THE COLD WAR AND LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS*

I AM GOING to discuss with you today a subject very close to my heart, one of vital importance to the United States and to everyone concerned with our welfare and destiny. My topic is the doctrine of internationalism, and perhaps this Sunday afternoon faculty lecture series may be a fitting opportunity to mount the pulpit and preach an hour’s sermon on a gospel so widely shared among contemporary American historians and political scientists.

In today’s world it is impractical, if not completely impossible, for anyone who lives in our country and who takes an active interest in global affairs to be a thorough-going isolationist. The school of thought which in the disillusioning days after Versailles produced William E. Borah and other Senate irreconcilables has now been superseded by a new generation which realizes that American concerns no longer stop at the water’s edge. Today’s leaders see that a nation with our tremendous powers and potentialities can not be retiring, smug, and self-centered. The Joseph Kennedys and the America Firsters who opposed international commitments in the 1930’s and early 1940’s in the face of the menace to world peace posed by the Axis powers are now an insignificant determinant in the shaping of our foreign policy, although it is true, as professional worriers constantly remind us, that a core of diehards still remains.

The proof of this remarkable growth in national maturity (and I use that word advisedly) can be well exemplified by the careers of two able and well-known gentlemen from

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Massachusetts, both of whom served their country and the Bay State in the United States Senate—Henry Cabot Lodge, with his eminently successful campaign against American entry into the League of Nations and his unswerving loyalty to the blustery, navy-conscious Teddy Roosevelt; and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who since his defeat for reelection in 1952 has acted as a special adviser to President Eisenhower and has represented the administration and the American people at the United Nations. The lives of these two men represent the evolution of a broader approach and at least the beginning stages of a willingness to cooperate with other races and peoples, guiding and not dominating, with the optimistic hope that eventually we shall all be able to dwell together in a safe and sane world.

What has replaced the old traditionalist pattern of thought is a rising realization that total American isolationism under modern conditions is no more than an idle dream, in many ways a pleasant and appealing one, but still a mirage too costly and dangerous even for over-indulgent Americans to entertain. This is probably the most startling and radical change in the brief two centuries of our national existence. It is not necessarily a phenomenon which follows campaign platforms or election returns. Awareness of our present role and status is not truly sectional, for Gallup polls and the other much maligned samplers of public opinion reveal that the Midwest and the Deep South, regions once the heartland of dogmatic conservatism, are today much more receptive to an internationalist climate than in the day of Harding and Coolidge.

Nor is internationalism a monopoly of any single political party or any particular class or type of occupation, despite writers like the justly famous Charles A. Beard who like to
apply the neo-Marxian paint-brush of economic determinism to American history. Isolationists of many different backgrounds and persuasions once thronged on both aisles of Congress; and, until the depression period of the 1930's and even beyond, American labor unions and their most progressive spokesmen, such as Samuel Gompers, were rock-ribbed in their insistence on 100% Americanism. Our newspapers, too, are responding to the internationalist tide. Today even the Chicago Tribune and the Hearst press seem to be mellowing, as, to paraphrase Mr. Dooley, editorial policies follow the circulation figures.

I wish that it were possible for all Americans to agree wholeheartedly on a set course of action for our country, whether this might involve aid to Franco and Tito or a shield protecting the Pescadores and Formosa, and then to hold matters of foreign policy out of the mud of party politics; but this desire is doubtless too unreal and idealistic. Perhaps the millennium when diplomatic affairs will be above partisan bickering will never wholly arrive. Even in the darkest days of the 1930's and 1940's, when World War II was swiftly approaching, many short-sighted politicians were unable or at least unwilling to submerge their instinctive dislike of the domestic aspects of the New and Fair Deals. There was little unity on international problems.

Even in times of war and peril bipartisan statesmen like Michigan's Senator Vandenberg have always been in the minority; and the rightness or wrongness of diplomatic events has repeatedly been a matter of prolonged and acid discussion, as in the Great Debate over imperialism after the Spanish-American War or in the more recent instances of the Yalta agreement and the Truman-MacArthur controversy over Korea. Foreign questions make ideal political fuel;
and in this light it was altogether natural and inevitable during the heated 1954 off-year congressional race for the Democrats to assail the diplomatic framework constructed by Secretary Dulles and his aides, just as it was expeditious for Vice-President Nixon to stump the country defending the accomplishments of the administration in foreign fields. What is encouraging, though, is the striking resemblance between the Republican and the Democratic approach to external developments. There is much harmony across party lines. For all practical purposes there is no such thing as a new or an old look. Neither the donkey nor the elephant is isolationistic; both are outward- and forward-looking. The main differences are just in degree.

Much has been written about American diplomacy and the hands-off doctrines which for many years characterized our official governmental attitudes toward other nations. But few will deny that the passage of time does work miracles, even in bureaucratic Washington; and many shibboleths once considered sacred are now outmoded. We shall see that this is true of the original concept of our venerable Monroe Doctrine of 1823. It is just as true for the repugnance, almost revulsion, with which until very recently most Americans, and practically all politicians, have regarded any foreign bonds which restless constituents and opposition party soap-box orators could denounce as “entangling alliances.”

Yet today times have changed. Huge jet bombers laden with hydrogen eggs and guided missiles can now span in a few hours the oceans which we once considered our most secure cloak, covering distances in minutes which in the age of sail and steam required days, weeks, and even months. Russian prototypes of our newly launched Nautilus, with atomic power plants and an almost unlimited cruising radius,
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can wreak incalculable havoc with our vital shipping and supply lines and can quite conceivably obliterate entire seacoast cities. In the tense cold war being waged today the Arctic wastelands are no longer the immense impenetrable shield of muskeg and tundra which they seemed as recently as World War II, when Sitka and Attu were very much on the periphery of our defense lines. Alaska is no longer so remote as it seemed to the everyday citizen who scoffed in 1867 at “Seward’s Icebox.” Rather the frozen Far North is the highway of the future, as planes follow the great circle routes over the North Pole. From Arctic bases Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, and other key Russian cities are as much within the orbit of our strategic air command as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco are within range of Soviet aircraft.

This is not a comfortable or relaxing age in which we are living, and in which the free nations of the world are struggling to survive; but history is dynamic. Wishful thinking alone can not recreate the peace and security of the past. We must learn to cope with present conditions, adapt ourselves to the accelerated pace of modern living, and combat the haunting doubts and fears which harass any politically conscious citizen and which must constantly beset our leaders and policy makers. The position of our chief of state is an unenviable one, although a surprising number of people still want to be president. It is not surprising that our chief executives often feel the overpowering urge to escape, whether to a trout stream, a yacht cruise down the Potomac, a poker game with White House cronies, a Gettysburg farmhouse, or a round of golf.

Rip Van Winkle found many transformations in the tiny sleepy Dutch hamlets lining the Hudson River, but most of
these changes occurred in the midst of his magical twenty
year nap. Our world has altered overnight. Germany and
Japan, our major foes in World War II, are now among our
most consistent friends and supporters outside the Iron Cur-
tain. The Soviet Union, China, and their satellites were all
listed as protagonists on the program of the play which
ended its six year run in 1945, whereas today they are our
most bitter enemies. Many of our older traditional allies seem
more critical and more lukewarm in their friendship. We
even have a whole new school of American historians—the
revisionists. These individuals, many quite prominent and
renowned in their field, claim grandiloquently that World
War II was all a mistake; that we were forced into fighting
the wrong foes in 1941 by the war-mongering F.D.R. and his
left-wing clique of conspirators, who deliberately permitted
the disaster of Pearl Harbor to arouse Congress and the pub-
lic; and that it would have been much simpler and wiser to
coexist with the totalitarianism of Hitler, Mussolini, and
Tojo.

Much of this is second-guessing of the ordinary Monday
morning quarterback type, which is always easier after the
game is over; but surely the changes which we have wit-
nessed since 1945 surpass any of the diplomatic revolutions
which have transpired earlier in the history of mankind, such
as those preceding the Seven Years’ War and the defeat of
Napoleon at Waterloo. It is a certainty that future historians
—if indeed there is to be any future history—will take due
note of this upheaval in their textbooks. Under the circum-
stances it is not surprising that some people have, in the
colorful phrase of Adlai Stevenson, had to be pulled kicking
and screaming against their will into the 20th century. Let us
rather be thankful that so many have, and that our foreign
policies now reflect a healthier, broader willingness to accept the hardships and to assume as our lot the tremendous moral, physical, and financial burdens of our role as the leader of the free as against the slave world.

Our whole foreign policy must be world-wide, and the machinery of our Department of State must be revamped. All too often the various desks and bureaus have reached decisions for one region with far-reaching implications for others, and today there seems to be a need for concentration and coordination of authority such as that recommended by the Hoover Commission but stalemated and pigeonholed by Congress ever since. Our government, like everything else in the United States, is big; but it should not be unwieldy or topheavy.

Internationalism is costly, and no one likes to foot the tax bills; but as the British discovered during the 17th and 18th centuries it is far cheaper to buy a balance of power than to expend one's own armies and manpower wastefully at the wrong time and on the wrong battlefields. Much as we regret recent developments in Viet Nam and Laos, direct American military intervention of the scope and scale of the "police action" in Korea would have been infinitely worse. It was hard enough to convince our infantrymen moving out on routine daily patrols in the no-man's-land across the 38th parallel that they were fighting and dying to protect their loved ones at home. Dienbienphu was a tragedy which we were powerless to avert. No one likes a lost cause; and in our present condition we cannot withstand every peripheral move made by our enemies, though we must carefully gauge the prestige effect of cheap Red gains at our expense. We must deploy our forces as mobile reserves, like the Seventh Fleet in the Strait of Formosa; for were we to dissipate our
strength futilely we would be discarding the last great deterrent to another incalculably terrible world war. One can lose many battles and still win a final victory.

Despite our size and our rapidly growing population statistics, despite our economic strength and untapped potentials, we in the United States cannot depend on past glories or rugged individualism. Nor is the deep religious faith in human beings and their civilizations which is often expressed by Arnold J. Toynbee a fully satisfactory solution, although Christianity is our most persuasive ideological asset in this world of fear and uncertainty. Despite Rousseau and the romanticists man is not necessarily innately good; not all action is progress. We must work to achieve our goals and not rely on pacifism or fatalism. Both terms connote inaction; both imply defeat.

This is the setting into which I want to place the subject of this afternoon’s lecture—a world in which no nation can stand alone, a war of words in which both belligerents are striving frantically to win friends and influence people. Today more than ever before in our history we Americans must endeavor to convince other countries and their millions of inhabitants that the democratic society and forms of government in which we take such pride are the best way of life, the only logical means by which people have the opportunity to escape the debasement which communism entails. It is a global battleground, monumental in the degree of its totality. It dwarfs the array of forces aligned in 1914 and 1941. It turns the world into an armed camp in which geopolitical factors of all types are of fundamental importance—psychological impressions, raw materials and physical resources, and
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above all the sheer mass and weight of human numbers. We must today turn to others for help.

The old maxim has never been more true—united we stand, divided we fall. We must try to comprehend and even sympathize with the differing points of view of other countries and their statesmen. We cannot afford the luxury of a smug xenophobia. With a little reading and study in world history we can appreciate, although probably not admire, the neutralism to which Nehru and his adherents cling. We can understand the roots of the antagonism usually mouthed by the French national assembly at the European Defense Community or any other scheme embracing a newly rearmed and revived Germany. From our Olympian heights we may be exasperated by India’s failure to cooperate with our plans for Southeast Asia and her apparent preference for her powerful neighbors ruled by Mao-Tse Tung and Ho Chih Minh. We may feel that Premier Mendès-France converted the Geneva conference into another Munich settlement. We may dislike the trend toward appeasement which seems to be gaining in popularity in western European capitals; but the overly frank and devastating criticisms voiced in our press and the senselessly vitriolic statements proclaimed by some of our more vocal public figures (usually after a brief and cursory recess junket financed by public funds)—men like Texas’ own Tom Connolly or the late Senator Pat McCarran—are unwise and may in the long run prove disastrous to friendly relations.

It is a difficult and often a thankless task to adapt our policies to foreign problems. We cannot please everyone. Not even a Solomon could find a course of action for the United States wholly palatable to Israel and the Arab League in their boundary disputes and border incidents, or to France
and her turbulent colonials in Morocco and Algeria, or to Pakistan and India in the ages-old enmity between Moslem and Hindu. Nevertheless, we can try, curbing our impatience and our natural impulse to meddle where we are not wanted. Our share in resolving the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute and the Suez Canal question points the way to future settlements, as does the accord recently reached between Yugoslavia and Italy over the disposition of the thorny danger spot of Trieste.

We wonder at the seeming ingratitude of foreign countries which have benefited enormously from years of American generosity. We have contributed greatly to world prosperity and recovery, through U.N.R.R.A., the Marshall Plan, Point 4 assistance, and the aid to Greece and Turkey embodied in the far-sighted Truman Doctrine. We also have tried to alleviate want and starvation in distress areas throughout the world, with shipments of surplus grain to feed the hungry in India, the fabulous Berlin airlift, gifts of money and supplies to people everywhere made homeless by floods and earthquakes, and open-handed distribution of materiel of all descriptions no longer needed by our armed services. But we must recognize that these steps on our part are often cold and calculated acts of selfishness—enlightened selfishness to preserve our four freedoms and national existence, it is true, but nonetheless measures taken primarily in our own interest, not principally with the needs and welfare of the recipient at heart. Other nations are grateful for our largesse, but they know perhaps more than we realize what is the prime motive behind our munificence. CARE parcels or Bundles for Britain are pieces of propaganda which speak for themselves, but we cannot expect our dollars to buy the souls of foreigners just as endowed as we with a sense of pride and honor.
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We tend to become annoyed too easily at any show of independent thinking on the part of our allies and forthright leaders of the stamp of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-Chek. We become highly indignant when 10 Downing Street and its venerable spokesmen, Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden, express a willingness to trade with Red China and Redder Russia, recognize the Communist regime in Peking, envision the coexistence of two distinct Chinas, or call for a conference "at the top" without the sanction of Washington officialdom. Nor should we expect to purchase whole foreign offices with commercial concessions. Our tariff barriers often reveal our true sentiments more loudly and authoritatively. One of the many strange anomalies of present day America is the fact that the Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930 is still law despite the passage of two decades of the reciprocal trade agreements instigated by Cordell Hull and his successors. It is difficult to explain the urgent necessity of excluding Swiss watch movements or Spanish filberts or even Scotch whiskey from ready access to American markets and consumers, and it is next to impossible to reconcile the whole concept of protectionism with an internationalist foreign policy.

In this world of unrest and tension where can we in the United States find friends? For reasons of mutual benefit we can usually rely on the countries of the western fringe of Europe and the Mediterranean and the patchwork of states in the Near and Middle East, although perhaps this is due more to the menacing Russian divisions poised on the frontiers of the Soviet Union than to a conviction that the United States is always blameless in international disputes. Sometimes it is hard to realize that few people share our self-righteous certainty in the Simon-purity of our motives and actions. Our past is checkered with instances of broken trea-
ties, ulterior intentions, and devious diplomacy. We have betrayed countless promises and pacts made with our native Indian tribes. At least twice, in 1846 and 1898, we have countenanced acts of open aggression in wars which many onlookers then and since felt unjustified, but which Presidents Polk and McKinley, both pious Sunday church-goers, declared to be the net result of irresistible provocation. Should we not expect foreigners to distrust us? The lessons of history are not easily forgotten; and the picture of the expansionistic United States, greedily and covetously eying the lands and possessions of its weaker neighbors, is difficult to erase, especially in Latin America.

Our experiences in the not-so-united United Nations since 1945 have convinced many political observers that our truest friends are to be found nearer home—in this hemisphere, in Canada and the assortment of 20 Latin American republics south of the Rio Grande. This conviction is of very recent date. For many years the United States, the "Colossus of the North," in its blundering fashion almost deliberately seemed to woo the enmity of the Latins; and in this endeavor we made a resounding success. We looked with distaste on the illiterate, poverty-stricken, disease-ridden, unsanitary countries so close to our borders, as if afraid that we ourselves might become contaminated. We blamed the Latins themselves for their poor standard of living, heedless of the possibility that their mixed racial stocks, their Spanish absolutist heritage, their ignorance of the most elementary democratic procedures, and their traditional emphasis on a single staple crop economy might be contributory causes to their very evident lack of political stability. We did nothing to counter the appalling infant mortality rate which was more than counteracting their high annual birth figures, for the age of organ-
ized charity and humanitarianism in this country had not yet arrived, awaiting the income tax amendment and Treasury decisions that gifts and contributions to worthy causes could be construed as valid tax deductions. For their part, the Latins with considerable justification regarded *norteamericanos* as a gang of insolent, swaggering braggarts and money-grubbers, eager to exploit their backwardness and misfortunes.

The anti-Yanqui hostility so deeply ingrained in many South Americans and artfully fed by ultra-nationalist rulers such as Juan Domingo Perón and subservient organs of an unfree press dates from the 19th century, and helps account for the preferential treatment accorded European traders and financiers before the outbreak of World War I. Latin America looked to England for its shipping and manufactures, to Germany for its military advice, and to France for its culture and fashions. *Porteños* from Buenos Aires pride themselves on the marked resemblance of their beautiful capital city to Paris, and wealthy ladies of the *beau monde* like Evita Perón have for years been the best patrons of Jacques Fath and Christian Dior.

The United States did make a marked penetration into the profitable and almost limitless Latin American market in the lands surrounding the Caribbean, but the vast half of South America below the bulge of Brazil remained virtually isolated and immune from the concerted efforts of high pressure American sales promotion. Our businessmen might dream rapturously of selling a pair of leather shoes or a Sunday-go-to-meeting suit to every barefoot naked Indian, as other travelling salesmen and promoters such as James Hill of the Northern Pacific liked to figure the money which they could mint by changing the national diet of Chinese coolies from
rice to wheat bread, or, to use a more up-to-date simile, by providing a chicken in every pot and a car in every garage; but our great economic and commercial opportunities only arose when two world wars funneled Latin American trade into United States channels.

Our political actions did little to reassure the republics of South and Central America of our benevolence and good will. After much grudging deliberation and soul-searching, Henry Clay’s campaign for the recognition of the revolutionary regimes in Mexico, Colombia, and the Rio de la Plata was rewarded; but this was only after Simón Bolívar, José de San Martín, Sucre, Mitre, and other key military leaders had wrested their separation from despotic Spain and her power-mad king Ferdinand VII. By then independence was practically a fait accompli. Our lack of participation in the abortive Panama Congress of 1826 is a further indication that except for a few hardy American adventurers our early republican fervor had cooled to caution and reserve.

Moreover, for the next hundred years we continued to fail in the task of ingratiating ourselves with our southern neighbors. The Monroe Doctrine was the cornerstone of our policy statements for more than a century after its formulation in 1823 by the President and his energetic Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, in an attempt to forestall the supposed machinations of the reactionary Holy Alliance; but this essential core of our ideological paraphernalia was a completely unilateral proclamation, enunciated and enforced without the slightest attention to Latin American desires or interests. In the long and exceptionally detailed series of books written by Dexter Perkins, the eminent diplomatic historian who has made a career and life study of the Doctrine, the main thread of the narrative is invariably the whim-
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sical, unpredictable course pursued by the United States and its so-called Latin American experts.

Sometimes, as during the ill-starred Maximilian episode in Mexico, our State Department presented stiff protests to Napoleon III and issued belligerent warnings to other interlopers, decrying any semblance of European intervention or royalist dabbling in the New World. While unwilling to annex the peninsula of Yucatan ourselves in its perennial conflict with authorities in Mexico City, we managed to foil any transfer of the province to England or Spain in return for military assistance. We fulminated against Spanish intrigues in the 1860's in Santo Domingo and the guano-rich chain of islands off the coast of Peru. We extended the no-transfer principle corollary of the Doctrine to Cuba and the Danish West Indies when the spectre of a united Germany, hungry for colonies and world recognition, appeared on the international horizon in the 1870's.

On other occasions our government has remained strangely silent. Our policy has been satirized as "keeping the rain off Latin America with a British umbrella," in the guise of His or Her Majesty's fleet; and it is undeniably true that South and Central America took little stock in the Monroe Doctrine as an instrument of their happiness and welfare and looked to England for their aid and protection. Although we might resent, as did John Quincy Adams, the appearance of coming in as "a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war," we did lack the naval strength to counter or fend off any open invasion in the western hemisphere.

Much has been made of the innate hostility of British-American relations in the 19th century; and certainly many instances of ill-will and open conflict can be found—in the Fenian raids into lower Canada; in the apparent British sym-
pathy for the Confederate cause in the War between the States; and in Honduras and Nicaragua, where the two great Anglo-Saxon countries vied for territory and political hegemony. In 1854, for example, an American naval vessel bombarded the British-run city of Greytown, seat of the English protectorate over the Mosquito Indians, in retaliation for an unpleasant incident in which the United States minister was slashed in the face by a broken bottle wielded by an overly exuberant native.

Nevertheless, for parallel commercial and financial reasons our over-all Latin American policy in the 19th century usually coincided with that of the imperious George Canning and his successors as Foreign Secretary, culminating in the self-denying Bulwer-Lytton treaty, which another generation was to regard as "the most persistently unpopular pact ever concluded by the United States." We find upon close examination that almost all the major violations of the Monroe Doctrine countenanced by Washington with little more than a polite murmur were accomplished by the agency of Great Britain.

England encroached with impunity in the 1830's along the Mosquito coast and consolidated its holdings in British Honduras and British Guiana in a period when colonialism in this hemisphere ran counter to the prevailing political winds. Another case, nearly disastrous in its unfortunate long-range repercussions, occurred in 1833 when our country permitted Great Britain to annex the barren Falkland Islands as a land base for her whaling vessels. Argentina has never forgiven us for this act of deliberate omission, if not outright commission; and the tiny islets lying offshore from the estuary of the Rio de la Plata still appear on her maps as Argentine territory and still kindle the spirits of porteño patriots, much as do the
similar geographical expressions, Fiume and Trieste, on the Adriatic.

We have permitted European countries to wage war on small, helpless Latin American states to redress grievances or to enforce the sanctity of financial contracts; but once again England was usually involved as a participant, either alone or in concert with other creditors, as in the Mexican intervention which led to the short rule of Maximilian. Britain attacked Argentina twice during the dictatorship of Rosas. She was implicated in 1902 with Italy and Germany in the chastisement of the cruel Venezuelan despot Cipriano Castro, whom the forthright Teddy Roosevelt dismissed as “that unspeakably villainous little monkey.” This is not to imply that other powers were blameless in their designs on the New World. France gained title to the Swedish West Indian island of St. Bartholomew without our consent; and her troops set foot on American soil in the region of the River Plate and in Mexico. One instance was the so-called Pastry War, a desultory skirmish to secure reparations for alleged damages, in which the foremost casualty was the left leg of the colorful Mexican general Santa Anna, of San Jacinto and Alamo fame—or ill fame. For the most part, though, the 19th century was distinguished by a policy of laissez-faire toward England, with Latin American concerns subordinated to other considerations. The chief targets of administration wrath were the less powerful land-bound countries on the continent of Europe.

Those who argue that from the outset the Monroe Doctrine was a virtuous document designed and molded for the protection and betterment of Latin America find it hard to
reconcile sentimentality with cold historical facts. The Doctrine gradually became the agency and then the justification for northern intervention, and it has had a mischievous and pernicious effect on hemisphere relationships. We might talk in pleasant-sounding platitudes about a globe divided by its Creator into separate spheres, the Old World and the New, where never the twain should meet; but for many years the United States did not interpret the Doctrine in any way as a pledge of self-abnegation or as a sawdust trail to hemispheric happiness and brotherhood.

The Doctrine gathered dust from disuse until it was revived and expanded by President Polk to bolster our shaky claims to Texas and to California. Expansionism was "the great American disease," rampant throughout the pre-Civil War period; and Latin Americans eyed our insatiable appetite with understandable fear. Even the eminently successful treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, which stripped prostrate Mexico of half her territory, was not rewarding enough to mollify the greedy advocates of the all-of-Mexico movement, so that in 1853 we blackjacked Mexico in the Gadsden Purchase with another bite south of the Gila River to accommodate the construction of the Southern Pacific Railroad.

Nor was our land hunger confined to regions contiguous to the Rio Grande. Led by its Young America wing, the Democratic party tried to shake the ripe apple of Cuba loose from the Spanish tree, to use the famous metaphor found in many contemporary newspapers and journals; but our efforts met with no success. Failure was certainly not due to lack of effort, however, as the story of the 1840's and 1850's attests. Only sharp sectional divisions foiled Pierre Soulé and his fellow signers of the Ostend Manifesto, and volunteers from New Orleans and Charleston swelled the ranks of the hetero-
geneous armies of Narciso López and other Cuban liberators. In these same decades a motley group of American filibusterers under the spell of the notorious William Walker won unofficial governmental approval for their designs on Lower California and Nicaragua.

The period after 1865 has been dubbed "the nadir of American diplomacy," an era in which the United States looked inward rather than outward, filling in the vast empty spaces of our West and erecting the pinnacle of business wealth, strength, and consolidation which was not to topple until the crash of 1929. Yet expansionism and its effects on Latin American opinion did not die in 1860. Under Republican auspices we intrigued to obtain Samaná Bay and the Danish West Indies, or Virgin Islands; and our search for extraterritorial bargains went unrewarded largely because of Senate quibbling over the proposed price tags. With an eloquent outburst of fevered imagination Secretary of State Seward told an audience of proper Bostonians, "Give me fifty, forty, thirty more years of life, and I will engage to give you the possession of the American continent and the control of the world."

Later secretaries were more subtle. James G. Blaine, the plumed knight from the state of Maine, acted as peacemaker in several inter-American disputes; but his reaction was far different when a mob of Chilean rioters knifed a drunken party of American sailors on shore leave at Valparaiso, as they were carousing in the True Blue Saloon. Then, too, the real motive behind the first Pan American conference in 1889-1890, inspired and dominated by Blaine, was to promote American trade and business; and the bewildered delegates were treated to a whirlwind 6,000 mile tour of United States factories and industrial plants in order to wean them
from their customary European connections and overwhelm them with the size and grandeur of our country. Little was done to promote Latin American security and progress.

The 1890's ushered in a new age in Latin American relations, as the eagle of imperialism began to scream. For the first time the United States entered actively and willingly the realm of international affairs. Even mild-mannered Grover Cleveland, the foe of Hawaiian annexation, yielded to the political expediency of twisting the British lion's tail, authorizing his jingoistic Secretary of State, Richard Olney, to declare in a stinging dispatch to London, "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

This insolent "twenty inch gun" note nearly involved us in war over the swamps and gold fields along the disputed Venezuela-British Guiana boundary line, but eventually sanity returned; and providentially British attention was diverted to the Boer uprising in South Africa. Three years later, however, the voices of moderation were drowned out by the fire-eaters and war-hawks in Congress and by the hysterical yellow press. The belligerency craze resulted in the relatively cheap and easy triumphs of the Spanish-American War. At the peace table the United States gained Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and a tutelage over Cuba and its spacious Guantánamo Bay only thinly disguised by the Platt and Teller Amendments.

After perhaps the most acrimonious and momentous of the many great debates in our history the Senate accepted our new manifest destiny as a world power. The United States became enmeshed in a new web of interests and grew increasingly careless of the rights of its neighbors. To big navy
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men like Mahan, Lodge, and the ebullient Teddy Roosevelt
the Caribbean loomed tremendously vital to American strat-
egy, a Mediterranean Sea or Roman lake all our own. Our
big stick, "cowboy diplomacy" and our determination to
"make the dirt fly" led to the Panama Canal steal of 1903
and to a foreign policy refreshing in its candor and directness
if not its honesty. Then, as a result of the Venezuelan crisis
of 1902 and distrust of the mailed fist of Kaiser Wilhelm II,
came the ill-omened Roosevelt Corollary, which imparted to
the United States an international police power and com-
pletely transformed the nature and original design of the
Monroe Doctrine. We were now to act first to ensure Carib-
bean political and economic stability and eliminate the need
for European nations to spank Latin American countries to
collect debts by force or by one-sided arbitration.

With this legalistic justification successive administrations,
with bipartisan approval, proceeded to interfere blatantly in
the affairs of Caribbean states—Roosevelt in Santo Domingo;
the stalwart, portly, and amiable Taft in Nicaragua; and even
the anti-imperialist Woodrow Wilson in the negro republic
of Haiti, after the particularly brutal assassination of Presi-
dent Guillaume Sam in the sacred confines of the French
legation in Port-au-Prince. In each case American protection
brought many gains in public health, sanitation, education,
and internal improvements. American customs receivers and
financial advisers introduced a new sense of efficiency, hon-
esty, and responsibility among government officials. Native
constabularies managed to maintain order.

The people prospered; but so did the horde of United
States businessmen and investors who hastened to take ad-
vantage of the protection afforded by the State Department
and gain control of railroads, banks, and sugar and banana
One economic expert, Dr. Jacob Hollander of Johns Hopkins, collected $132,000 for his services in scaling down the national debt of the Dominican Republic, exceptional pay for any professor! The emphasis placed by President Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, on the substitution of dollars for bullets failed to assuage the restiveness of Latin Americans, who chafed audibly at the presence of marine detachments and the other trappings of American rule.

One might reasonably expect the administration of Woodrow Wilson to display friendship for the depressed peoples of Latin America, and his renowned Mobile speech of 1913 seemed to keynote better tidings. Ironically, though, Wilson's emphasis on moral rights and social justice, so well expressed in the idealistic 14 Points, only served to complicate our inter-American relationships. Our ambassador to Mexico during Taft's single-term occupancy of the White House had played an unsavory enough share in the series of bloodthirsty revolutions which followed the overthrow of the aged dictator Porfirio Díaz, but Wilson's impractical insistence that a government must always rest on the consent of the governed was almost as unfortunate. This attitude merely prolonged the anarchy in Mexico and provided a backdrop for shooting incidents at Tampico and Vera Cruz, Pancho Villa's sorties in New Mexico, and General Pershing's undignified and fruitless pursuit through the mountain wilderness of Sonora and Chihuahua.

Hitherto the United States had followed a policy of *de facto* recognition of any regime which had established and maintained its control, whereas the new concept placed our country in the unenviable position of a supranational judge with life or death power over foreign governments. Diplo-
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mation recognition does not necessarily mean approval, as we proved in 1933 with our negotiations with Maxim Litvinoff of the Soviet Union, and as we shall again eventually demonstrate when we reluctantly but inevitably admit the reality and existence of Communist China. It is difficult to ignore a state which dominates several hundreds of millions of people. Wilson was rescued from his Mexican fiascoes by an offer of mediation by the A.B.C. powers of South America, and public attention was soon turned to the problems of involvement in World War I. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that our earnest adherence to the United Nations may provide a solution for our present dilemma.

* * *

The tale of inter-American relations since 1920 is a much more pleasant chapter in our diplomatic history. Latin Americans renewed their demand for a share in the interpretation and enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, hitherto a monopoly jealously reserved by the United States. The Doctrine was specifically included in the much-maligned Versailles treaty upon the insistence of the Republican Round Robin; but our decision to remain outside the League of Nations made the United States more amenable to a policy of retrenchment and conciliation elsewhere, especially in the western hemisphere.

Both major political parties share the credit for this reawakened sense of enlightened statesmanship. Before any lasting trust and cooperation could arise, we had to liquidate and specifically renounce our Model-T Latin American policy of misunderstanding and ill will, and to create new institutions and procedures for consultation and joint action. In his Mobile speech Woodrow Wilson declared that the United
States would never "seek one additional foot of territory by conquest," and his acceptance of outside A.B.C. mediation was a promising weathervane presaging the trend of the 1920's and 1930's.

We salved our sense of guilt by voting $25 million to Colombia as conscience money for the Canal land grab. We participated in the premature Little Washington Conference of 1922-1923 with representatives of several Latin American countries and quietly abandoned the Lodge Corollary, which discriminated against certain foreign firms in the New World. We signed a general arbitration in 1929 which rejected war as an instrument of national policy and which also committed the United States to a tribunal where the justices would be arrayed 4:1 against us.

The Senate condemned the outmoded Roosevelt Corollary and its sanction of United States intervention in Latin America in 1929; and the Clark memorandum backed with the blessing of Coolidge and Hoover maintained in 1930 that the Monroe Doctrine henceforth was to be directed against Europe, not Latin America. We abrogated the Platt Amendment in 1934, thereby ending any pretense of open interference in Cuban politics. In the same year we withdrew our last marines from Central American stations. We freed Panama from her onerous treaty obligations in 1936, and the series of 16 conciliatory reciprocity agreements lowering our tariff walls piecemeal in the early New Deal period greatly stimulated trade in a depression era.

The government even managed to stomach the expropriation by Calles and Cárdenas of foreign petroleum land holdings in Mexico, despite outcries in the press that Mexico was turning bolshevist. Americans had invested heavily south of the border at the encouragement of Porfirio Díaz; but now
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our mining magnates, cattle barons, and oil companies were sacrificed on the altar of hemisphere solidarity, regardless of the outraged protests of the Sinclairs and Guggenheims who had multiplied their original investments many times over. Rather, through the wise auspices of Dwight Morrow, we increased our purchases of Mexican silver, stabilized the wildly fluctuating peso, and granted loans through the facilities of the Export-Import Bank as the Axis threat to world peace grew.

This olive branch type of diplomacy attained its height and its fullest development under F.D.R. In a typical ringing phrase inserted in his initial inaugural address President Roosevelt coined a now well-known term: “In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others.” Roosevelt correlated this good neighbor policy, which in itself was neither new nor original, to Latin America in a speech before the Pan American Union. F.D.R. was always deeply interested in Latin America and its cares. He even claimed authorship of the 1918 Haitian constitution while serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and his personal appearance at the 1936 Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires made a deep impression on the delighted Argentines. Roosevelt also disregarded the advice of several close associates by authorizing our delegation to Montevideo in 1933 to sign the so-called Latin American Declaration of Independence—“No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”

As war clouds appeared in the 1930’s, the device of frequent Pan American conferences initiated by Blaine was regularized and expanded. At Buenos Aires the delegates
agreed to consult if the peace of the Americas was threatened, and two years later at Lima specific arrangements for meetings of foreign ministers were planned. Accordingly at Panama in 1939 a security belt was drawn around the New World (although it was frequently violated, as by the pocket battleship von Spee, which was scuttled in the Rio de la Plata after sanctuary in Uruguay was denied); and economic contracts were signed to purchase Brazilian rubber and coffee, Bolivian tin, Argentine canned beef, and other products in which the United States stood in critically short supply.

The foreign ministers assembled again in 1940 at Havana after the fall of the Low Countries and France, the low water mark of World War II, when Great Britain faced the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht alone. They quickly decreed a joint administration for colonies belonging to countries overrun by the Nazi juggernaut and passed overwhelmingy the famous “all for one and one for all” principle: “Any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against (all) the States which sign this declaration.” Steps were taken to calm any sensation of panic and to counter the activity of fifth column saboteurs and propagandists, for several countries possessed large national enclaves of German and Italian sympathizers.

After the disaster of 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor nine countries copied our lead in declaring war immediately on Germany, Italy, and Japan. More followed after the 1942 Rio meeting of the foreign ministers, and by V-E Day even Chile and Argentina had unenthusiastically joined in the struggle. Time and space are too short to detail the gratifying story of
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cooperation during World War II. Latin America stepped up her vital contributions of strategic material—rubber, tin, copper, tungsten, balsa wood, and kapok. Brazil furnished us air bases for anti-submarine patrols and for ferrying supplies the short route across the Atlantic, thus speeding the D-Day schedule for our North African campaign, Operation TORCH, in November 1942. From the Ecuadorean Galápagos Islands navy seaplanes maintained watch over the soft western underbelly approaches to the Panama Canal. Brazil detached troops to Mark Clark's command in the Italian theater, and Mexico sent an airforce squadron to the Pacific.

Nevertheless, toward the end of the war the wheels of inter-American cooperation began to slow down. The United States was planning carefully for the projected U.N. organization so dear to the heart of Franklin Roosevelt. Latin America had no voice at Dumbarton Oaks, in the Quebec conferences, or in the wartime talks which culminated at Yalta. Early in 1945 we caused widespread resentment by bludgeoning six South American countries into a belated declaration of war against the Axis powers by threatening to exclude them from seats at San Francisco. The touchy Latins were nettled by the way in which their consent to our post-war designs was taken for granted.

Largely at the insistence of the Latin American states the United Nations charter left room for the operation of regional security systems; and the paper solidarity of the western hemisphere has been established by the Act of Chapultepec of 1945, treaties signed multilaterally at Rio and Bogotá in 1947-1948, and the far-reaching Organization of American States (O.A.S.), which was born at Bogotá in 1948. These agreements bind the signatories to mutual defense and to a pacific settlement of all inter-American arguments, such
as the recurring border disputes between Haiti and dictator Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. A wary eye has always to be cast at Middle America, the Balkans of the New World, for the countries of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica have historically been a constant cockpit of bickering and unrest, as recent headlines prove. All regional procedures must be exhausted before any recourse is made to the Security Council at U.N. headquarters in New York.

Under the Republican administration chosen by the electorate in 1952 Latin American relations have shown a marked improvement. Foreign investments, loans, and technical Point 4 aid through the Foreign Operations Administration have been substantially increased, enabling our southern neighbors to expand transportation and industrial facilities and to concentrate on the constant problem of combatting low standards of living. Our foreign policy has broadened from the almost completely European orientation which so disappointed Latin America after the end of fighting. Furthermore, our disillusionment at continued U.S.S.R. intransigence in exercising the veto on all important questions has made us treasure more highly the value of the large bloc of good neighbor votes in the General Assembly. President Eisenhower's vow in his inaugural address to place more emphasis and reliance on Latin American contacts met with an instantaneously favorable response in foreign capitals; and in recent months many efforts have been made to win the friendship of our fellow Americans, such as the popular tour of Milton Eisenhower and disaster relief shipments of food to Haiti after the tragic devastation of Hurricane Hazel.

Public opinion regarding the United States is still far from the attitude which we might ideally desire, particularly among the left-wing intellectuals and intelligentsia and the
militaristic and nationalistic extreme right-wing elements in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile; but there was remarkably little protest about the apparently decisive participation of our Ambassador Peurifoy in the recent deposition of President Jacobo Arbenz and his Moscow-inspired party in Guatemala. We should be relieved that the ghost of anti-Yanquiism has been laid to rest and be content that the vast majority of Latin America is well-disposed to us.

There are still trouble spots, such as the powerful chauvinistic Peronistas in Argentina; doubtless there always will be. But at last we seem to have learned the vital lesson of consulting the interests of our good neighbors as well as our own selfish inclinations. It is comforting in these days of tension to realize that we in the United States are no longer isolated from our most natural friends and allies. Man was not meant to stand alone.

**Edmund T. Peckham**