ADDENDUM

AFTER the foregoing was written, the Cleveland Council on World Affairs held its memorable institute, "Report From the World," on January 9, 10, 11, 1947. Most of the statements on American foreign policy showed no deviation from the foregoing analysis of the third lecture. Mr. Byrnes' last address as secretary of state was a summary of his stewardship which had been previously stated, and thus included no major change which would influence earlier conclusions on American foreign policy.

Senator Vandenberg, on the other hand, differed in certain respects from the American foreign policy which had been followed. In view of his peculiarly important position as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it seems worth while to add his statements which show some deviation from the policy which had been followed. They are quoted rather fully in order to avoid the danger of lifting disconnected sentences from their context.

I believe the United States, in enlightened self-interest, will do everything within its power to sustain organized international defense against aggression; to promote democracy and human rights and fundamental freedoms; and, through international cooperation, to seek peace with justice in a free world of free men.

We have embraced the United Nations as the heart and core of united, unpartisan American foreign policy. We shall be faithful to the letter and spirit of these obligations. In my view, this will be true no matter what Administration sits in Washington; and it will remain true to whatever extent the United Nations themselves are faithful to our common pledge.

Meanwhile it [the United Nations] is definitely beset by hazards. For example, the necessity for unanimity among the five Great Powers is both strength and weakness to its arm. Strength—because these Great Powers when united are invincible. Weakness—because the excessive use of the veto, particularly in respect to the pacific settlement of disputes, can re-
duce the whole system to a mockery. It is much too early to talk about major surgery on the Charter itself. But I hope all the Great Powers will voluntarily join in a new procedural interpretation of the Charter to exempt all phases of pacific settlements from what, in such instances, makes of the veto a stultifying checkmate. I pose this as a test of international good-faith. . . .

I spoke of disarmament. No other peace factor is of such vitality; and none could better typify America's attitude toward peace and the world. We are prepared to disarm (1) to whatever extent other powers are dependably ready to make comparable, permanent and effective renunciations; or (2) in whatever degree the United Nations and its cooperative military resources prove hereafter to offer a reliable substitute. It is our dearest dream. But we shall not "dream" ourselves into a nightmare. We shall not disarm alone. We shall not trust to the persuasion of our example. We tried that once before. We shall take no "sweetness and light" for granted in a world where there is still too much "iron curtain." We shall not trust alone to fickle words. Too many "words" at Yalta and at Potsdam have been distorted out of all pretense of integrity. We shall not ignore reality. We do not intend to be at anybody's mercy; nor do we intend to emasculate our authority with those who may still think in terms of force. But we will joyfully match the utmost limits of mutual disarmament to which other Titans will dependably agree, if there be disciplines which guarantee against bad faith; and we will speed the day when such a boon shall deal war its deadliest blow. I repeat, however, that this cannot happen either in ambush or on a one-way street.

Our American proposals regarding atomic bombs illustrate my point. With an investment of $3,000,000,000,000 in this supreme destroyer of all time, and with a monopoly upon its sinister secret for some years to come, we offer not only to abandon our dominant advantage but also to join in outlawing its destructive use by anybody, any time, anywhere on earth. And what is our price? Just this—an effective system of continuous inspection and control which makes certain that no international brigand shall hereafter break faith with us and with the world! The price is simply protection against treachery! But it is a fixed price, Mr. Chairman, and the price must be paid. We ask nothing for ourselves. We ask everything for peace. I submit, sir, that never has there been a comparable example of national good will, nor one so thrillingly dramatizing the purpose of a great people to live and let live on a peaceful earth, if we are allowed to do so. . . .

By way of another example [of economic factors], I believe we shall continue the device of reciprocal trade agreements, in one form or another, to release and expand mutual trade—an even greater need for us than for any other country because our vastly expanded national economy and employment require it. Whether this can continue on its present multilateral basis will depend somewhat upon the type of competition we confront from foreign State monopolies and from a growing habit abroad of making bilateral agreements for political as well as economic purposes. . . .
Here [in the first five peace treaties], again, is an unmistakable cue to our international disposition ever to recognize the rights of little States as well as big. Here also is a cue to what seems to be our improved relations with the Soviet Union—as a result, I believe, of our present rugged policy of firm but friendly candor which I hope has permanently established the American doctrine that there are deadlines in our ideals from which we shall never again retreat. . . .

All occupying powers should recognize the independence of Austria and withdraw their troops. In Germany, retarded by Russian and French refusals to fulfill the Potsdam requirement that the four zones of German occupation should operate as an economic unit, the German situation has suffered such economic deterioration as to threaten chaos and disaster. We have partially met this worsening crisis by unifying the American and British zones—with an invitation to the French and Russians to join us at their option. This is a hopeful pattern. Meanwhile the business of renewed decentralized political autonomy—looking toward federated States which shall be the masters and not the servants of a new Berlin—makes encouraging progress in the American zone. But the pressing need is a plan for total peace—a plan which omits no possible precautions against recurrent Hitlerism, yet which offers some reward other than eternal degradation to new German states when they faithfully strive toward democratic self-redemption. The important thing for the world to know is that we intend to remain in occupation until this job is done. . . .

The Secretary [Mr. Stettinius, on May 15, 1945] said of the proposed [Pan-American] Conference that “it would be another important step in carrying forward the good neighbor policy.” If he was right—and I think he was—this long failure to hold the Conference has had the opposite effect. I am well aware of the reasons for delay. I entirely sympathize with the anxiety to purge the Americas of their last vestige of Naziism. But I think that, under half a dozen solemn Pan-American Treaties to which we are a party, this is a multilateral decision which should always be made by all of us jointly and not influenced or dictated by us alone. In some aspects it can be said that we have been proceeding jointly. But I think it is past time to hold the Pan-American Conference which we promised in 1945, and there to formally renew the joint New World authority which is the genius of our New World unity. There is too much evidence that we are drifting apart—and that a Communist upsurge is moving in. We face no greater need than to restore the warmth of New World unity which reached an all-time high at San Francisco. . . .

While recognizing the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, we have—through a year’s mission headed by our distinguished General Marshall—been impartially urging that it produce unity with a rival armed party, the Chinese Communists. Under the determined leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, a National Assembly has just produced a new Constitution and the government has been reorganized with a coalition of non-Communist parties. We can hope that this Nanking Charter, with its first,
great national election promised before next Christmas, will weld together a strong and competent China. It is my own view that our own Far Eastern policy might well now shift its emphasis. While still recommending unity, it might well encourage those who have so heroically set their feet upon this road, and discourage those who make the road precarious.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

After World War I scores of books appeared on the peace treaties and on the League of Nations, but relatively little was written on the general problem of the reconstruction and recovery from the war. Of interest in this field are *The World After the Peace Conference* (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1926) by Arnold J. Toynbee, certain chapters in *The Aftermath* (Scribners, 1929) by Winston Churchill, and the *Survey of International Affairs 1920-23* (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1925) also by Arnold J. Toynbee, the first volume of the excellent series brought out under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. An indication of the first steps in world reorganization after World War II may be found in *The United Nations* (Farrar, Strauss, 1946) by Louis Dolivet.

On the matter of power politics in general one of the best analyses is to be found in Chapter VII of Frederick L. Schuman’s *International Politics* (McGraw-Hill, 1941). The relations of the great powers are ably set forth in *The Super-Powers* (Harcourt, Brace, 1944) by William T. R. Fox, and in his lecture on the same subject in *A Foreign Policy for the United States* (University of Chicago Press, 1947) edited by Quincy Wright. For a good review of the historical relations of the United States and Russia one should refer to *The Road to Teheran* (Princeton University Press, 1944) by Foster Rhea Dulles; and for the more recent relations of the two countries there is an excellent study by Harold H. Fisher, *America and Russia in the World Community* (Claremont College, 1946).

Several worth-while volumes on American foreign policy
have come out in recent years, particularly *U.S. Foreign Policy* (Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1943) and *U.S. War Aims* (Little, Brown, 1944) by Walter Lippmann, and *The Road to Foreign Policy* (Doubleday, Doran, 1944) by Hugh Gibson. Of special interest because of his peculiar experience are the two surveys of international affairs, including United States policy, by Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (Harpers, 1944) and *Where Are We Heading?* (Harpers, 1946). Much valuable material has appeared recently also in recent numbers of the quarterly *Foreign Affairs*, and in publications of the Foreign Policy Association. The texts of official addresses and statements on American foreign policy are almost always to be found in the weekly *Bulletin* of the Department of State.