REALITY AS SUBSTANCE, PROCESS, AND VALUE*

The historian of philosophy who traces the development of men's basic ideas and problems is bound to recognize, beyond the specific differences of doctrine and method which distinguish the various thinkers, certain fundamental outlooks on reality. In some degree all of them have engaged philosophical reflection from its earliest beginnings in Greece, but the history of ideas manifests a shifting emphasis on one or another of these basic approaches to nature. Some interesting problems of interpretation are thus brought to our attention.

It should prevent initial misunderstanding if it is stated clearly that the three world-views listed in our title are not to be regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives but rather as complementary. Nor is the list of them to be considered as exhaustive. Their order as given here—Substance, Process, Value—is not meant to indicate progressive adequacy in every respect, from partial error to perfect truth of interpretation; nor on the other hand do they represent a mere variety of standpoints, indifferently on a par as insights into reality.

One more warning is not only needed but also proves useful at the outset of our inquiry. We should not neglect the interrelations of these different outlooks on nature, and also of some others that we shall have to consider. Goethe may teach us wisdom here in his two lines packed with meaning:

To reach unto the Infinite,
Distinguish first, but then, unite!

Prior to clear distinction or adequate synthesis, the early

* A paper read before the Historical Society of the Rice Institute on February 12, 1953.
Greek theories of nature reflected vague fusion of Substance and Process as fundamental principles of interpretation. We should note the varied and also somewhat indefinite connotation of the Greek term for nature, *physis*. *Physis* meant origin or birth and growth, the source or process of activity in a thing, how it arises and comes to realize its character and constitution. When this active principle was considered as the basic or essential element, *physis* signified the primary matter, the substance or matrix of which things are made. Or else the essence of things was regarded as their form or system of relations, and *physis* was viewed as the cosmic order and by extension the universe. The Latin term *natura* had a similar flexibility of meaning. It was derived from the verb *nascor* meaning "to be born," and so signified the birth or original production of a thing and also its essential substance and constitution, the orderly source and course and pattern of things. Might we use the term "bearing" to express this dual meaning: the bearing of things? Even in this verbal analysis the student of ancient thought may recognize hints of leading ideas in contending philosophical theories. Later thought has carried on this interplay of the categories of Substance and Process, of things and agencies.

The first of these views, which is here called Substance, is concerned mainly with the objects of experience. It regards nature as a sum or system of existent things or substances. It recognizes their teeming variety and seeks to describe their characteristic differences, but it does not accept mutiplicity and variety as the last word of understanding. It explores the relations of different things and their likely explanation as forms of some basic substance or substances. This problem of the primary stuff or elemental being marked the first chapter of ancient science and philosophy, in Ionian Greece:
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What is the world made of? The early explorers of nature were versatile in their cosmological ventures. They tried to reduce the immense variety of beings to some primary stuff, as it were in a chemistry of one element: water or air or some less obviously definable, infinite matrix of all substances. Or they emphasized the irreducible differences of things, in various doctrines of a plurality of elements. The characteristic nature of things was conceived by some of them not as matter or stuff but as fundamental form, and the world-order was regarded quantitatively as a system of calculable relations.

The basic view of Substance has emphasized a spatial outlook on nature, things located and related to each other spatially, expanding or condensing, joined or separated in space. The problem of change tended to focus on the recognition and explanation of motion. The atomists expounded as final truth their doctrine of a world of material particles moving in space. This view of nature as an immense system of substances is characteristic of our intellectual tradition, and of course for many purposes of description and explanation it has served very well. This table, these chairs, the walls of the room in which we are assembled, all of them exist in their substantial identity and respective location, even as everyone is out there seated in his chair. Our knowledge of things involves precise and reliable accounts of their qualities and relations: their shape, texture, color, sound, heat, motion or rest, and the ways in which the perceived stability or change in any of these and other qualities and conditions affect other bodies. This is a rough statement of our ordinary ideas of nature.

While this cosmology seemed obvious to common sense, its final adequacy was questioned by some critical minds in
antiquity and by many more in modern science and philosophy. It is in its way correct, but is it a thoroughly true version of nature and human nature? A serious objection to it has been that it yields a defective account of mind and rational activity. Socrates, to be sure, was an object in space, with his bones and muscles and the rest of him inside his skin, walking in the streets of Athens or sitting in his prison cell. But this account missed the main points in Socrates' nature and career: his inquiring mind, his power to stimulate and to enlighten other minds, his loyalty to his convictions that led him to remain in prison and await his death rather than to escape, though the gates were open. If we should try to explain these really important characteristics of Socrates in terms of moving particles in space, it would be, as Plato called it, "an idle way of speaking."

One way out of this difficulty has been to retain the basic view of Substance, but recognize two kinds of substances, some of them bodies existing and moving in space, but others non-spatial and immaterial, minds. This was the dualistic cosmology of Descartes which inaugurated systematic modern philosophy. Descartes was firm in his adherence to the mechanical explanation of nature; he regarded animals as automata and treated even human physiology as a chapter of physics. But he described rational mind as nonwise material or in space and distinguished it as thinking substance.

This cosmological dualism was directly embroiled in the problem of the causal interaction or other relation of mind and body. Descartes was bound to insist on the irreducible duality of material and mental substances, but our every sense perception and every voluntary action were perplexing instances of their interaction. This problem, as we all know, has engrossed systematic philosophers and psychologists
Reality as Substance, Process, and Value 45 through the ages. It can scarcely be said that its final solution has been attained. But it is of interest to note the growing conviction that mind cannot be understood as a kind of substance, and to consider the proposed accounts of it as a process and a system of activities. This advance beyond substantialism, beyond the doctrine of Substance, marked the developing course of empiricism and was explicitly realized in the Critical philosophy of Kant.

Before Kant, the traditional account of nature as a system of beings or substances had been criticized by Leibniz. Many thinkers, ever since Plato and Aristotle, had questioned the adequacy of a cosmology of moving material particles to explain life and mind and rational thought. But Leibniz questioned this cosmology in the physical field. The real nature of things, he reasoned, cannot be understood so long as we regard them in merely extensional or dimensional terms as so many substances or volumes of occupied space. A body is not so much a thing of a certain size and shape located and moving or being moved somewhere. Do you recognize a magnet if you simply regard its size and shape? A body is essentially a certain unique center or focus of activity. Nature is a system of activities.

The activism of Leibniz anticipated significantly some basic ideas in the contemporary revision of physical science. The growing ascendancy of the category of Time has required the replacement of geometric by dynamic terms in the description of nature. The most characteristic feature of our modern thought, as Samuel Alexander observed, has been “the discovery of Time,” and the view of things as ongoing in time has emphasized agencies rather than substances. In our day Whitehead has affirmed this principle explicitly: “Nature is a process.” It is beyond our competence or con-
cern to consider here the specific scientific evidence on which this conclusion rests. But we are interested in its philosophical bearing. Some religionists have derived much comfort from the modern dynamical view of nature, as though it somehow safeguarded spiritual values. It should be clear that the shift in cosmological emphasis from substances to energies or activities does not in itself confirm the reality of spiritual character in the world. Nature may be described as a system of processes, but processes explicitly and thoroughly mechanical. Or it may be regarded as an ascending scale of activities, from star dust to spirit.

Our modern dynamic view of nature is thus confronted with a problem similar to that which faced the earlier cosmology of substances. How are we to represent reality so as to give due recognition to all its types or grades of manifestation? If the variety of processes in nature is ultimately reducible to a uniformly mechanical character, not only biology but also psychology and all the humanistic sciences would have to learn their final wisdom from physics. But if nature is a hierarchy of processes, then the various stages or grades in the scale may well require radically different principles of interpretation. So the modern dynamical revision in physical science has not settled the perennial issue in philosophy; it has reopened and emphasized it in a revised perspective. Activism, the conception of nature as Process, centers its attention not on things but on doings. The words of Faust come to our minds: “In the beginning was Action.” But directly we are bound to ask: “What Action?” What sort of activities are evidenced in nature and in men’s lives and careers?

The issue before us has been familiarly stated as mechanism versus teleology. Aristotle insisted on final or purposive cause
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as a needed principle of explanation. In accounting for the course of events in nature, we should consider not only the stuff or form of mechanical operation of things but also their purpose. Medieval and modern theologians confidently interpreted this purposive or teleological aspect of things as evidence of God's creative design in nature. This may be called a teleology from above; it found systematic expression in the famous argument from design to prove God's existence, and it reached its summits of affirmation during the eighteenth century. These summits appeared sublime but were very precarious. The extreme teleologists undertook to explain the entire course of nature as a planned economy devised and directed by a benevolent Providence for the well-being of man, the crown of creation. Long shelves of treatises, unreadable today, expounded the operation of God's design in nature as evidenced by the study of birds, of fishes, of stones, of anything: ornithotheology, ichthyotheology, petrotheology! This pious exaltation of purposiveness ignored the limits of good sense and aroused a sharp reaction. Voltaire cited ironically the remarkable design of Divine Providence which directed the course of great rivers to bring them to the sea in convenient proximity to men's important centers of navigation.

Against teleology, modern science from the outset emphasized the mechanical operation of nature. This scientific temper characterized a number of distinguished philosophers, not all of them strict mechanists. Bacon preferred Democritus to Aristotle; Hobbes espoused and developed the Democritean atomism; Spinoza, while recognizing the distinctive reality of mind, explicitly rejected final causes as principles of explanation in nature. Throughout the history of modern thought this resistance to teleology has marked the various
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forms of naturalism. Firmly entrenched in the system of physical laws, the more extreme mechanists have sought to reduce all scientific accounts of life and mind to a basically physical statement. Feuerbach expressed this conviction in a dietetic pun: *Der Mensch ist was er isst,* “Man is what he eats.” Moleschott proposed to express mental activity chemically, in terms of phosphorus, fat, and water. Vogt described thought bluntly as an organic secretion.

Incomparably more important than the materialistic epigrams was Darwin’s reconstruction of biology. His evolutionary method was significant in two ways, both relevant to our present discussion. By his investigation of the origin of species and his exploration of the ongoing stream of life, Darwin shifted the biological emphasis from the description and classification of living beings, as in the botany of Linnaeus, to the explanation of the genesis of biological types and living processes. In philosophical terms, Darwin’s doctrine was a sort of biological activism. This was one important systematic aspect of the evolutionary theory.

The other aspect of evolutionism is also significant, but it has received a twofold interpretation. The prevailing view held by evolutionists is that Darwin’s method integrated biology with the other mechanistic sciences. By his explanation of the origin of species Darwin ruled out the old traditional appeal to design in nature. The vast system of biological species was explained in strictly causal terms as the factual series of effects of various environmental conditions on various forms of life. The limited nourishment or other means of survival determined the preservation of certain adapted and fit species and the extinction of others. Darwin’s survival of the fittest had no teleological connotation. The fittest in any environment were those that could and did
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survive. This statement was in fact as mechanistic as the statement that a bar of copper will be preserved when exposed to rain water which will cause a bar of iron to rust. While Darwin thus explained the factual survival or extinction of species with certain variations in certain environments, he did not explain in distinct terms how certain variations originate, and he regarded the problem of the primal source of life as beyond his province. Some later evolutionists have been more confident. Their mechanistic bias may be gauged by their response to the announcement by a noted geneticist that the mutation rates of fruit flies could be increased by exposure to X-rays and that these mutations were transmissible to offspring. The whole course and manifold currents of life could conceivably be regarded as a vast series of physical and chemical processes.

But while evolutionary biology, strictly interpreted, is mechanistic in tenor and is so intended explicitly by most of its exponents, evolutionism has not been without certain teleological overtones. The survival of the fittest has seemed to warrant the inference of a progress in nature. Darwin himself yielded occasionally to this tendency to give the evolutionary mechanism a finally commendatory teleological slant. At the close of his Origin of Species he wrote: “We may look with some confidence to a secure future of great length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection.” It needs little argument to show that Darwin’s evolutionary biology did not warrant his use of the terms “good,” “progress,” and “perfection” in his laudation of nature. His own doctrine taught strictly, not that natural selection works solely for the good of each being or tends to progress towards perfection, but only that under
certain environmental conditions certain results of survival or extinction are effected. We should not be so concerned to elaborate this criticism. The importance of this and similar passages in evolutionary writings is that they provide evidence of the persistently teleological view of living processes which even pronounced evolutionists share.

As is commonly familiar, the basic idea of evolution as development has proved to be a fruitful principle of explanation in the various humanistic sciences. While many workers in these fields have proceeded to mechanistic conclusions, others have seen in the complex course of civilization evidences of some immanent teleology. Some philosophers of evolution have interpreted it as teleological at the core though factually mechanistic in its detailed operation. Bergson's creative evolution and Samuel Alexander's emergent evolution are instances of the conviction that bare mechanics cannot ultimately explain the ongoing course of life and thought. The ideas of nisus, of productive tendencies, of directive activities, of progress, all signify a recognition of teleology in some sense.

This teleological outlook in the interpretation of biological processes becomes more common and imperative when we deal with mental processes. The activity of intelligence is characteristically concerned with meanings and values, and these transcend the range of mechanistic expression. When Darwin writes of the "progress towards perfection" in nature, his words cannot be comprehended in his evolutionary biology, but our evaluative intelligence understands them at once. So a problem is bound to confront the philosophical mind: How are we to expand or revise our view of reality as Process so that we may be able to comprehend, that is, to include and to understand its meaning and value aspects
which are manifested to us in our human intelligent activities?

The adequate philosophical concept or perspective which we need here must be one that connotes not merely events, bare occurrences, but meaningful processes, significant and valuable activities. The idea of mechanism cannot have this connotation, and in fact it explicitly precludes it. The idea of evolution would not serve in so far as it emphasizes factual causal operation, but it raises a demand for the needed idea as soon as we begin to consider evolution as a developing process revealing some significant direction and progress.

In our time Croce and after him Collingwood and others have proposed the idea of History to express the view of reality as ongoing, significant activity. Of course this is not the concept of history as merely the written record of some body of past events. Even here critical historians have urged, against the notion of a historical linkage of bare discrete facts, the idea of history as an interpretation of a progressively significant course of events. History in this philosophical use of the word is more analogous to what we intend to say when we speak of a person's life-history, that is, his unfolding career, what he is and has been achieving and has become through the years, what he has meant and means to himself and to others. Even so we may consider the history of a social movement, of a people, or more universally the history of mankind in its various significant expressions, science or art or religion. The history of philosophy is philosophy itself in its manifold self-expression; it is the utterance and the living reality of thinking mind, man thinking most clearly and persistently, most deeply and integrally.

The term "history" has been applied also outside the field of human activities, but with various shades of appraisal. We
speak of natural history rather loosely, to suggest an interesting survey rather than a systematic investigation of nature. Francis Bacon included in his encyclopedic project for modern science one hundred and thirty natural histories—of comets, earthquakes, floods, and drouths as well as of vegetable, animal, and human matters and processes. These were to be studies introductory to the scientific explanation of nature. But the more philosophical meaning of history, which is usually discussed in its humanistic applications, has been urged as significant also in the interpretation of nature generally. Natural science itself has been described by Collingwood as a form of thought that “exists and always has existed in a context of history, and depends on historical thought for its existence.”

The idea of history, philosophically reinterpreted, may well serve to express the value aspect of unfolding significance of reality as we know it especially in human activities. But there is another and essential characteristic of value which is not quite comprehended in the idea of history, namely the dramatic character of values as involving an interplay of alternatives. Factually considered, the different beings and processes in nature are not viewed as of different rank. While they may be distinguished, they are all naturally on a par. But the moment we consider anything in a personal perspective which reveals some value aspect, our minds are engaged in a relative estimate and eventual choice between contending meanings or purposes or ideals. Our views become issues. Each value manifests its meaning and its rôle in our experience as a contender for our preference and choice, contending with some related or opposite value. This so-called bipolarity of alternatives may be seen through the entire series of human activities, and in each case a certain value, while it may
be viewed in its field as distinguished from other values in other fields, is recognized and appraised more characteristically in its contending relation to its counter value. So we may consider the familiar alternatives in our experience of values: happiness or misery, truth or error, beauty and harmony or ugly discord, justice or injustice, virtue or vice. The issue is not always one of positive or negative values, involving good or evil. The choice may concern relative worth in a hierarchy of values calling for critical preference rather than emphatic approval and utter condemnation.

The term "dramatic" is used here to describe these alternatives which are so characteristic of the world of values. The idea of Drama has often been used analogically to express men's estimates of the course of existence. Is the drama of our lives a tragedy or a comedy? Horace Walpole's epigram comes to mind directly: "The world is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel." The pessimism of Schopenhauer exposed human life as a tragedy in its essentials, but in its ignoble details a comedy. In his vision of genius Dante contemplated the world-order and man's life and destiny under God's just providence as the Divine Comedy. In our time the Spaniard Miguel de Unamuno advocated a dramatic philosophy in his work, The Tragic Sense of Life. William James in a well-known passage portrayed our existence dramatically as a struggle of values: "It feels like a real fight,—as if there were something really wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulness, are needed to redeem." Hartley Burr Alexander wrote a brilliant essay on "Drama as a Cosmic Category." Our brief discussion does not claim to be exhaustive. It is meant to reaffirm the significance of including Drama, the dramatic perspective, as one of the basic views of reality which philosophy should
include in its accounts of the world, the recognition of human experience and its values.

Philosophical activism, emphasizing Process as the fundamental aspect of reality, should not be reluctant to consider the ultimate implications of Drama. Drama meant originally action, a way of doing. The dramatic view of life revealed an interplay and a struggle of active rôles of which the plays on the stage were artistic reënactments. The Greek anthropomorphic imagination personalized the counterplay of values even as it personalized the aspects and forces of nature and the various cosmic agencies in its pantheon and mythology. Philosophical reflection outgrew mythology and anthropomorphism, but it was confronted in its turn with the problems which have never ceased to engross moral, artistic, and religious insight. The visions of poets and saints are themselves experiences which the philosopher must understand and integrate with the rest of his account of reality. A thorough philosophy must be one that comprehends poetry and religion as adequately as it comprehends the physical sciences.

It has been said that as poetic genius reaches its greatest achievement it strikes the tragic note. For tragedy expresses most emphatically the struggle of values in which men’s lives are embroiled. Values are manifested in any situation or process seen in a personal perspective, where desires or beliefs or ideals or wills are involved. We may adapt the wisdom of the Stoic sages to our present discussion: tragedy arises when a certain temper and will are brought to bear on certain conditions and events. The crisis that eventuates may be a struggle of the human will with something wild in the universe, as James wrote, or a clash with other wills that cross it, or it may be a tension in the will itself, a personality self-
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trending in the crisis of counter-motives. Greek tragedy portrayed the conflict between a will heroic but faulty in some important respect and the cosmic order of necessity or august right, Nemesis with its inevitable doom. Modern tragedy has emphasized the crisis in character itself, the wrenching of the will's career by callous circumstance, where one's purposes are flouted by one's own desires or spurned by a dull or hostile society. But in all these cases tragedy has expressed in an intense form the essentially dramatic nature of value as a counteraction of alternatives.

We should remember that tragedy was religious in its ancient motives, and in its modern themes also the religious strain has persisted in some form. Religion throughout its history has expressed in various ways men's conviction of the supreme reality of the highest values. This conviction has been men's faith in God. But against these highest and holy values religion has also centered its attention on the callous, the corrupt, and the hostile, on evil powers and principalities, sinful in human lives, titanic or satanic in the cosmic scheme. This is the abysmal problem of evil which has divided religions and philosophies, with their rival solutions and their common quandaries.

The significance of Drama as a basic view of reality is shown by the tendency of both theology and philosophy to give their dramatic value judgments a metaphysical connotation. The supreme in value has been viewed as the most real, the first principle and the finally prevailing. The antithesis, God and Matter, represented to Plato not only the contrast of rational good and bodily-sensual evil but also the supreme reality of Divine Reason over against the misleading appearance and non-being of material existence. Before the age of Plato, Gotama Buddha had traced the origin of evil in
the deluded self-engrossment of men, and taught salvation through enlightenment. Man can be delivered from evil and misery only as he is delivered from ignorance, as he realizes that his ego is impermanent like froth, and that truth, reality, and blessedness are to be reached in the eternal peace of Nirvana: a religious and a metaphysical surcease. Zoroastrianism regarded the whole world-process and all men’s lives as locked in the dualism of good and evil: light and darkness, truth and falsehood, purity and corruption, life and death. The evil powers were seen as world-wide, old as creation, but the Zoroastrian did not admit their final reality. A great day of destiny was surely coming when the good God Ahura-Mazda would overcome and utterly destroy the fiend Ahriman and his evil cohorts. Christian theology reveals a similar balancing of motives. The world with all therein is the creation of perfect Omnipotence, but is it not Satan’s realm, a world of corruption and sin? Yet it is also the stage of the divine drama of redemption, tragic in its enactment through the ages, sublime in its ultimately consummation. Without the flame of religious utterance, Leibniz expressed this dual theological-metaphysical conviction: “God is infinite, and the devil is limited.”

In our discussion so far the moral viewpoint has not been considered explicitly, and yet it must be clear that the conflicting alternatives which we have noted in tragedy and in religion imply decidedly moral issues. This whole dramatic view of man’s life and of man’s world is an ethical outlook. Our deliberation, unsettled and then confirmed preference, choice, and action—the entire course of a characteristic moral experience is concerned with alternative values, rival desires or interests or purposes and ideals. There is, to be sure, a process of factual determination here. A man’s past experi-
ence has formed habits and tendencies which may seem to operate with almost causal necessity in a new situation. But personality is never quite summed up in any simple deterministic formula. The moral crisis engages the self in contending directions. His eventual course and character is at issue, what he is to be and to become. This complex interplay and reconstitution of personality is the drama of moral experience. The free self-determination which it reveals is in each case a concrete expression of the creative strain in the world of values. Without it, we could hardly see how moral choices really mattered. The serious view of morality signifies that a contest of real import is involved in each moral decision. The agent’s own character and career, the well-being of society, and in more ultimate ramifications the whole cosmic system of values are concerned in every moral act. It is not indifferent; it always matters: this is the note of an alert morality. Within a man’s range of experience, his every moral crisis is his Gethsemane, in which he may be denying or reaffirming, betraying or redeeming the higher values. This moral insight is at the root of duty and responsibility.

Moral experience here manifests the creative power of intelligence which is revealed also in poetic or in theoretical activity. Aristotle regarded the intellectual virtues as the highest, for in their contemplative perfection a man is most nearly godlike. God’s reason, as Aristotle called it, is poetic, creative, and man’s moral experience is also in its degree a creative realization of values. We may apply to men’s moral decisions the words of Goethe’s heavenly mystic choir:

The Unattainable
Here is achieved.

We have only glanced here at several aspects of reality which have engaged men’s critical reflection. The progres-
sive development of philosophy has been marked by its alertness to various perspectives of interpretation and also by its concern to avoid onesidedness and to achieve integral correlation and synthesis of standpoints. This dual purpose should continue to guide philosophic thought. We should neither overcomplicate nor oversimplify our cosmic problem. Philosophy, like science, views and must view the world as intelligible. Our basic conviction here may be expressed in Hegel's words: "The secret nature of the universe has no power in itself which could offer permanent resistance to the courage of science." But we should also apply to our interpretation of nature the words of the Fourth Gospel: "In my Father's house are many mansions." Nature also is a manifold system; it has many mansions. We should explore them all, and as someone has remarked, we should remember that they are not all on the same level. The fundamental cosmic categories are different and complementary ways in which reality can be viewed and interpreted.

Substance and process are two such fundamental aspects, and our factual account of nature seems to involve our continual shift from one to the other. But it is when we undertake to understand and to express adequately the nature of the process of being that we come to realize more fully the range of reality. It can be viewed, first, as a vast causal mechanism. The exploration of all its intricate objects, conditions, and connections, with the formulation of the principles of their various uniformities, forms the impressive system of the physical sciences. Related to this mechanistic outlook on nature, but raising important new problems, is the evolutionary view which has proved epoch-making in biology and has also been fruitful in its extension to other fields. Its application to the humanistic sciences has disclosed both the
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essential correlation of all living processes and also the distinctive characteristics of human intelligent activities. In the interpretation of men's lives, individual and social, the viewpoint of evolution is inadequate if its mechanistic aspect is emphasized. Evolution here points to history as the more fruitful category and principle of humanistic interpretation: the view of human lives as significant processes in which values are pursued and realized. This view of reality as a vast process of significance and values which is especially manifested in human lives can be interpreted even more fruitfully by the category of drama. It reveals to us essential characteristics of poetic, religious, and moral experience. While men have often spoken figuratively of the drama of existence, its tragedy or its comic aspects, the more thorough analysis and use of drama as a principle of basic interpretation is an important task for philosophy, with real promise for its effective execution.

The tentative character of this essay is evident and need not be pointed out. It is to be regarded as a brief outline of more extensive work on which the writer is engaged. If any closing word is needed at this point, it is by way of a plea for a critical correlation of philosophical standpoints. A really scientific, that is, knowledge-yielding philosophy must be one which avoids abstract onesidedness and unwarranted exclusion of important aspects of nature and human experience. And it must be one which does not confuse the basic views of reality, but recognizes the significance of each view or aspect in its relevant perspective.

Radoslav A. Tsanoff