657) of the Roman comique, Ragotin has an unfortunate encounter with some gypsies.10 He promptly gives evidence of "his natural pride" and choler (he "began to be extremely angry, as little men soonest are"); then, showing off, he drinks too much (a little man presuming to be a big one), and when he is thoroughly muddled he sets off alone on his mule. Presently the drink takes effect: he falls off his mule, vomits, and passes out. A madman strips him of his clothes, the sun
and insects sting his body. The madman’s relatives arrive, mistake Ragotin for their kinsman, and bind him and haul him away in a wagon. The wagon turns over, dumping Ragotin in a muddy slough. He manages to get out and run away—“his body all besmeared and bruised, his mouth dry and gaping like to the parched earth, his head heavy and dull, and his arms pinioned behind his back.” He is again bothered by flies. He encounters some nuns whose coach has overturned and whose priest, trying to keep Ragotin at bay, “with a great deal of gravity and decorum,” asks him how he got this way. Ragotin answers “very saucily” (reasserting his dignity, though this is hardly the time or place) and adds injury to insult by toppling the priest, coachman, and a peasant into a river. They pursue him for revenge, and the coachman gets close enough to give him a good whipping, to escape which Ragotin runs into a miller’s yard, and is “caught by the buttocks by a mastiff dog”; attempting to escape the dog, he overturns some bee hives and is stung fearfully.

So much for “Ragotin’s Misfortune,” as Scarron calls it. To begin with, Ragotin is a tiny man who is too proud. He lacks the heroic quality of a Quixote. While Quixote in his madness tries to change the world, Ragotin presumes merely to change his own status. His punishments all follow from the pride manifest in the dwarf’s drinking beyond his natural capacity. His being purged, stripped, and whipped are steps in a return to the real Ragotin (not, as in Quixote’s case, to the real world). But the punishment is also descriptive in another sense. When Ragotin’s punishment is over, “A bear’s cub but newly whelpt, and never licked into form, could not be so shapeless as our Ragotin was in human figure, after having been stung by these merciless creatures, being swelled excessively even from head to foot.” The result is a burlesque of his affected shape in that it is formless and swollen, the very image of false pride. His punishment embodies emblematic images first of the ugly reality beneath his pretension and then of the pretension itself.

We can also take the example of an almost but not entirely innocent victim, the Lazarillo de Tormes of Juan de Luna’s continuation. He is forced by some fishermen who have picked him up after a shipwreck to pose as a deep sea monster in a tank of water, with a beard that is connected to an assistant below who can duck him whenever he wishes. In this deplorable state Lazaro is shown at great profit from one end of Spain to the other. His painful and humiliating situation is a striking image of man’s inhumanity to man in the name of the dollar, but it is also an image of his own self-abasement. It follows directly from his character as De Luna presents it: he has married the priest’s whore and will do anything in order to survive. References to his shameful relation with his wife and the priest are everywhere, and his passivity is contrasted
with the decisive action of her second husband, who learning of her adultery whips her.

The implications of the satiric device of punishing the guilty are clarified by a survey of its sources. A satire is said to “pillory” or “lacerate” or “blister” the person it attacks. The punishing of a knave within the satiric fiction was probably at first based on the belief that by a pre-enactment of his wishes the satirist could somehow coerce nature into making the fiction real; in this sense, punishment is a vestige of satire’s origin in ritual and magic. Certainly one source is the primitive satirist’s curse which enumerates the poxes and floggings he wishes to see descend upon his enemy. The satirist who wants to materialize the curse (and perhaps recall some of its vigor) must describe a physical chastisement of the villain. The ancient satirist Archilochus asks that his enemy be shipwrecked: “Shivering with cold, covered with filth washed up by the sea, with chattering teeth like a dog, may he lie helplessly on his face at the edge of the strand amidst the breakers—this ’tis my wish to see him suffer, who has trodden his oaths under foot, him who was once my friend.” Helplessness and isolation are not an arbitrary revenge; they describe the character of the turncoat who has cut himself off from human loyalties.

The curse itself derives from the idea that external appearance corresponds to inner reality, a diseased body to a diseased soul, and so (some satirist must have inferred) the marks of punishment will suggest the quality of the soul within that merits such punishment. A pox is both a painful punishment for one’s transgression, and an externalization of an internal corruption. As in the case of Raguin, punishment adjusts the false appearance until it does correspond to the inner reality. The punishment of Volpone (“to be in prison, cramped with irons,/Till thou be’t sick and lame indeed”) is a way of adjusting his physical condition to his spiritual. In the same way, Mosca’s limberness and pliability, his love of acrobatics for their own sake, are punished by his being confined to the oars of a galley. There is also, of course, a strong element of the therapeutic in punishment: besides the lash and the strappado, the purge and the scalpel define the distemper as they remove it.

Carried far enough these ideas lead to the belief that the manner of one’s dying defines the man; or, as Kenneth Burke has noticed, we say not that a man is “by nature a criminal” but that “he will end on the gallows.” In *La Picara Justina* (1605), dying becomes a logical extension of the satiric exposure through punishment. The author cites the saying “That People Dye as they Live” and the example of Diomedes, who fed his horses on the flesh of conquered kings, and was himself fed to his dogs by Hercules. Justina gives us accounts of the violent deaths of her many ancestors, each symbolic of the ancestor’s crime. For example, her glut-
tonous mother stole steaks and puddings; when she is finally caught, “for fear of a discovery, [she] cramm’d in half a yard of Pudding, which being thrust down too hastily, stop’d up the Passage, so that there was no moving forwards or backwards, nor could she Speak or Breathe.” The merchant interrogates her, “but she could return no answer; and the best of it was, that a long piece of Pudding hung out at her Mouth, so that she look’d like a Bear in Heraldry, Arm’d and Langued.” In suffering and death she creates the satiric image (actually an escutcheon) that sums up her essential character.

Punishment and death are terminal actions that round off tidily the vicious actions they conclude. They obviate potentialities and establish a fixed, complete portrait. Justina’s mother brought about her own end, demonstrating neatly that, as with a glutton whose satiety only increases his appetite, the crime is its own punishment. But this formalized, emblematic quality is partly counteracted when a second person is involved to do the punishing; and the picaresque emphasizes the punishment both as an action and as an emblem. If at one extreme is the portrait of Justina’s mother, at the other are episodes in the same novel in which much more time and pains are spent on the punishment than on the description of the roguery being punished. The latter are often glossed over or mentioned after the fact, while Justina’s punishment of them receives the spotlight. Such scenes are about punishment itself or about the clever agent.

The picaresque is at its most characteristic when the two movements appear together. In Alemán’s Guzman de Alfarache (1599; I refer to Mabbe’s somewhat inflated version which emphasizes the emblematic quality), there is an old hostess at an inn who cheats her customers and feeds them spoiled food. She has already made Guzman violently ill by feeding him rotten eggs. Two young fellows receive the same treatment and decide to pay her back. They take note of the eggs and go on to order a fish, which they eat; and then, instead of paying her, one of them throws the rotten eggs in the old woman’s face,
with Flowre, or a Flounder that is ready for the frying-pan; with a gesture so graciously scurvie, a looke so pleasantly fierce, and in all the rest so handsomely ill-favoured, that as oft as you shall but thinke either of it or her, you cannot (if your life should depend upon it) but you must needes burst foorth into laughter.16

The old woman might almost be one of the damned standing in hell for Dante's inspection; her punishment has all the earmarks of Ragotin's—including the obvious pain—but she is frozen in this pose by the vivid, figurative description. The young man's description of her turns her into an "old rotten Carrion," "a Mullet dressed with Flowre, or a Flounder that is ready for the frying-pan"; and she takes on the appearance of her own wretched food. The passage as a whole conveys a mixed image of pain, defeat, and dangerous defiance.

Nor is the suffering irrelevant. The ugliness of the hostess' suffering can be contrasted with the dignity of Quixote's or Pablos' (or later Fielding's Parson Adams'), which deflects our attention from the punished to the punisher. Ragotin's reaction (to run howling, and to lash out violently at the first people he meets) is closer to hers. Her suffering, like her punishment, expresses her inner ugliness. It in no way mitigates her crime.

Nevertheless, whenever one person punishes another guilt is diffused. The hostess' suffering, just though it is, does to some extent shift our attention to the agents of punishment, the young men. The author, Aleman, is particular on this point: the story of the hostess' punishment is followed by a priest's lengthy sermon on the evils of revenge. Thus punishment does not mitigate the absolute folly of the punished, but it does rub off onto the hands of the punisher. When punishment of the wicked is used as a satiric device the evil remains clear-cut; but very frequently the good becomes qualified and ambiguous.

The youths who punish the hostess are motivated more by revenge than by a feeling for justice, and so we are left with the impression of a larger fish devouring a smaller, not of the defeat of evil by good.17 In the Roman comique it seems very likely that anyone who had been attacked by robbers and abandoned on that same road (for example, Joseph Andrews) would have been treated as hostilely by nature and man. And so the punishment of Ragotin involves a double action: Scarron presents one man being punished for his crime (the emphasis is decidedly here), but also a second man exploiting his helpless condition.

The guilt of the punished and the guilt of the punisher are often balanced against each other in the picaresque. Guzman de Alfarache has the foolish notion that, by dressing up, he can seduce a lady of quality. Only too readily he finds a "lady" and carries an enormous meal to her chamber, where (predictably) he is interrupted by her "brother" who sits down with her to the sumptuous repast. The amorous Guzman is forced to spend the
evening hidden, appropriately enough, in an enormous jug “that had no water in it, yet was it not without some droppings, and a kinde of sliminesse hanging about the sides of it, and that none of the cleanest.” The emphasis is about equally distributed between Guzman’s folly and the lady’s exploitation of it.

Picaresque novels are built on this shifting relationship between a central character and the many characters he meets. With each encounter the proportion of innocence and guilt shifts into a new ratio. The appearance of either a purely innocent victim or a completely just chastiser is rare, at least in the Spanish and continental picaresque. When the picaro is punished he usually has been caught cheating or stealing; when he is a punisher of wickedness it is usually to exploit someone’s folly. At best he is a prankster like Justina, whose punishments are hardly distinguishable from the merry pranks of the German and English jestbooks. More typical is the desperate, ambitious picaro who is trying to get ahead. Guzman plays the moral agent only for the purpose of showing off his cunning to his master-of-the-moment, and Lazaro punishes out of desperation and exploits in order to survive.

Lazarillo de Tormes shows how closely the punisher-punished relation is bound up with the master-servant relation. When Lazaro’s first master, the blind beggar, smashes his head against the stone bull, he is punishing the innocent and so reflecting his own evil; but he also (as Lazaro himself recognizes) vividly demonstrates his servant’s block-headedness. And when Lazaro smashes the beggar’s head against a post at the end of their association, he is perhaps unconsciously revealing a connection between his master’s physical and moral blindness, but the action also reflects the wickedness of the servant.

The moral the beggar draws from the stone bull (that a beggar’s boy must not be gullible) is only too true: in the world of the picaresque, stupidity and weakness have become crimes. Lazaro’s revenge on the beggar is not so much a triumph of justice as a sign that Lazaro has learned the lesson of the stone bull. There are always two phases to the picaro’s relationship with his master: innocent, he is unjustly punished by his master, and, learning his lesson (which amounts to acquiring guilt), he punishes and exploits his master (or trying to do so is caught and justly punished). Pablos, following his hazing by the students of Alcalá, becomes a prankster and exploits others.

The motive force of this world is violent retribution or punishment. The simplest punishment that exposes an evil man implicates all the surrounding characters in a common guilt. The picara Justina’s father cheats his customers by selling too much chaff with his barley, until one day a victimized gentleman “gave him such a Stroke with [a half-peck measure]
on the Pole, that his Soul flew out into the Measure, and the Body drop'd down for want of it." But the satirist does not use the death of Justina's father only as a symbol of his character but as a touchstone for other characters, a jumping-off place for other satiric portraits. The family reacts phlegmatically to the death; the gentleman who killed him buys his way out of the situation, and the wife accepts the money and settles down to a dinner with the gentleman, leaving her dead husband in a winding sheet full of holes. The poor dead man is not even safe from his dog, who has been left to guard him while the others feast:

The Devil of a Cur smelling the Roast-Meat [of the dinner], began to Bark and Howl to be let out, and finding no Body answer'd, went to complain to his Master, who taking no Notice, he thought fit to whisper in his Ear, which being Deaf he gnaw'd it off, and lest the other should complain nibbled it clear away, and some part of the face with it.

Threatening to tell that the wife had thrown her husband to the dogs, the gentleman takes his leave; the wife decides not to go into mourning since it would be unbecoming (she is too fat), and because of the wintry weather they "carry'd the Corps to Church faster than he would have gone himself if alone." The act of punishment does not remain isolated but catches up all the people involved, moving outward in widening circles.

The Spanish picaresque posits a world in which crime is always being punished, but punishment is based on superior cunning or strength or luck, not on virtue. Only when Lazaro has shaken off his clouds of glory can he defeat even the blind beggar. If the old hostess were as sharp as the two youths who smear her with rotten eggs she would probably have punished them. It is a world with no moral agent to bring retribution, but either a revenger, a prankster, a desperate picaro, or somebody who, by the very act of punishing, succumbs to the degenerate values of this world. The characters act almost exclusively by prudential considerations, making no moral judgments on each other (Lazaro is grateful to the beggar for what he has learned from him).

The picaro himself progresses not toward a happy ending or moral wholeness, but toward strictly prudential knowledge. At the end he has learned how to survive: he is just out of the galleys, better equipped for more of the same, or he skips out for South America and another chance. His acquired talents are knowledge of how to beg, how to pick pockets, how to steal from a locked chest—as opposed to how to tell right from wrong, or how to find and wed the right girl.

The moral judgment is solely the author's. For the ideal we have to look not to the punisher or the punished, but to the ideal relationship of which the punisher-punished is a corruption: such a relationship as that between a man and a woman brought together by mutual love and
respect, or a servant and master held together by bonds of duty and responsibility.

The result is a singularly secularized world; a good priest gleams through occasionally (perhaps as much to placate the Inquisition as to suggest hope), reminding us that there was at one time an ideal. The picaro maintains a few shreds of his original goodness, which is the simplicity that prevents him from overcoming his masters with any regularity or finality. He lives in a world in which even the wise and good are forced to wickedness in order to survive. This world is in a worse state of collapse than is usual in satire: it is a shambles, standards all but gone, a place of desperation in which the best one can do is get by without hanging, and the best resolution to a plot is the hero’s settling for security without honor, keeping a priest’s whore as his wife in return for sustenance. But in such a grey world where no one stands out as good, no one stands out as remarkably evil either. All are on a lower middling level of behavior and so would appear real rather than evil if they were not morally judged.

The motif of punishment tells us a great deal about the directions taken by post-Lazarillo picaresque satire. None of these, except perhaps Don Quixote (and in England Defoe’s unsatiric novels), captured the sober verisimilitude, the calm, unemotional relation of fact that characterized Lazarillo de Tormes. They all picked up—or reverted to—some of the fantasy of the 1555 continuation, in which Lazaro became a fish and adventured on the sea-bottom. We have seen the transition from the matter-of-fact smashing of heads against hard objects in Lazarillo to the elaborately described and overtly symbolic punishments in Guzman, Don Pablos, and the Roman comique.

Recognizing the convenience and flexibility of the picaresque form, satirists tended to over-emphasize its satiric lines, turning it into a close approximation of formal verse satire. The diffusion of guilt as a correlative of the picaresque world became an expository device, a net for catching odd and various fish. Master and servant or punisher and punished represented no longer a relationship but an occasion for an elaborate satiric anatomy which catches up a whole spectrum of fools and knaves. Finally, the relationship between two people became the relationship between an eye and an object. A decided shift of emphasis took place from the master-servant relation to the master, or rather (since the master as such tended to disappear) to the character, object, scene, or place observed. With his fifth master, Lazaro simply reported what he saw and heard, coming close to assuming the role of observer. With this change, the narrative was no longer an embodiment of satire but a vehicle for it, a framework for portraits.


3. E. M. W. Tillyard believes that the picaresque “had to do with the under-dog, the little man, the fellow a bit worse off than the average, who has his adventures and troubles and somehow just survives” (The Epic Strain in the English Novel, Fair Lawn, New Jersey, 1958, p. 14). For a useful interpretation of the picaresque along this line, though with greater application for later picaresque narratives, see Robert B. Heilman, “Variations on Picaresque (Felix Krull),” Sewanee Review, LXVI (1958), 547-77. Heilman argues that the picaresque is distinct from satire: satire is “generically related to melodrama and therefore calling upon another area of aesthetic responsiveness” (p. 551).


6. Cf. Sherman Eoff, “The Picaresque Psychology of Guzman de Alfarache,” Hispanic Review, XII (1953), 107-119. Eoff shows that Guzman’s attacks on the established and entrenched are merely made to forward his own ambitions or to express his contempt for what is beyond his reach.

7. God’s role is a curious one in Lazarillo de Tormes: He is on everyone’s lips of course, quite naturally; but Lazaro’s constant references to him carry something more than the automatic sound of asseveration. God is part of his world, and is either not doing any good or is thwarted. Lazaro learns very early, like Robinson Crusoe, that it is good to give God credit, and pray to him, but that the only way to get anything done is to do it yourself. Cf. Robert Alter, Rogue’s Progress (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 1-10.


12. Cf. The Duchess of Marlborough’s wish that someone would “make me a caricature of Lady Masham describing her covered with running sores and ulcers that I may send to the Queen to give her a slight idea of her favourite”—i.e., what Lady Masham was really like (Bohun Lynch, A History of Caricature, London, 1926, p. 46).
13. Mary Claire Randolph has discussed this subject in “The Medical Concept in English Renaissance Satiric Theory: Its Possible Relationships and Implications,” Studies in Philology, XXXVIII (1941), 125-57.


17. The behavior of the second youth plays some part in the impression: he pretends to sympathize with the hostess in order to get close enough to cover her face with hot ashes. He reminds one of the treacherous student who persuaded Pablos to lower his cloak.

18. The Spanish Libertines, pp. 17-20. The incident is reminiscent of the story of Thelyphron in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, with “man’s best friend” replacing the witches.

19. Le Sage shows the reductio ad absurdum of the punishment motif in his version of Vanillo Gonzales (chap. xxi). Don Rodrigo de Centella keeps a register of all the injuries and injustices that are done in Florence (being informed through spies), and then notifies the injured that he will punish the injurer for a certain sum. He decided the case by precedent, strict principles of justice, and a list of appropriate punishments.